depressing to think it too often or to take it too seriously. National
authorities, flags and histories can grip one within a vice of
nationality unless they are balanced by other loyalties, both those
closer to the
ground of ordinary living and those more universal. Chapter 8 will
consider the function of religion both as a contributor of
intimacy
and national — and we have seen already many examples of both —
and as their nemesis, even a challenger through the creation of
alternative human communities able to claim in certain
circumstances a more absolute commitment.

CHAPTER EIGHT
Religion further considered

1

We all know the story of how Stalin remarked derisively, "The Pope.
how many divisions has he got?" It is an ironic commentary upon
the futility of that question that the Stalinist empire fell apart at the
point when it had to recognize that Catholic nationalism Poland
was the one entity which it absolutely could not digest. Stimulated by a
Polish Pope, an answer had been given. One could add that the one
entity which the British Empire, despite centuries of bullying,
absolutely failed to digest was Catholic nationalism Ireland. And if
there is one area of Europe today which has absolutely failed to
conform to its liberal standards of political behaviour, it is Orthodox
nationalist Serbia. In each case we see the definite power of a
nationalism grounded in religious identity. The bond between
nationalism and religion has seldom been so deeply rooted or so
powerful as in those three cases, yet most of Europe's nationalisms
have had fairly close religious ties, as we have seen particularly in
good to England. There have, nevertheless, been a few nationalisms,
such as those of Scotland, Switzerland and Italy, where religion
has played no more than a rather subsidiary role.

This chapter will look at our subject again from the religious and,
discussing, first, a variety of ways in which religion contributes
powerfully to nation-formation and nationalism, and, secondly,
the universal and anti-nationalist dimensions of Christianity and
Islam. Throughout this book, the examples studied have almost all been
Christian ones. I have indeed argued that every ethnicity is
shaped significantly by religion just as it is by language, yet in my
opinion it is no accident that beyond that early stage when one
RELIGION AS CONSIDERED

The construction of Nationhood

The construction of Nationhood, it is Christian peoples that have been under discussion. The reason is not simply that our discussion has been largely restricted to Europe. There is more to it than that. The nation and nationalism are both, I wish to show, characteristically Christian things which, in as far as they have appeared elsewhere, have done so within a process of westernization and of imitation of the European world, even if it was imitated at western rather than as Christian.

The only real exception I would admit to this claim is that of the Jews. Indeed they may well be called the true precursors so that the Old Testament provided the model in ancient Israel which Christian nations have adopted. Yet from the fall of Jerusalem in the first century until the establishment of Israel in the twentieth, the Jews were so far from being a nation-state or a political entity at all that they had really ceased to look like a nation in the terms in which we are speaking. The huge paradox of Jewish history is that the people who gave the world the model of nationalism, and even nation-statehood, lost it for them for nearly two millennia and yet survived. Other lost state, land in consequence after a while any sort of nationalism, becoming for the most part internally apathetic, they retained the core identity of a nation through the exercise of collective memory, the usage of religion based upon a specific doctrine. Wherever their spoken language, Jewish, were held together by the Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts. Furthermore, they were in consequence held together at a nation rather than an ethno group. Indeed, different ethnicities, such as Ashkenazim and Sephardim, emerged within it. It was extraordinary that in numerous people containing within it so many educated and wealthy people should neither have a state of their own nor be incorporated into any other state except rather marginally. The marginality was ensured by the Christian or Islamic domination of the states in which they lived. It is the deprivation of politics that strikes one most forcibly about pre-twentieth century Jewish existence, yet in secularized states not grounded upon ethnic nationalism that was neither abstract nor irreconcilable. The American example here is paradigmatic. But the saw the political order around them naturalized itself. In Europe was during the eighteenth century, the more anomalous as the process again became and the more inevitable the rise of Zionism, Zionism was not a religious movement. Jewish religion was fully

accommodated in a dropwise sentence and was in fact for long highly unsympathetic towards Zionism. Zionism was a national movement stimulated by the pressure of other nationalistic movements within the European world. Its goal like them was the creation of a nation-state, and it is lamentable that studies of nationalism regularly avoid its consideration. Here, if anywhere, the basic order must be, nationalism, nationalism, nationalism. Yet it is also true that before the necessities, the nation could seem almost invisible. Indeed for many individual Jews their Jewish identity could be correctly classified as ethnic and religious while their national identity was English, French, or German. For some this is still the case.

