

Chapter 1

Introduction

The macro-political regulation of ethnic conflict

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INTRODUCTION

This book began life when ethnic conflict and its regulation were not universally fashionable subjects. Its concerns now have an almost outrageous timeliness. Ethnic conflict is a persistent feature of modernity but the last few years have brought seismic changes in the relations between several ethnic communities around the world. The disintegrations of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have burst asunder the borders of these former communist empires. The conventional wisdom had been that the international (for which read the interstate) system had stabilised the borders of the world's states, so that secessions and the redrawing of territorial frontiers through conquest or partitions were phenomena of previous ages (see Mayall 1990). The aftermath of the Second World War and the decolonisation of Europe's empires had, it was said, carved states' borders in stone. Events like the forging of the states of Israel and Bangladesh through war and insurrection, Indonesia's conquests of East Timor and West Irian and India's invasion of Goa were merely exceptions which proved the rule. Today, however, we know the stability of state borders after 1945 (or 1960) owed more to the geo-politics of the cold war than to the triumph of particular norms of 'international order'. It remains to be seen whether the 'new international order' proclaimed over the rubble of the cities of Kuwait and Baghdad presages a new stabilisation of the world's territorial frontiers. Perhaps Saddam Hussein's adventurism was merely the first and least successful of a new round of state- and nation-building projects that will owe more to

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conquest than consent. At least some Serbians appear to have made this calculation.

The renewed instability of state frontiers is merely one symptom of the global political power of ethnic consciousness and conflict. The last two decades have seen the final collapse of white settler regimes in Africa (in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe). As we go to press the South African system of apartheid, the last bastion of European settler domination in Africa, is on the verge of extinction. However, during the period of apartheid's rise and fall new systems of ethnic domination have been established around the world, in Fiji by native Melaneseans, by Morocco in the western Sahara, by Israelis in what was Palestine; and there have been several attempts to establish such regimes that have led to protracted 'civil' wars, notably in Uganda and Sudan. In the post-colonial era, partly because of the fear (or pretext?) that open, multi-party democracies would degenerate into ethnic contests for state power, much of Africa has been under one-party dictatorships or military rule. In the next decade the re-experimentation with democracy under way in large parts of Africa will provide a decisive test of the success of the nation-building efforts of African generals and dictators. Some parts of the world appear to be trapped in deadlock ethnic wars, where no faction is sufficiently powerful completely to control or crush its opponent(s): for instance Burma/Myanmar (Smith 1991), Chad, Peru and the Sudan. In happier zones ethnic communities have been able to negotiate agreed changes to their political systems, notably in Belgium, Canada and Switzerland. Yet other sites of ethnic conflict live in a twilight world between deadlocked war and permanent negotiation: Cyprus, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka. The Balkans may join them, again. As we went to press, Canada, Cyprus, Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland and South Africa were the subjects and objects of inter-ethnic negotiations about their political futures. The Indian government and its discontented ethnic subjects have been involved in analogous talks almost from the moment of Indian independence.

The chapters which follow provide a series of case studies from Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and Oceania; and from what used to be called the first, second and third worlds. The contributors were asked to focus briefly on the causes of ethnic conflict, but to concentrate on the methods used to manage,

control or terminate ethnic conflict in their area of specialist knowledge. The case studies cover examples of relatively benign and amicable relations between ethnic communities, as well as ones where domination is enforced. They cover examples of the normatively desirable as well as the morally appalling. They are not restricted to conflicts which have immediate implications for all of us, like the conflicts in the former Soviet Union, but include examination of places like Fiji and Northern Ireland which add to our theoretical understanding of bi-ethnic conflicts, and a study of Burundi, the locus of two internationally ignored genocides.

Notwithstanding the global comprehensiveness of our sample, readers will immediately think of numerous additional cases which might have been included. However, given the ubiquity of ethnic conflict an exhaustive collection of case studies would have extended to several volumes. In mitigation we plead that this introductory chapter contains some modest discussion of cases not covered by our contributors.

Scientific endeavours, as conventionally understood, are built upon theories and hypotheses, evidence and experiments. The development of a science is often measured by the scale of precision in prediction and postdiction of which it is capable, and by the degree of development of quantified indicators of the phenomena being examined or explained. It cannot be said that the study of ethnic conflict and ethnic conflict management have yet wholly met the aspirations of positivist ideals of social science,¹ and we cannot hope to make good such deficiencies in this introduction. Instead we shall attempt a humbler task, that of classification, the necessary precursor of scientific theory and empirical verification and falsification.

As well as being classificatory, this chapter is both positive and normative. We develop a taxonomy of eight modes of ethnic conflict resolution which maps the empirical forms of macro-political ethnic conflict regulation. Our long-term positivist ambition is to establish whether there are 'laws of motion' which govern the forms of ethnic conflict regulation we are interested in explaining: regularities which enable the 'postdiction' (if not the prediction) of the circumstances under which particular strategies for managing ethnic conflict will be attempted, and successfully implemented. But we also have normative concerns:

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to evaluate the merits of the different forms of ethnic conflict regulation, and to establish whether multi-ethnic states can be stabilised in ways which are compatible with liberal democratic values and institutions.

A TAXONOMY OF THE MACRO-POLITICAL FORMS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT REGULATION

Here we confine ourselves to presenting our taxonomy of the macro-political² forms of ethnic conflict regulation, and briefly showing its relevance for the case studies elaborated by our contributors, leaving its further development to future research (McGarry and O'Leary, forthcoming). The term 'regulation' is inclusive: it covers both conflict termination and conflict management. Eight distinct macro-methods of ethnic conflict regulation can be distinguished, to wit:

- (i) *methods for eliminating differences*
 - (a) genocide
 - (b) forced mass-population transfers
 - (c) partition and/or secession (self-determination)
 - (d) integration and/or assimilation
- (ii) *methods for managing differences*
 - (a) hegemonic control
 - (b) arbitration (third-party intervention)
 - (c) cantonisation and/or federalisation
 - (d) consociationalism or power-sharing.

This is a taxonomy, and not a typology: the classification of entities by logical types. Typologies are heuristics used to codify existing knowledge. Good social science typologies are simple; constructed through the use of logical antonyms rather than empirical observations; and provide a fruitful basis for further theoretical development and empirical investigation. Taxonomy by contrast is the classification of organisms, and originated with the Swedish scientist Linnaeus. Taxonomists aim to place all organisms in a hierarchical classification scheme, in which, to put it very crudely, 'likes' are classified with 'likes'. Taxonomies, unlike typologies, are empirical rather than ideal-typical, *a posteriori* rather than *a priori* categories. Our list of eight modes of ethnic conflict resolution is taxonomic because it was arrived

at simply through researching cases of ethnic conflict termination and regulation, and putting together 'likes with likes'.³

However, our taxonomy does not suggest Linnaeus-like discreteness or exhaustiveness. Often the eight modes are found in combination and targeted at the same ethnic group(s), or, alternatively, different strategies are aimed at different ethnic groups within the same state. Thus the Nazis practised genocide, mass-population transfers and hegemonic control of Jews. Stalin practised genocide, mass-population transfers and hegemonic control of multiple ethnic groups (see Chapter 3). Yugoslavia under Tito practised elements of control, arbitration and consociation (see Chapter 8). Oliver Cromwell offered Irish Catholics a choice between genocide and forced mass-population transfer. They could go 'To Hell or Connaught!' The USA practised genocide on native Americans, integration of immigrant Europeans and control of black Americans in the deep South. Contemporary Israel practises consociationalism amongst Jews of different ethnic origin but control over Palestinians; it practised mass-population transfers in the past and may do so again. Belgium has practised consociationalism to regulate divisions between its 'spiritual families' and federalism to resolve tensions between its linguistic communities (Chapter 12).

However, it is beneficial to divide our taxonomy through a logical distinction, which creates a typological contrast: some modes of ethnic conflict regulation seek to eliminate or terminate ethnic differences, whereas others seek to manage the consequences of ethnic differences. Thus genocide, mass-population transfers, partition/secession and integration/assimilation are all political strategies which seek to eliminate ethnic differences, at least within a given state. By contrast the strategies which seek to manage the consequences of ethnic differences are those of control, arbitration, federalism/cantonisation and consociationalism.⁴

It is possible, and desirable, to rank the eight methods in the taxonomy normatively, even if it is not possible to construct a simple or lexicographic moral hierarchy. It is not, in our opinion, possible or desirable to say that either difference-eliminating or difference-managing methods are inherently superior. Of the eliminating-differences strategies there are moral justifications for partition/secession (e.g. Barry 1991c; Beran 1987; Buchanan 1991) and arguments for integration (assimilation) which

have been advanced by generations of liberals and socialists. However, there is no obvious moral hierarchy which enables people to claim that integration is better than partition (or vice versa), unless there is widespread consent for one option rather than the other, where widespread consent refers to substantial majorities within all the relevant ethnic communities. The merits of partition/secession as against integration/assimilation must be decided by political argument and pragmatic considerations, such as feasibility and estimates about long-run efficacy. There is nothing morally weighty to be said in favour of genocide or forced mass-population transfers, the other difference-eliminating strategies, although 'ethical' arguments have usually accompanied the implementation of these gruesome projects.

