Civilians, Soldiers, and Strife

Domestic Sources of International Aggression

Kurt Dassel

Do militaries provoke crises and wars to protect their organizational interests, or are their ends better served by avoiding such confrontations? Does internal strife encourage a country's leaders to pursue aggression beyond its borders, or to behave more cautiously on the international stage? Despite much research, scholars continue to reach different answers to these questions. Proponents of militarist theories of war contend that the military's organizational interests are generally served by actual, or threatened, use of their forces; hence these organizations tend to support belligerent foreign policies. Critics counter this assertion, noting that war can be very damaging to military organization, and that officers frequently counsel against international adventurism. Advocates of diversionary theories of war argue that when political elites are confronted with internal strife, they are tempted to provoke external conflicts in order to unite the country behind their leadership. Skeptics charge that when a country is divided internally, its leaders will try to avoid creating additional problems abroad. These two theories are among the most common domestic-level explanations of the causes of war. They are also policy relevant, given the prominent political role of the military and the potential for upheaval in countries such as Russia, China, and North Korea. Nevertheless, despite the theoretical and practical importance of these theories, we still do not know when soldiers and domestic strife will provoke war and when they will promote peace.

Militarist and diversionary theories of war are usually treated separately; however, in this article I show that they are useful complements. A diversionary approach shows that a particular type of domestic strife, what I call

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"contested institutions"—a situation in which powerful groups disagree about the rules of the political game—makes the military willing and able to use force either at home or abroad to protect its interests. My analysis of military organizations suggests that the military prefers to maintain its interests by using force internally. If, however, the domestic use of force will divide the military against itself, then the military will protect its interests by pursuing diversionary aggression abroad.

My argument makes several contributions. First, it advances the debate over whether military parochialism and domestic strife encourage war or peace by identifying hypotheses that can predict when one or the other of these outcomes will obtain. Second, it is applicable to any country with contested political institutions, be it a great power or a third world country. Third, it helps reconcile the comparative politics view of the military with the international relations view. When the military's organizational interests are threatened, comparativists tend to expect it to respond by launching a coup (or similar behavior), whereas international relations scholars usually expect it to respond with external aggression. The argument here draws on both the comparativist and international relations literatures to explain when the military will protect its organizational interests by using force at home, and when it will do so by using force abroad. Finally, this work is policy relevant because it helps distinguish status quo powers from revisionist ones. Militaries bent on using force abroad to protect their parochial interests are not particularly concerned with obtaining limited foreign policy goals, such as acquiring territory. Rather, they are seeking to provoke a foreign threat for the sake of having one. Hence, when dealing with such aggressors, firm deterrence, not reassuring appeasement, will be the appropriate policy.

In the next section, I discuss the literatures on diversionary war and militarist war to show how they fail to identify when domestic strife and the military will provoke international conflict. In the following section, I explain how domestic strife can make the military more willing and able to use force. I also introduce the variables that influence when this is likely to happen. I then bring these variables together to develop several hypotheses on when the military will use force abroad and when it will use force at home. I also outline illustrative cases to establish the argument's plausibility. I conclude with a summary of the argument's contributions.

Scapegoating and Militarism: Competing Logics and Mixed Evidence

The subject of diversionary war has received considerable attention, with mixed results.[1] Several historical and case studies have shown that in many instances domestic strife encouraged leaders to use force against foreign scapegoats in order to unify their country and bolster their position at home.[2] Yet numerous statistical tests have failed to replicate this result across a wide range of countries and time periods.[3] These findings are not surprising because domestic strife could motivate any number of responses, including: abdication by the rulers, domestic repression of the opposition, and diversionary aggression against foreign scapegoats. The objective is to identify the conditions under which domestic strife is more likely to lead to diversionary aggression abroad.

A number of scholars have taken on this task. Leo Hazelwood, for example, tested whether the *intensity* of domestic strife might affect the likelihood of external conflict.[4] He hypothesized that low-intensity strife would not merit the risk of diversionary aggression, and high-intensity strife would discourage it by making victory more difficult. Hence only moderately intense strife should lead to war. Despite the plausibility of Hazelwood's propositions, the quantitative tests failed to support them. Jonathan Wilkenfeld hypothesized that domestic strife would be more or less likely to lead to war depending on the *type of regime* in which it occurred.[5] He concluded that "revolutionary" activity correlated with war for centrist (authoritarian) regimes and that "domestic turmoil" correlated with war for polyarchic (democratic) regimes. Sub-

1. For reviews, see Michael Stohl, "The Nexus of Civil and International Conflict," in Ted Robert Gurr, ed., *Handbook of Political Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1980), pp. 302–313; and Jack Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 262–267.
2. Richard Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), pp. 279–296; Arno J. Mayer, *Dynamics of Counter Revolution in Europe, 1870–1956* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 134–149; Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 169–192.
3. Rudolph Rummel, "Dimensions of Foreign and Domestic Conflict Behavior: A Review of Empirical Findings," in Dean Pruitt and Richard Snyder, eds., *Theory and Research on the Causes of War* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1969), pp. 225–226; Stohl, "The Nexus of Civil and International Conflict," pp. 303–305; and Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War," p. 262.
4. Leo Hazelwood, "Diversion Mechanisms and Encapsulation Processes: The Domestic Conflict–Foreign Conflict Hypothesis Reconsidered," in Patrick J. McGowan, ed., *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies*, Vol. 3 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1975), pp. 213–243.
5. Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 1 (1968), pp. 56–69.

sequent studies, however, have contradicted Wilkenfeld's findings, and each other.[6]

In a historical study of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe, Arno Mayer argued that *intra-elite* conflict between the aristocracy and bourgeoisie led to international aggression. In the modern era, the noble class had begun to lose its privileged position in society at the same time that it continued to occupy the more influential positions in officer corps across Europe. According to Mayer, the aristocracy could not afford to repress the bourgeoisie because it needed the bourgeoisie's economic output; thus the nobility used foreign aggression to bolster the domestic military's influence, and with it the position of their class. In contrast, elite (aristocracy and bourgeoisie) versus mass conflict led to domestic repression.[7] This argument can account for wars in Europe during this period, although how to apply it to other countries and time periods is not immediately clear. For example, in contemporary times, what types of elites would have to be in conflict, and over what would they have to be fighting? It is not evident which elite groups would have to be in conflict to encourage China, for example, to pursue external aggression. In another study, Jack Levy and Lily Vakili argued that, in the case of Argentina's 1982 invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, the military junta chose international aggression because its narrowing base of public support, economic difficulties, lack of a unifying mission, and intra-regime splits made both acquiescence and domestic repression unpalatable options.[8] Again, this is quite plausible, but it does not explain why Argentina's military did not use force abroad in 1973 or 1978, when these four factors were also present. As these examples show, the work on diversionary war provides plausible accounts of how strife leads to international conflict in particular cases, but it does not explain why apparently similar forms and degrees of strife fail to lead to conflict in other cases.[9]

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6. Dina Zinnes and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "An Analysis of Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations," in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., *Comparative Foreign Policy* (New York: David McKay, 1971), pp. 209–210. See also Ross Miller, "Domestic Structures and the Diversionary Use of Force," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (August 1995), pp. 760–785; and Chris Gelpi, "Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (April 1997), pp. 255–282.
7. Arno Mayer, "Internal Crisis and War since 1870," in Charles Bertrand, ed., *Revolutionary Situations in Europe* (Quebec: Interuniversity Centre for European Studies, 1977), pp. 201–202.
8. Jack Levy and Lily Vakili, "Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes: Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case," in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *The Internationalization of Communal Strife* (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 127, 135–136.
9. For this and other critiques of the literature, see Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 81–86.

Militarist theories of war suffer from a similar problem; sometimes militaries seem to provoke foreign conflicts to advance their interests, but other times their interests are better served by avoiding international entanglements. Joseph Schumpeter argued that imperialism, the "objectless disposition . . . to unlimited forcible expansion," was the strategy of an atavistic warrior class trying to maintain its privileged domestic position:[10] "Created by wars that required it, the machine now created the wars it required."[11] The advocacy of war may be a consciously self-serving decision by officers, or it may be the unconscious product of socialization and motivated biases. The military tends to attract individuals of a particular type, socialize them to hold a particular worldview, and selects for upward mobility those most successful in these regards. How can a person, "drafted by his early sense of patriotism, instilled with an overriding concern for his country, ordered to search the horizon for the enemy, surrounded by men similarly charged, [and] frustrated by the inexplicable (if not ominous) opposition of civilians" not be a little overly aggressive?[12] Given this worldview and the motivated bias toward aggression, it would be surprising if the military did not foster war.

