

This attitudinal configuration affects interethnic behavior. It has long been known that general attitudes of distrust are correlated with interethnic antipathy.³⁷ What is more, suspicion is acted upon. In Sri Lanka, for example, a common Sinhalese view that Tamil graders were giving extra marks to Tamil papers helped produce a policy of ethnic weighting of grades, and I have heard a grader in Malaysia admit to ethnic favoritism, on the assumption that graders from other groups were doing the same: "everyone favors his own race." In an array of societies, it is believed that officeholders will use their authority for the exclusive or disproportionate benefit of their own ethnic groups.³⁸ In the concise language of a Guyanese survey respondent: "Indian for Indian—black for black." If there is such suspicion, coupled with an absence of faith in the impartiality of public institutions and a belief that those institutions are nonetheless inordinately important in shaping the fortunes of ethnic groups, it becomes vital to capture them. Politics becomes urgent, and it is not easy to fashion institutions that can mediate group claims.

WINNING THE CENSUS

As an entitlement issue, the census is a splendid example of the blending of group anxiety with political domination. On the one hand, it is common to encounter anxiety-laden perceptions of the fecundity or illegal immigration of competing groups; these produce considerable overestimates of the population of outgroups.³⁹ In this sense, the census is related to the fear of extinction discussed in Chapter 4. On the other hand, since numbers count in the quest for political domination, the hope of a group is to enlarge its relative share of the population. Numbers are an indicator of whose country it is. As ingroups fear higher rates of natural increase on the part of outgroups, they simultaneously aim for a gener-

131. My own survey results from Guyana and Trinidad in 1965 are similar. Compare Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963), 101–04.

37. Leonard Berkowitz, *Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), 152; Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1958), 382; George Henry Weightman, "A Study of Prejudice in a Personalistic Society: An Analysis of an Attitude Survey of College Students—University of the Philippines," *Asian Studies* (Manila) 11 (Apr. 1964): 87–101, at 99.

38. See, e.g., Hudson, *The Precarious Republic*, 18, 34; Kearney, *Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon*, 138; Walter Schwarz, *Nigeria* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 14.

39. See, e.g., Michael Poole, "The Demography of Violence," in John Darby, ed., *Northern Ireland: The Background to the Conflict* (Belfast: Appletree Press, 1983), 159.

ous count of ingroup members. The census is therefore no dreary demographic formality to be left to experts.⁴⁰

Disputes over census results in ethnically divided societies are common. Nigeria had such disputes in 1962, 1963, and 1973, and in each case the question was whether the Hausa, Yoruba, or Ibo had been overcounted or undercounted. Kenya had such a dispute in 1981, when census results indicated that the Kikuyu population had increased by 50 percent in a decade, twice the Luo rate of growth. In Baluchistan, in Pakistan, Pathans complain that the Baluchi numbers are inflated. In Mauritania, results of the 1978 census were not published, and Kewri suggested that a Moor-dominated government was suppressing the news that the Kewri are now a majority. It comes as no surprise, then, that in Tanzania ethnic questions have been left off the census since 1978; that Kurdish demands for a new census in Iraq were ignored; that the Belgians cannot agree on how to phrase the ethnic question; and that the Lebanese, fearful that changed ethnic ratios would upset the quotas on which state institutions were founded, have conducted no census since 1932.

It is not merely what is asked and how the results are to be interpreted that counts. Individual answers are also manipulable, since there is an element of self-definition in ethnic affiliation. In one pre-independence census in India, the division of the Punjab into Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh states was at stake. The Hindu versus Sikh question was closely contested, with many Punjabi-speaking Hindus telling census enumerators that their language was really Hindi, so as to leave the Punjabi-speaking Sikhs in a minority and repel the demand for a separate state.⁴¹ In Assam, Bengali Muslims had routinely declared Assamese to be their language, partly because it rendered them eligible for certain land rights reserved for indigenes. But then shifts in census responses produced small changes in the proportion of Bengali to Assamese speakers that in the early 1970s "aroused the anxieties of many Assamese"⁴² and paved the way for their violent reaction to enlarged Bengali electoral rolls later in the decade.

40. See generally James F. Guyot, "Who Counts Depends on How You Count: The Political Consequences of Census Counting for Ethnic Minorities" (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, mimeo., n.d.).

41. See G. D. Khosla, *A Taste of India* (Bombay: Jaico, 1970), 144–49.

42. Myron Weiner, "The Political Demography of Assam's Anti-Immigrant Movement," *Population and Development Review* 9 (June 1983): 279–92, at 286. See also Charu Chandra Bhandari, *Thoughts on Assam Disturbances* (Rajghat, India: A. B. Sarva Seva Sangh Prakashan, 1961), 17.