The long hiatus in Jewish national history, and the fact that modern Jewish nationalism and national homelands came at the end rather than at the start of a claim, is why it has seemed acceptable to start a study of the construction of nations and nationalism with England, seen as effectively the world's perception within the continuities of modern history, even though in terms of Chananian history, England is also preceded by the more isolated examples of Ethiopia and Armenia.

The third branch of the Abrahamic monotheists were the Jews, a world religion which shares so much with Judaism and Christianity. But on this point it has remarkably little in common, so as I will hope to demonstrate, Christianity has of its nature been a state of national religion, even quite profoundly anti-national. A great deal of space and discussion about the relationship between religion and nationalism is confused by the fallacy, the assumption that every religion is likely to have the same sort of political effect. It is not so.

For turn to the religious simulation of nationalism. This seems normally, an overview from one or another aspect of the religious contribution to the construction of nationalism itself. The more influential every expression of the former, whereas a notion whose influence over religious figures is seriously likely later turn, primarily, to review the different, the inevitably overlapping, ways in which Christianity has shaped national formation, and I propose to do so under seven heads: first, sanctifying the starting point, second, the mythologization and communication of great
threatens to national identity; third, the social role of the clergy; fourth, the production of vernacular literature; fifth, the provision of a biblical model for the nation; sixth, the episcopal model of the church; seventh, the development of a national language.

Shaping and contesting origins. We have a fascinating example in France: the controversy over how to commemorate the baptism of Clovis at Reims by St. Remigius in 507. The link between the Frankish kingdom of Clovis and modern France may seem somewhat distant, but it is the case that the Clovis conversion did not, in its own right, lead to any sense of national identity. Rather, it was the subsequent development of the Holy Roman Empire, the bishops of Reims, which became the cornerstone of French nationalism. This is an important point to remember, as it underpins the notion that the bishops of Reims were central to the development of French national identity.

In contrast, the conversion of Clovis by St. Remigius was a more complex process. While Clovis himself remained a pagan, the bishops of Reims were able to use his conversion to their advantage, symbolizing their own power and influence. This was achieved through a series of events, including the conversion of Clovis's wife, Clotilde, and the subsequent baptism of Clovis at Reims. The bishops of Reims were able to use this event to assert their authority and to establish a sense of national identity.

The construction of national identity is a complex and multifaceted process, and it is important to remember that it is not a single event that lead to the development of national identity. Instead, it is a process that involves a range of factors, including religious, political, and cultural factors. In the case of France, the conversion of Clovis by St. Remigius was a key moment in the development of national identity, but it was not the only factor that contributed to this process. Other important factors include the development of a national language, the production of vernacular literature, and the provision of a biblical model for the nation.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONHOOD

a broadly nation-wide affair, but the connection is not the near
is near.

A different type of religious influence upon a nation's religion
comes when it has arisen directly out of religious conflict. Holland
is a classic case. One can state the degree of detachment of
the provinces Netherlands in pre-Revolution times, but what
determined its independence, separation from the south and base
character was a religious struggle of Protestants against Catholic
Spain. The sixteenth-century Dutch predicament was closely similar
to the of Elizabethan England and Holland alike, indeed, not have
survived very far had the help of an English expediatory force, but
while English nationalism already existed, the Dutch did not.
Dutch national consciousness and nationalism were, in consequence,
still more closely tied to the Protestant identity which came to
emerge. Compare this with the Portuguese — again, a nation
which grew out of religious war, this time the Catholic Portuguese
nationalism was characterized in consequence for centuries by a
particularly militant type of Catholicism, aggressive, nationalistic,
anti-

The commitment to Christian reconquest of the Iberian
peninsula was far more crucial to the construction of Spanish
nationalism; for both a militant nationalism Catholicism remained a
significant force well into the twentieth century.

These examples suggest that one wide-ranging concept for
the religious shaping of nationalism is that of contested frontier.
When a number of countries share the same form of religion, their national
character is likely to develop without the use of continuing religious
influences, which are generally required for Catholics facing Mus-
lims, Orthodox facing Catholics, Protestants facing Catholics.
Whenever a people feel threatened in that respect by the
advances of a power connected to another religion, the political
counter is likely to be superimposed upon it in a sense of religious
conflict, almost natural, so that national identity became fused with
religious identity.

