January 12, 2012

European Identities Part II

This is a continuation of the extract of the talk I gave at the University of Geneva in Nov. 2011 on “European Identities.” This part deals with the failure to create an identity at a European level:

Let me turn to nation building at the EU level. When we pass from the level of these individual European states to the question of European identity as such, what is it and what kind of deficit do we have? Everybody who is going through this crisis of the Euro realises now in retrospect that there are many flaws in the Maastricht Treaty and in the whole process of creating Europe, such as the absence of a disciplining mechanism, the absence of exit mechanism out of the either Euro or European Union itself. A lot of this discussion is dominated by people in finance and by economists because that is the short-term problem that has faced us, a new recession and the collapse of the European banking systems as a result of Europe’s failure to address politically these kinds of problems.

I don’t want to minimize these problems at all, but in a sense, there is a deeper failure at the European level, a failure in European identity. That is to say, there was never a successful attempt to create a European sense of identity and a European sense of citizenship that would define the obligations, responsibilities, duties and rights that Europeans have to one another beyond simply the wording of the different treaties that were signed. The EU in many respects was created as a technocratic exercise done for purposes of economic efficiency. What we can see now is that economic and post-national values are not enough to get people to buy into this community.  So wealthy Germans feel a sense of noblesse oblige towards poorer Germans; this social solidarity is the basis of the German welfare state. But they do not feel similar obligations towards the Greeks,whom they regard as being poor disciplined, very non-German in their general approach to fiscal matters.

So there is no solidarity in that broader European sense. I think for various reasons Europe is stumbling toward a short-term solution to this crisis. But I do not think that any form of deepening at this point is a viable project unless someone pays more attention to identity and is able to answer the question in a more substantive sense of what it means to be a European. Not just in a negative sense that we don’t want conflict and old nationalisms and war, but what it means in terms of positive values.

Now, let me just conclude by saying that these issues that I have discussed- immigration, national level identity and European level identity-in the next years are going to merge as really the same issue because these are the central issues of all the new populist parties that have arisen all over the continent of Europe. That is to say, opposition to immigration and Euro-scepticism. We have older parties like the Front National in France and the Vlaams Belang in Belgium. But in the last decade we have seen the emergence of new ones, the Party of Freedom in the Netherlands, Danish People’s Party, the Sweden Democrats, True Finn Party, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) in here in Switzerland. Opposition to Europe and immigration has a common source amongst all these parties. It is basically a populist impulse. It is a feeling that the needs of ordinary citizens have been ignored by the elite with regards to both the deepening of the European Union and to immigration issues. In France, many people that voted for the Front National were extremely resentful of the fact that, for example, living in Marseille, there is a lot of crime and the state was not willing to deal with that problem because the crime was associated with Muslim gangs. You can replicate the story in many European settings. The mainstream parties were too politically correct to recognize that these were issues that bothered ordinary people and as a result, these populist parties had to take matters into their own hands and organize.

And to be quite honest, the whole European project has been an elite-driven affair. We know that on several occasions when the issue of agreeing to a treaty was put up for popular referendum and when the people gave the wrong answer, the elite would say the people were wrong about that, they are going to have to vote again. So, I think that in a sense the rise of populism reflects in a certain way the deepening of democracy in Europe: the public is not going to be lead along by their elites like they were in the first decades after the Second World War. But it means that there are tremendous dangers for European democracy that lie ahead in the immediate future. I think we all recognize in the European Union that an important process either deepens it or it begins to split apart. The current middle ground is not one that is sustainable.

I will just leave you with the following the following fact. The deepening project, that is to say to moving from monetary to fiscal union, may make sense in terms of economics, but it is going to have a tremendous number of political costs that need to be taken into account. There is absolutely no grassroots support in Europe for this deepening project; this is again going to be an elite-driven affair are undertaken for largely technical economic reasons. It is actually something that is already stimulating the renationalization of Europe. Already, people have said fiscal union is in fact the Germanization of Europe. And it also forces conditions that amount to the suspension of democracy in Europe, now you have technocrats running the governments of Italy and Greece that were not elected in normal fashion by their constituents. The reason why they are there is because of the conditions set not by the Italian and Greek public but set by other parts of Europe. This kind of deepening both on the part by Northern and Southern countries is going to lead to doubts about political accountability in both of the halves. All of this is being undertaken against the background of a prolonged and deepening economic crisis. In many respects this identity problem is one that we all need to think about very deeply; it is one that will come back, I guarantee you, in our politics in the near future.