The census shows nicely the capacity of ethnicity to stand ordinary processes on their head. In a severely divided society, we have seen that an election can become an ethnic head count. Now it is clear that a census needs to be "won." So the election is a census, and the census is an election.

THE ASYMMETRY OF GROUP CLAIMS

Group claims are not necessarily equal. Some groups seek domination, not the mere avoidance of it. Some seek to exclude others from the polity altogether, and some seek merely to be included on equal terms. If all groups merely wanted inclusion, distrust and anxiety would still make ethnic conflict serious, but more tractable than it is. What makes it intractable is that claims to political inclusion and exclusion have an area of mutual incompatibility.

Consider the Pushtuns (Pathans) of Afghanistan: "As a vigorous and aggressive people, they have felt that they are destined to rule and have never for a moment doubted the rightness of their occupancy of the pinnacles of power. They have not wanted to share power with other groups or to accommodate their soaring ambitions."⁴³ For inclusion, parity of power would be sufficient. To achieve the exclusion of others, however, confining them to parity is inadequate.

Ethnic conflict is often in the zero-sum category, but not always. Claims may not be perfectly incompatible. The claim to exclude need not be absolute; it may only be a claim to priority. Political claims can therefore be scaled, from equality to priority to exclusivity. Still, even priority can be gained only at the expense of political equality.

The asymmetry of the claims means that they are also relative. What is sought is not necessarily some absolute value but a value determined by the extent to which it reduces another group's share. Demands are often cast in relative terms, and conflict-reducing proposals that involve expanding the pool of goods available to all groups typically have little appeal.⁴⁴ Not "how many?" but "what fraction?"—that is the key ques-

43. Leon B. Poullada, "Afghanistan Searches for Unity" (unpublished paper presented at a Colloquium on Afghanistan, U.S. Department of State, Sept. 1973), 13.

44. See, e.g., *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 11, 1980, p. 11, reporting a Malay leader's demand for controls on the economic progress of non-Malays. Proposals to expand the number of Malay university students simply by increasing the number of places were also opposed by Malay back-benchers on the ground that relative, not absolute, numbers counted. Interview, Kuala Lumpur, Feb. 29, 1968.

tion, just as it was for Tajfel's experimental subjects, who emphasized maximum intergroup differential more than maximum payoff alone. Just as relative group worth is at issue, so is relative group power. "Tell me who is rubbing his hands in glee," declares the Basque separatist Telesforo de Monzon, "and I'll tell you who should cry." Ethnic conflict is, at bottom, a matter of comparison.

The position of a group claim on the scale from equality to priority to exclusivity is not rigidly fixed, but contingent. Movement along the scale is possible and frequent. Demands first cast in terms of parity can ripen into demands for priority or exclusivity. That is the history of language demands in Sri Lanka, which rapidly moved from *Swabasha*, a claim for the recognition of both indigenous languages, Sinhala and Tamil, to Sinhala Only. This change went hand in hand with popular slogans like "Ceylon for the Sinhalese."⁴⁵ The growing narrowness of Sinhalese conceptions of nationalism through this century has been chronicled by Michael Roberts.⁴⁶ It is a process replicated in one severely divided society after another. But narrowness is not the only direction in which claims move. Largely as a function of political opportunities, constraints, and incentives, claims may soften as well as harden, as we shall see when we deal with party politics and military politics. Ethnic claims respond to the political market, which in democratic countries is heavily structured by the electoral process and elsewhere by the balance of force.

Nevertheless, ethnic exclusivism is quite common, and it takes a number of forms. As Sinhala Only implies, one form is to treat other ethnic groups (here, Tamils) as if they are not included in the political community. Another form is to seek their formal exclusion from the polity, by disfranchisement or some equivalent. Homogeneity is an exclusivist goal with a powerful appeal. In any struggle between two societies, "the victorious society as a rule fails to annihilate the vanquished society, but subjects it, assimilates it, imposes its own type of civilization upon it."⁴⁷ Mosca is of course referring to the conquest of one nation by another, but the statement is equally evocative of intrastate ethnic conflict between unranked groups, so much do the two types of conflict have in common.

Mosca concludes that "every social type"—he might have said every

45. Tarzie Vittachi, *Emergency '58: The Story of the Ceylon Race Riots* (London: André Deutsch, 1958), 33.

46. Roberts, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Sinhalese Perspectives: Barriers to Accommodation," *Modern Asian Studies* 12 (July 1978): 353-76.

47. Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, 29.

ing" South Indian laborers in their midst. The same advice is dispensed to businessmen by a Maharashtra party magazine. According to the title of an article, "Losing a Customer Is a Specialty of Marathi Shopkeeper." Maharashtrians, concludes Mary F. Katzenstein, "are being urged to acquire the characteristics exhibited by the 'outsiders' " whom their leaders oppose.⁹⁵

The message of all of these elite injunctions is that the qualities that formerly served to distinguish a group from the undesirable ways of ethnic strangers are now themselves seen to be undesirable. There is no longer consolation in the argument that, while ethnic strangers may achieve more, their behavior is unenviable. Now they achieve more precisely because their behavior is more worthy. Inexplicably, one's own elites say so.

All ambivalence has gone out of group evaluations. The sentimentality of the former colonial rulers for the "dignity, politeness, and nobility" of the backward groups finds no echo in the views of leaders of those groups. Politeness, it is said, is not conducive to achievement; aggressiveness is better. That elites should feel this way—and that it should create stress—are both understandable. There is some evidence that people with more foreign contact are more critical of their own group and its attributes—such broader horizons would certainly characterize ethnic elites—and there is also evidence that less advanced groups tend to be somewhat more prejudiced toward outgroups.⁹⁶ The two together add up to conflicting pulls on members of backward groups. Ingroup attributes are denigrated, and the models advanced for emulation are the very outgroups that are especially disliked.

The whole matter is made more difficult by the fact that backward groups usually claim, and often receive, preferences of one kind or another. Compensatory measures are demanded to offset the presumed superior ability of advanced groups to compete. Backward groups demanding them are convinced of their inability to compete on equal terms. Our sons, notes a Telangana in support of preferences, "are not as ambitious as theirs. So how can we ever catch up?"⁹⁷ On this basis, Lulua and Sinhalese have received preferences in university admissions.

95. All quotes are from Katzenstein, "The Consequences of Migration: Nativism, Symbolic Politics, and National Integration" (unpublished paper presented at the 1973 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association), 8.

96. Reigrotski and Anderson, "National Stereotypes and Foreign Contacts," 72, 74; Bularao, *Ethnic Attitudes in Five Philippine Cities*, 84, 130, 144, 146.

97. Quoted in Weiner, *Sons of the Soil*, 251.

Malays have been beneficiaries of a variety of preferential programs, and Maharashtrians and Telanganas have been accorded preferences in employment. "If," explains a Maharashtra government leader, "you have two plants, one with hardy roots and broad leaves and the other with only weak roots and small leaves, they can not drink the water, the soil nutrients, or absorb the sun's energy with the same efficiency. The weak plant needs more attention so that it can catch up and one day produce beautiful fruit."⁹⁸ Preferences, said a proponent, are "medicine"—it "cannot be withdrawn if a patient continues to be sick."⁹⁹

The key is indeed catching up, for now it is taken as given that collective equality is an important good and also that the presence of achievement motivation is ground for moral approbation, its absence ground for deprecation. There is tension between these two—collective equality and achievement motivation—and both have been pursued. "The Government's policy," said a Northern Nigerian official, "is to support merit, but at the same time to protect the weak."¹⁰⁰

But it does not end there. Elites recognize that preferential policies are a deviation from norms of equal treatment, typically rationalized as a temporary expedient. Consequently, groups that receive preferential treatment are under constant pressure from leaders to justify their benefits by performance. Performance is felt to entail rejection of the very traits that come with one's ethnic identity and adoption of those possessed by people who, at bottom, are believed unworthy of emulation. Early socialization sends one message to group members; political elites send another, quite dissonant message.

THE FEAR OF EXTINCTION

There is a race-against-time element in the felt necessity to catch up. A backward group needs to catch up fast, because, as just noted, preferences cannot be justified forever, and the group must also catch up "before it is too late." The future looks uncertain. In fact, backward groups have frequently exhibited severe anxiety about threats emanating from other groups. One form this anxiety takes is apprehension about being dominated and being turned into "hewers of wood and drawers of water."¹⁰¹ Conciliatory leaders are depicted as being excessively gener-

98. Quoted in Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, *Ethnicity and Equality: The Shiv Sena Party and Preferential Policies in Bombay* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1979), 28.

99. Quoted in Weiner, *Sons of the Soil*, 250.

100. *West Africa*, June 4, 1966, p. 639.

