Ethnic Minorities and the Clash of Civilizations: A Quantitative Analysis of Huntington's Thesis

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Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis has sparked considerable debate. Huntington argues that post-Cold War conflicts will revolve primarily around civilizations. This article uses the Minorities at Risk dataset to provide a quantitative element to the civilizations debate, which, thus far, has been based mostly on anecdotal arguments. The article focuses on whether there has been a rise in both the quantity and intensity of ethnic conflicts between groups belonging to different civilizations since the end of the Cold War. Overall, the analysis reveals several problems with Huntington's argument. First, Huntington's classification of civilizations is difficult to operationalize. Secondly, civilizational conflicts constitute a minority of ethnic conflicts. Thirdly, conflicts between the West and both the Sinic/Confucian and Islamic civilizations, which Huntington predicts will be the major conflicts in the post-Cold War era, constitute a small minority of civilizational conflicts. Finally, there is no statistically significant evidence that the intensity of civilizational ethnic conflicts have risen relative to other types of ethnic conflicts since the end of the Cold War.

Ever since Huntington proposed his 'clash of civilizations' thesis there has been a vigorous debate over its validity.[1] This debate has only intensified since Huntington elaborated on this thesis in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*.[2] While Huntington's thesis contains several arguments, perhaps the most well known and controversial is the argument that the end of the Cold War resulted in a change in the nature of world conflict, with post-Cold War conflicts being based more on culture, mostly defined by religion, than those that occurred during the Cold War.[3] He argues that during

[1] Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (1993), 22–49.

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

[3] The concept of dividing the world according to culture is not a new one. See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, 'On Nationalism, World Regions, and the Nature of the West' in Per Torsvik, ed.,

the Cold War, most of the world's conflicts were between Western ideologies (the conflict between democracy and communism), but now that the Cold War is over, most of the world's conflicts will be between civilizations, specifically between the West and the non-West. Modernization, rather than inhibiting religion, as many argued it would, tends to produce renewed commitment to indigenous cultures.[4] Without the Cold War to inhibit them, these civilizations will assert themselves on the world stage, resulting in clashes between them. Huntington also predicts that, in particular, there will be increasing clashes between the West and both the Islamic and Sinic/Confucian civilizations.[5]

These civilizational conflicts are divided by Huntington into three categories: core state conflicts, which are between the dominant states of different civilizations; fault-line conflicts between states of different civilizations that border each other; and fault-line conflicts within states that contain groups of different civilizations. This work focuses on the latter of these types of conflicts and attempts to use quantitative methods to assess whether Huntington's arguments regarding an increase in civilizational conflicts is born out. Specifically, this work uses data from the Minorities at Risk dataset to assess whether the quantity and intensity of ethnic conflicts that can be defined as civilizational have risen since the end of the Cold War in comparison to other ethnic conflicts.

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Mobilization, Center–Periphery Structures, and Nation Building (Oslo: Universitesforlaget, 1981), pp. 51–93; and Bruce Russet, 'Delineating International Regions', in J. D. Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 311–52.

[4] The modernization school of thought predicted that, for various reasons, modernization would cause the decline in ethnicity and religion as important factors in politics. For a survey of the literature on modernization, see, among others, Gabriel Almond, 'Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics', in Gabriel Almond and James C. Coleman, eds, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960); David Apter, The Politics of Modernization; (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1953); J. Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modernization (New York: John Wiley, 1972); W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959); Donald E. Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1970); Donald E. Smith, ed., Religion, Politics and Social Change in the Third World (New York: Free Press, 1971); Donald E. Smith, ed., Religion and Political Modernization (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); and Frank Sutton, 'Social Theory and Comparative Politics', in Harry Eckstein and David Apter, eds, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968). For a discussion of this literature, see Jonathan Fox, 'The Salience of Religious Issues in Ethnic Conflicts: A Large-N Study', Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 3 (1997), 1–19.

[5] Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, pp. 207–44; Samuel P. Huntington, 'The West: Unique, Not Universal', Foreign Affairs, 75 (1996), 28–46. For a more detailed discussion of the debate over Huntington's predictions with regard to Islam and the West, see Jonathan Fox, 'Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West', Journal of Peace Research, 38 (2001), 459–72.

THE DEBATE OVER THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS HYPOTHESIS

The debate over Huntington's thesis is voluminous and cannot be fully addressed here. However, there are several elements of this debate that are particularly relevant. They include several critiques of his thesis. First, many argue that nation-states and realpolitik will remain the major driving force between conflicts.[6] Another version of this type of argument is that the civilizations Huntington describes are not united and most conflicts will be between members of the same civilizations.[7] Secondly, many make the opposite argument that due to post-Cold War economics, communications and environmental concerns the world is becoming one unit, thus inhibiting all conflict.[8] Thirdly, some combine the above two arguments, and predict that there will be clashes both at levels more micro and more macro than civilizations.[9] Fourthly, others simply argue that today's conflicts are not civilizational without making any judgements with regard to whether these conflicts take place at a more micro or macro level.[10]

Fifthly, many argue that Huntington ignored some important phenomenon that will impact on conflict, thereby making his theory irrelevant. These phenomena include improved conflict management techniques,[11] world wide trends toward secularism,[12] information technology,[13] that most ethnopolitical conflicts result from protracted discrimination rather than cultural roots,[14] the

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[6] Faoud Ajami, 'The Summoning', *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (1993), 2–9; John Gray, 'Global Utopias and Clashing Civilizations: Misunderstanding the Prosperity', *International Affairs*, 74 (1998), 149–64.

[7] Shirleen T. Hunter, *The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger; with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 1998); Zerougui A. Kader, 'The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 20 (1998), 89–92; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick and others, 'The Modernizing Imperative', *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (1993), 22–6; James Kirth, 'The Real Clash', *The National Interest*, 37 (1994), 3–14; Stephen N. Walt, 'Building Up New Bogeymen', *Foreign Policy*, 106 (1997), 177–89; Masakazu Yamazaki, 'Asia, A Civilization in the Making', *Foreign Affairs*, 75 (1996), 106–28.

[8] Said Tariq Anwar, 'Civilizations Versus Civilizations in a New Multipolar World', *Journal of Marketing*, 62 (1998), 125–8; John G. Ikenberry, 'Just Like the Rest', *Foreign Affairs*, 76 (1997), 162–3; Frederick S. Tipson, 'Culture Clash-ification: A Verse to Huntington's Curse', *Foreign Affairs*, 76 (1997), 166–9.

[9] Robert L. Bartley, 'The Case for Optimism', *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (1993), 15–18; Richard Rosencrance, 'The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order', *American Political Science Review*, 92 (1998), 978–80.

[10] Ted R. Gurr, 'Peoples Against the State: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System', *International Studies Quarterly*, 38 (1994), 347–77; Pierre Hassner, 'Morally Objectionable, Politically Dangerous', *The National Interest*, 46 (Winter 1997a), 63–9.

[11] Milton Viorst, 'The Coming Instability', *Washington Quarterly*, 20 (1997), 153–67.

[12] Ajami, 'The Summoning'.

[13] Benjamin R. Barber, 'Fantasy of Fear', *Harvard International Review*, 20 (1997/1998), 66–71.

