

POWER-SHARING OR PARTITION?

History's lessons for keeping the peace in
Bosnia¹

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Ten years after the Dayton accords, Bosnia's political status remains in doubt. Supreme authority still rests in the hands of an unelected international official. Security is still ensured by international peacekeepers. And Bosnia's two main political entities – a Serb Republic and a Muslim-Croat Federation – still disagree about whether or not they should be merged into one. This limbo status is untenable for a variety of reasons, including wanting international will for the high costs of sustaining Bosnia as a protectorate, the EU's ongoing accession process, and the impending consideration of final status for neighboring Kosovo.

The fundamental question has remained the same ever since Yugoslavia began to disintegrate in the early 1990s: can and should Bosnia be forged into a unitary state – and if so on what terms – or should it be partitioned along ethnic lines, with Serb areas possibly joining neighboring Serbia? I have detailed elsewhere how this question originally plunged Bosnia into war in 1992.² Serbs inside and outside the republic declared in 1991 that they would not peacefully accept Bosnia's secession from Yugoslavia unless it first were divided into autonomous ethnic cantons. By contrast, Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, who together represented a majority of the population, favored a unitary state (though for some Croats in Herzegovina this was merely instrumental to a longer-term plan to unite with neighboring Croatia). The European Community's representative, Jose Cutileiro, initially embraced the Serb view as the best hope of avoiding violence. He declared that the EC would withhold recognition of Bosnia's independence until all sides accepted his plan to divide Bosnia into ethnic cantons, thereby briefly persuading the Muslims and Croats to accept. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic was ecstatic and proclaimed "a great day for Bosnia."³ The United States, however, opposed this approach and convinced the EC in March 1992 to join in pledging to recognize Bosnia the following month even without cantonization, whereupon the Muslims and Croats abandoned the agreement. In April 1992, the EC and United States did recognize a

unitary independent Bosnia, and the Serbs responded with a brutal offensive that captured and ethnically cleansed two-thirds of Bosnia's territory within weeks, establishing a de facto ethnic partition (except for a few Muslim enclaves in Serb-controlled, eastern Bosnia).

A similar debate about ethnic partition helps explain why this bloody war persisted for three and a half years. Once fighting started, Bosnia's Serbs insisted that for security purposes the ethnic division that they still demanded would now have to include a single contiguous Serb territory. By contrast, Western diplomats during the first year of war advocated the Vance-Owen plan, which harked back to Curtiliero's patchwork cantonization that was now unacceptable to the Serbs. Only when international mediators acquiesced to the Serb insistence on contiguous territory, in the Owen-Stoltenberg plan of summer 1993 and the Contact Group plan of the following summer, did negotiated agreement even become a possibility. But the Serbs still resisted for two years because these proposals would have required them to surrender 30 percent of the territory they controlled. Only when they lost that territory militarily in the summer of 1995 — as a result of the United States forging a Muslim-Croat alliance, strengthening it by overlooking violations of the UN arms embargo, and then leading NATO bombing of Serb military targets — did the Serbs agree to negotiate peace.

The Dayton accords intentionally left unresolved the question of Bosnia's ultimate political status in order to facilitate achievement of at least temporary peace. During the negotiations, the Serbs continued to insist on ethnic division, while the Muslims demanded a unitary state. To appease each, U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke included both concepts in the accords — a militarily and politically autonomous Serb republic within a unitary Bosnian state — even though these represented two fundamentally incompatible visions for Bosnia's future. Ever since, the international community has tilted to one side, utilizing carrots and sticks in an attempt to persuade the Serbs to accept a unitary Bosnia — but to little avail.

The ambiguity of the Dayton accords may have been essential to ending Bosnia's war, but that uncertainty has now become a liability. Final status must be addressed, and it is a decision that could have great consequence for the welfare and security of Bosnia and the wider Balkans. The optimal answer rests in part on the particularities of the region, such as its recent history of warfare, the unresolved status of Kosovo, a still fragile peace in Macedonia, Montenegro's recent divorce from Serbia, and nascent secessionist movements in parts of Serbia including Vojvodina, the Presevo Valley, and the Sandzak (shared with Montenegro). But insight also can be gained by looking at the worldwide record since World War II of attempts to share power following ethnic civil war. Such an analysis reveals how rarely and under what special conditions these efforts have succeeded, which suggests that current international efforts in Bosnia are flawed and should be adjusted.

The next section of this chapter reviews the academic debate on the fea-

ibility of power-sharing versus partition after ethnic civil war. The following section examines the six successful cases of such power-sharing since 1945, detailing why all but one provide little optimism for Bosnia. The subsequent section explains why a host of other allegedly successful cases do not actually qualify as power-sharing resolution of ethnic civil war, at least not yet, and therefore offer no model for such a solution. The concluding section draws lessons from this historical overview to formulate a prescription for consolidating peace in Bosnia.

The Humpty Dumpty theory of ethnic conflict

The academic literature contains two perspectives on the ability of ethnic groups to share political power after fighting a civil war against each other. One view contends that ethnic groups — as opposed to ideological adversaries — cannot return to living under common political authority after civil war because of a lingering “security dilemma” that has prevented any successful instance of such power-sharing. The alternate view claims that power-sharing is no more difficult after an ethnic civil war than an ideological one, and that it actually happens quite regularly. My own recent research, and that of others, suggests the truth lies in between. Power-sharing after ethnic civil war is indeed much harder, although not impossible, which has provided lessons for Bosnia that have been largely ignored.

Most famously pessimistic, Chaim Kaufmann has argued that once ethnic civil wars reach a threshold level of violence, opposing ethnic groups lose the ability to live peacefully intermingled under a common political authority. The root cause, he argues, is a security dilemma between individuals of opposing ethnic groups, exacerbated by the war. Following a peace agreement, if members of these groups find themselves living side-by-side, absent the clear ethnic power hierarchy that results from one side's victory, they inevitably will lash out against each other — in self-defense, if not in anger — thereby re-igniting the civil war.⁴ Kaufmann argues that such security dilemmas are much worse following ethnic civil wars, because identities cannot be hidden or changed as they can after ideological civil wars. He concludes that this security dilemma, and therefore ethnic civil wars, can be ended in only three ways:

- 1 military victory by one side to establish a clear ethnic hierarchy;
- 2 suppression of the conflict by a third-party military occupation; or
- 3 physical separation of ethnic groups into defensible enclaves.

To put it crudely, because of the persistent security dilemma following ethnic civil wars, a multi-ethnic Humpty-Dumpty cannot be put back together again. Kaufmann thus offers a radical prescription to the international community: not only should it stop seeking power-sharing agreements to resolve violent ethnic conflicts, it should instead facilitate population exchanges to achieve ethnic separation, as a means to lasting peace.