This leads to our second factor, the metaphorization of themes
to national identity. I am thinking of such things as the Guisle
Plot, the siege of Derry, the Battle of Kosovo, or the career of Joan
of Arc. Here we have episodes in which national situation is so
seems to be at stake. There is nearly always a matter in the story:
Calypso's lad, Vain, was Taking, Guy Fawkes, Bishop Cadzow —

and this sharpens up the sense of 'us' and 'them,' the absolute duty of
loyalty to the horizontal fellowship of 'us,' and the moral gap
separating us from the other. From the threat to our freedom,
religion and laws that they constitute — whether Muslim, Catholic,
or just the time-serving bishop willing to do a job for his foreign
masters. God is on our side — most clearly in such events, even if
they may only be seen to be the case a lot later on.

Selden were such events at the time really so decisive. Meaning
has largely been read back into them but that does not make it
necessarily a false meaning, even in historical terms. It is rather
that we have a large piece of Christianity symbolically symbolized in
public memory by a single event or hero figure calculated least to
reinforce a special identity. Most events are simply forgotten or
exaggeration, at least, to the opposite. If the siege of Derry or Gunpowder
Plot becomes institutionalized, it is to ensure that such subsequent
generating is valuated into a certain view of the world, a view at
once nationalistic and religious. It is the quasi-religious quận in
which these quite secular events are remembered which seems to
make so heavy a load of meaning credible. Such events and their
embroidery for more than merely nationalist memory; they are potent
instruments for the promotion of nationalism. Nelson Mandela
describes in his autobiography the distinguishing effects of the recital
of a praise poem to Shaka on sonata in South Africa's first Freedom
Trial: Suddenly there were no Xhosa or Zulu, no Indian or
African, no whites or blacks, no political or religious leaders; we
were all nationa...

In that moment we felt the load of the great past
and the power of the great cause that linked us all
together.

Our third religious factor in the affirmation of nationalism is the
clergy. Not of course, always in the same way. An early medieval
localism, almost undiscerned priesthood may not have fulfilled this
role, though it is worth noting that Alfred of Winchester, coming
from such a background — the indigenous village priesthood of
Hibernia — does itself become remarkably anti-nationalistic in his
works on the Genealogy of the English Kings and the Life of Edward the
Confessor. What is a clergy with some education and status, as in some
medieval and early modern societies was to work initially in
between rulers and ruled. In expressing a perspective about the existence
of nation-consciousness, Hildesheim remarked that 'it is clearly
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONHOOD

The construction of nationhood is a complex process that involves the development of cultural, political, and economic institutions. In early modern Europe, the idea of nationhood was often associated with the concept of the nation-state, which emerged as a result of the process of nation-building. This process was characterized by the development of a sense of national identity, which was often based on shared language, culture, and history.

The construction of nationhood was also facilitated by the development of a literate society, which was essential for the transmission of national identity. The literate society was often associated with the Protestant Reformation, which emphasized the importance of reading and writing in the spread of religious and political ideas.

In the context of early modern Europe, the construction of nationhood was often associated with the development of a national language. The use of a national language was essential for the transmission of national identity, and it was often associated with the development of a literate society.

RELIGION FURTHER CONSIDERED

Religion played a significant role in the construction of nationhood. The spread of Christianity, for example, was essential for the development of a literate society, which was necessary for the transmission of national identity.

In the context of early modern Europe, the construction of nationhood was often associated with the development of a literate society, which was necessary for the transmission of national identity. The literate society was often associated with the development of a national language, which was essential for the transmission of national identity.

