

38

THE NATIONAL PROBLEM IN RUSSIA

By Richard Pipes

Most students of Russia would agree that the nationalities question was one of the basic causes of the Russian Revolution. Yet one finds practically nothing on the subject in most treatments of Russian history. In view of the fact that almost 60 per cent of the Russian Empire's population were non-Russian, such neglect of a vital problem is inexcusable. The fact remains that very little has been written on the subject in English. Below we reproduce the bulk of the introductory chapter of a study of the problem in the first years of the Soviet era. Richard Pipes is professor of Russian history at Harvard University.

D. S. Mirsky's *Russia* is the only general history of the period up to the revolution which gives extensive analyses of the development of Russia's national minorities. For the Ukraine, see Mikhail Hrushevsky's *A History of the Ukraine* and the symposium entitled "The Role of the Ukraine in Modern History," *Slavic Review*, June, 1963, pp. 199-262. Central Asia is covered in Richard Pierce, *Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917*, and Serge Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*. For the Caucasus, see W. E. D. Allen, *A History of the Georgian People*. One of several studies of the Jewish problem is Louis Greenberg, *The Jews in Russia* (2 vols.). See also Nicholas Vakar, *Belorussia: The Making of a Nation*. For Poland, see the *Cambridge History of Poland* in two volumes. The fate of Russia's nationalities during 1917 is discussed in E. H. Carr's *Bolshevik Revolution*, Vol. I. For a legal analysis, see Leonid Strakhovsky, "Constitutional Aspects of the Imperial Russian Government's Policy toward National Minorities," *Journal of Modern History*, XIII, 467-92.

... The first systematic census, undertaken in 1897, revealed that the majority (55.7 per cent) of the population of the Empire, exclusive of the Grand Duchy of Finland, consisted of non-Russians. The total population of the Empire was 122,666,500. The principal groups were di-

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vided, by native language, as follows (the figures are in per cent):

Slavs:	
Great Russians	44.32
Ukrainians	17.81
Poles	6.31
Belorussians	4.68
Turkic peoples	10.82
Jews	4.03
Finnish peoples	2.78
Lithuanians and Latvians	2.46
Germans	1.42
Caucasian Mountain peoples (gortsy)	1.34
Georgians	1.07
Armenians	0.93
Iranian peoples	0.62
Mongolians	0.38
Others	1.03

One of the anomalies of pre-1917 Russia was the fact that although, to quote one observer, "the Russian Empire, Great Russian in its origin, ceased being such in its ethnic composition," the state, with some exceptions, continued to be treated constitutionally and administratively as a nationally homogeneous unit. The principle of autocracy, preserved in all its essentials until the Revolution of 1905, did not permit—at least in theory—the recognition of separate historic or national territories within the state in which the monarch's authority would be less absolute or rest on a legally different basis from that which he exercised at home. In practice, however, this principle was not always consistently applied. At various times in history Russian tsars did grant considerable autonomy to newly conquered territories, partly in recognition of their special status, partly in anticipation of political reforms in Russia, and in some cases they even entered into contractual relations with subject peoples, thus limiting their own power.

Poland from 1815 to 1831 and Finland from 1809 to 1899 were in theory as well as in practice constitutional mon-

archies. Other regions, such as the Ukraine from 1654 to 1764, Livonia and Estonia from 1710 to 1783 and from 1795 to the 1880's, enjoyed extensive self-rule. But those exceptions were incompatible with the maintenance of the principle of autocracy in Russia itself. Sooner or later, for one reason or another, the privileges granted to conquered peoples were retracted, contracts were unilaterally abrogated, and the subjects, together with their territories, were incorporated into the regular administration of the Empire.

At the close of the nineteenth century, Finland alone still retained a broad measure of self-rule. Indeed, in some respects, it possessed greater democratic rights than Russia proper; Finland under the tsars presented the paradox of a subject nation possessing more political freedom than the people who ruled over it. It was a separate principality, which the Russian monarch governed in his capacity as Grand Duke (*Velikiĭ Kniaz'*). The tsar was the chief executive; he controlled the Grand Duchy's foreign affairs; he decided on questions of war and peace; he approved laws and the appointments of judges. The tsar also named the resident Governor General of the Grand Duchy, who headed the Finnish and Russian armies and the police on its territory, and who was responsible for the appointments of the local governors. A State Secretary served as the intermediary between the Russian monarch and the Finnish organs of self-rule. The Finns had complete control over the legislative institutions of the state. They possessed a bicameral legislative body, composed of a Senate and a Seim (Diet). The Senate considered legislative projects and performed the function of the supreme court of the state. The Seim was the highest legislative organ in the country. Called every five years on the basis of nationwide elections, it initiated and voted on

COLLECTION
RESERVE

legislation pertaining to its domain. No law could become effective without its approval. Finnish citizens in addition enjoyed other privileges. Every Finnish subject, while in Russia proper, could claim all the rights of Russian citizens, although Russian citizens in Finland were considered foreigners. In every respect, therefore, Finland had a uniquely privileged position in the Russian Empire, which resembled more closely the dominion relationship in existence in the British Empire than the customary colonial relationship prevalent in other parts of Russia. The Finns had originally acquired these privileges from the Swedes, who had ruled their country before the Russian conquest. The tsars preserved them because Finland was acquired by Alexander I, a monarch of relatively liberal views, who, for a time, had thought of introducing a constitutional regime into Russia proper.