Kaufmann defends his theory based on the ostensible universe of "ethnic civil wars resolved from 1944–1994," derived from databases assembled by Ted Robert Gurr.⁵ Of the twenty-seven wars he says were completed during this period, twelve ended by military victory, five by *de facto* or *de jure* partition, two by outside military occupation, and eight by negotiated agreements other than partition. On initial inspection, the last eight appear at odds with Kaufmann's theory, because they are peace settlements achieved without partition. Kaufmann, however, argues that all eight of these settlements depended on grants of full or partial autonomy to a regionally concentrated ethnic group, so that — like partition — they are essentially based on physical separation of ethnic groups. As he writes:

The data supports the argument that separation of groups is the key to ending ethnic civil wars. Every case in which the state was preserved by agreement involved a regionally concentrated minority, and in every case the solution reinforced the ethnic role in politics by allowing the regional minority group to control its own destiny through regional autonomy for the areas where it forms a majority of the population. There is not a single case where non-ethnic civil politics were created or restored by reconstruction of ethnic identities, power-sharing coalitions, or state-building.⁶

By contrast, T. David Mason and Patrick J. Fett find that ethnic civil wars are no less likely than ideological ones to end by negotiated power-sharing. Drawing on the Correlates of War database (see www.correlatesofwar.org), they examine all civil wars settled during 1945–1992, a period almost identical to that of Kaufmann. They find that 26 percent of ethnic civil wars ended by such agreement, even higher than (and statistically indistinguishable from) the 21 percent of ideological civil wars they say ended in this manner. As they observe: "The finding of no relationship between the ethnic basis of the conflict and the likelihood of a settlement is . . . at odds with most of the literature."⁷

Comparison of the studies reveals several reasons for this discrepancy.⁸ First, the two rely on remarkably different databases of "all" ethnic civil wars since World War II (see Table 2.1). Although each database contains roughly the same number of cases (twenty-seven and twenty-eight), only six civil wars are found in both. Thus, each database excludes at least three-quarters of the other's cases. Additional differences in operational definitions — most fundamentally, whether negotiated agreements that provide for some degree of regional autonomy should be categorized as "power-sharing" or "ethnic separation" — also contribute to the divergent conclusions. Finally, some of the apparent discrepancy results from both studies rhetorically exaggerating the significance of their statistical findings. For example, Kaufmann highlights that all negotiated settlements involved regionally concentrated ethnic groups as evidence that *de facto* partition promotes peace, but even if his statistics were accurate — which is

Table 2.1 Little overlap in two databases of "all" resolved ethnic civil wars^a

State	Ethnic group	Mason-Fett	Kaufmann	Overlapping cases
Angola	Ovimbundu	1975–1991		
Azerbaijan	Armenians		1988–	
Bangladesh	Chittagong		1975–1989	
Burma	Karens		1945–	
Burundi	Hutu	1972		
Burundi	Hutu	1988		
Chad	Various	1980–1988		
China	Tibetans	1950–1951		
China	Tibetans	1956–1959		
China	Uighurs, etc.		1959–1989	1 case for each
Ethiopia	Tigreans/Eritreans	1974–1991		2 cases for Kaufmann
Georgia	Abkhazians		1961–1991	
India	Nagas		1992–1993	
India	Tripuras		1952–1975	
India	Hyderabadis	1948		
India-Hyderabad	Achinese	1953		
Indonesia	Indonesians		1975–1980s	
Indonesia	Papuan		1964–1986	
Indonesia	Timorese	1975–1977		1 case for each
Indonesia	Timorese		1974–1980s	
Iran	Kurds		1945–1980s	
Iraq	Kurds	1959, 1961–1975		2 cases for Mason-Fett
Iraq	Shiites		1960–	
Israel	Palestinians		1991	
Jordan	Palestinians	1970		
Lebanon	Various	1958		
Lebanon	Various		1975–1990	
Liberia	Various	1989–1992		
Mozambique	Ndar/Shona	1979–1992		
Nicaragua	Miskitos		1981–1988	
Nigeria	Ibo	1967–1970		
Nigeria	Maitatsine	1980–1984		1 case for each
Pakistan	Bengalis	1971		
Pakistan	Baluchis	1973–1977		
Papua New Guinea	Bougainville		1988	
Philippines	Moros		1972–1987	
Rwanda	Tutsi	1963–1964		
Rwanda	Tutsi		1990–1994	
Rwanda	Northern clans		1988–	
Somalia	Basques		1959–1980s	
Spain	JVP ^b	1971		
Sri Lanka	Various	1963–1972		
Sudan	Baganda	1966		
Uganda	Various	1980–1988		
USSR	Lithuanians		1945–1952	
USSR	Ukrainians		1944–1950s	
Western Sahara	Saharawi	1975–1983		
Zaire	Katangans	1960–1965		
Zimbabwe	Blacks	1972–1979		

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Notes

a Kaufmann's database spans 1944–1994; Mason and Fett's 1945–1992.
b JVP was in reality neither an ethnic, religious nor other identity group.

debatable, as elaborated below – his inference ignores the fact that such regional concentration has failed to avert the outbreak of violence in the first place.

More recent research by Rothchild, Hartzell, Hoddie, and Lake suggests the truth lies somewhere in between. Though not impossible, ethnic civil war is indeed more difficult to resolve by negotiated agreement than its ideological variant.⁹ Moreover, negotiated settlements of ethnic civil war are less likely to relapse into war if they rely on regional autonomy or partition rather than centralized power-sharing. A 1999 study by the first two authors found that peace agreements after ethnic civil wars were 40 percent less stable than after ideological ones, and that regional autonomy provided more stability than power-sharing such as federalism.¹⁰ More recently, Hartzell and Hoddie have found that among civil wars ended by negotiation, ethnic wars were a remarkable four-to-five times more likely to resume.¹¹ A study by the first three authors also found that partition provided longer peace than other settlements. This implies that ethnic civil wars settled by power-sharing are the most prone to fail.¹² Moreover, Lake and Rothchild find that regional autonomy can only serve as an interim solution, because it inevitably devolves toward either hard partition or re-centralization of authority. As they write, "We find no evidence of successful institutionalization of [territorial power-sharing] provisions in a post-war constitutional order."¹³ Thus, the only long-term alternative to partition appears to be centralized power-sharing, but as noted above agreements based on such power-sharing are the most prone to failure. What remains unclear are the long-term prospects for peace achieved initially by regional autonomy that is later eroded through re-centralization – a pattern that is common according to Lake and Rothchild, and which is currently being pursued by the international community in Bosnia.¹⁴

The finding that partition reduces the likelihood of renewed civil war between ethnic groups is hardly surprising. Few would dispute that physically separating two groups reduces the security dilemma between them and the opportunities for friction to flare into violence. Rather, the questions about partition have always been three:

- 1 Is partition the only feasible negotiated solution to ethnic civil war?
- 2 If not, do the benefits of partition outweigh the human costs of organized population transfers?
- 3 Does partition increase the likelihood of violent conflict within each of the separated groups?

The primary theoretical shortcoming in Kaufmann's work is his assumption that each ethnic group is monolithic, at least during and after inter-ethnic civil war. In reality, ethnic groups have internal divisions, even during violent conflict against other groups, which has two important implications. First, it is precisely such intra-ethnic divisions, which Kaufmann assumes away, that can facilitate the inter-ethnic power-sharing accords that Kaufmann says are impossible. As

Barak illustrates in the case of Lebanon in 1989, power-sharing sometimes requires that factions of opposing ethnic groups realize they have a common interest against factions within their own ethnic groups.¹⁵ Second, according to Licklider and Atlas, the hidden divides within ostensibly monolithic ethnic groups explain why settlements of ethnic civil war often fail to hold. The cause of renewed war, they say, is "often a breakdown in relations among former allies, not former foes."¹⁶

These dynamics suggest several important caveats to Kaufmann's prescription for the international community to promote partition as a means of resolving ethnic war. First, partition may obstruct some paths to peace that rely on alliances of factions within opposing ethnic groups. Second, partition may give rise to violence within one or more of the separated ethnic groups. Finally, partition itself often requires the use of force and invariably rips many people from their homes.