Nevertheless, much of the post–World War II scholarship on the military and war tends to discount this causal relationship. First, even if the military does tend to advocate external aggression, it may not be able to translate this preference into action. Other groups in a country may prefer peace, and they may be able to prevent the military from initiating or provoking a war.[13] In the United States since World War II, for instance, the military's advice has exerted a powerful influence over civilians in situations where it counseled against using force, but it was far less persuasive when it advocated aggression.[14] Second, many scholars have argued that, empirically, military officers are generally reluctant to resort to force,[15] or at least they are no more aggres-

10. Joseph Schumpeter, "The Sociology of Imperialism," *Imperialism and Social Classes* (New York: Meridian, 1955), p. 6.
11. Ibid., p. 25.
12. Jeremy J. Stone, "The General Faces Reality," *New Republic*, October 29, 1966, pp. 30–31. Cited from Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 495; see also *War and Politics*, pp. 479–496.
13. Robert Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 4 (December 1973), pp. 467–490. This, I argue, is true only in countries with stable political institutions.
14. Richard Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 6, 11–12.
15. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 69–70; and Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York: Meridian, 1967), p. 13.

sive than civilians.[16] Richard Betts's study of the U.S. military found that although field commanders were more aggressive than civilian advisers, army chiefs of staff tended to be less inclined to advocate the use of force, and on average the position of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs was little different from that of civilians.[17] More generally, according to Betts, "there is a rough inverse relation between scope of responsibility and aggressive optimism of major military officials."[18] Similarly, Stanislav Andreski found that countries governed by military dictatorships (i.e., countries in which the military would be most able to translate its preferences into policy) almost never fight international wars.[19]

A more recent body of work addresses these critiques. Several scholars have argued that officers do not actively call for war or advise civilians to pursue aggression, but that they do call for offensive military doctrines and warn of the unconditional hostility of foreign states.[20] The primary purpose of offensive doctrines and hostile enemies is to serve the organization's interests (e.g., larger budgets and greater political autonomy). The secondary, often inadvertent, effect is to make war more likely by structuring an environment in which civilian leaders are more inclined to choose war. These arguments did effectively rebut the critiques of earlier scholars, and they did show that militaries occasionally provoke wars to protect their interests. However, they did not identify when these dynamics are more or less likely to occur. Virtually all countries have militaries, and virtually all militaries want to protect their organizational interests, so they should frequently provoke wars. Yet war is rare. As with diversionary theory, the task of a militarist theory is to identify the conditions under which militaries are more likely to use force abroad to protect their interests and when they are less likely.

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16. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 26.
17. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, p. 4.
18. Ibid., pp. 143–144.
19. Stanislav Andreski, "On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (December 1980), pp. 3–10.
20. Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 41–59; Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 15–34; and Stephen Van Evera, "Causes of War," Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1984, pp. 206–214. See also Scott Sagan, "More Will Be Worse," in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 56–57.

Repression at Home or Aggression Abroad?

Diversionary and militarist theories of war, although generally treated as unrelated, complement each other well. Critics of militarist theories rightfully point out that the military's core interests (i.e., their political prerogatives, unity, monopoly of force, and the existence of the organization itself) are rarely threatened enough to warrant war.[21] It is here that a diversionary theory can help by more narrowly specifying the universe of cases in which the military might pursue aggression abroad. Given a situation in which there are contested political institutions, the military will be sufficiently motivated to use force to protect its interests. Diversionary theory, however, takes us only so far. After all, the military may respond to threats to its interests by using force at home rather than abroad. At this point, an analysis of the military can help by indicating when it will be unwilling to resort to domestic repression and hence, more willing to pursue international aggression. In cases when using force at home can be expected to cause the military to divide against itself, diversionary war will be more likely.

This theory does not purport to identify conditions necessary for the occurrence of international aggression. It does not apply, for example, to countries with consolidated political institutions, and thus cannot explain why a country such as the United States might use force abroad. Furthermore, even in countries with contested institutions, a variety of factors—such as the international distribution of power, the strategic interaction among states, the organizational culture of the military, and the idiosyncratic beliefs of particular leaders—may affect both military and civilian leaders' decisions about using force. We know that many factors simultaneously encourage and discourage external aggression, and this is precisely why we need simplifying theories such as the one presented here. The key is to identify the circumstances in which a few variables take on such extreme values as to override the effects of other relevant variables.

Militaries are not always obsessed with protecting their organizational interests. Indeed, they are often motivated by ideological concerns, professional responsibility, the nation's interests, and class or other communal interests. The condition of contested institutions, however, is an extreme situation. Because

21. Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1975), pp. 41–49; and Eric Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1977), p. 65.

contestation creates deep threats to, and opportunities to advance, its organizational interests, the military's desire to protect its interests will tend to dominate these other concerns. The military will not always be willing to use force to protect and advance its organizational interests, but in the extreme environment of contested institutions, it will. If it can use force domestically, then it will avoid doing anything that jeopardizes this ability. Hence it will prefer to avoid foreign conflicts in order to concentrate on internal opponents. More often than not, this preference will outweigh any factors encouraging it to use force abroad. Conversely, if using repression at home will divide the military against itself, it will have powerful incentives to protect its interests by using force abroad. Again, although other factors may discourage international conflict, the military's situation is extreme enough that its preference for, and power to pursue, aggression abroad will usually be overriding.

THE UTILITY OF A DIVERSIONARY APPROACH

Militaries usually do not provoke crises or wars to protect and advance their core organizational interests, but sometimes they do. For that matter, militaries sometimes launch coups or repress domestic opponents for parochial purposes. These are all pieces of the same puzzle. To protect their interests, some militaries use "normal" legal means, whereas others resort to force. To explain why the military uses force abroad to protect its interests, we must first explain why it uses force at all. This is where a militarist approach needs the help of a diversionary approach. A specific type of domestic strife, contested political institutions, makes the military willing and able to use force to secure its interests. Most scholars agree on this point. Samuel Finer argues, "Where public attachment to civilian institutions is strong, military intervention in politics will be weak . . . where public attachment to civilian institutions is weak or non-existent, military intervention in politics will find wide scope."[22] Samuel Huntington rejects arguments that claim interventions are caused by "internal structures of the military" and asserts the main cause "lies in the absence or weakness of effective political institutions in society."[23] Morris Janowitz concurs with Huntington and goes so far as to argue that "it is impossible to locate those scholars who put forth the first claim."[24] Although

22. Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, pp. 18–19.
23. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 196.
24. Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 23. Janowitz perhaps goes too far here, given that some scholars do

one might suppose that violent military intervention at home is a cause of contested institutions, the vast majority of scholars conclude that the causal arrow flies in the other direction: contested institutions lead to the military's use of force. In countries with consolidated institutions, such as the United States or Tito's Yugoslavia, the military, like other political actors, seeks to secure its interests through legal means and will not use force to undermine institutions in pursuit of its ends. In stark contrast are countries with contested institutions such as prewar Japan and Argentina in the 1970s. In these cases the military was both willing and able to use force to protect its organizational interests.

CONTESTED INSTITUTIONS DEFINED

Political institutions are the rules by which actors play the political game. They are contested when reasonably powerful groups in a country advocate different sets of rules. Individuals dissatisfied with "the system" are not enough. They must be organized into entities such as parties, unions, state agencies, and social movements, and they must articulate alternative institutions. Specifically, these revisionist groups must advocate other rules and procedures for choosing the political leadership, constraining the executive, regulating political participation by society, and amending these basic constitutional guarantees.[25] Furthermore, revisionist groups must have a reasonable chance of

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argue that internal characteristics play a role. Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 100–101, argues that internal factors such as cohesion and ideology may affect a military's propensity to coup; Eric Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*, pp. 31–61, contends that the socioeconomic backgrounds and professionalism of officers can encourage intervention. Nevertheless, even these two scholars argue that the most important factor encouraging intervention is the illegitimacy of political institutions and governments. See Perlmutter, *Military and Politics*, pp. 93–94; and Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*, p. 64.

