allegiance while supporting their individuality, their liberty, and their capacity for self-government. It is not enough to hold out a vision of selfless social harmony that is incapable of attracting the energetic support of people as we know them. But neither is it enough to preserve people's economic freedom if they lose, as a consequence, the strength to insist on liberty. Contemporary defenders of democratic virtue (like Bellah) need to think more about interests both they and liberal skeptics need to think more about pride and virtue.

The strongest defense of liberalism and the free market must be complex. It would absolve liberalism's unique ability to combine interests, freedom, pride, and virtue—a kind of virtue that is not especially noble, but that is attainable and conducive to peace and prosperity. That is how I have interpreted Tocqueville's claim: liberal virtue equals the proud exercising of the capacity for self-government in public and private life. Refusing to take this claim seriously, defenders of capital may surrender their most effective weapons against communism and republican critics of liberalism.

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LIBERALISM AND THE POLITICOIZATION OF ETHNICITY
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Most liberal democracies exhibit cultural pluralism, that is, citizens of the same country belong to various cultural communities, and so speak different languages, read different literatures, practice different customs. Most contemporary liberal political philosophy, on the other hand, assumes that countries are “nation-states”. Citizens of the same state are assumed to share a common nationality, speak the same language, develop the same culture. My concern in this paper is how liberals have adapted their principles to deal with cultural pluralism.

I. Multinational States and Polyethnic States

There are many different forms of cultural pluralism, and many different ways of labelling them, so some preliminary distinctions are required. There are two main sources of cultural pluralism. One source is the co-existence within a given state of more than one culture, where “culture” means a historical community, more or less intentionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and history. A “culture” in this sense is closely related to the idea of a “nation” or of a “people” — indeed, these terms are often defined in terms of each other. A country which contains more than one culture is, therefore, not a nation-state but a multinational state, and the smaller cultures form “national minorities”, or “minority cultures”. The incorporation of different cultures into a single state may be involuntary, as occurs when one cultural community is invaded and conquered by another, or when its homeland is simply overrun by colonizing settlers who maintain their old culture. But the formation of a multinational state may also arise voluntarily, when different cultures agree to form a federation for their mutual benefit.
The second source of cultural pluralism is immigration. A country will exhibit cultural pluralism if it accepts huge numbers of individuals and families from other cultures as immigrants, and allows them to maintain some of their ethnic particularity. Under these circumstances, immigrants are expected to integrate into the public institutions of the existing culture(s), but they are not required or expected to shed all aspects of their distinctive heritage and assimilate entirely to existing cultural norms. Immigrants may associate with each other to pursue their ethnic preferences, but such groups are not nations, and do not constitute cultures. Their distinctness is manifested in their private lives, and does not affect their institutional integration; they still participate within the dominant culture and speak the dominant language. A country with extensive immigration of this sort will have a large number of "ethnic groups" as loosely aggregated subcultures, and not exhibit "polyethnycism." 

A single country may be both multicultural (as a result of colonization, conquest, or confederation) and polyethnic (as a result of immigration). Indeed, all of these patterns are present in Canada — the Indians were conquered by French settlers, the French were conquered by the English. Although the current relationship between the two can be seen as an uneasy federation, and both the English and French have accepted immigrants who are allowed to partially maintain their ethnic particularity. So Canada is both multicultural and polyethnic. Those labels are less popular than the term "multiculturalism" for that term can be confusing precisely because it is ambiguous between multinational and polyethnic. Some French-Canadians have opposed the Canadian government's "multiculturalism" policy because they think it requires the destruction of the uniqueness of their culture. Other people have the opposite fear (or hope) that the policy will be expanded to treat immigrant groups as nations, and further support the development of institutionally complete cultures alongside the French and English. In fact, neither fear is justified, since "multiculturalism" is a policy of supporting polyethnicity within the national institutions of the English and French cultures. As Burnet says, culture, including language, can only be maintained and developed when it is employed in all areas of life. So far it is so, it cannot have been the intention of the framers of the policy to promote multiculturalism: that would be to be bilingual — English and French — which makes this evident. Rather, the policy makers wished to endorse polyethnicity.