[14] Dieter Senghass, 'A Clash of Civilizations – An Idea Fixé?', *Journal of Peace Research*, 35 (1998), 127–32.

relative importance of culture and economics,[15] and the desire of non-Western civilizations to be like the West.[16]

Sixth is the argument that Huntington has his facts wrong. Some, simply argue that the facts do not fit Huntington's theory.[17] Pfaff accuses Huntington of ignoring facts.[18] Some, like Hassner, even go as far as to accuse Huntington of bending the facts to fit his theory.[19]

While the above are by no means all of the criticisms of Huntington's theory and many of these criticisms clearly contradict each other, they all have one common theme that is of particular relevance to this study, the argument that post-Cold War conflicts will not be particularly civilizational. Huntington's reply to most of these critiques can be best summed up by his statement: 'got a better idea?'[20] He cites Kuhn's famous work on scientific paradigms which, among other things, argues that a paradigm need only be better than its competitors, it doesn't have to explain everything.[21] Huntington argues that the Cold War paradigm was not perfect, and neither is the Civilizations paradigm. There were anomalous events that contradicted each paradigm. However, both paradigms have strong explanatory power for the era which they explain, and, more importantly, this explanatory power is greater than any competing paradigm.[22]

While Huntington's detractors clearly do not agree with this, it is clear that with a few notable exceptions discussed below, most of Huntington's critics,

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[15] Rosencrance, 'The Clash of Civilizations'; Hunter, *The Future of Islam*; Bruce Nussbaum, 'Capital, Not Culture', *Foreign Affairs*, 76 (1997), 165.

[16] Kirkpatrick and others, 'The Modernizing Imperative'; Kishore Mahbubani, 'The Dangers of Decadence', *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (1993), 10–14.

[17] Gurr, 'Peoples Against the State', pp. 356–8; Anwar, 'Civilizations Versus Civilizations'; Hassner, 'Morally Objectionable, Politically Dangerous'; Kader, 'The Clash of Civilizations'; Walt, 'Building Up New Bogeymen'; Peter Neckermann, 'The Promise of Globalization or the Clash of Civilizations', *The World and I*, 13 (1998), 315–23.

[18] William Pfaff, 'The Reality of Human Affairs' *World Policy Journal*, 14 (1997), 89–96.

[19] Pierre Hassner, 'Clashing On', *The National Interest*, 48 (Summer 1997), 105–11.

[20] Samuel P. Huntington, 'If Not Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War', *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (1993), 186; Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 29–40, 59–78 and 128.

[21] Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

[22] It is important to note that Huntington also has numerous supporters who agree with his assessments and use them to make policy prescriptions. These include, among others, Donald P. Gregg, 'A Case for Continued US Engagement', *Orbis*, 41 (1997), 375–84; Wang Gungwu, 'A Machiavelli for Our Times', *The National Interest*, 46 (1997), 69–73; Ratih Hardjono, 'The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order', *Nieman Reports*, 51 (1997), 87–8; Robin Harris, 'War of the World Views', *National Review*, 48 (1996), 69; Dwight C. Murphey, 'The Clash of Civilizations', *Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies*, 23 (1998), 215–16; William E Naff, 'The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 556 (1998), 198–9; Richard Seamon, 'The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of World Order', *United States Naval Institute: Proceedings*, 124 (1998), 116–18; Abdurrahman Walid, 'Future Shock', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 160 (1997), 38–9.

as well as Huntington himself, rely mostly on anecdotal evidence.[23] This type of approach, while useful for theory building and taking a first look at an issue, is flawed in that it is easy for both proponents and critics to cite examples and counterexamples for each side of the argument without either side convincing the other. The debate over the clash of civilizations argument is an excellent example of such a deadlock, the nature and implications of which are discussed in detail by Deutsch, who argues that:

introspection, intuition [and] insight [are] processes that are not verifiable among different observers … But even though we can understand introspectively many facts and relations which exist, it is also true that we can understand in our fertile imagination very many relations that do not exist at all. What is more, there are things in the world that we cannot understand readily with our imagination as it is now constituted, even though we may be able to understand them … in the future, after we have become accustomed to the presuppositions of such understanding. We can, therefore, do nothing more than accept provisionally these guesses or potential insights … If we want to take them seriously, we must test them. We can do this by selecting … data, verifying them [and] forming explicit hypotheses as to what we expect to find … And we then finally test these explicit hypotheses by confrontation with the data … In the light of these tests we revise our criteria of relevance, we get new and revised data and we set up new methods of testing.[24]

That is, when studying a subject anecdotally, different observers generally come to different conclusions. Only a more comprehensive methodology, such as quantitative analysis, can analyse all of the anecdotes in an organized manner and provide objective results. Accordingly, the quantitative evaluation of Huntington's arguments presented here is sorely needed.

The few studies which do use quantitative methods to test the clash of civilizations argument, while informative, do not definitively answer whether there has been an increase in ethnic civilizational conflict in the post-Cold War era. Some studies focus on international conflict. Thus, Russett, Oneal and Cox find in direct tests of Huntington's arguments that civilizational differences have no impact on international militarized disputes and that conflicts within civilizations are more common.[25] Henderson indirectly tests Huntington's theory and finds that while religious differences increase international conflict, the impact of culture on conflict is not unidirectional.[26] Davis, Jaggers and

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[23] Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 257–8, does use some cross-sectional quantitative data to show that the Islamic civilization is disproportionally involved in fault-line conflicts. However, this is a secondary aspect of his theory. His other uses of quantitative data are mostly descriptive statistics which present demographic, land use or economic data. The vast majority of the evidence Huntington presents is anecdotal and this use of quantitative data can be described as the exception that proves the rule.

[24] Karl W. Deutsch, 'The Limits of Common Sense' in Nelson Polsby, ed., *Politics and Social Life* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), 51–7, p. 53.

[25] Bruce Russett, John R. Oneal and Michalene Cox, 'Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Deja Vu? Some Evidence', *Journal of Peace Research*, 37 (2000), 583–608.

[26] Errol A. Henderson, 'The Democratic Peace Through the Lens of Culture, 1820–1989', *International Studies Quarterly*, 42 (1998), 461–84; Errol A. Henderson, 'Culture or Contiguity:

Moore also indirectly test Huntington's arguments and find that the mere presence of cross-border ethnic linkages alone is not enough to influence international conflict and foreign policy behaviour, but they can be of influence when combined with other factors.[27]

Others address other aspects of Huntington's theory. For instance, Midlarsky finds that Islam is linked to autocracy on two out of three measures[28] and Price finds that Islam neither undermines nor supports democracy or human rights.[29]

Others address domestic conflict. Henderson and Singer find that cultural and ethnic diversity do not influence domestic conflict.[30] However, their sample is based on the Correlates of War data from 1946 to 1992, so their findings apply mostly to the Cold War era. Ellingsen found that there is no real change in the dynamics of ethnic conflict from the Cold War to the post-Cold War eras.[31] Gurr – using a sample of the most violent conflicts in an earlier version of the Minorities at Risk dataset, the data which is used in this study – finds that there is no evidence that civilizational cleavages are becoming more important.[32] However, Gurr's study is based on a limited sample and is only current through mid-1994, as opposed to the analysis presented here which uses data current through 1998 on a larger number of cases.[33]

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Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity States, and the Onset of War, 1820–1989', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41 (1997), 649–68.

[27] David R. Davis, Keith Jaggers and Will H. Moore, 'Ethnicity, Minorities, and International Conflict', in David Carment and Patrick James, eds, *Wars in the Midst of Peace: Preventing and Managing International Conflicts* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), 148–63; David R. Davis and Will H. Moore, 'Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior', *International Studies Quarterly*, 41 (1999), 171–84. Similar arguments are made by Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, 'The Ethnic Dimension of International Crisis', in Carment and James, eds, *Wars in the Midst of Peace*, pp. 164–93; David Carment and Patrick James, 'Internal Constraints and Interstate Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Crisis-Based Assessment of Irridentism', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39 (1995), 137–50.

