\textbf{Political messianism}

On one matter, particularly all scholars agree: As an ideology and movement, nationalism is modern. It dates from the last eighteen or very early nineteenth centuries, and is prominent in Western and Central Europe, and the United States. It is, therefore, a product of the discoveries of modernity. Just as the world religions contributed a much earlier response to the predicament of humanity in agrarian societies, with their natural disasters and social catastrophes, so the nation and nationalism represent the fundamental responses to the crises of identity so many human beings faced with the onslaught of modernity on the traditions of their ancestors. Nationalism is the natural response of human beings whose social world, with its stable groupings, has collapsed, yearning to belong to a durable community, they turn to the transcendental nation as the only Available replacement for the extended family, neighbourhood and religious community all of which have been eroded by capitalism and Westernization.

\'political religion\'

This was very much the fruit of the argument advanced by the theorists of \textit{political religion} in the 1980s. They saw nationalism in the new states of Africa and Asia as a religion of modernization, a political version of traditional religion. These modern states, they argued, have a number of requirements; the aggregation of an electorate, the establishment of strong central authority, the development of economic rationality, the need for liberal institutions for coping with change. But in the new states, the norms of social integration and economic development took on special importance in view of their ethnic heterogeneity and lack of resources. To achieve social integration and development, elites had to mobilize the masses and encourage them on a positional gratification and accept considerable sacrifice. The values of patriotism, commitment, hard work, frugality and self-restraint had to be inculcated in the newly independent states, and among the citizens, as a fervent and passionate ideology of mass self-sacrifice, served the purposes of the elites of the new states admirably, for in conditions of nation building from colonial rule it equated the unitary new nation with the newly independent state, and urged the citizens to labour for the good of the whole nation. In this way, the mass, and in one-party or military regime, came to
Marginal youth

This is the starting point for Eric Keddie's analysis of the spread of nationalism to colonial societies in the long introduction to his book, *Anatomy of a Revolution*. Written in the late 1960s, this book sought to understand the roots of nationalism and the ways it spread, focusing on the role of the educated middle classes in developing nationalist movements. Keddie argued that nationalism was a response to the challenges of modernity, including the industrialization of society, the rise of urban centers, and the spread of education. In this passage, he discusses the role of youth in these movements, noting their importance in challenging traditional forms of authority and in advocating for change.

Keddie's analysis of the role of youth in nationalism is part of a broader critique of the existing scholarship on the topic. He argues that previous studies have often neglected the social and political contexts in which nationalism emerged, focusing instead on the ideological and cultural elements of the movement. By emphasizing the role of youth, Keddie seeks to highlight the dynamic and often rebellious nature of these movements, which were often fueled by a sense of frustration with the existing social order.

In his introduction, Keddie also raises the question of whether nationalism was a temporary phenomenon or a lasting one. He suggests that the spread of nationalism was a response to the challenges of modernity, and as such, it was not likely to disappear overnight. He notes that the movement was often accompanied by social and political changes, which in turn influenced the spread of nationalism.

Overall, Keddie's analysis is a call to reframe the study of nationalism, shifting the focus from the intellectual and cultural elements to the social and political contexts in which these movements emerged. His work has been influential in shaping the way historians and scholars approach the study of nationalism, and his insights continue to be relevant in understanding the complex and dynamic nature of these movements.
The cult of the ‘dark gods’

What impact did those new European ideas have on Asian and African societies? Kedourie sees in this period the early expression of Greek rationalism in the person of Achamnides, Korkis (1748–1835), the Greek enlightener and master of the Greek Orthodox community of Smyrna. Korkis had studied Western ideas through the prism of a Latin-carrying man, and stayed several years during the 1770s in Holland, after returning from a brief sojourn in his homeland. He spent the rest of his life in France. Here, under the influence of the growing rationalism of the French Revolution, Korkis began to question the traditionality of his native Greece. In Western terms, knowing its decline and expressing in a lecture of 1803: ‘We continually appeal to a glorious past, earnest of a still more glorious future, and smoke for the successors of present and existing institutions’ for his conclusion, Korkis emphasized that modern Greece was the descendant of the ancient Greeks, and as such must be worthy of history only by accepting this, the regeneration of Greece become possible (ibid., 49–50).