Despite these potential downsides of partition – the forceful dislocation of peoples, obstruction of moderate inter-ethnic alliances, and fostering of new conflicts within separated groups – partition may be the lesser evil in cases where it can end otherwise insoluble, ethnic violence. To figure out when to apply this draconian prescription requires further research into the determinants of success for partition, power-sharing, and hybrid solutions such as regional autonomy, as well as the costs and risks of each. In the absence of such data, it is irresponsible to tout any solution – whether partition or power-sharing – as a silver bullet to resolve all ethnic conflict. But as a first step it is useful to explore if, and under what conditions, power-sharing has ever succeeded at ending ethnic civil war.

Ethnic civil wars are rarely resolved by power-sharing

Since World War II, only six ethnic civil wars have been resolved by power-sharing agreement: Lebanon-1958, Sudan-1972, Zimbabwe-1979, Mozambique-1992, South Africa-1994 and Guatemala-1996. Other apparent success stories can be rejected on at least one of the five following grounds:

- 1 *Regional autonomy.* As Kaufmann argues, a negotiated agreement based on substantial regional autonomy may be tantamount to partition, relying on a division rather than a sharing of power. To be consistent with his theory, however, such a settlement must include defensible borders and regional control over security forces – otherwise peace relies at least partly on power-sharing.
- 2 *Peace enforcement.* If outside forces ensure order after the signing of a power-sharing accord, peace can be attributed to enforcement rather than power-sharing.¹⁷ In such cases, the true test of power-sharing is whether peace persists after withdrawal of outside forces.
- 3 *Disguised victory.* If the side that is losing a civil war signs a power-sharing

agreement, the peace may be attributable to negotiated surrender, rather than power-sharing.¹⁸ In such a case, the test is whether the stronger side actually shares any significant power during implementation of the agreement.

4 *Non-ethnic.* If a civil war divides members of at least one of the contending ethnic groups, the war may be ideological rather than ethnic, in which case its resolution by power-sharing does not contradict Kaufmann's theory. However, some intra-group conflict occurs in all ethnic civil wars, so the determining factor is whether the main schism in the war runs between or across ethnic groups.¹⁹

5 *Pause in fighting.* If civil war resumes after a brief period of post-war sharing of power, the original war may never actually have been resolved. A reasonable test is whether such peace lasts five years – a respite difficult to reconcile with Kaufmann's theory. Moreover, if renewed war involves different combatants from the original, it would not necessarily vitiate the success of power-sharing in resolving the initial conflict.²⁰

The six cases of power-sharing resolution of ethnic civil war that satisfy all these tests are detailed below and summarized in Table 2.2. This is followed by a brief explanation of why other putative cases do not qualify.

Lebanon-1958

Lebanon's 1958 civil war arose when the country's pro-West, Christian-led government was opposed by a coalition of Arab nationalists, Muslim militants, and Christian political challengers to the president. The country quickly divided along sectarian lines, however, and violence occurred between rather than within sectarian groups. After an estimated 1,300 to 2,500 deaths, an agreement resumed power-sharing between Lebanon's three primary groups – Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shiite Muslims. The Sunni were not regionally concentrated, and the agreement did not involve regional autonomy but rather a consociational sharing of central authority. Although U.S. troops intervened for three months, they did not engage the combatants, and there was no other outside peace enforcement.²¹ The agreement did not represent the surrender of any group, because each retained its pre-war share of political power: as before, the president would be Christian, the prime minister Sunni, and the speaker of parliament Shiite. The president had a veto, could dissolve parliament, and could fire or appoint the premier, who had the power to form a cabinet but only with the support of parliament, which had seats reserved 6:5 in favor of the Christians (based roughly on the 1932 census). In addition, civil service posts and budgetary allocations were doled out by quota.²²

There are two grounds on which this case could be questioned as power-sharing resolution of ethnic civil war: (1) whether the fighting actually was ethnic; and (2) whether peace was more than just a pause in fighting. Ideological

Table 2.2 Six cases qualify as power-sharing resolution of ethnic civil war

State	Year	Regional autonomy?	Peace enforcement?	Disguised victory?	Non-ethnic war?	Just a pause in war?
Lebanon	1958	No. Sunni not concentrated	No. Only 3-month U.S. intervention	No. Returned to consociational power-sharing	No. Despite ideological tension (pro-Arab vs. pro-West), fighting was inter-ethnic	No. After 17 years, new war triggered by Palestinians, not original combatants
Sudan	1972	No. Autonomy did not include autonomous security forces or defensible border	No	No	No	No. After 11 years, new war spurred by power struggle within north, not insecurity
Zimbabwe	1979	No	No. Only 3-month, British-led monitoring force	No. Whites guaranteed parliamentary seats, pensions, payment for land	No	No. Although after 20 years, land seizures caused partial white exodus
Mozambique	1992	No	No	No	No. Though partly ideological, the sides divided mainly along ethnic lines	No resumption yet
South Africa	1994	No autonomous security forces or defensible borders in constitution	No	No. Whites retain economic dominance	No. Tri-ethnic: White, Zulu, Xhosa	No resumption yet
Guatemala	1996	No	No	No. Both sides made major concessions	No. Started as ideological, but became ethnic, even verging on genocidal	No resumption yet

factors, including pan-Arabism that was fed in 1958 by the temporary unification of Egypt and Syria and revolution in Iraq, helped motivate the outbreak of fighting and the subsequent intervention. Accordingly, the war is often characterized as an Arab nationalist revolt against a pro-West regime.²³ But as Cobban observes: "In Beirut, the city was divided along largely sectarian lines, with the Sunni-dominated areas held by the rebels and the Christian-dominated areas in the hands of the loyalists." She adds that by September 1958, "which saw many of the bloodiest incidents . . . many regions of the country became polarized along sectarian lines."²⁴ Likewise, Meo writes, "the great majority of Muslims, who constituted almost half of the population, sympathized with and supported the objectives of the revolution. The other half of the population, the Christians, however, were overwhelmingly in favor of the regime."²⁵ Salibi similarly explains, "the insurrection had spread to nearly all Moslem and Druze districts," driven by a combination of pan-Arabism and Muslim resentment of perceived Christian advantage, both inflamed by political aspirants.²⁶ Attié's recent study also notes the "predominance of the confessional nature of the Lebanese crisis," and reports that "the divisions were almost totally along sectarian lines."²⁷ As in virtually all ethnic wars, a fraction of each group, notably in the elite, crossed over to ally with another for ideological, political or personal reasons, but this does not invalidate the main sectarian divide.

Peace from renewed power-sharing was only temporary, but it did endure for a remarkable seventeen years in a region of intense instability. Moreover, the eventual breakdown of peace resulted mainly from an exogenous factor — Palestinian refugees armed by external supporters — rather than a security dilemma between the parties of the original war. As Seaver writes about the renewal of war in 1975: "Although both the Maronite leaders . . . and the Sunni oligarchs . . . agreed that the Sunni-Maronite ruling formula should not be altered, the Palestinian issue ultimately proved fatally divisive."²⁸ Kaufmann's exclusion of the case from his database cannot be justified by the relatively low level of deaths, because his database includes ethnic conflicts with even lower totals: Nicaragua-Miskitos from 1981 to 1988; Spain-Basques from 1959 to 1980s; and Bougainville-Papua in 1988.²⁹

Sudan-1972

Following a nine-year civil war that entailed a quarter-million battlefield deaths, Sudan's 1972 agreement brought more than a decade of peace between northern Arabs and southern Christians and animists — until another civil war broke out in 1983. This peace cannot be rejected as a mere pause in fighting, not only because of its duration but because the second war arose from the north's internal politics rather than an unresolved security dilemma with the south.³⁰ The agreement did grant a degree of regional autonomy and thus might be dismissed by Kaufmann as *de facto* partition. But the agreement did not establish a defensible border or full regional control over security forces, two factors he insists are

essential to resolving an ethnic civil war by partition. Thus, his theory cannot account for how this ethnic civil war was resolved for eleven years by power-sharing.