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nationhood in the European context, it is necessary to explore further, first the nature of Christianity as a religion of translation and, second, the historical relationship between being a bearer of the Bible, both Old and New Testament, and the formation of nationhood. Benedict Anderson has claimed the rise of nations and of nationalism only to be possible when the influence of religion bore their ‘sacred languages’ declined. It is a great misconception that Christianity never had a sacred language. If it had one it would presumably have been Aramaic, that spoken by Jesus, the ‘Word made flesh’, but Christians quickly abandoned its use as they moved out from Israel through a few still use it. But it has never been seen as sacred. Even Greek, in which the New Testament was written, has not been. Only a sort of fundamentally that can make language sacred within the Christian tradition but to do so goes against the whole nature of the religion. What is striking about its history is the willingness again and again to translate — into Syriac, Armenian, Coptic, Ethiopic and Latin in the early centuries, then Slavonic and finally almost numberless other languages. Undoubtedly there were periods of interference and linguistic conservatism on the part of authority, especially of the papacy, but it would be quite mistaken to see the centrality of translation to the Christian enterprise as merely a Protestant characteristic, or to doubt that the attempt to make Latin of all languages into a sort of ‘sacred language’ on the part of Roman Emperors was other than a deviation from the Christian norm. The speed with which the vernaculars of Western Europe — Welsh, Irish, English, German, French, Dutch and the rest — were colonised by Christian writers is striking and it derives from the nature of Christianity, the absence of any writing by Jesus himself and the commitment to universality which is so clear in the New Testament, to make disciples of all the nations (Mt 28:19). The Pentecost text in Acts 2 which can be taken as representing the foundation myth of the church stresses precisely a diversity of languages, Parthian, Median, Elamite and the rest, ‘we hear them preaching in our own language about the marvels of God’ (Acts 2:11). Christians had, then, the use of the world’s vernaculars inscribed in its origins. Neither Hebrew, Greek nor Latin had any special claim on its loyalty and it was quickly recognised that sacred terms remained equally sacred in translation. The early tradition that Matthew’s Gospel was first written in Aramaic and then translated into Greek is evidence of that, as are the translations into Latin and Syriac already in the second century. Christianity did, then, take a culture of translation for granted. It also had in the New Testament numerous references to the world as one of ‘peoples’ and ‘nations’, and in the Old Testament it offered a model of what a nation looked like. Regard of Ptolemy writing his Chronicle about the year 200 set out what may be called the normative Christian view of human societies in the following. Just as different peoples (diverse nations, popularia) differ between themselves in descent, manners, language and laws (genres, maneria, leges, legibus) so the holy and universal church differs among itself, although joined in the unity of faith nevertheless varies in ecclesiastical customs among them.” Here the unity and universality of the church is not in question; it inevitably limits the degree of specifically religious diversity acceptable between nations but it takes the existence and differences of the latter for granted and does not rule out a diversity of ecclesiastical custom reflecting national differences.

Within the unity of Christian faith, the full diversity of nations, customs and language comes simply to be hidden for granted. No one reading the New Testament as a primary grade to the way the world is could have much doubt of that. This brings us to our fifth factor — the Bible as the mirror through which to imagine and create a Christian nation. In central New Testament terms nations might be encouraged but there could be no place for a single chosen nation. It is the church itself which is the New Israel. Nevertheless the Old Testament provided a detailed picture of what a God-containing nation would look like and of the way God would treat it. It was thus that God’s existence and identity with the people as a whole. Why should God behave differently now? Why should one’s own, New Testament-sanctioned nation not be vouchsafed an Old Testament style of providential role? One finds already in writer’s like Isaiah the application to their own people of what one might call Old Testament political economy, an economy that included belief in divine predestination for a particular people. John Barbour, the fourteenth-century Scottish poet, saw national resistance to the English in the terms of the story of the Macsabes. Such comparisons seemed to natural and even so apparent in its own case. Theologically one might be held back from suggesting too special a status for a particular people but in terms of some sort of political or historical destiny it could be hard to deny it, and the more the Old Testament...
was translated into the vernacular and accessible to a theologically uninitiated laity, the greater the likelihood of claiming for one’s own nation a divine election, so powerful was the Old Testament example working on the political imagination of a Christian people. We have seen this particularly at work in medieval France and seventeenth-century England, but it is curiously revealing to find that even Rousseau, secular prophet of the new nationalism, learning to the Poles on how to be a nation, appealed to the example of Moses, as the ideal nation-builder.

This tendency was enormously stimulated by our sixth force, the development of anthropological states churches, primarily within the Orthodox tradition, especially among the Slavs, but also in Protestantism. The local ecclesiastical autonomy of a national church is one of the strongest and most enduring factors in the encouragement of nationalism, because it easily stimulates the urge to give all that is strongest in God’s Old Testament prediction for one nation and New Testament prediction for one church contemporaneously to one’s own church and people.