Prior to 1917, the Russian Empire also possessed two protectorates, the Central Asian principalities of Bukhara and Khiva. In 1868 and 1873 respectively, these states recognized the sovereignty of the Russian tsar and ceded to him the right to represent them in relations with other powers. They also granted Russians exclusive commercial privileges and were compelled to abolish slavery in their domains. Otherwise, they enjoyed self-rule.

The remaining borderlands of the Empire were administered, in the last decades of the *ancien régime*, in a manner which did not differ essentially—though it differed in some particulars—from that in effect in the territories of Russia proper. Whatever special powers the Imperial Government deemed necessary to grant to the authorities administering these territories were derived not so much from a recognition of the multinational character of the state or from a desire to adapt political institutions to the needs of the inhabitants, as from the impracticability of extending the administrative

system of the Great Russian provinces in its entirety to the borderland. . . .

Russian law also made special provisions for certain groups of non-Russian subjects. Russia, prior to 1917, retained the system of legally recognized classes and class privileges, long since defunct in Western Europe. Within this system there was a social category of so-called *inorodtsy*, a term which has no exact equivalent in English and can best be rendered by the French *peuples allogènes*. The *inorodtsy* comprised the Jews and most of the nomadic peoples of the Empire, who were subject to special laws rather than to the general laws promulgated in the territories which they inhabited. For the nomadic *inorodtsy*, this meant in effect that they possessed the right to self-rule, with their native courts and tribal organization. Their relations with the Russian authorities were limited to the payment of a fixed tribute or tax, usually to an agent of the Ministry of Interior or of State Properties. By settling on land and abandoning nomadic habits, an *inorodets* changed from his status to that of a regular Russian citizen, with all the duties and privileges of the class which he had joined; as long as he retained his *inorodets* status, he gave nothing to the government and received nothing in return. Russian treatment of the nomads was, on the whole, characterized by tolerance and respect for native traditions. Much of the credit for this must be given to the great liberal statesman M. M. Speranskii, who, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, had laid down the basic principles for their administration.

For the other subgroup of *inorodtsy*, the *Jews*, membership in this class entailed stringent restrictions (most of them stemming from eighteenth-century legislation). These forbade them to move out of a strictly defined area in the south-

western and northwestern parts of the Empire, the so-called Pale of Settlement, to purchase landed property, or to settle outside the towns. Such disabilities brought severe social and economic suffering, for the Jews were crowded into towns where they had no adequate basis for livelihood and had to rely heavily on primitive handicraftsmanship and petty trade to survive. By creating abnormal economic conditions in the Jewish communities and preventing them from taking their place in the life of society, the restrictive legislation contributed to the large number of Jews found in radical movements at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Jew could alter his status only by adopting Christianity.¹

At no point in its history did tsarist Russia formulate a consistent policy toward the minorities. In the early period of the Empire, approximately from the middle of the sixteenth until the middle of the eighteenth century, the attitude of the government toward its non-Russian subjects was influenced strongly by religion. Where discrimination existed, the principal reason was the desire of the regime to convert Moslems, Jews, and other non-Christians to the Orthodox faith. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, with the secularization of the Russian monarchy, this religious element lost its force, and political considerations loomed ever larger. Thereafter, the treatment of the minorities, as of the Great Russians themselves, was largely determined by the desire on the part of the monarchs to maintain and enforce the principle of autocracy; minority groups which challenged this effort in the name of national rights were treated as harshly as were Russian groups which challenged it in the name of democracy or freedom in general.

¹ Exceptions were made only in the case of certain categories of Jews who were either rich merchants or had a higher education.

The period from the accession of Alexander III (1881) to the outbreak of the 1905 Revolution was that in which persecution of the minorities culminated. The Russian government perhaps for the first time in its entire history adopted a systematic policy of Russification and minority repression, largely in an endeavor to utilize Great Russian national sentiments as a weapon against growing social unrest in the country. During this period, Finnish privileges were violated through a suspension of the legislative powers of the Seim (1899), the introduction of the compulsory study of Russian in Finnish secondary schools, the subordination of the Finnish Ministry of Post and Telegraphs to the corresponding Russian institution, and other restrictive measures. Polish cultural activity was severely limited; the Jewish population was subjected to pogroms inspired or tolerated by the government, and to further economic restrictions (for instance, the revocation of the right to distill alcohol); the Ukrainian cultural movement was virtually brought to a standstill as a result of the prohibitions imposed on printing in the Ukrainian language (initiated in the 1870's); the properties of the Armenian church were confiscated by the Viceroy of the Caucasus (1903). It was, however, not accidental that this era of Russification coincided with the period of greatest governmental reaction, during which the Great Russian population itself lost many of the rights which it had acquired in the Great Reforms of Alexander II (1856-81).