Zimbabwe-1979

The civil war in Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) from 1972 to 1979 pitted the ruling white minority against a coalition of black rebels, resulting in 12,000 battle deaths. A power-sharing agreement, including integration of the opposing armed forces, was signed in late 1979, after both sides faced a series of sticks and carrots from external supporters.³¹ The white minority government agreed to accept black majority rule, and in turn the blacks agreed to reserve white seats in parliament for seven years, honor pension obligations to white officials, and not seize white lands without payment. In the first years after the agreement, the black coalition splintered along ethnic lines, as Matabele supporters of Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU party were marginalized by Robert Mugabe's Shona-dominated, ruling ZANU party. In 1982, frustrated Matabele rebels began to seize white lands. Remarkably, Mugabe's black government did not acquiesce to the seizures, but rather fought a war against its erstwhile black allies in order to defend the rights of its erstwhile white enemies. The government successfully quashed the Matabele insurgency by 1987, thereby sustaining the core of the original black-white, power-sharing agreement.³²

The case stands up to all five potential objections as a successful resolution of ethnic civil war through power-sharing. The agreement did not grant regional autonomy. The British-led monitoring force had neither the size nor the mandate to conduct enforcement and withdrew within three months.³³ The agreement did not disguise a victory by the blacks because the whites were nowhere near defeat on the battlefield and the power-sharing agreement was fully implemented after the war, preserving white economic dominance for many years. The conflict clearly was ethnic, as the main divide was black-white. Admittedly, the black rebel coalition during the war masked an internal black divide, but ethnic wars typically subsume temporarily other societal divides. Though low-level violence resumed shortly after the peace agreement, it was a struggle for power among blacks, not resumption of the original ethnic war. The most remarkable fact about Zimbabwe was noted aptly two decades after the peace agreement: "There has been no renewed violence between whites and blacks to date."³⁴ A few years later, economic failure and Mugabe's faltering political support led to a temporary renewal of violent seizures of white farms, which triggered some white emigration.³⁵ But even if this low-level violence represented the partial demise of the 1979 agreement, it would not invalidate twenty years of peaceful power-sharing.

Mozambique-1992

Mozambique's thirteen-year civil war, entailing 200,000 battlefield deaths, is often coded as ideological because it pitted the communist FRELIMO government against RENAMO rebels supported by anti-communist Rhodesia and South Africa. But RENAMO drew its leadership from the Ndau people in the geographic center of the state, while the FRELIMO government was led and supported mostly by ethnic groups in the south. Some observers such as Michel Callen emphasize that RENAMO never relied exclusively on one ethnic group nor received unanimous support from any ethnic group and did receive external support, concluding that, "while ethnic factors were undoubtedly a factor in the war, it cannot be defined as an interethnic conflict."³⁶ By contrast many others, including Mason and Felt, code the war as ethnic. Labels aside, it is indisputable that opposing ethnic groups killed each other for years, leading to sharp polarization of identity. Thus, according to Kaufmann's theory, the groups should not have been able to achieve peace by sharing central authority. Yet, that is precisely what they have done for more than a dozen years since the 1992 peace agreement.

South Africa-1994

The 1948 Apartheid racial discrimination policy of South Africa's white government spawned an armed black opposition, eventually spiraling into a civil war starting in the late-1980s that killed thousands. In the early-1990s, spurred partly by the white business community, South African president F. W. de Klerk initiated negotiations that led to an agreement to share power through democratic elections in 1994.³⁷ The war clearly was ethnic, involving three main factions: white government security forces, Zulu warriors of the Inkatha Freedom Party, and the mainly Xhosa fighters of the African National Congress.³⁸ Although a 1993 draft constitution granted limited regional autonomy to nine provinces, it never envisioned autonomous provincial security forces guarding defensible borders. Moreover, the final 1996 constitution scaled back even this limited autonomy.³⁹ The peace did not represent a disguised victory, because no side was defeated on the battlefield, and all sides ultimately made significant compromises: whites surrendered control of the government, the ANC permitted continued white economic dominance, and the Zulu accepted less than full autonomy for KwaZulu-Natal province. No outside peacekeepers were deployed. Though low-level political violence persists between Zulu and ANC supporters, and high crime rates have spurred some white emigration, ethnic civil war was ended by power-sharing and has not recurred for more than a decade.⁴⁰

Guatemala-1996

Although Guatemala's civil war began in 1960 as an ideological struggle, it evolved by 1980 into an ethnic war pitting the ruling minority elite of European heritage versus the majority, indigenous Mayan populace who fueled a rebel movement. Peaking in intensity from 1981 to 1983, army violence killed an estimated 200,000 Mayans during the war, but failed to defeat the rebels. Accordingly, the two sides turned to negotiations and in late 1996 signed a multifaceted peace deal, agreeing to end the war, disarm the rebels, halt army human rights abuses, ensure equality for the indigenous, and share power over the whole territory in a unitary democracy.⁴¹ The agreement was not a disguised victory because the government was forced to make major concessions before the rebels would agree to peace. The agreement did not grant regional autonomy, nor did it rely on outside military intervention. Although implementation has been slow and bumpy, especially during a conservative regime from 1999 to 2003, progress is substantial. The rebels have demobilized; the army has downsized; armed patrols have been reduced; free and fair elections have been held; refugees have returned; and discrimination has been outlawed. Most important, as a 2003 UN report noted, "The armed conflict has definitively ended, as has the state policy of human rights abuses that characterized the conflict."⁴² Though work remains, the implementation of power-sharing is exemplified by the fact that both candidates in the December 2003 presidential run-off election called for helping the indigenous.⁴³ Even more remarkable, although the more conservative candidate won, he appointed to his cabinet the Nobel Prize-winning indigenous activist Rigoberto Menchu to oversee implementation of the agreement.⁴⁴ The genocidal violence of Guatemala's ethnic civil war is exactly the kind that Kaufmann says should prevent power-sharing agreements of the type that has successfully kept the peace in Guatemala for more than nine years.

Disqualified cases

Other apparent power-sharing settlements of ethnic civil war cannot be coded as such because they fail one or more of the above tests (as summarized in Table 2.3). For example, the Philippines is disqualified on two grounds: de facto partition and continued violence. In 1996, the Catholic-dominated government gave substantial autonomy to the Moro, a group of Muslims concentrated in southern islands, permitting them to maintain a security force of 20,000. The main rebel group has honored the cease-fire, but a splinter organization fights on.⁴⁵

Three other cases fail because of the presence of occupation forces, indicating that peace may stem from enforcement rather than power-sharing. In Northern Ireland, 12,000 British forces were still committed to peacekeeping six years after the 1998 Good Friday agreement.⁴⁶ In Tajikistan, some 15,000-25,000 Russian troops have been present since its 1997 peace agreement.⁴⁷ In Lebanon, until recently, at least 15,000 Syrian troops remained after

Table 2.3 Disqualified cases fail at least one test of power-sharing resolution of ethnic civil war