All the aspects considered hitherto can easily coalesce under one final heading, a nation’s holiness and spiritual destiny. Once a Christian history has been constructed for a nation from the baptism of a first king and on through great deliverances, a history of a people’s faith and divine providence, upon which the Bible is meditated upon in one’s own language with all the immediacy this brings, one’s own church is fully independent of any other and identified in extent with that of the nation, the more so since the Cessationist movement is determined to claim to be a chosen people, a holy nation, with special divine mission to fulfill. The Old Testament provided the paradigm. Nation after nation applied it to itself, reinforcing their identity in the process.

Hobsbawm devotes a couple of interesting pages to the concept of ‘Holy Russia’, following Michael Cheremisnyi’s ‘Jews and People’.

With Russia Hobsbawm briefly looks ‘holy Ireland’ and ‘holy Tyrol’. Why should they be holy and why stop there? For Cheremisnyi a land could not be holy unless it could put forward a unique claim in the global economy of salvation’ which Russia could do as the heir to Byzantium which made of Moscow the ‘Third Rome’. That is quite enough but, as Hobsbawm suggests, religious passion hardly needed such an ecclesiastical argument to convince them that Russia was God’s chosen land. Such a common sense rhetoric rather than a popular theology of salvation and mission historically revolving themes of providential religion, the sacredness of local space. Such notions are caught up in the life of the Christian Church, in its liturgical round of once national and biblical, not to provide the conviction that this people, our people, has been chosen by God for Israel was chosen. We find in the Ethiopians, as I suggested in chapter 5, an excellent early example, symbolized by the wonderful myth of the carrying off of the Ark of the Covenant by Menelik from Jerusalem to Aksum.

Ethiopia becomes in consequence the true, Christian, Israeli. Undoubtedly, in Frankish eyes, the Ethiopians were little less. And, in English eyes, the English. In Serb eyes, the Serbs. And finally, the Americans, though ‘finally’, may prove the strong word. Each people sees its ‘manifest destiny’ clearly enough. Why precisely the Tyrol should do so, I do not know but, doubtless, they have a good reason.

Once, as I was walking along Olga’s Drive, I stopped at a cottage remote from anywhere, to ask for a glass of water. As I was drinking it, the old woman who had offered it, and a cup of milk as well, asked me a little bittily, whether Olta might be one of the kings we read of in the Bible. The Bible is so easily misunderstood. In its nature and the church’s retention of such large literary traditions, it helps it at a country in more than a theological fashion. In it and with it. The whole concept of a ‘Holy People’, divinely chosen but suffering all the ups and downs of a confusing history, seems so applicable to its native home. Of course for the early Christian and with the universal church’s permanent theological vision that concept is realized in a universal community of faith and by no means in any one nation, but for ordinary Christians, say and clerical, that can seem too remote, too unpolitical. From a good theologian as Bode can help rationalize the universal.

Anthony Smith's has denied that German National Socialism is properly to be recognized as a nationalism on the rather odd grounds that it is incompatible with a national vision of a plurality of free nations. But can one really define the membership of the nationalisms in such polite terms and is not actually very anti-historical to do so? Does any potential nationalism ever really hold that other nations matter equally with one’s own? I would argue that at this point the German National Socialist type of nationalism, despite its particularly violent character, is in principle quite close to normative.
nationalism, a norm with a biblical background. The root of the
more extreme version of European nationalism lies precisely here, in a
widely held Christian assumption that there can only be one fully
independent nation, one's own, the true successor to ancient Israel. The
contradiction of this to Christian belief is something we shall return to
later, but what matters now is to recognize how powerful it has been
in Christian experience. It seems too that the more powerfully one
identifies one's own nation as chosen, the more one might want to
eliminate the Jew, from the face of the earth.

The more intense nationalism within the European sphere has
grown out of a set of such identifications, one often reacting to
another, even if they have mostly, though not entirely, adopted a
secularized form of it in the modern era. What one must not be
decieved into thinking is that modernized, secularized form of
nationalism in any way represents its beginning. Moreover the hard
religious rock which led to such identifications in the past still
provides enormous strength to national struggles at the popular level.

