themselves and of others and their judgments of the opportunities and the responsibilities of life are shaped, to an extent, by the existence of such groups and their membership of them. It may be meaningful to claim that the views regarding national self-determination apply only to a populated world like ours. One may point to different principles that would apply in a world with unoccupied fertile lands. Such speculation is unprofitable but it may serve to highlight some of the reasons for the principles that apply in our condition. To speculate concerning a reality different from ours in its basic social and moral constitution is pointless in a deeper way. Such social facts are constitutive of morality. Their absence undermines morality's very foundations. We could say that under such changed conditions people will have normative beliefs and will be guided by different values. But they are not ones for which we can claim any validity.

2. This qualification is to take account of the fact that, according to doctrines of limited government, certain matters are outside the realm of politics, and no political action regarding them may be undertaken.

3. Among the exceptions to this rule are the slowly growing importance of international, especially regional, associations such as the European Community, the growth of a doctrine of sovereignty limited by respect for fundamental human rights, and the continuing (usually thinly veiled) claims of some states that they are not bound by the international law regarding the sovereignty of others.

4. The fiction-reading public can take the character of a literary work with maximal recognition as part of its identity. The importance of 'acceptability' in such groups has often been noted and analyzed.

5. This is not meant to suggest that there are not often drawbacks to self-rule. They will be considered below.

If the committee is to make dedications, this Article would be for Salman Rushdie, who a few months ago celebrated his one-thousandth day in hiding in Britain under police protection from the sentence of death passed upon him in Tehran in 1988. I want to begin with an extended quotation from an essay entitled In Good Faith, which Rushdie wrote in 1990 in defense of his controversial book The Satanic Verses.

If the Satanic Verses is anything, it is a migrant's view of the world. It is written from the very experience of uprooting, dislocation and metamorphosis (slow or rapid, painful or pleasant) that is the migrant condition, and from which, I believe, can be derived a metaphor for all humanity.

Standing at the center of the novel is a group of characters (most of whom are British Muslims, or not particularly religious persons of Muslim background), struggling with but the sort of great problems that have arisen to surround the book - problems of hybridization, and globalization, of reconciling the old and the new. Those who oppose the novel most vociferously today are of the opinion that intercultural with a different culture will inevitably weaken and ruin their own. I am of the opposite opinion. The Satanic Verses celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It refutes in itsationalization and the abstraction of the Pure, and it is a triumph of that is done not mixing across the world. It is the great possibility that mass migration gives the world, and I have tried to embrace it. The Satanic Verses is for change-by-creation, change-by-contagion. It is a love-song to our mongrel selves.

I was born an Indian, and not only an Indian, but a Bombayite-Bombay, most hybrid, most cosmopolitan, most hybrid, most hybrid, most hybrid. My writing and thought have therefore been as deeply influenced by Hindu myths and attitudes as
The Cosmopolitan Alternative

If I knew what the term meant, I would say it was a 'postmodern' vision of the self. But, as I do not, let me just call it 'cosmopolitan', although this term is not supposed to indicate that the practitioner of the ethos in question is necessarily an emigrant (like Rushdie), a perpetual refugee (like, for example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau), or a frequent flyer (like myself). The cosmopolitan may live all his life in one city and maintain the same citizenship throughout. But he refuses to think of himself as defined by his location or his ancestry or his citizenship or his language. Though he may live in San Francisco and be of Irish ancestry, he does not take his identity to be compromised when he learns Spanish, eats Chinese, wears clothes made in Korea, listens to jazz by Herbie Mann, and reads Ukrainian politics, and practices Buddhist meditation techniques. He is a creature of modernity, conscious or living in a mixed-up world and having a mixed-up self.

I want to use the opportunity provided by Rushdie's sketch of such a life to challenge the claims that are made by modern communutarians about the need people have for involvement in the substantive life of a particular community as a source of meaning, integrity, and character. One of the things that we are going to find, as we proceed with this exploration, is the importance of pressing the communautarian meaning of the term 'community'. Many of us have been puzzled and frustrated by the absence of a clear understanding of this concept in some of the assertions made by communautarians like Alasdair Macintyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer. I do not mean the absence of a precise definition. I mean the absence of any settled sense about the scope and scale of the social entity that they have in mind.