<i>State</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Regional autonomy?</i>	<i>Peace enforcement?</i>	<i>Disguised victory?</i>	<i>Just a pause in war?</i>	<i>Never a "war?"</i>
India (Nagaland)	1972		Yes. 200,000 Indian troops	Yes. Nagas generally consider the agreement a surrender	Yes. Low-level violence continues	
Spain (Basqueland)	1980				Yes. Violence continues at historic, low level	Yes. Fewer than 800 killed in 35 years
Nicaragua (Miskito areas)	1987					Yes. Only a few hundred killed
India (Tripura)	1988	Yes			Yes. India did not implement agreement. Violence continues	
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	1988				Yes. Violence continued for at least a decade. Now a new agreement, but too soon to tell	
Lebanon	1989		Yes. 15,000 or more Syrian troops until 2005 withdrawal. Unknown if peace will survive their departure			
Georgia (S. Ossetia)	1992	Yes, though without formal agreement	Yes. Russian troops			
Israel (Palestine)	1993				Yes. Violence continues	
Georgia (Abkhazia)	1994	Yes, though without formal agreement	Yes. Russian troops			
Bosnia	1995	Yes, though being eroded	Yes. 7,000 peacekeepers remain			
Croatia (E. Slavonia)	1995			Yes		
Mali	1995					Yes. Fewer than 1,000 killed in five years of conflict
Philippines	1996	Yes, including for 20,000 local forces			Yes. Violence continues	
Tajikistan	1997		Yes. 15,000–25,000 Russian troops			
Bangladesh (Chittagong)	1997				Yes. Government has not implemented agreement. New violence in 2003	
N. Ireland (UK)	1998		Yes. British troops still deployed			

the power-sharing 1989 Taif agreement ended that country's second civil war.⁴⁸ It is too soon to tell whether Lebanon's peace will survive the April 2005 departure of those troops.

Another three cases are disqualified because of both an occupying force and *de facto* partition. In Bosnia, 7,000 peacekeepers remained nine years after the Dayton accords, which granted significant autonomy (including military) to each of Bosnia's two entities.⁴⁹ Likewise, two civil wars in Georgia's secessionist republics of the early 1990s, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, were halted by occupying Russian troops and local autonomy, though without final peace agreements to formalize these arrangements.⁵⁰

Another recent case of ostensibly negotiated peace is actually a disguised victory. In late 1995, Yugoslav authorities agreed to end hostilities and give back to Croatia control of the Eastern Slavonia region captured four years earlier. They did so, however, only after Croatia forcibly took back other Serb-held regions in Croatia and Bosnia and appeared poised to do the same to Eastern Slavonia. By settling this matter through negotiation rather than war, Belgrade managed to avoid the near total Serb out-migration that occurred in regions re-taken forcibly by Croatia, and thus enabled 80 percent of Serbs to remain after the peaceful handover.⁵¹ But the result is Croatian control, not power-sharing.

Bangladesh cannot be counted, even though violence has subsided, because its power-sharing agreement has not been implemented. In 1997, the government agreed to settle its two-decade war against rebels of the Chittagong hill tribes — which had left thousands dead — by granting limited autonomy and reversing a Bengali land-settlement program that had displaced additional tens of thousands of tribal people. The agreement qualifies as power-sharing because the pledged autonomy is extremely limited and makes no provision for autonomous tribal security forces or a defensible internal border. But the government has failed to implement most of the agreement, especially since the 2001 election of the BNP party that had opposed it. Not only has the government refused to facilitate return of displaced tribal people, it continues to subsidize Bengali settlers. Moreover, violence erupted anew in 2003, displacing 1,500 tribal people.⁵² Full-blown civil war has yet to renew, but the case cannot be coded as successful resolution of ethnic war through power-sharing until calm is restored and the government substantially implements the agreement.

Yet another intriguing case satisfies all the tests for power-sharing settlement of ethnic civil war — except the death toll was so low that the conflict may not qualify as war. From 1990–1995, Mali's army fought a counter-insurgency against northern Tuareg rebels. The violence clearly had an ethnic character, as Tuareg spearheaded the rebellion and were singled out for retaliation by the government (though other northern minorities initially supported the rebels). The peace agreement did not represent a negotiated surrender because both sides realized that victory was impossible and accordingly made significant concessions: the government sharply increased spending in the north, marginally

expanded autonomy, and integrated some former rebels into the army and civil service, while the Tuareg abandoned their goal of independence, demobilized, and turned over 3,000 weapons. The grant of autonomy was not tantamount to partition because the Tuareg gave up autonomous security forces. Nor did any third-party occupation enforce peace. Initial grassroots opposition to power-sharing on both sides was mitigated by widespread reconciliation efforts by the army and communal groups.⁵³ Peace was not merely a pause in fighting because it persists a decade later.⁵⁴ The only question is whether the fighting ever escalated sufficiently to qualify as war. Death estimates for the entire five-year conflict run only between 500 and 1,000 — below the threshold for war in most operational definitions.⁵⁵

To Kaufmann's credit, none of the eight settlements he attributes to regional autonomy actually qualifies as power-sharing. But one case comes close and most of the other wars never actually ended at all. For example, the conflict between India and its Naga minority persists at a low level despite the enforcement efforts of 200,000 Indian troops among the 3.5 million populace of Nagaland, because many Nagas reject the 1972 agreement as a surrender.⁵⁶ Likewise India's war against its Tripuri insurgency persists after India's perceived failure to implement a 1988 autonomy agreement.⁵⁷ Until a 2006 ceasefire, Spain's battle against Basque separatists persisted at its historic, extremely low level (800 killed in thirty-five years) despite a 1980 autonomy agreement.⁵⁸ Israel's struggle against the Palestinians continues after collapse of the 1993 Oslo peace accords. Also, as noted above, autonomy agreements have failed to settle the Philippines' struggle against the Moro, or Bangladesh's versus the Chittagong tribes, while Georgia's war against secessionist Abkhazia is frozen by the intervention of Russian troops. The case in Kaufmann's database that comes closest to power-sharing is the 1987 peace agreement between Nicaragua's government and its Miskito Indian minority. Though the state nominally granted autonomy, actual local authority has remained so limited that the Miskitos protested in 2000 by boycotting elections. Power thus remains centrally shared, yet peace has prevailed for more than seventeen years. As in Mali, however, the death toll in the original conflict was so low (a few hundred Miskito deaths) that it probably should not be counted as civil war.⁵⁹ Finally, Papua New Guinea's war against Bougainville rebels, which Kaufmann coded as a victory for the state in 1988, actually persisted for at least another decade. A recent autonomy agreement has halted fighting, but it is too soon to know whether peace will hold.⁶⁰

Lessons for Bosnia

Even the six cases of "successful" power-sharing after ethnic civil war, described above, provide little optimism for long-term peace in a unitary Bosnia. Lebanon's 1958 settlement overcame a much smaller challenge because the death toll had been only two percent of that in Bosnia, and still the settlement did not prevent war from resuming seventeen years later (albeit for different

reasons). Sudan's 1972 agreement broke down after eleven years, leading to a second, even bloodier civil war that lasted more than two decades. Zimbabwe's 1979 inter-racial peace agreement was quickly followed by factional war among the blacks, and the agreement itself began to unravel after twenty years, prompting an exodus of the white minority. In Mozambique peace has held, but the preceding war was not driven by the kind of ethnic fears that permeated Bosnia, so power-sharing was easier. South Africa's death toll was less than 10 percent of that in Bosnia, diluted across a longer time and over a larger population, and the iconic Nelson Mandela promoted compromise — distinctive factors that may account for the success of power-sharing. Only Guatemala's 1996 peace agreement represents successful centralized power-sharing after extremely violent ethnic civil war. But this single analogy, where peace has lasted for less than a decade, is a weak reed on which to hang policy towards Bosnia.