Since "multicultural" invites this sort of confusion, I will use the terms "multinational" and "polyethnic" to refer to the two main types of cultural pluralism.

In culturally plural societies, an important area of conflict concerns the way ethnicity should be recognized by the state, e.g., which languages should be recognized in the parliament, bureaucracies and courts, should each nation or ethnic group have its own national language, should state officials be elected or appointed by national ethnic organizations, should political offices be reserved for members of particular nations or ethnic groups, or should they be distributed in accordance with a principle of national or ethnic proportionality? Should nations have veto power over cultural-affect decisions on immigration, communication, education, etc.? These are all questions about what we might call the "politicization of ethnicity." We can distinguish two broad categories of political claims, to correspond to the two categories of cultural pluralism. In multifaction states, ethnic groups are included to demand some form of political autonomy or territorial jurisdiction so as to ensure the free development of their culture. At the extreme, nations may wish to secede, if they think their self-determination is impossible within the larger state. In polyethnic states, ethnic groups demand the right to freely express their particularity (e.g., in private ethnic associations and press), without it hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant culture, and are inclined to demand state


support for these actions (e.g., cultural exchanges and festivals, ethnic studies in schools, bilingual education). As the excessive
ethnic groups may demand that political offices be reserved for
their members according to their proportion of the population, and that some benefits be distributed through other
organizations.3

2. The Current Liberal Orthodoxy

These questions form much of the substance of the political life
of pluralist countries, both in the day-to-day administration of
state policy, and in the historical moments of constitutional
commitments and crises. Yet they are almost entirely ignored
in contemporary liberal political philosophy. Liberal philoso-
phers rarely discuss the difference between nation-states and
polyethnic or multinational states, and apparently do not think
of cultural plurality as raising important questions for liberal
politics. Despite this theoretical vacuum, a certain view about
the salience of ethnicity has come to be accepted as the
orthodox liberal position. And while this view is both
abstract and explicit, we can construct its basic outline.

Contemporary liberals, insofar as they discuss the same, treat
culture in the same way as religion, as something which we
should be free to pursue in their private life, but which is of
concern to the state, just as liberalism precludes the estab-
ishment of an official religion. So too there cannot be
official cultures which have preferred status over other possible
cultural allegiances. In a liberal society "the state stands
but itself the model that cultural group membership is private,
that shifting matter of personal choice and degree," 4 Yet
state does not oppose the freedom of people to express their
different cultural attachments, but nor does it nurture their
expression—rather, to use Glazer's phrase, it responds "to
"neutralizing." Palmeese groups are protected from dis-
incrimination and prejudice, and they are given the liberty of

3 A comprehensive quote system is ultimately incompatible with group
pluralism, because it reproduces within every group the same cultural
pressures that give rise to a group's distinctive culture. Moreover, it
produces historically specific patterns of oppression and work.

4 "Prescriptions in Political Theory" in M. Walzer, ed., Political

5 N. Glazer, "Theoretical Rights Against Group Rights," in A. Tay

6 R. Kymal, "Language and Culture in the Canadian Debate: The State of
the White Paper" (1976) 6 Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalities
67-87; J. B. Segal, "Political Psychology, Comparatively Speaking" (1974)
Journal of Historical Sociology 31-12.
emphasize on the utilitarian function, governments "can enter official languages without at the same time legislating official cultures . . . in erecting official languages, one does not necessarily imply that the cultures which these languages transmit and represent thereby become official cultures." Culture remains a purely private affair," for while English and French have official backing at the "utilitarian" languages, all languages compete on equal terms for "cultural" allegiance. It is the
task of the individual members of a culture to show the excellence of their product on the cultural marketplace, so it were. If they succeed, the language of that culture will become attractive to others. . . . If a culture, and hence language, cannot show itself to be worthy of choice in the light of standards of the good, then it deserves to disappear.18