Of the managing-differences strategies one should be morally unacceptable to liberals, namely hegemonic control (see below). The rest (arbitration, cantonisation/federalism and consociationalism) are compatible with democratic norms, although there are many liberal critics of the democratic quality of consociational practices (e.g. Barry 1991a, b; Lustick 1979; Glazer 1987). Advocacy of the merits of the remaining strategies, namely federalism/cantonisation, consociation and arbitration, must, however, be tempered by empirical judgements about their feasibility and long-term efficacy.

(i) Eliminating differences

(a) *Genocide*

The first two extreme and terminal 'solutions' to ethnic conflict are the most abhorrent: genocide and forced mass-population transfers. They often go together. Genocide literally means the killing of a *genos* (a race or kind). There is some controversy as to how the concept should be used, either legally or by social scientists (e.g. Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Kuper 1981). We think the concept should be confined to cases where the victims share (real or alleged) ascriptive traits, while Harff's useful term *politicide* should be employed for the systematic mass killing of people who may or may not share ascriptive traits (Harff 1992).

Genocide, then, is the systematic mass-killing of an ethnic collectivity (however defined), or the indirect destruction of such

a community through the deliberate termination of the conditions which permit its biological and social reproduction. On this definition appalling genocides were perpetrated by the Nazis in the 1930s and 1940s, and within the Communist bloc in Eurasia. The European colonisers in the Americas, and Russians and Turks in the Tsarist and Ottoman empires also perpetrated genocides by this definition. The option of genocide remains available to political actors in the modern world. Despite the infamy won by Hitler and Stalin it is wishful thinking to assume that genocide has become unthinkable.⁵ Since 1945 there have been genocides perpetrated in the Soviet Union (of the Chechens, the Ingushi, the Karachai, the Balkars, the Meskhetians and the Crimean Tartars⁶); in Burundi (of Hutu, see Chapter 7); in Iraq (of the Kurds); in Paraguay (of the Ache Indians); in Indonesia (of the Chinese⁷ and the indigenous population of East Timor); in Nigeria (of Ibo residents in the north); in Equatorial Guinea (of the Bubi); in Uganda (of the Karamojong, the Acholi, the Lango, Nilotic tribes and the Bagandans); in Pakistan (of the Bengalis in what became Bangladesh); in Burma (of Muslims in border regions); and in Iran (of Kurds and Baha'is). We therefore still live in a world in which genocide is practised; indeed, in absolute terms the twentieth century has been more genocidal than its predecessors. Only confident optimists believe genocide has become outmoded because of the triumph of universal norms in what some sociologists are pleased to call 'late modernity'.

Genocides are usually one-sided - indeed some would say this is one of their defining features (Jonassohn 1992: 19) - and they are intended to terminate ethnic conflict. In the construction of many empires it can be said that genocides 'worked': they secured the relevant territories for imperial rulers. European Jews were the victims of the most atrocious genocide in the Second World War, and the Armenians suffered grievously in the First World War, and in both cases the perpetrators resolved on final solutions, believing it would stabilise their empires. Yet genocides often fail to achieve their objectives and always create explosive and historically entrenched bitterness and fear amongst the descendants of victims. Serb-Croat relations in what was Yugoslavia are inflamed by memories of war-time genocide during the Second World War (Chapter 8). If Russians and indigenous groups in the Baltic states, Ukraine and Kazakhstan

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are to co-exist peacefully lots of skeletons have to remain buried (Chapter 3). The state of Israel's 'siege mentality' owes its existence to a reaction against the Nazi genocide of Jews.⁸ Moreover, one of the consequences in a community which has undergone genocide is a very high birth-rate, which often shifts a political conflict downstream to the next generation.

It is possible to identify circumstances under which genocide is likely to be contemplated. *State genocide* is more likely to occur when:

- an empire is being constructed and maintained (e.g. genocide was used as a deliberate policy of land acquisition and mass terrorisation by European settler-states in the 'new world', Africa and Australasia);
- an ethnic community lacks geo-political resources, such as its own state or a powerful diaspora (like Armenians, European Jews and Gypsies);
- a subordinate ethnic community is left vulnerable within a disintegrating system of control, whether organised by an empire or a party dictatorship, (like Armenians and Bosnian Muslims);
- a given ethnic community (Jews, Ibos, Armenians, overseas Chinese) possesses economic superiority and cultural identifiability in conditions of industrialisation, but lacks military and political power (Gellner 1983: 105);
- the relevant state is not democratic.⁹

Frontier genocide, which by contrast may not be directly implemented by state officials, is likely to occur when settlers, possessed of technologically superior resources, displace natives from their access to land. It is a concomitant of colonisation and conquest.

These conditions are facilitative, not necessary. An obvious necessary condition for genocide appears to be the presence of a racial, ethnic or religious ideology which sanctions a non-universalist conception of the human species, and makes mass-murder easier to accomplish. These belief-systems may be more important than technological capacities for managing mass-killings, as it is the discipline of the killers, rather than their instruments, which may best account for the scale of genocides. The Old Testament God of the Jews (and subsequently of the Christians and Muslims) could be used to sanction the extermi-

nation of peoples long before Nazi racism. Some have argued that ideological (as opposed to imperial) genocides are modern: beginning in the religious wars of the Middle Ages they have been carried further by the spread of nationalist and Marxist-Leninist doctrines. We do not agree. For us, the rise and fall of empires is primary in explaining the conditions which facilitate genocide, and genocide is not 'modern', although it occurs in modern times. Moreover, nationalism and racism should be carefully distinguished. Nationalism is not inherently genocidal, though racism may be. Genocides can be instrumental and 'pre-emptive' as well as being ideological: indigenous peoples were killed by European colonisers on the supposition that their circumstances were those of 'kill or be killed'. The same beliefs seem to have been important in motivating Tutsi genocides of Hutu in Burundi (Chapter 7).

(b) *Forced mass-population transfers*

Forced mass-population transfers occur where one (or more) ethnic community is physically transplanted from its homeland and compelled to live elsewhere. Some Serbians have coined a chilling expression for forced mass-population transfers, 'ethnic cleansing'. A population (or populations) can also be forcibly 'repatriated' and pushed back towards its alleged 'homeland', as occurred during the high tide of apartheid in South Africa. Forced mass-population transfers must be distinguished from agreed 'population exchanges', i.e. the transfers which accompany agreed secessions or partitions, such as those between Greece and Turkey after the end of the Second World War. The population transfers in Cyprus in 1974/5 were in no sense agreed, by comparison with the Greek-Turk exchanges of the 1920s. They were the result of frightened populations moving under the threat of military coercion. The populations which move after 'agreed exchanges' between states never consider such moves to be voluntary, but their fate must be distinguished from those unilaterally compelled to move.

Forced mass-population transfers may displace but they do not always terminate ethnic conflict. The ethnic turmoil in what was the Soviet Union is partly an outcome of forced mass-population transfers executed by Lenin and Stalin and their successors (Chapter 3). Violence in the contemporary Caucasus is, in part,

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the result of similar policies pursued by both Tsarist and Ottoman emperors. Palestinians were expelled from Israel during the insurrectionary war which founded the state of Israel, and many Palestinians fear that the settlement of the West Bank by Israeli colonisers is merely the prelude to a further set of expulsions. In turn the creation of a Palestinian diaspora helped precipitate the destabilisation of Jordan, the Lebanon, and even Kuwait. Some presently fear that the Muslims of Bosnia may become the Palestinians of Europe: dispossessed, repressed people living in refugee camps, desperate to recover their former lands. In what soon may be described as the former state of Ethiopia forced resettlement policies exacerbated the civil war and famine-proneness of the country during the mid-1980s. In the last decade the states of Nigeria, Vietnam and Burma have expelled large numbers of residents on plainly ethnic criteria, and India has promised to expel Bengali immigrants (from Bangladesh) from the state of Assam, although this decision has not yet been implemented when going to press.

Forced mass-population transfers, like genocides, are often advocated as integral components of imperial consolidation strategies. They are usually implemented after or during wars and civil wars – consider Oliver Cromwell's 'transplantation' strategies in Ireland, Tsarist and Turkish policies in the Caucasus in the nineteenth century, Stalin's movement of the Volga Germans, Cossacks and others, and Milosevic's 'Greater Serbia' project. Forced mass-population transfers are also likely to be advocated in response to the perceived threat of 'ethnic swamping', as seen in the Assamese demonstrations against illegal Bengali immigration, or in response to economic depressions, when the call for 'repatriation' of 'guest-workers' may be extended to include all those who are not 'sons and daughters of the soil'. 'Ethnic cleansing' by Serbian irregulars in Bosnia demonstrates that forced mass-population transfers can be narrowly instrumental: to establish 'facts' which might make future territorial adjustments 'impossible'.

There are no moral merits to forced mass-population transfers, especially as they facilitate genocidal assaults on vulnerable populations and/or encourage the likelihood that the victims will suffer from famine. Forced mass-population transfers violate minimalist conceptions of human rights and egalitarian political philosophies. Nevertheless where peoples believe that their

homelands have been stolen from them by settler-peoples it becomes thinkable if not justifiable to argue that historic retribution is in order.

(c) Partition and/or secession (self-determination)

Genocide and forced mass-population transfers are obnoxious from the perspective of modern liberalism or modern socialism. By contrast, partitioning territories to permit self-determination or secession can, in principle, respect the rights of ethnic communities. Partition, self-determination and secession are compatible with liberal democratic institutions (universal, periodic and competitive elections, alternations in power, and civic freedoms of expression, assembly and organisation), in that such states can, in principle, permit secessions and preserve democratic institutions. Partition resolves ethnic conflict, if it works, by breaking up multi-ethnic states, or by allowing divorce between those ethnic communities which do not wish to live together in the same state.