When they say that the modern individual is a creation of community, or that each of us owes a identity to the community in which she is brought up, or that our choices necessarily are framed in the context of a community, or that we must not think of ourselves as holding rights against the community, or that communities must have boundaries, or that justice is fidelity to shared understandings within a community, it is hard to define what kind of entity we are talking about. Is 'community' supposed to denote something as small as a neighborhood, or social relations that can sustain gendered-type solidarity and face-to-face friendships? What is the relation between the community and the political system? Is 'community' supposed to do work comparable to 'civil society', picking out the social infrastructure of whatever state or political entity we are talking about? As John Dunn recently has argued, the concept of the state no longer picks out a natural kind, denoting as it does political entities as small as Fiji and as large as the United States, as tight as Singapore and as loose as the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.), is there any sense in...
supposing that for every state there is just one community or society to which individuals owe their being and allegiance.

Should we even suppose that communities are not bigger than what we are a product of a community, is that heritage limited to national boundaries, or is it wide (as wide as possible) as the language, literature, and civilization that sustain us? Are we talking about particular communities, or the levels of self-contained ethnic groups, or are we talking about the communal culture and civilization that makes it possible for a New Zealander trained at Oxford to write for a symposium in the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform?

I suspect that the popularity of modern communautarians has depended on not giving unequivocal answers to these questions. I suspect that it depends on using premises that evoke community on one scale (usually) large to support conclusions requiring allegiance to community on quite a different scale (usually small).

For the purposes of this Article, I want to single out one meaning of the term “community,” a meaning that is at the core of the broader meaning of “communal.”

It is “community” in the sense of ethnic community: a particular people, sharing a heritage, a culture, and a way of life that is in some real or imagined sense transnational, being referred back to a shared history and shared provenance or homeland. This is the sense of “community” implicated in nineteenth-century nationalism. I shall use “community” in this sense as a sort of counterpoint to my exploration of Rudolph’s cosmopolitan ideal. I want to play down the communal critique of the cosmopolitan ideal of life to something like the claim, made by the German historian Johann Gottfried von Herder, that, in (Isis) Berlin’s paraphrase, “among elementary human needs—such as food, shelter, security, procreation, communication—belonging to a particular group, united by some common links—especially language, collective memories, continuous life upon the same soil,” and perhaps “race, blood, religion, a sense of common mission, and the like.”

Some will protest that it is unfair to pin matters down in this way. Michael Sandel, they say, is not Johann Gottfried von Herder. But the aim is not to underestimate the subtlety of any particular philosopher’s position. From time to time, it is important for us not only to read the ordinary ambiguous literature of communautarians, but also to see how much substance there would be in a different and particular claim were taken one by one, and their proponents were forced to abandon any reliance on community or civilization. In the end, that is the best way to evaluate the average of different meanings that are evolved in this literature. This Article is certainly not a complete evaluation of that task, but it is intended as a substantial beginning.
3. A Thin Theory of the Good

So there are two visions to be considered—the cosmopolitan vision indicated by Salman Rushdie and the vision of belonging and immersing in the life and culture of a particular community expressed by the proponents of Article 27.

It is important to see that these are not merely different lifestyles of the sort that old-fashioned liberalism could comfortably accommodate in a pluralistic world—some like democracies, some like open, some like Catholics, some are Methodists—that sort of thing. Instead, we are talking as I indicated earlier about the background view of life, agency, and responsibility that is presupposed already by any account of what it is for lifestyles to be diverse or for diversity to be tolerated.

This contrast between lifestyle and background assumptions is worth exploring a little further. Any political theory, including a theory of federal or liberal neutrality, must be predicated on some view of what human life is like. This a true even if it is only what philosophers call a "thin" theory—namely, a theory giving us the bare framework for conceptualizing choice and agency but leaving the specific content of choices to be filled in by individuals. We need a thin theory to tell us what goods should be at stake in a theory of justice, what liberties and rights are going to be called for, and more broadly, what the substantial confines of human lives can be expected to be so that we can have some sense of how everything will fit together. For example, a liberal theory of rights needs to be able to say what religious choices and matters of conscience are very important to people (and so worthy of special protection) without begging any questions about what the content of those choices should be. A thin theory is also necessary in order to work out a subject-matter for a theory of justice. What is at stake distributionally, for example, is whether we are interested in the just distribution of happiness, the just distribution of material resources, or the just distribution of human abilities and capacities.

Each society must have some conception at this level, no matter what plurality it envisages on some other level.