The outbreak of the Revolution of 1905 and the subsequent establishment of a constitutional monarchy brought to a halt the period of national persecution but it did not repair all the damage done in the previous quarter-century. The Dumas, especially the First, in which the minorities were well represented, gave

COLLECTION

only slight attention to the national question, though they provided an open rostrum of discussions on that topic. In 1907, the government regained supremacy over the liberal elements; it changed the electoral laws in favor of the Russian upper classes, among whom supporters of the autocracy were strong, depriving the remainder of the population of a proportionate voice in the legislative institutions of the state. The borderlands, where liberal and socialist parties enjoyed a particularly strong following, were hardest hit by the change, and some (Turkestan, for instance) lost entirely the right to representation.

NATIONAL MOVEMENTS IN RUSSIA

The paradox—and tragedy—of Russian history in the last century of the *ancien régime* was the fact that while the government clung to the anachronistic notion of absolutism, the country itself was undergoing an extremely rapid economic, social, and intellectual evolution, which required new, more flexible forms of administration. The nineteenth century was a period when capitalism and the industrial revolution penetrated Russia, stimulating the development of some social classes which had previously been weak (a middle class, an industrial proletariat, and a prosperous, land-owning peasantry), and undermining others (e.g., the landed aristocracy). Western ideas, such as liberalism, socialism, nationalism, utilitarianism, now found a wide audience in Russia. The Russian monarchy, which until the nineteenth century had been the principal exponent of Western ideas in Russia, now lagged behind. The second half of the reign of Alexander I (1815–25) marked the beginning of that rift between the monarchy and the articulate elements in Russian society which, widening continuously, led to conspiratorial movements,

terrorist activity, and revolution, and finally, in 1917, to the demise of monarchy itself.

The national movement among the minorities of the Russian state, which also began in the nineteenth century, represented one of the many forms which this intellectual and social ferment assumed. Because the traditions and socio-economic interests of the various groups of subjects, including the minorities, were highly diversified, their cultural and political development tended to take on a local, and in some cases, a national coloring. Romantic philosophy, which first affected Russia in the 1820's, stimulated among the minority intellectuals an interest in their own languages and past traditions, and led directly to the evolution of cultural nationalism, the first manifestation of the national movement in the Russian borderlands.

Next, in the 1860's and 1870's, the spread of Russian Populism, with its emphasis on the customs and institutions of the peasantry, provided the minority intellectuals with a social ideology and induced them to establish contact with the broad masses of their own, predominantly rural, population. Finally, the development of modern political parties in Russia, which took place about 1900, led to the formation of national parties among the minorities, which in almost all instances adopted either liberal or socialist programs and affiliated themselves closely with their Russian counterparts. Until the breakdown of the tsarist regime, such Russian and minority parties fought side by side for parliamentary rights, local self-rule, and social and economic reforms; but while the Russian parties stressed the general needs of the whole country, the minority parties concentrated on local, regional requirements. The fact that the minorities in Russia developed a national consciousness before their fellow-nationals across the bor-

der (the Ukrainians in Austrian Galicia, Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, Azerbaijanis in Persia, and so on) was a result of the more rapid intellectual and economic growth of the Russian Empire.

The refusal of the tsarist regime to recognize the strivings of the minorities was part of the larger phenomenon of its failure to respond to the growing clamor on the part of all its citizens for fundamental reforms, and had equally dire results.

THE UKRAINIANS AND BELORUSSIANS

The Ukrainians and Belorussians (22.3 and 5.8 million respectively in 1897) descended from the Eastern Slav tribes which had been separated from the main body of Russians as a result of the Mongolian invasions and Polish-Lithuanian conquest of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. For over five centuries, these two parts of Eastern Slavdom developed under different cultural influences. By the end of the eighteenth century, when Moscow had conquered the areas inhabited by the other Eastern Slavic groups, the dissimilarities caused by centuries of separate growth were too considerable to permit a simple fusion into one nation. Through contact with their western neighbors, those peoples had acquired distinct cultural traditions with their own dialects and folklores. Moreover, the steppes of the Black Sea region had for several centuries following the Mongolian invasion remained a no man's land, where runaway serfs, criminal elements, or simply adventurers from Poland, Muscovy, or the domains of the Ottoman Empire had found a haven. In the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, those groups to which the Turkic name "Cossack" (freebooter) was applied had formed an anarchistic society, with a center along the lower course of the Dnieper, which lived in

complete freedom, hunting, fishing, or pillaging. In the course of time, these Cossacks—with their ideal of unlimited external and internal freedom—developed a new socio-economic type of great importance for the future Ukrainian national consciousness.

Tied by the bonds of religion and the memory of common origin, but separated by cultural and socio-economic differences, the Ukrainians and Belorussians did not coalesce completely with their Great Russian rulers. The rapid economic development of the rich Ukrainian agriculture following the liberation of the serfs, especially in the last two decades of the *ancien régime*, when the Ukrainian provinces became one of the world's leading grain-exporting regions, created an additional basis for Ukrainian nationalism. There now emerged a prosperous class of independent farmers, without parallel in Russia proper. On the whole, the Ukrainian peasantry knew neither the communal type of land ownership nor the service relationship between peasant and landlord (*barshchina*). Its soil was individually owned, and paid for by money, not by personal labor.

