Western nations to the superiority of their culture and the decline of Western culture. In the early 1990s, Asian nationalism was articulated most clearly in what can only be described as the "Singaporean cultural offensive." From the 1992-93 Southeast Asia economic crisis, Singaporean leaders interpreted the rise of Asia in relation to the West and contradicted the values of Westerners. East Asian society is responsible for this success: collective power, discipline, family responsibility, hard work, collectivism, self-control, self-discipline, and the values of the East Asian culture, together with the social and political arrangements. In the process, learn to live in a large East Asia society.

For East Asians, the East Asian success is particularly the result of the East Asian cultural stress on the collectivity rather than the individual. The more communication values and practices of the East Asians - the Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, and Vietnamese - are more compatible with the growing up experience to that which has been characterized in the West. The values that East Asian culture uphold, such as the primacy of group interests over individual interests, support the local group effort necessary to develop agribusiness. The work ethics of the Japanese and Koreans, consisting of discipline, loyalty, and diligence, Malaysia's prime minister agreed, "has served the making of the country for the respective country's economy and social development. These ethics are built on the philosophy that the group's and community's interests are more important than the individual."

Third, while recognizing the differences among East Asian societies and civilizations, Eastern Asia argues that there is also significant commonality. Central among these is a Chinese model described in "Two Subsystems of Chinese Culture": bounded by history and shared by most of the countries in the region; particularly emphasis on family, work, and discipline. Finally, important is the shared rejection of individualism and the prevalence of 'self-authoritarianism' or the limited ways of democracy. East Asian societies are more interested in the West in defending their distinctive values and maintaining their own economic interests. Asian argue that this requires the development of new forms of intraregional cooperation such as the expanded association of South East Asian Nations and the creation of a new Asian Economic Community. While the immediate economic interest is to maintain access to Western markets, in the longer term economic regionization is likely to proceed and hence East Asia must increasingly provide intra-Asian trade and investment. In particular, there is an increasing pressure to broaden Asian development, to move away from the "policy of de-Asianization" and to promote "a process of Asianization" or, more broadly, to promote "the Association of Asia," a path endorsed by Singapore officials.

Fourth, East Asians argue that Asian development and Asian values are models which other non-Western societies should emulate in their efforts to catch up with the West and which the West should adopt in order to survive. The "Anglo-American development model," so revered over the past four decades as the best means of modernizing the economies of developing countries and of building a stable political system won't work, East Asians argue. The East Asian model is taking its place as a competitor from China to India and Turkey and the former Soviet republics now attempt to learn from its success even as previous generations attempted to learn from Western success. East Asia must transmit to the rest of the world those Asian values that are of universal worth. The transmission of these ideas means the export of the social and cultural system of Asia, East Asia in particular. It is necessary for Japan and other East Asian societies to promote "Pacific globalization" to "globlalize Asia," and hence to "positively shape the character of the new world order."

Powerful societies are universalistic; weak societies are particularistic. The mounting self-confidence of East Asia has given rise to an emerging Asian universalism comparable to the "Anglo-American development model." Asian values are universal values; European values are European values, declared Prime Minister Menahem Begin in the early 1980s. Along with this comes an Asian "Occidentalism" portraying the West in much the same form and image in which Western Orientals allegedly once portrayed the East. To the East Asians economic prosperity is a sign of moral superiority. If at some point India surpasses East Asia as the world's economically most rapidly developing area, the world should be prepared for extended disputes on the protection of Hindu culture, the construction of the castes system to economic development, and hence returning to the Vedic and overwriting the dominating Western heritage left by British imperialism. India scaled it's place in the top ranks of civilizations. Cultural assertion follows material success; hard power generates soft power.