Above all, we need a thin theory of choice, responsibility, and agency that we can say something about the shape of individual lives in relation to matters like society, community, politics, and justice. We need to have some skeletal sense of how things are so fitted together. Are we envisaging society of individuals in some strong sense, or a community of people bound together in some organic common life? Are we envisaging a society of equals, so that each person's claims against others are to be matched by others' reciprocal claims against him? Or are we envisaging a hierarchically oriented functionality towards some non-cosmopolitan end?

4. Opposition and Authenticity

We cannot make any progress at all in political philosophy unless we tie ourselves down to some extent here. Certainly a liberal theory of neutrality that purports to be neutral about everything in this area quickly falls apart into utter incoherence. Critics of liberalism are fond of uncovering the assumptions made at this level, as if that were a way of discounting the neutrality of the liberal ideal. But every political theory must take some stand on what authentic human agency is like and how that relates to the fact of cosmopolitanism and communautarian account of human life and activities—are not merely disagreements at the level of competing lifestyles. They are not to be thought of as liberal failures who have already settled the broad terms and conceptions of their association. They are tensions at a deep philosophical level.
eat to be rich and creative, and with no more unhappiness than one expects to find anywhere in human existence. Immediately, one argument for the protection of minority cultures is undercut. It can no longer be said that all people need their own culture to maintain a happy existence, and the heritage their ancestors treasured by the way they needed food, clothing, and shelter. People used to think they needed red meat in their diet. It turns out not to be true; vegetarian alternatives are available. Now some still prefer an omnivorous diet, it is too long ago for them to give up the way of life they were trained to live in childhood. The same—if the cosmopolitan alternative can be sustained—is true for immersion in the culture of a particular community. Such immersion may be something that particular people like and enjoy. But they no longer need it that it is something that they need.

Of course, it does not follow from this that we are entitled to cherish and destroy minority cultures. But the collapse of the Herderian argument based on the fact that we need seriously undercuts any claim that minority cultures might have to special support or assistance or to extraordinary protection or forbearance. At best, it leaves the right to cultural freedom up to the same footing as the right to religious freedom. We no longer think it true that everyone needs some religious faith or that everyone must be sustained in the faith in which he was brought up. A secular lifestyle is evidently viable, as is conversion from one church to another. Few would think it right to try to suppress religious belief in consequence of these possibilities. But equally, few would think it right to subordinate religious sects merely in order to preserve them. If a particular church is dying out because its members are drifting away, no longer convinced by its theology or attracted by its ceremonies, that is just the way of the world. It is like the death of a fashion or a hobby, not the demise of anything that people really need.

So the very existence and viability of the cosmopolitan alternative is enough to undercut an important part of the case for the preservation of minority cultures. Sometimes the cosmopolitan argument goes further. The stronger claim that Salaman Rushdie suggests, with the hybrid lifestyle of the true cosmopolitan is in fact the only appropriate response to the modern world we live in. We live in a world formed by technology and trade, by economic, political, and cultural imperialism and their offspring, by mass migration and the dispersal of cultural influences. In this context, to immerse oneself in the traditional practices of one's own culture might be a fascinating anthropological experiment, but it involves an artificial dislocation from what is going on in the world. That it is an artificial dislocation is evidenced by the fact that such immersion often requires special subsidies and extraordinary concessions by those who live in the real world, where cultures and practices are not so sealed off from one another. The charge, in other words, is one of insularity.

Let me state it provocatively. From a cosmopolitan point of view, immersion in the traditions of a particular community in the modern world is like living in Disneyland and thinking that one's surroundings epitomize what it is for a culture to really exist. Worse still, it is like demanding the funds to live in Disneyland and the protection of modern society for the boundaries of Disneyland, while still managing to convince oneself that what happens inside Disneyland all there is to an adequate and fulfilling life. It is like thinking that what every person most deeply needs is for one of the Magic Kingdoms to provide a framework for his choices and his beliefs, completely neglecting the fact that the framework of Disneyland depends on commitments, structures, and infrastructures that far outweigh the character of any particular facade. It is to imagine that one could belong to Disneyland while professing complete indifference towards, or even disdain for, Los Angeles.

That is the case from one side. Suppose, on the other hand, that we accept what defenders of minority culture offer— that there is a universal human need for rootedness in the life of a particular community and that this communal belonging confers character and depth on our choices and our actions. Then the freedom that Rushdie claims looks deviant and marginal, an odd or eccentric exercise of license rather than a consummation of human liberty. It is sometimes said that claims of freedom must be made with respect to actions that make sense and that unilaterally rather than hostility is the first obstacle to tolerance. If anything like this is true, then the more credence we give to the cosmopolitan thesis, the less intelligible the claim to cosmopolitan freedom becomes.

