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When All Else Fails Chaim D. Kaufmann

Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century

Until recently, there has been a near consensus among policymakers and scholars that the objective of ethnic conflict management should be to support and preserve integrated, multiethnic societies. In the last few years, however, the idea that separating the warring populations may be the best solution to many of the most intense ethnic conflicts has been gaining ground. Events in Bosnia have supported this trend, as observers note that the more the warring groups have separated, the more peaceful their relations have become, while proposals to thoroughly reintegrate them command less and less support.¹ In addition, a growing body of scholarship that focuses on the role of intergroup security dilemmas in ethnic conflicts argues that intermixed population settlement patterns can promote escalation of violence, implying that separation of warring groups may dampen conflict.²

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1. John J. Mearsheimer, "Shrink Bosnia to Save It," *New York Times*, March 31, 1993; Mearsheimer and Stephen W. Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," *New Republic*, December 18, 1995, pp. 16–21; Robert M. Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 740–742; Ivo H. Daalder, "Bosnia after SFOR: Options for Continued U.S. Engagement," *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997–98), pp. 5–18; Robert A. Pape, "Partition: An Exit Strategy for Bosnia," *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter 1997–98), pp. 25–28; and Michael O'Hanlon, "Turning the Cease-fire into Peace," *Brookings Review*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 41–44. In addition, some analysts who oppose the partition of Bosnia admit that reintegration of the separated populations would be very difficult. See Charles G. Boyd, "Making Bosnia Work," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 42–55; Susan L. Woodward, "Avoiding Another Cyprus or Israel," *Brookings Review*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 45–48; and Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), p. 133. Flora Lewis, "Reassembling Yugoslavia," *Foreign Policy*, No. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 132–144, argues that Bosnia could be reintegrated.

2. Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103–124; Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136–175; and Daniel L. Byman, "Divided They Stand: Lessons about Partition from Iraq and Lebanon," *Security Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 1–29. See also Myron S. Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 37–38; and Clive J. Christie, "Partition, Separatism, and National Identity," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 63, No. 1 (January–

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Separating populations, however, remains deeply controversial. Even when carried out safely, population transfers inflict enormous suffering, including loss of homes and livelihoods and disruption of social, religious, and cultural ties. Thus they can be justified only if they save the lives of people who would otherwise be killed in ethnic violence. Critics argue that ethnic population transfers, and the partitions that often accompany them, generally do not reduce suffering and death but actually increase them.

The most important empirical evidence marshaled against demographic separation rests on the outcomes of four famous twentieth-century partitions—Ireland, India, Palestine, and Cyprus—all of which were accompanied by large-scale population transfers and by substantial violence.³

The question addressed in this article is: If the logic of demographic separation is correct, why were the partitions and population transfers in these four cases so violent? There are three possibilities: the violence in these cases could be evidence that the theory is wrong; the violence could have resulted from idiosyncratic factors that do not shed light on the causal logic of the theory; or the pattern of violence in these cases could be just as predicted by the theory, which would mean that violence in these cases (and future cases) could probably be reduced if policymakers facing severe ethnic conflicts were more willing to consider the option of separating hostile populations.

To answer this question, I investigate the records of these four cases and find that the critics' claims are not justified. In all four cases separation of the warring groups did reduce subsequent violence. Continuing or resurgent intergroup violence in limited regions within some of the cases has resulted not from partition or from separation but rather from the incompleteness of separation of the hostile groups in those specific areas.

This article is divided into three sections. The first assesses the state of the debate on demographic separation as a remedy for ethnic wars and identifies the empirical questions that must be answered in order to advance it. The second section investigates whether the net effects of the partitions and population transfers in the Irish, Indian, Palestinian, and Cypriot cases were to reduce loss of life or to increase it. The third section considers whether partitions and population transfers create undemocratic states.

March 1992), pp. 68–78. On why separation can resolve ethnic conflicts but not ideological civil wars, see Chaim Kaufmann, "Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars," *Security Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 62–103.

3. Radha Kumar, "The Troubled History of Partition," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 1 (January/February 1997), pp. 22–34.

The State of the Debate

This section lays out the sides in the current debate and the requirements for advancing our knowledge on the effects of population transfers and partitions.

THE CASE FOR SEPARATION

Whenever ethnic communities cannot rely on a strong and impartial central state to prevent civil strife, all groups must mobilize for self-defense. However, the material and rhetorical measures that groups use to mobilize for defense also pose offensive threats to other groups, creating a security dilemma in which no group can provide for its own security without threatening the security of others. The intensity of this security dilemma is in part a function of demography: the more intermixed the pattern of settlement of the hostile populations, the greater the opportunities for offense by either side; and it becomes more difficult to design effective measures for community defense except by going on the offensive preemptively to “cleanse” mixed areas of members of the enemy group and create ethnically reliable, defensible enclaves.⁴

The same dynamic also prevents de-escalation of ethnic wars until or unless the warring groups are substantially separated (or one side conquers or annihilates the other). Solutions that aim both to restore multiethnic civil politics and to avoid population transfers, such as institution building, power sharing, and identity reconstruction, cannot work during or after an ethnic civil war because they do not resolve the security dilemma created by mixed demography.⁵ As long as both sides know that the best security strategy for each is to engage in offense and in ethnic cleansing, neither can entrust its security to hopes for the other’s restraint.⁶ The policy implication is that the international

4. Posen, “Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” pp. 108–111.

5. The processes of war, especially reports of real or imagined enemy atrocities, also harden ethnic identities and solidify hostility and mistrust, creating additional hard-to-counter threat perceptions even in excess of real threats; this effect persists for a considerable time even after the end of large-scale fighting. Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions,” pp. 141–145, 150–151.

6. For additional types of proposed solutions to ethnic conflicts, see Donald L. Horowitz, “Making Moderation Pay,” in Joseph V. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 451–476; Arend J. Lijphart, “The Power-Sharing Approach,” in *ibid.*, pp. 491–510; Gidon Gottlieb, *Nation against State* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993); and I. William Zartman, “Putting Things Back Together,” in Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 267–273. For an analysis that focuses on perceptual rather than structural aspects of intergroup security dilemmas, and recommends solutions based on institution and confidence building, see David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 41–75.

community should endorse separation as a remedy for at least some communal conflicts; otherwise, the processes of war will separate the populations anyway, at much higher human cost.

The critical causal factor is separation of people into defensible enclaves, not partition of sovereignty.⁷ Conversely, partition without separation only increases conflict, as it did in Croatia and Bosnia in 1991–92.

THE CASE AGAINST SEPARATION AND PARTITION

Among most international organizations, Western leaders, and scholars, “population transfers” and “partition” have long been dirty words. With rare exceptions, the United Nations has supported states against secession movements, and the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) prefers to bring “safety to people, not people to safety.”⁸ Opponents argue that ethnic partitions and population transfers have three main flaws: (1) rather than dampening violence, partitions and population transfers actually cause violence; (2) they generate new conflicts, often by transforming civil conflicts into international ones; and (3) partitions create rump states that are undemocratic and culturally narrow, perpetuating intercommunal hatred.⁹ The first two criticisms are the most serious because they concern the central issue of whether demographic separation saves or costs human lives. The third is important because it suggests that refugees may find themselves in a polity more repressive than the one they left.¹⁰

7. Although, in principle, final political arrangements could be based on either regional autonomy or separate sovereignty, in practice, demographic separation is likely to be accompanied by partition, for three reasons. First, one side will often insist on partition. Second, whenever the international community intervenes to facilitate population transfers, it will need to specify partition lines, whether these are between what are to become autonomous provinces or between independent states. Third, because international law favors sovereign states, granting sovereignty will usually improve a group's ability to maintain its security.

8. UNHCR, “Working Document for the Humanitarian Issues Working Group of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia” (Geneva: UNHCR, 1992). According to former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “The new danger which will appear in the world in the next ten years is more fragmentation. . . . We will not be able to achieve any kind of economic development, not to mention more disputes on boundaries.” “UN Chief Fears World Could Split into 400 Mini-states,” *Montreal Gazette*, September 21, 1992. On international practice toward secession movements, see Lee C. Buchheit, *Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978).

9. Robert Schaeffer, *Warpaths: The Politics of Partition* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990); Amitai Etzioni, “The Evils of Self-Determination,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 89 (Winter 1992–93), pp. 21–35; Gidon Gottlieb, “Nations without States,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 3 (May/June 1994), pp. 100–112; and Kumar, “Troubled History of Partition.”

10. Additional criticisms of partition and population transfers include claims that they damage prospects for future economic growth and that international support for one instance could create

The implication of the critics' logic is that most of those who have become refugees in ethnic conflicts could have safely remained in their original homes and enjoyed reasonable economic, political, and cultural freedom if partition and population transfers had not been externally imposed on them. Their bottom line is that working to reintegrate ethnic groups at war with each other is both more moral and, in the long run, more practical than acquiescing in partition.

This is wrong. The security dilemma generated by intermixed populations ensures that ethnic wars always separate the warring communities; this process cannot be stopped except by permanent military occupation or genocide, or by not having the war in the first place. When ethnic conflicts turn violent they generate spontaneous refugee movements, for several reasons: people are afraid to stay in areas where ethnic fighting is ongoing or expected to begin, or they are forced to leave by their neighbors, marauding gangs, or a conquering army. Thus the question in the midst of severe ethnic conflict is not whether the groups will be separated but how—with protection, transport, subsistence, and resettlement organized by outside powers or institutions, or at the mercy of their ethnic enemies and of bandits? Refusal or failure to organize necessary transfers does not protect people against becoming refugees, but inflicts disaster on them when they do.