25. The types of rules are drawn from the literature on regimes and regime change: Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 179–185, 187–196, 264–285; Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 119–129; Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism," in James Molloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 93–97, 102–105; Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State," *Archives Européenes de Sociologie*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1984), pp. 187–192; Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 11–20; and Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers, and Will Moore, *Polity II: Handbook* (Boulder: University of Colorado, 1989). I have added amendment rules to this mix. The reason is that groups can disagree about basic constitutional rules, and still agree on a set of rules to follow to change the constitutional rules. Groups can still resolve their differences by following the rules to change the rules (e.g., the recent transitions to democracy in Hungary and Poland).

affecting the rules. Most countries have some groups advocating alternative institutions, but often these groups are too weak to effect change. (For example, the presence of right-wing militias in the United States does not mean that U.S. political institutions are contested.) Conceptually, political institutions are contested when revisionist groups are reasonably powerful relative to groups favoring the status quo.[26] Operationally, institutions become contested not when the military uses force, but when other actors commonly recognized as consequential (e.g., major political parties, large social movements, legislatures, and executives) refuse to play politics according to the rules of the game.[27]

A common example of contested institutions is a transition to democracy. Argentina in 1982 provides a classic case. The military junta opposed the main political parties. They disagreed on the rules for governing the political game. Finally, the dispute was not over relatively mundane institutions, such as whether the legislature would be unicameral or bicameral, but over the most fundamental rules—unconstrained military dictatorship or competitive multiparty democracy.

Several caveats are in order. First, not all transitions are cases of contested institutions. In Hungary in 1989, for instance, powerful groups disagreed over fundamental institutions, but agreed on a set of amendment rules that would determine whether they transited from communist authoritarianism to liberal democracy. Both sides accepted and abided by the amendment rules; hence Hungary's transition is not a case of contested institutions. Second, the change of institutions need not be in a democratic direction. Transitions from democracy to authoritarianism, or from one form of authoritarianism to another, are usually periods of contested institutions as well. Third, regime transitions are not the only instances in which institutions are contested. Revolutions, for example, are almost always periods of institutional contestation. Fourth, it is not necessary for political institutions to actually change. Opposition groups frequently accumulate considerable power, apply it to change the rules of the

26. My concept of a country with contested institutions is very similar to, and influenced by, Huntington's notion of a "praetorian society" (Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, pp. 1–92), particularly with regard to the effects of such an environment. The principal differences between these concepts are: (1) Huntington seeks to measure the *strength* of institutions, whereas I look only for expressed disagreements with, and transgressions of, institutions; and (2) I do not look at the extent of mobilization in a country, a key cause and indicator of praetorian societies for Huntington.

27. Obviously, if the military's use of force were used as an indicator of contested institutions, the argument would be a tautology. Given that numerous other indicators are readily available, this danger is easily avoided.

political game, come close to success, but ultimately fail. The unsuccessful 1905 Russian revolution is a good example. Finally, institutions may be contested for long periods of time. Russia's revolution did not succeed until 1917, and yet the intervening eleven years were not a time in which every powerful political group in the country embraced the czarist regime. The opposition was organizing prior to 1905, they were actively articulating their grievances and pushing for change between 1905 and 1917, yet the communist regime was not consolidated until 1921, at the earliest. Hence political institutions were contested in Russia for roughly two decades. In short, contested institutions appear in many guises, including most regime transitions, political revolutions, and failed attempts at these.[28]

THE MILITARY'S WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE

This unwillingness to play politics by a common set of rules is what makes the military willing to use force to protect its interests. First, political actors, including the military, cannot resolve their disputes by following rules and procedures, because there are no commonly accepted institutions. To achieve their ends, they must resort to extra-institutional means. According to Huntington, when institutions are contested, "each group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities. The wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup."[29]

Second, civilians will also recognize the increased utility of force in this environment, and they will want to acquire coercive capabilities of their own while preventing their opponents from gaining them. Because the military possesses these capabilities in abundance, civilians are encouraged to encroach upon its interests. They may challenge the military's autonomy by arrogating decision-making authority, promoting officers on the basis of political loyalty, or inserting civilian commissars into the organization, so that civilians, not officers, decide when and how to use force. For similar reasons, civilians may try to gain the loyalty of groups within the military. They may weaken force

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28. For discussions of related subjects, see the debate over when transitioning democracies become consolidated: Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 65–72; Laurence Whitehead, "The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies: A Discussion with Illustrations," in Robert A. Pastor, ed., *Democracy in the Americas* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989), pp. 79–95; and Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 26–34.

29. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 196.

cohesion by appealing to soldiers from their own ethnic, class, regional, or other groups. Civilians may also try to form coercive organizations of their own. They may organize state militias, palace guards, or guerrilla armies so that the military does not monopolize force. In extreme situations, civilians may try to disband the military, imprisoning and even executing high-ranking officers. They may try to destroy the organization itself and replace it with one loyal to them. In their efforts to gain coercive capabilities, civilians will threaten the military's core interests; this too makes the military willing to use force to protect itself.

THE MILITARY'S ABILITY TO USE FORCE

Civilians control the military primarily through consolidated institutions.[30] In this environment, groups resolve their disputes by following rules and procedures. These rules stipulate the acceptable means for achieving political ends. When groups fail to achieve their objectives, they do not seek redress by trying to gain control over the military or by acquiring other means of coercion, because they believe they can better secure their interests by playing according to the rules. Rather than escalate the level of conflict, they start a new game. This constraining influence of political institutions applies to civilians and soldiers alike. Officers are drawn from society and are socialized in the same political culture. If the vast majority of the citizenry accept and embrace the country's political institutions, so too will the officer corps. When the military does not achieve its ends, officers do not seek redress by escalating the conflict; they too start a new game.

When institutions are contested, in contrast, all groups in the country are freed from the constraints of political rules and procedures. Popular elections and executive decrees are equally impotent. The legislature defies the executive; the executive disregards the courts; the ruling elite silences the people. Most relevant here, the military can ignore a purportedly authoritative civilian command. Contested institutions make the military more autonomous.

This is not to say that the military is omnipotent. Indeed, it may be wholly incapable of influencing policy across a range of issue areas, such as trade, labor, education, environment, and religion. Nor is this to say that civilians have no impact on the military's decisions to use force. To the contrary, civilian support is vital to the military, so it uses force in such a way as to attract civilian

30. Ibid., pp. 192–198; Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, pp. 18–19, 77–80; and Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion*, pp. 22–23, 80–106.

allies. Finally, I am not arguing that the military is always the dominant actor in countries with contested institutions. Civilian allies can be the leading partner in the civilian-military coalition, as was the case in Sukarno's Indonesia or Zulfiqar Bhutto's Pakistan. My claim is the rather limited one that, in an environment of contested institutions, the military will enjoy sufficient autonomy to use force to protect its interests. Civilians may completely exclude it from many issue areas, but because the military controls the means of coercion, civilians cannot exclude it from decisions about the use of force. They might exercise great influence over *how* the military uses force—over which groups it targets—but not over *whether* the military uses it. Finally, civilian leaders may be the ones to order the military to use force, they may be the most vocal advocates of violence, and they may very well benefit from the military's actions. Nevertheless, their ability to lead the military depends in large part on keeping it satisfied. If the civilians should attempt to steer the military in a direction it does not want to go, they will find, as both Sukarno and Bhutto did, that the armed forces are fully capable of undermining their dominant position, allying with other civilians, and using force to remove them from power. Contestation does not make the military all powerful, but it does make it relatively autonomous and capable of using force.

The Military's Options: Repression, Inaction, or Aggression?

How will the military use its coercive capabilities when institutions are contested? When faced with threats to, and opportunities to advance, its organizational interests, the military could pursue at least three different strategies. It could repress whichever domestic groups were creating trouble for it; it could do nothing in the hope that the problems would go away; or it could use force abroad and provoke external threats in order to rally the populace and silence its opponents. The diversionary approach focusing on the effects of contestation shows that inaction will result in damage to the military's interests. A militarist theory can supplement a diversionary theory by identifying more accurately when the military will engage in domestic repression or external aggression.

REPRESSION

The military will usually use force at home because the groups threatening its interests and preventing it from advancing its interests are located domestically. Provoking a foreign threat will buffer the military from these internal

opponents because external dangers make civilians dependent on the military's protection, and it would be poor politics for them to interfere with the military in a time of crisis. Using force abroad does not, however, eliminate these groups. The military's comparative advantage is in coercion, so it will want to use its advantage directly against its opponents. Concentrating its capabilities against domestic opponents does not guarantee success, but it does give the military its best chance of success.

Thus, why not always use force at home? Because contested institutions place divisive stress on the military, and using force domestically can compound this stress. Sometimes using force at home will divide the military against itself, and lead to intramilitary civil war. If the military were to engage in such a confrontation, it would not only be unable to concentrate its capabilities against civilian opponents, it would also suffer severe damage to its organizational interests. Its unity would be shattered, its monopoly of force lost, and its existence placed in jeopardy. When using force at home would lead to intramilitary fighting, the armed forces have strong incentives to protect their interests in other ways.