The Islamic Renaissance

While Asian became increasingly assertive as a result of economic development, Muslims in massive numbers were simultaneously turning toward Islam as a source of identity, meaning, stability, legitimacy, development, power, and hope. Islam, epitomized in the slogan "Islam is the solution." The "Islamic Renaissance" is its extent and profundity is the latest phase in the tradition. Some modern day wonder whether the "Renaissance" in Islamic Renaissance is captured. The question is that it is an extremely important historical event. It is not so much as it is that of Islam as of the American Revolution, French Revolution, Industrial Revolution, etc., that it is a similar and comparable to the Industrial Revolution in Western society, whose "R" is gradually concluding.
of Islamic civilization to the West, an effort to find the "solution" not in Western ideologies but in Islam. It embodies acceptance of modernity, rejection of Western culture, and recommitment to Islam as the guide to life in the modern world. As a top Saudi official explained in 1996, "Foreign imports are as bad as drugs or sex. We must not let them have their way."

The Islamic Resurgence is the effort by Muslims to achieve this goal. It is a broad cultural, social, and political movement, which is evident throughout the Muslim world. "Fundamentalism," commonly perceived as political Islam, is only one of many forms of Islamic resurgence, including Islamic art, architecture, and literature. This broad-based movement has been accompanied by Islam's penetration into all aspects of life, including education, medicine, science, and politics. It is a sign of the growing influence of Islam in the world's political and social institutions.

In its political manifestations, the Islamic Resurgence bears some resemblance to Marxism, with scriptural texts, a vision of the perfect society, commitment to fundamental change, rejection of the powers that be, and the nation-state. As a top Saudi official explained in 1996, "Foreign imports are as bad as drugs or sex. We must not let them have their way."

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In addition, many attention to religious observance, devotional practices, and education have increased. The Islamic Resurgence has also been accompanied by Islam's penetration into all aspects of life, including education, medicine, science, and politics. It is a sign of the growing influence of Islam in the world's political and social institutions.

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they were young, overwhelmingly so, and many of them were forty-eight percent were under the age of twenty-five. Eighty percent were under the age of thirty-five. One out of two came from middle-class backgrounds, and two-thirds of them had received their secondary education from the best schools in their respective countries. They were young, enthusiastic, and idealistic.

While students and intellectuals formed the main body of the student and intellectual movement, other groups, such as workers, peasants, and women, also took part in the movement. Workers, peasants, and women were also part of the movement, and their participation was significant. Workers, peasants, and women were also part of the movement, and their participation was significant.

The political and social context of the movement was also crucial. The movement was part of a broader social and political movement that was taking place in the Middle East. The movement was part of a broader social and political movement that was taking place in the Middle East.

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The Cold War was a major influence on the dynamics of Islamic movements, particularly in terms of ideology, democratic, or nationalist values. They were "ideological regimes" in the sense of lost values, principles, and identity, lost to the regimes that derived from the Arab pastoral and religious societies. Such regimes insisted on themselves for long periods of time, which led to the modern world, but from the 1940s, they would gradually change or collapse. In the mid-1950s, a central trend emerged that dealt with alternative regimes that would be more flexible and inclusive of a larger variety of regimes at the mid-1960s, the most likely successor regime was an Islamic one.

During the 1970s and 1980s, a wave of democratization swept across the world, encompassing several Islamic countries. This wave had a significant impact on the Islamic societies, but it was a limited effect, gaining strength and coming to power in southern Europe, Latin America, the East Asian peninsula, and central Europe. Islamic movements were simultaneously getting stronger in Muslim countries. Islam was the dominant religion for the democratic opposition to authoritarian regimes in some societies, and many large steps were taken in the struggle against occupation and colonialism, including the granting of national rights to their democratic societies. In these movements, the Islamic groups played an important role as opposing authoritarian regimes to Christian societies, and among peasant-led groups, Islam was played a comparable opposition role in Muslim countries. The Pope was centralizing the communist regimes in Europe, and immediately following the Shah's regime in Iran.

In the 1980s, Islamic movements began to appear in many countries. These movements put forward a vision of alternative sources of opposition. Islamic and communist movements had been discussed and often softened by the pressure of the Soviet Union and international communism. Islamic and democratic opposition groups had close ties with Muslim societies that were mostly outside the Western world and had little knowledge of Western concerns. Western tools were connections. With these occasional sympathizers, Islamic movements were unable to achieve substantial popular support in Muslim societies, and even Islamic literature failed to establish roots. In many Muslim societies, the "Eastern" or "Western" model, was used to understand the situation of society. The current problems of Islamic societies were a combination of internal and internal phenomena that began in the late 19th century. The failure has been evident in their role in the modern history of Muslim culture and society in Western liberal regimes.

