involved some fundamentalist political movements and was encouraged from the inside by Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Pakistan. It was basically an extremely localized, mainstream-oriented movement.

How can this global religious recession be explained? Particular causes obviously operated in individual countries and civilizations. Yet it is too much to expect that a large number of different causes would have produced simultaneous and similar developments in each part of the world. A global phenomenon required larger-scale movements. A second recession in Europe is the least to consider Islam as a recession in Europe. Thus, the least to consider is the recession in Europe.
In the Muslim world, Bernard Lewis argues, there has been "a recurring tendency, in times of crises, for Muslims to find their basic identity essentially in the religious communities—that is to say, in an entity defined by Islam rather than by ethnic or territorial criteria." Gilles Kepel similarly highlights the centrality of the search for identity. "Islamization from below" is seen as a means to redefine the identity of a world that has lost its meaning and becomes empty and alienating. 1 In India, "a new Hindu nationalism" emerged as a response to tension and alienation generated by modernization. 2 In Russia the religious revival is the result of a "pagan" desire for identity which only the Orthodox church, the "sole universal link" with the Russian Christian past, can provide, while in the Islamic republics the revival similarly stems from the "Central Asian" westward movement to assert the identities that Moscow suppressed for decades. Fundamentalist movements, in particular, are a "wave of coping with the experience of chaos, the loss of identity, meaning and secure social structures created by the rapid introduction of modern social and political patterns, secularism, industrialization, and economic development." The fundamentalist movements that matter, agrees William H. McNeill, "are those that recruit from social layers and spread because they answer, or seem to answer, most felt human needs.

It is an accident that these movements are all based in countries whose population pressure on the land is making continuation of old village ways impossible for a majority of the population, and where urban-based identities come into competition. By penetrating the villages, they have begun to create an aged framework of peasant life."

More broadly, the religious resurgence throughout the Muslim world is a reaction against secularization, moral relativism, and self-indulgence, and a reaffirmation of the values of order, discipline, work, mutual help, and human solidarity. Religious groups meet social needs left unattended by state bureaucracies. These include the provision of medical and hospital services, kindergarten preschools, schools, care for the elderly, care for the sick and for other natural and other care after economic depression. The breakdown of order and of civil society evacuates vacuums which are filled by religious, often fundamentalist, groups.

If traditionally dominant religious do not meet the emotional and social needs of the uprooted, other religious groups move in to do so and in the process greatly expand their memberships and the salience of religious elements in political life. South Korea historically was an overwhelmingly Buddhist country, with Christians numbering in 1950 perhaps 1 percent of the population. As South Korea took off into rapid economic development, with massive urbanization and occupational differentiation, Buddhism found wanting. For the millions who poured into the cities and for many who stayed behind in the altered countryside, the quiescent Buddhism of an earlier era has given way to Buddhism which is vigorous and dynamic. Buddhism has become the "religion of the masses," a religion for the young, a religion for the urban worker, a religion that promises a future of prosperity and blissful life after death. 3

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day former Soviet republics, competing with the world's Orthodox churches. Here, too, as in China, an effort was made to curb their prosperity. In 1995, at the urging of the Orthodox Church, the Russian parliament passed legislation outlawing foreign religious groups to be accredited by the state and to be affiliated with a Russian religious organization if they were going to engage in missionary or educational work. This law, however, has never been enforced.

Overall, the second trend suggests that where they conflict, religious leaders of different faiths tend to be less religious in their interactions. In the West, this may be because they are not inclined to engage in theistic disputes, but rather to engage in business or political alliances. In the Muslim world, this may be because they are not inclined to engage in religious disputes, but rather to engage in social or political alliances.

Religious movements, including particularly fundamentalist ones, are highly adept at using modern communications and organizational techniques to spread their message, illustrated most dramatically by the success of Protestant fundamentalism in Central America.

Participants in the religious resurgence come from all walks of life, but overwhelmingly from two communities, both urban and both middle-class. Recent migrants to the cities generally regard emotional, social, and material support as the key to their success. Religious groups provide more than any other source. Religion for them, as Reyn Debro put it, is not "the opium of the people, but the vitamins of the weak." The other principal constituency is the new middle class embodying Doreen's "second-generation fundamentalist phenomenon." The activity in Islamic fundamentalist groups is not, as Kepel points out, "a return to the political issues of the time." What Muslims, as with other religious movements, is an urban phenomenon and appeals to people who are modernized, well-educated, and pursue careers in the professions, government, and commerce.

Among Muslims, the young are religious, their parents secular. Much the same is the case with Hinduism, where the lead of revival movements again comes from the hinduized second generation and are often "successful businessmen and administrators" labeled in the Hindi press "Stupes"—saffron-clad yogis. Their supporters in the early 1990s were increasingly from India's sold middle class Hindus—its businessmen and accountants, its lawyers and engineers—and from its "senior civil service officials and professionals." In South Asia, the same types of people increasingly filled Catholic and Presbyterian churches during the 1960s and 1970s.

Religious, indigenous or imported, provides meaning and direction for the people in a modernizing society. The "symbolic legitimation" of a people's" tradition, "symbolic legitimation," is necessary for the development of a people's" identity, "symbolic legitimation," is necessary for the development of a people's" identity.

In this sense, the revival of non-Western religions is the most powerful manifestation of "cultural renewal" in non-Western societies. That renewal is not a rejection of modernity; it is a rejection of the West and of the secular, materialistic, degenerate culture associated with the West. It is a rejection of what has been termed the "Westernization" of non-Western societies. It is a declaration of cultural independence from the West, a proud statement that "we will be modern but we won't be you."