Although this distinction between the utilitarian and cultural functions of language is questionable, we now have the basis of the current liberal orthodoxy on ethnicity. Liberals have worked to the ideal of benign neutrality in attacking the entire range of proposals for the politicization of ethnicity in Canada, whether it be the national rights claims of French Canadians,19 the national and aboriginal rights claims of the Indian and Inuit peoples,20 or the demands of ethnic groups to improve the social benefits under the multicultural policy.21 This conflict between the requirements of liberalism and the demand for public recognition of cultural groups has led to a schizophrenia in the way Canadian politicians and courts deal with ethnicity. Our political culture and institutions recognize both liberal equality and minority rights, yet each has been weakened by the other.22


19. Ibid at 70.


"Separation", and "parallel development" were all consistent with the requirements of liberal equality, since "each offers a declaration of the ideal of an area of liberty, or in other words, a free society for free men." But, like Hobhouse, he believed that developing the pluralist options was the greatest challenge facing English liberalism if its appeal was to be beyond the boundaries of its "culturally homogeneous" homeland.

Some liberals did oppose minority rights, but not because of a commitment to the principle of "benevolent neutrality." Their concern was stability, not justice. They believed, with Mill, the free institutions are "too hard to impose" in a multicultural state. Among a people with different fellow feeling, especially if they can speak different languages, the common public opinion necessary to the workings of representative institutions cannot exist... If it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide with the main with those of nationalities.

For liberals like Mill, democracy is government "by the people," but self-rule is only possible if "the people" are "people." The notion of a democracy must share a sense of political allegiance, and common nationality was this to be a precondition of that allegiance. Thus T. H. Green argued that liberal democracy is only possible if people are "bound to the state by ties derived from a common dwelling place with its associations, from common memories, traditions and customs, and from common ways of feeling and thinking which a common language and still more a common literary embodiment." According to this stream of ideas...


14 Ibid., supra note 13 at 133.


that liberalism depends on a notion of the self which is unencumbered by social attachments, whose freedom is exercised precisely by abstracting itself from its cultural situations. I believe this explanation lies elsewhere. The new liberal orthodoxy is the result, not of the inexorable working out of liberalism's individualistic premises, but of the convergence of a number of post-war political changes. Three features of the post-war world have conspired to suppress or distort questions of ethnicity, and have led liberals to adopt a misplaced antagonism towards the politicization of ethnicity. These three factors are (a) disillusionment with the minority rights scheme of the League of Nations, (b) the American racial desegregation movement, and (c) the "ethnic revival" among immigrant groups in the United States. While none of these events is distinctive Canadian, each has contributed to the formation of a new liberal orthodoxy that has been adopted, perhaps unwittingly, by Canadian liberals. I will discuss each of these in turn, to see how they have helped create this new liberal orthodoxy.

4. The Failure of the Minority Treaties

The first important change in liberal views came with the failure of the League's minority protection scheme, and its role in the outbreak of World War Two. The scheme faced international recognition to the German-speaking minorities in Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the Nazis encouraged them to make demands and lodge complaints against their governments. When the Polish and Czech governments were unwilling or unable to meet the escalating demands of their German minorities, the Nazis used this as a pretext for aggression. The Nazi manipulation of the League scheme, and the cooperation of the German minorities in it, created a "strong reaction against the concept of international protection" of national minorities. The "hard fact was that statesmen, generally guided by public opinion which was deeply opposed to the competition of various ethnic groups in the country, were disposed to encourage the racial solidarity of all ethnic minorities that had been suppressed by the victorious powers and to limit their participation in the national political life."


5. Racial Desegregation in the United States

The modern liberal rejection of minority rights began with worries about political stability, but it acquired the mantle of justice when it was linked to racial desegregation. In 1954, the Supreme Court struck down the system of segregated educational facilities for black and white students in Brown v. Board of Education. The decision was the culmination of a long struggle for civil rights, and it marked the beginning of a new era of social and political change. The decision was not without its critics, but it set an important precedent for the future of civil rights in the United States.