The critics' charge that partitions and population transfers create illiberal states is also misguided.¹¹ Although it is true that not all partition successor states are liberal democracies, the successor states created by the partitions studied in this article are not less democratic than either their predecessors or their neighbors. Even though several of the successor states have discriminatory laws, such discrimination is generally less intense than what the pre-partition minorities would likely have faced under majority rule.

REQUIREMENTS FOR RESOLVING THE DEBATE

The maximum universe relevant to this debate would be all cases of border changes or population movements that altered the ethnic makeup of one or more states. In practice, this universe would be uncountably large, so for this

a "moral hazard" that would encourage proliferation of secession movements. These issues are considered in Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions," pp. 170-173.

11. The claims of both sides in this debate about effects on political development are best understood as "other things being equal," given that political development is also affected by numerous nonethnic factors, such as economic development, income distribution, preexisting political institutions, and so forth.

study I define a more manageable set of the cases most relevant to the policy utility of demographic separation today: specifically, all twentieth-century ethnic partitions and secessions that have led to the formation of new states, roughly twenty in all.¹² Table 1 summarizes this set.

Within this set, there is a strong association between high violence and large population transfers; almost all of the high-violence cases involve more substantial refugee movements than any of the low-violence cases. This outcome, however, is consistent with the arguments of both sides in the debate: proponents of demographic separation contend that high violence causes population movements, while critics contend the reverse.

To resolve this debate over cause and effect, the cases that are most important to investigate in detail are the high-violence partitions. Because both sides in the debate are most concerned with the causes of extreme violence, the low-violence cases cannot be decisive. We should also focus on partition rather than secession cases, given that our purpose is to assess whether international intervention reduces or increases the costs of ethnic conflict. This article studies four of the five cases that qualify—Ireland, India, Palestine, and Cyprus—and that also have the additional virtue of being the same cases most commonly used by the critics.

Separation and Violence

This section examines the records of the partitions of Ireland, India, Palestine, and Cyprus to judge the validity of the claims (1) that separation and partition increase rather than reduce short-run violence, and (2) that they also perpetuate or actually increase intergroup hatred and violence in the long run.¹³

12. I define partitions as separations jointly decided upon by the responsible powers: either agreed between the two sides (and not under pressure of imminent military victory by one side), or imposed on both sides by a stronger third party. Secessions are new states created by the unilateral action of a rebellious ethnic group.

We could study ethnic population transfers between states to see whether they reduce subsequent interstate violence. Indeed, the records of the two largest ethnic population transfers in twentieth-century Europe—the Greco-Bulgarian-Turkish population exchanges in the 1920s and the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe after World War II—suggest that they may. Each of these exchanges was preceded by a series of wars that cost many times more lives than the population transfers did, and each has been followed by interstate peace.

13. The following discussions pay special attention to the roles of the minority communities in each case, because it is usually minorities who are most concerned about their group's security and who press hardest for partition.

Table 1. Ethnic Secessions and Partitions, 1900–94.^a

| | Secessions | Partitions |
|---------------|--|--|
| Low Violence | Baltic states, 1918 Finland, 1918 Soviet Union, 1990–91 Slovenia, 1991 Macedonia, 1992 | Norway, 1905 Austria-Hungary, 1918–19 ^b Ottoman Empire, 1918–19 ^c Singapore, 1965 Slovakia, 1993 |
| High Violence | Algeria, 1962 Bangladesh, 1971 Nagorno-Karabakh, 1991* Iraqi Kurdistan, 1991* Northern Somalia, 1991* Croatia, 1991 Bosnia, 1992 Abkhazia, 1992–93* Eritrea, 1993 Chechnya, 1994* | Poland, 1918 Ireland, 1921 India, 1947 Palestine, 1947 Cyprus, 1974* |

NOTES: *De facto, not internationally recognized.

^a Cases of decolonization in which the colony and its inhabitants had never been part of the metropolitan state are not included, because in most instances the remaining metropolitan population was small and viewed by most inhabitants as foreigners, not as a local ethnic group that could potentially contest for power. Algeria is an exception, because it had been legally part of the French metropole and also contained an ethnic French population of more than 1 million who wanted both to stay where they were and to remain French citizens.

^b No large-scale ethnic violence within or among the successor states, although one successor state (Hungary) fought a war with an existing state (Romania) that had gained territory in the partition.

^c No wars among successor states, but Turkey fought a war with Greece in 1920–23.

IRELAND

Although the partition of Ireland has been accompanied by violence, this violence was not caused by partition itself, but by the fact that the partition did not separate the antagonistic communities, particularly in the North. As a result, the demographically mixed North has been subjected to decades of violence, while the relatively monolithic South has enjoyed peace.

DID THE PARTITION OF IRELAND REDUCE VIOLENCE OR INCREASE IT? Political violence in Ireland increased markedly in the decade after the British government agreed to Home Rule and to partition in 1914. There were four major episodes: (1) the Easter Rising of 1916, in which approximately 450 died;¹⁴

14. Alan J. Ward, *The Easter Rising* (Arlington Heights, Ill.: AHM Publishing, 1980), p. 13.

(2) the Irish War of Independence from 1919 to 1921, in which an estimated 1,500 people were killed;¹⁵ (3) the 1922–23 civil war within the Irish Republic, which cost as many as 4,000 more lives;¹⁶ and (4) sectarian violence in Ulster between 1920 and 1922, which left another 428 dead.¹⁷

Opponents of partition and separation might see this record as evidence for their position, but this would be a mistake. The first two episodes were not sectarian conflicts at all and had nothing to do with partition; rather, they were fought over whether Ireland would receive only Home Rule within the United Kingdom or whether it would gain full independence. The opposing sides in both rounds were Irish nationalists versus the British Army and police, not Catholics versus Protestants.

The third and fourth episodes occurred because the 1921 partition did not separate the two communities, particularly in Ulster. Separation was not an issue in the South, because the twenty-six counties assigned to the Irish Free State contained a population that was less than 10 percent Protestant.¹⁸ This minority was far too small and too thinly spread to constitute a possible political or military force. Thus there was no security dilemma, and Ireland has not experienced a problem of sectarian violence to this day.

The source of both the sectarian violence in Ulster and the Irish Civil War was the mixed demography of Northern Ireland. The six counties that remained part of Britain included a 34 percent Catholic minority, creating a fairly intense security dilemma.¹⁹ With extreme nationalists in the South calling for action to undermine the partition, many Ulster Protestants believed that preserving their political, economic, and possibly even physical security required suppressing any accretion of power by Catholics. This security dilemma was further exacerbated by the irregular and commingled settlement patterns of the two groups within Northern Ireland (see Map 1); if Catholics and Protestants had been mostly separated in distinct regions, then Protestants would still have controlled the province government, but would have had little reason to interfere in local rule of Catholic areas. The result in 1920–22 was a wave of

15. Michael Hughes, *Ireland Divided: The Roots of the Modern Irish Problem* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 49; and Ward, *Easter Rising*, p. 126.

16. J.J. Lee, *Ireland, 1912–1985: Politics and Society* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 69.

17. Patrick Buckland, *Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1973), p. 176; and Charles Townshend, *The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919–1921* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 342.

18. 1911 Census, reported in Buckland, *Ulster Unionism*, pp. 179–180.

19. *Ibid.*

both organized and private violence in which 428 people were killed, more than 8,000 Catholics were forced out of their jobs, and about 23,000 were driven from their homes.²⁰

Northern Ireland's intermixed demography also created a security dilemma for nationalists in the South, who saw the vulnerability of the Ulster Catholics as demanding action to rescue them. This security dilemma did not lead to international war (the Irish government recognized that undoing the partition by force was infeasible), but it did help cause a short civil war in the South. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), which was operating in the North, refused to accept government discipline and was defeated by government forces in a war lasting from June 1922 to August 1923.²¹ One could argue that even if there had been virtually no Catholics resident in the North, the IRA would have fought anyway for the cause of a united Ireland, but IRA leaders' appeals to their membership to die for mere land would have been much less compelling than a call to rescue fellow Catholics from pillage and murder. Similarly, it would have been harder to accuse the government of treason for abandoning people who were not there.²²

COULD THE PARTITION OF IRELAND HAVE BEEN AVOIDED? The partition of Ireland could have been averted in only two ways, either of which would have had worse consequences.

First, Britain could have granted Home Rule (or independence) to a united Ireland and coerced the Ulster Unionists into submission. In fact, the British government tried to do this in 1914, but was stopped by the risk of civil war in Britain itself, as well as by the evident willingness and capability of the Unionists to resist. Imposing Home Rule on Ulster was opposed by the Tory opposition in Commons, a majority of the House of Lords, King George V, and a great many Army and Navy officers.²³


20. Buckland, *Ulster Unionism*, p. 176; D.G. Pringle, *One Island, Two Nations?* (Letchworth, U.K.: Research Studies Press, 1985), pp. 239–242; and Frank Gallagher, *The Indivisible Island* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1957), pp. 225–265.

21. J. Bowyer Bell, *The Secret Army, 1916–1970* (New York: John Day, 1971), pp. 29–66; and Dennis Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf: Northern Attitudes to the Independent Irish State, 1919–49* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1988), pp. 72–77.

22. In the June 1922 election, the most extreme nationalist party, Eamon De Valera's faction of Sinn Fein, gained only 36 seats versus 92 others, but even De Valera did not favor prompt action against Northern Ireland. The IRA was not united either; an emergency convention in June voted narrowly against rebellion. Bell, *Secret Army*, pp. 30–34.

23. When in March 1914 the British government attempted to deploy troops to reinforce arms depots in Ulster, most of the officers who received the orders mutinied. War Minister J.E.B. Seely, Army Chief of Staff Sir Henry Wilson, and Army Commander-in-Chief Sir John French sided with

Map 1. Religious Majorities in Ulster, 1911.