[28] Manus I. Midlarsky, 'Democracy and Islam: Implications for Civilizational Conflict and the Democratic Peace', *International Studies Quarterly*, 42 (1998), 458–511; Jonathan Fox, 'Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 6 (2000), 1–24, similarly finds that Islam is associated with autocracy.

[29] Daniel E. Price, *Islamic Political Culture, Democracy, and Human Rights* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999).

[30] Errol A. Henderson and J. David Singer, 'Civil War in the Post-colonial World, 1946–92', *Journal of Peace Research*, 37 (2000), 275–99.

[31] Tanja Ellingsen, 'Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew? Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict During and After the Cold War', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44 (2000), 228–49.

[32] Gurr, 'Peoples Against the State'.

[33] In a reply to another quantitative critique of his thesis, Samuel P. Huntington, 'Try Again: A Reply to Russett, Oneal and Cox', *Journal of Peace Research*, 37 (2000), 609–11, cites Gurr's article out of context. Gurr 'Peoples Against the State', p. 358, demonstrates that 'there is no evidence to date that civilizational … cleavages are becoming more important as a source of ethnopolitical conflicts' and that civilizational conflicts were and continue to be a minority of ethnic conflicts. Huntington replies that his argument does not apply to the frequency of conflicts, but rather to a which conflicts are likely to escalate in the future. John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, 'A Response to

OPERATIONALIZING HUNTINGTON'S CONCEPT OF CIVILIZATIONS

The purpose of this study is to assess quantitatively whether some of Huntington's predictions are correct with regard to ethnic conflict using the Minorities at Risk Phase 3 (MAR3) dataset, specifically, whether clashes between minority and majority groups of different civilizations within the state are more common and more intense than those between groups who are both of the same civilization.[34] That is, the conflicts analysed here are a subset of a type of conflict Huntington calls 'fault line conflicts'. These are conflicts between civilizations where they happen to border each other. This analysis does not address 'fault line conflicts' between states of different civilizations which border each other (for example, India vs. Pakistan). Nor does it address what Huntington calls 'core state conflicts', which are conflicts between the core states of civilizations (for example, the United States vs. China).

In order to perform this analysis, Huntington's concept of civilization must be operationalized. That is, specific criteria that allow the categorization of each majority and minority group into specific civilizations. However, this task is not as simple as it appears for several reasons. First, Huntington divides the world into eight major civilizations: Western, Sinic/Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and 'possibly' African.[35] Also, Huntington clearly states in parts of his book that there is a Buddhist civilization and in other places in the same book he clearly states that there is no such civilization.[36] For operational purposes here, Buddhists are considered part of the Sinic/Confucian civilization for several reasons: there is no mention of the

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Huntington', *Journal of Peace Research*, 37 (2000), 611–12, in a reply to this note correctly that Huntington did specifically predict a rise in the frequency of civilizational conflicts.

[34] For a more detailed description of the dataset, see Ted R. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993); Ted R. Gurr, 'Why Minorities Rebel', *International Political Science Review*, 14 (1993), 161–201; Ted R. Gurr, *Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000); Ted R. Gurr and Will H. Moore, 'Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s', *American Journal of Political Science*, 41 (1997), 1079–1103, as well as the Minorities as Risk website at www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar where a copy of the dataset and the codebook are available.

[35] Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations'; and Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 45–8.

[36] The Buddhist civilization appears on his map of 'The World of Civilizations: Post-1990' (pp. 26–7). He also infers that there is a Buddhist civilization on p. 257, Table 10.1, where he argues that the Chinese–Tibetan conflict is intercivilizational 'since it is clearly a clash between Confucian Han Chinese and Lamaist Buddhist Tibetans'. Otherwise, one would assume, as did Gurr, 'Peoples Against the State' in his quantitative analysis, that Buddhists were included in the Sinic/Confucian civilization. This is supported by Huntington's, *Clash of Civilizations*, p. 48 statement, that 'Buddhism, although a major religion, has not been the basis of a major civilization' and his inclusion of 'the related cultures of Vietnam and Korea', which are countries with Buddhist majorities, in the Sinic/Confucian civilization (Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, p. 45). Of the 275 minority groups in the dataset, this only affects two: the Tibetans under Chinese rule and the Chinese minority in Vietnam. This is because the distinction between the Sinic/Confucian civilization and the Buddhist civilization would only affect the coding of whether a conflict is civilizational or not in the case where one group is Sinic/Confucian and the other is Buddhist. If the other group is from another civilization

Buddhist civilization in his 1993 article; also, more often than not, Huntington did not include them in his list of civilizations; and, in the actual listing and description of civilizations in his book, Huntington stated that Buddhists are included in the Sinic/Confucian civilization.[37]

Secondly, Huntington's list and description of civilizations is in many places not nearly specific enough for use in categorizing groups, especially minority groups.[38] For the most part, as Huntington admits, his definitions are, to a great extent, based on religion.[39] He defines the Sinic/Confucian civilization as the Confucian Chinese, Chinese minorities outside of China and 'the related cultures of Vietnam and Korea'. As noted above, this is operationalized here as including the Chinese and Buddhists. The Japanese civilization appears to include the Japanese and only the Japanese. The Hindu and Islamic civilizations appear to be wholly defined by religion, even if Huntington claims otherwise. The Slavic-Orthodox civilization seems to be a combination of the Orthodox Christian religion combined with a common historical experience. The Western civilization is basically the United States, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand, which are mostly Protestant Christians but include many Roman Catholics. Huntington expands on this, arguing that a combination of the following traits defines Western civilization: its classical legacy; Catholicism and Protestantism; European languages; separation of spiritual and temporal authority; the rule of law; social pluralism; representative bodies of government; and individualism. Individually, he argues, many of these traits are present elsewhere but not in combination. The Latin American civilization is distinguished by being Catholic and 'incorporates indigenous cultures'. Finally, the 'possible' African civilization is based on a developing common identity.[40]

These definitions, taken at face value, are generally adequate to define the civilization of majority groups in states with two exceptions, Israel and the Philippines. Although, Huntington to a great extent bases his civilizations on religion, he does not deal with Judaism. Although Israel is geographically located in the Middle East, an Islamic region, and much of Israel's Jewish population came from Islamic countries, it is more appropriate to include Israel in the Western civilization for three reasons. First, in the past, and to a lesser extent currently, many Middle Eastern Moslems have perceived Israel as a Western imperialist intruder in the Middle East. Secondly, many of the traits of the Western civilization described by Huntington apply to Israel.[41] Thirdly, Israel was established primarily by European Jews, with most eastern Jews

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or both groups are Buddhist, the coding would be the same whether or not the Buddhist civilization is included in the list of world civilizations.

[37] While it is clear that the Tibetans consider themselves distinct from the Chinese, this distinction does not have to be civilizational. It can also be an ethnic or national difference.

[38] Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 45–8.

[39] Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 45–8.

[40] Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 69–72.

[41] Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 69–72.

coming after the state's establishment. In the Philippines, the majority group is Asiatic but they are mostly Westernized and Christian. In this case, religion was the deciding factor and they were coded as Western.