For Else Kedourie, the idea of the ancestors past feeds on hatred of the present. Outgoing Yezids, ‘More substance in our countries than hear’, Kedourie emphasizes the European Enlightenment curiousness of the non-Western intellectuals’ antagonism towards all existing traditional institutions, notably religious orthodoxy, in the Balkans and in Asia. The non-European metamorphosis of beliefs and assumptions involved the Ottoman Empire, which, from being the work of the House of Osman, inheriting the triumphal cause of Islam, became the achievement of the Turks, or more generally, the Islamizing, imperial, both ‘Turk and Persian’ being internal discourse European philosophic and historical inventions. In fact, the name ‘Turkey’ was given to the land of the Turks by the Karshni regime in the 16th; hence the name for this idea in the Turkish language, for the foremost Turkish theorist of nationalism, Gazi Gokalp, indeed.

The country of the Turks is not Turkey, but just Turkish. Their country is not a breed and everlasting land Turan, a term that could cover Semitic, Hebrew, and Jewish, nor to mention Aramaic, Gothic, Slavic, Rumanian and Transylvanian, as manifestations of the pre-Roman notion of Turan. Later, however, the Turks ceased to be Turanian for Helens: in the 1930s they had become beautiful, tall specimen of the ‘Aryan race’, in line with the new interest in racial and fascist doctrines (ibid., 48–52).

In Iran, Pakistan, India and Africa, Kedourie finds the identical processes of Europeanization of thought and the same materializations of ideas. In the past, the Buddhists, Confucians, Muslims and Jews were teachers and prophets whose teachings
...towards the role of the imperial state in maintaining and enforcing, via means of coercion and domination, the political order. This role was not unique to the British Raj, but was a common feature of many colonial empires. However, in the context of the British Raj, the role was more pronounced and its impact was felt more deeply on the society and culture of the subcontinent.

The British Raj had a profound impact on the political, social, and cultural life of India. It was a period of transition, marked by the clash of different cultures and ideas. The British Raj brought modernity and progress, but it also brought inequality and oppression. The struggle for independence was a reflection of the people's desire to assert their identity and establish a just and equitable society.

The Indian National Congress was formed in 1885 to campaign for the introduction of self-government in India. It was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious organization that aimed to unify the country under a non-violent and democratic system. The Congress played a crucial role in the struggle for independence and its success was largely due to the leadership and commitment of its members.

The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre of 1919 was a turning point in the struggle for independence. The massacre, which claimed the lives of hundreds of innocent civilians, galvanized the people of India and boosted the morale of the Congress. It also strengthened the resolve of the Indian people to fight for their freedom.

Ambedkar's perspective on the struggle for independence was radical and forward-thinking. He believed in the power of the people and the need for a just and democratic society. His ideas were based on the principles of equal rights, social justice, and the upliftment of the marginalized sections of society.

Ambedkar's work and ideas continue to inspire and influence the struggle for justice and equality in India. His legacy is a source of inspiration for those who seek to build a better future for all.
The millennial hope is the modernization and revolution of society according to religious and political ideals. In a society where love, equality, and cooperation are the guiding principles and all humanity is united under a single political system, all distinctions and inequalities are abolished. But what is the state of such a society, where the distinction between public and private is eliminated? How can we create a world where love and cooperation are the guiding principles? We must transcend the barriers between different societies and create a single global society. This is the goal of the millennial hope.

Hence the revolutionary aims and style of the politics of millennial nationalism:

All of them [millennial nationalists] announce the gospel of love and brotherhood, and they must therefore destroy all social and political institutions that stand in the way of progress and the quest for absolute liberty which, as Hegel observed, goes hand-in-hand with terror. The idea of progress is a shared and respectable version of the millenarianism of the European tradition. Its disruptive political style, nationalism, has been placed in the service of a secular politics of the impossible, a utopian melancholy in which, as Kaczynski declared, terror is the essence of virtue.