SOURCE: Data taken from the *Census of Ireland, 1911* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office).

In addition, few if any doubted that the Ulster Protestants would fight.²⁴ On "Ulster Day," September 18, 1912, 218,206 Ulstermen signed a "Solemn League and Covenant," pledging to resist Home Rule; 228,991 women signed a parallel document. This was most of the adult Protestants in the province.²⁵ Since 1912 they had been preparing a regional defense force, the Ulster Volunteer Force, that by 1914 had 85,000 to 90,000 members, and was fairly well organized and rapidly improving its equipment through purchase and smuggling.²⁶ It was said in London in the spring of 1914 that suppressing Ulster would have required the entire British Army and would have taken twelve to eighteen months.²⁷

The other possibility would have been to deny Irish independence indefinitely. This would have required suppressing all armed combinations and nationalist political cells throughout Ireland, a task that 40,000 British troops and 10,000 police could not carry out in 1919–21. The British would certainly have been forced to engage in brutal tactics against civilians, an alternative that the government rejected as too awful.²⁸

DOES PARTITION INCREASE HATRED AND GENERATE NEW CONFLICTS? In the seventy-five years since partition, the Irish Free State has enjoyed virtually complete freedom from sectarian conflict. A united Ireland remains a rhetorical goal, but public support for action toward this end has faded over the years. Even though the 1985 Anglo-Irish agreement on Northern Ireland contained no promise of eventual sovereignty, the Irish government paid no domestic political price for signing it.²⁹

the mutineers, assuring them that force would not be used against Ulster. When ordered to withdraw this promise, Seely and French resigned, which led to a threat of mass resignations by military officers. At this point there was a real risk of a complete split in the British Army. Elizabeth A. Muenger, *The British Military Dilemma in Ireland: Occupation Politics, 1886–1914* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), pp. 168–172, 188–191; and Hughes, *Ireland Divided*, pp. 34–36.

24. Buckland, *Ulster Unionism*, p. 64; Townshend, *Political Violence*, p. 343; and Gallagher, *The Indivisible Island*.

25. John F. Galliher and Jerry L. DeGregory, *Violence in Northern Ireland: Understanding Protestant Perspectives* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), p. 10. Despite class, rural-city, and other cleavages within the Ulster Protestant community, Unionism commanded absolutely solid support. In 1910 all Protestant-majority districts in Ulster elected Unionist MPs. Buckland, *Ulster Unionism*, frontispiece, pp. 22–34, 179–180.

26. Townshend, *Political Violence*, pp. 252–255; and Muenger, *British Military Dilemma*, p. 177.

27. Hughes, *Ireland Divided*, p. 35.

28. Townshend, *British Campaign in Ireland*, pp. 189–192; and Sheila Lawlor, *Britain and Ireland, 1914–1923* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1983), pp. 85–86.

29. In 1991, 82 percent were prepared to postpone union if that would help bring about an internal settlement in the North. Market Research Bureau of Ireland, reported in Gemma Hussey, *Ireland*

Northern Ireland, however, has not achieved peace between the two religious communities. Protestants still fear eventual Catholic rule (or union with Ireland), Catholics have been subjected to decades of discrimination, and repeated rounds of political violence have erupted.³⁰ The “Troubles” from 1969 to the present have claimed about 3,400 lives.³¹ The sources of the difference between these two histories are again demography and the security dilemma. The Protestant population of Ireland stood at about 8.5 percent in 1991, while the Catholic minority in the North had increased to 38 percent.³²

Resolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland requires assuring the security of both communities, which in turn requires a credible, joint guarantee by the only actors strong enough to provide it—the Irish and British governments. Very recently, prospects for peace have improved because the two governments finally seem prepared to provide whatever assurances are necessary. In April 1998 the Irish Dail formally amended the republic’s constitutional claim on the North to require the consent of the province’s population, and in May the Irish government condoned British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s promises to Unionists that violent factions would be excluded from the new Northern Ireland Assembly and that there would be no change in the status of Northern Ireland without the people’s consent.³³

WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE? The partition of Ireland was unavoidable, but forcing 430,000 Catholics into Northern Ireland was not. Unfortunately, the Ulster Unionists commanded so much political support in Britain at the time that they were in effect allowed to set the boundaries of Northern Ireland. Seeking to incorporate as many Protestants as possible without endangering their majority in the province, they chose six of Ulster’s nine counties, including two that contained more Catholics than Protestants.³⁴

Today (London: Viking, 1993), pp. 186–188. In a 1996 poll only 38 percent of people polled in the republic supported unification. Carl Homore, “Desire for Union Now a Need for Peace,” *Houston Chronicle*, September 22, 1996.

30. Richard W. Mansbach, ed., *Northern Ireland: Half a Century of Partition* (New York: Facts on File, 1973).

31. Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, *The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict, and Emancipation* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 1.

32. *Ireland: Statistical Abstract, 1995* (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1995), pp. 55, 409.

33. “Dublin Parliament Poised for Peace Poll Go-Ahead, Press Association, April 21, 1998; and Frank Millar, “Blair and Trimble Appeal to Undecided Unionists,” *Irish Times*, May 21, 1998.

34. Lawlor, *Britain and Ireland, 1914–1923*, pp. 124–126; and D.W. Harkness, *Ireland in the Twentieth Century: Divided Island* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 34–37.

Ireland's best chance at lasting peace would have been to draw a partition line that separated the two groups as fully as possible, without regard to county lines or other prior boundaries.³⁵ Because no line could avoid leaving substantial minorities on each side, the British government should also have offered money to people willing to move, making clear that it could not protect those who insisted on staying behind. The result would have been a smaller but safer Northern Ireland.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The most frequently mentioned case in the debate over ethnic population transfers and partitions is India. Critics of the 1947 partition blame it for causing more than 15 million refugees and hundreds of thousands of deaths. This correlation, however, is spurious. The partition, the population transfers, and the violence were all caused by the irresolvable security dilemmas between the Muslim and Hindu communities of India, and especially between the Muslim and Sikh communities of Punjab Province, both of which were generated by the removal of the imperial power that had previously guaranteed the security of all groups. In short, independence from Britain, not partition, caused these tragedies.

Constructivist scholars of identity would charge the communalization of Indian politics, and therefore ultimately the violence, to manipulation of mass aspirations and fears by self-interested communal elites.³⁶ Whether or not we accept this model of mass political mobilization, however, the fact remains that the removal of British imperial power created real security dilemmas, which lent inherent credibility to political appeals based on community security.

DID PARTITION CAUSE THE VIOLENCE? The independence of India and Pakistan on August 15, 1947, not only divided the Indian subcontinent; it also involved the partition of two of colonial India's most populous provinces,

35. A Boundary Commission operated from 1924 to 1925, but was limited to recommending only very minor changes, which in any case were not implemented. *Report of the Irish Boundary Commission, 1925* (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1969). A better partition would have given the Unionists all of counties Antrim and Londonderry; much but not all of Down, Armagh, and Tyrone; and a few small bits of Monaghan, Fermanagh, and Donegal. The large Catholic-majority region spanning Londonderry and Tyrone (see Map 1) is mountainous and was thinly settled.

36. Paul R. Brass, *Language, Religion, and Politics in North India* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Mushirul Hasan, *Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1916–1928* (Columbia, Mo.: South Asia Books, 1979); Gyanendra Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Milton Israel, *Communications and Power: Propaganda and the Press in the Indian Nationalist Struggle, 1920–1947* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Punjab in the northwest and Bengal in the east. Although intercommunal rioting had been on the rise in 1945 and 1946, independence and partition were expected to dampen the violence. Some population movements were anticipated, but they were not expected to be especially large, sudden, or dangerous. These expectations were met in Bengal, where more than 5,000 people were killed before independence but very few after, and where 3.5 million people moved across the new border with little loss of life.

Punjab accounted for most of the refugees and nearly all the deaths. From August to October 1947, the province was convulsed by an intense communal civil war involving some of the largest ethnic cleansing campaigns in history. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed in Punjab, and the war sparked large numbers of revenge killings elsewhere as well. More than 10 million people from the Punjab and adjacent provinces had to flee for their lives.

By the late 1920s it was clear to all parties that India would achieve eventual independence. Given that British power was the ultimate guarantee of security for all communities in India, the prospect of its withdrawal activated potential intercommunal security dilemmas. Two such dilemmas were critical in determining the final outcome of the process: between Muslims and Hindus at the national level, and between Sikhs and Muslims in Punjab.³⁷

Muslims made up 22 percent of the population of India and Hindus 68 percent,³⁸ meaning that under pure majoritarian rule the Muslims would be absolutely insecure in the event that the government should be captured by Hindu supremacists such as the Hindu Mahasabha movement. Although the largest Indian nationalist movement, the Congress Party, was formally committed to a secular India, in practice it never represented all Indian communities. Members of the Mahasabha movement and other Hindu nationalists, such as B.S. Moonje, were welcome in Congress, while members of Muslim parties were excluded as “communalist.”³⁹

37. The Hindu-Muslim security dilemma was most severe in the belt of North India, where the percentage of Muslims ranged from 20 to 60 percent. In the South, where Muslim minorities were quite small, intergroup security dilemmas were weak, and communal mobilization and violence remained low before, during, and after partition.

38. *Census of India, 1931*, Vol. 1, Part 1 (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1933), p. 392.