Between the years 1948 and 1991 only one new state, Bangladesh, was carved out of an existing state – if we exclude the very numerous cases of decolonisation of European and US-controlled territories in Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, since the collapse of the communist empires of Ethiopia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union secession has become a growth-industry, the in-vogue method of ethnic conflict-resolution. Iraq will be next if Iraqi Kurds are allowed to have their way. The secession of Quebec from Canada remains a possibility after Canadians overwhelmingly rejected a proposed constitutional settlement in a referendum in October 1992. There are secessionist or semi-secessionist¹⁰ movements in Europe (e.g. amongst the Basque, Corsican, Northern Irish nationalist, Scottish, Slovak and Welsh peoples); in Africa (e.g. the Polisario movement in the Moroccan-controlled western Sahara, the Dinkas of the southern Sudan and a bewildering variety of communities in the Horn of Africa); in the new republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh wishes to secede from Azerbaijan, South Ossetia from Georgia, Crimea from the Ukraine, and the 'Dniester Republic' from Moravia); and in central and southern Asia (e.g. the Khalistan movement for a Sikh homeland, the Kashmiri independence movement, Tibetans

in Communist China, and the multiple ethnic secessionists of Burma).

The normative idea behind principled partitions and secessions is the principle of self-determination.¹¹ The key problem with the principle of self-determination as a means of eliminating ethnic conflict is that it begs four questions:

- Who are the people?
- What is the relevant territorial unit in which they should exercise self-determination?
- What constitutes a majority?
- Does secession produce a domino effect in which ethnic minorities within seceding territories seek self-determination for themselves?

In what were Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union these questions are hardly academic. As Lieven and McGarry and Schöpflin show here they have given rise to multiple civil wars. There are many other hard cases in seeking to apply the doctrine of self-determination. In Transylvania there are two major populations (Hungarians and Romanians) mixed together in the same region along with other smaller communities. In Northern Ireland each ethnic community claims that it is part of another nation, and wishes the putative boundaries of that nation to be the relevant jurisdiction for decision-making (Chapter 6).¹² In Quebec, native Canadians, who occupy a huge proportion of the province's land-mass, are unwilling to secede from Canada with the Francophone majority (Chapter 2). In the Punjab (Chapter 4) and Kashmir, Hindus vehemently oppose the very idea of secession. In Slovakia, the Hungarian minority fears that the secession of the Slovaks from Czechoslovakia will be detrimental to their interests.

The constitution of a majority for self-determination begs the question of a majority in what region? In moderately complex cases the principle of self-determination seems indeterminate. As Ivor Jennings remarked:

On the surface [the principle of self-determination] seem[s] reasonable: let the people decide. It [i]s in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people.

(Jennings 1956: 56)

Exercising the principle of self-determination is only straightforward where there is no large or disgruntled ethnic minority within the relevant region affected by the proposed secession *and* when the seceding area includes the great majority of those who wish to leave. Unfortunately it is difficult to think of instances where these optimum conditions have applied. Norway's secession from Sweden was an exemplary case. So was the case of Swiss Jura. Here, in an 'internal secession', plebiscites were held commune by commune to produce a result that split the new canton into two, along religious lines (Protestants voted to stay with Berne canton). By contrast the partitions of Ireland and India left significant minorities behind in Northern Ireland and Kashmir. Even when secessions seem straightforward, and the seceding areas appear reasonably homogeneous, new conflicts can emerge fairly rapidly. The Ukraine is a possible future example. Most commentators have focused on the dangers posed by the sizeable Russian minority, but less attention has been paid to the deep historical, cultural and geographical divisions between Catholic westerners (who were annexed by Stalin) and the Orthodox (who have been linked to Russia for some three centuries). After the glow of national liberation fades, so might Ukrainian national unity.

There have been some ingenious proposals about how to construct a normative liberal theory of secession (e.g. Beran 1984; 1987), which can answer Jennings's question: 'Who decides who are the people?' Beran advances the argument that every (self-defined) area within a liberal democratic state should be given the right to secede, provided the same right is extended to every sub-area within the proposed secessionist territory. This argument answers the serious accusation that self-determination creates a dangerous domino effect by saying two different things:

- there is nothing wrong with allowing a state to fragment on the principle of self-determination; and
- the fact that the seceding units themselves should grant the right of self-determination within their boundaries should put a prudential check on the aspiration to seek self-determination in territorially problematic zones.

Adam and Moodley accept the thesis that people should be entitled to secede from democratic states. They think that it is important to reduce the fears of the Zulu-based Inkatha and

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white extremists that a democratic South Africa will become a vehicle of ANC/non-Zulu black power (Chapter 10). They think that the inclusion of a secession clause in the new South African constitution will create incentives to accommodate ethnic minorities (for a contrary argument see Buchanan 1991: 159-61).

However, the right of secession seems unlikely to be entrenched in many modern liberal democratic constitutions,¹⁵ and secession is likely to continue to have a bad press amongst liberals and socialists. But with the collapse of the global cold war, there is now much greater room for successful secession and the alteration of borders artificially frozen by the strategic interests of the superpowers - as the reunification of Germany suggests. The cold war had elevated the stability of boundaries into a necessity: rather than face nuclear confrontation each superpower respected the boundaries of the other's client-states, at least in Europe. 'Globalisation' and the increasing power of supra-state organisations may also make some international boundaries less inviolate.

Secession remains an option very likely to produce violence, and problems (initially) as bad as the ones it is intended to solve. Partitions can lead to population movements, often involuntary ones, and populations on the move are highly vulnerable to massacre, as happened during and after the partition of the Indian subcontinent (Khoshla 1950). Whether implementing secession is straightforward, on Beran's lines or not, the proposal of any community to secede from any state is likely to encourage key elites in the affected states to behave in chauvinistic and war-like ways. Normally secessionist movements provoke elites satisfied with the existing state into mobilising 'Unionist' movements against traitors. It was ironic to watch American commentators warning the Soviet Union during 1990-1 to allow its republics the right to self-determination. As Gorbachev observed, Lincoln's heirs have short memories.

What can be said of a general nature about the circumstances under which secession/partitions are likely to be carried out? Three external phenomena matter most and need to be studied closely: the nature of the inter-state system (is it permissive or restrictive?); the aftermath of wars (which often lead to territorial transfers/partitions, often without any considerations of consent) and the disintegration of empires (although this observation is almost tautological).

People seek full self-determination, in the form of independent statehood, for a variety of reasons. The urge for self-government may be motivated by a reaction against ethnic discrimination and humiliation, by the pragmatic expectation that the new nation-state will have greater economic and political freedom, by the wish to have a state in which different public policies will be pursued, by the desire for power and prestige amongst nationalist elites, or to protect a given ethnic culture from extinction. Not much of a very general nature can be successfully sustained about the economic circumstances or motivations of full-scale ethnic secessionist movements (Connor 1973). One observer notes that secessions are demanded both by economically advanced groups (e.g. Basques, Catalans, Ibos, Lombards, Sikhs, Tamils) and by economically backward communities (East Bengalis, Karens, Kurds, Slovaks); and that the secessionist communities can be located in either backward or advanced regional economies (Horowitz 1985: 229ff).

Most importantly enthusiasm for the principle of self-determination flows from the democratisation of the world. Democratisation means that the people are to rule. The statist declares that the people are all those who are resident in a given state or political unit's boundaries (the civic nationalist); the nationalist that they are the nation (the ethnic nationalist). In a few happy cases - Iceland - these two answers approximately coincide. However, in most cases the two definitions of the people do not coincide. In the general case the definition and championing of the people are up for grabs, and the possibility of partition/secession enters into the fabric of any state where the ethnic and civic nationalisms may point to different definitions of the nation.

Once democratisation poses the issue of the definition of the people a clustered set of issues automatically follows: the most important of which are the definition of citizenship, the possession of the franchise, the state's boundaries and the organisational structure of the state. These issues create incentives for political entrepreneurs to make party-building efforts out of ethnic cleavages, whether at the foundation of the state or afterwards. Politicians in multi-ethnic states have multiple incentives to play the ethnic card: whether it be Randolph Churchill playing the Orange card in the UK in the 1880s or Jean-Marie Le Pen playing the Algerian card in France in the

1980s. It is not possible to immunise the democratic process to exclude potentially explosive civic and ethnic issues. They are always there for mobilisation by the oppressed or the opportunist or both. Those who lose out politically under existing state arrangements and policies, whoever they may be, may always choose to redefine the rules of the game by playing the ethnic card in the arena of party politics.

A final reason why ethnic questions are potentially explosive, and raise the possibility that some people(s) will be tempted to exercise self-determination through secession is simple. Ethnic questions raise relatively non-tradable issues. Nationality, language, territorial homelands and culture are not easily bargained over. They create zero-sum conflicts, and therefore provide ideal materials for political entrepreneurs interested in creating or dividing political constituencies.

Having suggested reasons why democratisation increases the likelihood that political actors will seek self-determination for their community and thereby destabilise existing multi-ethnic states we must make two qualifications. First, destabilisation is likely to be contained if the relevant state or region exists in a milieu of other liberal democratic states. Thus far, in the twentieth century, liberal democracies have never gone to war against one another. Second, there are some circumstances under which the destabilising effects of democratisation upon multi-ethnic states can be muted, and inhibit the impetus to consider secession. These factors include:

- internal territorial segregation which permits self-government ('good fences make good neighbours');
- demographic dominance (where the large group is sufficiently secure not to fear the minority (or minorities) and behaves in a generous way);
- demographic stability (where one or more groups are not outgrowing or 'outfalling' one another); and
- a history of pre-democratic co-operation amongst ethnic political elites which gives the post-authoritarian state a reasonable chance of promoting accommodation.