Nationalism as it appears and spreads in Europe is one of the many forms of the vision of a political society in which all things are made new. The doctrine of nationalism, what makes it a unique and inimitable human action is unity, the millenarian hope that men can somehow put an end to all oppression and violence.

Citing the Revolutionary Constitution (1886) of the anarchist Bakunin, which are under the influence of the Synges, he reveals the revolutionary political style of the quest for absolute liberty. Kaczynski argues that the cells of the dark gods, Bakunin, and the intellectuals of the Synges is the product of the European revolution. The glorification of the state, which Kaczynski declares, is the product of the idiosyncrasy of the state of nature, where the struggle for liberty becomes a conflict between the state and the individual. In this final analysis, there are all variations on the underlying theme of the victory of the state, the guilt of Europe over the innocence of Asia and Africa, and the calamity of intolerance. The doctrine, which has led to the conflict between the state and the individual, between the state and the individual, has led to the conflict between the state and the individual, between the state and the individual. As the old man of the mountains, whose 'theory' was to promote theories that are transmitted to the future, could have told him, the state will also cause the conflict to continue.
Colonialism and the intellectuals

The idea that colonialism is a product of a certain form or sponsored intellectual caught between tradition and westernization is an essential one. It can be found in one early essay by Torey-Bolger as well as in the works of Thomas Hodgkin, and it is a long held view of Karl Marx's characterization of an "oriental" society by the proponents of the idea that "intellectuals in place of the bourgeoisie!" But in the case of Keddie, this idea is based on a new context and a deeper analysis. Keddie's makes some claims that, first, the discrepancy between the intellectual and colonial procedures is more acute, second, the dislocation of ideas can only be sustained by a state because impossible colonial doctrine of collective political progress, and third, that the reality of the intellectual is the product of the intellectualization of various aspects of society and is applied to maintain tradition through the processes of religious ideology. His painstaking research and rich illustration of these arguments make Keddie's analysis a unique project and original, and makes it the most compelling statement of its kind. Keddie, 1976, ch. 5; Torey-Bolger, 1972, Hodgkin, 1936, 1944.

Two considerations frame Keddie's arguments. The first is that his theoretical claims are limited. Unlike Geertz, Naipol or Heath, Keddie's approach is more narrow. He tries to show that he is interested in a particular doctrine or movement in its context. As an expression of a particular "genre" all the historians are concerned with are the ways in which specific ideas and practices emerge and are deployed in a specific social and cultural milieu. The purpose of Keddie is to show that ideologies of intellectuals in an early nineteenth century Central Europe undergoing revolutionary social and political change and second, a late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Asia and Africa radically transformed by the ideas of European colonialism. Common to both is the adoption of cultural modernization and social modernization, which undermines traditional communities and forces the age-old tradition of political ideas and habits. See Keddie, 1980.

The second consideration is the nature of Keddie's work. Keddie is clearly hostile to all expressions of nationalism, as he regards the doctrine as not only intellectually incoherent and empty, but also morally pernicious and detrimental to the political order. For Keddie, nationalism is a particularly virulent, because the distinctive species of the more general Western ideal of progress, in which stems from its broken attempt to realize unstable ideals in an imperfect world. Words, nationalism are simply the sign of pride. Taking the abstraction of the intellectual project. In fact, as we know Keddie's work, nationalism's impact was highly visible. For one thing, it was very much depended on the culture and policies of the colonial power. Where the British, for example, tended to assimilate an African or Indo-Chinese elite, leaving behind the rest of self-declared" wealth" and incredible wealth to their people with the people, and destroy all bases of power and a noble international order (see also Dunn 1978; ch. 3; Veblen 1994).