39. H.V. Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 59. Moonje argued that Hindus should negotiate with Muslims only from a position of strength and that Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolence would “lead to destruction and extermination of the Hindus from the face of the world.” Letter, March 16, 1922, cited in Mushirul Hasan, “Communalist and Revivalist Trends in Congress,” in Hasan, ed., *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends*

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League, demanded constitutional arrangements that would assure communal autonomy, especially: (1) guaranteed electoral majorities in the five provinces with Muslim-majority populations—Punjab, Bengal, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Sind, and Baluchistan; and (2) a weak federal system in which the central government would have little power over the provinces.⁴⁰ Muslim leaders further insisted that police functions should belong to the provinces and national defense to the British governor-general (i.e., that a Hindu-dominated central government should possess no tools of coercive force).⁴¹ Agreement in principle on some of these points was reached at an All-Parties Conference in 1928, but the Congress Party leadership was forced to disavow the deal because of Hindu nationalist opposition.⁴² In practice, the Muslim demands might have exposed Hindu minorities in Punjab, Bengal, and Sind to Muslim domination.

The results of the 1937 elections intensified this security dilemma in three ways. First, electoral success persuaded Congress leaders that they could reach out directly to the Muslim masses, ignoring the Muslim political parties.⁴³ To survive, the Muslim League had to transform itself from an elite circle into a genuine mass party that could claim to represent most Indian Muslims. It succeeded, based on explicitly communal appeals such as the slogan “Islam in Danger,” so the ultimate effect was to increase fear and mistrust between the

in *Colonial India* (Delhi: Manohar, 1985), p. 206. According to Jawarhalal Nehru, many a congressman “was a communalist under his national cloak.” Nehru, *An Autobiography* (London: John Lane, 1936), p. 136.

40. Jinnah also called for one-third of the seats in the central legislature and a 75 percent majority requirement for action by the legislature. Although Jinnah did not dominate Muslim politics until much later, a wider meeting of a number of Muslim groups in 1927 had agreed on a similar program, as had another such meeting in 1925. V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 36–37; Uma Kaura, *Muslims and Indian Nationalism* (Columbia, Mo.: South Asia Books, 1977), pp. 29–30; and R.J. Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917–1940* (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 24–25.

41. Aga Khan at the Second Round Table Conference, London, 1931, reported in Kaura, *Muslims and Indian Nationalism*, pp. 72–73.

42. Moore, *Crisis of Indian Unity*, pp. 101–104; Uma Kaura, *Muslims and Indian Nationalism*, pp. 42–51; R. Coupland, *The Indian Problem: Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*, Vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 125; and Hasan, “Communist and Revivalist Trends in Congress,” p. 210.

43. Congress swept most of the country, gaining control of seven provinces. Subsequently, it took the position that it represented all Indian nationalists, so its own Muslim members, not Jinnah or others, were the true arbiters of Muslim opinion and interests. Actually, however, it contested only 58 of 482 Muslim seats and won just 26, 19 of these based on Pathan protest votes against Punjabi political dominance of Northwest Frontier Province. Hodson, *The Great Divide*, pp. 66–72; *Return Showing the Results of the Elections of 1937*, Cmd. 5589, cited in Coupland, *Indian Problem*, pp. 15–16, 121–123.

two communities. Second, Muslims in the seven provinces ruled by Congress soon complained of abuses, including physical insecurity because of government failure to restrict communal violence by Hindus; these reports were widely circulated.⁴⁴ Third, Congress's aggressive political tactics led Muslim leaders to doubt whether British control over defense could last much beyond independence. A Congress-controlled government might contrive to reduce the governor-general to a figurehead as it had in Australia, then change the basis of recruiting of the army, and then be able to do anything at all.⁴⁵

By 1940 Jinnah was convinced that nothing short of a separate Muslim state, "Pakistan," could provide security for the Muslim community. Further Hindu-Muslim negotiations proved fruitless; and in the face of increasing Muslim unity and evident determination, on June 3, 1947, Congress, the Muslim League, and Viceroy Earl Louis Mountbatten agreed to partition.⁴⁶ It was further agreed that because both Punjab and Bengal contained only narrow Muslim majorities and large Hindu-majority regions, Muslim West Punjab and East Bengal would go to Pakistan and predominantly Hindu East Punjab and West Bengal to India. Both states would gain independence on August 15, 1947, and the British-chaired Boundary Commissions would announce their decisions on August 17.⁴⁷

Although the national-level Hindu-Muslim security dilemma necessitated the partition of India, it did not cause most of the tragedy that followed, except indirectly by distracting the major players' attention from a second, even more severe, security dilemma between Muslims and Sikhs in the province of Punjab. Virtually all of the Sikh population of nearly 6 million in 1941 was concentrated in Punjab. Although the provincial population overall was 56 percent Muslim, 27 percent Hindu, and just 13 percent Sikh, the Sikhs averaged considerably wealthier than the other communities and had exercised disproportionate power in provincial politics.⁴⁸ By the 1940s Sikhs and Muslims had

44. Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided* (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1946), pp. 146–152; and Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 164–169.

45. Kaura, *Muslims and Indian Nationalism*, pp. 128–129.

46. In 1946 elections the Muslim League won all the Muslim seats in the central assembly. In the Punjab legislature, the Muslim League won 79 of 86 Muslim seats, while the intercommunal Punjab Unionist Party declined from 99 seats in 1937 to 18. Two of these immediately defected to the Muslim League. E.W.R. Lumby, *The Transfer of Power in India, 1942–7* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1954), pp. 69, 145–148.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 162–164.

48. *Census of India, 1931*, Vol. 1, Part 1, pp. 387, 392; and *Census of India, 1941* (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1943). Prior to 1927 Sikhs were 24 percent of the electorate and held 18 percent of

not fought in several decades, but they had a long history of intercommunal hostility.⁴⁹ Sikhs also controlled a large fraction of the best land in Central Punjab and in the canal colonies in West Punjab (see Map 2). Accordingly, Sikhs feared Muslim dominance even more than Muslims feared Hindu rule; their wealth, political influence, religious freedom, and even physical security all might be at risk. From the Muslim point of view, the Sikhs presented a special threat because their martial tradition meant that the whole male population had to be considered armed.⁵⁰

The core Sikh concerns were driven by security and remained essentially unchanged from the 1920s onward. In different negotiations with various parties, Sikh demands varied considerably on issues such as representation in the Punjab legislature, the boundaries of Punjab, and representation in the central legislature; but they remained constant on the two points most central to their physical security: (1) creation of a political unit in which Sikhs would be, if not a majority, at least holders of the political balance between Muslims and Hindus (i.e., anything but a Muslim-majority Punjab); and (2) retention of their traditional overrepresentation in the army of whatever state they would be part of.⁵¹

To secure these goals, Sikh leaders pursued every possible avenue of negotiation: first, participation in all-India constitutional negotiations; then, direct negotiations with Congress. After it became clear that partition could not be avoided, they tried direct negotiations with the Muslim League on Sikh status within Pakistan, made an attempt to get the British to impose arrangements for Sikh security, offered a proposal for an independent Sikh state, and finally


the seats in the provincial council. Sikhs also maintained special claims to Punjab on grounds that they provided a disproportionate share of the province's revenue, that the province contained all their important religious sites, and that Sikhs had been the last rulers of the region before the British. Anup Chand Kapur, *The Punjab Crisis* (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1985), pp. 39, 43.

49. Sikhism was transformed from a purely religious movement to a distinct, militant community in response to Muslim rule; Sikhs fought 250 years of almost continuous war against Muslim princes from about 1600 onward. Sikh rulers had controlled the Punjab for about 100 years prior to the British takeover in 1849, and were still remembered in the twentieth century for harsh repression of their Muslim subjects. Sikh troops also helped suppress Muslim rebels during the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857–58. Kapur, *Punjab Crisis*, pp. 6–9; and Hodson, *Great Divide*, pp. 18–20.

50. Sikh tradition requires males to carry ceremonial daggers at all times, and to take up arms when necessary to defend righteousness. Sikhs also comprised a greatly disproportionate fraction of the Indian Army: 13 percent in 1930 compared to slightly more than 1 percent of the population. Kapur, *Punjab Crisis*, p. 7, notes 9 and 10; and p. 20, n. 47.

51. *Ibid.*, pp. 51, 98, 111.

Map 2. Muslim and Sikh Populations in Punjab, 1941.



SOURCE: Data taken from the *Census of India, 1941* (New Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1943).

put forth a proposal to partition Punjab along lines that would keep all Sikhs within India. All were rejected.⁵²

By the summer of 1947 Sikh leaders were desperate. On March 2 the Punjab's coalition government made up of the Congress Party, Sikhs, and the cross-communal Unionist Party had collapsed in the face of a massive Muslim League civil disobedience campaign.⁵³ In February and March Muslims had attacked Hindus and Sikhs in Lahore and Amritsar, the two main cities of central Punjab and the core of the region most likely to be disputed; more than 3,000 were killed.⁵⁴ Possibly most threatening had been Jinnah's proposal in December 1946 to Sikh leader Sardar Baldev Singh that the Muslims and Sikhs combine to seize all of Punjab, while still refusing to provide any guarantees of the status of Sikhs in Pakistan. This could only inflame key Sikh fears that Muslim rule would be oppressive, and that the Muslims would not be satisfied with any initial territorial settlement.⁵⁵ Finally, it was clear that the June 3 partition agreement would, in all likelihood, leave nearly 2 million Sikhs stranded in Pakistan.

It appears that at this point Sikh leaders devised a four-point last-resort plan to protect their national security unilaterally: (1) if the boundary award proved unsatisfactory, to contest as much as possible of the core Sikh areas in central Punjab, and to resist possible Muslim attempts to contest any part of East Punjab; (2) to evacuate most Sikhs west of the line; (3) to eliminate the Muslim population east of the line, thus increasing the Sikh percentage in East Punjab

52. *Ibid.*; Satya M. Rai, *Partition of the Punjab* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp. 37–38; and Lumby, *Transfer of Power, 1942–7*, pp. 185–186.