The application of these definitions of civilizations to minority groups is considerably more problematic. That is, these definitions are vague and leave many questions open when applying them to many minority groups. The Afro-Americans in the United States and several Latin American states bring up such a question. Are they part of the African identity group or are they sufficiently assimilated into their local cultures to be considered part of them? Reasonable arguments can be made for either case. For operational purposes, these groups are considered part of the African civilization because there are many indications, especially in the United States, that many Afro-Americans consider themselves to have a distinct identity which is, in part, tied to their African origins.[42] This common identity seems to be the key factor in Huntington's definition of the African civilization which is unique among his definitions of the civilizations in that it is wholly based on identity and culture and has no obvious religious component. It is important to note, however, that this is an extension of Huntington's theory. It is argued here that this extension is necessary because Huntington did not address this issue.

A similar question arises for black Moslem groups in Africa. Are they part of the African or Islamic civilizations? Since Huntington seems to be ambivalent about the African civilization and defines the Islamic civilization wholly on the basis of religion, these and all other Moslem groups are considered part of the Islamic civilization. The Druze, Baha'i and Sikhs are groups that do not fit well into any of Huntington's categories. Since the Druze and Baha'i religions are considered Islamic offshoots and the Sikh religion combines elements of the Islamic and Hindu faiths, ethnic groups of these three religions are considered here part of the Islamic civilization. Another problematic group are the Gagauz in Moldova. They are Orthodox Christian but not European in origin. For operational purposes, religion was the deciding factor and they are included in the Slavic-Orthodox civilization. Finally, there are many minority groups that are of mixed origins. An excellent example are the Roma minorities in Europe. These groups were coded as 'mixed' and clashes between them and other groups are considered non-civilizational conflicts.

A third problem in operationalizing Huntington's definitions is that there is a category of minority found throughout the world which does not fit into any of his civilizations, yet is clearly distinct from the others. This category is indigenous peoples. While their religion, race and culture vary widely, indigenous peoples have a common historical experience that in many ways makes them more similar to each other than to any of

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[42] It is clear that many African Americans such as W.E.B. Dubios would probably disagree with this classification. However, others – like Marcus Garvey – would probably agree with the argument that the connection to Africa is part of the African American identity.

Huntington's civilizations.[43] For this reason, while not considered a separate civilization, indigenous groups are considered a separate category from other civilizations and conflicts involving indigenous groups are considered a third category in addition to intercivilizational and noncivilizational conflicts. This seems to be the most reasonable way to deal with a large number of minority groups that do not fit into any of Huntington's classifications. Perhaps Huntington failed to account for indigenous peoples because the primary focus of his theory seems to be on international conflict. However, since he clearly intends his theory to include domestic conflict, the failure to include a major portion of the world's ethnic minorities in his theory is a serious problem.

Finally, the MAR3 dataset is designed to assess the relationship between majority and minority groups within a state. The majority group is operationally defined as the group which controls the state. Accordingly, in cases of civil war, there is no such majority group. This only affects three cases: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Lebanon. All cases in Afghanistan are coded as not civilizational because all four ethnic groups are Islamic. In Bosnia, the three ethnic groups, the Serbs, Croats and Moslems belong to three different civilizations (Slavic-Orthodox, Western and Islamic respectively). Accordingly, these three cases are coded as civilizational conflicts. Similarly, Lebanon is ruled by a combination of Moslems and Christians. Accordingly, all of the cases in Lebanon are considered civilizational clashes.

As a general note, the above discussion reveals the difficulties in operationalizing Huntington's concept of civilizations. These difficulties arose because, like many grand theories, Huntington's theory is often too vague to address many specific situations. It is argued here that these codings are a reasonable operationalization of Huntington's concept of civilizations, if not the only possible operationalization. In general, wherever possible, religion was used as the deciding factor. In cases where this could not be done, as was the case with minorities of African origin in North and South America, indigenous peoples, and minorities of mixed origins, as well as the Jewish majority in Israel, other solutions were found.[44]

These difficulties in operationalizing Huntington's concept of civilizations, in and of themselves, cause one to question the validity of Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis. They lend credence to those who argue that Huntington's concept of civilizations is oversimplified, unclear and not sufficiently systematic. His self-contradictory statements on whether Buddhism constitutes a civilization is an example of how the anecdotal approach can lead to situationally convenient explanations and arguments. Also his failure to account

[43] For a full discussion of the commonalities of indigenous peoples as well as the international mobilization of these groups, see Gerald R. Alfred and Franke Wilmer, 'Indigenous Peoples, States, and Conflicts', in Carment and James, eds, *Wars in the Midst of Peace*, pp. 26–44; and Franke Wilmer, *The Indigenous Voice in World Politics* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1993).

[44] A full listing of the groups tested here, as well as their civilizational affiliations, is available as an appendix to the website version of this article or in Fox, 'Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict'.

for indigenous peoples places the comprehensiveness of his thesis into question. While, to be fair, the coding of events data generally requires some questionable judgement calls, the combination of coding quandaries described above reveals a theory that has some serious inconsistencies and overlooks important facts for which it should account.[45]

METHODOLOGY

This analysis uses data from the Minorities at Risk Phase 3 (MAR3) dataset as well as additional data on civilizations collected independently. The unit of analysis in this dataset is the minority group within a state. For each of the 275 cases there is a minority and a majority group. Thus, the same majority group and the same minority may appear several times in the dataset. What is unique to each case is that the same pair of majority and minority groups do not appear more than once. As described above, conflicts between two groups of the same civilization, as well as those involving minorities of 'mixed' origins, are coded as noncivilizational, conflicts between two groups of different civilizations are coded as civilizational, and conflicts involving indigenous minorities are coded as indigenous conflicts. Again, indigenous minorities are not considered here to be another civilization. They are, rather, a category of minority for which Huntington failed to account but which should be included in parts of the analyses in order to present a more accurate picture of ethnic conflict.

In one instance, the Minorities at Risk Phase 1 (MAR1) dataset is used. This dataset is current up to 1989 and, more importantly, the 233 minorities contained within it represent the ethnic breakdown of the world up to the end of the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, many majorities became minorities and many minorities became majorities. For example, there are now Russian minorities in many of the former Soviet republics which are ruled by groups that were considered minorities in the Russian-ruled Soviet Union. Thus, using this data allows for Cold War vs. post-Cold War comparisons of the distribution of types of ethnic conflicts. It is important to note, however, that unless otherwise noted, all of the analyses in this work use the MAR3 dataset with the exception of the civilization variable which was coded independently.[46]

[45] Russett, Oneal and Cox, 'Clash of Civilizations' also find difficulty in coding Huntington's civilizations. Because their analysis focuses on international war they encounter and deal with only those problems relevant to coding the civilization of a state. Their codings, while not identical to those used here, are strikingly similar. In cases of mixed population, they code based on the majority group's religion. Israel is coded as Western. The only major difference is that, while they agree with the assessment here that Huntington is ambivalent over whether or not there is a Buddhist civilization, they choose to include it as a separate civilization in their analysis.

[46] Additional improvements in the MAR3 dataset over the MAR1 dataset include the rebellion and protest scores being changed from coding for five-year periods to one-year period. Numerous additional variables were added and many variables were updated through 1998. The MAR dataset is available at the Minorities at Risk Website at www.bsos.umd.edi/cidcm/mar. The civilizational data is also available separately at the Minorities at Risk website.