Because of the lack of evident political concern in the New
Testament as also within the early Christian community, Christianity
does not start as Islam did - with any clear political model of its
own. As a consequence when Christianity came to power it was
able to go in two very different directions. The one, the national;
the other, the universal. Each appears very early within
Christian history. The first state to become Christian was Armenia
in the late third century and the survival of the Armenian national
identity from then until now is surely one of the more remarkable
things in human history. The kingdom did not survive, what did to
so was the Armenian Bible and the related literature. The
Ethiopian case is closely parallel. One would not expect small
kingdoms of that period to survive in any shape or form across
ten centuries. The key to their survival seems to be the very
that Christian conversion produced both a vernacular
literature and the idea of a nation out of which grew a real nation able
to endure across the political vicissitudes of the centuries.

We have seen the national model recur again and again, yet if one
looks at some of the central areas of Christian history, one also sees a
quite different one - acceptance of a world empire, the continuation
of Rome. Here, Christians were able to find no less a home. A
world empire corresponded geographically and politically to the sort
of religious society they saw themselves to be, and they were just as
able to find provision to work in Roman imperial history as other
Christians found it at work in the development of Armenia, France
or England. There was no theological reason to think that because
the Jews had had a nation-state, Christians should live in nation-
states. Nations exist divided by language and culture, according to
numerous New Testament texts, but they can do so within the
empire of Rome. Nation, then, but not nation-states. Read
Eunuch or Leucippus for the identification of Constantine and of the
presidency of the empire.

While, in the west, the empire soon after collapsed, the idea of it
did not. Its revival by Charlemagne and his successor both as the
Holy Roman Empire and as a papal empire across the medieval
and early modern centuries into the beginning of the nineteenth
never produced a stable international unity. What it did produce
was, on the imperial side, a rather decentralized federation of
provinces and cities, and, on the papal, a highly influential unity
of canon law. The former never in any way included England; it was
soon reduced to little more than Italy and Germany, and then to
Germany and contiguous areas alone. Yet it held the heart of Rome.
One of the reasons why the medieval empire failed was that it could
not work with the papacy, each appearing to threaten the other, yet
in point of fact empire and papacy were agreed in asserting a
Christendom which was more than a collection of nation-states.
And while the final political achievement of neither may appear very
considerable on the positive side, on the negative they helped to
ensure the lack of development of nation-states until a very late date
in both Germany and Italy. The tendency is to ask why these two
systems, central to Europe, were so backward in this great
'modernizing' development which made so much more progress in
rather marginal areas like England and Spain. The best answer seems
to be that they had been too deeply affected by a different, and
greater, conception of the state, a conception for which in practice
the nation had not yet come but which, at least arguably, grew more
harmoniously out of core Christian experience, the New Testament
vision of neither Jew nor Greek . . . but all are one in Christ
The Constitution of Nationality

(Continued)...

and he did many of them to prove that Christianity can be at home among them. 11 Emboung has his fingers on a material divergence between the two religions. The Muslim tribute to the Qur'an made translation almost impossible. For the religious person it has to be read, received, and lived a few times a day, or listened to in a mosque. In consequence the whole cultural impact of Islam is necessarily to Arabic, to reach people into a single whole-oriented structure of language and government. And this is what it did, even the language of Egypt disappeared before it, except as a Christian lingua franca. Nations are not transformed by Islam but reconstructed. This is a fact of history and it is a fact dependent upon society. The recognition of it should make it all the clearer that the construction of nations within the Christian world was not something independent of Christianity, but rather, something stimulated by the Christian attitude both to language and to the state.

While both Muslims and Christians recognize their Abrahamic inheritance, Muslims did not incorporate the Hebrew script into their own at all. This means that Muslims were never affected by the Old Testament at all in the way that Christians have, namely, ever going into the eighth century. While Christianity was conceived of as a political enterprise it was always politically ambiguous between nation-state and universal state. Islam has never been in every way in principle for a purely political enterprise and as such a religion in essence an enterprise related to nationalistic identity. What Christianity has often failed to do. This does not, of course, mean that Muslims cannot develop into nations, only that their religion does not help them to do so, directing them instead towards different social and political formations. The last part of this book has been resisted by Iranians and Turks as by all the people out of Iran. A single political and linguistic community for the world was impossible to imagine in the thirteenth century, though maybe not now. Azerbaijan itself might be regarded as a large example of nation formation, comparable to Frenchization and indeed it has been so judged by some. Given the perception of the modern world with nation-states it is inevitable that some modernists have imagined that "Arian national" stretching from Morocco to Iraq but it is not natural to do so and only the imposition of western categories has made it plausible or seem desirable to Arab speakers. Aab "nations", like Turkish or...
Religion Further Considered