 

Posted in Europe, General

10 Responses to European Identities Part II

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  2. Jim. says:

    “But I do not think that any form of deepening at this point is a viable project unless someone pays more attention to identity and is able to answer the question in a more substantive sense of what it means to be a European. Not just in a negative sense that we don’t want conflict and old nationalisms and war, but what it means in terms of positive values.”

    Without a return to Christian roots — truly religious roots, where people go to church on Sunday and hear the Word of God that forms the foundation of the culture unites them — “Europe” will founder in a sea of petty nationalisms that will never be integrated.

    Secular Europe is a divided Europe. Europe that refuses to embrace Christianity and its culture of life and family is a dying Europe.

    Secular Europeans will not survive. There will either be a repudiation of secular socialism and a revival of Christianity (like the United States has had every few generations) that restores the birthrate, or Caucasian Europeans will be replaced by Muslims and the European culture that has flourished for 500 years and more will be gone.

    Socialist secularism has done more damage to the European population than WWII. It’s time people realized that, and tried to turn it around.

    • CPC says:

      @Jim: “Christian roots”?! Plus, that last sentence of yours proves either you’re a buffoon or you’re simply trying to rile folks up (thus, disingenuous). Europe needs a lot, but just as it doesn’t need a rise in Islamism, it sure as hell doesn’t need a return to Vatican power, or Lutheranism, or Calvinism, or any other b.s. where a group of wannabe-virgins enforce a feudal system, encouraging war, ignorance and disease. There’s much I’d comment regarding Mr. Fukuyama’s piece, but I just had to let you know, sans any real facts, that you’re dead wrong, you crypto-fascist.

  3. Frank Arden says:

    I recall a few years back we were entertaining friends visiting from Denmark. After lunch I brought the matter of the EU. Denmark had just had its referendum on the matter and I wanted to know how they voted. The husband, a businessman, votes “yes” because he thought it would be good for business.

    His wife voted “no” because she was suspicious of this liberal idea that believed sovereignty could be replaced by a bunch of elite technocrats. She did not believe there was a social glue strong enough to hold it together.

    I agreed with her.

    In an earlier blog you posted about American Exceptionalism, I thought one thing missing from your comments was more about the unique way the colonies were glued together before the Revolution.

    In fact, the American Revolution did little to reorganize society, but instead sought to sustain the status quo that had evolved through the benign neglect of the British.

    Recently, Socialist Harold Meyerson wrote an article (I can’t remember where) blaming gridlock on the Constitution. Typically, he blames the Founders for a construct that was meant to protect the propertied class and limited democracy.

    To him the solution to gridlock is simple: we need more democracy. He comes just short of calling for a parliamentary system and even criticizes bicameral state legislatures as redundancies.

    This politically liberal frustration with the Constitution is not new. It’s the same old and tired theory that the US system was designed by and for rich white men, etc, etc. Meyerson ignores the expansion of the franchise since that time.

    He also ignores the results of unbridled democracy that allowed the French revolution, just two years later, to become the slaughter bench of history.

    In this, the founders were most wise. The US Republic established by the Constitution was intended to limit democracy through the Electoral College, super majorities in the legislature and the amendment process, and the selection of senators by state legislatures.

    The glue that has held it together has been not only Federalism and shared sovereignty, but a union of shared language, shared experience, and shared interest.

    The European problem of assimilation and the various measures of success (or failure) is the result of how different cultures deal with the same thing in different ways.

    American culture, and the government that rose from it, was always built for immigrants and assimilation and is why we’ve been so successful at it. The European nations were not built that way.

    As for gluing the EU together and maintaining the Euro, the idea at present is to bond the Euro nations with a fiscal union. This will only create more friction with a further loss of sovereignty and a massive loss of democracy as the great democratic parliaments of Europe rot in impotency.

    Democratic socialists as Meyerson should quit trying to replace James Madison with more democracy and instead, turn their dread to Europe where democracy is about to be lost.

    • Pennywisdom says:

      That’s because these people see democracy as a panacea–the Will of the People is always enlightened–without any real reflection on how social consensus is truly created. I would recommend to them spending some time with Tocqueville (or Rousseau, for that matter) and then maybe they would learn a thing or two about glue. But until then, the conversation will continually be redirected away from the real issue–Culture–to the smokescreen of materialist politics.

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