It is important to note that some have criticized the MAR data on grounds of selection bias.[47] Gurr addresses these criticisms. First, it can be argued that 'the project's roster of groups is not "complete" … Therefore, … the study includes some groups that are in the zone of indeterminancy … [and] new groups are added from time to time, based on suggestions by users and information from our Web searches.'[48] Given that the project has been in existence since the mid-1980s and has received considerable attention, it is fair to argue that this process has led to a fairly accurate list of the groups which meet the criteria described above. Secondly, it can be argued that the study focuses only on those groups engaged in collective action and ignores those groups that are more 'politically quiescent'. Gurr argues that 'this criticism is misplaced because the Minority project's principle objective is to identify and analyze only the groups that meet its criteria for political significance, that is, differential treatment and political action.'[49] The presence of either of these factors means, for the purpose of this study, that a conflict is taking place. Conversely, it is hard to argue if these factors are not present that any conflict is occurring. Thus, it is argued here that the MAR data contains a reasonably record of all serious conflicts between ethnic groups and governments.

A third potential criticism is that in focusing on ethnic conflict the data does not include all domestic conflicts, including civil wars such as the one in Algeria. I argue that this is not a problem when testing Huntington's arguments because nearly all domestic civilizational conflicts are also ethnic conflicts. This is because Huntington's definition of civilizations is basically the aggregation of many more specific ethnic groups into more general civilizational categories. Thus, any two groups that are of different civilizations should also be of different ethnicities and any conflict within the same ethnic group should also be within the same civilization. Thus, while the MAR data may not contain all domestic conflicts, as noted above, it is a reasonably accurate list of all ethnic conflicts between minorities and governments and, thus, should miss very few, if any, domestic civilizational conflicts. Given this, the MAR data should provide a reasonable basis for testing Huntington's theory.

The first step in the analysis is to assess how many conflicts fit into each category. In this test, the distribution of types of conflicts contained in the MAR1 and MAR3 datasets are compared in order to assess the Cold War and post-Cold War distribution of types of conflicts. Secondly, the conflicts in the MAR3 dataset are assessed pairwise, so the number of clashes between each potential pair of majority and minority civilizations is determined. Thirdly, the mean intensity of civilizational and noncivilizational conflicts on a yearly basis from

[47] See, for example, James D. Fearon and David D. Latin, 'A Cross-Sectional Study of Large-Scale Ethnic Violence in the Postwar Period' (unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1997).
[48] Gurr, *Peoples Versus States*, pp. 10–12.
[49] Gurr, *Peoples Versus States*, pp. 12–13.

1985 to 1998 is determined on two scales: rebellion and protest.[50] While other aspects of ethnic conflict like discrimination, repression and political organizing can also be used to measure the intensity of ethnic conflicts, protest and rebellion are generally accepted as the major measures of ethnic conflict intensity.[51] These years are selected because the yearly coding of these variables in the MAR3 dataset begins in 1985 and, at the time of this writing, ends in 1998. Although there are codings covering five-year periods available from 1945 to 1990, these are not comparable with the yearly codings because all of these codings are on a Guttman scale which measures the highest level occurrence within the given period. As a result, the five-year codings are, on average, higher than the yearly codings because a single event during a five-year period can raise the coding for the entire period, whereas it would raise the coding of only one of the five years if they were coded on a yearly basis. Conflicts involving indigenous minorities are excluded from this step because it would be unfair to test Huntington's theory regarding the intensity of ethnic conflict on a set of groups for which the theory was not intended. It is fair, however, to include these conflicts in the earlier steps testing the number of conflicts in each category because Huntington does claim that civilizational conflicts will, in the post-Cold War era, become a greater proportion of *all* conflicts.

Finally, while it is difficult to determine the exact time the Cold War ended, the last year of the Cold War for the purposes of this analysis is 1989.

DATA ANALYSIS

The first question concerns whether there are more civilizational or noncivilizational conflicts. As shown in Figure 1, civilizational conflicts make up only a minority of ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War era, constituting 37.8 per cent (104 out of 275) of the conflicts. Almost half the conflicts are noncivilizational, constituting 47.6 per cent (131) of the conflicts. Indigenous conflicts constitute 14.5 per cent (40) of them. This situation differs little from the situation before the end of the Cold War. As shown in Figure 1, the proportions of Cold War era civilizational vs. noncivilizational conflicts are nearly the same. Civilizational conflicts constitute 36.9 per cent (86 out of 233), noncivilizational conflicts constitute 46.4 per cent (108), and indigenous conflicts constitute 16.7 per cent (39) of the Cold War conflicts. Thus, contrary to Huntington's predictions, not only are civilizational conflicts a minority of the post-Cold War ethnic conflicts, the end of the Cold War has not caused a marked difference in the relative proportion of civilizational conflicts. These results are similar also

[50] For a full description of these variables, see Gurr, 'Why Minorities Rebel'; Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*; Gurr and Moore, 'Ethnopolitical Rebellion'; and the Minorities at Risk website at www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar.

[51] See, for example, Gurr, 'Why Minorities Rebel'; Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*. For an example of a study that focuses on discrimination as a measure of ethnic conflict, see Jonathan Fox, 'Religious Causes of Ethnic Discrimination', *International Studies Quarterly*, 44 (2000), 423–50.

TABLE 1   *Pairwise List of Clashes between Minority and Majority Civilizations in the 1990s*

Minority civilization	Majority civilization										
	West	Sinic	Slav-Orth.	Latin Amer	Hind	Islam	Japan	Afrca	Mix.	Civil War	Total
Western	11	1	6	0	0	5	0	2	1	1	27
Sinic/Confu	0	9	2	1	0	3	1	1	0	0	17
Slav-Ortho.	3	0	11	0	0	8	0	0	0	1	23
Latin Amer	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Hindu	1	4	0	1	3	3	0	0	0	0	12
Islamic	6	5	14	0	3	38	0	5	4	1	76
African	2	0	0	10	0	8	0	43	0	0	63
Indigenous	7	6	0	20	3	3	0	1	0	0	40
Mixed	7	1	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16
Total	38	26	41	32	9	68	1	52	5	3	275

Fig. 1. Types of clashes, Cold War and post-Cold War eras

to results presented by Gurr in his examination of fifty serious ethnopolitical conflicts.[52]

The pairwise examination of civilizational conflicts, shown in Table 1, does not support Huntington's expectations of a Sinic/Confucian–Islamic alliance against the West. All three of these civilizations engage in more clashes within their civilizations than with any other civilization. Of the thirty-eight minorities in the West only six are Islamic and none Sinic/Confucian. Of the twenty-six minorities in Sinic/Confucian states only one is Western. Of the sixty-eight minorities in Islamic states only five are Western. In all, there are only twelve clashes between the West and either Islamic or Sinic/Confucian groups. This constitutes only 4.4 per cent of the 275 ethnic conflicts contained in the entire MAR3 dataset.[53]

Nor does the mean intensity of civilizational vs. noncivilizational protest, as measured in Figure 2, support Huntington's hypothesis. If Huntington's hypothesis were correct, the intensity of civilizational conflict would have risen

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[52] Gurr, 'Peoples Against the State', p. 358.
[53] For a more detailed discussion and analysis of the participation of the Western and Islamic civilizations in ethnic conflict, see Fox, 'Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict'.