Egyptian veneration, dated from the second year of the First Ptolemaic dynasty, is evidence of the early presence of Christianity in the region. The first recorded instances of Christian activity in Egypt are from the 3rd century, with the construction of Christian catacombs in Cairo and Alexandria. The spread of Christianity was influenced by the existing religious milieu, with the dual influence of Judaism and paganism.

In the Roman Empire, Christianity faced persecution, especially under the rule of Emperor Nero, but it also gained followers. The Edict of Milan in 313 AD by Emperor Constantine granted religious tolerance to Christians, leading to a significant increase in their numbers.

The spread of Christianity to the Islamic world occurred through missionary efforts and conversions. The Islamic conquests of the 7th century led to the incorporation of Christian populations into Islamic society, with varying degrees of assimilation and resistance.

In summary, the spread of Christianity in Egypt was influenced by political, social, and religious factors, leading to a unique blend of Christian, Islamic, and local religious practices. The coexistence of these religions reflects the rich multicultural heritage of the region.

The example of the Coptic Church in Egypt, which remains one of the oldest and largest Christian communities in the world, highlights the enduring legacy of early Christian presence and influence.

The texts and images on this page discuss various aspects of the spread of Christianity, including its early roots, the influence of Roman and Islamic empires, and the unique developments in Egypt. The combination of these influences shaped the religious landscape of the region, leaving a lasting impact on the cultural and spiritual heritage of the area.
and nationalism with a maturity for beyond Edinburgh 1810 or the William Temple of 1842. Those who have often led the way here are some of the Free Churches, though not always. Evangelical Protestantism has frequently combined a strongly unorthodox loyalty in highly spiritual terms with a very particularistic loyalty in political terms. In chapter 2 we saw how early Methodist reverted to a very nationalistic attitude towards Ireland. But it is undoubtedly within this constituency that the most creative efforts have been made to create Protestantism and Christianity with it from national bonds. It is groups like the Methodists and the Quakers which have produced a Christian spirit most irrespective to nationalism. Thus small non-state churches and very large, highly international, churches are those most affected by nationalisms. It was the established state church in East and West which most completely surrendered to it. With national churches have been increasingly discredited and, of course, some of them, perhaps most notably Evéques Anglais, have been transformed instead into international fellowships. Only in Eastern Europe has this development, central to modern Christianity, still hardly got under way.

Nationalism owes much to religion, to Christianity in particular. Nations developed, as I have suggested, out of a typical medieval and early modern experience of the multiplication of vernacular literatures and of state systems around them, a multiplicity largely dependent upon the church, its scriptures and its clergy. Nationalism and nationalism have in themselves almost nothing to do with modernity. Only when modernization itself was already in the air did they almost accidentally become part of it, particularly from the eighteenth century when the political and economic success of England made it a model to imitate. But nationalism could occur in states as unmodern as ancient Ethiopia or Armenia and fail to happen in Renaissance Italy or even Frederick the Great’s Prussia. If Christianity on one side fostered this development, both creatively and disastrously, it always had another side — whether papal, imperial or free — struggling to reach the surface. Certainly that is the side which those of us who share in the modern ecumenical experience mostly prefer to encourage. If religion in the past did so
much to produce, for example, Ireland's present divisions, so far as they appear to be religious divisions, is no less true that many of what is alien to religion today in Ireland is extremely dormant to their overcoming. Yet the churches are not only still nationallist in many parts of the world, they also continue elsewhere to refuse myths and practices which produce the alienation between communities upon which civil nationalism increasingly feeds. To give just one example, I recall hearing a memorable speech by Garrett Fitzgerald, at the time Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Irish Republic, at an international symposium on interchurch marriage in Dublin in September 1974. He spoke at a Roman Catholic layman posing out that intermarriage broke down social and political barriers while religious segregation, sanctioned by Roman canon law, reinforced nationalism, and argued that marriage in Ireland, too, I thought it hard to believe that the conduct of this nation of modern Ireland would have remained as intense if there had been a wider practice of Catholic-Protestant marriage.