53. This agitation was sparked by a government attempt in January to disarm the Muslim National Guards. Ian Talbot, *Khizr Tiwana, the Punjab Unionist Party, and the Partition of India* (Surrey, U.K.: Curzon Press, 1996), pp. 68, 148, 154–161.

54. This violence was partly sparked by Sikh leader Master Tara Singh's calls in the provincial assembly on March 4 for "Death to Pakistan" and "The pure shall rule; no resister will remain." Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1962), p. 77. The police in Lahore and Amritsar, who were mostly Muslim, were not effective. Violence also spread to Muslim-majority areas in Western Punjab, in turn followed by attacks on Muslims in Southeastern Punjab. Ian Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj* (Riverdale, Md.: Riverdale, 1988), pp. 227–228; Rai, *Partition of the Punjab*, p. 83, n. 25; and Anita Inder Singh, *The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936–1947* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 218–220.

55. Singh, *Origins of Partition*, pp. 205–206; and Lumby, *Transfer of Power, 1942–7*, p. 186. In June a last attempt by moderate Muslim League leader Nawab Mushtaq Achmad Gurmani to mediate between the Muslim League and the Sikh leadership was disavowed by Jinnah. Moon, *Divide and Quit*, pp. 82–87. According to Moon, Jinnah had frequently threatened the Sikhs that division of Punjab would not be in their interest, but had never encouraged them on their prospects in Pakistan. See also Kapur, *Punjab Crisis*, pp. 94–95.

after the war; and (4) later, to press the Indian government for redivision of East Punjab in order to create a true Sikh-majority province.

Although the existence of such a plan cannot be established with certainty, there is suggestive evidence. As early as March 1947, the Sikh Panthic Party passed a resolution that it would fight Pakistan to the end.⁵⁶ Military mobilization began in April, and by June the Sikh Akali Fauj had 8,000 men; in addition, the British provincial governor was receiving intelligence reports of a plan for a terror campaign in East Punjab.⁵⁷ Several Sikh leaders, including Sardar Baldev Singh, the Sikh representative on the Boundary Commission, made clear that they would not respect an unfavorable award.⁵⁸ Fighting began well before the award was even announced; starting on July 30, Sikh forces attacked Muslim villages in the central region around Lahore and Amritsar, which was disputed by both communities, as well as Muslim communities throughout East Punjab.⁵⁹ By the end of August, much of East Punjab had been cleared of its Muslim population.⁶⁰

The main evidence that the Sikh evacuation from West Punjab was pre-planned is that most Sikhs departed before trouble broke out in their areas; they also demonstrated better preparation than Muslim refugees going the other way and succeeded in getting away with more of their property and fewer losses.⁶¹ After the war Sikhs numbered roughly 30 percent of the Indian province of East Punjab and Hindus 70 percent. Sikhs then agitated for further division of Punjab to create a Sikh-majority state, which was accomplished in 1966.⁶²

56. This was the only organized Sikh party, holding 22 of 33 Sikh seats in the Punjab assembly. Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p. 227; Rai, *Partition of Punjab*, p. 40; and Kapur, *Punjab Crisis*, p. 50.

57. By June the Hindu RSS had 58,000 men and the Muslim League National Guards 39,000. Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, pp. 232–233. At the end of March the superintendent of police in Delhi predicted that “once a line of division is drawn in the Punjab all Sikhs to the West of it and all Muslims to the east of it will have their...chopped off.” Quoted in Moon, *Divide and Quit*, pp. 87–88. The previous governor of Punjab had begun predicting civil war as early as 1945. Wolpert, *Jinnah*, p. 249.

58. Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, p. 232; and Hodson, *Great Divide*, p. 338.

59. Although in the end this fighting did not affect the final partition line, it appears that Sikh forces did temporarily occupy some locations west of the partition line. Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, pp. 233–234; *The Sikhs in Action* (Lahore: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1948); and Moon, *Divide and Quit*, pp. 151–152.

60. Moon’s judgment is that the Sikhs were deliberately making room for 2 million refugees from Pakistan. *Divide and Quit*, pp. 279–280.

61. Hodson, *Great Divide*, p. 411; and Moon, *Divide and Quit*, pp. 122, 281.

62. Kapur, *Punjab Crisis*, pp. 149–183. This did not end the conflict over the scope of Sikh autonomy, which flared into violence again between 1980 and 1992.

The war in Punjab also sparked additional ethnic cleansing in adjacent provinces. By September refugees bearing tales of atrocities flooded Delhi and the United Provinces, leading to revenge massacres of Muslims, which in turn led to Muslim attacks on Hindus and Sikhs in West Pakistani cities such as Peshawar and Karachi. Both sides also attacked refugee convoys and trains passing through Punjab itself.⁶³ Altogether, hundreds of thousands of people were killed, and more than 10 million refugees were exchanged between India and West Pakistan.⁶⁴

An additional cause of loss of life in this war was the failure of the British, Indian, or Pakistani governments to take meaningful preparations to protect refugees in Punjab, in part because they all underestimated the scale and suddenness with which the war would escalate, but also because the Indians and Pakistanis did not want to legitimate or encourage population movements.⁶⁵ The British-commanded Indian Boundary Force, which was supposed to control communal violence in Punjab, was, at 50,000 men, far too small for the task, and many of its contingents proved unreliable for communal reasons. Transport and reception camps were not prepared. For weeks, the Indian government also continued to send Muslim refugee trains directly through Punjab, rather than around it.⁶⁶

At no point did any side make energetic efforts to protect, feed, or shelter refugees in transit through Punjab. Many lives lost in Punjab could have been saved if refugees had not been directed *toward* the center of the Sikh uprising. Nearly all could have been saved had the British provided enough reliable troops to control the province, or found allies who could. The lesson of Punjab is not that population movements must be costly, but rather that refugees should not be forced to travel through a war zone.⁶⁷

63. In many areas police and officials of the "wrong" community fled, further reducing restraints on pogroms. Menon, *Transfer of Power*, pp. 419–423; Hodson, *Great Divide*, p. 406; and Lumby, *Transfer of Power, 1942–7*, pp. 193–195.

64. The number of deaths is disputed. Hodson estimates 200,000, Moon less than 200,000. Lumby says "hundreds of thousands," an Indian High Court judge later estimated 500,000, and the Pakistani government claimed more than 500,000 Muslims alone. Kumar says that more than a million died. Hodson, *Great Divide*, p. 418; Moon, *Divide and Quit*, pp. 268–269, 293; Lumby, *Transfer of Power, 1942–7*, p. 199; *Sikhs in Action*, foreword; and Kumar, "Troubled History," p. 26.

65. Congress agreed to "communal option" for officials, but maintained that the general population throughout the country should stay where they were. Rai, *Partition of the Punjab*, pp. 73–75.

66. Hodson, *Great Divide*, p. 412; Rai, *Partition of the Punjab*, p. 79; and Moon, *Divide and Quit*, pp. 278–279.

67. Barry Posen provides a formula that can be used to estimate the number of troops needed to protect a refugee movement, in this case roughly 250,000. Posen, "Military Responses to Refugee Flows," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), p. 106, n. 51.

Although the war in Punjab accounted for the vast majority of all the deaths in communal conflict between 1945 and 1947, one other region of India is also especially important to this analysis. Unlike Punjab, the partition of Bengal markedly dampened the security dilemma in that province; it assured that the millions of Hindus in West Bengal would not have to live under Muslim rule, and, unlike Punjab, the division line did successfully separate districts populated mainly by each of the two communities. Most important, there was no third side with an overwhelming security motive to overturn the settlement. As a result, the announcement of independence and of the partition line lowered violence in Bengal by resolving both sides' security uncertainties. More than 5,000 were killed in the province in the year before independence, but very few afterward.⁶⁸ Between 1947 and 1951, 3.5 million people moved between India and East Pakistan in orderly, planned transfers, without loss of life.

DID PARTITION INCREASE HATRED AND CAUSE NEW CONFLICTS? The 1947–51 population exchanges resolved Hindu-Muslim security dilemmas throughout most of India and Pakistan, as very few Hindus remained in Pakistan, while the Muslims of India are too few, too thinly spread, and too far from any possible aid to even imagine resisting the Indian government . . . and they have not. Sporadic Hindu-Muslim violence still occurs in India, although at low levels compared with the fears of both sides from the 1920s to the 1940s or the actuality of 1945–47.

The independence of India and Pakistan did generate one new conflict, over control of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. This conflict occurred not because India was partitioned but because Kashmir, whose population was about two-thirds Muslim, was not. Drawing a partition line through Kashmir would have been easier than in Punjab or even Bengal, because most of the Hindu population of the state resided in the southernmost division, Jammu, adjacent to India, and the boundary between Jammu and the rest of the state is largely mountainous.⁶⁹

68. Although accounts are incomplete, it appears that total deaths in intercommunal violence in India in 1946–47 not directly related to the Punjab civil war may have been about 20,000. Suranjan Das, *Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905–1947* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 167–205; Francis Tiker, *While Memory Serves* (London: Cassel, 1950), pp. 424–426; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, January 17–24, 1948, p. 9049; Menon, *Transfer of Power*, pp. 294, 434–445; and Lumby, *Transfer of Power, 1942–7*, pp. 120–122.

