

Introduction

A bomb rips apart a commuter train in Madrid. Scores are killed in a suicide attack in a crowded market in Baghdad or Peshawar. Another coalition soldier dies in Afghanistan. As a Canadian resident of London, I'm painfully aware of the steady drip of coalition casualties which is searing itself into the psyches of both countries. The threat of terrorism is never entirely absent. Behind the scenes, western societies wring their hands over profound cultural questions which cut to the core of who we are. How much should we bend liberal principles to accommodate religious practices? Is Islam off-limits to comedians and artists? How to achieve security without trampling on suspects' freedom from detention without trial? Can we achieve a measure of unity in the face of growing diversity?

If I am correct, what we have witnessed over the past decade is the thin edge of a rising wedge which transcends Islam. Simply put, this book argues that religious fundamentalists are on course to take over the world through demography. We have embarked on a more turbulent phase of history in which the frailty of secular liberalism will become ever more apparent. In contrast to the situation today, the upsurge of fundamentalism will be felt *more* keenly in the secular West than in developing regions. This is because we are witnessing the historic conjunction of religious fundamentalism and demographic revolution.

The world is in the midst of an unprecedented shift from population growth to decline. Europe is leading the way, but East Asia is aging more quickly and may overtake it, while other parts of the world - especially India, Southeast Asia and Latin America - are treading the same path. These changes are driven by rising prosperity, women's education, urbanisation and birth control. Europe's fertility has been below

replacement for four decades. As a result, its native population has begun to fall in absolute terms - a slide which will accelerate over time. World fertility is lagging by around 70 years, but is predicted to sink below replacement by 2035. Global population decline will follow several decades later.

It may seem as if the world is in danger of being depopulated and left to the animal kingdom.¹ People are increasingly failing to replace themselves and the openly nonreligious among them are displaying the lowest fertility rates ever recorded in human history: sometimes less than one child per woman. However, the demographic transition relies on people's desire to better themselves in this world, not the next one. Those embracing the here and now are spearheading decline, but individuals who shun this world are relatively immune to it. Everywhere one looks, religious fundamentalists are successfully bucking the trend toward fertility rates below the magic 2.1 children per woman. Even if everyone else died off, homo religiosus would endure. In the West, fundamentalism is also growing because the religion of uprooted immigrants from demographically-expanding parts of the world is being radicalised by its collision with western secularism. Identity politics reinforces and protects faith.

Fundamentalism is a modern response to the threat of secularism. In their quest for religious certainty, Christian, Muslim and Jewish fundamentalists have elevated the most world-denying, illiberal aspects of their traditions to the status of sacred symbols. One badge of fundamentalist belonging is outlandish dress - be this the ultra-Orthodox Jewish sidelock, Salafi burqa or Amish hat. Often these innovations are quite recent. Fundamentalism thumbs its nose at secular modernity in other ways, too, such as by affirming traditional women's roles. Large - sometimes unlimited - family sizes are typically part of the package, as exemplified by America's Quiverfull Protestants. These practices mark out the true believers from the

backsliders who have supposedly compromised, to a greater or lesser degree, with secularism.

It's not that fundamentalists have suddenly begun to have large families. It's just that others are having fewer. In the past, when most children died before reaching adulthood, differences in family size had more to do with material factors. Any group trait which lowered infant mortality - African resistance to malaria, Christians tending their sick during plagues, superior Jewish hygiene, the wealthy being able to afford food and shelter - led the group to increase its share of the population. Only around 1900, for example, did European women of lower socio-economic status begin to have larger numbers of surviving offspring than the well-off.² Fertility was also driven by the need for labour on the farm and insurance in old age, neither of which counts in wealthy societies. Finally, those with access to contraception controlled their fertility better than those without it. Today, however, people - especially in developed countries - are largely able to choose the number of children they have. Why they select as they do depends more than ever on their cultural values and lifestyle choices. This increases the fertility gap between seculars and fundamentalists, paving the way for revolutionary population shifts.

Might secularism's salvation lie in luring away the children of the devout? This may work for the more open fundamentalist sects and cults, such as some American neo-evangelicals or the Jehovah's Witnesses. But strong religions generate powerful motives for people to remain in the fold and powerful disincentives to leave. This makes them more successful than moderate faiths in keeping their flock from straying. Largely endogamous, or in-marrying, religious fundamentalists like the ultra-Orthodox Jews or Mormons have been improving their retention rates over the

past century. Put high fertility and retention together with general population decline and you have a potent formula for social change.