101. Kapilacharya, *Shiv Sena Speaks*, 13.

ous in granting concessions to ethnic strangers, whose intentions are, allegedly, to take control of the country and subordinate the backward group. Every issue can then become a survival issue. A common formulation is that if a certain political demand is not granted, the group "will cease to exist." To take two examples among many: At the time of the Sinhala Only legislation in Sri Lanka in 1956, there was a fear among certain Sinhalese that there would be a compromise with the Tamils. Sinhala language activists called Buddhist priests to agitate against this prospect, telling them "that if they didn't do something there would be no more Buddhism and no more Sinhalese—they'd all be Hindu priests, speaking in Tamil."¹⁰² The same was said at the time of the compromise language legislation in Malaysia in 1967. If the Malays do not "stand up," the "Malay race will disappear and sink from our own land!"¹⁰³

Survival is not meant metaphorically. Strikingly, a great many backward groups entertain a fear of extinction, usually expressed by reference to the fate of the "Red Indians of America." Here is what they say:¹⁰⁴

Fiji: The *raison d'être* of the Fijian National Party "was to prevent Fijians from succumbing to competition, as the North American Indians, Hawaiians, and Maoris had done."

Sind, Pakistan: Sindhis "do not want to be turned into Red Indians . . ."

Malaysia: "More than one [Malay party branch] leader expressed concern that the Malays might become 'like the Red Indians in America,' an analogy frequently repeated in the Malay press."

Punjab, India: "Either the Sikhs must live as equals or accept virtual extinction."

102. Interview, Colombo, Aug. 17, 1968. See also Robert N. Kearney, *Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon* (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1967), 62–63, 73.

103. *Bangsa Melayu Akan Hilang Di Dunia* (pamphlet; Kuala Lumpur, Feb. 1967), 1.

104. The following are quoted in R. S. Milne, *Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States* (Vancouver: Univ. of British Columbia Press, 1981), 97; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 1, 1972, p. 12; Marvin L. Rogers, "The Politicization of Malay Villagers," *Comparative Politics* 7 (Jan. 1975): 202–23, at 217; Baldev Raj Nayar, *Minority Politics in the Punjab* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966), 117; Weiner, *Sons of the Soil*, 167; Ba Maw, *Breakthrough in Burma*, 187; Filipinas Foundation, *An Anatomy of Philippine Muslim Affairs* (n.p., mimeo., 1971), 149; Bernard K. Gordon, *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 54; "A Comma in the Refinery Movement," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Nov. 8, 1969, pp. 1771–73, at p. 1771; Wriggins, *Ceylon*, 240, quoting N. D. Wijesekera, "Dynamism of Traditional Cultures," in R. Picris, ed., *Traditional Sinhalese Culture* (Peradeniya: Univ. of Ceylon, 1956), 21–22.

Bihar, India: If tribals do not have their land, "then they will become extinct like the American Indians."

Burma: Many Karens "believe that a Burmese-dominated nation . . . will mean their gradual extinction as a community or at least permanent neglect and inferiority to the Burmese."

Philippines: "This feeling of urgency and fear of eventual extinction [on the part of Philippine Muslims] should be understood by those in power . . ."

Cambodia: Khmers fear they may lose their identity as a people, "like the Cham," a people of the ancient Champa Kingdom absorbed centuries ago by the Vietnamese.

Assam, India: "The Assamese think that their individuality is in danger of being wiped out by foreign and non-Assamese elements . . ."

Sri Lanka: "Lacking a strong culture, the people, too, are considered vulnerable. 'For have not certain societies where traditional cultures were abandoned become extinct within our living memory? Some of the South Sea Islands have become depopulated.'"

Vamik D. Volkan notes a comparable fear of "dying off" among Turkish Cypriots—"within fifty years no Turk will be left on the island"—and connects it to a low group "self-concept."¹⁰⁵ Among groups in the West that have used the same language of extinction are the Basques and the French Canadians.¹⁰⁶

To a considerable extent, such apprehensions reflect demographic insecurity. The Philippine Muslims and the Assamese have experienced extremely high rates of in-migration of ethnic strangers in recent decades, and the Assamese are in close proximity to East and West Bengal, with, between them, a Bengali population fifteen times the Assamese population. The Fijians are outnumbered by the Indians in their midst. The Sikhs, a bare majority in the Punjab, are surrounded by a sea of Hindus outside the Punjab. The Sinhalese, a large majority in relation to the Tamils in Sri Lanka, are a minority in relation to the Tamils in India. Comparable observations have been made about the Flemings and Wal-

105. Volkan, *Cyprus—War and Adaptation: A Psychoanalytic History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1979), 105.