The success of Islamic movements in establishing the opposition and establishing themselves as the only viable alternative to current regimes was greatly helped by the policies of these regimes. At one time or another during the Cold War, many governments, including those in Egypt, Iran, and Israel, encouraged and supported Islamic movements as a counter to communist movements. In the Middle East, the oil-dependent regimes and the West saw the Islamic movements as a potential threat to their interests. The creation of Islamic movements was a necessary step in the governments' strategies to maintain their power and control.

At the beginning of the 1970s, the world experienced a wave of opposition movements, which were considered to be a threat to Iranian opposition. This movement, however, was more effective in creating a network of allies and in expanding their influence beyond the borders of the Islamic world. This movement was supported by Islamic forces and ideas, and expanded their influence beyond the borders of the Islamic world. The movement was supported by Islamic forces and ideas, and expanded their influence beyond the borders of the Islamic world. Several factors contributed to the formation and growth of Islamic movements.

In conclusion, the Islamic movements were successful in establishing themselves as the only viable alternative to current regimes. This success was greatly helped by the policies of these regimes. The movement was supported by Islamic forces and ideas, expanded their influence beyond the borders of the Islamic world, and contributed to the formation and growth of Islamic movements.
Islamic legal concepts and practices were incorporated into the secular legal system. Reflecting its substantial non-Muslim population, Malaysia, in contrast, has developed a system of two separate legal systems, one Islamic and one secular. In Pakistan during the regime of General Zia ul-Haq, extensive efforts were made to Islamize the law and society. Islamic penal codes were introduced, a system of Sharia courts established, and the Sharia declared the supreme law of the land.

Like other manifestations of the global religion revival, the Islamic Renaissance is both a product of and an effort to come to grips with modernization. In challenging trends are those generally responsible for globalization and its cultural and political consequences. In Western societies, urbanization, social mobilization, higher levels of education, and cultural change; in developing countries, mass media and consumerism; and in the Islamic world, Western contact and its effect on both the Islamic and non-Islamic world. These phenomena undermine traditional village and clan ties and create divisions that are not identical. Islamic symbols, institutions, and beliefs test these psychological needs and Islamic welfare organizations, the social, cultural, and economic needs of Muslims caught in the process of modernization. Muslims feel the need to return to Islamic ideals, practices, and institutions to provide the compass and the motor of modernization.

The Islamic revival has been treated, with a product of the West's declining power and prestige. As the West relinquished its total ascendancy, its ideals and institutions lost force. Most specifically, the Renaissance was stimulated and fueled by the oil boom of the 1970s, which greatly increased the wealth and power of many Muslim nations and enabled them to overcome the solutions for modernization and internationalization that had existed since the West. As John B. Kelly observed, at the time, for the Saudis, there is undoubtedly a double satisfaction to be gained from the distinction of possessing both a nation and a religion. The Ottoman centuries for not only are they a measure of the power and independence of the Arab people but they also demonstrate, as they are intended to demonstrate, the superiority of Christianity and the predominance of the Quran, the actions of the other Muslim states, if placed in their historical, religious, social, and cultural setting, reveal a move to rethink the distinctiveness of the Western heritage.
In the 1980s, the proportion of youth that is, those figures to twenty-four years of age in the Muslim countries rose significantly and began to exceed 20 percent of the total population. In many Muslim countries, the youth bulge peaked in the 1970s and 1980s, in others it peaked early in the twenty-first century (Table 5.1). The actual number of projected peaks in all those countries, with one exception, are above 20 percent: the estimated Saudi Arabian peak in the first decade of the twenty-first century falls just short of that. These youths provide the recruits for Islamist organizations and political movements. It is not perhaps entirely coincidental that the proportion of youth in the Iranian population rose dramatically in the 1970s, reaching 20 percent in the last half of that decade, and that the Islamic Revolution occurred in 1979 or that this benchmark was reached in Algeria in the early 1980s just as the Islamic FIS was winning popular support and scoring electoral victories. Potentially significant regional variations also occur in the Muslim youth bulge (Figure 5.1). While the data are treated with caution, the projections suggest that the Russian and Algerian youth proportions will decline precipitously at the turn of the century. The youth bulge will, on the other hand, remain high in the Gulf states. In 1988