white children in the South. This decision, and the civil rights movement generally, had an enormous influence on American views of racial equality. The new model of racial justice was "color-blind laws", replacing "separate but equal treatment", which was now seen as the paradigm of racial injustice. But the influence of Brown was soon felt in areas other than race relations, for it seemed to lay down a principle which was equally applicable to issues of ethnicity. According to this principle, "minority is a matter of arbitrary exclusion from the dominant institutions of society, and equality is a matter of non-discrimination and equal opportunity to participate. Vested in this light, legislation providing separate accommodations for minority cultures seems no different than the segregation of blacks. The natural extension of Brown, therefore, was to remove the separate status of minority cultures, and encourage their equal participation in mainstream society. This reasoning underlies the Canadian government's 1969 proposal to replace the special constitutional status of Indians, and Brown was cited by the Canadian Supreme Court when striking down a law enacted under that status. Brown's formula for racial justice was also invoked against the rights of American Indians, and the rights of national minorities in international law. However, the actual judgment in Brown does not support the application of the color-blind formula to the rights of national minorities. The Court was simply not addressing the issue of national rights, like the right of a culture to the autonomous institutions needed to be able to freely develop itself within a multination state. Segregations were not claiming that whites and blacks formed different cultures with distinct languages and literatures. On the contrary, the whole burden of these cases 14 "Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy", in R. Berardinelli et al., eds, The Indian Adjustment, Integration, and Sovereignty (Ottawa: National Press, 1972) 202 at 204 ("separate but equal services do not provide truly equal treatment") and 215 ("...the problem of removing the specific references to Indians from the Constitution "...is a goal to be kept constantly in view"). 15 Radical & Black Protests 1970 S.C.R. 282 at 300 ("The social situation in Brown v. Board of Education and in the American race-relations is different, but the basic philosophy is the same..."). 16 R. Darby and J. Hetherington, The Native Indian Tribes and Government (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) at 241, 242; V. Yamey and W. Thom, Human Rights, Ethnicity and Discrimination (Montreal: Government Press, 1980) at 199. 17 Grand Jury and the Politicization of Ethnicity 245 was that the education received by blacks in their segregated faculties was identical to that of whites. The question was whether racial groups could be given separate facilities so long as the facilities were identical. And the Court ruled that under that circumstance segregation was inherently unequal, since it would be seen as a "badge of inferiority", as a sign of racism. Nothing in the judgment warrants the claim that national rights are incompatible with liberal equality. Indeed, the judgment, examined more closely, may argue for the recognition of national rights. Consider the situation of American Indians, whose separate institution came under attack after Brown. Where blacks have been forcibly excluded (segregated) from white society by law, Indians - aboriginal peoples with their own cultures, languages, religions and territories - have been forcibly included (integrated) into that society by law. This is what [I mean by coercive assimilation - the practice of compelling, through submission, an ethnic, cultural and linguistic minority to shed its uniqueness and identity and mingle with the rest of society. 18 Integrated education for the Indians, like segregated education for the blacks, is a "badge of inferiority" for it fails "to recognize the importance and validity of the Indian community." In fact, the "integration of Indian children in white-dominated schools had the same negative educational and emotional effects which segregation was held to have in Brown," so the "underlying principle" which struck down the segregation of blacks (i.e., that racial classifications harmful to a minority are prohibited) should also strike down legalized integration of Indians. The point is not that Indians don't need protection against racism. But whereas racism against blacks comes from the denial by whites that blacks are full members of the community, racism against Indians comes primarily from the denial by whites that Indians are distinct peoples with their own cultures and communities. Unfortunately, the centrality of the
civil rights movement has prevented people from seeing the distinctive issues raised by the existence of national minorities.\footnote{As Thomas Berger notes, "The American media portrayed Canadian immigration as an unimportant issue, even though the social and political consequences of immigration in terms of national identity was just as significant to the United States."


6. Polytvtvity and the American Ethnic Revival

The belief that minorities are unfair and divisive was confirmed, for many liberals, by their role in the ethnic revival, which played a significant role in the 1960s and 1970s. This revival began with the claim that it was legitimate ("not really American") for ethnic groups to express their distinctive culture. At the time, the explicit aim of immigration policy was "cultural conformity," i.e., converting immigrants to the cultural norms of the country's English heritage. These groups were considered incapable of making the adjustment faced by immigration restrictions, and sooner or later the government was forced to give up on its previous ethnic ties. These restrictions and expectations were progressively abandoned in the 1960s and 1970s, both in the United States and Canada.