69. Majid Husain, *Geography of Jammu and Kashmir State* (New Delhi: Rajesh Publications, 1987), p. 54.

Failure to divide Kashmir intensified Hindu-Muslim security dilemmas in three ways, generating a history of conflict that still continues. First, although communal relations in Kashmir had been better than in many other areas, and Maharaja Hari Singh initially attempted to keep Kashmir independent, by October 1947 each community had reason to fear for its security. Both groups were aware that India and Pakistan each claimed Kashmir, both had heard about atrocities in Punjab, and some of the maharaja's troops began attacking the Muslim population.⁷⁰

Second, Kashmir borders key economic centers of both countries, and is thus strategically valuable. In October the maharaja invited in pro-Indian Sikh troops, and a few weeks later Muslim irregulars invaded from Pakistan. Both regular armies intervened. Battle deaths reached 1,500 before a truce was signed at the start of 1949.⁷¹ India took control of most of the state, but Pakistan invaded again in 1965, and there was more border fighting in 1971.

Third, under Indian rule Kashmiri politics have become increasingly communalized over time, threatening the security of all groups. From the early 1960s onward, increased political participation has led to several cycles of Muslim autonomy demands and Indian government responses that actually reduced local authority. For example, from 1980 to 1982 the Kashmir government backed a proposal to allow 1947 refugees (i.e., Muslims) to return, sparking fears that Hindus and Sikhs now settled on refugees' former property would be dispossessed. When the 1983 election again returned the same government in a vote along communal lines, Indian President Indira Gandhi removed the state government and instituted repressive measures.⁷² Since the late 1980s Kashmir has been fighting an ongoing Muslim insurgency, aided by Pakistan. More than 30,000 people have been killed, and virtually the whole Hindu population of the Valley of Kashmir (about 250,000) have fled their homes. It is uncertain how many Kashmiri Muslims support the insurgents, but nearly all have become profoundly alienated from Indian government rule.⁷³ Since May 1998 Kashmir has become the focus of mutual Indian and Pakistani nuclear threats.

70. Šumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts since 1947* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 34–35, 42.

71. Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990* (Hertingfordbury, U.K.: Roxford Books, 1991), pp. 131–136; and Ganguly, *Origins of War in South Asia*, pp. 13–14.

72. The arrival in 1983 of Muslim refugees fleeing a massacre in Assam and the assault in 1984 by Indian forces on the Sikh Golden Temple in Amritsar did not help either. Šumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes for Peace* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), pp. 76–90; and Lamb, *Disputed Legacy*, pp. 327–330.

73. Ganguly, *Crisis in Kashmir*, pp. 107–108, 133, 152–156; "India and Pakistan Plan Kashmir Talks," *New York Times*, June 24, 1997. In 1998, in the first free elections in Kashmir in nearly two decades,

The most important conflict within Pakistan since independence has been the secession of Bengali-speaking East Pakistan (Bangladesh) from the mainly Urdu-speaking West in 1971 (which also caused the 1971 international war between Pakistan and India).⁷⁴ Possible explanations of this conflict include undemocratic institutions that allowed West Pakistan to dominate Pakistani politics, reaction against state repression, and ethnic and linguistic tensions; however, the conflict cannot be charged to the 1947 separation of Hindus and Muslims.

Finally, both Pakistan and India contain numerous additional ethnic minority groups, including Sikhs, Nagas, Tripuras, and others within India, and Baluchis, Pathans, and Mohajirs in Pakistan, that have agitated for greater autonomy or even rebelled.⁷⁵ Some of these disputes predate independence, and we have no way to determine whether any of them would have occurred in the context of a united India. There is one exception; the conflict that has emerged in recent years, mainly in the city of Karachi, between Mohajirs (refugees from India and their descendants) and the pre-1947 Sindhi community is chargeable to the partition of India and resulting population exchanges, and has cost more than 3,500 lives as of 1997.⁷⁶

WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE? The problem with Indian independence was not partition, but that partition did not go far enough. First and most important, there was no provision for a Sikh homeland, either as an independent state or as a province of India. Even though Sikhs were only 1.2 percent of the population of India, 6 million people as determined, organized, and armed as they were could not be ignored and still hope for peace. The hard part is that because Sikhs were not an absolute majority in any district of Punjab, any homeland would have required planning for substantial population transfers and therefore substantial commitment of resources for refugee protection and resettlement.

Second, Kashmir should have been included in the general settlement, regardless of the maharaja's wishes. The result would likely have been a partition more favorable to Pakistan than the one achieved by war, and would have

the antiseparatist National Conference won 4 of 6 seats, while turnout was low as a result of a boycott called by Muslim separatists. Surinder Oberoi, "Three Die and 12 Abducted during Kashmir Elections," AAP Information Services, March 1, 1998; and "Betrayal in Jammu and Kashmir," *The Hindu*, April 5, 1998.

74. Ganguly, *Origins of War in South Asia*, p. 58.

75. Myron Weiner, *Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978).

76. Reuters World Service, January 28, 1995; and Reuters North American Wire, April 28, 1997.

avoided stranding a large community, both vulnerable and threatening, on the wrong side of the line.

PALESTINE AND ISRAEL

The War of Israeli Independence cost the lives of 6,000 Jews and probably more than 10,000 Arabs, and displaced well over a million people; about 750,000 Palestinian Arabs fled Israel, while over half a million Jews migrated from Arab countries to Israel.⁷⁷ As in Ireland and India, these costs were results of security dilemmas generated by independence, not of partition.

DID PARTITION REDUCE VIOLENCE OR INCREASE IT? Neither; it had no effect. Very few people today would suggest that the partition of Palestine could have been avoided. From 1946 onward, the Jewish population mounted a revolt that British forces could not control, forcing their withdrawal. A unified independent Palestine was impossible because the Jews would not submit to rule by the Arab majority, and the Arabs would not accept any arrangement that allowed for political power for Jews or even continued Jewish immigration. Palestinian Arabs staged major riots in 1929 over these issues, as well as a major rebellion from 1936 to 1939.


The departure of British power from Palestine, competing Arab and Jewish land claims, and the intermixed population settlement pattern created a security dilemma so intense that civil war was certain. The three main areas of Jewish settlement—eastern Galilee, the coastal strip from Haifa to Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem—all contained substantial Arab populations and, even more important, were separated from each other by all-Arab regions (see Map 3). A partition plan that did not envisage substantial population transfers could have done nothing to resolve this security dilemma, and the one voted by the United Nations in November 1947 was no exception.⁷⁸

Faced with armed conflict internally as well as external invasion, the Jewish state could survive only if it could (1) expand to link together its three main parts, and (2) move out a large fraction of the Arabs from Jewish-controlled

77. Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars* (New York: Random House, 1982), p. 108; Walid Khalidi, *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1982), p. 582; and Joseph P. Schechtman, *The Refugee in the World: Displacement and Integration* (New York: Barnes; Yoseloff, 1964), p. 262.

78. The plan divided Palestine into eight parts: three main Jewish and three main Arab enclaves, meeting at two points in such a way that none of the Jewish or Arab enclaves were contiguous. A seventh small Arab enclave (the city of Jaffa) was surrounded by Jewish territory and the eighth ("internationalized" Jerusalem) by Arab territory. T.G. Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 177–183.

Map 3. Palestine, 1946.



SOURCE: *Supplement to a Survey of Palestine* (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1947).

areas, especially from the most strategically critical locations. The pattern of ethnic cleansing during the war followed security dilemma logic. Israeli government leaders and military forces in some places encouraged Arab inhabitants to remain, in others harassed or frightened many into flight, and in yet others carried out forced expulsions, depending on the strategic needs at each place and time.

Two polar opposite events that took place just ten weeks and fifty miles apart illustrate this dynamic. In late April 1948 the Jews gained control of the city of Haifa, whose population was roughly evenly mixed. Almost immediately the entire Arab population, not just of Haifa but of all the coastal towns north to the Lebanese border, abandoned their homes and fled to Lebanon. The Israeli government was surprised and dismayed by this exodus, and Israeli politicians and soldiers tried to persuade the population to stay.⁷⁹ In contrast, in early July Haganah troops surrounded the Arab towns of Lod (Lydda) and Ramle southeast of Tel Aviv and expelled their entire populations—60,000 in all—on forty-eight hours' notice, with only what property they could carry.⁸⁰

The difference in strategic need accounts for this difference in behavior. The Mediterranean coast north of Haifa was an all-Arab region, with no Jews living in or beyond it who might need to be rescued. Lod and Ramle, however, sat astride the main Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road at a time when the Jewish portion of Jerusalem was under siege and Israeli leaders were uncertain whether it could hold out. Resupply and reinforcement convoys had to travel through the streets of the two towns, and routinely had to fight their way through. Jerusalem could not be secured as long as these towns (and certain other villages further along the route) remained in Arab hands.⁸¹

The war ended in 1949 when the Israeli-Arab security dilemma was ameliorated, if not fully resolved, by nearly complete separation of the two communities. Israel secured a defensible territory that included the major Jewish settlements and the spaces between them. The remaining 156,000 Arabs made up no more than 15 percent of the new state's population and were disorganized and demoralized, and therefore were not perceived by Jewish Israelis as a significant threat.⁸² Gaza, the West Bank, and the Old City of Jerusalem came

79. British District Police Reports, April 26 and 28, 1948, cited in Schechtman, *The Refugee in the World*, p. 191.

80. Benny Morris, "Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 82–109.

81. Jewish terrorists not under government discipline carried out an even more brutal cleansing operation in the village of Deir Yassin, which also overlooks the Jerusalem road.

82. Howard M. Sachar, *A History of Israel* (New York: Knopf, 1979), pp. 382, 395.

under control of the Egyptian and Jordanian armies; no Jews remained in these areas.