During the eighteenth and part of the nineteenth century, it was still an open question whether the cultural and economic peculiarities of the Ukrainian people would lead to the formation of a separate nation. The absence of a Ukrainian intelligentsia and centripetal economic forces militated against; the Cossack tradition and the interests of the Ukrainian peasants for. Throughout its existence, the Ukrainian movement had to develop in an atmosphere of skepticism in which not only the validity of its demands but the very existence of the nationality it claimed to represent was seriously questioned by persons unconnected with the movement. This accounts, at least in part, for the great vehemence

RESERVE
COLLECTION

with which Ukrainian nationalists tended to assert their claims.

The cultural phase of the Ukrainian movement began in the 1820's, under the stimulus of the ideas of Western romanticism transmitted through Russia. Scholars began it by undertaking ethnographic studies of the villages of southwestern Russia, where they uncovered a rich and old folklore tradition and the ethos of a peasant culture, the existence of which had been scarcely suspected. On this basis, there arose in Russia and in the Ukrainian provinces a sizable provincial literature which reached a high point with the publication in 1840 of the *Kobzar*, a collection of original poems in Ukrainian by Taras Shevchenko, then a student at the Saint Petersburg Academy of Arts. This began the transformation of a peasant dialect into a literary, and, subsequently, a national language: In 1846, a number of writers and students at Kiev founded the Cyril and Methodius Society—a secret organization permeated with the spirit of utopian socialism, German idealism, and the notions of international brotherhood and social equalitarianism. Present also was a strong element of cultural Pan-slavism. This society, like others of similar type in Russia proper, was suppressed in 1847.

In the second half of the century, the Ukrainian movement patterned itself after Populism, prevalent in Russia at the time. It devoted itself to the social problems of the peasantry, and displayed strong sympathy for peasant customs and manners. The cultural movement received a temporary setback in the 1870's when the Russian government, suspecting a liaison between the "Ukrainophiles" (as the Ukrainian Populists were called) and Polish nationalists, issued edicts which for all practical purposes forbade printing in the Ukrainian language. For the next thirty years, its center shifted to Galicia, where it en-

joyed greater freedom owing to Vienna's interest in utilizing Ukrainian (Ruthenian) patriotism as a counterbalance to Polish nationalism in this province.

Until the end of the nineteenth century, the Ukrainians had no political parties of their own. In the Ukraine, as in Galicia, there were numerous provincial organizations of a cultural character, the so-called *Hromady* (Communities), devoted to the study of Ukrainian life, but they took no part in political activity. It was only in 1900 that a society of young Ukrainians founded the first political organization, the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (or RUP for short). This party, established in Kharkov, represented a merger of various groups dissatisfied with the purely cultural activity of the older generation, and determined to give the Ukrainian movement a political expression. The RUP utilized the local *Hromady* to spread its influence to the provincial towns and villages. Its headquarters were located in Kiev, but the nerve center was abroad, in Lemberg (Lwów, Lviv), where the RUP printed propaganda to be smuggled into Russia, and engaged in other illegal activities. The RUP united several divergent tendencies: separatist, anarchistic, Marxist, Populist, and others. At first the extreme nationalist, irredentist element won the upper hand; the first program of the RUP (1900) demanded unconditional independence for a "greater Ukraine" extending between the Don and the San rivers. But before long, the more moderate elements prevailed and the RUP withdrew the demand for Ukrainian independence from its program, replacing it with a demand for autonomy within the Russian Empire. The RUP played a part in stimulating agrarian disorders in the Ukraine in 1902-3, and in spreading ideas of Ukrainian nationalism among the masses. It also served as a training ground for many of the future

political leaders of the Ukrainian cause.

A few years after its formation, the RUP began to fall apart, as the various groups which it had united stepped out to form independent parties. The first to depart were the separatists (*samostiiniki*) who, dissatisfied with the gravitation of the party toward Russian socialist organizations, founded the National Ukrainian Party (NUP) in 1902. Next went the extreme left radicals, who, in 1905, joined the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. The remainder of the RUP adopted the Social Democratic program and renamed itself the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party (USDRP). Its program included the demand for Ukrainian autonomy and the establishment of a regional Seim (Diet) in Kiev. In 1905, the liberal elements of the Ukrainian society who had not been associated with the RUP formed a separate Ukrainian Democratic Radical Party (UDRP). Thus within a few years, a large number of Ukrainian parties appeared on the scene—an early manifestation of the extreme factionalism which was to become a characteristic trait of Ukrainian political life. The USDRP and UDRP were the most influential, though none of them seems to have had a numerous following or a very efficient apparatus. The USDRP co-operated closely with the Russian Marxists, whereas the UDRP supported the Russian Kadets.

The Belorussian movement developed more slowly than the Ukrainian. Its cultural phase did not get well under way until the beginning of the twentieth century, with the publication of the *Nasha niva* (Our Land), the first newspaper in the Belorussian language. The first Belorussian national party was the Belorussian Revolutionary Hromada, founded in 1902 in St. Petersburg by a group of students associated with the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), and later renamed the Belorussian Socialist Hromada. The

Hromada took over the program of the PPS, adding to it a statement on the national question, which demanded the introduction of federal relations in Russia, with territorial autonomy for the provinces adjoining Vilna and national-cultural autonomy for all the minorities of the region. The Belorussian movement, operating in one of Western Russia's poorest areas, and having to compete with Polish, Jewish, Russian, and Lithuanian parties, remained ineffective and exercised no influence on political developments in prerevolutionary Russia.