Despite this dearth of historical precedent, the international community has increasingly pursued power-sharing, and opposed partition, in implementing Dayton. The accords themselves, in Annex 4, established a new constitution for Bosnia with a high-degree of regional autonomy, granting the Serb Republic control of its own armed forces, police, tax code, education system, parliament, and political institutions, with very little authority centralized at the Bosnian state level.⁶¹ Over the last five years, however, incentives from the European Union, NATO, and the United States — and unilateral acts by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) — have coerced or imposed centralization. The Federalation half of Bosnia has welcomed aspects of centralization, but until recently progress has been hampered by broad political opposition from Bosnia's Serb Republic.

The European Union, since the late 1990s, has dangled the economic carrot of accession via its "stabilization and association process," attempting to coerce Bosnia into increasingly intrusive reforms including the strengthening of the central state at the expense of the regional autonomy codified by Dayton. Laying the groundwork in May 1999, the Council of Europe established thirteen requirements for Bosnia to join its organization. Next, in May 2000, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) — a Dayton-mandated board of foreign officials convened twice a year to oversee the agreement — established eighteen conditions for Bosnia to meet before the EU would even conduct a feasibility study on membership. These included establishment of state-level institutions — a treasury, an institute of standards, and a common passport — and the removal of trade barriers between the two entities. When the EU study was finally completed, in November 2003, it ruled that accession negotiations should not begin until the achievement of sixteen conditions, including further reduction of regional autonomy by strengthening the state-level judiciary and budget, creating a single economic space, and integrating the state's energy market.⁶² NATO added to the pressure by requiring Bosnia to unify its military authority in order to qualify for the Partnership for Peace program, a prerequisite for membership in the alliance.⁶³ Washington likewise attempted to foster centralization in late

2004, by banning members of the Serb Republic's separatist Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) from entering the United States.⁶⁴

Only Bosnia's Muslims and Croats support centralization, consistent with their longstanding advocacy of a unitary Bosnia that effectively could be controlled by their combined majority. Indeed, in June 2003, the Muslim and Croat members of Bosnia's presidency embraced two changes to the Dayton constitution that were high on the international agenda: establishment of a unified military command; and elimination of the ethnic veto in parliament over legislation perceived to threaten a group's interest. The Serb Republic explicitly rejected such centralization as "a return to the past" — a haunting reminder that this same controversy originally sparked Bosnia's bloody war.⁶⁵ Even the Croats, as the smallest of the three groups, remain ambivalent about centralization. They support it instrumentally, hoping to use the Muslims' demographic power as leverage against the Serbs, but retain their own aspirations for separation and eventual unification with Croatia.

As a result, international coercion explains nearly all of the centralization and other institutional reform that Bosnia has adopted legislatively. The Council of Europe reported in 2001 that such change had "been a slow and difficult process, accomplished only under constant pressure of the international community." Three years later, Christophe Solioz likewise observed that, "the international community is still largely responsible for pushing forward the adoption and implementation of this reform package, notably by drafting about 60 percent of the [EU-mandated] laws — usually with only minimal participation by Bosnian officials."⁶⁶ Coercion is facilitated by the threat that the OHR can and will impose reform unilaterally, if necessary, under the expansive Bonn powers conferred by the PIC in December 1997.⁶⁷ The former HR, Paddy Ashdown, enunciated this threat in September 2003, warning the Bosnian parliament that, "The more you reform, the less I will have to. The less you reform, the more I will have to."⁶⁸

This carrot and stick approach has worked gradually, at least at the margins. In December 2003, Bosnia's parliament approved the OHR's proposal to centralize nominal control of the armed forces by shifting command of the Serb Republic army to the president of Bosnia. The legislature also created a federal investigative service to conduct police operations across entity lines, which previously had been hindered by the entities' separate police forces.⁶⁹ These reforms effectively amended the Dayton constitution, leading the OHR's principal deputy, Donald Hays, to declare in 2004 that the EU's economic incentives had finally triumphed over nationalism.⁷⁰ Such optimism was bolstered when the SDS lost in local elections in October 2004, spurring one local pollster to agree that the "Serb stomach has finally won over the Serb heart."⁷¹

On core issues of political autonomy, however, the Serb Republic has been reluctant to acquiesce, forcing the OHR to impose decisions unilaterally. For example, in November 2000, immediately following elections, "the OHR imposed ten pieces of legislation dealing with everything from the court system

to weights and measures."⁷² In December 2002, Ashdown unilaterally created three state-level ministries – Justice, Security, and Transportation – to deal with domestic affairs that previously had been the purview of the entities. At the same time, he halted the practice of rotating the offices of prime minister and other cabinet ministers among the three ethnic groups, and eliminated the veto each group had held over major ministry decisions.⁷³ Soon after, in April 2003, he abolished the Serb Republic's supreme defense council and eliminated all reference to statehood in its constitution.⁷⁴ Perhaps most dramatically, in July 2004, Ashdown barred from politics nearly sixty officials of the Serb nationalist SDS party, including its leader Dragan Kalinic.⁷⁵

The danger of this strong-arm approach is illustrated by the Serb Republic's reaction to the OHR's efforts to erode autonomy on security affairs.⁷⁶ On 16 December 2004, Ashdown dismissed nine police and political officials in the Serb Republic, ordering the entity to surrender control of police and defense matters to the central state. Instead, the republic's Prime Minister Dragan Mikerevic resigned, despite being a political moderate opposed to the nationalist SDS. Indeed, Bosnian Serb politicians across the political spectrum reacted by signing a joint hard-line statement opposing any unilateral re-centralization of authority. Moreover, in January 2005, the republic's president nominated as the new prime minister a member of the nationalist SDS party. Thus, rather than compelling unification, the OHR's diktat backfired by at least temporarily bolstering separatist tendencies.

The OHR eventually prevailed by again resorting to international leverage. NATO and the EU reiterated that unification of the Bosnian army was a prerequisite for membership, coercing the Serb Republic to acquiesce in August 2005.⁷⁷ The EU also threatened in October 2005 to exclude Bosnia from imminent Balkan accession talks unless centralization were extended to the police, which compelled the Serb parliament to approve by a vote of 55–5 this major concession that it had rejected 56–10 only a month earlier.⁷⁸ The European Commission rewarded Bosnia two weeks later by recommending the start of accession talks.⁷⁹ But the autonomy question will persist during the five-year implementation of the policing statute, which is based on three somewhat vague principles: centralization of administrative control, elimination of political interference, and establishment of new jurisdictions based on policing requirements rather than entity borders.⁸⁰

Bosnia's Serbs still cling to their fundamental demand to govern and police themselves, so they are likely to resist any police jurisdictions that substantially cross the inter-entity border. Indeed, the presence of armed Federation officials in the Serb Republic could provoke tension and even violence. Savo Cvjetinovic, head of the Bosnian Serb war veterans' association, ominously warned recently that, "Republika Srpska was born in blood and will end in blood if necessary."⁸¹ The danger of such destabilization is underscored by an International Crisis Group report warning that, "significant quantities of light and heavy weapons remain dispersed at storage locations throughout the country, some of which have not been registered with SFOR as required under Dayton."⁸²

This is not to suggest that international efforts to coerce Bosnia's centralization threaten to reignite war imminently, especially given the continuing presence of international peacekeepers (although NATO's peacekeeping role was replaced in 2004 by the EU, which is now contemplating phasing out the military presence).⁸³ Nor is this analysis intended to downplay the risks that a partition of Bosnia would create for the surrounding areas of the former Yugoslavia. As has been true since the start of the Yugoslav crisis in 1990, any secession, even a relatively peaceful one, risks spurring a domino effect that could trigger violence. At minimum, a partition of Bosnia would increase demands for independence by Kosovo, and for greater autonomy by Albanians in Macedonia and Serbia's Presevo Valley, as well as by Bosniaks in the Sandzak and Hungarians in Vojvodina. This contagion threat from partition may outweigh the domestic risks of centralization. But if coerced centralization triggered civil war in Bosnia, it likewise would threaten contagious violence.