DID PARTITION CAUSE INCREASED HATRED AND GENERATE NEW CONFLICTS? Since independence Israel has not experienced significant internal intergroup violence, but has fought four wars against neighboring states in 1956, 1967, 1969–70, and 1973; has occupied parts of Lebanon twice, in 1978 and 1982–85; and since 1987 has faced organized resistance to its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Israel has been the target of continuing terrorism, and Israeli citizens have carried out terrorist attacks as well.

Partition played no role in causing the continuation of violence after 1949, which resulted simply from the presence of the Jewish state. Most Arabs remained unwilling to accept the permanence of a large Jewish presence in Palestine, while Israelis suspected the Arabs of genocidal aims. However, despite wars and terrorism, most civilians on both sides have been safe most of the time for nearly fifty years, which was not true before the population transfers. Over time, many on both sides have abandoned the most extreme enemy images. Israel has signed peace treaties with two of its neighbors, and enjoys calmer relations with most other Arab states than it once did.

The one new conflict generated since Israel's independence, the Palestinian *intifada*, was caused in large part by Israel's policy of planting Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, in effect remixing populations that had been separated. Prior to the coming to power of the Likud Party in 1977, most settlements were placed either just across the 1949–67 Green Line or as security outposts in remote areas. After 1977, however, the pace of construction accelerated, including establishment of settlements deep in the midst of regions populated by Arabs, most infamously the placement of 400 Jews in the middle of the 100,000-population city of Hebron. This generated a new security dilemma, both because the new settlements consumed more and more land and because provisions for their security required restricting freedom of movement between Arab towns.⁸³

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? Mutual security for Jews and Palestinians requires once again substantially separating the populations by removing those Jewish settlements furthest from Israel proper that cannot be maintained except by continuing military suppression of the Palestinians. This includes the three

83. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising—Israel's Third Front* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); and Geoffrey Aronson, *Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians, and the West Bank* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987).

settlements in Gaza, Hebron, and dozens of others. It is not necessary that all Jewish settlements be removed; many that are sited directly across the Green Line from Israel proper and serve as suburbs to Jerusalem or to the coastal plain could be incorporated into Israel without also including Arab population centers. Where populations are already separated, it is easier to move borders than people.⁸⁴ Some might object to such a unilateral border adjustment on grounds of equity or law. It would, however, make both sides safer and might also help them muster the political will to substantially implement the 1993 Oslo peace agreement.

CYPRUS

Critics of the 1974 de facto partition of Cyprus argue that even though there have been virtually no casualties since then, the partition and population exchange have actually made the conflict worse, not better: "The division of Cyprus is little more than a long standoff that remains volatile and continues to require the presence of U.N. troops."⁸⁵

In fact, however, the situation has remained remarkably stable since 1974. There have been only twelve deaths in ethnic strife on the island in twenty-four years.⁸⁶ This generation of calm compares starkly to the escalating ethnic violence on Cyprus from 1955 to 1974.

DID PARTITION REDUCE VIOLENCE OR INCREASE IT? Prior to 1960 Cyprus was under British rule; the population was approximately 80 percent Greek and 20 percent Turkish. In the 1950s the main Cypriot independence movement, EOKA, was a specifically Greek movement whose aim was union with metropolitan Greece (*enosis*). The Turkish community, fearing Greek domination, preferred continued colonial rule or, if independence could not be avoided, partition.⁸⁷

84. Alexander B. Downes, "The Holy Land Divided? Theory and Practice for a Successful Partition of Palestine," unpublished ms., University of Chicago, suggests that Jews now living in the West Bank exchange places with the Palestinians of Gaza. This seems to me excessive.

85. Kumar, "Troubled History of Partition," p. 29. Kumar further claims that there was a war scare between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus as recently as August 1996, but this actually amounted to no more than some moderately warm rhetoric by Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis, plus Turkish protests about attacks on three consulates. See Michele Kambas, "Greek PM Slams Turkey on Arrival in Cyprus," Reuters European Community Report, August 17, 1996.

86. Five in 1975, two between 1989 and 1993, and five in 1996. "List of Deaths on Green Line since 1974," Agence France-Presse, August 11, 1996; Patrick Baz, Agence France-Presse, August 14, 1996; and Michele Kambas, Reuters World Service, October 15, 1996.

87. Nancy Cranshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp. 42–50, 62–67, 71–75; Christopher Hitchens, *Hostage to History*:

The population settlement pattern on the island contributed to an intense security dilemma. Although most villages and “quarters” of major towns were populated exclusively by one group, Greek and Turkish settlements were spread throughout the island, with only a slight bias of Turkish concentration toward the north.⁸⁸ As a result, from 1955 to 1974 Cyprus underwent four major rounds of civil war. First, starting in 1955 EOKA attacked British forces, Greek “collaborators” and communists, Turkish Cypriots serving in the British government and police, and increasingly the Turkish community at large; Turkish terrorist groups attacked Greek civilians. At least 509 people died before Britain granted independence in 1960.⁸⁹

Second, although the new state’s constitution incorporated power-sharing principles and prohibited *enosis*, Greek Cypriot leaders, including President Archbishop Makarios, continued to advocate Greek majority rule as well as *enosis*.⁹⁰ Governance was soon paralyzed by obstructive tactics on both sides, and in 1963 Greek Cypriots abrogated the constitution and established a new, all-Greek government. In December 1963 civil war broke out again, and Greek forces soon controlled nearly the whole country except for a few towns in the northern part of the island (see Map 4). In August 1964 an offensive against the Turkish Cypriots’ only remaining outlet to the sea was stopped by the Turkish Air Force. At least 550 people died and 25,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees were resettled. From 1964 to 1968 most of the Turkish-held enclaves were under a de facto economic blockade.⁹¹

Third, after a military buildup by Greek Cypriot nationalists, including 12,000 Greek Army troops deployed on Cyprus as a deterrent to further Turkish interference, Greek Cypriot forces again attacked Turkish villages in April and November 1967.⁹² Turkey responded by threatening air strikes and troop landings. This time a deal brokered by the United States and the UN led

Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire to Kissinger (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1989), pp. 42–46; and Tozun Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 28–30.

88. Richard A. Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963–1971* (Waterloo, Ontario: University of Waterloo, 1976), pp. 8–11.


89. British official figures, reported in Cranshaw, *Cyprus Revolt*, p. 406.

90. Makarios was, however, prepared to be patient on the latter, because he did not want to provoke Turkish intervention. Cranshaw, *Cyprus Revolt*, pp. 341–345, 366–367; P.N. Vanezis, *Makarios: Pragmatism v. Idealism* (London: Abelard Schuman, 1974), pp. 123–133; and Stanley Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), pp. 159–166.

91. Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict*, p. 46; and Cranshaw, *Cyprus Revolt*, pp. 367–373. The presence of 7,000 UN peacekeepers during the latter part of the fighting had little effect.

92. Makarios’s personal interest in *enosis* waned after the April 1967 military coup in Athens, but he felt unable to oppose the projects of Greek Cypriot nationalists, which commanded great

Map 4. The Turkish Cypriot Enclaves in the Late 1960s.



M e d i t e r r a n e a n S e a

SOURCE: Pierre Oberling, *The Road to Bellepais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). Used by permission.

to the withdrawal of the Greek Army units, and in 1968 the movement restrictions on Turkish Cypriots were lifted. Deaths between 1964 and 1968 were probably about 600.⁹³ From 1968 to 1974 the sides conducted direct negotiations, but the Greek Cypriots would not give up the goal of *enosis*, and the Turks would not accept it.⁹⁴

Finally, in 1971 a new Cypriot nationalist organization, EOKA B, which was supported by the military junta ruling in Athens, began terrorist attacks. On July 15, 1974, Makarios was overthrown in a bloody coup.⁹⁵ An unknown number of people, probably in the hundreds, were killed. Nicos Sampson, an ultra-rightist infamous for heading massacres in 1963–64, was appointed president. A massive islandwide pogrom appeared imminent.⁹⁶

Turkish forces then invaded Cyprus and overran 37 percent of the island, creating a Turkish-controlled zone in the north. Sampson's government collapsed and Makarios resumed power. Approximately 1,000 people, mostly Cypriot National Guardsmen and Greek civilians, were killed in this operation, not many less than the death toll of the previous twenty years. The invasion, however, did save thousands who would likely have been murdered if men like Sampson had actually executed their program. Approximately 200,000 Greek refugees moved south of the line, and about 60,000 Turkish Cypriots moved north.⁹⁷ Even though the Turkish invasion was motivated in part by nationalist rather than humanitarian concerns, it saved lives; fortunately, we will never know just how many.

popularity. In 1970 he barely survived a nationalist assassination attempt. Mayes, *Makarios*, pp. 183–186, 206–207.

93. Hitchens, *Hostage to History*, p. 65; Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations*, pp. 73–74, 173; and Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict*, p. 119.

94. For details of the negotiations and internal politics of the sides, see Polyvios G. Polyviou, *Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation, 1960–1980* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980), pp. 62–132; and Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations*, pp. 89, 167, 175–188.

95. Although EOKA B was an illegal organization, it commanded great popular support among Greek Cypriots, including much of the Cypriot National Guard. The funeral in January 1974 of its founder, General George Grivas, was attended by one-fifth of the entire Greek population. Polyviou, *Cyprus*, pp. 120–130; and Pierre Oberling, *The Road to Bellepais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 149–150.

96. Sampson was elected to the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives in 1969 on the slogan "Death to the Turks!" Oberling, *Road to Bellepais*, p. 160. According to Makarios, Sampson and the head of the Athens junta in 1974, General Dimitrios Ioannides, had come to see him back in 1964 and proposed: "Your Beatitude, here is my project. To attack the Turkish Cypriots suddenly, everywhere on the island, and eliminate them to the last one." Quoted in Orianna Fallaci, *Interview with History* (New York: Liveright, 1976), p. 318.