INACTION

Given that repression carries such risks, perhaps inaction would not be such a poor strategy. Rather than using force to protect its interests, the military could opt to sit tight and try to ride out the storm. The problem, however, is that institutions are still being contested, and so civilians continue to encroach on the military's autonomy. Thus inaction means that the military will suffer damage to its interests. Because the costs of inaction are so great, it is doubtful that the high command could pursue this policy for long. In the cases I have studied, inaction by the high command eventually provoked other officers to take matters into their own hands to protect the organization's interests (e.g., the unauthorized invasion of Manchuria by Japan's local army in 1931, the nonviolent ouster of the military junta in Argentina in 1981, and the support of Serbian militias in Bosnia by the Yugoslavian army). When political institutions are contested, inaction is not only an ineffective option, it is an unworkable one.

AGGRESSION

A third option is to provoke an armed external threat. This strategy will not eliminate the root cause of the military's problems—the contestation of institutions—but it will deal with the most troubling symptoms of contestation—

threats to its organizational interests. Provoking an external threat can do this for several reasons. First, armed external threats are the military's raison d'être. Civilians create, countenance, and support militaries to deal with such threats; when threatened, it is natural for civilians to cede greater political autonomy and authority to the military.[31] As Huntington points out, "When [World War II] came, the American military did not reach out after power. . . . Instead, power was unavoidably thrust upon them."[32] To deal effectively with external threats, the military needs broader prerogatives, maximum unity, and control over all of the nation's coercive capabilities. When a country is threatened, the military is more justified in claiming, and civilians more eager to concede, these organizational interests. Second, international crises encourage a "rally 'round the flag effect."[33] Dissension gives aid and comfort to the enemy; hence the military's domestic opponents must mute their attacks on the military or risk discrediting themselves in the eyes of their own constituents.[34] At a minimum, groups generally hostile to the military must leave it alone. At a maximum, they must hastily burnish their patriotic credentials, echoing and even outdoing military alarms, in order to avoid being branded traitors.

The armed forces may of course find it difficult to exploit a threat that they themselves initially provoked. In general, however, this is not a great obstacle. Pretexts for aggression can usually be found.[35] Even in a country such as the United States, with its free press and numerous civilian experts on military and foreign policy, there is a reflexive tendency to support the state when it uses force abroad. This brings us to the third reason why foreign aggression will benefit the military: the ability to exploit self-made threats will be even easier in countries with contested political institutions. Mature, stable democracies rarely experience contestation. It almost always occurs in authoritarian regimes, when there is a transition to another form of authoritarianism, to

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31. Vagts, *A History of Militarism*, pp. 362–363, 383–390; Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 316–317, 322–325; and Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, pp. 64–66.
32. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 316.
33. Lewis Coser, *The Function of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1956), pp. 87–110; John Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York: University Press of America, 1985), pp. 50–58; T. Clifton Morgan and Kenneth Bickers, "Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 25–52.
34. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 106–109; W.G. Beasley, *The Modern History of Japan* (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 247–248, 255–256; Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 114; and Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 35–38.
35. Schumpeter, "The Sociology of Imperialism," p. 28.

democracy, or simply to uninstitutionalized chaos. In other words, contestation occurs in countries that tend to lack freedom of the press, that have few norms of balanced and impartial reporting, that try to suppress the development of independent civilian expertise in military and foreign affairs, and that seek to monopolize information on these issues. When political institutions become contested, it almost always happens in countries in which the military will be more able to successfully provoke threats, play the nationalist card, and thereby bolster its parochial interests.[36]

To summarize, when institutions are contested, the military cannot pursue a policy of inaction. A diversionary theory tells us this much. What it does not tell us is whether the military will use repression at home or resort to aggression abroad. It is here that a theory of the military can help. The military will usually use force domestically because it wants to concentrate its comparative advantage—coercion—against its opponents within the country. If, however, using force domestically will divide the military against itself, then it will resort to aggression abroad. An intense cold war, a series of border clashes, a victorious war, or a stalemated war will help the military strengthen its unity, maintain its monopoly of force, and usually expand its political prerogatives. What is needed is a theory that explains when using force at home will split the military.

The Variables: Civilian Support and Military Cleavages

Two variables—the breadth of civilian support for the military's use of force domestically and the extent to which the military contains internal cleavages—largely explain when using force at home will divide the military against itself.[37] As stated, an environment of contested political institutions exists when groups in a country strongly disagree about fundamental political issues.

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36. Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 11–25.

37. It is not unreasonable to suppose that cleavages in the military, and ready civilian allies for the military's forceful intervention, might to some extent encourage the contesting of institutions in the first place. Nevertheless, it is clear that contestation is not reducible to these factors. For decades, countries such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had numerous ethnic cleavages in the military, and yet they experienced no institutional contestation. To the contrary, these countries were held up as exemplars of strong, consolidated institutions. Only *after* consequential groups began to question, and defy, communist institutions did these militaries break apart, ally with civilian co-ethnics, and use force domestically. Because consolidated institutions frequently trump the divisive power of military and societal cleavages, it is necessary to distinguish contested institutions as a necessary precondition for the military's self-serving repression and aggression.

Specifically, efforts to resolve class conflict, ideological disputes, religious differences, ethnic strife, regional separatism, or other differences have reached an impasse, and consequently these groups no longer agree on how to resolve their disagreements. To the extent that the military is a microcosm of society, this condition of contested institutions will tend to divide it against itself.[38] Using force domestically can exacerbate these disagreements because it tends to politicize the military. It entails repressing some groups but not others. This targeting of groups weakens the advocates of one set of political institutions and strengthens the advocates of another. In other words, using force makes the military take sides in the contest over institutions. By taking sides, the military adopts and bolsters a particular policy agenda, an agenda that will benefit some groups more than others. If some officers are also members of the groups being repressed, disenfranchised, or otherwise disadvantaged, then using force domestically provides them with conflicting incentives. As members of the military, they stand to gain by using force at home to protect the organization's interests. As members of these class, ethnic, ideological, or other groups, however, they stand to gain by protecting the interests of these groups and opposing repression. If using force at home sufficiently alienates enough officers, then the military risks dividing against itself.

To explain when a split will occur, a theory of the military must answer two questions: to what extent is the military, like the larger society, rent by divisive class, ethnic, religious, ideological, or other cleavages; and to what extent will using force domestically exacerbate tensions along these cleavages? To answer the first question, I look at the number and nature of cleavages within the military. The more cleavages in the military, the more likely officers are to disagree over political issues, and the more likely the military is to divide against itself. Also important is the relative divisiveness of any given cleavage. It is difficult to measure the divisiveness of a particular cleavage, especially across countries and over time. For example, are ethnic cleavages more divisive than class cleavages? Are religious cleavages more divisive than ideological cleavages? Rather than make the attempt, I simply argue that two overlapping cleavages are more divisive than two crosscutting cleavages. If cleavages crosscut, then officers opposed on some issues will be allied on others. Different groups of officers will have reasons to split apart, but also incentives to pull together. In contrast, if cleavages overlap, groups will consistently oppose one another over a range of issues. Opposing coalitions will stabilize and become

38. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 60.

more acrimonious and divisive. Hence the more cleavages overlap, the more likely the military is to divide along those lines. (Note that the number and nature of military cleavages vary independently of contested institutions.) Contested institutions do not create cleavages; they make preexisting latent cleavages become manifest. From this analysis, I distinguish three types of militaries: homogeneous militaries containing few cleavages and none that overlap; heterogeneous militaries with several crosscutting cleavages; and split militaries containing several overlapping cleavages.

To determine the extent to which using force domestically will exacerbate military cleavages, I consider the breadth of the civilian coalition supporting the military's use of force domestically. Presumably, a particular civilian group will support the use of force only if it is not targeted for repression, disenfranchised by the resulting political institutions, or disadvantaged by the anticipated governmental policies. Consequently, as more civilian groups coalesce to support the use of force domestically, officers from different ethnic, ideological, religious, regional, and other groups can do so without repressing, disenfranchising, or disadvantaging their civilian cohorts. The broader the civilian coalition supporting the use of force at home, the less divisive it will be for the military to employ it.