Thus, the risks of partition do not by themselves justify the international community pushing blithely in the opposite direction toward rapid re-centralization of authority in Bosnia, as it continues to do. Just days after the coerced centralization of Bosnia's police and army in October 2005, U.S. undersecretary of state Nicholas Burns called for further erosion of autonomy by "strengthening of a single Presidency" and "building a unitary state."⁸⁴ The historical record does not rule out the possibility of centralized power-sharing after ethnic civil war, but it does indicate that such an attempt is a longshot more likely to result in renewed violence. In the absence of any firm grounds for expecting better prospects in this case, the international community – as represented by the OHR, the EU, NATO and the United States – should proceed with far greater caution in Bosnia than they have recently.

A path forward

At least five options can be envisioned for consolidating peace in Bosnia. First, the international community could continue on its present course of coercing centralized power-sharing while downsizing its peacekeeping presence. Such an approach might work, despite the dearth of historical precedent, due to unique factors in Bosnia such as the unprecedented level of engagement by international civic agencies, the extraordinary enticement of EU membership, and the increasing preference of co-ethnics in neighboring states for regional peace.⁸⁵ But some recent evidence suggests this strategy may be backfiring by intensifying nationalism that could, in a worst-case scenario, spur the renewal of war. A second alternative is for the international community to reverse course and embrace the formal partition of Bosnia into two states. However, this could trigger dominoes in Bosnia and the wider Balkans, spurring demands for secession, independence and irredentism. A third option, in recognition of these continuing regional tensions, would be an international conference to adjust borders or develop a common framework for grants of local autonomy within

the former Yugoslavia.⁸⁶ For example, Serbia would be more willing to accept the independence of Kosovo if it were compensated by being allowed to annex Bosnia's Serb Republic. But the long-term failure of previous such efforts, in 1878 and 1919, suggests caution in opening Pandora's box – even if somehow the requisite political will again could be conjured, which is difficult to imagine.

The fourth possibility is known colloquially as “kicking the can down the road” – maintaining Bosnia's status quo by deferring any further centralization. Bosnia would remain a de facto international protectorate with a sizeable peace-keeping force and would retain its ambiguous Dayton status between partition and integration, which is peaceful if inefficient, in the hope that a more permanent solution eventually would arise. As noted at the outset, however, two main problems confront this option. First, in the absence of war, international will for the enormous cost of sustaining this limbo status is rapidly eroding. Second, the patience of the Bosnians themselves may soon reach its limit, especially if the final status of Kosovo is resolved before theirs.

All of this suggests that a fifth option is the best way to consolidate peace in Bosnia. Not coincidentally, it is the same one that might have averted war in the first place. Rather than rejecting the Serb Republic's demand for strong regional autonomy, the international community should embrace it, halt the pressure on Bosnians to strengthen their central state, and accept the de facto, though not de jure, partition of Bosnia into a very loose confederation of two entities. By alleviating the longstanding Serb fear of being subjected to Muslim-Croat rule, it would remove the last potential casus belli of any significance in Bosnia. The Muslims might feel aggrieved by losing the prospect of a unitary Bosnia, but it is inconceivable that they would take up arms to regain it. The Croats might cite the Serb precedent to demand greater autonomy in the Federation cantons where they predominate, but they too would be unlikely to resort to violence. Risks of a regional domino effect could be mitigated by opposing the de jure partition of Bosnia, thus preventing the emergence of a fully independent Serb Republic. The example of Bosnia as an extremely loose confederation could also serve as a model for resolving Kosovo's final status by granting that province co-equal status in a two-entity state with Serbia. If this model could keep the region peaceful long enough to enable EU accession for all of the former Yugoslavia, it might well avert any return to war.

The greatest opposition to this proposal would probably come from two external actors. First, the United States has long opposed granting full autonomy to the Serb Republic on grounds that it would reward prior ethnic cleansing. The U.S. desire not to reward aggression or set a negative precedent is admirable, but given that the Serbs acquired no net territory in the fighting, were themselves uprooted in many areas, suffered considerable hardship, and would not gain full independence, it is unlikely that other groups in the region would view the Serbs' fate as worthy of emulation. Second, the European Union argues that centralizing Bosnia is essential to carrying out the reforms required for accession. In truth, however, this is a matter of convenience rather than necessity. The EU's

bureaucrats, heavily burdened by the union's recent and ongoing eastward expansion, understandably would prefer to deal with Bosnia as one rather than two entities. But it is implausible that EU officials would be unable to prepare Bosnia for accession simply because they were forced to work separately with Sarajevo and Banja Luka. The normative preferences of the United States and the bureaucratic concerns of the European Union are worthy considerations, but they pale in comparison to the goal of consolidating an, as yet, still fragile peace in Bosnia.

Notes

- 1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the tenth annual World Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, Columbia University, New York, NY, 14–16 April 2005. The middle section of this chapter also draws on my article, Copyright 2004 from Alan J. Kuperman, “Is Partition Really the Only Hope? Reconciling Contradictory Findings About Ethnic Civil Wars,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (summer 2004), pp. 314–349, part of a special issue on “Living Together After Ethnic Killing.”
- 2 A. J. Kuperman, “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons From the Balkans,” unpublished manuscript.
- 3 D. Binder, “U.S. Policymakers on Bosnia Admit Errors in Opposing Partition in 1992,” *New York Times*, 29 August 1993, p. 10. Although all three groups agreed to the principles, they did not sign them. S. L. Burg and P. S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999, pp. 110, 112.
- 4 C. Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” *International Security* 20, no. 4 (spring 1996), pp. 136–175. He suggests that a minimal level of residual ethnic intermingling, following population exchanges, will not necessarily trigger renewal of war, although he does not define this threshold.
- 5 See T. R. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*, Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993; and T. R. Gurr, “Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System,” *International Studies Quarterly* 38, no. 3 (September 1994), pp. 347–377.
- 6 Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible,” p. 161.
- 7 T. D. Mason and P. J. Felt, “How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 4 (December 1996), p. 563.
- 8 A. J. Kuperman, “Is Partition Really the Only Hope? Reconciling Contradictory Findings About Ethnic Civil Wars,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (summer 2004), pp. 314–349.
- 9 Starting in 1980, negotiated settlement of all civil war became far more commonplace than before. Whereas Licklider found less than a quarter of the civil wars that ended from 1945–1993 did so by negotiated agreement, Hoddle and Hartzell say the figure is 65 percent (twenty-four of thirty-seven) for wars that ended from 1980 to 1996. See M. Hoddle and C. Hartzell, “Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 40, no. 3 (May 2003), pp. 303–320. The authors do not disaggregate power-sharing and power-dividing agreements. Howard notes a similar trend in all major civil-war databases, which she attributes to a temporary norm of negotiated settlement in the late twentieth century. See L. M. Howard, “The Rise and Decline of the Norm of Negotiated Settlement,” paper presented at the Georgetown Junior Faculty Workshop on Intervention, Georgetown University, 23–24 October 2003, 2. She cites the Major Armed Conflict, Correlates of War, and Intra State War databases, and those