The Old Order Amish, for instance, double in population every twenty years. They numbered just 5,000 in 1900 but count close to a quarter million members today. In the period 1997-2003 alone, 66 new Amish colonies formed. Only the fastest growing nondenominational megachurches can match their growth rate. The Amish are still a small group, and they live in the USA, a large country. Might growth and influence lead to moderation? This seems less likely today because fundamentalists have effectively mobilised against the threat of secularism, which helps unify them and prevent moderating splits. Consider the Ultra-Orthodox Jews, a larger group who - at least in Israel - occupy a much smaller pond. Once a trace element in the population, they now make up a third of the country's Jewish schoolchildren and are on track to becoming a majority of Jews in the second half of this century. Unless secular Zionists figure out how to arrest their growth in a liberal manner, the outcome is predictable. And it is difficult to see how the rest of the world can avoid succumbing to similar forces as the demographic revolution unfolds.

Even small fertility premiums can lead to impressive gains if maintained over generations. The Mormons should have been a shrinking minority in Utah by now. However, they increased their share of the state's population from 60 percent in 1920 to 75 percent by the end of the century in the teeth of considerable non-Mormon immigration. Across the United States, the more numerous evangelicals grew from a third to two-thirds of white Protestants during the twentieth century. In both cases, fundamentalists enjoyed no more than a one-child advantage over others, but maintained this over a century. Their success has not gone unnoticed and has spawned self-conscious pronatalism. The Quiverfull movement, for instance, which opposes

family planning, has formulated a 'two-hundred year plan' for domination. They may find Islamic fundamentalists in the way: some Islamists envision a demographic conquest of the West and victory 'from below' over the secular regimes of the Muslim world.

Though radical leftist writers assail liberal capitalism, the saga of ever-rising human progress - in science and human virtue - remains the central ideology of western societies. Yet, as John Gray notes, liberalism is not necessary for modernity, and has largely won by historical accident. Human virtue, unlike science, winds back and forth rather than progressing ever upward. There is no necessary reason why the road ahead will not twist in an illiberal direction, leading to an outcome as violent as anything witnessed during the bloody twentieth century.³ Religious fundamentalism and demographic transition form a potent cocktail. It will fuel apocalyptic terrorism, but violence is not the main issue. Religious zealots are no more violent than socialists or anarchists. The jihadist revolution even shows signs of having lost its way. The greater threat is cultural: that fundamentalism will replace reason and freedom with moral puritanism. As the recent experience of the Muslim world shows, the violent sting of fundamentalism can only be drawn by trading away secular thinking, women's rights and expressive liberty.

All the same, for many of us, the storm takes place at a distance. We rarely meet a fundamentalist. We don't know any victims of terrorism. We live our lives largely outside religion's orbit. In our world, bestselling New Atheists like Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett loom larger. The churches and synagogues we know haemorrhage members. We seem on the cusp of a new era of naked atheism. Denmark and Sweden are leading the way, writes Phil Zuckerman: 'Worship of God can wane, prayer can be given up, and the Bible can go

unstudied,' yet society runs smoothly, with little crime, excellent health and high levels of societal happiness. People in Scandinavia, he writes, live perfectly contented lives knowing that their consciousness will simply expire when they die and that life has no further meaning beyond the here and now.⁴

As Scandinavia shows, there is a strong case to be made that the least religious countries are the most advanced. Pippa Norris and Ron Inglehart draw on decades of worldwide survey data to show that as income, education and equality increase, religiosity declines.⁵ Secularisation theorists add that more complex, differentiated societies tear the 'sacred canopy' of religion asunder, reducing its influence and plausibility in modern life.⁶ The Enlightenment and secular humanism transformed the consciousness of the West's cultural elite after the mid-eighteenth century. Today, nearly all leading scientists and intellectuals in the developed world are nonbelievers. In Francis Fukuyama's terms, the secular 'last men' of today realise that their inherited religious tradition is simply one among many. Consequently, they no longer believe it to be the truth. Religious authority melts away under the glare of modern cosmopolitanism.⁷

In our politics, the great collective myths are on life support. Political parties now differ only by degree, competing on managerial competence rather than transformative ideology. We witness the 'end of chiliastic hopes' prophesied by ex-Trotskyist Daniel Bell in his *End of Ideology* (1960). The great secular ideologies - socialism, nationalism and even the liberal anarchism of 1968 - have lost their grip. These ideas once served as surrogate religions, providing a storyline for societies akin to those we invent for ourselves each day. They told us where our societies came from and where we were going, anointing us as the chosen ones who would be gratefully remembered after death.⁸ Collective myths and symbols inspired many to sacrifice,

helping people achieve a sense of transcendence. In contemplating the arcadian golden age of our heroic ancestors or the utopia of a socialist tomorrow, we escaped the confines of our profane present.