Measuring the breadth of support is fairly easy in countries with established multiparty systems. Parties want to accumulate power, and if some group can help them, parties will try to mobilize and represent that group. If a group is not represented by a party, chances are its support of or opposition to the use of force will not matter. In these countries, we can focus on support or opposition by the parties on the assumption that they account for the politically active, concerned, and relevant groups in society. The task is more complicated in countries without well-established parties. For example, in a single-party state, or in countries with weak parties, there may not be a consensus among party members about whether the military should use force at home. In these cases, it will be factions within the party, or parties, that mobilize support or opposition to the use of force at home. Alternatively, in countries without established parties, individuals such as a monarch or a charismatic leader may, similar to a political party, mobilize and represent societal groups. In short, the breadth of civilian support depends upon the behavior of political parties (and party-like organizations such as party factions) and individual leaders. If none of the key parties or party-like organizations supports the use of force domestically, then the coalition of civilian support is absent; if at least one advocates it, then support is narrow; if the majority backs it, support is wide.

The Hypotheses and Evidence

Contested institutions tend to create threats to the military's organizational interests, to offer opportunities for it to advance these interests, and to free it from civilian control; they make it willing and able to use force. The breadth of civilian support and cleavages within the military largely determine how it uses force. In some cases, the military is so rent by internal cleavages that the condition of contested institutions alone is enough to break it apart. Like the society from which they come, members of the officer corps strongly disagree about fundamental political issues. In this case, the opposing blocs in the military will avoid using force abroad in order to concentrate their forces against opponents at home. In this situation the military will not fear that using force at home would *cause* it to break apart, because it already has or soon will. In other cases, the military is sufficiently homogeneous, and/or enjoys sufficiently broad civilian support, that it can use force domestically without fear of dividing against itself. When this is true, the military will resort to force to protect its interests. At the same time, it will avoid foreign conflicts so that it can concentrate its coercive capabilities against opponents within the country. Finally, in some instances, the military contains enough cleavages and lacks enough civilian support that if it were to use force domestically, it would divide against itself. Using force at home will cause a rift that would otherwise have been avoided. In such instances, the military will avoid using force at home and instead use it abroad. Below I deduce several hypotheses on how the military will use force, and present evidence to support each one.

THE HOMOGENEOUS MILITARY

A homogeneous military contains few cleavages and none that overlap. Unlike the larger society, the officer corps will not be divided along ethnic, religious, ideological, or other lines. They will tend to agree on fundamental political issues, and so they will generally agree on how to use force domestically. As long as the breadth of civilian support is at least narrow, to say nothing of wide, a homogeneous military will use force at home. Narrow civilian support means that at least one major party or party-like organization supports the military. Given that a homogeneous military comes from only a narrow segment of society, support from that segment is all it needs to use force domestically without repressing, disenfranchising, or disadvantaging its civilian counterparts. If support is narrow or wide, officers will enjoy harmony between their interests as members of the military and their interests as members

of societal groups. Under these conditions, the unsurprising expectation is that the military will protect its interests by using force domestically, because it can do so without breaking apart or risking civil war. The more interesting corollary to this hypothesis is that the military will steadfastly avoid using force abroad. Because the military's organizational interests are so seriously threatened, it will be more driven by organizational concerns than usual. And because the organization's interests are best served by repressing domestic opponents, the military will avoid doing anything that might weaken its repressive capabilities, so it will endeavor to maintain peace abroad.

ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL, 1930–70. Countries are at peace most of the time; thus peace is overdetermined. It is therefore difficult to show that peace is caused by particular variables. One way to circumvent this difficulty is to identify a situation in which many powerful factors point to war, whereas the particular variables of interest point to peace. In this situation, peace is not overdetermined. If it occurs, we can be more confident that the variables under consideration caused it. Relations between Argentina and Brazil during the mid-twentieth century provide just such a situation. From what we know of the causes of war, Brazil and Argentina should have engaged each other militarily sooner or later. By any measure, Brazil's military-industrial capabilities approached, equaled, and surpassed Argentina's sometime between 1930 and 1970.[39] Power transitions of this sort are one of the best predictors of war.[40] Furthermore, a number of contributing factors heightened the prospects of war. The two countries share a common border, have a history of armed conflict, were self-consciously engaged in competition for continental leadership, were aligned with opposing sides in World War II, lacked nuclear capabilities with which to deter each other, and were not democracies. Existing theories of the causes of war point to a relatively high likelihood of war, and yet none occurred. In fact, the two countries never even engaged in a violent dispute with each other.

This remarkable forbearance was possible because the militaries of both countries were able to use force domestically to deal with the problems created by contested institutions, and hence were reluctant to become involved in

39. Compare Stanley Hilton, *Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930–1939: The Politics of Trade Rivalry* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975), pp. 3–5, 111–114, 120–121, to Max Manwaring, "Brazilian Military Power: A Capability Analysis," in Wayne Selcher, ed., *Brazil in the International System* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 65–98.

40. Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation," in Midlarsky, *Handbook of War Studies*, pp. 171–194.

conflicts abroad. First, in neither country could the consequential political groups agree on a common set of institutions. Fascists, bureaucratic authoritarians, democrats, and communists all struggled to shape institutions, and in the course of these struggles the military's interests were seriously challenged. Prior to World War II, military unity in Argentina was threatened by struggles between liberals and fascists, and in Brazil, the military's unity and its monopoly of force were endangered by struggles between regionalists and centralizers.[41] After the war, both militaries feared communist revolution, the success of which would have meant their own destruction.[42] Second, both militaries were relatively free of internal cleavages. Argentina's contained an ideological cleavage: paternalist officers favored authoritarian political institutions and little participation by the citizenry; nationalists preferred authoritarian institutions and mass mobilization; and liberals, although willing to countenance dictatorship in the short run, advocated democratic institutions in the long run.[43] Brazil's military contained a regional cleavage, with officers tending to serve in, and feel a strong tie to, the regions in which they grew up.[44] Third, in both countries, the breadth of civilian support for the military's use of force domestically was always at least narrow, if not wide. In Argentina the Radical Party (actually a moderate right-of-center party) could not beat the Peronists at the polls, so they consistently supported military repression of the Peronists in order to gain power.[45] In Brazil civilian legislators, fearful of overly ambitious executives, wrote an article into the constitution stipulating that the military was to intervene domestically should that be necessary to enforce compliance with the constitutional rules of the game.[46] Even after the military imposed its dictatorship in 1964, it continued to enjoy support from landowners, industrialists, and much of the middle class.[47]

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41. On Argentina, see Gary Wynia, *Argentina: Illusions and Realities* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986), pp. 86–90. On Brazil, see Thomas Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964: An Experiment in Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 14–16, 26–28.
42. On Argentina, see Wynia, *Argentina: Illusions and Realities*, pp. 86–116; and David Rock, *Argentina, 1516–1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsin* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 262–367. On Brazil, see Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 155–158.
43. Guillermo O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 54–57.
44. Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, pp. 17–20.
45. Wynia, *Argentina: Illusions and Realities*, pp. 117–143.
46. Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, p. 75.
47. Ibid., pp. 195–198.

With consistent civilian support for the use of force at home, these militaries were able to free themselves of civilian oversight, extend their political prerogatives, and attack groups trying to break their monopoly of force. Furthermore, because they were relatively free from internal cleavages, military unity was fairly secure. The few military rebellions that did occur were brief, small in scale, and often nonviolent. They did not risk damaging civil wars. Overall, the use of force at home proved an effective means of protecting the military's interests, and both repeatedly engaged in domestic repression.[48] Consequently, using force abroad was unnecessary and perhaps even dangerous for the organization. Given the patterns of civilian support and military cleavages, about the only event that could deprive the military of its ability to protect its interests by using force at home was a major conflict abroad. From this perspective, it is not surprising that Argentina and Brazil managed to avoid war despite the array of incentives seeming to encourage it.

ARGENTINA AND THE 1982 FALKLANDS/MALVINAS WAR. Holding constant the variable of military cleavages, we can consider what happens when the level of civilian support drops. Although homogeneous militaries usually use force at home to protect their interests, this is not always the case, for it could be that no major party or party-like organization will support it. When a supporting coalition is absent, at best, poorly organized fringe groups will back violent military intervention. If none of the major civilian groups supports using force, then doing so would literally pit the military against the rest of the nation. Even for the most homogeneous military—a military with no internal cleavages—using force domestically would entail attacking the civilian group from which the officer corps is drawn. As members of the military, officers might stand to gain by defying their civilian cohorts and using force internally, though even this is dubious. As members of that cohort, and as citizens of the nation, however, they would lose. The vast majority of civilian groups in society oppose violent military intervention. Because officers are drawn from this society, whatever considerations make these civilians reject the military's use of force domestically will also resonate with the officers themselves. Some officers might be willing to try to repress the citizenry and impose institutions that disenfranchise the populace, both mass and elite. Others, however, would certainly balk, to say nothing of the enlisted soldiers. Even a homogeneous

48. On Argentina, see Wynia, *Argentina: Illusions and Realities*, pp. 86–98; Paul Zagorski, "Civil-Military Relations in Argentine Democracy," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Spring 1988), pp. 414–420. On Brazil, see Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil*, pp. 5–6, 27–29; and Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, pp. 85–122.

military needs some civilian support if it is going to use force at home and maintain its unity.