97. Cranshaw, *Cyprus Revolt*, p. 395; and Polyviou, *Cyprus*, p. 203.

DID PARTITION INCREASE HATRED AND GENERATE NEW CONFLICTS? Greek Cypriots still have not accepted the partition of Cyprus, and no nation except Turkey recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Several rounds of negotiations have been held in which the Turks have offered to return some land or to reunite Cyprus as a loose federation, but these proposals have not been acceptable to the Greek side.

Despite the lack of reconciliation, the situation has remained calm as well as safe for a generation. Both sides know that the Turkish Army garrison in the north could defeat any possible irredentist offensive, and neither side has shown any evidence of plans to try to disrupt the existing situation.

The Politics of Successor States

Critics of ethnic population transfers and partitions have overestimated the risks that these remedies pose to political development. There are two main areas of development that should be considered: democratization and treatment of ethnic minorities.

The four partitions studied in this article have produced nine de jure or de facto successor states: the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Cyprus, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The degree to which the political institutions of these states qualify as democratic is most easily measured by the extent to which they hold periodic free elections that can alter the composition of the government and its policies, and whose results are not overturned by force, such as military coups.⁹⁸ Of the nine successor states, five (Ireland, Northern Ireland, India, Israel, and Cyprus) have political institutions that clearly meet democratic qualifications. Four (Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Palestinian Authority, and the TRNC) do not fully qualify, but even these states are not clearly less democratic than their pre-partition predecessors, and all are at least as democratic as most of their neighbors.

Although Pakistan and Bangladesh have always had nominally democratic forms, each has been under military rule for slightly less than half the time since their respective dates of independence (Pakistan 1958–71 and 1977–88, and Bangladesh 1975–86). In comparison, British colonial rule in India had become, by the time of partition, largely democratic at the province level,

98. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 5–13.

although not at the national level and not in the princely states. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh have democratic qualifications that are at least as strong as those in any state in South, Southeast, or Central Asia, or in the Middle East. Three exceptions are India and Israel (also partition successor states), and arguably Sri Lanka.

Although it did not emerge until after the 1993 Oslo agreement, the Palestinian Authority can be considered as a de facto successor state of the partition of the Palestine mandate. While the Authority has nominally democratic forms, it has not yet had a change of leadership, and political expression is often suppressed. It does not, however, compare unfavorably to the British mandatory government, which had no representative institutions above the level of municipalities, or with other Arab states.⁹⁹ We could also ask whether the 1947 partition affected the political development of adjacent states that gained territory or absorbed refugees. There is little evidence that it did, as none of these states except Lebanon had democratic institutions either before or after partition.¹⁰⁰

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus also has democratic forms but has never had a change of government. However, prior to partition in 1974 united, formally democratic Cyprus never had a change of government either, and allowed the Turkish minority no political role.¹⁰¹ Compared with the democratic qualifications of its neighbors around the eastern Mediterranean, those of the TRNC rank about average.

Even where there are democratic forms, we must also ask whether minorities are nevertheless effectively disenfranchised. Four of these nine successor states have significant minority populations. In the Republic of Ireland and in India, minorities face no barriers to political participation, although the government of India has proscribed secessionist parties that have threatened the territorial integrity of the state.

Arab citizens of Israel have faced significant repression, most severely in the first fifteen years after partition. Although many formal discriminatory policies

99. A British plan in the 1920s to create a legislature was blocked by Arab opposition. Bernard Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish Conflict, 1917–1929* (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1978).

100. The presence of refugees from Palestine had some impact on the civil war from 1975 onward, although the war was more the result of tensions among the native Christian, Sunni, and Shiite populations. David Gilmour, *Lebanon, the Fractured Country* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984).

101. Since 1974 the (Greek) rump state of Cyprus has had several changes of government in free elections. Eric Solsten, *Cyprus: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993).

have been lifted, until recently Arabs were barred from effective political influence by an informal understanding that parties dependent on Arab votes could not be part of a governing coalition.¹⁰² In the last several years, however, this barrier has weakened. The Labor Party–led coalition that governed Israel from 1992 to 1996 depended on the support of two Arab parties, and Arab votes nearly decided the 1996 prime ministerial contest between Shimon Peres and Benjamin Netanyahu, in which Netanyahu led by 11 percent among Jewish voters but won the election by a margin of just 0.9 percent.¹⁰³

In Northern Ireland, Catholics faced few barriers to participation in national-level politics, but for five decades their influence on the province government and local bodies was reduced by gerrymandering, especially in the cities of Londonderry and Belfast, as well as in certain rural areas where Catholics were in the majority. In addition, a 1946 “Representation of the People Bill” disenfranchised certain categories of potential voters, disproportionately Catholics. These abuses were largely ended by the imposition of direct British rule in 1972.¹⁰⁴

Although these restrictions on minority rights are serious, repression of ethnic minorities would likely have been worse in each case had partition and population transfers not occurred. Even if we imagine that it could have been possible in 1947 to construct a government of a united Palestine that would have treated the Jewish minority more mildly than Arabs have fared in Israel, the Jewish community saw the prospect of Arab rule as so dangerous that it could have been imposed only by crushing the Jews’ capacity to resist. Whatever tendencies toward tolerance such a government might have had initially would surely have been undermined by the violence and mutual security fears generated in the process of establishing control. The problem of the Protestants in a united Ireland would have been the same.¹⁰⁵

102. Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel’s Control of a National Minority* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980).

103. “Rabin Meets Hadash, DAP Representatives: Shas Hints at Abstention Tomorrow,” *Jerusalem Post*, November 9, 1993; and “Netanyahu Wins Israeli Election,” Associated Press, May 31, 1996.

104. Schaeffer, *Warpaths*, pp. 166–167.

105. Critics also charge that partition successor states discriminate against minorities through citizenship and language laws—for example, Israel’s Law of Return, which grants automatic citizenship to Jewish immigrants, and its 1950 Absentee Property Law, which bars the return of Arabs who left the country during the 1947–49 war. However, official languages, citizenship laws, and immigration practices that favor the majority are actually features of most nation-states, including such liberal democracies as Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, France, and Italy.

Challenges for Separation and Partition

This analysis suggests three lessons for management of ethnic civil wars. First, we need to identify the threshold of intergroup violence and mutual security threats beyond which we must resort to separation and partition, and we should set the threshold conservatively—no one wants to dissolve diverse societies, even deeply troubled ones, that have any hope of avoiding massive violence and attaining civil peace. The theory and evidence presented here can help us identify cases that are clearly over that threshold; but absent a fully developed theory of the causes of interethnic hostility in peacetime, we cannot know exactly where the true threshold may lie.

Even this limited knowledge, however, is of policy use. We should not fail to separate populations in cases that have already produced large-scale violence and intense security dilemmas, even if in some such cases we might later wish that we had acted sooner and in yet other cases we may not be able to decide whether to act.

Second, while the findings here do not suggest whether partitions of sovereignty should occur more or less frequently, they do imply that partition should never be done unless the national communities are already largely separate or will be separated at the same time. Partitions that do not unmix hostile populations actually increase violence, as they did in Northern Ireland, Kashmir, and Palestine, and when Croatia and Bosnia seceded from Yugoslavia. Defensible boundaries are also essential; the UN partition plan for Palestine, which gave each side three disconnected patches of land, could only generate a bloody civil war.¹⁰⁶

In all four cases discussed above, ethnic separation reduced violence. Where populations were largely separated to begin with, violence was much less intense than where they were tightly intermingled. When warring populations were separated, either by planned transfers or by ethnic cleansing, violence subsequently declined. Except in those regions where hostile communities remain mixed on the ground, all four cases have had less violence since partition than before, and all sides have lower expectations of future violence now than they did then.

106. Existing administrative unit boundaries are often given excessive weight, as in Kashmir in 1947 and Ulster in 1921. See Steven R. Ratner, "Drawing a Better Line: *Utī Possidetis* and the Borders of New States," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 90, No. 4 (October 1996), pp. 590–624.

Finally, the record of twentieth-century population transfers and partitions suggests major changes in how we treat refugees of ethnic wars. The international community should stop trying to prevent the movement of refugees away from threats of ethnic massacres and should instead support and safeguard their resettlement. The UNHCR's policy of bringing "safety to people, not people to safety" cannot be implemented in the midst of ethnic wars, and attempts to do so are likely to cost the lives of some of the very people they are supposed to save. Concern that facilitation of refugee movements amounts to support for ethnic cleansing is misguided. Ethnic cleansing can only be stopped by an army on the ground strong enough to defeat the cleansers. Otherwise, making it harder for ethnic cleansers to expel their enemies only invites them to escalate to murder.

Similarly, the international community should stop pressing winners of ethnic wars to take back refugees of the other side, and should stop pushing refugees to return when they fear for their lives if they do. After an ethnic war, repatriating any substantial number of refugees back to territory held by the other group risks making control of that territory once again uncertain, thus re-creating the same security dilemma that helped escalate the conflict in the first place.¹⁰⁷

107. The severity of this risk depends on the robustness of the winning side's territorial control. Nigeria could afford to reabsorb refugees of the Biafran war because the war's decisive outcome meant that there was little chance of a new revolt. The Republika Srpska, which is far more fragile, cannot. International demands that the Rwandan Patriotic Front accept the return of more than 2 million Hutu refugees placed the RPF in an impossible position. Because the RPF represented less than 10 percent of the population, it could not claim legitimacy if it refused repatriation, but the return of large numbers of Hutus, including adherents of the former government, was bound to lead to a new round of civil war, and did. "Hutu Rebels Terrorize Three Nations: The Slaughter Continues," *International Herald Tribune*, January 29, 1998.