From the point of view of communities, the cosmopolitan freedom, that Rushdie offers—the freedom to renounce his heritage and just play with it, merging it with imagery and movies and jokes and obscenities—is like the freedom offered by any other oddball: the freedom to sail the Atlantic in a bathtub or the freedom to steer one's way through a bewildering series of marriages and divorces. Those who leap from one community to another, merging their roots and never settling down into any stable practices and traditions may, like the bathtub sailor or the matrimonial admiral, excite our sneaking admiration. But when things go wrong for them, our pitying response will be, "Well, what did you expect?"

A moment ago, we considered the view that immersion in the life of a minority culture is like living in Disneyland and that it is an insular world of avoiding the complex actualities of the world as it is. But the charge of insularity is likely to be returned with interest by the proponents of minority culture. From their point of view, it is the Rushian life of shifting
7. Our Debt to Global Community

One advantage of our focus on the cosmopolitan visitor is that it focuses us to think a little more grandly about the scale on which community and friendship are available for the constitution of the individual and the maintenance of community and friendship. Talk of community in the metaphysical sense plucked of belonging, is, as I have said, apt to evoke images of small-scale community, neighborhood, or intimacy—the aboriginal hunting band, the Arizona city-state, or the Mayan dynasty in a Germanic village.

Think literally, however, of the real communities to which many of us owe our allegiance and in which we pursue our values and live large parts of our lives: the international community of scholars (defined in terms of some shared specialization), the scientific community, the human rights community, the artistic community, the feminist movement, what's left of the international avant-garde, and so on. These structures of action and interaction, dependence and interdependence, effortlessly transcend national and ethnic boundaries and allow men and women the opportunity to pursue common and important projects under conditions of goodwill, cooperation, and exchange throughout the world. Of course, one should not project too sly a picture of this interaction. Such groupings exhibit rivalry, suspicion, and divisive controversy as well, but no more than any common enterprise and certainly no more than the gossip or backbiting one finds in small communities. Indeed, it is a community on the global scale which is the modern realization of Aristotelian friendship—equals who are good at orienting themselves in common to the pursuit of virtue. This form of community is quite missed by those who lament the loss of our friendship in modern life.

Once we recognize this, the simple Herderian pattern of the constitution of an individual through his belonging to a homogeneous group begins to decline.
of their culture to fellow citizens who do not necessarily share their ethnic allegiance. They may worry for the days of their own self-sufficiency, the days when the question of sharing their lands with anyone else simply did not arise. They have that in common. I think, with Norwegian individuals who worry for the days when the individual person was not subject to the mercy of the community and did not owe so much to the state, and who resent the processes that have brought them to this point. 

Yet here we are all set. Our lives, our practices, whether individual or communal, are in fact no longer self-sufficient. We may pretend to be self-sufficient atoms, and behave as we are supposed to behave in the fantasies of individualistic economics; but the pretense easily exposes itself as the reality of our communal life. And similarly—though we may despair ourselves in the divisive consequences of our ethnic heritage and increase ourselves in an environment designed to minimize our sense of relation to the outside world—no honest account of our being will be complete without an account of our dependence on larger social and political structures that goes far beyond the particular community with which we pretend to identify ourselves.

If this is true of the relation of indigenous minorities to the larger state, it applies also to the relation of particular cultures and nations in the world order as a whole. The point is evident enough from the solemn articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which claims the integrity of indigenous cultures as a matter of human rights. One hardly can maintain that immersion in a particular community is all that people need in the way of connection with others when the very form in which that claim is couched—the twenty-seventh article of a successor of human rights charters administered and supported by international agencies from Ottawa to Geneva—indicates an organized social contract that already takes us far beyond a specific nation, community, or ethnicity. The point is not that we should all therefore abandon our tribal allegiances and realign ourselves under the flag of the United Nations. The theoretical point is that it belies the particularities of a particular community to snatch at and to disparage those whose cosmopolitan commitments make possible the lives that they are trying to lead. The activity of these international organizations does not happen by magic; it presupposes large numbers of men and women who are prepared to devote themselves to issues of human and communal values as general and who are prepared to pursue that commitment in abstraction from the details of their own particular heritage.