(d) Integration and/or assimilation

A fourth method of macro-political ethnic conflict regulation is

built upon the idea of trying to eliminate differences within the state by seeking to integrate or assimilate the relevant ethnic communities into a new transcendent identity. Whereas civic integration has the more modest object of creating a common civic, national or patriotic identity,¹⁴ ethnic assimilation aims to create a common ethnic identity through the merging of differences (the melting pot).

Integration/assimilation has been the official aspiration of civil rights leaders in the USA, the African National Congress in South Africa, unionist integrationists and the integrated education lobby in Northern Ireland (Chapter 6), and the democratic left in those European countries striving to cope with immigrant influxes. Though inconceivable a few years ago, integration/assimilation has been embraced by pragmatists in South Africa's National Party who believe that the economic status quo can be secured and improved under liberal integration better than under apartheid (Chapter 10).

Usually people who advocate integration policies favour reducing the differences between ethnic communities, ensuring that the children of the (potentially rival) ethnic communities go to the same schools, socialising them in the same language and conventions, encouraging public and private housing policies which prevent ethnic segregation, and ensuring that the workplace is ethnically integrated through outlawing discrimination. Liberal integrationists promote bills of rights with equal rights for individuals, rather than communities. Assimilation policies go further. They favour the merging of ethnic identities, either into one already established identity (e.g. a French identity) or into a new one (e.g. a Soviet or Yugoslav identity). The ultimate proof of successful assimilation is large-scale intermarriage across the former ethnic boundaries which leads first to their blurring and then to their eradication. Integrationists and assimilationists also support 'catch-all' political parties, arguing against ethnic political parties, and aim to shun all policies which might show up differences between communities.¹⁵

This strategy of ethnic conflict management is driven by both high-minded and instrumental motives. Liberals and socialists, with the best of intentions, associate ethnic pluralism with sectarianism, parochialism, narrow-mindedness and chauvinist bigotry. They maintain that those opposed to integration either want or risk societal disintegration. Canadian integrationists

demanding a Charter of Rights after 1945 to prevent a repeat of the war-time internment of ethnic minorities (Japanese, Italians and Ukrainians). White liberals in the USA funded court cases promoting black integration. Other liberals in North America sincerely advocate the assimilation of aboriginal minorities as the best way to end the atrocious conditions on reservations (e.g. Gibson 1992). Likewise the European left generally espouses the integration of immigrants because it abhors racism and discrimination. However, sometimes integrationism is not so high-minded: in Northern Ireland those who advocate integration of all as either British or Irish citizens are often merely interested in scoring ethnic points; while in South Africa some of those who advocate integration are either interested in preserving their economic privileges (whites) or see it as a way of establishing majority control (blacks). Sometimes integrationism is not even accompanied by formal generosity - consider white Canadians or white Britons who rail against Sikhs being allowed to wear their turbans where others would not be permitted to do so.

The targets of integration/assimilation policies respond in various ways - partly as a function of their perceptions of the motives lying behind the policies. Integration/assimilation policies are often targeted at migrants in liberal democratic states. These policies are more overtly liberal than the form of quasi-control associated with *metic* or guest-worker policies. In Canada, immigrant communities have acquired a Canadian civic identity on top of their original ethnic identity. The United States has proved a 'melting pot' in which some ethnic assimilation has taken place, although it would be better to say that white Protestants have assimilated (Swedes, Norwegians and Germans), and that white Catholics (Irish, Italians and Poles) have gradually assimilated. After 1945, both Canada and the USA have had some success in integrating Asian immigrants. Similarly, 'New Australians' have emerged in the wake of post-war continental European migrations. But these cases of moderately successful integration/assimilation involved migrations to a 'new' country, where the migrants, in principle, were willing to adapt their cultures to their new host country and accept a new civic identity.

Qualitatively different integration/assimilationist projects are those aimed at uniting (moderately) different communities against a common foe. The Anglican ascendancy in eighteenth-

and nineteenth-century Ireland promoted pan-Protestant unity against an insurgent native/Catholic threat. The South African government has ensured that all whites (English, Greeks, Italians, European Jews) and not just Afrikaners have benefited from apartheid, to create pan-white unity against blacks. Israeli governments have sought to downplay Sephardic-Ashkenazi differences in the interest of presenting a united front against Palestinians. During the nineteenth century the dominant English minority in Quebec welcomed Irish and other English-speaking immigrants as allies against French-Canadians. Contemporary *Québécois*, troubled by the low birth-rate amongst Francophones, have recently turned to non-white but French-speaking immigrants (from Haiti, Senegal and former French colonies) to bolster their linguistic community.

Mutually agreed integration/assimilation projects have reasonable prospects of success. However, where ethnic communities seek more than civic equality or equal opportunity and insist on autonomy or self-government (or where no external threat can compel pan-community unity) integration/assimilation policies fall on stonier ground. Ethnic communities living in their ancestral territories, for example, are often less willing than individual migrants to shed their culture or accept some new overarching identity. In the USA and Canada native Americans resist assimilation and hold out for varying degrees of self-government (or what we call cantonisation below). They call themselves 'first nations' to stress the moral superiority of their claims to cultural protection.¹⁶

Assimilation in contested homelands, however high-minded, cannot work where it involves assimilation on one community's terms: if one community's language, culture, religion and national myths are given precedence then we are not talking of assimilation or integration but of annexation; in such cases people complain of *ethnocide*, the destruction of a people's culture as opposed to physical liquidation of its members. This complaint is the standard one raised by the indigenous peoples of the world. Some forms of integration and assimilation appear to require coercion: compulsory educational homogenisation and the imposition of standard cultural codes as preconditions of full industrial and welfare-state citizenship. Making peasants into French people in the nineteenth century, the schooling of black South Africans in Afrikaans, the 'Russification' practised by the

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Tsars and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the periodic attempts at Anglicisation of French Canada in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the 'Romanisation' implemented by Ceaucescu in Transylvania, are policies cut from the same cloth. But even arguably more neutral strategies of integration/assimilation encounter significant resistance: as with Nehruvian secularism in India (Chapter 4), or Yugoslav (Chapter 8) and Soviet communism (Chapter 3). These efforts to establish transcending or pan-ethnic identities are often seen by minorities as disguised forms of cultural annexation, although the same policies may be rejected by the relevant dominant communities who see transcendent or pan-ethnic identities as detrimental to their (Hindu, Serbian or Russian) cultures.

Those who regard assimilation/integration strategies as benign forms of ethnic conflict regulation in contested homelands underestimate the difficulties involved. Optimistic observers of South Africa need to be counselled that it will be some time before representative Afrikaners and blacks embrace the ANC and the National Party respectively. The Hutu in Burundi, as Lemarchand suggests, are unlikely to abandon their distinct identity or their ethnic organisations just because such actions would fit the agenda of the Tutsi-dominated government (Chapter 7). In the foreseeable future, Northern Ireland Catholics, Basques and Croats are unlikely to be integrated or assimilated with their ethnic enemies. In fact, resistance to unwanted assimilation or integration projects is likely to be very high,¹⁷ and can provoke ethnic revivals and secessionism in response, as has occurred in Burma, Ghana, Iraq, Sudan and Uganda (Horowitz 1985: 567-8). It is axiomatic that modern ethnic identities can only be significantly sustained through educational and neighbourhood segregation of some kind, because these conditions are necessary to preserve a cultural critical mass in the relevant communities. Some go further and claim that such communities require broadcasting media and control over access to land to sustain their identities. Such arguments explain why policies designed to compel people to be schooled together and to be neighbours are provocative, and possibly productive of violence. In short, unless assimilation/integration projects are targeted at people willing to acquire a new civic identity (like voluntary migrants) and to modify their ethnic identity, they produce rather than provoke conflict (Nordlinger 1972: 36-9).

For these reasons, amongst others, many liberal democracies which are managing large-scale immigrations, or multiple recently established ethnic communities, have realised that multi-cultural policies make greater sense than straightforward integration or assimilation strategies. They are abandoning the spirit of classical liberalism to manage immigrants. In England and France, at least in previous generations, liberals had a general bias towards integration/assimilation as macro-political forms of ethnic conflict resolution - at least within the metropolitan cores of their empires. However, this strategy seeks to resolve ethnic conflict by eliminating ethnic differences when the relevant problem is the desire of members of ethnic communities to maintain differences: which liberals committed to the right of individuals to choose their own conceptions of the good find it hard to argue against. This difficulty leads to a normative division of opinion between liberal integrationists (who are accused of intolerance) and liberal multi-culturalists (who are accused of surrendering liberalism to a form of relativism which tolerates illiberalism, e.g. in the form of Muslim schools). Liberal multi-culturalists are on their way to considering the merits of macro-political ways of resolving ethnic conflict which rely on managing differences rather than eliminating them (e.g. Kymlicka 1991).

Political engineers seeking to resolve ethnic conflict also frequently recommend the development of catch-all political parties to break down the salience of ethnic cleavages, i.e. they advocate electoral integration. For example, the absence of Great Britain's political parties in Northern Ireland before 1989 led one enthusiast for electoral integration to argue that the British party boycott was 'the fundamental reason' for continuing conflict in the region (Roberts 1990: 132). Those persuaded of the merits of engineering electoral integration include the military framers of Nigeria's second constitution, which forced political parties to develop some support in all regions of the state.