When it lacks support, the hypothesis is that the military will avoid using force domestically, and instead use force internationally to protect and advance its interests. This explains Argentina's invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas in 1982. Nothing had changed at the international level of analysis to suggest that 1982 was different from previous years. The territorial dispute over the islands, the distribution of power between Argentina and Great Britain, the condition of international anarchy, and the offense-defense balance (i.e., the relative advantage of attacking versus defending) had been constants for years.[49] In some respects, politics appeared to be much the same at the domestic level as well. Pro-democracy groups were trying to rid themselves of a military dictatorship much as they had in 1973 and 1978.[50] The military was showing signs of strain along its ideological cleavage much as it had throughout the postwar era.[51] The Peronist Party, several smaller parties, and a number of unions were again leading the charge against the military. These groups had repeatedly born the brunt of military repression since World War II, and they were again opposing its use of force at home. In one critical respect, however, 1982 was very different from previous years. In the past, the Radical Party had often gained power with the aid of the military, and for several years after 1978 it tried to strike a similar deal. In September 1981, however, the military announced that it would continue to deny party participation in politics for at least another three years. The armed forces clearly signaled that no deals were in the offing, and by 1982, the Radical Party gave up hope of allying with the military and instead chose to join the opposition.[52] Argentina's two dominant parties—the Radicals and the Peronists—as well as three smaller parties opposed the military's use of force domestically. As a result, the military lacked the support of any major party or party-like organization. Thus, if the military were to use force at home, it would have had to have been used against virtually the entire nation. The combination of contested institutions and no

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49. For an essentially realist argument, see Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, *Signals of War* (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1990), pp. 3–7.
50. Rock, *Argentina, 1516–1987*, pp. 346–374; Donald Hodges, *Argentina's "Dirty War": An Intellectual Biography* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), pp. 196–252.
51. *Latin American Weekly Report* (*LAWR*), July 3, 1981, p. 9; and David Pion-Berlin, "The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina: 1976–1983," *Journal of InterAmerican and World Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Summer 1985), pp. 55–76.
52. *LAWR*, November 13, 1981, p. 1; and William Smith, *Authoritarianism and the Crisis of the Argentine Political Economy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1989), p. 255.

civilian support placed great divisive stress on the military even though it was fairly homogeneous. In fact, in December 1981 a group of paternalist officers deposed the liberal junta. These hard-liners were among the most ardent supporters of Argentina's "dirty war," a period of repression in the 1970s in which at least 9,000 civilians were killed.[53] If any junta would dare initiate a new round of domestic repression it was this one. It did not dare. In January 1982 the military leadership decided they would gain control of the Falklands/Malvinas by whatever means necessary.[54] In April 1982 the junta launched its invasion. No longer able to protect the military's organizational interests by using force at home, the junta attempted to do so by pursuing aggression abroad.

These two cases show the importance of civilian support for the military's use of force domestically. Contested institutions and military cleavages remain constant, and the breadth of civilian support is allowed to vary. As civilian support narrows and then disappears, even a homogeneous military—a military most able to use force at home and still maintain its unity—will eschew domestic repression and resort to international aggression.

THE HETEROGENEOUS MILITARY

A heterogeneous military is marked by crosscutting cleavages. Given this diversity of interests, officers will likely disagree about fundamental political issues, and so it will be difficult to reach a consensus on how to use force domestically. Nevertheless, because cleavages are crosscutting, consensus will not be impossible. When cleavages crosscut, a given group of officers will not consistently oppose another group over a range of issues. For example, officers may disagree about some political issues because of ethnic differences, but agree about others because they come from the same economic class. Because officers are opposed on some issues, using force domestically risks dividing the military against itself; however, because these same officers will be aligned on other issues, compromise may be possible. Much will depend upon the breadth of civilian support. Because the military in this scenario contains a wide range of class, ideological, religious, and other groups, it needs broad civilian support so that its officers can use force at home without repressing, disenfranchising, and disadvantaging their civilian cohorts. When the breadth

53. *LAWR*, July 3, 1981, p. 9; *Latin America Regional Report: Southern Cone*, December 18, 1981, pp. 1, 7; and Pion-Berlin, "The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina," pp. 66–67.
54. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, *Signals of War*, pp. 3–4.

of civilian support is wide, the hypothesis is that a heterogeneous military will use force at home to protect its interests and simultaneously avoid conflicts abroad.

INDONESIA AFTER SUKARNO. Indonesia's military in the latter half of the 1960s demonstrates the pacific inclinations of a heterogeneous military enjoying wide civilian support. Under President Sukarno's fragile regime of "Guided Democracy" (1959–65), he and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) were the two major civilian actors, and both opposed the military's use of force domestically.[55] The result of the contesting of institutions and this pattern of civil-military relations was an aggressive foreign policy against the newly formed state of Malaysia and its British patron.[56] In late 1965, however, the pattern of civil-military relations in the country began to change. A coup attempt by left-leaning officers, who had some help from the PKI, was portrayed as a violent attempt by the PKI to seize power. The charge stuck, most of the Indonesian populace and political elite came to support repression of the communists, and the military was happy to oblige.[57]

The resulting demise of Guided Democracy did not end the contestation of Indonesia's political institutions. The old political parties, banned throughout the first half of the 1960s, quickly mobilized and pressed for a greater role. President Sukarno maneuvered to maximize his own power, and the military sought to install some form of military-led bureaucratic authoritarianism.[58] The pattern of cleavages within the military remained much the same, with an ethnic cleavage overlapping a regional cleavage. Javanese officers came mostly from Central and East Java, while officers of numerous other ethnicities were mostly from West Java and the Outer Islands of the Indonesian archipelago.[59] Although cleavages overlapped, the military is not categorized as split because it contained only two cleavages, not many. Finally, excepting the specific target

55. Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth McVey, ed., *Indonesia* (New Haven, Conn.: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, by arrangement with Hraf Press, 1967); Herbert Feith, "President Soekarno, the Army, and the Communists: The Triangle Changes Shape," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 4, No. 8 (August 1964), pp. 969–980; and Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 43–68.

56. Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 4, No. 6 (June 1964), pp. 904–913; Franklin Weinstein, *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1969); and Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 168–170.

57. Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, pp. 135–157; and Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, pp. 212–214, 227.

58. Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, pp. 159–160.

59. Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, pp. 14–16.

of the PKI, no civilian party or party-like organization supported using force domestically for several months after the coup attempt. Without broader civilian support, the military could not use force domestically against Sukarno or the political parties that backed him. Many Javanese officers were intensely loyal to the president, and targeting him would almost certainly have divided the military and precipitated civil war.[60] Consequently, the military avoided using force against Sukarno and continued its belligerent foreign policy to justify its extensive political prerogatives and to maintain its unity.[61]

When Sukarno appointed an anti-army, left-leaning cabinet in February 1966, and banned one of the newly formed student organizations, civilian support for the domestic use of force began to grow. The country's main student organization, the Indonesian Student Action Front, started to call for Sukarno's ouster, as did several political parties.[62] Shortly thereafter, Sukarno signed a letter ceding executive authority to the commander of the army, General Suharto. Suharto proceeded to form a cabinet, which included several prominent civilian leaders. Then, in late June the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, Indonesia's supreme policymaking body, gave its approval to Sukarno's letter, forbidding him from issuing any more presidential decrees and regulations.[63] For the vast majority of civilians, General Suharto was now Indonesia's president, with the authority to issue and enforce executive decrees. The military under Suharto's leadership could now protect and advance its interests by using force at home, should it prove necessary. In August Indonesia formally ended its campaign of aggression against Malaysia. By the fall of 1966, the two countries' armies were cooperating in joint operations against insurgents on their common border.[64] One year later, in August 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, and several other states formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). A major incentive to join "for Indonesia, [was that] ASEAN provided an opportunity to dispel old antagonisms and create new and more congenial relationships."[65] Once the military could protect its interests by using force at home, it not only ended its campaign of aggression

60. Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, pp. 141–142, 158–162.
61. Ibid., pp. 198–199; and Weinstein, *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation*, p. 31
62. Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, pp. 163–164, 173–175, 197–198; and Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, pp. 228–234.
63. See Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, pp. 192–203; and Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, pp. 235–239.
64. Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 122.
65. Evelyn Colbert, "Southeast Asian Regional Politics," in W. Howard Wriggins, ed., *Dynamics of Regional Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 233.

abroad, but also took steps to avoid future conflicts by assuring its neighbors that it would not again become a threat.