But the ethnic revival in the United States soon moved on to new ambitions. One result of the more open expression of ethnic identity was that ethnic groups became more conscious of their status as a group. It became common to measure the distribution of income or occupations in terms of ethnicity, and those groups which were facing less well-defined group-based affirmative action became more conscious of their distinct cultural self-determination, and the need for separate institutions in which to develop their own culture. These and other ways, ethnicity became increasingly salient in American political culture and public policy.

American liberals have had an ambiguous relationship to this ethnic revival. Most liberals accepted the initial demand for the abandonment of the cultural conformity model, even though earlier liberals strongly supported the old model which emphasized shared cultural allegiance as the basis of political allegiance. But as ethnic demands escalated, liberal support diminished. I will look at two discussions of the ethnic revival to see how worries about the politicization of immigrant groups in America has influenced liberal views of ethnicity in general.

A. Nathan Glazer

Glazer believes that the politicization of ethnicity in America is a new and disturbing trend. Ethnicity has not yet become the traditional basis of American politics because the federal division of the United States, "preceded the creation of much of our great ethnic diversity" (275). In the absence of ethnic and racial concentrations dominating the one or more states, and of ethnic concentrations that could claim national rights on the basis of settlement or interval, and of National Origin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 154-155.

B. J. Warner

Warner notes the importance of the idea of Americanism in the United States, "a powerful and influential concept in American politics. It is a concept that speaks to the idea of a common identity among all Americans, regardless of their race, religion, or ethnicity. It is a concept that speaks to the idea of a common culture, shared values, and a common language. It is a concept that speaks to the idea of a common destiny, a common future. It is a concept that speaks to the idea of a common purpose, a common goal. It is a concept that speaks to the idea of a common vision, a common dream. It is a concept that speaks to the idea of a common spirit, a common heart." (Warner, ed., The Idea of America, 1967, pp. 154-155.)

C. J. R. Varela

Varela notes the unique role of the United States in the development of American identity, "a role that is unique to the United States, a role that is unique to the American culture, a role that is unique to the American people. It is a role that speaks to the idea of a common identity, a role that speaks to the idea of a common culture, a role that speaks to the idea of a common language. It is a role that speaks to the idea of a common purpose, a common goal. It is a role that speaks to the idea of a common vision, a common dream. It is a role that speaks to the idea of a common spirit, a common heart. It is a role that speaks to the idea of a common destiny, a common future. It is a role that speaks to the idea of a common language, a common culture, a common identity." (Varela, ed., The Idea of America, 1967, pp. 154-155.)

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American territories before they became part of the United States, it became difficult for most groups to exercise their right to use their language in a state's government, or to establish institutions reflecting their distinctive ethnic culture, or to vote. This American pattern of dispersed and intermingled ethnicity, which he calls "new world ethnic diversity", is fundamentally different from the mobilization states of the old world. American groups "rarely put forward concrete ethnic demands of the type we might see in nations where ethnic groups formed more compact, self-conscious, culture-maintaining entities" (283).

The fact that ethnic groups in America don't make national claims is not evidence of racism, for ethnic groups have to ground for such claims in the case of mother-tongue education, for example, most Americans had come to this country not to maintain a foreign language and culture but with the intention to become Americanized as fast as possible, and this meant English language and American culture. They sought the induction into a new language and culture that public schools provided—into many present-day immigrants, too—while they often found, as time went on, that they regretted what they had lost, this was their choice, rather than an imposed choice (149).