Intermarriage is undoubtedly in some circumstances stronger the very existence of a community, just as in others it can threaten in purity and act as a red rag to a bull in actually constituting an existing nation. If there were little inter-religious marriage in Belfast, there was a very good deal in Sarajevo. It was seen as a threat to the security of Dr. Karadzic's ideas of ethnic nationalism was precisely to bring it to an end, so prevent further pollution of Serb blood. Freedom to marry across boundary lines is anti-nationalist. In this sense, the Shari'a and Catholic canon law have both been strategically applied to make intermarriage impossible in any institution of the community. Only when an institution of genuine reciprocity is admitted can intermarriage contribute, as it is of its nature to do, to the binding of contiguous communities.5 The fact remains that intermarriage goes against the borders of territories national in the old sense and is anathema to ethnic nationalists. Intermarriage and nationalism remain practical constraints and if one wishes to diminish the latter one will not animate the former. In that same song, "We, the Old Country"

Bob Woodward, a Protestant Dr.4imrun Smith, bewitched his people and their national identity.
by another Roman, as it were, to the name of Morgan. Rome, the usual place where such persons can find their way, France, Spain, and Hungary, seek her glorious prelates, disguised as a boy, is a part of the European army. In fact, Cymbeline is deceived and captivated and restored by Morgan and his supposed sons. The Romans, cast out from their home, are able to be executed, continue to all their old habits, until the roadway of the queen is at last revealed to Cymbeline together with the identity of his son. The destructive blindness of nationalism falls from British eyes. Through Wales the true Roman, of Britain, is revealed once more and, though it is here, it is not in the same way as in Shakespeare. The presence of 19th-century nationalisms, which have made the possible path from the sea to Milton's heaven, the symbol of the final act, to its fellow contemporaries in regard to the matter of nationality, is mysteriously emphasized, although we cannot call it strongly.

My friend is S. Connell, who founded the Abbey of Bangor, only a little outside modern Belfast, in the middle of the 9th century. Forty years before Augustus was born in Caprobay, almost everything I have been endeavouring to delineate in this lecture, when it comes to character, is what the 19th century might call the European tradition. It may only be a sort of subject in Connell's Bangor. It was undoubtedly the most likely centre of learning in Ireland at that time and looks as if the origins of Irish literature may well be located in and around Bangor, which was also the first step in the establishment of national identities. In this Ireland actually holds the way to Europe. Yet Bangor was not a universal place. Colman had been a disciple of Connell and, indeed, here for many years before setting out for the continent, he found the great premonitions of Lusitania and Uthina. Colman was born into a world where he was at home in Rome and as the Roman of the Pilgrims, Shakespeare was surely suggesting much the same when he spoke Cymbeline with Colman's voluntary decision to pay tribute once more to Europe. The long final command is clear enough.

Yet again, if Connell's Ireland was already very much one, in language, myth, religion, and law, it was also a divided island even. We may say, a little postnationally, between north and south. Let me give an example. There is a story recorded in later centuries of how when Cymon, son of Uthina, King of Leinster, received his crown to become a monarch, he went south to Ulster to join the components in Connell's Bangor. Cordwainers who had come to Bangor from Leinster at a much the same time. After a while, we are told, Cymon could no longer bear to be absent from his fatherland and Connell permitted him to return to the South. On the journey he fell sick on a hillside and in a darkened cave, the beauty of Leinster and its people. Whose death he, upon waking, he was enough and, returning to Connell and Bangor, he stayed there till he died. There can be no question that there was a real unity of Ireland already belonging to a still greater national unity stretching across Europe. But there can be no doubt that the political and cultural story of Ireland begins then and for centuries afterwards, allowed Ulster to be sufficiently distinct from Leinster to give Connell's story its point.

Let A Roman and a British reign wave

What better conclusion can there be to a study of nationalism?
NOTES TO PAGES 273-274


7 The underlying reason for this deeply traditional Ganda thinking was probably that a Mosquito cannot be circumcised.


9 Religion further considered:


5 Ibid., p. 78.

6 Ibid., p. 79.


10 Holmberg, Nation and Nationalism, p. 49.


15 William Temple, Church and Nation (London: Macmillan, 1934), p. 44.