Such electoral integrationist projects may be well-intentioned ways of regulating ethnic conflict, but they are mostly based on wishful thinking. If there are parties which already mobilise across ethnic divisions then political stability is likely to be greater, and that is all to the good, but the belief that one can generate parties with such effects through heroic acts of will or engineering is fundamentally utopian, especially if the relevant

ethnic communities have already been mobilised behind different conceptions of nationalism. As one astute observer generalises:

It is sometimes possible to maintain a system of party alignments cutting across a communal cleavage. It is usually possible to shift from this to a system where parties articulate the communal cleavage. But it is extremely difficult if not impossible to move in the reverse direction, because of the primitive psychological strength of communal identification and the effects of social reinforcement on maintaining the political salience of communal identification.

(Barry 1991b: 146)

In addition to the agreed and coercive forms of integration/assimilation we have discussed there are also cases where the dominated community (or communities) has sought assimilation/integration, but has been denied it. America's 'melting pot' has not successfully extended (if it was ever so intended) to blacks or Afro-Americans. Until the 1950s the local white majorities in the deep South worked a system of control, and sought to prevent any kind of integration, let alone assimilation. While blacks, with some exceptions,¹⁸ support integration, and won formal victories to establish this goal in public policy in the 1950s and 1960s, American cities and schools remain segregated and racial life-chances are still dramatically unequal.¹⁹ In Northern Ireland, the unionist government and party blocked the integrationist ambitions of at least some Catholics in the 1960s, precipitating the current long wave of political violence. If, as at least one academic anticipates, the Palestinians switch their demands from separate nationhood to demanding civil rights within the Israeli state, we might expect a similar pattern there (Nusseibeh 1990).

While some liberal and bourgeois elites within dominant ethnic communities might favour integration/assimilation of the dominated, as a way of broadening the legitimacy of their regimes, they may find that such ambitions provoke a furious backlash from their co-ethnics in less privileged positions. In Northern Ireland in the late 1960s moderate integrationist unionists lost all influence over their 'followers'. The current South African government is gambling that it can integrate blacks before it has to face the white electorate again: if it fails it may go the way of all flesh.

(ii) Managing differences

(a) *Hegemonic control*

The most common system of managing as opposed to eliminating ethnic conflict practised in multi- or bi-ethnic states is that of 'hegemonic control', a concept first developed by Ian Lustick (1979; 1987) although we use the term slightly differently (O'Leary and Arthur 1990; O'Leary and McGarry 1992: chs 3 and 4). Hegemonic control has been the most common mode through which multi-ethnic societies have been stabilised in world history. Imperial or authoritarian regimes controlled multiple cultures within their territories through coercive domination and elite co-option.²⁰ They suppressed latent divisions between ethnic communities which might otherwise have been manifested, especially in conditions of economic modernisation. The control was 'hegemonic' if it made an overtly violent ethnic contest for state power either 'unthinkable' or 'unworkable' on the part of the subordinated communities: ethnically-based slave-systems were exemplary cases of authoritarian hegemonic control. Hegemonic control in imperial or authoritarian regimes need not have rested, although it often did, on the support of the largest or most powerful ethnic community. What was necessary was control of the relevant coercive apparatuses: thus ethnic minorities in Burundi, Fiji (after 1987), Liberia (before 1980) and South Africa (until 1990-1) were able to sustain hegemonic control because of their control over security and policing systems. In Burundi the Tutsi govern through a form of control which Lemarchand calls 'authoritarian containment' (Chapter 7).

Hegemonic control is therefore coercive and/or co-optive rule which successfully manages to make unworkable an ethnic challenge to the state order. However, there is a key difference in coercive regimes which practise hegemonic control. In authoritarian empires there was usually no grand objective pursued to eliminate ethnic difference - although one might argue that the world religions propagated transcendent identities. By contrast, in communist hegemonic systems, a new transcendent identity was consistently proclaimed: one which would eventually eliminate ethnic differences as irrelevant to people's civic identities as citizens. However, after initial post-revolutionary fervour it was rare for this vision to be articulated as one which would utterly

eradicate ethnic difference, and the policies of communist parties primarily focused on suppressing the politicisation of ethnic differences (Chapters 3 and 8).

In liberal democracies hegemonic control appears less feasible than in authoritarian regimes. Liberal democracies with statist conceptions of citizenship permit, indeed facilitate, ethnic organisation and mobilisation; and ethnic contests for state power become eminently 'thinkable' and 'workable' within liberal democratic or open institutions. Think of how Irish nationalism was facilitated by the democratisation of the United Kingdom, or of how ethnic nationalism was encouraged by glasnost in the Soviet Union. Similarly the breakdown of the Franco regime after 1975 facilitated ethnic challenges to the Spanish state (Chapter 9), although of a less severe variety. The liberal optimist might therefore conclude that democratisation spells doom to systems of hegemonic control.

However, systems of hegemonic control, or ethnic domination, can be constructed in formally liberal democratic states. The most obvious method is when formally liberal democratic institutions are monopolised by a minority of the state's population. Thus white South Africans and Rhodesians established forms of settler-control over other ethnic communities, while preserving liberal democratic rules for their own community. Citizenship and representative government were confined to the *Herrenvolk*. Minority control within a given region is very common: consider Serbian domination of Albanians in Kosovo, or the treatment of the majority Bengalis in what was East Pakistan. In Fiji, the native minority, frightened by electoral returns which threatened their participation in government, supported a coup in 1987 which shifted towards a system of minority hegemonic control (Chapter 11).

But hegemonic control can occur in states in which the majority or entirety of the relevant state's adult population have formal access to citizenship. Democracy in its most primitive meaning is understood as 'majority rule'. Where political 'majorities' constantly fluctuate, as people change their minds on the key policy or political issues of the day, then majority rule is a sensible decision rule, infinitely preferable to the kind of minority rule practised by emperors, military dictators or one-party regimes. However, where there are two or more deeply established ethnic communities, and where the members of these

communities do not agree on the basic institutions and policies the regime should pursue, or where the relevant ethnic communities are not internally fragmented on key policy preferences in ways which cross-cut each other, then 'majority rule' can become an instrument of hegemonic control.

Northern Ireland (1920-72), and the deep South of the USA (c. 1870-c. 1964), are examples of regions within liberal democratic states where formal majoritarianism co-existed with hegemonic control over the relevant minority. The relevant majority monopolised the police and judicial systems, manipulated the franchise to consolidate their domination, practised economic discrimination in employment and the allocation of public housing, and institutional discrimination against the minority's cultural and educational system(s), and ruthlessly repressed minority discontent. As Noel shows, the Canadian state practised control over aboriginal groups (Chapter 2). Natives were policed through the white judicial system, denied certain privileges if they left reservations and denied the (federal) franchise if they remained on them (until 1961).²¹ In India, the demands of Sikhs for an autonomous Punjab partly arose from their fear that Nehruvian tolerance had increasingly given way to Hindu chauvinism, presaging a move towards control as the preferred Hindu method of governing India (Chapter 4). Since 1969 Malaysia has been moving away from consociationalism towards control: prompting Mauzy to describe the present arrangements with the label 'coercive consociationalism' (Chapter 5).

The normative lesson is obvious: a majoritarian system of liberal democratic government, designed to create strong powers for the governing party, is no guarantee of liberty for ethnic minorities. A 'winner takes all' system in the presence of ethnic parties ensures that ethnic competition will be regarded as a zero-sum conflict. Where two or more ethnic communities wish to belong to different external nation-states the potential instability of majoritarian liberal democracy is even more obvious, and the temptations to establish a system of control by the majority are correspondingly greater.

Some maintain that systems of hegemonic control can be normatively defensible. Lustick maintains that control is often the only alternative to continuous war - he had in mind the Lebanon after 1976 (Lustick 1979). However, this quasi-Hobbesian reasoning (any state is better than none) is suspect.

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Consider first the consequences of universalising Lustick's argument. It would lead one to maintain, as some do, that the dictatorial CPSU and the Yugoslav League of Communists were morally justified precisely because they suppressed ethnic conflict in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, that one-party states in Africa and Asia are similarly defensible, and that the reimposition of Ba'athist control over the Kurds is preferable to continuous civil war in Iraq.

There are at least five further difficulties with universalising Lustick's limited defence of hegemonic control. First, the options in any given ethnic conflict are rarely simply between those of control and continuous ethnic war - although there will be plenty of political entrepreneurs seeking to advance precisely this argument. Second, some of the options (federalism/cantonisation, arbitration and consociationalism) have some record of success in stabilising deeply divided societies in ways compatible with liberal democratic norms, whereas any system of control is easily convertible into a system for the execution of genocide, ethnocide, forced mass-population transfers and other violations of human rights. Third, partitionist or secessionist options are almost invariably more desirable than the imposition of control. If the relevant partition or secession is even moderately well executed it should ensure that more people can enjoy legitimate self-government than would be the case under a system of control. Fourth, under systems of control the subordinated minority will always seek to 'internationalise' their plight under the relevant hegemonic group or party/dictator, and thereby threaten the stability of the relevant regime as well as the international order. Therefore one can use stability arguments which are the converse of Lustick's. Fifth, if a system of control eventually breaks down, its practices will have added to the accumulated stock of ethnic grievances. Repression sidelines moderates, bolsters extremists and obstructs prospects for future accommodation, as Singh and O'Duffy demonstrate has been true in both the Punjab and Northern Ireland (Chapters 4 and 6, respectively). The same story is true of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. One might also argue in a realist fashion, although the evidence would need careful appraisal, that wars may sort matters out more successfully than exercising hegemonic control, and even create incentives for post-war co-operative behaviour.