106. Milton M. da Silva, "Modernization and Ethnic Conflict: The Case of the Basques," *Comparative Politics* 7 (Jan. 1975): 227–51, at 230; Robert Chodos and Nick Auf der Maur, eds., *Quebec: A Chronicle, 1968–1972* (Toronto: Lewis & Samuel, 1972), 79; Hughes, *French Canada in Transition*, 152.

loons in Belgium and the Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. Majorities within a country become minorities within an international region, depending on how the region is conceived. Political space is not a fixed concept. This is another way of saying that the environment of group juxtapositions may be broader than that created by formal territorial boundaries. When once this is conceded, it becomes obvious that there is a realistic component to group anxiety.

But the realism is strictly limited. The Philippine Muslims who have engaged most vigorously in separatist warfare are the Tausug, whose islands are practically unaffected by in-migration. The Fijians have rates of population growth at least as high as those of the Indians. Fearful as they are of extinction, the Sikhs have had in recent decades the highest rate of population increase of any group in the Punjab, a rate one-third higher than the all-India rate. The Malay population has a significantly higher rate of growth than the more urbanized Chinese population and is in close proximity to kindred peoples in Indonesia. Neither the Hausa in Northern Nigeria nor the Telanganas in Andhra Pradesh had reason to fear becoming a minority, much less becoming extinct, but they, like the Malays, spoke of being overcome by ethnic strangers.¹⁰⁷

Nigeria: "the less well-educated people of the North will be swamped by the thrusting people of the South."

Telangana: There "seems to be [an] apprehension felt by the educationally-backward people of Telangana that they may be swamped and exploited by the more advanced people of the coastal area."

Malaysia: "Malaysia has far too many non-Malay citizens who can swamp the Malays the moment protection is removed."

These apprehensions about survival, swamping, and subordination reflect the enormous importance accorded to competitive values: a group that cannot compete will be overcome or will die out. Such sentiments have tended to be uttered at times when the groups entertaining them have been politically in a strong position.

107. The following are quoted in *West Africa*, June 11, 1966, p. 647; *The Telangana Movement: An Investigative Focus* (Hyderabad: Anand Rao Thota, for the Telangana University and College Teachers' Convention, 1969), 43; Mahathir, *The Malay Dilemma*, 31.

GROUP ANXIETY AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

To an outside observer, the fear of succumbing to the superior numbers or capacities of another group and disappearing must be regarded as extreme and irrational. Still, these apprehensions persist, coloring group relations in many ways. How to explain them?

First of all, the fear of subordination needs to be marked as a characteristic feature of life in unranked ethnic systems. These resemble two or more societies in one environment, and for this reason they give rise to inevitable uncertainty and discomfort that I shall treat more carefully later.

Second, the fear of extinction and swamping in particular can be identified technically as an anxiety-laden perception. Anxiety reactions are characterized by a "disproportion between the external stimulus and the response," and in extreme cases that disproportion is also extreme.¹⁰⁸ Whereas fear flows from a recognizable danger and gives rise to a proportionate response, anxiety flows from a diffuse danger of exaggerated dimensions; it limits and modifies perceptions, producing extreme reactions to modest threats.¹⁰⁹ It has often been remarked that ethnic politics in severely divided societies is characterized by extreme demands. To understand the context of group anxiety from which such extreme demands emanate is to make the politics of such societies far more comprehensible.

Third, there are relationships among self-esteem, anxiety, and prejudice. Prejudice allows a discharge of hostility, thereby reducing anxiety.¹¹⁰ A correlation has also been found between lack of individual self-esteem and degree of hostility toward outgroups,¹¹¹ and the same relationship should hold for group self-esteem. Aggression, says Volkan of the Cyprus case, can be "ego-syntonic" for a group, "a means by which to gain a sense of worth."¹¹² The exaggeration of threats, more-

108. Ernest Jones, "The Psychopathology of Anxiety," in Jones, *Papers on Psychoanalysis*, 5th ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), 295. See Charles Rycroft, *Anxiety and Neurosis* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968).

109. Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society*, 2d ed. (New York: Norton, 1963), 406-07; Ross Stagner, "The Psychology of Human Conflict," in Elton B. McNeil, ed., *The Nature of Human Conflict* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 56.

110. Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *Social Change and Prejudice* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 54.