So far I have developed the instrumental role of Taylor's argument; but as individuals need communal structures in order to develop and express the capacity that their rights protect, no minority communities need large political and international structures to protect and to sustain the cultural goods that they pursue. But Taylor's critique of individualism also goes deeper than this. The very idea of individuality and autonomy, he argues, is a socialartifact, a way of thinking and managing the self that is sustained in particular social and historical contexts. I am sure that he is right about that. But we must not assume, simply because individuality is an artifact, that the social structures that are said to produce it are necessarily natural. Certainly there is nothing natural about communia- tion, ethnic, or national ideas. The idea of a small-scale national community is as much a product (and indeed a quite recent product) of civilization, growing and flourishing as the convergence of a number of disparate currents under particular conditions in a particular era, as is the idea of the autonomous individual. 

Certainly, ethnic nationality is an idea which postulates or dreams its own naturalness, its own singularity, its own immaterial cultivation of a certain path of soul. Each national community, in Benedict Anderson's phrase, is rooted in something that can be traced to the misery of man, the need to do something to keep oneself together, as the natural units of mankind, in the heyday of ascetic philosophy. The claim that we always have belonged to specific, defined, and culturally homogenous peoples—the staple claim of modern nationalism—needs to be treated with the same caution as individualist fantasies about the state of nature: useful, perhaps, as a hypothesis for some theoretical purpose, but entirely misleading for others.

B. Kymlicka's View of the Social World

A. The Importance of Cultural Membership

In all of this, the cosmopolitan strategy is not to deny the role of culture in the constitution of human life, but to recognize, first, the assumption that the social world divides up neatly into particular distinct cultures, ones to every community, and, secondly, the assumption that what everyone needs is just one of these cultures—a specific, coherent culture to give shape and meaning to his life.

That assumption, I am afraid, pervades Will Kymlicka's recent book on community and culture, and it is to his argument that I now want to turn. Kymlicka's aim is to show that liberal theorists, such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, have underestimated radically the importance of culture as a primary good for the self-constitution of individual lives. He wants to fill this gap and to enlist liberal theories in the cause of the preservation of minority cultures.

Thus, Kymlicka's starting point is not so much the Herderian urge to
belong, but a Russian conviction about the importance to people of the freedom to form, reform, and revise their individual beliefs about what makes life worth living. To suit that freedom, one needs a certain amount of self-respect, and one needs the familiar protections, guarantors, opportunities, and access to the means of life—all the things that figure already on Rawls’s list of the primary goods to be governed by a theory of justice. In order to make the case that culture is also one of these primary goods, Kymlicka argues that people cannot choose a conception of the good for themselves in isolation, but that they need a clear sense of an established range of options to choose from.

In deciding how to lead our lives, we do not start de novo, but rather we choose to define ideals and forms of life that have been developed and tested by uncountable individuals, sometimes for generations. The decisions about how to lead our lives must ultimately be our own alone, but this decision is always a matter of selecting what we believe to be most valuable from the various options available, selecting from a context of choice which provides us with different ways of life. Kymlicka elaborates the point by insisting that what we choose among are not ways of life understood simply as different physical patterns of behavior.

The physical movements only have meaning to us because they are identified as having significance by our culture, because they fit into some pattern of actions which is culturally recognized as a way of leading one’s life. We learn about these patterns of activity through our presence in stories we’ve heard about the lives, not of imaginary, others. We decide how to lead our lives by imitating, selecting, in these cultural narratives, by adopting roles that have struck us as worthwhile ones, as east work living (which may, of course, include the roles we were brought up to occupy). What follows from this? Kymlicka asks.

Liberals should be concerned with the loss of cultural structures, not because they have some moral status of their own, but because it’s only through having a robust, secure cultural structure that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligently assess their value.

On the face of it, the argument is a convincing one. Of course, choice takes place in a cultural context, among options that have culturally defined meanings. But in developing his case, Kymlicka is guilty of something like the fallacy of composition. From the fact that each option must have a cultural meaning, it does not follow that there must be one cultural framework in which all available options are assigned a meaning. Meaningful options may come to us as t lnerts or fragments from a variety of cultural sources. Maybe that is true, for Kymlicka is moving too quickly when he says that each item is given to

significance by some entity called ‘our culture,’ and he is not entitled to infer that from that there are things called ‘cultural structures’ whose integrity must be guaranteed in order for people to have meaningful choices. His argument shows that people need cultural materials; it does not show that what people need is ‘a rich and secure cultural structure.’ It shows the importance of access to a variety of stories and roles; but it does not, as he claims, show the importance of something called membership in a culture.