(b) *Arbitration (third-party intervention)*

Arbitration of bi-ethnic or multi-ethnic states is the least recognised mode in the literature on ethnic conflict regulation, except perhaps in international relations and peace studies (Hoffman 1992). The main classification problems with the concept of arbitration are deciding whether or not it includes:

- both internal and external arbitration;
- what one of us elsewhere has called 'co-operative internationalisation' (O'Leary 1989); and
- forceful intervention by a self-appointed umpire concerned to establish stability in a given region.

These three classification problems share one feature. One must decide whether to classify any conflict-regulating activity which is the outcome of third-party intervention as arbitration, or to confine the term arbitration to cases where the relevant third-party intervention is characterised by procedural neutrality of some kind. Our preference is for the latter more exclusive usage.²² Many third-party interventions, as we shall see, are indistinguishable from efforts to establish control of a given region. However, we believe that arbitration can be internal or external and includes 'co-operative internationalisation'.

Arbitration on our construal entails the intervention of a 'neutral', bi-partisan or multi-partisan authority. It differs from other methods used to stabilise antagonistic societies because it involves conflict regulation by agents other than the directly contending parties. Integral to the concept of arbitration is that the disinterestedness of the arbiter makes it possible for this person (or institution, or state) to win the acquiescence if not the enthusiastic support of the contending ethnic segments; and thereby dampen the violence which would otherwise occur. An arbiter provides governmental effectiveness where war or anarchy might otherwise prevail. Arbitration is distinguishable from *mediation* because the arbiter makes the relevant decisions, whereas mediators merely facilitate them. Thus from 1991 until we went to press, the EC had been mediating rather than arbitrating in what was 'Yugoslavia'.

In a system of arbitration the role of the arbiter is portrayed like that of a conciliator presiding over a family quarrel. The arbiter pursues the common interests of the rival segments in the

relevant society as he or she perceives them; regulates the political exchanges between the segments as an umpire (to prevent a further and more dramatic breakdown in state order); and presides over ethnic elites who have varying incentives to engage in responsible and co-operative behaviour. Arbitration, in principle, can establish the conditions for longer-term democratic conflict resolution: secessions, partitions, power-sharing or even the peaceful integration or assimilation of the rival communities. But third-party interventionists can play the role of self-appointed arbiters and act to reconstruct the old system of ethnic control - as, for example, occurred when a Russian Tsar handed back Hungary to Habsburg control in 1849, or when the British empire handed Northern Ireland to the Ulster Unionist Party. Alternatively, self-appointed arbiters can presage the creation of a new system of control by handing power to a different ethnic segment(s), as some maintain Syria will eventually do in the Lebanon.

The prerequisite for agreed arbitration is that the arbiter's claim to neutrality be broadly accepted by the major contending ethnic segments. Not all professed arbiters pass this test. Since 'neutrality' is rhetorically superior to 'partisanship' and useful for domestic and international consumption, the self-presentations of arbiters must be treated with scepticism: few observers credited Syria's intervention in Lebanon or Soviet federal intervention in Nagorno-Karabakh with impartiality, and the disinterestedness of US arbitration in the Middle East is widely questioned. Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland did not regard the British government as a neutral arbiter after 1972 (Chapter 6, and see O'Leary and McGarry 1992: ch. 5). The British government appeared to acknowledge this fact when it signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, providing a role for the Irish government as guardian of the nationalist minority in the region (O'Leary and McGarry 1992: ch. 6).

Arbitration of ethnic conflicts is of two broad types, the internal and the external, each of which can be performed by different kinds of agent. *Internal arbitration* can be executed by an individual who is not a member of the main antagonistic ethnic communities: for example, Julius Nyerere in post-independence Tanzania. It can be fulfilled by statesmen with the moral authority to transcend their ethnic origins: for example, Mahatma Gandhi in the Indian subcontinent, or President Tito

in Yugoslavia. It can also be managed by someone who can claim a connection with all the major ethnic groups: for example, Siaka Stevens in Sierra Leone. Internal arbitration can also be performed by institutions as opposed to individual agents. The monarchy in pre-1965 Burundi played an arbitration role over Tutsi and Hutu (Chapter 7). The US Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Warren, arbitrated conflicts between blacks and whites in the 1950s and 1960s. Federal governments, like supreme courts, can arbitrate ethnic conflict within the constituent units of their federation, as occurs regularly in Canada, where the Ottawa government has constitutional responsibility for indigenous minorities in the provinces. While few US blacks or Canadian natives regarded the relevant federal governments as their institutions, they clearly thought them more impartial than state or provincial governments.²³ Finally, internal arbitration can be performed by a political party. One-party states claim to absorb key members of rival ethnic communities and regulate their rival aspirations. This argument was advanced by Nkrumah in Ghana in the 1960s, Nimeiri in Sudan in the 1970s, and Mugabe in Zimbabwe in the 1980s. However, it is empirically difficult to distinguish this (alleged) form of arbitration from hegemonic control. In a competitive political system, by contrast, internal arbitration can be performed by a pivotal political party, one judged to be sufficiently disinterested by the other contending factions to be able to chair a cross-ethnic coalition. The Alliance Party has long sought to perform this function, without success, in Northern Ireland; and the Indian Congress Party has long claimed to be a reasonable arbiter of ethnic conflicts in India's regions, a claim which has become steadily more threadbare in the years since Nehru's death.

External arbitration by contrast suggests that ethnic conflict cannot be successfully managed within the relevant political system. It is a potentially useful conflict-regulating device during processes of decolonisation, where an external force still possesses authority, but less effective when the conflict zone is a strong sovereign state. External arbitration can be performed by a single external agent or state, a bi-partisan authority, or a multi-partisan force. Multi-partisan arbitration or co-operative internationalisation, as originally envisaged for United Nations' peacekeeping (and peacemaking) forces, has been performed

with intermittent success in Cyprus, and parts of the Middle East and Africa, for example in Namibia. However, this kind of arbitration is usually a sign that the relevant ethnic conflict is seen as insoluble and as a dangerous threat to the security of an entire set of states. There is truth in the cynical observation that 'when the UN come, you know that your problems are with you for ever'. However, adjudication of international law by the International Court of Justice shows that we do have instruments for multi-partisan arbitration of ethnic conflicts, should we choose to develop them.

Bi-partisan arbitration in its fullest form involves two states sharing sovereignty over a disputed territory²⁴ - in the form of a condominium - but it can also involve an agreement by a state which maintains sovereignty over the relevant region to consult with another interested state over how that region's government is conducted, and to grant the external government a role as guardian of an ethnic minority within the relevant region. One example is the Anglo-Irish Agreement between the British and Irish governments, signed in 1985 (Chapter 6; O'Leary and McGarry 1992: ch. 6). The Italian and Austrian governments in 1946 came to an agreement over South Tyrol, ensuring the German-speaking community 'complete equality of rights with the Italian-speaking inhabitants within the framework of special provisions to safeguard the ethnic character and the cultural and economic development of the German-speaking element' (see Alcock 1970; Hannum 1990: 432-40). The Finnish and Swedish governments reached a similar agreement over the Åland islands - although this agreement in effect set up a Swedish canton within Finland, a canton with the right to prevent Finnish citizens from settling on the islands (see Ålands landsting 1988). Other bilateral agreements between states over contested regions and national minorities existed in inter-war Europe (see Hannum 1990: ch. 17).

(c) *Cantonisation and/or federalization*

There are two territorial principles of macro-political ethnic conflict regulation, cantonisation and federalisation, both of which can be used to manage ethnic differences in ways which are fully compatible with liberal democratic norms.

Cantonisation might more accurately be designated as 'com-

munisation' after the communes which operate beneath the cantons in Switzerland. It might also be considered synonymous with devolution organised on an ethno-territorial basis. However, we prefer the term cantonisation because unlike communalisation or devolution it is a term distinctively associated with the regional management of ethnic differences. Under cantonisation the relevant multi-ethnic state is subjected to a micro-partition in which political power is devolved to (conceivably very small) political units, each of which enjoys mini-sovereignty. Although it is usual to discuss cantonisation in the context of federalism - as the Swiss paradigm might suggest - the principle of cantonisation is separable, in principle, from formally federal forms of government. Cantonisation must be distinguished from mere administrative decentralisation, common in unitary states: it is built upon the recognition of ethnic difference and allows for asymmetrical relations between different cantons and the central government. The democratic Spanish state, erected after the fall of Franco, which is, formally speaking, an asymmetrical form of decentralised unitary state, can be considered an example of relatively successful cantonisation, with the notable exception of the protracted conflict in the Basque Country (Chapter 9).