Fig. 2. Average intensity of civilizational vs. noncivilizational protest, 1985–98

TABLE 2   Significance of Difference Between Mean Levels of Protest in 1987 and in the Post-Cold War Era (Pairwise T-Tests)

	N	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Not civ.	127	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.023
Civ.	94	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.019
Total	221	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001

in comparison to other conflicts at the end of the Cold War era. The data does not conform to this. For the entire period analysed here, civilizational conflicts have a higher average level of protest than noncivilizational conflicts. While the intensity of both of these types of conflicts begins to rise towards the end of the Cold War in 1988 and peaks in 1991, these rises are approximately proportional. The mean level of protest then drops until 1998 to levels that are slightly higher than the levels in 1985. Thus, throughout this period, the proportional intensity of ethnic protest remains approximately the same between civilizational, noncivilizational and indigenous ethnic conflicts.[54] The only clear influence the end of the Cold War seems to have had was a temporary boost in protest in both types of ethnic conflict. Furthermore, the significance of the differences in the mean level of protest between 1987 and the post-Cold War era (1990 to 1998), as shown in Table 2, reveals that while the changes over time in the level of protest are significant, they are equally significant for both civilizational and noncivilizational conflict.[55] Thus, any influence of the end of the Cold War on the conflict measured here, appears to influence civilizational and noncivilizational conflict equally.

The mean intensity of civilizational vs. noncivilizational rebellion, shown in Figure 3, also provides no confirmation for Huntington's theory. The difference between the mean levels of civilizational and noncivilizational rebellion are not large and are not statistically significant for the entire period and rebellion by non-civilizational ethnic minorities is consistently higher than by civilizational ethnic minorities, except in 1995 where the mean level of rebellion for both groups is nearly identical. As is the case with protest, the mean level of rebellion for civilizational and noncivilizational conflicts rises in the late 1980s, peaks in the early 1990s, and drops considerably by 1998. Thus, the end of the Cold War coincides with changes in the average level of rebellion among ethnic minorities, but these changes for the most part do not fit the pattern of a clear rise in civilizational conflict in proportion to other types of conflict predicted by Huntington's thesis. Furthermore, the differences in the mean level of rebellion between 1987 and the post-Cold War era (1990 to 1998), as shown in Table 3, are statistically significant from 1990 to 1992 but not thereafter. This indicates that after 1992 the mean level of rebellion is not significantly different from the level of rebellion during the Cold War. Thus, in the longer term, any influence of the end of the Cold War on rebellion affects civilizational and noncivilizational conflicts equally.

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[54] The mean level of protest in civilizational conflicts divided by the mean level of protest in noncivilizational conflicts between 1985 and 1998 ranges between 1.16 and 1.34. However, the differences between the two are statistically significant only in 1991 and 1992.

[55] The year 1987 is used as a point of comparison because this is the last year before the mean level of conflict begins to rise and this rise is closely associated with the end of the Cold War.

Fig. 3. Average intensity of civilizational vs. noncivilizational rebellion, 1985–98

TABLE 3   Significance of Difference Between Mean Levels of Rebellion in 1987 and in the Post Cold-War Era (Pairwise T-Tests)

	N	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Not civ.	125	0.015	0.015	0.061	0.529	0.143	0.964	0.439	0.639	0.787
Civ.	91	0.027	0.112	0.119	0.096	0.277	0.165	0.636	0.403	0.872
Total	216	0.001	0.004	0.015	0.113	0.069	0.385	0.364	0.377	0.756

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the results of this analysis do not support Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' argument. Civilizational conflicts constitute a minority of ethnic conflicts both during and after the Cold War. Additionally, conflicts between the West and both the Sinic/Confucian and Islamic civilizations, which Huntington predicts will be the major conflicts in the post-Cold War era, constitute a small minority of civilizational conflicts. In fact, the largest percentage of ethnic conflicts occur within civilizations, lending support to those who argue that many ethnic conflicts will be at a level more micro than the civilizational level.

The intensity of all types of ethnic conflict did rise just after the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s but dropped by 1998. However, there is no support for Huntington's prediction that the intensity of civilizational conflicts will rise in comparison to noncivilizational ones. Thus, the major influence that the end of the Cold War had on ethnic conflict was a general, but so far temporary, rise – probably due to a lifting of restraints on all types of domestic conflict caused by the fall of the former Communist dictatorships and the end of the superpower rivalry in the international arena.

The results do, however, shed some light on the influence of culture on ethnic conflict. Civilizational conflicts, which are the ones in which the groups involved tend to be more culturally different, involve consistently higher levels of protest and lower levels of rebellion. Thus, it is minorities which are more culturally similar to the majority groups in their state which opt more often for the violent alternative or rebellion as opposed to the more peaceful option of political protest. This also contradicts Huntington's thesis.

Perhaps some of the most interesting results of this analysis concern its methodological aspects. Huntington's theory is insufficiently clear to apply it to many ethnic minorities without some judgement calls or even extensions of the theory. He even directly contradicts himself several times as to whether an entire civilization, the Buddhist civilization, even exists. In addition, the fact that Huntington failed to include indigenous peoples in his 'paradigm' of world politics in the post-Cold Ear era is, by itself, worthy of note. This is especially so considering the increasing activity and successes of indigenous people in domestic politics worldwide and the growing normative authority of their claims in the international arena.[56] These minorities are important because nearly all of them (thirty-five out of forty-one) make claims for some form of autonomy or independence and such claims are likely to provoke conflict. Gurr argues that such separatist demands 'are highly threatening because they challenge nationalist ideologies held by most dominant groups and imply the breakup of the state'.[57]

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[56] Wilmer, *The Indigenous Voice*.
[57] Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, p. 294. Similar arguments are made by Ted R. Gurr, 'Minorities, Nationalists, and Ethnopolitical Conflict', in Chester A. Crocker and Fen O. Hampson, eds,

It is also important to note that the failure of civilizational factors to explain ethnic conflict stands in stark contrast to the fact that traditional arguments positing that, among other things, the major causes of ethnic conflict include discrimination, group organization and governmental characteristics are strongly supported by the empirical evidence.[57] Thus, Huntington's argument that the theory with the most explanatory power should be the accepted paradigm works against him and dictates that his 'paradigm' should not be the major explanation for ethnic conflict in the post-Cold War era.[58]

However, it is important to reiterate that the results presented here are limited to ethnic conflicts between majority and minority groups. That is, the conflicts analysed here are only 'fault line' conflicts within states and not 'fault line conflicts' between states nor 'core state conflicts'. Accordingly, the evidence presented here does not warrant rejecting Huntington's entire hypothesis. However, it is sufficient to cast serious doubt on major elements of this hypothesis and, when combined with the results of Gurr, Russett, Oneal and Cox, Henderson, Ellingsen, Davis, Jaggers and Moore, Midlarsky, and Price,[59] it is enough to say that the empirical results when presented in their most favourable light provide, at best, mixed support for only some aspects of Huntington's clash of civilizations argument and contradict major elements of it. Thus, the growing body of empirical evidence cannot support Huntington's claims that his 'paradigm' provides the best explanation for conflict in the post-Cold war era, especially with regard to ethnic conflict.

(F'note continued)

Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 53–77 at p. 54; Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 229–84; Radha Kumar, 'The Troubled History of Partition', *Foreign Affairs*, 76 (1997), 22–34; Robin M. Williams Jr, 'The Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts: Comparative International Perspectives', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 20 (1994), 49–79.

[57] Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*; Gurr, 'Why Minorities Rebel'; Gurr, *Peoples Versus States*.

[58] Huntington, 'If Not Civilizations'; Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*.