Despite these claims, Keddie succeeds in offering a general framework for the understanding of nationalism, which, at certain points, even manages to escape a degree of sympathy with those who reduce nationalism. That said, the framework is graced by the diffusion of ideas under the impact of a discriminatory colonialism. Keddie sees nationalism as a discourse transmitted through travel and reading from its origins in the West, and Western intellectuals, in the product of its "transculturalization of various aspects of society" and its appeal to maintain tradition through the processes of religious ideology. His painstaking research and rich illustration of these arguments make Keddie's analysis a unique project and original, and makes it the most compelling statement of its kind. Keddie, 1976, ch. 5; Torey-Bolger, 1972, Hodgkin, 1936, 1944.

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population encountered and succeeded citizens, the British colonial authorities preferred a policy of "syndical rule," working with and through traditional but subsidized indigenous authorities. We also have to take into account the variable presence of missionaries and the impact of missionary education in supporting indigenous élites and communities. The only one of the three that has escaped criticism is that the British authorities generally acted through a system of "indirect rule." This system of rule was not, as is often claimed today, a form of "pluralism" or "federalism," but rather a system of "indirect rule" that allowed the British authorities to maintain control while appearing to respect local customs and traditions. The British authorities used this system of rule to maintain control over the African populations, and it was a form of rule that was widely criticized by both the Africans and the Europeans who lived in the region.

In the context of the development of nationalism in Africa, the role of the British authorities in the formulation of the nationalist movements in the 20th century is significant. The British authorities had an interest in maintaining control over the African populations, and they used this system of rule to maintain control over the African populations, and it was a form of rule that was widely criticized by both the Africans and the Europeans who lived in the region.

The failure to treat seriously the social and cultural conditions in which nationalism emerges in Africa and Asia stems not only from the British authorities' ambitions, but also from their psychological ethos of "indirect rule." In fact, their understanding of the power of ideas is closely linked to their belief in the universal need of human beings to belong to a stable community. It follows that, if such communiques are entertained, human beings must immediately look for alternative sources of collective solidarity. At this point, the nation appears, like some sort of amalgam, to fill the gap and average the pains of their dissatisfaction. A new idea gives birth to a new sense of community at the very moment when the old ideas of religion and the national form of community are undermined.

But all this stems from the fact that human beings must belong to stable communities, and secondly that the nation is indeed a whole new kind of community and has no links with traditional communities. Yet it may be true that many human beings prefer to live their lives in stable communities, though, given the variety of such groups in the modern world, their collective identities are likely to be multiple and intermingling. But it should not be inferred from this that all human beings always prefer stability to change, and tradition to the ability to join or form their own communities of choice. This is as much a generational issue as it is a question of time.
vicissitudes of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Of course, as Kenneth graciously concedes, this is simply a more lyrical and fervent expression of the enlightened melancholy of the Enlightenment, of which Kenneth gives an endless sample from an English developer of work of 1727 by William Waddington, which also forewarns a future opposition to the innocence and poverty of the pastoral socials of Kenneth 1992: 94.

Now, we may readily concede some influence on eighteenth-century melancholy from earlier representations of religious melancholy. But it is far more difficult to trace the impact of Kenneth from the iconography and apocalyptic melancholy of Joseph of Teghien, the late twelfth-century, and Gerard of Sion, 1200s in the thirteenth centuries to Lessing’s sonnets and Marot’s in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In the long forthcoming period, Kenneth gives only one of the sources of the apocalyptic melancholy in the Jacobean and John Milton’s analysis of Lessing. We can certainly trace the origins of Kenneth, indeed any melancholy to the apocalyptic visions of the Marian Prophecy, the Eastern of the Divine Spirit and the Apocalypse of Mary from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries. For Kenneth’s kinetic logic, it is true, he would need to show that every case of melancholy, at least in Europe, was preceded by a national movement with strong cultural expression. It may be possible to show that a few melancholy were prevalent, within a few centuries, a national movement like the Maori Movement in Hawaii, to name but one, which Kenneth suggests might have influenced the making of eighteenth-century melancholy. We give this point one such importance.