THE TURKIC PEOPLES

By 1900 Russia had within its borders nearly fourteen million Turks—several million more than the Ottoman Empire itself. The remaining Moslems were either of Iranian stock, or else belonged to North Caucasian groups whose racial origin is uncertain.

Culturally and economically, the most advanced Turks in Russia were the Volga Tatars (over two million in 1897) who inhabited the regions adjacent to Kazan. Descendants of the Kazan Khanate which had been conquered by Ivan IV, the Volga Tatars had early abandoned the nomadic habits of their ancestors and had settled in the cities and on the soil. Taking advantage of the geographic location of their territory, they developed considerable commercial activity, serving as middlemen between Russia and the East. This economic position they retained after the Russian conquest. A statistical survey undertaken at the beginning of the nineteenth century revealed that the Tatars owned one-third of the industrial establishments in the Kazan province, and controlled most of the trade with the Orient. The Volga Tatars were the first of the Turks in Russia, or for that matter, anywhere in the world, to develop a middle class. This

RESERVE
COLLECTION

enabled them to assume leadership of the Turkic movement in Russia.

The Crimean Tatars and the Azerbaijani Turks were next in order of cultural advancement. Both these groups had come relatively late under Russian dominion, the former in 1783, the latter in the first decade of the nineteenth century. The Crimean Tatars were the remnants of the Crimean Khanate which, at one time, had dominated the Black Sea steppes and from the middle of the fifteenth century to the Russian conquest had been under the protection of the Ottoman Sultan. At the time of the Russian occupation, they had numbered, according to contemporary estimates, one half million, but several waves of mass migration to Turkish Anatolia had reduced that number by 1862 to one hundred thousand. In 1897 there were in the Crimea 196,854 Tatars. The Crimean Tatars owed their cultural advance partly to contact with other nations, made possible by their geographic location, and partly to the wealth acquired from subtropical horticulture.

The Azerbaijanis (1,475,553 in 1897) lived along the Kura River valley of Transcaucasia. They formed a smaller part of that branch of the Turks, the majority of whom then, as now, inhabited northwestern Persia. The Azerbaijanis were an agricultural people, consisting of a peasantry and landowning aristocracy. With the development of the Baku oil industries on their territory, the Azerbaijanis also acquired the beginning of an urban middle class.

The Central Asian Uzbeks (about two million in 1897, not counting those inhabiting Khiva and Bukhara) also were largely settled, and had developed an urban trading and artisan class. At the time of the Russian conquest they were politically and economically the rulers of Turkestan.

The remaining Turkic groups in Rus-

sia consisted largely of seminomads: Bashkirs of the southwest Ural region (1,493,000 in 1897); the Kazakhs and Kirghiz (4,285,800), and the Turkmens of Central Asia (281,357 in 1897); and the numerous small tribes of Siberia. The majority of those groups combined cattle-breeding and the tending of sheep with agriculture.

Nearly all the Turkic peoples spoke similar dialects of the same language and had a common racial descent. An observer might have expected, therefore, that "Turkism" or "Pan-Turkism" would provide the basis for a national movement of the Turkic groups in Russia. This, however, did not prove to be the case. The concept of a single Turkic people emerged only at the end of the nineteenth century and, before the Revolution of 1917, had not had an opportunity to affect even the Turkic intelligentsia, let alone the broader masses of the population.

The Turks in Russia, insofar as they felt a sense of unity, were much more conscious of their common Moslem faith than of their common ethnic origin. Since Islam, like most Oriental religions, is not only a set of beliefs but also a way of life, it affects family relations, law, commerce, education, and virtually every other aspect of human existence. This religious bond provided the main basis of the Turkic movement; it was, prior to 1917, always more important than the ethnic element. But it also presented great difficulties to the slowly developing national movement among the Russian Turks which from the first took on an openly westernizing character, and as such was anticlerical. Its leaders found themselves thus in the position of having to uproot the very ideas which provided the *raison d'être* of their movement.

The national awakening of Russian Turks had its beginning in the Crimea.

[Its leader was Ismail-bey Gasprinskii (Gaspraly or Gaspıralı) who, in 1883-84, established in his native city of Bakhchisarai a Turkish-language newspaper, the *Terdzhiman* (*Tercüman*, meaning Interpreter) which before long became the prototype for all Moslem periodical publications in Russia and served as an organ of Moslems throughout the entire country. Gasprinskii also founded a new school system, based on the principles of modern education, to replace the *medresse*, which taught Arabic and restricted instruction to subjects bearing on religion. On the basis of the experience which these efforts provided, there grew up in Russia within one generation a considerable network of periodical publications and "new-method," or so-called *dzhaddidist* (*jadidist*) schools. By 1913 Russia had sixteen Turkic periodical publications, of which five were daily newspapers. All except three of those were written in the dialect of the Volga Tatars which was quickly gaining acceptance as the literary language of all Russian Turks. In the same year, there were published in Russia 608 books in Turkic languages in a total edition of 2,812,130 copies, of which 178 titles and 1,282,240 copies were devoted to religious subjects, while the remainder were secular. The reformed school system, which the tsarist government allowed to develop freely, spread to the Volga region and from there to Turkestan. On the eve of the First World War, Russian Turks had access to a considerable number of elementary and several secondary schools of the secular, Western kind which taught youth in their native languages free from government interference or supervision. From educational institutions of this kind, supported largely by wealthy Kazan or Baku merchants, emerged the intelligentsia which, during the Russian Revolution and the first

decade of Soviet rule, was to play a crucial role in the history of the Moslem borderlands.