[59] Gurr, 'Peoples Against the State'; Russett, Oneal and Cox, 'Clash of Civilizations'; Henderson, 'Culture or Contiguity'; Henderson, 'The Democratic Peace'; Ellingsen, 'Colorful Community'; Davis, Jaggers and Moore, 'Ethnicity, Minorities, and International Conflict'; Davis and Moore 'Ethnicity Matters'; Midlarsky, 'Democracy and Islam'; and Price, *Islamic Political Culture*.

APPENDIX: GROUPS INCLUDED IN THE DATASET

Country	Group	Civ Clsh	Min. Civ.	Maj. Civ.
Region 1: Western Democracies and Japan				
Australia	Aborigines		Indig.	Western
Britain	Afro-Carib	X	African	Western
	Asians	X	Hindu	Western
	N. Ir. Cath.		Western	Western
	Scots		Western	Western
Canada	Fr. Canad.		Western	Western
	Québécois		Western	Western
	Natives		Indig.	Western
France	Basques		Western	Western
	Corsicans		Western	Western
	Afro-Arabs	X	Islamic	Western
	Roma		Mixed	Western
Germany	Turks	X	Islamic	Western
Greece	Turks	X	Islamic	Western
	Roma		Mixed	Western
Italy	S. Tyroleans		Western	Western
	Sardinians		Western	Western
	Roma		Mixed	Western
Japan	Koreans	X	Confuc.	Japanese
N. Zealand	Maoris		Indig.	Western
Nordic	Sami		Indig.	Western
Spain	Basques		Western	Western
	Catalans		Western	Western
	Roma		Mixed	Western
Switzerland	Jurassiens		Western	Western
	For. wrkrs		Mixed	Western
USA	Afr-Amer.	X	African	Western
	Hispanics	X	L. Amer.	Western
	Natives		Indig.	Western
	Hawaiians		Indig.	Western
Region 2: Ex-Soviet Bloc Countries				
Albania	Greeks	X	Slv-Orth	Islamic
Azerbaijan	Armenians	X	Slv-Orth	Islamic
	Lezghins		Islamic	Islamic
	Russians	X	Slv-Orth	Islamic
Belarus	Russians		Slv-Orth	Slv-Orth
	Poles		Slv-Orth	Slv-Orth
Bosnia	Serbs	X	Slv-Orth	Civ War
	Croats	X	Western (Cath.)	Civ War
	Muslims	X	Islamic	Civ War

APPENDIX—*continued*

Country	Group	Civ Clsh	Min. Civ.	Maj. Civ.
Czech Republic	Slovaks		Slv-Orth	Slv-Orth
	Roma		Mixed	Slv-Orth
Estonia	Russians	X	Slv-Orth	Western (Luth.)
Georgia	Abkhazians	X	Islamic	Slv-Orth
	Adzhars	X	Islamic	Slv-Orth
	Ossetians		Slv-Orth	Slv-Orth
	Russians		Slv-Orth	Slv-Orth
Hungary	Roma		Mixed	Western (Luth.)
Kazakhstan	Russians	X	Slv-Orth	Islamic
	Germans	X	Western	Islamic
Kyrgyzstan	Russians	X	Slv-Orth	Islamic
	Uzbeks		Islamic	Islamic
Latvia	Russians	X	Slv-Orth	Western (Luth.)
Lithuania	Poles	X	Western (Cath.)	Slv-Orth
	Russians		Slv-Orth	Slv-Orth
Macedonia	Albanians	X	Islamic	Slv-Orth
	Serbs		Slv-Orth	Slv-Orth
	Roma		Mixed	Slv-Orth
Moldova	Gagauz		Slv-Orth	Slv-Orth
	Russians/Slavs		Slv-Orth	Slv-Orth
Russia	Avars	X	Islamic	Slv-Orth
	Buryat	X	Confuc. (Budd.)	Slv-Orth
	Chechens	X	Islamic	Slv-Orth
	Ingushes	X	Islamic	Slv-Orth
	Karachays	X	Islamic	Slv-Orth
	Kumyks	X	Islamic	Slv-Orth
	South Ossetians		Slv-Orth	Slv-Orth
	Lezghins		Mixed Slav and Islamic	Slv-Orth
	Tatars	X	Islamic	Slv-Orth
	Tuvinians	X	Confuc. (Budd.)	Slv-Orth
	Roma		Mixed	Slv-Orth
	Yakuta		Slv-Orth	Slv-Orth
Slovakia	Hungarians	X	Western	Slv-Orth
	Roma		Mixed	Slv-Orth
Tajikistan	Russians	X	Slv-Orth	Islamic
Turkmenistan	Russians		Slv-Orth	Islamic
Ukraine	Russians		Slv-Orth	Slv-Orth

APPENDIX—*continued*

Country	Group	Civ Clsh	Min. Civ.	Maj. Civ.
	Crimean Russians		Slv-Orth	Slv-Orth
	Crimean Tatars	X	Islamic	Slv-Orth
Uzbekistan	Russians	X	Slv-Orth	Islamic
Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro)	Albanians (of Kosovo)	X	Islamic	Slv-Orth
	Hungarians	X	Western	Slv-Orth
	Sandzak	X	Islamic	Slv-Orth
	Roma		Mixed	Slv-Orth
	Croatians	X	Western	Slv-Orth

Region 3: Asia

Country	Group	Civ Clsh	Min. Civ.	Maj. Civ.
Afghanistan	Hazaras		Islamic	Islamic
	Pashtuns		Islamic	Islamic
	Tajiks		Islamic	Islamic
	Uzbeks		Islamic	Islamic
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill People	X	Confuc. (Budd.)	Islamic
	Hindus	X	Hindu	Islamic
	Biharis		Islamic	Islamic
Bhutan	Lhotshampas	X	Hindu	Confuc. (Budd.)
Myanmar (Burma)	Rohingya Muslims	X	Islamic	Confuc. (Budd.)
	Zomis (Chins)		Indig.	Confuc. (Budd.)
	Kachins		Indig.	Confuc. (Budd.)
	Karen		Confuc. (Budd.)	Confuc. (Budd.)
	Mons		Confuc. (Budd.)	Confuc. (Budd.)
	Shans		Confuc. (Budd.)	Confuc. (Budd.)
China	Hui	X	Islamic	Confuc.
	Tibetans		Confuc. (Budd.)	Confuc
	Turkmen (of Xiajang-Kazak & Uighur)	X	Islamic	Confuc.
Fiji	East Indians	X	Hindu	Confuc.
	Fijians		Confuc.	Confuc.

APPENDIX—*continued*

Country	Group	Civ Clsh	Min. Civ.	Maj. Civ.
India	Kashmiris	X	Islamic	Hindu
	Muslims	X	Islamic	Hindu
	Nagas		Indig.	Hindu
	Scheduled tribes		Hindu	Hindu
	Sikhs	X	Islamic	Hindu
	Mizos		Indig.	Hindu
	Tripuras		Indig.	Hindu
	Assamese		Hindu	Hindu
	Bodos		Hindu	Hindu
Indonesia	Chinese	X	Confuc. (Budd.)	Islamic
	East Timorese	X	Western (Cath.)	Islamic
	Papuans		Indig.	Islamic
	Aceh		Islamic	Islamic
Kampuche (Cambodia)	Vietnamese		Confuc. (Budd.)	Confuc. (Budd.)
South Korea	HoNamese (in Cholla Province)		Confuc. (Budd.)	Confuc. (Budd.)
Laos	Hmong		Indig.	Confuc. (Budd.)
Malaysia	Chinese	X	Confuc. (Budd.)	Islamic
	Dayaks (Sarwak)		Indig.	Islamic
	Indians	X	Hindu	Islamic
	Kadazans (Sabah)		Indig.	Islamic
Papua New Guinea	Bougainvilleans		Indig.	Mixed
Pakistan	Ahmadis		Islamic	Islamic
	Baluchis		Islamic	Islamic
	Hindus	X	Hindu	Islamic
	Pashtuns		Islamic	Islamic
	Sindhis		Islamic	Islamic
	Mohajirs		Islamic	Islamic
Philippines	Cordilleras (Igorots)		Indig.	Western
	Moros	X	Islamic	Western
Singapore	Malays	X	Islamic	Confuc.
Sri Lanka	Indian Tamils	X	Hindu	Confuc. (Budd.)
	Sri Lankan Tamils	X	Hindu	Confuc. (Budd.)
Taiwan	Aboriginals		Indig.	Confuc.
	Mainlanders		Mixed	Confuc.
	Taiwanese		Confuc.	Confuc.