The answer lies in the second, analogous, need of accommodation. For Kenneth, nationalism is a species of the revolutionary doctrine of progress, which in turn is a modern, functional, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, modern, political, 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whence, the social consequences of millenarianism and nationalism are quite different. Millenarianism appealed to the least educated, the poorest, most peripheral and most disadvantaged strata, whereas more ambitious, educated, urban classes formed the backbone of most nationalisms, even when they sought to draw other strata, lower class social strata, into the movement (A. D. Smith 1978: ch. 2).

It is noteworthy, then, that the French Revolution figures so prominently as a legacies and analogies to Kedourie's analysis, despite the fact that, already in 1789, let alone 1792, French nationalism was the first fully fledged example of secular millenarianism in Europe, and that it directly involved national responses wherever the
Revolutionary and Napoleonic armies penetrated. This means that, historically and sociologically, the "progressive" urban bourgeoisie is excluded from the picture, to be replaced by the authoritarian, organic and millenarian nationalism of Central and Eastern European intellectuals, as Hans Kohn had already proposed. But it is only in France that the educated urban classes, including the bourgeoisie, took up the national cause. We find them in the vanguard of the movement in places as far removed from each other as Greece and Italy, Japan and India, Mexico and the Gold Coast. But in the movement there exists in the least incipient and authoritarian, even if it often centers on a national leader. On the contrary, it is firmly grounded in the realities of the present situation, even when it seeks to change them for the better. In this respect, most nationalisms conform much more closely to what Kedourie calls the "'right doctrine of nationality, of which he appears, than to the 'continental' unitary doctrine of nationalism, which he so happily destroys" Shaffer 1998; Kedourie 1960: ch. 2; Kohn 1967: ch. 7; Gilles 1994: ch. 3.

So neither, as in the sociological level not in the ideological level, the nationalities can be compared with, or derived from, millenarianism, whether of the medieval or of more recent varieties. They belong to different worlds of thought and action, and are divided not just by "modernity" but, more radically, by the particularism of ethnic history, culture and territory.

The religion of history

Millenarianism seeks to abolish the past, and replace it wholly by the future. Nationalism, in contrast, seeks to fashion a future image of the past. Not any past, of course, only an authentic past, the genuine past of a people, homelaid. It is this past that must be reenacted and reimagined to form a blueprint of the community's destiny; for only through a real understanding of the ethnic past can national representation succeed.

Now, for Kedourie, the past is mainly a cultural resource to be mobilized and manipulated by the political leaders. In this respect, Kedourie differs from other modernists. They see religion and history as, at best, epiphenomena from which various cultural elements can be appropriatated to give legitimacy to, or emotional support for, radical social change.

There is, in this view, something unusual about the nationalist attitude to the past. For Kedourie, on the other hand, nationalism mobilization and manipulation of the masses can only succeed if history and religion are taken seriously and their potential political and communal to the national cause. The masses have an option. They are constrained by pre-existing religious and other religions, and the history of a community not to be transformed into the national religion. To some extent, this qualifies Kedourie's modernism. Even if the nation is modern, of course, it does not mean that the national religion is the state's official religion. Instead, as Kedourie argues, the role of the national religion is to be fulfilled by the state and is often transformed into the national religion as a substitute for the state's official religion. The masses have been given a choice, but the choice has been between two forms of religious devotion: one within the state and the other outside. This, then, is Kedourie's answer to the problem of "popular religion" which all nations have to face.