111. Leonard Berkowitz, *Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), 278. Bettelheim and Janowitz, *Social Change and Prejudice*, 53-55, 70.

112. Volkan, *Cyprus—War and Adaptation*, 117.

over, serves another function. Since "it is incompatible with his self-esteem to realize that he is waging a war of persecution," a person hostile to outgroups "sometimes invents the existence of a powerful and threatening conspiracy aimed at his own well-being."¹¹³ The fear of extinction is a powerful threat, more readily understood as a rationale for hostility.¹¹⁴

Fourth, the fear of extinction needs to be viewed against the specific content of the exclusivist demands made by the groups entertaining such fears. As in the Sinhala Only demand, for example, the thrust of the claim is to pursue a policy designed as if the country contained only the Sinhalese—that is, as if it were homogeneous. As I noted a moment ago, two or more incipient societies in a single state is an uncomfortable situation, and it often produces impulses to make the society homogeneous, by assimilation, expulsion, or even extermination. This leads me to speculate that the fear of extinction is actually a projection. Projection is a psychological mechanism by which unacceptable impulses felt by oneself are imputed to others, often the very targets of those impulses. If the thought is that "we wish to overcome or extinguish them," it may be expressed as "they wish to overcome or extinguish us."¹¹⁵ This is called direct projection. Its relevance here is reinforced by patterns of violence initiation. As noted earlier, backward groups are overwhelmingly initiators and advanced groups are targets of ethnic riot behavior. So much hostility can only be justified if there is a large threat emanating from the targets of the aggression. Experiencing an emotion without the presence of an adequate stimulus commonly results in a quest for justification by projection of that emotion onto others.¹¹⁶

We are now in a position to explain the conflict behavior of nonelites, to sense what was troubling "the Itsekiri common man"¹¹⁷ and common men of other ethnic groups. It will be recalled that Lloyd was puzzled by the tendency of the Itsekiri to exaggerate threats out of all proportion to the actual dangers confronting them, to apprehend the future with foreboding, and to engage in mob violence over issues in which they

113. Bertelheim and Janowitz, *Social Change and Prejudice*, 138.

114. As Jones says, anxiety always has guilt behind it. Jones, "Fear, Guilt, and Hate," in Jones, *Papers on Psychoanalysis*, 304–05.

115. See Alexander Mitscherlich, "Psychoanalysis and the Aggression of Large Groups," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 52 (May 1971): 161–67, at 162–63.

116. See the classic study by Henry A. Murray, Jr., "Fear and Estimates of the Maliciousness of Other Personalities," *Journal of Social Psychology* 4 (Aug. 1933): 310–29, at 324. See also Erikson, *Childhood and Society*, 164.

117. See Chapter 3, pages 129–31, above.

apparently had little material stake. In particular, Itsekiri nonelites were concerned that they might lose their ethnic identity, despite very few indications that this might actually occur.

It seems clear now that the Itsekiri, like the Sinhalese, the Hausa, the Malays, the Fijians, the Telanganas, the Assamese, and a good many other groups, were troubled by invidious group comparisons with the "dynamic" Urhobo in their midst. Disdainful of manual work, inclined to consumption expenditure, and stereotyped as lazy, the Itsekiri acknowledged the Urhobo propensity to hard work but consoled themselves with a view of the Urhobo as uncultured and dirty. The Itsekiri were given to anxiety-laden perceptions—for that is precisely what their exaggeration and foreboding connote: they are textbook symptoms—and they were also inclined to conflict behavior based on their anxiety. Understandably, their view of the situation did not appear to Lloyd to be realistic, and that is why he searched for an explanation in the realm of leadership manipulation and deception. A more fruitful explanation, however, lies in the disparaging evaluations of group worth to which the Itsekiri and comparable groups were subject, evaluations that led them to want to do something to retrieve their self-esteem. The participation of nonelites in the conflict, hard to explain on the basis of narrow group "interests," is easy to explain on the basis of invidious comparison. Since the individual "sense of identity is the feeling of being a worthy person because he fits into a coherent and valued order of things,"¹¹⁸ ego identity depends heavily on affiliations. A threat to the value of those affiliations produces anxiety and defense.¹¹⁹ For this reason, people often express hostility toward those who create uncertainty about the correctness of their own behavior and that of the groups to which they belong,¹²⁰ and they often do so out of all proportion to the character of the threat that presently confronts them.