Beginning with the Russian Revolution of 1905, the political movement among Russian Turks took two parallel courses. There was an All-Russian Moslem movement, and there were local movements of the various national groups. Occasionally the two forms actively supplemented one another, occasionally they conflicted, but they never merged completely. In 1905 and 1906, the leading representatives of the Moslem intelligentsia met in three congresses, the first and third at Nizhnii Novgorod (now Gorkii), the second at Moscow. At those meetings, the principle of unity of all Russian Moslems was asserted through the establishment of a Moslem Union (*Ittīfāq-ul-Muslīmīn* or *Ittīfak*) and agreements for the caucusing of the Moslem deputies in the Russian Dumas. The Third Congress (August 1906) adopted resolutions urging the introduction of regional autonomy into Russia, without specifying whether or not it was to rest on the national principle.

In the First and Second Dumas, in which they had thirty and thirty-nine deputies respectively, the Moslems formed a separate Moslem Faction in which the Volga Tatar Saadri Maksudov (Maksudi) later came to play a dominant role. The majority of them supported the Russian liberals or Kadets, though small socialist groups were also present within the Faction. The change of electoral laws, effected in 1907 to favor the election of Russian deputies, reduced the number and importance of Moslems in the last two Dumas.

Simultaneously with the All-Russian Moslem movement—which was dominated by liberal elements—there developed regional Turkic parties, generally of a more radical character. The

COLLECTION
RESERVE

Volga Tatars again led the way. In 1906 two Volga Tatar writers, Fuad Tuktarov and Gaijaz (Ayaz) Iskhakov (Iskhaky), founded a local counterpart of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party, which, grouped around the newspaper *Tang* (Dawn), advocated the immediate transfer of all land to the people and, wherever possible, of factories to the workers. The relations of their party, the *Tangchelar* (*Tançelar*), with the pro-Kadet Ittifak were cool and occasionally hostile.

In Azerbaijan a group of young Turkic intellectuals, many of whom had been closely associated with the local Bolshevik organization during the 1905 Revolution, formed in Baku in 1911-12 the Moslem Democratic Party *Mussavat* (*Musavat*). Its original leader was a young journalist, Mehmed Emin Resulzade. The first program of this Party had a pronounced Pan-Islamic character, expressing the desire for the reestablishment of Moslem unity throughout the world and the revival of the ancient glories of Islam. It advanced no specific demands for the Azerbaijani people. Indeed, the very concept of a distinct Azerbaijani nation did not come into being until 1917, when local nationalists applied to their people the geographic name of the Persian province inhabited by Turks.

These two parties, established among the leading Turkic peoples in Russia, had no counterparts among the smaller Turkic groups which were to acquire national organizations only during the Revolution of 1917.

THE PEOPLES OF THE CAUCASUS

The term Caucasus (*Kavkaz*) is applied to the territory adjoining the northern and southern slopes of the Caucasian Mountains which stretch between the Caspian and Black seas, a thousand-

mile-long chain with elevations surpassing those of the European Alps. Under tsarist administration this area was divided into six provinces or *gubernie* (Baku, Tiflis, Erivan, Elisavetpol, Kutais, and Chernomore), five regions or *oblasti* (Batum, Daghestan, Kars, Kuban, and Terek), and one separate district or *okrug* (Zakataly). Topographically, the Caucasus can be divided into two main parts, separated from each other by the Caucasian range. The Northern Caucasus (*Severnyi Kavkaz*) includes the steppes stretching from the mountains toward the Volga and Don rivers and the northern slopes of the mountains themselves. South of the range is Transcaucasia (*Zakavkaz'e*), an area covered by mountains of medium height and traversed by three river valleys: the Rion, Kura, and Araks (Aras). The total territory of the Caucasus is 158,000 square miles.