Cantonisation is really an application of the fashionable (Catholic) idea of subsidiarity to ethnic relations: decision-making power is managed at the lowest appropriate level of a political hierarchy. Cantons are usually designed to create ethnically homogeneous units where majority rule is practically coterminous with the self-government of all the relevant community.²⁵ Where ethnic conflict is high then the partitioning of existing governmental units to create ethnic homogeneity is the operating administrative principle, as happened in the case of the Bernese Jura. Cantonisation decomposes the arena of ethnic conflict and competition into smaller more manageable units: it involves a negotiable form of 'internal secession'. Under 'rolling cantonisation' policing and judicial powers can be gradually devolved to those areas where the population expressed a wish to exercise such powers, and where it is judged that the experiment had some prospects of success. In the newly independent state of Bosnia a carefully designed form of cantonisation may have made a great deal of sense and prevented the possibility of extensive blood-letting between Serbs, Croats and Muslims.

However, cantonisation is fraught with potential difficulties, notably the drawing and policing of appropriate units of government, winning consent for them, and the ever-present threat that the cantonisation of policing and judicial powers might be used by paramilitary organisations to seize control of parts of the relevant territories, and treat them as 'liberated zones'. This might explain why the Bosnian government would not consider cantonisation, especially the botched version suggested by the European Community's officials.²⁶ Yet cantonisation is often as realistic as pushing full-blooded nationalist positions, whether these be integrationist, secessionist or irredentist. Cantonisation is more gradualist in its implications than drastic partition of state-boundaries because it permits governments the freedom to reverse any experimental initiatives which go badly wrong. The Canadian government seems to be moving in the direction of cantonisation after its recent recognition of the 'inherent right' of native peoples to self-government 'within the Canadian federation' (Chapter 2).

'Pseudo-cantonisation' is also a possible political strategy, where territorial decentralisation of ethnic conflict is used to facilitate or disguise control, and merits the condemnation of liberals and socialists. For example, the South African government established a number of barren 'homelands' for blacks in an unsuccessful attempt to de-legitimise their demands for power at the centre, and successive Likud governments in Israel (1977-92) refused to partition 'Eretz Israel', instead offering Palestinians a form of autonomy which no representative Palestinian could embrace.

Overlapping cantonisation and federalism there exists a grey area of territorial management of ethnic differences which is often found in conjunction with external arbitration. International agreements between states can entrench the territorial autonomy of certain ethnic communities, even though the 'host state' does not generally organise itself along either cantonist or federalist principles: for example the agreement between Italy and Austria guaranteeing the autonomy of South Tyrol, or the agreement between Finland and Sweden guaranteeing the autonomy of the Åland islands.

Federalism is similar but not coterminous with cantonisation as a device for regulating multi-ethnic states: the states, provinces or *Länder* are usually much larger than cantons.²⁷ By federalism

we do not mean the kind of pseudo-federalism which used to characterise the Soviet Union. In a genuine federation the central government and the provincial governments both enjoy separate domains of power, although they may also have concurrent powers. Constitutional amendments require the consent of both levels of government. Federations automatically imply codified and written constitutions, and bicameral legislatures. In the federal as opposed to the popular chamber the smallest component units are usually disproportionately represented, i.e. over-represented.

Federalists maintain that if the boundaries between the components of the federation match the boundaries between the relevant ethnic, religious or linguistic communities, i.e. if there is a 'federal society' (Stein 1968), then federalism can be an effective conflict-regulating device. In the cases of Belgium, Canada and Switzerland the success of federalism in conflict regulation, such as it is, is based upon the historic accident that the relevant ethnic communities are reasonably geographically segregated (Chapter 12). Federalism is less desirable for communities which cannot control federal units, because of their geographical dispersion or paucity of numbers - as with Quebec Anglophones, Francophones outside Quebec, Flemish-speakers in Wallonia, Francophones in Flanders, blacks in the USA and indigenous peoples in Australia and North America. One reason why federalism proved totally insufficient as a conflict-regulating device in Yugoslavia was because there was insufficient geographical clustering of the relevant ethnic communities.

Geographically clustered ethnic communities chose multi-ethnic federations for a variety of reasons. First, federations have often evolved out of multi-ethnic colonies, where secession might have provoked conflict with those who wanted to keep the polity unified. Second, even if a history of common colonial government did not promote any overarching cultural loyalties - for example through what Anderson (1983: ch. 4) calls 'administrative pilgrimages' - it usually creates elites (soldiers, bureaucrats and capitalists) with an interest in sustaining the existing regime's territory. Third, large federal states can often be sold economically - they promise a larger single market, a single currency, economies of scale, reductions in transactions' costs and fiscal equalisation. Fourth, large federal states can be marketed as geo-politically wise, offering greater security and

protection than small states. Finally, the personal philosophies and dispositions of federation-builders matter: the Macdonald-Cartier alliance in Canada (Chapter 2) and Nehru's leadership in India were critical in establishing and sustaining their federations.

Unfortunately federalism has a poor track-record as a conflict-regulating device in multi-ethnic states, even where it allows a degree of minority self-government. Democratic federations have broken down throughout Asia and Africa, with the possible exception of India - whose survival is partly accounted for by the degree of central control possible in its quasi-federal system. Federal failures primarily occur because minorities continue to be outnumbered at the federal level of government. The resulting frustrations, combined with an already defined boundary and the significant institutional resources flowing from control of their own province/state, provide considerable incentives to attempt secession, which in turn can invite harsh responses from the rest of the federation: the disintegration of the Nigerian and American federations were halted only through millions of deaths. As the ingenious federal engineering of the Nigerian second republic went down before a military coup the jury must remain out on the success or otherwise of democratic federalism in resolving Nigeria's ethnic dilemmas. India, the most successful post-colonial federation, faces secessionist movements in Kashmir and Punjab, and Canada is perennially threatened with the secession of Quebec (although this, like Godot, never comes). As Lieven and McGarry and Schöpflin demonstrate, even the sham federations of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia provided various ethnic movements with the resources to launch successful secessions during 1991-2 (Chapters 3 and 8, respectively). The threat of secession in multi-ethnic federations is such that Nordlinger actually excludes federalism from his list of normatively defensible conflict-regulating practices (1972: 32). Integrationist nation-builders in Africa have distrusted federalism precisely for this reason. Federations have been especially fragile in bi-ethnic societies. The Slovaks moved rapidly to snap the hyphen in the redemocratised Czecho-Slovakia. With the possible exception of Belgium (Chapter 12) there is not a single case of successful federalism based upon dyadic or two-unit structures (Vile 1982). Even the Belgian federation technically has four sub units, even if it is built around a dualist ethnic division, and the EC has

helped sustain the unity of Belgium. Even relatively successful multi-ethnic federations appear to be in permanent constitutional crises. Not only do the division of powers need to be constantly renegotiated as a result of technological advances, economic transformations and judicial interventions, but to maintain stability supplemental consociational practices are often required at the federal and subcentral levels of government (see Chapter 12).

However, despite the difficulties associated with it, genuine democratic federalism is clearly an attractive way to regulate ethnic conflict, with obvious moral advantages over pure control. The argument that it should be condemned because it gives rise to secession and civil war can be sustained only under two circumstances. First, if in the absence of federalism, there would be no secessionist bid *and* if it can be shown that ethnic conflict cannot be justly managed by alternative democratic means. Second, if the secessionist unit would be likely to exercise hegemonic control (or worse) over its indigenous minorities: as some maintain will be the fate of the Hungarian minority in an independent Slovakia.

(d) *Consociation or power-sharing*

Political relationships can be organised between ethnic communities to prevent conflict according to *power-sharing* or *consociational* principles. These principles can operate at the level of an entire state, or within a region of a state characterised by ethnic conflict: they are relevant to both central and local governments. Consociational principles were invented or re-invented by Dutch politicians in 1917 through till the 1960s, and by Lebanese politicians between 1943 and 1975. Malaysian politicians experimented with consociationalism between 1955 and 1969, Fijians on and off between 1970 and 1987, and Northern Irish politicians for a brief spell in 1974.

Consociational democracies usually have four features (Lijphart 1977a):

- *A grand coalition government* which incorporates the political parties representing the main segments of the divided society;
- *Proportional representation, employment and expenditure rules* apply throughout the public sector;

- *Community autonomy* norms operate under which ethnic communities have self-government over those matters of most profound concern to them; and
- *Constitutional vetoes* for minorities.

Consociational principles are based upon the acceptance of ethnic pluralism. They aim to secure the rights, identities, freedoms and opportunities of all ethnic communities, and to create political and other social institutions which enable them to enjoy the benefits of equality without forced assimilation. In some zones of ethnic conflict around the world the relevant populations effectively have a simple choice: between creating consociational democratic institutions or having no meaningful democratic institutions at all. A case in point is the Lebanon whose delicate consociational compromise was destabilised by Israel and Syria in 1975/6 and by the impact of the Palestinian diaspora. By no means have all consociational experiments proven successful - as the cases of Cyprus, Lebanon and Northern Ireland indicate - but some of them have. The best normative case for consociational arrangements is that they involve the self-government of the relevant communities, and they are better than the alternatives: majority domination, bloody partition, secessionist warfare and the unthinkable options of forced population transfers and genocide.²⁸

However, the consociational model of ethnic conflict regulation is easily destabilised because it is most likely to exist in a multi-ethnic or bi-ethnic region in which no one ethnic community can easily dominate the others. To work consociational systems requires at least three fundamental conditions to be present. First, the rival ethnic segments must not be unreservedly committed to immediate or medium-term integration or assimilation of others into 'their' nation or to the creation of their own nation-state. Nationality conflicts appear to have an irreducibly zero-sum character. Preventing ethnic communities from developing full-scale and exclusive national consciousness requires political elites either to downplay the state's national identity in a world in which the pressures to do the opposite are very powerful, or to develop an artificial and transcendent national identity, which may prove very difficult. Second, successive generations of political leaders must have the right motivations to engage in conflict regulation and sustain the

consociational system. The leaders of the rival ethnic communities must fear the consequences of ethnic war, and desire to preserve the economic and political stability of their regions. They must, for example, believe they are incapable of governing on their own (or establishing hegemonic control). Their motivations may be self-interested or high-minded, but without them there is no prospect of producing a consociational arrangement. The moment rival elites believe that the benefits of war exceed the costs of peace a consociational system is doomed. Third, the political leaders of the relevant ethnic communities must enjoy some political autonomy themselves, so that they can make compromises without being accused of treachery. If they lack confidence - for example because they are outbid by external irredentists or by rival leaders in the capital city - they will not be prepared to engage in hard bargaining. This condition not only requires restraint on the part of external elites outside the affected area but also within the relevant ethnic communities. This condition is most exacting as the dangerous phenomenon of outflanking, of Sharon outflanking Shamir, of Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party outflanking the Ulster Unionist Party, of Butadroka outflanking Mara, is latent in all proportional representation consociational systems.