A POSITIONAL GROUP PSYCHOLOGY

The sources of ethnic conflict are not to be found solely in the psychology of group juxtapositions, but they cannot be understood without a psychology, an explanation that takes account of the emotional concomi-

118. Alan O. Ross, *Ego Identity and the Social Order: A Psychological Analysis of Six Indonesians* (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, Psychological Monographs, no. 542, 1962), 27.

119. *Ibid.*, 32.

120. Berkowitz, *Aggression*, 171–72.

there is more time to work on policies averting secession and, because of their reluctance to secede, more latitude regarding the actual substance of policies that might prove sufficient to avert secession. There is also, however, more time for both sides to prepare for the battle when it comes: to cement foreign alliances, procure sophisticated weapons, and organize the secessionist region and the rump region for war. This extra time, preparation, and organization are likely to insure that the resolution of the fighting, when it eventually occurs, will be clear-cut.

WHEN PATHS CROSS: RECURRENT THEMES IN SECESSION

There are times in the development of knowledge when classification is more important than the identification of common elements. Secession, a phenomenon that has been discussed in unduly homogeneous terms, is a case in point. I have been at pains, therefore, to emphasize the existence of different paths to secession. Nevertheless, there are also elements common to all the paths, elements submerged in taxonomy.

Many such conditions could be singled out as contributing to the emergence of separatist sentiment regardless of the character of the separatist group or region. For example, Crawford Young has rightly noted that three major wars of secession—Biafra, Bangladesh, the Southern Sudan—were fought against military regimes inaccessible to the political influence of the secessionist region.⁷¹ The development of a wholly ethnically-based party system may have the same effect of producing inaccessibility—especially if the majority groups that control the center are themselves divided by intraethnic party competition. Such divisions, we shall soon see, frequently encourage intransigence *vis-à-vis* potential secessionists. One can identify this pattern in Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Burma, and Chad. Then, too, the occurrence of violence, particularly in the form of ethnic riots, seems to abet the growth of separatist inclinations. Riots, polarizing elections, or military coups can serve as signs that alternatives to secession are unpromising or that negotiations would be futile. Such events catalyze separatism.

There is another class of common conditions that seems to have a more direct causal relation to the emergence of separatist inclinations in the first instance. Two such conditions are especially powerful: the loss

71. *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, 502.

of group members through assimilation and the migration of ethnic strangers into the potentially separatist region.

The separatism of the Kurds, the Basques, and tribal groups in the Indian state of Assam, among others, owes much of its impetus to the erosion of group boundaries. Migrants from all of these groups to towns in the territory of neighboring ethnic groups often became, respectively, Arabized, Castilianized, or Assamized. In the Indian Punjab, too, Sikhs felt their distinctive identity threatened by the prospect of absorption in the much larger Hindu community. In Sri Lanka, untouchables among the Ceylon Tamils have recurrently been targets for conversion to Buddhism and to the Sinhalese language, to the alarm of the Tamil community. In each case, separatism is linked to boundary maintenance.⁷²

Even more prominent is the question of in-migration. Over and over again, ethnically differentiated settlers provoke a separatist response. The influx of Franco-Algerians in Corsica, German-speakers in the Swiss Jura, Coastal Andhras in Telangana, Punjabis in Pathan areas of Pakistan, Christians in the Southern Philippines, and Buddhist Thais in Southern Thailand are among many instances. How seriously in-migration is taken is indicated by the case of Mizoram in Northeast India. Periodically, the Mizos issued ultimatums that all non-Mizos leave their territory by specified deadlines; when a deadline was ignored, the Mizo National Front proceeded to kill high officials who came from other states.⁷³

Government-supported colonization schemes that bring ethnic strangers into the region are uniformly regarded as plots to overwhelm the existing majority in the region by weight of numbers. In Sri Lanka, the quest for agricultural land led governments to place Sinhalese settlers from the South in the Gal Oya Valley, a no-man's-land between traditional Tamil and Sinhalese homelands. Sinhalese have also been moving into the heavily Tamil Eastern Province, creating fears that Tamil majorities and pluralities will become minorities.⁷⁴ nefarious motives are often attributed to governments that promote ethnically differentiated

72. See Urmila Phadnis, "Neo-Buddhists in India and Ceylon," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Dec. 6, 1969, pp. 1897-98.

73. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Feb. 7, 1975, p. 36; *ibid.*, Sept. 14, 1979, p. 30. *Indian Express* (Madras), June 23, 1975. The same thing happened subsequently in neighboring Manipur, where Meiti separatism grew as the number of Bengali and Nepalese immigrants grew. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Nov. 30, 1979, p. 22.