When immigrants chose to leave their culture and come to America, they voluntarily relinquished their national membership, and the national rights which go with it. This is contrast to national minorities in the old world, where the denial of national rights, like mother-tongue education, is an imposed choice. The heart of Glazer's argument against the politicization of ethnicity in America is this distinction between old-world citizens which are "a federation of peoples", and immigrant countries which are composed of "dispersed, mixed assimilated [and] integrated" ethnic groups (227). And I think this is a significant distinction. 8

85. Sayer, out at 127-79. Reference to this work use in particular is to 29.

86. Of course, there will be some cultural groups which do not fit neatly within either the "national majority" or the "voluntary immigrant" category.

cannot claim the same rights as national minorities. If I and others decide to emigrate to Chile, we have no right that the Chilean government provide us with public services in our mother-tongue. We could argue that a government policy that provided English-language services would benefit everyone, by enriching the whole cultural environment. But we have no right to such policies, for in choosing to leave Canada, we relinquished the rights that go with membership in our cultural community. Public subsidization of the ethnic activities of voluntary immigrant groups is best seen as a matter of choice, which no one has a right to, or a right against.
extensive demands of the ethnic revival would, therefore, be unjust, impracticable, divisive, and coercive.

This is Glazer’s argument against the politicization of ethnicity in America, and it is a recognizably liberal argument, for it is focused on the role of choice in American assimilation and coercion in the assimilation of minority nations. But notice that this argument, whatever its validity, is not an argument against national rights. Glazer’s point is that ethnic groups in America are not national minorities, yet that national minorities don’t have any rights. Yet, as with the Brown judgment, there has been a tendency for liberals to generalize the conclusion to all cases of ethnicity. Indeed, Glazer himself describes the argument as to make them apply to national minorities. He notes that even in the United States there are exceptions to the national minority pattern: American Indians, Mexican-Americans, blacks, Puerto Ricans etc. In respect to many of these groups, the United States is at least a “federation of peoples.” When the Southwest joined the United States, Spanish-Americans were recognized as a distinct culture entitled to special rights, although these were taken away when Anglophone settlers achieved majority status (127); and Indians and Puerto Ricans continue to be federated to the American state as distinct peoples with special political status.

Glazer recognizes that these groups “process much more in the way of national characteristics” (121-123), and that they are demanding national rights on the grounds that their characteristics are inapplicable to immigrant groups.

Both blacks and the Spanish-speaking population are in a distinctive political situation: the blacks were brought as slaves, and the Mexican and Puerto Ricans were conquered. The American Indians were also conquered. The white ethnic groups

6 It is also an instance of, against existing “undeliberated” policies, to bring as the nature of national rights of whites.

7 The parallels here are not with respect to matters of national rights of whites.

8 The parallels here are not with respect to matters of national rights of whites.
252. Group Rights

Maintenance and group rights on the one hand, or individual integration and individual rights on the other. The United States, whatever the reality of discrimination and segregation, has as a national ideal a unity and new ethnic identity, that of American. 4

So Glazer's claim is that minority rights are excluded from the national consensus because they are unfair. Rather, they are unfair because they are excluded from the national consensus.

So there is no argument (at least not a liberal argument). What if the national consensus is built on ignorance of or insensitivity to the interests of minority nations (as his own argument suggests)? In any event, Glazer's description of the national consensus is biased. He says the consensus must either accept or reject the politicization of ethnicity. But why can't the national consensus emphasize what Glazer himself emphasizes: the difference between immigrant groups and national minorities? The national ideal may recognize the legitimate rights of minority cultures while denying the illegitimate claims of immigrant groups. Indeed, this is close to the actual practice and national consensus in both the U.S. and Canada: as laws give Indians, Inuit, French Canadians, and Puerto Ricans special political status that other ethnic groups do not have, so Glazer has no argument of justice or convention to support his commitment to build neutrality towards national minorities. Why then is he opposed to the rights of national minorities?