Kymlicka’s claim about the difference between physically and culturally defined options was an echo of an argument made earlier by Alasdair MacIntyre, and it may reinforce my point to discuss that argument as well. According to MacIntyre, we exist in a human society with one or more imputed characters—in which we have been drafted—and we have to learn what they are in order to be able to understand how others respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to be constructed. It is through hearing stories about walled stepmothers, lost children, good but misguided kings, wolves that tadde two boys, young sons who receive no inheritance but must make their own way in the world and elud sons who waste their inheritance on frivolous living and go into exile to live with the wise, that children learn of the moral world, what a child and what a parent is, what the cast of characters may be in the drama into which they have been born and what the ways of the world are. Depive children of stories and you leave them untaught, anxious5 in their actions as in their words.

Again, it is important to see that these are heterogeneous characters drawn from a variety of disparate cultural sources: from first-century Palestine, from the heritage of Germanic folklore, and from the mythology of the Roman Republic. They do not come from some thing called ‘the structure of our culture.’ They are familiar to us because of the immense variety of cultural materials, various in their provenance as well as their character, that are in fact available to us. But neither their familiarity nor their availability constitute them as part of a single cultural matrix. Indeed, if we were to insist that they are all part of the same matrix because they are all available to us, we would violate the individuality of cultures beyond any sociological interest. Any array of materials would count as part of a single culture whenever they were familiar to one and the same person. It would then be logically impossible for an individual to have access to more than one cultural framework.

Someone may object to the picture of cultural heterogeneity I am painting: Doesn’t each item take its full character from the integrity of the surrounding cultural context, so that it is a distortion to isolate it from that context and impose it with disparate materials? Maybe that is true, for certain purposes. If we were making an anthropological study of each item,
we would want to explore the detail of its context and provenance, we would look at the tale of the prodigal son in the context of Arawak storytelling, and we would confine the children lost in the wood to the Germanic villages from which the Grimm brothers drew their collection of folklore. But that is absurd as an account of how cultural materials enter into the lives and choices of ordinary people. For that purpose, the materials are simply available, from all corners of the world, as more or less meaningful fragments, images, and shapes of stories. Their significance for each person consists in large part in the countess occasions on which they have been (from the anthropological priest's point of view) retrieved and misapplied, woven into a wider context and juxtaposed to other fragments, which they may have very little in common with. Since this is the reason for the fact that cultural meanings enter people's lives, Salman Rushdie's depiction of a life lived in the shadow of Hindu gods, Muslim film stars, Kipling, Christ, Nabokov, and the Mahabharata is at least as authentic as Kymlicka's realism on the purity of a particular cultural heritage. If all this is correct, then membership in a particular community, defined by its identification with a single cultural frame or matrix, has none of the importance that Kymlicka claims it does. We need cultural meanings, but we no longer need homogenous cultural frameworks. We need to understand the options that we are given in the contexts in which we make sense, but we do not need any single context to structure all our choices. To put it crudely, we need culture, but we do not need cultural identity. Since none of us needs a homogenous cultural framework or the integrity of a particular set of meanings, none of us needs to be immersed in one of the small-scale communities that, according to Kymlicka and others, are alone capable of securing this integrity and homogeneity. Some, but still perhaps such minorities and welcome the social substitution of their preference. But if it is not, as Kymlicka maintained, a necessary presupposition of rational and meaningful choice.

B. Evaluation and Cultural Security

In addition to the claim (which I have just criticized) that each person needs to be a member of a particular cultural community, Kymlicka also argues that each person needs some assurance of the security of the cultural framework or frameworks from which she makes her choices. This seems to me a self-defeating claim. Kymlicka's liberal individual is supposed to be making not just a choice, but an evaluation. Which of the roles presented to me by the cultural material at hand is a good role or an attractive one (for me)? New evaluations in a practical and, in part, a comparative manner. I choose role A because it accepts a better way of living and relating to others than role B. It is difficult to see how one can make these comparisons without the ability to take a role, defined by a given culture, and compare it with what one might term another way of doing roughly the same thing of sort. For example, a traditional culture may define the role of male elder, a patriarchal position of cultural power, as a source of authority and the embodiment of tradition. Is this something for a young man to aspire to? One thing he may want to know is that the political of patriarchal authority have, in almost all other social contexts, come under fierce challenge, and that people have developed other means of authoritative governance that do not embody male power and fatherhood in the same way. But to the extent that our young man can know this, he is not choosing from a cultural framework which is secure, in Kymlicka's sense. He only can make his choice a genuine evaluation to the extent that the culture he is scrutinizing is vulnerable to challenge and comparison from outside. Unless the culture is vulnerable to his evaluation (and other evaluations like it), his evaluation will have no practical effect; and unless it has been vulnerable in this way in the past, he will have no basis for an informed and sensible choice.