74. For some figures, see Schwarz, *The Tamils of Sri Lanka*, 14.

colonization schemes. The Kurds, for example, accused the Iraqi government of attempting to Arabize Kurdish areas in the 1970s by evicting Kurds and replacing them with Arab settlers.⁷⁵ Whatever the motives, an end to such settlement is both a goal of separatism and a common negotiating demand of separatists.⁷⁶ "Swamping" is, again, a word frequently invoked.⁷⁷ And since the relations of groups to regions are an integral part of separatism, disputed territories are a common accompaniment of separatist movements: the Kurds claim the Kirkuk area, which the Arabs say has an Arab majority; the Basques demand the inclusion of Navarre province within their territory, though it is the least Basque province; Muslims have claimed sovereignty over some Christian-majority areas of the Southern Philippines; and Muslims in Southern Thailand seek a state that will embrace a large part of the Thai-majority Songkhla province.

Some groups have had to worry simultaneously about out-migration and assimilation, on the one hand, and colonization and territory, on the other. Prominent among such groups have been the Basques, whose language is spoken by only a minority within the Basque country, whose concern, beginning in the nineteenth century, has been with the "*invasión de maketos*," the invasion of Spanish in-migrants, and who speak of the "process of Basque extinction."⁷⁸ The Kurds of Iraq have also been concerned about both issues. They have demanded double restrictions: an end to Arab colonization and a prohibition on posting Kurdish civil servants outside of Kurdish areas.⁷⁹ They wish to keep Kurdish elites at home—and keep them Kurdish—and to keep others out. In point of fact, these two issues are part of the same underlying ethnic drive to render group boundaries secure. In this drive, relative group size is a major area of anxiety. Hence the central place accorded related issues of intermarriage, relative birth rates, and who will speak what language. Relative group size in the undivided state as a whole is threatened by

75. Martin Short and Anthony McDermott, *The Kurds* (London: Minority Rights Group, Report no. 23, 1975), 12.

76. See, e.g., Peter G. Gowing, "Muslim Filipinos Between Integration and Secession" (unpublished paper presented at the 1973 annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies), 14; Astri Suhrke, "Loyalists and Separatists: The Muslims in Southern Thailand," *Asian Survey* 17 (Mar. 1977): 237–50, at 241; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 2, 1980, p. 30 (Bangladesh hill areas).

77. "Our province has been swamped by the Punjabis," Abdul Ghattar Khan, quoted in Sayeed, "Pathan Regionalism," 499.

78. Silva, "Modernization and Ethnic Conflict," 230.

79. Raoof, "Kurdish Ethnic Nationalism and Political Development in Republican Iraq," 10.

assimilation, and it is equally threatened for the region by in-migration. It is easy to see why such concerns are rapidly converted into separatism, for separatism allows the use of territorial boundaries to control—and to shore up—endangered ethnic group boundaries.

SECESSION AND SUCCESS: THE STRENGTH AND OUTCOMES OF SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS

Many groups have fought separatist wars in the last thirty years, but few have succeeded. The Southern Sudanese were able to negotiate a measure of regional autonomy after years of fighting. By a combination of protracted warfare in the field and surprise operations in the capital, Chadian Muslims managed to overwhelm the Chad government and secure most of the country, but their ascendancy was soon challenged again on the battlefield. Muslims in the Philippines and Kurds in Iraq have periodically been offered regional autonomy schemes, the genuineness of which they doubt or the generosity of which they think can be enhanced by fighting. Various groups in Burma, especially the Shans and the Karens, have long had control of large stretches of territory. Baluch and Pathans in Pakistan have occasionally been able to deny the government full access to their regions, and this has been true of Iranian peripheral groups as well. Yet, despite all of these successes attributable to force or the threat of it, it remains remarkable that only one country—Bangladesh—owes its independence to a war of secession fought since the Second World War.

The infrequency of successful secessions, despite the ubiquity of secessionist movements, cannot be attributed to the legitimacy accorded existing state boundaries or to the efficacy of the international system in promoting conciliation. Many states have been willing to meddle in the affairs of their neighbors by supporting secessionists in border areas. Rather, the inadequacy of this help, together with the internal strains present in many separatist movements and the determination of central governments to secure international aid to subdue them, result in defeat or a willingness to settle for less than the original secessionist aims.

The strength of a secessionist movement is a function of several domestic and international elements, some of which are easy to identify. If, for example, the events preceding the secession are dramatic enough to induce the wholesale defection of forces formerly committed to the gov-