The Caucasian population is extraordinarily heterogeneous. It may safely be said that no other territory of equal size anywhere in the world displays a comparable diversity of languages and races. The mountains of the Caucasus, situated near the main routes of Asiatic migrations into Europe and to the Near Eastern centers of civilization, have offered a natural haven for peoples seeking escape from wars and invasions, and in the course of the past three thousand years nearly every one of the peoples inhabiting or passing through the region has left its mark on the Caucasus' ethnic composition. In 1916 the Caucasus had 12,266,000 inhabitants, divided into the following principal groups:

Russians, Ukrainians,	
Belorussians	4,023,000
Azerbaijanis and other	
Moslems	2,455,000
Armenians	1,860,000
Georgians	1,791,000

Caucasian Mountain	
peoples	1,519,000
Other European peoples .	140,000
Other indigenous peoples .	478,000

The greatest ethnic heterogeneity is to be found in the Northern Caucasus, and especially in its eastern sections, Daghestan and Terek. The term "Caucasian Mountain peoples" (*Kavkazskie gortsy*, or simply *gortsy*) has no ethnic significance; it is merely a general term used to describe the numerous small groups inhabiting the valleys and slopes of the Caucasian range. There one can find living side by side the descendants of the Jews carried into captivity by the Babylonians, of the Avars, who had ravaged Eastern Europe between the sixth and eighth centuries; and of numerous other small peoples, some of whom number no more than a few hundred. In Transcaucasia, on the other hand, in addition to the Azerbaijani Turks, there are two sizable national groups: the Georgians and the Armenians. Their racial origin is still a matter of dispute, but it is certain that they have inhabited their present territories continuously for over two thousand years. Their history has been closely associated with that of the entire Near East, and, at various times, they have been subjected to the dominant powers in that region, the Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Byzantines, Mongolians, and Turks.

The central factor in the historical development of the Georgians and the Armenians was their adoption of Christianity in the fourth century. As a result of this, they entered into contact with Byzantium and, through it, with Europe. This bond with the West not only brought these two peoples under different cultural influences from those of their neighbors, but also developed in them a consciousness of distinctness, of separateness from the civilization of the Near East, which remained long after

they had been cut off from the main body of their co-religionists by the spread of Islam. Surrounded on all sides by Moslems, the Christian Georgians and Armenians always felt themselves drawn to Europe and were susceptible to Western ideas. For the same reason, they passed voluntarily under Russian dominion, and once incorporated into Russia, got along well with their Christian rulers. Eastern Georgia became a vassal of Russia at the end of the eighteenth century to escape Persian misrule; it was not allowed to enjoy the privileges of vassalage for long, however, and in 1801 it was incorporated into the Russian Empire by a tsarist edict. Russian Armenia came under Russian rule as one of the prizes of the victorious wars which the tsars waged with Persia at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Russia ruled only a small part of the Armenian population, the majority of which continued to live on territories of the Ottoman Empire.

The Caucasus is a purely geographic, not a historic or cultural concept. There never was, or could have been, a "Caucasian" national movement. The ethnic, religious, and socio-economic divergencies separating the main groups of the population from each other, not only prevented the emergence of a united cultural or political movement, but actually led to internal frictions and at times to armed conflicts. Instead of one, there were separate national movements of the principal ethnic groups.

The Georgians were primarily a rural people, composed of a largely impoverished ancient feudal aristocracy (5.26 per cent of the entire Georgian population in 1897) and a peasantry. The Georgian urban class was small and insignificant. It was the *déclassé* nobility which, from the beginning, assumed the leadership over the cultural and political life of Georgia. The Georgians possessed

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nearly all the elements that usually go into the formation of national consciousness: a distinct language, with its own alphabet; an ancient and splendid literary heritage; a national territory; and a tradition of statehood and military prowess. In the 1870's, a cultural movement arose among the Georgian aristocracy, which, with its interest in the newly liberated peasant, assumed forms akin to Russian populism.

The political phase of the national movement in Georgia acquired a somewhat unusual character. Whether it was due to the fact that the carriers of the national ideology in Georgia did not belong to the middle class but to an anti-bourgeois nobility, or whether it was caused by the general receptivity to Western ideas characteristic of the Georgians, or by still other causes, the Georgian movement became from its very inception closely identified if not completely fused with Marxian socialism. Marxism was introduced into Georgia in the 1880's and at once encountered an enthusiastic reception. In the First Duma, six of the seven Georgian deputies were Social Democrats; in the Third, two out of three. Georgian socialists did not form separate organizations of their own, but joined the regional branches of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, where they soon attained considerable prominence. They had no national demands. Noi Zhordaniia, one of the chief theoreticians of the movement, stated repeatedly that all demands for autonomy were utopian, and that Georgia would obtain sufficient self-rule as a result of the anticipated future democratization of Russia. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a small group of intellectuals, dissatisfied with this attitude, left the Social Democratic Party and founded a separate organization, *Sakartvelo* (Georgia), which in time transformed itself

into the Georgian Party of Socialist-Federalists. Their program, close in social questions to that of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party, called for the establishment of a Russian Federal Republic with autonomy for Georgia. Its popular following, however, judging by elections to the Dumas, was small. About 1910 the Georgian Mensheviks somewhat modified their views and adopted formulae calling for extraterritorial cultural autonomy for Georgia.

The absence of territorial demands in the program of the most powerful party of the Georgian movement need not be interpreted as an indication of the lack of Georgian national sentiment. The national ideals of the Georgian intelligentsia were identified, ideologically and psychologically, with the goals of Russian and international socialism. As long as this attitude persisted—that is, as long as Georgian intellectuals believed Marxist socialism capable of dealing with the problems posed by the development of the Georgian nation—there was no necessity to advance territorial demands.