To preserve a culture—to insist that it must be secure, some what may—is to isolate it from the very forces and tendencies that allow it to operate in a context of genuine choice. How does one tell, for example, whether the gender roles defined in a given culture structure have value? One way is to see whether the culture endures and collapse as a way of life in a world once different ways of doing things are perceived. The possibility of the erosion of allegiance, or of the need to compromise a culture beyond all recognition in order to retain allegiance and present mass exodus, is the key to cultural security. It is what cultures do, under pressure, as contexts of genuine choice. But if that is so, we cannot guarantee at the same time the integrity of a given community and say that its culture (or the fate of its culture) can tell people about the value and viability of this particular way of life. Either people learn about value from the dynamics of their culture and its interactions with others or their culture can operate for them at most as a museum display on which they can pride themselves. There is, I suppose, nothing wrong with such a selective nostalgic pride, but it certainly should not be confused with genuine choice and evaluation. To confer meaning on one's life is to take risks with one's culture, and these are risks that vary those whose interest is the preservation of some sort of cultural purity.
9. The Cosmopolitan Self

I have argued that the "Cosmopolitization" of identity that Salaman Roudaite elaborated in the passage with which we began has none of the insubstantiality that the cosmopolitan critique tends to suggest. I think it may well be richer, more diverse, and more substantial than the response to the world in which we live than a retreat into the confined sphere of a particular community.

But what becomes of the self in the cosmopolitan picture? This is the final question that I want to consider. If we live in the cosmopolitan world, do we live our allegiances from here, there, and everywhere. But of cultures come into our lives from different sources, and there is no guarantee that they will fit together. At least if a person draws his identity, as Kymlicka suggests, from a single culture, he will obtain for himself a certain degree of coherence or integrity. The coherence which makes his particular community a single cultural entity will confer a corresponding degree of integrity on the individual self that is constituted under its sources. By contrast, the self constituted under the auspices of a multiplicity of cultures might seem to be as confused, even schizophrenic.

The point is an important one. The cosmopolitan, as we have seen, is not in the business of deciding that people are formed by attachments and involvements, by culture and community. She acknowledges it, and she acknowledges it as much as much for the cosmopolitan's comfort. For she shows how each person has or can have a variety, a multiplicity of different and perhaps disparate communal allegiances. Such identities, as the cosmopolitan individual has therefore requires management: Cultural structures cannot provide that management for her because the many of them are implicated in her identity, and they are too differently shaped.

The trouble is, if we talk too much about management, we fall into the trap of postulating the existence of a managerial entity, an agent existing in distinction from each of the disparate elements that together constitute the person in question. We have to postulate the 'I', the true self, who contemplates the whole in order. But who or what is this entity? How does it make its decisions? How does it know what sort of order to maintain?

One dominant theme in recent communitarian writing has been a critique of this picture of the independent self—the cosmopolitan manager, standing back a little from each of the items on the smorgasbord of its personality. In order to manage the disparate commitments, to see that they fit with one another, and to evaluate each item and compare it with others on the cultural menu, the self would have to be an entirely separate entity, with no content or commitments of its own. Michael Sandel quite properly has raised the question whether this is really the way that we want to view our personality and our character.

[We cannot regard ourselves as independent in this way without great cost to those loyalties and convictions whose moral force comes partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are—members of the family or community or nation as people, as bearers of this history, as sons and daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic. Allegiances such as these are more than values I happen to have or am exposed to at a given time.]

To imagine a person incapable of cohesive attachments such as this is not to conceive an ideal free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without character, without moral depth. For to have character is to know that I know in a history I neither summon nor command, which carries consequences none the less for my choices and conduct.\(^{66}\) Sandel's critique seems to present the defender of cosmopolitanism with an unhappy dilemma. Either he must endorse the ethical self of liberal deontology—the self that chooses but is not identified with any of its choices; or he must admit that the self can have a substantial character of its own, a character essential to its identity. If he chooses the former, he gives a wholly unrealistic account of choice, for on what basis can this person choose if it is has no values, commitments, or projects of its own? If, on the other hand, he opts for the picture of a self with a substantial essence in order to avoid the imputed shallowness of the former conception, then cosmopolitanism begins to look unsatisfactory. For now the self must have more that cultural characteristics in all their plurality and variety.
but a distinct character, and it has not been proven that the concept of engaging with the world can provide that.