- compiled by Walter, Doyle and Sambanis, and SIPRI. She believes the norm has faded in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
- 10 D. Rothchild and C. A. Hartzell, "Security in Deeply Divided Societies: The Role of Territorial Autonomy," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 5, no. 3&4 (autumn-winter 1999), pp. 267-268.
 - 11 C. A. Hartzell and M. Hoddie, "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management," *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (2003), p. 328.
 - 12 C. Hartzell, M. Hoddie, and D. Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables," *International Organization* 55, no. 1 (winter 2001), pp. 183-208.
 - 13 D. A. Lake and D. Rothchild, "Territorial Decentralization and Civil War Settlements," in *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars*, eds P. G. Roeder and D. Rothchild (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 110. The authors, however, do find nine states that remain "semi-decentralized" following implementation of a negotiated agreement. The authors cite two factors that militate toward partition: (1) governance requires a belief that institutions will last, and fully independent institutions are perceived as longer lasting; and (2) minorities do not accept promises about future benign treatment. They cite one opposing factor: any central institutions inherently promote further centralization. This empirical finding and theoretical argument are in tension with the deductive logic in favor of regional autonomy in Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace," 191-192.
 - 14 Lake and Rothchild, "Territorial Decentralization," argue that the state's promise of regional autonomy, even if not credible, represents a "costly signal" that reassures opposing groups in the short term.
 - 15 O. Barak, "Intra-Communal and Inter-Communal Dimensions of Conflict and Peace in Lebanon," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34, no. 4 (November 2002), pp. 619-644.
 - 16 P. M. Atlas and R. Licklider, "Conflict Among Former Allies After Civil War Settlement: Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Lebanon," *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 1 (January 1999), p. 36.
 - 17 B. F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
 - 18 T. C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
 - 19 Atlas and Licklider, "Conflict Among Former Allies," 40.
 - 20 Atlas and Licklider, "Conflict Among Former Allies."
 - 21 E. Alin, "U.S. Policy and Military Intervention in the 1958 Lebanon Crisis," in D. W. Lesch, *The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment*, 3rd edition, Boulder: Westview, 2003, pp. 149-167.
 - 22 B. M. Seaver, "The Regional Sources of Power-Sharing Failure: The Case of Lebanon," *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 2 (summer 2000), pp. 254-255.
 - 23 M. Hudson, "Tying Again: Power-Sharing in Post-Civil War Lebanon," *International Negotiation* 2, no. 1 (January 1997), p. 108.
 - 24 H. Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon*, London: Hutchinson, 1985, pp. 88, 91.
 - 25 L. M. T. Meo, *Lebanon: Improbable Nation*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965, p. 169.
 - 26 K. S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, New York: Praeger, 1965, p. 201.
 - 27 C. Attié, *Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2004, pp. 171, 228.
 - 28 Seaver, "The Regional Sources of Power-Sharing Failure," p. 266.
 - 29 Mason and Fet, "How Civil Wars End", Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible."
 - 30 Atlas and Licklider, "Conflict Among Former Allies," p. 38, summarize: "the settlement seems to collapse as an unanticipated consequence of internal political tensions within the northern elite."
 - 31 Each side was told by its historical sponsor (the United Kingdom for the whites; neighboring frontline states for the blacks) that support would be cut off if they did not negotiate in good faith, but would be sustained if the other side rejected a negotiated settlement. The United Kingdom also committed, in response to rebel demands, to deploy more than 1,000 British-led Commonwealth monitors during the transition and to permit the rebel forces to be cantoned near supportive frontline states where they felt less vulnerable in case the white government reneged. See Stephen John Steadman, *Peacekeeping in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980*, Lyme Rensler, 1991. See also Walter, *Committing to Peace*, 131-142, who emphasizes the monitors, although the location of cantonment areas seems to have been more decisive. The death total is from Mason and Fet, "How Civil Wars End."
 - 32 Atlas and Licklider, "Conflict Among Former Allies," pp. 40-43.
 - 33 All of the monitors withdrew by 16 March 1980, leaving behind only forty British com/RRGP/Agila/Sunset:jrn (accessed 6 March 2004).
 - 34 Atlas and Licklider, "Conflict Among Former Allies," p. 40.
 - 35 R. W. Johnson, "Mugabe, Mbeki, and Mandela's Shadow," *The National Interest*, no. 63 (spring 2001), pp. 59-75.
 - 36 M. Cahen, "Nationalism and Ethnicities: Lessons from Mozambique," dated 1999, available at <http://www.cphrc.org.uk/essays/cahen1.htm> (accessed 6 March 2004). See also, M. Cahen, "Nationalisms and Ethnicities: Lessons from Mozambique," in E. Braathen, M. Bøås and G. Sæther (eds), *Ethnicity Kills? The Politics of War, Peace and Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa*, London: Macmillan, 2000, pp. 163-187.
 - 37 P. Gastrow, "A Joint Effort - The South African Peace Process," European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, available at http://www.xs4all.nl/~conflic1/pbp/part1/8_joint.htm (accessed 12 March 2004). A chart of yearly political violence is contained in P. Camay and A. J. Gordon, "The National Peace Accord and its Structures," South Africa Civil Society and Governance Case Study no. 1, Co-operative for Research and Education (CORE), Johannesburg, South Africa, 2000, available at <http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc/final/southafrica/saf4.doc> (accessed 12 March 2004). "Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict Case Study: South Africa." Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, available at http://www.idea.int/publications/democracy_and_deep_rooted_conflict/ebook_cs_south_africa.htm (accessed 12 March 2004).
 - 38 "The Zulu of South Africa." Minorities at Risk, available at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data/safzulu.htm> (accessed 12 March 2004).
 - 39 Lake and Rothchild, "Territorial Decentralization."
 - 40 "Good news for political stability - but South Africans are still insecure," South African Institute of Race Relations, 21 March 2001, available at <http://www.sairr.org.za/wsc/pstory.htm?storyID=214> (accessed 12 March 2004). Report concludes that "Since 1994 political violence has declined consistently."
 - 41 S. Jonas, "Democratization Through Peace: The Difficult Case of Guatemala," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 42, no. 4 (winter 2001), pp. 10-14.
 - 42 H. Salvessen, "Guatemala: Five Years After the Peace Accords. The Challenges of Implementing Peace," International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), March 2002, pp. 9-17. *MINUGUA Report to the Constitutive Group Meeting for Guatemala*, Executive Summary, UN Verification Mission in Guatemala, 7 May 2003, 1-2.

- 43 "Poll Rivals Pledge Boost for Mayans," *Agence France Press*, 27 December 2003.
- 44 "Menchu Plans to Join New Guatemalan Government," *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, 18 January 2004, 8A.
- 45 After more than two decades of war that killed 50,000, the agreement of 2 September 1996 created an autonomous region comprising fourteen provinces. The region was slightly enlarged by an August 2000 referendum. "Moros in the Philippines," Minorities at Risk, www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data/phimoro.htm (accessed 12 April 2004). See also Rothchild and Hartzell, "Security in Deeply Divided Societies," p. 260.
- 46 12,000 troops are committed to the mission, although only about 4,000 are deployed at any time, while the rest are in various stages of rotation. P. Almond, "Ulster Vote Hit UK Troop Options," *UPI*, 28 November 2003. These troop levels are planned to be reduced in the wake of the Irish Republican Army's announcement of plans to disarm. "Britain Plans Major Cuts of Troops in N. Ireland," *Washington Post*, 2 August 2005, p. A14, reports that, "Britain would cut troop levels by more than half to a maximum of 5,000 at 14 bases within two years."
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