APPENDIX:—*continued*

Country	Group	Civ Clsh	Min. Civ.	Maj. Civ.
Thailand	Chinese		Confuc. (Budd.)	Confuc. (Budd.)
	MalayMuslims	X	Islamic	Confuc.
	Northern Hill Tribes		Indig.	Confuc. (Budd.)
Vietnam	Chinese		Confuc.	Confuc. (Budd.)
	Montagnards.		Indig.	Confuc. (Budd.)

Region 4: North Africa and the Middle East

Algeria	Berbers		Islamic	Islamic
Baharain	Shi'i		Islamic	Islamic
Cyprus	Turks	X	Islamic	Slv-Orth
Egypt	Copts	X	Western	Islamic
Iran	Azerbaijanis		Islamic	Islamic
	Baha'is		Islamic	Islamic
	Bakhtiari		Islamic	Islamic
	Baluchis		Islamic	Islamic
	Kurds		Islamic	Islamic
	Turkomans		Islamic	Islamic
	Arabs		Islamic	Islamic
	Christians	X	Western	Islamic
Iraq	Kurds		Islamic	Islamic
	Shiites		Islamic	Islamic
	Sunnis		Islamic	Islamic
Israel	Arabs	X	Islamic	Western
	Palestinians	X	Islamic	Western
Jordan	Palestinians		Islamic	Islamic
Lebanon	Druze	X	Islamic	Mixed
	Maronites	X	Western	Mixed
	Palestinians	X	Islamic	Mixed
	Shiites	X	Islamic	Mixed
	Sunnis	X	Islamic	Mixed
Morocco	Berbers		Islamic	Islamic
	Saharawis		Islamic	Islamic
S. Arabia	Shiites		Islamic	Islamic
Syria	Alawis		Islamic	Islamic
Turkey	Kurds		Islamic	Islamic

APPENDIX—*continued*

Country	Group	Civ Clsh	Min. Civ.	Maj. Civ.
Region 5: Sub-Saharan Africa				
Angola	Bakongo		African	African
	Ovimbudu		African	African
	Cabinda		African	African
Botswana	San		African	African
Burundi	Hutu		African	African
	Tutsi		African	African
Cameroon	Kirdi	X	African	Islamic
	Westerners	X	Western	Islamic
	Bamileke	X	African	Islamic
Chad	Southerners		African	Islamic
Djibouti	Afars		Islamic	Islamic
Eritrea	Afars	X	Islamic	African
Ethiopia	Afars	X	Islamic	African
	Oromo		African	African
	Somalis	X	Islamic	African
	Tigreans		African	African
	Amhara		African	African
Ghana	Ashanti		African	African
	Ewe		African	African
	Mossi, Dagomba	X	Islamic	African
Guinea	Fulani (Fulbe)		Islamic	Islamic
	Malinke		Islamic	Islamic
	Susu	X	African	Islamic
Kenya	Kikuyu		African	African
	Luo		African	African
	Maasai		African	African
	Kalenjins		African	African
	Luhya		African	African
	Kisii		African	African
Madagascar	Merina		African	African
Mali	Tuareg		Islamic	Islamic
	Mande		Islamic	Islamic
Mauritania	Kewri		Islamic	Islamic
	B. Moors		Islamic	Islamic
Nambia	Europeans	X	Western	African
	San		African	African
	Basters		African	African
Niger	Tuareg	X	Islamic	African
Nigeria	Ibo	X	African	Islamic
	Ogni	X	African	Islamic
	Yoruba		Islamic	Islamic
Rwanda	Tutsi		African	African
	Hutu		African	African

APPENDIX:—*continued*

Country	Group	Civ Clsh	Min. Civ.	Maj. Civ.
Senegal	Casmance Region (Diola & others)	X	African	Islamic
Sierra Leone	Creoles		African	African
	Limba		African	African
	Mende		African	African
	Temne		African	African
South Africa	Asians	X	Confuc.	African
	Coloreds		African	African
	Europeans	X	Western	African
	Xhosa		African	African
	Zulus		African	African
Sudan	Southerners	X	African	Islamic
Togo	Ewe		African	African
	Kabre		African	African
Uganda	Acholi		African	African
	Baganda		African	African
Zaire	Luba		African	African
	Lunda, Yeke		African	African
	Banyarwandans		African	African
	Nagbundi		African	African
	Hutu		African	African
	Tutsi		African	African
Zambia	Bembe		African	African
	Lozi (Barotse)		African	African
Zimbabwe	Europeans		African	African
	Ndbele		African	African

Region 6: Latin America and the Caribbean

Country	Group	Civ Clsh	Min. Civ.	Maj. Civ.
Argentina	Natives		Indig.	L. Amer.
Bolivia	Natives, Highland		Indig.	L. Amer.
	Natives, Lowland		Indig.	L. Amer.
Brazil	Afro-Brazilians	X	African	L. Amer.
	Amazonian Indians		Indig.	L. Amer.
Chile	Natives		Indig.	L. Amer.
Colombia	Afro-Americans	X	African	L. Amer.
	Natives		Indig.	L. Amer.
Costa Rica	Antillean Blacks	X	African	L. Amer.
Domin. Rep.	Afro-Americans	X	African	L. Amer.
Ecuador	Afro-Amer.	X	African	L. Amer.
	Natives, Highland		Indig.	L. Amer.
	Natives, Lowland		Indig.	L. Amer.
El Salvador	Natives		Indig.	L. Amer.
Guatemala	Natives (Maya)		Indig.	L. Amer.

APPENDIX—*continued*

Country	Group	Civ Clsh	Min. Civ.	Maj. Civ.
Guyana	African	X	African	L. Amer.
	East Indians	X	Hindu	L. Amer.
Honduras	Black Car.	X	African	L. Amer.
	Natives		Indig.	L. Amer.
Mexico	Mayans		Indig.	L. Amer.
	Zapotecs		Indig.	L. Amer.
	Oth. Native		Indig.	L. Amer.
Nicaragua	Natives (Miskitos)		Indig.	L. Amer.
Panama	Afro-Carib.	X	African	L. Amer.
	Natives		Indig.	L. Amer.
	Chinese	X	Confuc.	L. Amer.
Paraguay	Natives		Indig.	L. Amer.
Peru	Afro-Amer.	X	African	L. Amer.
	Native, Highland		Indig.	L. Amer.
	Native, Lowland		Indig.	L. Amer.
Venezuela	Afro-Amer.	X	African	L. Amer.
	Natives		Indig.	L. Amer.