These are demanding requirements. If these conditions are not present, as in the Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Malaysia, Cyprus and Fiji, then consociational experiments break down. An even more depressing conclusion is also possible. Consociational practices may work to calm ideological, religious, linguistic or ethnic conflicts, but only if these conflicts have not become the bases of separate national identities. Consociationalism may only be practicable in moderately rather than deeply divided societies (Horowitz 1985: 571-2). This conclusion is not appetising for enthusiasts of consociationalism in Burundi, Fiji, Northern Ireland, Malaysia, Lebanon and South Africa.

CONCLUSION

In the chapters which follow our contributors examine ethnic conflict regulation in a variety of hotspots and cooler locations. We hope our framework allows readers to classify the mode or modes of conflict regulation used in each case study, and to judge their morality, feasibility and consequences. The comparative

evaluation of ethnic conflict regulations matters because we are all ethnics of one kind or another, even when we want not to be, and because our community relations are too important to be left to ethnic partisans. Political scientists have few more important duties than to contribute to hard-headed but ethical analyses of ways of resolving ethnic conflict.

NOTES

- 1 Pioneering and exemplary trailblazing works have been carried out by Walker Connor (1973), Donald Horowitz (1985) and Arend Lijphart (e.g. 1968, 1977a, 1984).
- 2 Micropolitical forms of ethnic conflict regulation are smaller scale, and include *inter alia* rigorous discrimination and segregation, equal opportunities policies, affirmative action programmes, community relations and cultural encounter groups, specific forms of electoral representation, etc.
- 3 Although the eight methods were arrived at taxonomically two of them are *typologically* related, namely consociationalism and control (Lustick 1979), and arbitration (or third-party intervention) can be typologically contrasted with them (McGarry and O'Leary, forthcoming).
- 4 Eliminating and managing differences are mutually exclusive strategies from the perspective of the target ethnic community. However, there is no reason why a state may not seek to eliminate differences between some ethnic communities while seeking to manage differences with others.
- 5 For a contrary view, see McNeill (1986: 71).
- 6 Some believe that these were cases of forced transfers rather than genocide because Stalin's express intention was to remove these peoples from militarily sensitive areas, and not to kill them. However, by the 'indirect destruction' element in our definition they count as genocides.
- 7 The Chinese were (conveniently) treated as coterminous with Communists: so it is difficult to distinguish genocide from politicide in Indonesia. Estimates of the number of victims in 1965-6 range from 500,000 to 1,000,000.
- 8 In response to the Israeli-organised Palestinian catastrophe some Palestinians wish to execute full-scale retribution, by driving Israelis 'into the sea'.
- 9 However, frontier-genocides occurred in all the parliamentary colonies of the British empire which became the 'white dominions'.
- 10 We use the term semi-secessionist movements to cover those seeking to leave one state to unite or re-unite with another. Strict secessionists seek to create an independent state, and are often wrongly called irredentist. It is states which seek to expand to complete their nation-stateness which are properly irredentist. Naturally irredentist states

- and semi-secessionist movements often go together (e.g. the Republic of Ireland and Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland).
- 11 Self-determination can in principle be exercised to agree to integration, assimilation or cantonisation (autonomy). However, full self-determination is often understood as isomorphic with secession.
 - 12 However, Northern Ireland unionists are ambiguous about whether they believe the boundaries of the UK or of Northern Ireland should be the ultimate jurisdiction for constitutional decision-making.
 - 13 The one liberal democracy to have granted the right of secession is the United Kingdom. In 1949 it granted the right of secession to the Northern Ireland parliament, and in 1985 it granted the right of the people of Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland. However, this right, as Irish nationalist critics point out, was not one which the local majority of unionists were ever likely to choose.
 - 14 Horowitz calls civic integration 'inter-ethnic nationalism' (1985: 567). Civic integration (which involves equal citizenship without ethnic assimilation) may seem like a strategy for managing rather than eliminating differences. However, as it is aimed at barring ethnicity from the public arena, we consider it an elimination strategy.
 - 15 Integrationists/assimilationists are especially sceptical about consociational arrangements which they believe entrench ethnic divisions and reward divisive political leaders.
 - 16 There are, however, some examples of assimilation within and across historic homelands, as George Schöpflin has reminded us. Substantial numbers of Slavs were assimilated as Germans and Austrians (see Vienna's telephone directory). Likewise, Germans and Slavs were assimilated by Hungarians; Ukrainians and Germans were assimilated by Poles; and some Poles were assimilated by Russians. Where urbanisation is occurring, and the assimilating group is relatively open and prestigious, the assimilands may not care to preserve their ethnic identity.
 - 17 A Canadian native chief described the policy of the Trudeau government in the late 1960s as one of 'peacetime genocide'. The policy aimed at removing some historic rights which had been conferred on natives.
 - 18 Some blacks (e.g. Malcolm X and Louis Farakhan) have rejected the American way, preaching separatism, black consciousness, self-reliance and, on occasions, secession.
 - 19 The undeclared goal of American public policy in major conurbations appears to be that of controlling rather than integrating blacks. The Reagan and Bush administrations have effectively quarantined blacks and controlled them through increased spending on police and prisons: leading to more young blacks being in prison than in higher education by the end of the 1980s. While control works reasonably well, from the perspective of whites, it can lead to sudden breakdowns - as we saw in Los Angeles in April 1992.
 - 20 Co-opting elites as a technique for monopolising power should be distinguished from offering to share power - the former is characteristic

- of control, the latter of consociationalism. Some leaders of the ANC believe that the South African government is offering them the former under the guise of offering them the latter.
- 21 South Africa's government was fond of reminding the US and Canadian governments that their treatment of aboriginals is like apartheid - and many native and left-wing intellectuals agreed.
 - 22 In legal literature adjudication is the term usually used to refer to neutral third-party intervention (coupled with an imposed decision), while arbitration can often involve non-neutral third parties (e.g. commercial arbitrations) pushing the parties towards compromise (our thanks to David Schiff).
 - 23 US blacks welcomed the intervention of federal troops to replace Arkansas state-troopers at Little Rock in 1957, just as native Canadians welcomed the intervention of federal troops to replace Quebec provincial police at Oka in 1990. Northern Irish Catholics welcomed the intervention of British troops in Northern Ireland in 1969. They were preferable to the local Royal Ulster Constabulary and the 'B Specials'.
 - 24 We have argued elsewhere for the merits of this way of regulating ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland (O'Leary and McGarry 1992: ch. 8).
 - 25 Cantons could be designed to achieve a very local form of power-sharing government between the rival ethnic communities, especially where communities are so intermingled as to prevent neat partitioning: however, the logic of this system is really that of local consociationalism.
 - 26 Address by Bosnian foreign minister at the London School of Economics, March 1992.
 - 27 Indeed the constituent units of federations can be subdivided into cantons to manage ethnic conflict, as the Canadian government proposes to do in the North-West Territories.
 - 28 Discussions of the circumstances under which consociationalism is likely to succeed can be found in Barry (1991), Lijphart (1977a, 1985), McGarry (1990), McGarry and Noel (1989) and O'Leary (1989).

Chapter 2

Canadian responses to ethnic conflict

Consociationalism, federalism and control

S. J. R. Noel

INTRODUCTION

The management of ethnic conflict has long been, and remains, a fundamental prerequisite for the maintenance of Canada as an effective political entity. For more than two centuries, under a variety of constitutional regimes, successive governments have sought to overcome deep divisions of language, religion and race that pose an ever-present threat to social peace and stability. The means employed in pursuit of that often elusive goal have varied widely across a broad spectrum of responses. Depending on the period, the location, and the specific parties to the conflict, virtually every possible response has been tried in one circumstance or another. My aim in this chapter is not to explore the entire spectrum but rather to identify the three most important types of conflict management responses that have been (and the two that are) employed in the Canadian state. These, I shall argue, broadly conform to the well-known theoretical models of consociationalism, federalism and control.

CONSOCIATIONALISM

The great ethno-linguistic cleavage that runs through the very heart of Canada is generally portrayed as that which separates the English-speaking majority from the French-speaking minority. This simple characterisation, however, is misleading in several important respects. Not only are there other important cleavages of region and ethnicity that must be taken into account, but the cleavage between the two 'founding peoples' (as the French and English like to call themselves, to the annoyance of others) is in

RESERVE
COLLECTION