The position of the Armenians was different from that of the Georgians in several important respects: instead of living in a well-defined area of their own, the Armenians were scattered in small groups among hostile Turkic peoples throughout Eastern Anatolia and Transcaucasia, and had a numerous, influential middle class. The paramount issue for the Armenians, ever since the massacres which their population had suffered in the Ottoman Empire in the 1890's, was Turkey and the Turks. Their main concern was how to save the defenseless Armenian population from further massacres engendered by the religious and socio-economic conflicts between the Armenian bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie and the Turkic land-owning and peasant classes,

as well as by the cynical attitude of the central government of Turkey. In this respect, the problems facing the Armenians were not unlike those confronting the Jews in the western regions of the Empire. Then there was also the question of devising a political solution which would be suited to the ethnic distribution of the Armenian population and provide its urban classes with commercial advantages. The Armenian movement acquired early in its history a conspiratorial, para-military character. It was essentially middle and lower-middle class in content, and much less socialist in spirit than the political movements in Georgia or in most of the remaining Russian borderlands.

The cultural movement in modern Armenia had begun already in the 1840's, at first under the influence of German and French, and then of Russian, ideas, and was actively supported by Armenian merchants residing in the Levant and Western Europe. Its organization centered around the separate Armenian Church establishments and its head, the Catholicos. In the 1890's there were numerous Armenian schools, as well as many societies and cultural centers, supported by the church in Russian Armenia.

The first Armenian political party was the *Hnchak* (Clarion), founded in 1887 in Switzerland. This party was socialist in character. In the 1890's, some of its members separated and founded the *Dashnaksutiun* (Federation) which during the next quarter of a century came to occupy a dominant role in Armenian political life. The Dashnaks were, in their social program and in their general reliance on terroristic methods of struggle against the Ottoman government, somewhat akin to the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, though the latter refused to establish direct relations with the *Dashnaksutiun* on the grounds that it was allegedly a

petty-bourgeois, nationalistic group which employed socialist slogans only as camouflage. The national program adopted by the *Dashnaksutiun* in 1907 made the following demands concerning the Russian Caucasus:

Transcaucasia, as a democratic republic, is to be a component part of the Federal Russian Republic. The former is to be connected with the latter in questions of defense of the state, foreign policy, monetary and tariff systems.

The Transcaucasian Republic is to be independent in all its internal affairs: it is to have its parliament, elected by means of universal, direct, equal, secret, and proportional vote. Every citizen, regardless of sex, is to have the right to vote beginning at the age of twenty.

Transcaucasia is to send its representatives, elected by the same system of universal elections, to the All-Russian Parliament.

The Transcaucasian Republic is to be divided into cantons, which are to have the right to broad local autonomy, and communes with an equal right to self-rule in communal matters.

In determining cantonal borders, it is imperative to take into account the topographical and ethnographical peculiarities of the country in order to form groupings as homogeneous as possible.

The Dashnak program also demanded cultural autonomy, and the right to use local languages in addition to the governmental language of all Russia. Whereas in Russia the Armenian population was too scattered to permit application of national autonomy, the party did request territorial rights for the Armenians in that part of its program which dealt with the Ottoman Empire.

The North Caucasian peoples had no indigenous national parties despite the fact that they were less assimilated and in many respects more dissatisfied with Russian rule than were the peoples of Transcaucasia. The mountains of the Caucasus had been conquered by Rus-

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444

sia in some of the bloodiest and longest campaigns of its entire history. No other acquisition had cost Russia as much effort as that impoverished land inhabited by the wild and independent mountaineers. The forceful expulsions carried on by the tsarist regime, the mass migrations of the people of whole regions following the Russian conquest, punitive expeditions, Cossack encroachments on land, the hostility of the men of the mountains for the inhabitant of the plains, of the Moslem for the Christian—all this created a suitable foundation for national animosities. But it was not sufficient to produce an organized national movement. The North Caucasian mountain peoples possessed no ethnic unity and formed no cultural community; they were isolated from each other by mountain ranges. Moreover, some of the groups feuded among themselves, largely as a result of great discrepancies in the distribution of land.

The Caucasus therefore had not one but several national movements developing side by side. Of unity, there was none. The Georgians had their eyes turned to Russia, to Europe, and to socialism; the chief concern of the Armenians was the Turk on both sides of the frontier; the Azerbaijanis participated in the All-Russian Moslem movement; and the inhabitants of the moun-

tains had developed as yet no definite political orientation.

The national movements among the minorities inhabiting the Russian Empire arose under the stimulus of the same forces which had affected Russian society in the nineteenth century: Romantic idealism, with its glorification of the *Volk* and of historic traditions; Populism, with its idealization of the peasantry; the spirit of Western enlightenment; socialism. ✓

Two features of the minority movements stand out. In the first place, before 1917, among the peoples discussed, there had been in evidence no separatist tendencies. The Russian Empire was considered by most of its inhabitants to be a permanent institution which required not destruction but democratization and social reform. In the second place, in most of the borderlands, there was an alliance between nationalism and socialism. This phenomenon was perhaps due to the fact that the majority of the nationality groups did not possess indigenous middle classes, which in Russia proper, as in other European countries, formed the backbone of the liberal forces. On the other hand, the nationalists could not ally themselves with Russian rightist groups because the Russian rightists automatically opposed them. ✱

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