To avoid this dilemma, we should go back and question the foundations and assumptions about identity that are presupposed and critique. So long as we think that the management of self is like the governmental governance of a community or a corporation, we will be driven to an embarrassing question about the specific character of the self as its own manager. But perhaps we think instead about personal identity, not in terms of hierarchical management, but in terms of the self-directed or self-sustaining. Perhaps the self is not something that is a product of processes and inclusions, but rather the governance of the self is not the more or less comfortable set or more or less comfortable view of these elements. The threat, of course, is that we will neglect one or the other, but that may be better understood as rational choice or dominance rather than mere quantification plurality. An image that may help is that of the self as a group of friends living and working together. Each friend has a character of its own, and strength and weakness of her own, and they differ, but they are good friends, and his friends may be the key to their associations and to their ability to work and develop different projects and enterprises. No one would have friendship be obtained only if one were the only friend or the only friend is recognized as being in charge or only to the extent that all parties are agree on the specific conditions for cooperation or charity. Friendship does not work like that, nor do we think that the internal policy of the self. There may be, in addition, a fundamental agreement within the self (as indeed there are among friend) all of us have the most culturally and psychologically secure, have the experience of inner conflict. But from distracting from the self's integrity, the possibility of such conflicts, and the safety and openness of self that are possible, too important to be healthy personality. It may be that the idea of diversity of character—Randhale's meaning or her approach—that makes it possible for each of us to respond to a multi-dimensional world in new and creative ways.

These are perhaps speculations, and they need to be matched more closely to the empirical psychology of personality. However, I hope that they indicate how misleading it may be to seek a picture of human life or action as the cosmopolitan vision that I have outlined. To the extent that personality and character is not a single thing. The oppositions and diversity of the cosmopolitan way of life may well hold more for a key to understanding the role of the individual and society in a new world and the assumption of that new role, and the character of the new world, with a simple and established cultural role.
community. I hope that, at any rate, the vision of cosmopolitanism developed here can provide the basis of an alternative way of thinking— one that embraces the aspects of modernity with which we all have to live and which comes the diversity and mixture that for most people is their destiny, whatever the cosmopolitanisms say.

Notes


6. See ibid. at 42.

7. See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, 191 (1985) (referring to a claim of equality in which government is neutral as to 'goodness' since each person conception of what gives value to life differs).

8. Rawls, supra note 4, at 408.

9. Mackie presents a less rigid conception of a liberal life.

People differ radically about the kinds of lives that they choose to pursue. Even though putting it is misleading: in general people do not and cannot make a general choice of total life style: they choose successively in various spheres successively to meet these not once and for all.


The autonomous person is part author of his life. The image this metaphor is more accurate in the sense that one of the recognized, complete persons who decides what giving is to have and spend it according to his own account. ... (Discerning) an effort to impose any special theory on one's life. The fundamental nature of this is a divine and heteronomous picture. A person who is frequently changed but can be as autonomous as one who never changes is the adult temperament.

Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 370-7 (1988). There is a strong temptation in traditional liberalism to take the form of an Aristotelian teleology, teleological and methodological to the purposes of liberalism: instead of a single conception of the good life, authoritatively enunciated by Aristotle...

Nietzsche, Ethics, 283 (bk. X, ch. 7) (David Ross trans., 1954), there are many more conceptions, and each person should be free to choose one. With Rawls and Mackie, I think that the freedom of the modern self is less constrained than that: it is the freedom to make a variety of choices, not the freedom to choose just one out of a number of ethical conceptions.

10. Nietzsche now endorses this position.

11. But for the enforcement of knowledge it may be of more value not to reduce oneself to uniformity in this way, but to lean instead to the gentle voice of each of life's different situations—these will suggest the amount of mind appropriate to them. Through that striving towards ensnaring oneself as a single rigid and unchanging individual man has an intelligent interest in the life and being of many others.


11. The cosmopolitan would have in mind includes, most prominently, Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (2d ed. 1984); Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982); Charles Taylor, "Aristotelianism", in Philosophical Papers: Philosophy and the Human Sciences, 187 (1989); and Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (1983); see also the extracts collected in Liberalism and Its Critics (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984).

12. See supra note 11.


16. Taylor, supra note 11, at 165.


18. Walter, supra note 11, at 313.


22. Anderson, supra note 21, quite rightly, that 'imagined' does not imply 'fabricated'. Ibid., at 15.