JAPAN IN THE 1930S. Without wide civilian support, a heterogeneous military will avoid using force domestically and will instead use it abroad to protect its interests. Because of the number of divisive cleavages in the military, it will have trouble reaching a consensus on how to use force domestically. If the supporting coalition of civilians is narrow, to say nothing of absent, using force at home will make many officers target their civilian cohorts, buttress undesirable political institutions, and support a disagreeable policy agenda. Some may be willing to prioritize the military's interests over their ethnic, regional, ideological, or other interests, but many will not. When civilian support is narrow to nonexistent, using force domestically will tend to divide a heterogeneous military against itself and lead to intramilitary civil war. Using force abroad to provoke an external threat, however, can protect the military's interests without damaging officers' ethnic, regional, ideological, or other interests.

In an environment of contested institutions, officers prioritize the protection of their organization's interests over other concerns. Because aggression will tend to protect these interests, many officers will prefer it. Furthermore, the choice these officers face is not between foreign conflict or peace. As argued above, both repression and inaction will tend to cause intramilitary civil war; hence the officers' real choice is between internal or external conflict. Because the alternative to foreign aggression will do such damage to the military's parochial interests, virtually all officers will at least tolerate it. Heterogeneous militaries have trouble reaching consensus on issues, including the use of force abroad. But because aggression offers the hope of benefits, and because the alternatives to aggression promise serious costs, officers can more easily agree on it than on any other course of action or inaction. For these reasons, the hypothesis is that when the breadth of civilian support is narrow or absent, the heterogeneous military will eschew repression at home and resort to aggression abroad.

Pre–World War II Japan illustrates the dynamics of a heterogeneous military with narrow civilian support. By the mid-1920s the political institutions of Meiji Japan had begun to break down. Initially, it appeared that the advocates of democracy would succeed in installing a parliamentary system. The democratizers aimed at nothing less than the complete subordination of the military to civilian control, an arrangement unprecedented in Japanese history. Not surprisingly, the military and its civilian allies opposed democratization. What is surprising, however, is that the use of force domestically was not the primary tool of their resistance.

In part, the lack of internal force resulted from the narrowness of civilian support. Factions in the Seiyukai (one of Japan's two main parties) actively encouraged military coups.[66] Prominent members of the royal family, including Emperor Hirohito's next eldest brother, Prince Chichibu, were also sympathetic to such plots.[67] The emperor, however, vigorously opposed any coup attempt, even ones ostensibly on his behalf; this opposition remained an obstacle because many officers and soldiers were intensely loyal to him.[68] The remaining parties, factions, and individual leaders were consistently noncommittal.[69] Whenever rebel units attempted a coup or initiated aggression abroad, these civilians waited for the outcome before condemning or supporting the actions.

Although the emperor's opposition and the resulting narrowness of civilian support were obstacles to using force within Japan, they cannot fully explain the military's forbearance. The armed forces' reluctance to use massive force at home was also partly the result of its internal cleavages, which included ideological differences, regional competition, branch rivalries, and disputes between junior and senior officers.[70] Had the military been homogeneous, it could have used force domestically to protect its interests. It was precisely because the military contained crosscutting cleavages that Emperor Hirohito, so powerless in many regards, was so powerful on the issue of military coups. These cleavages ensured that the military would have great trouble agreeing on a domestic political agenda. Without wide civilian support—in this case, without the emperor's support—using force domestically was sure to confront many officers and soldiers with the disagreeable task of defying their ideological and religious beliefs (the emperor was venerated as something of a deity as well). Any faction using force domestically could count on some civilian support. It could also expect opposition from rival military factions and the

66. Robert Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 379, 384; and Richard Storry, *The Double Patriots* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1957), pp. 106, 113–114.
67. Lesley Connors, *The Emperor's Advisor: Saionji Kinmochi and Pre-war Japanese Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 169.
68. Ibid., p. 167.
69. Storry, *The Double Patriots*, p. 187; Beasley, *Modern History of Japan*, pp. 247–248; Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement*, pp. 239–241, 365, 370–375; Gordon Berger, *Parties Out of Power in Japan, 1931–1941* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 230; and Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, pp. 145–148.
70. James Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 249–256; Yale Maxon, *Control of Japanese Foreign Policy* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 19–21, 98–112; Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement*, pp. 377–379; Michael Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 29–30, 79.

emperor. Indeed, factional infighting in 1936 provoked a rebellion by some 1,400 junior officers and soldiers. The navy, fearing that the army might be sympathetic to the rebels and do nothing to oppose them, sent marines to Yokohama. The war minister, General Kazuo Kuwashima, sent units from the Imperial Guard to surround the rebels. In short, three contingents of soldiers under rival commands converged on Tokyo.[71] On another occasion, the navy had been opposing the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy because it thought this alliance would lead Japan into a war with the United States. Fearing that the army would try to compel it to accept the treaty, the navy installed machine guns around the Naval Ministry building.[72] Navy Minister Oikawa Koshiro finally signed the pact because, in part, he feared civil war with the army if he refused.[73] The combination of narrow civilian support and a heterogeneous military meant that either inaction or the use of force at home would risk intramilitary civil war.

The fear of civil war, more than any other factor, encouraged Japan to pursue aggression abroad. This is not to say that Japan was not threatened by the Soviet Union, or that its dependence on the United States for war-related materials was not a liability, but Japan's campaign of aggression was ill-suited for dealing with these problems. Extensive conquest would provoke a war with the United States, Britain, and China well before Japan could secure access to the territories and the raw materials it needed to repel an anticipated Soviet invasion.[74] Japan's leaders understood that their foreign policy would lead to a war against these four powers, and they knew they could not win that war.[75] Nevertheless, the combined might of China, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union failed to deter Japan's leaders. As James Marder notes, "The Navy would have been able to prevent war by stubbornly refusing to go along with the Army; but the consequences of such a policy, an Army coup d'état or a direct clash between the Army and Navy, were regarded by [Navy Chief of Staff] Nagano and [Navy Minister] Shimada as too terrible to contemplate. Nagano told his wartime aide . . . that the result of such a clash would have

71. Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy*, p. 273; and Connors, *The Emperor's Advisor*, p. 168.
72. Arthur Marder, *Old Friends, New Enemies* (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 101.
73. Ibid., p. 125.
74. Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy*, pp. 187–188, 191–196; Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War*, p. 104; and Charles A. Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 324.
75. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War*, pp. 44–46, 101–105; Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, p. 112; and Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire*, p. 324.

been more serious and prolonged than a war with foreign countries."[76] The sobering conclusion is that war, even against four great powers, was a reasonable strategy for Japan's decision makers.

These two cases once again show the effect of changes in civilian support. In both, institutions are contested and the militaries are heterogeneous. However, the broader civilian support in Indonesia enabled its military to use force domestically to protect its interests and hence to pursue peace abroad, whereas the narrow civilian support in Japan forced its military to try to protect its interests by fighting a difficult foreign war. More important, the addition of the Japan case is useful for demonstrating the influence of military cleavages. In contrast to a homogeneous military, the greater number of cleavages within a heterogeneous military makes it more difficult to use force domestically and still maintain unity. To put it another way, the same breadth of civilian support should encourage a heterogeneous military to use force abroad, but encourage a homogeneous military to use force at home. This is most strongly shown by comparing 1930s Japan to the Brazilian-Argentine peace of the mid-twentieth century. In Japan, contested institutions and narrow civilian support spurred its heterogeneous military to pursue international aggression, even though a powerful opposing coalition of states should have deterred it. In Brazil and Argentina, however, contestation and narrow civilian support allowed these homogeneous militaries to use force at home and make peace abroad, even though the power transition between these countries encouraged them to make war.