After asserting that the "group" policy is to assimilate the Indians, he goes on to note "a fatal complication":

If the public policy gets turned around to the point where, rather than trying to suppress or ignore the existence of the culture group as a distinctive element in American society and policy, it recognizes a distinctive status for some groups and begins to attach rights in public law to membership in them, will that not react to the others' half-way toward assimilation, and will they not begin to reassert themselves so that they will not be placed at a disadvantage? (291)

Here is the crux of the matter for Glazer. Indians who desire recognition of their national rights may have both justice and convention on their side, but

4. See, e.g., 106

Our problem is that we are not a federation of peoples like Canada or the Soviet Union but of states, and our ethnic groups are already too dispersed, mixed, assimilated to permit without confusion a policy that separates us for special treatment. But if we try, then many other groups will join the queue, or try to, and the hope of a large fraction of all Americans will have to be abandoned... in a multicultural society, such a policy can only encourage one group after another to raise claims to special treatment for its protection... Then the demand for special treatment will lead to animosity against other groups that already have it, by those who think they should have it and don't. (237-239)

In other words, recognizing the legitimate demands of Indians would make European and Asian ethnic groups demand illegitimate and divisive benefits, and there by perpetuate the "langer fraternity of all Americans".

It is worth pausing to consider how weak this argument is. Firstly, Glazer's argument is hypothetical. It rests on the importance of distinguishing national minorities and ethnic groups, but he then shows that this distinction can be drawn. Secondly, his argument is ethnocentric. He says there is a "national consensus" in favor of assimilation, but he clearly means by this a consensus amongst European and Asian ethnic groups, not the actual consensus that other groups want national rights. He says that such consensus has produced a "fraternity of all Americans", even though he admits that it has excluded Blacks, Indians, Hispanics and Puerto Ricans. He says that national rights should be rejected in order to avoid mutual resentment. But what he really hopes to avoid is unjustified resentment amongst European and Asian ethnic groups, since he admits that national minorities are already [legitimately] resentful at the denial of their national rights. Inherent groups have illegitimately adopted the language of national rights, and in order to fight this divisive tendency, Glazer denies Indians the legitimate use of that language.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Indians are being sacrificed to preserve Glazer's real concern, viz., the fraternity of immigrant groups in America. The beliefs of ethnic groups are taken by Glazer to be definable of the "national" ideal, of what "all Americans" feel. As a result, the
another ethnic group, but they have resisted that pressure and fought to protect their distinct status. Indians are indeed subject to racism, but the racism they are most concerned with is the racism that states they are distinct peoples with their own cultures and communities.

Since Walter has no argument against minorities which demand national rights rather than polyethnicity, he instead suggests that no one really wants national rights. It is hard to believe that he actually thinks this, for it is completely at odds with the history of Indian tribes in America or Canada. In any event, the fact that Indians might choose to become an ethnic group like all the others does not show that they don't have the right to choose otherwise (nations can choose not to exercise their legitimate rights). Walter's claim is not only insensitive to the real aspirations of American Indians, it is irrelevant to the question of the legitimacy of their national rights.

So nothing in Walter's argument supports the claim that national rights are unfair. In the end, Walter, like Glazer, resorts to the idea of a national consensus. He says that the question of national rights within a multinational state "must itself be worked out politically, and its precise character will depend upon understandings shared among the citizens about the value of cultural diversification, local autonomy, and so on. It is to these understandings that we must appeal when we make our arguments." And in America, the larger political community sees national rights as "inconsistent with our historical traditions and shared understandings ... inconsistent too with contemporary living patterns, deeply and bitterly divided." But in other words, the dominant culture, adapted to the needs of immigrant ethnicity, is paramount, and Indians can be allowed to interfere with its "shared understandings," or with rights that would be "divisive." But, like Glazer, Walter provides no arguments why a consensus adapted to immigrant ethnicity should define what is legitimate for national minority.

* The results Thurgood Marshall's claim that Indians want assimilation are not "true" but "that they have not and will not desire the policies of the white-dominated Indian policies." (L. Friedman, ed., Argument: The Case Against Before the Supreme Court of the United States, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 90.)


* Text at 171.

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...he ignores the fact that the national consensus in the U.S. (and Canada) does accept the special status of national minorities.

Walter's argument exhibits the same faults as Glazer's. Both make ad hoc appeals to a "national consensus," which they equate with the aspirations of European and Asian immigrants, and which they describe in simplistic terms. Both assert the importance of liberalist attachments to the separation of state and ethnicity, but the reasons they give for rejecting national rights have nothing to do with liberal principles, and indeed are in conflict with them.