How is it that the state manages to enforce this choice and how is it that the masses are forced to accept? The answer is complex. It lies in the fact that the state is a powerful institution and that it is not easily managed. The masses, often quite successfully, have managed to resist the state. But the longer the state has been in power, the more it has been forced to build on the traditions and the symbols of the masses, and, as Kedourie argues, the state has used symbols that have a popular resonance. Nor, for Kedourie, are the symbols and rituals of traditional religion that have been resistant to the state. To mobilize the people, the state has therefore had to adopt the collective emotions related to traditional religions. For example, the state has used symbols that have a popular resonance. Nor, for Kedourie, is it that the symbols and rituals of traditional religion are resistant to the state. To mobilize the people, the state has therefore had to adopt the collective emotions related to traditional religions. For example, the state has used symbols that have a popular resonance. Nor, for Kedourie, is it that the symbols and rituals of traditional religion are resistant to the state. To mobilize the people, the state has therefore had to adopt the collective emotions related to traditional religions. For example, the state has used symbols that have a popular resonance. Nor, for Kedourie, is it that the symbols and rituals of traditional religion are resistant to the state. To mobilize the people, the state has therefore had to adopt the collective emotions related to traditional religions. For example, the state has used symbols that have a popular resonance. Nor, for Kedourie, is it that the symbols and rituals of traditional religion are resistant to the state. To mobilize the people, the state has therefore had to adopt the collective emotions related to traditional religions. For example, the state has used symbols that have a popular resonance. Nor, for Kedourie, is it that the symbols and rituals of traditional religion are resistant to the state. To mobilize the people, the state has therefore had to adopt the collective emotions related to traditional religions.
For a number of other theorists, too, religion continues to be directly relevant to nationalism. Mark Jepperson, for example, distinguishes between the revival of religious nationalism and the secular state nationalism of the West. The latter has attempted to overcome the nation as a secular and liberal creation of the modern state. This is a project that religious nationalists passionately regret. Yet, they condemn the rampant materialism, alienation and corruption of Western society and its secular nationalism, and wish to see the nation back from the secular modernity towards spiritual and religious roots. Secular nationalism, he says, has falsified the nature and purpose of the nations: it has encouraged greed, vice and corruption; it must be opposed in the name of a higher, purer conception of the nation. Hence is not nationalism as such, but rather the Western materialization and secularization of religion that have proved to diminish in the case of some countries. Yet religion has found a new civil war emerging, replacing the old one between the Western and Soviet ideological beliefs, with one between secular and religious heritage. At present, secularism, in the form of a new civil war, is preying, as it were, on the religious heritage.

Yet, for Bruce Lincoln, too, there are clear links between religion and nationalism. He examines two very different societies and religious settings, Sri Lanka and Australia, showing how in both, nationalism has taken on the role of a religion whose beliefs and rites achieve the communal and social purposes and provide meaning and purpose to individuals and nations. This role of the nation as a religious institution, he argues, is not simply traditional and religious; it is also a function of modernity. Thus, Meenakshi@end and religious identity has been characterized by new and violent meanings in the context of interstate warfare. But theSpinozian thinker and contemporary Nehru suggested that mixing and combining the values and symbols from the Greek and African traditions and the traditions of the people with Buddhist, Jain and Hindu beliefs, and the tradition of the country,. The idea of nationalism is to be understood in the broader context of world religions and the new religions with which modernity has become increasingly interconnected and intertwined. This is the idea of nationalism as a religious institution, which has been characterized by new and violent meanings in the context of interstate warfare. But the Spinozian thinker and contemporary Nehru suggested that mixing and combining the values and symbols from the Greek and African traditions and the traditions of the people with Buddhist, Jain and Hindu beliefs, and the tradition of the country..
6 Invention and imagination

The year 1963 saw the publication of two seminal books for the study of nationalism. The 1st, entitled The nation, was cited as introducing the study of nationalism, and was edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, with an introductory chapter by Hobsbawm. The second, entitled Nation and Nationalism, put forward some general hypotheses about the development of nationalism in various parts of the world, together with some case studies. Both books stemmed from a Marxist perspective, but sought to move beyond its traditional concerns with political economy into the realms of culture by analyzing and complementing them with themes drawn from the analysis of narratives and discourse developed by postmodernist theory in general. Both texts are intended to move beyond the traditional understanding of nationalism as a historical phenomenon to a more complex and nuanced understanding of national identity.

Inventing nations

Nations as 'invented traditions'

In his introduction to The nation, Eric Hobsbawm put forward some general propositions about invented traditions, national traditions, and the nation. His message was that we can best understand the nature and appeal of nationalism by analyzing national traditions, and that national traditions are one kind of invented traditions. If we could understand the genesis and function of invented traditions, we would be in a position to explain national traditions and understand the nations' relationship to them.