THE SPLIT MILITARY

A split military is rent by many overlapping cleavages. For example, not only will officers come from distinct regions in the country, but they will also be members of different ethnic groups, economic classes, religious faiths, and so forth. Because of the numerous cleavages and the resulting diversity of interests in the military, officers will, like their counterparts in the larger society, disagree about fundamental political issues. In particular, they will disagree about how to use force domestically. Furthermore, because these cleavages overlap, one bloc of officers will consistently disagree with the others. Even in the best of times, relations between these opposing blocs will be strained. In an environment of contested institutions, relations will be unmanageable. As

76. Marder, *Old Friends, New Enemies*, quotation on p. 254; see also pp. 251–255; and Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War*, p. 254.

members of the military, all officers stand to gain by maintaining unity and pursuing a single political agenda. As members of different groups, however, officers have an interest in using force to pursue contradictory agendas. If these cleavages crosscut, officers opposed on some issues will be aligned on others, potentially leaving room for compromise. However, because they overlap, the collective weight of these interests is likely to sway an officer more than his or her singular interest in the military. This is a single military organization in name only. Opposing blocs of officers will view one another with as much, if not more, antipathy as they do foreign armies.

The divisions produced by overlapping cleavages, and the fact that contested institutions tend to exacerbate these divisions, will cause opposing blocs in a split military to use force at home against one another irrespective of the breadth of civilian support. The reason civilian support can matter is that it makes using force domestically more or less divisive for the military. However, because a split military in an environment of contested institutions is essentially broken apart already, the breadth of civilian support is irrelevant. The opposing blocs will act like discrete militaries in and of themselves. They will try to monopolize force within the country and establish themselves as its only military. Each bloc may very well seek allies abroad to intervene on their behalf, but none will provoke foreign militaries. The hypothesis for any country with a split military is that it will pursue a relatively pacific foreign policy because it is consumed by civil war at home. A good case in point is the former Yugoslavia.

THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. As the political institutions of the communist system began to break down in 1990, the Yugoslav army's organizational interests became threatened. Not only were its extensive political prerogatives jeopardized,[77] but also various civilian groups sought to acquire means of coercion to achieve their ends. Slovenia and Croatia formed their own militias and bought arms from Austria and Hungary; Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina began to form irregular units as well.[78] The Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), while always more sympathetic to the Serb cause, for a time sought to avoid using force at home because doing so would have precipitated a civil war.[79] However, many

77. James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (London: Pinter, 1992), pp. 89, 141.
78. Robin Alison Remington, "The Yugoslav Army in Transition," in Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, eds., *Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 164–165; Dimitrios Kyriakou, "Civil Society and War in Bosnia," in ibid., pp. 233–256; and Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military*, p. 140.
79. Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military*, p. 150; and Remington, "The Yugoslav Army in Transition," p. 165.

of the cleavages that were wreaking havoc on the Yugoslav state and society were also present within the military. Furthermore, the ethnic, class, religious, and regional cleavages in the military overlapped one another. Ethnic Croats and Slovenes tended to be wealthier than their Serbian counterparts; they were Catholic while Serbs were Orthodox; and each ethnic group came predominantly from a distinct region in the country.[80] The cleavages that tore Yugoslavia apart did the same to its military.

Over time, the high command's policy of inaction proved difficult to maintain, as Serb officers at all levels began to take decidedly pro-Serbian actions across a range of issues. Notably, YPA tanks joined interior forces in repressing protests in Kosovo, and MiG fighters were used to support Serbian rebels in Croatia.[81] The YPA began to act less like a single self-interested Yugoslav army and more like a single self-interested Serbian army. Non-Serbian officers began to leave the organization, and the loyalty of the Territorial Defense units, previously subordinate to the YPA, became in doubt. In June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, YPA tanks rolled into Slovenia, and the Slovenian Territorial Defense forces fought against them. Moreover, Slovenian officers in YPA headquarters in Belgrade provided valuable information to the republican forces.[82] During this fighting, the YPA chief of the General Staff, General Blagoje Adžić, "invited all 'non-Yugoslav-oriented officers' to leave the JNA [YPA]."[83] This invitation prompted the departure of Slovenian, Croatian, Moslem, and Macedonian officers, and increased desertion of non-Serbian conscripts. After brief skirmishes in Slovenia, the YPA withdrew and fighting spread in Croatia. Again, former YPA officers of Croatian background left the army to join the newly forming Croatian military.[84] The combination of contested institutions and overlapping cleavages proved too much for the Yugoslav military to endure. Various blocs within it ceased pursuing the organizational interests of the military and instead supported the ethnic, class, religious, and regional interests of their civilian cohorts. As ex-

80. Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military*, pp. 3, 8, 52, 76; Leonard Cohen, *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), p. 203; and Kyriakou, "Civil Society and War in Bosnia," p. 236.
81. Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military*, pp. 1, 139–143; Remington, "The Yugoslav Army in Transition," p. 165.
82. Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, pp. 218, 224.
83. Ibid., p. 226; Mihailo Crnobrnja, *The Yugoslav Drama* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), pp. 168–169.
84. Crnobrnja, *The Yugoslav Drama*, p. 167; and Warren Zimmerman, *Origins of a Catastrophe* (New York: Times Books, 1996), pp. 96–97, 141–142, 154.

pected, the YPA did not use force abroad to protect its interests. Rather, the contending blocs within the military preserved their strength for, and used it in, Yugoslavia's civil war.

The most significant aspect of the Yugoslav case is that it shows the consequences of contested institutions. The YPA contained several overlapping cleavages for decades, and yet it had not come close to fighting a civil war. As soon as groups began to question the legitimacy of the communist regime, however—as soon as Yugoslavia's political institutions became contested—the breakup of the YPA and the onset of civil war was almost inevitable. Consolidated political institutions made the YPA unwilling and unable to use force to protect its interests. Like other political actors, it pursued its ends primarily through institutionally sanctioned means, even during the ten years after Marshal Tito's death. Thus even the multiple overlapping cleavages in the YPA could not by themselves cause the disintegration of the military; it took the advent of contested institutions to unleash these divisive forces.

Conclusion

Many scholars have argued that domestic strife and military parochialism can encourage war. At the same time, it is clear these two factors do not always lead to war. To the contrary, many other scholars have shown that domestic strife and parochialism can encourage international peace. The task is therefore to specify the conditions under which these variables will provoke war, and those under which they will promote peace. To do so, I have argued that it is useful to combine elements of both diversionary and militarist theories of war. By drawing on diversionary theory, we can specify when the military will be both willing and able to use force to protect and advance its interests; I contend that it will use force when political institutions are contested. By drawing on theories of the military, we can identify when the military will have a strong inclination to use force at home and when it will exhibit a powerful propensity to use force abroad. I argue that the military will tend to use force abroad when internal cleavages and civilian support are such that using force domestically will cause a breakup that otherwise could have been avoided. It is strongly inclined to use force at home when cleavages and support make a breakup nearly inevitable, or almost impossible.

This is not to deny that other variables also affect decisions about using force. In fact, multiple factors were at play in each of the cases I examined. However, because contested institutions create grave threats to vital organizational inter-

ests, the military's desire to protect its parochial interests will tend to override other motivating factors. Moreover, because contestation frees the military from civilian control, and because the military possesses the means of coercion, it will be able to turn its desires into actual policy.

The most important contribution of this argument is that it offers testable hypotheses about when the military and domestic strife will provoke wars and when they will promote peace. It also helps reconcile some of the seemingly contradictory evidence generated by the work on diversionary and militarist war. It is not surprising that quantitative analyses of diversionary war have failed to corroborate the findings of numerous case studies, because these analyses use a broad definition of domestic strife. Many forms of domestic strife will not threaten the military's interests, and they will not free the military from civilian control; hence efforts to correlate them with external aggression will not be successful. Neither is it surprising that the case studies of diversionary war can explain some instances in which strife led to foreign aggression but not others. Because these studies have not focused on the military's interests and its incentives to use repression at home, they cannot anticipate when domestic strife will fail to lead to aggression abroad. Finally, this argument helps account for some of the conflicting findings on military aggressiveness. Most of the works that conclude that militaries have neither a preference for, nor power to cause, conflicts and wars have focused on countries with consolidated institutions.[85] In contrast, the works that find militaries advocating external aggression focus primarily on countries with contested institutions.[86] By recognizing the great difference between an environment of contested institutions and one of consolidated institutions, we can see that these apparently contradictory findings are in fact perfectly compatible. Only in countries with contested institutions will the military be both willing and able to use force abroad to protect its organizational interests.

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85. For instance, see Betts's study of the post–World War II U.S. military, in *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises;* and Posen's pre–World War II British and French cases, in *The Sources of Military Doctrine.*

86. See, for example, Snyder's study of the pre–WWI militaries in France, Russia, and Germany, in *The Ideology of the Offensive;* and Posen's look at pre–World War II Germany, in *The Sources of Military Doctrine.*