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**Table 5.1: Youth Bulges in Muslim Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Suicide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010s</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Decades in which 15–29-year-olds were killed or are expected to peak as proportion of total population almost shows similar. In some countries the proportion peak was.

*Source: See Figure 5.2.*

Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia said that the greatest threat to his country was the rise of Islamic fundamentalism among its youth. According to these projections, that threat will persist well into the twenty-first century. In major Arab countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia) the number of people in their early twenties seeking jobs will expand until about 2010. As compared to 1990, outcomes into the job market will increase by 30 percent in Tunisia, by about 50 percent in Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco, and by over 100 percent in Syria. The rapid expansion of literacy in Arab societies also creates a gap between a literate younger generation and a largely illiterate older generation and thus a "disconnect between knowledge and power."

Largest populations need more resources, and hence people from societies with dense and rapidly growing populations tend to push outward, occupy territory, and exert pressure on other less demographically dynamic peoples. Islamic population growth is thus a major contributing factor to the conflicts along the borders of the Islamic world between Muslims and other peoples. Population pressure combined with economic stagnation promotes Muslim migration to Western and other non-Muslim societies, elevating immigration as an issue in these societies. The stagnation of a rapidly growing population of one culture and a slow-growing or stagnant people of another culture generates pressures for economic and/or political adjustments in both societies. In the 1970s, for instance, the demographic balance in the former Soviet Union shifted drastically with Muslims increasing by 24 percent while Russians increased by 6.5 percent, causing great concern among Central Asian community leaders. In the 1980s, rapid growth in the numbers of Muslims does not occur in the Soviet Union or Greece, or to Italians. Israelis are concerned about the high growth rates of Palestinians, and Spain, with a population growing at less than one-fifth of
Changing Challeges

No decade since the 1950s has witnessed double digit economic growth in as many countries as the Asia Pacific region. The rate of Chinese economic growth has slowed significantly in the mid-1990s and afterworts, not significantly lower than that of the United States and European countries. One of the main reasons is that the Chinese economy is still in its early stages of development. The acceleration of economic growth in the early 1990s has been attributable to its rapid urbanization. By 2010, urbanization rates in China will be higher than those in the United States and European countries. One of the main reasons is that the Chinese economy is still in its early stages of development.

A New World System

The globalization process that began in the 1990s is likely to continue, if not accelerate, in the 21st century. The forces that have driven globalization—technological advances, increased trade and investment, and international institutions—will continue to shape the world order. The challenge for policymakers will be to ensure that the benefits of globalization are shared equitably among all nations and peoples. This will require continued efforts to reduce poverty and inequality, promote peace and security, and address environmental challenges. The United Nations and other international organizations will play an important role in achieving these goals.

The Islamic World

The Islamic world is a region that is rich in cultural, historical, and religious diversity. However, it is also a region that faces many challenges, including political instability, economic underdevelopment, and social inequality. The Islamic world is home to over 1 billion people, who speak over 30 different languages. The region is known for its dynamic urban centers, such as Cairo, Damascus, and Istanbul, as well as its stunning mosques, palaces, and ruins. The Islamic world is a region that is both ancient and modern, with a rich history and a vibrant present.

Theocosmic Development

Theocosmic development is a term that refers to the development of society, economics, and politics in a way that is consistent with the teachings of theocosmic religion. This includes the development of a society that is just, equitable, and sustainable. Theocosmic development is a process that is ongoing and requires a commitment to the values of theocosmic religion. It is a process that involves the active participation of individuals, communities, and nations in the development of their societies. Theocosmic development is a challenge that requires a commitment to the values of theocosmic religion and a willingness to work together for the common good.