Secularisation theorists plausibly argue that the lonely, alienated condition of modern society has not stimulated a return to faith in the developed world. In a fascinating model based on recent survey data, David Voas predicts that atheists and agnostics will prevail in Europe, but suggests that this process may take a century or two to run its course.⁹ Religious revival has arguably succeeded only in the more deprived parts of the world where skepticism has yet to pour cold water on supernatural, enchanted modes of thinking. The upheavals of urbanisation, democracy and capitalism can only spark religious revival when the people remain, in Fukuyaman terms, 'in history.' Failed states, corruption, inequality and civil war provide insecurity, which fuels fundamentalism.

This Whiggish analysis dovetails with a long tradition of thought from Auguste Comte to Friedrich Nietzsche, which says that the triumph of a secular worldview is only a matter of time. Charles Taylor correctly appraises it as an ideological 'subtraction story' that is not susceptible to empirical verification. 'The Positivists,' notes Stuart Hampshire, 'believed that all societies cross the globe will gradually discard their traditional attachments because of the need for rational, scientific and experimental modes of thought...there must be a step-by-step convergence on liberal values, on "our values"...We now know that there is no "must" about it and that such theories have a predictive value of zero.'¹⁰ Rodney Stark and Roger Finke go further: 'After nearly three centuries of utterly failed prophecies...it seems time to carry the secularisation doctrine to the graveyard of failed theories, and there to whisper "*requiescat in pace*."' ¹¹

These skeptics correctly skewer the idea that the end of religion is preordained, but they do not provide solid evidence of what will reverse its current western free-fall. As Norris and Inglehart rightly remark, 'Were Comte, Durkheim, Weber and Marx completely misled in their beliefs about religious decline?...Was the predominant sociological view during the twentieth century totally misguided?...We think not.' They correctly state that critics of secularisation focus largely on marginal anomalies like the United States while the overall trend is still moving in a secular direction.¹² Even Charles Taylor, who disavows secularisation, has written a fascinating chronicle about how western thinkers slowly detached their philosophy from its religious training wheels.¹³

Skeptics and proponents alike fail to see the soft underbelly of secularism: demography. Norris and Inglehart are aware of its power. They observe that less developed countries tend to be more religious than rich ones and have faster growing populations. Population explosion in the developing world creates many more religious people than secularism can digest. The secular West and East Asia are aging and their share of world population declining. This means the world is getting more religious even as people in the rich world shed their faith. Notwithstanding these trends, the authors feel confident that secularism will eventually win out as income and education tame religious fertility in the Third World.¹⁴

The swift pace of the demographic transition in Asia, Latin America and even the Middle East lends some credence to this prediction. However, I find such hopes to be misplaced. If anything, the developing world is more likely to modernise in an American than European way, retaining its faith as it becomes wealthy. The most perceptive secularisation theorists allow that religion can resist decline when it serves the secular function of maintaining identity. Catholicism distinguished Poland from

Orthodox-cum-communist Russia, Brittany from secular Paris. Developing countries cling to their religion as a badge of pride in the face of 'westoxification.' This is most evident in Islam, but the fast-growing Protestants of the global South also brandish their faith, often as a riposte to their Muslim, Catholic or Hindu neighbours.¹⁵

As globalisation makes us more similar, we become increasingly sensitive about our differences. This raises the importance of identity politics. The world's tropical denizens are set to increase their share of the world's population and will repopulate an aging West. When nonwhite religious people encounter the disdain of white secular natives, religion and ethnicity reinforce each other, insulating religion from the assimilating power of secularism. Some rebel by shouting their identities from the rooftops. In Europe, surveys of second generation minorities confirm that only the children of Christian immigrants are susceptible to the charms of secularity. Muslims resist it almost entirely. Immigration makes Europe more multicultural *and* more religious. Just look at immigration entrepôts like London and Paris which - against all expectation - are among the most religious spots in their countries. Imagine a provincial English evangelical of the nineteenth century coming to London to experience the bible belt! All of which shows how religious demography can trump secularisation.

Religious demography moves in direct ways as well. All three Abrahamic faiths encourage people to 'go forth and multiply' and extol the virtues of motherhood, marriage and family. This was largely redundant when material necessity compelled everyone had to have large families. First of all, most children died before they reached the age of ten. Second, young hands were needed to work the land and serve as one's old age pension. Today, by contrast, modern medicine and sanitation have conquered infant mortality. In the city, children are more a burden than a boon.

Contraception is readily available to limit fertility. Birth rates are consequently much lower. Under these circumstances, value choices have a bigger impact on fertility, and, by extension, the composition of the population. In other words, those biblical injunctions to reproduce now matter. Across the world, surveys find that the religious - especially fundamentalists - marry earlier and have children sooner and more often than their secular counterparts. This holds even when we narrow our focus to women with identical income and education levels. The difference is most dramatic in modern pluralistic societies where value choices count most for family formation.

Religious fertility may be important in the developed world, but can they retain their kids in the fold? If pious children simply assimilate into the secular mainstream, the radical effect of religious fertility is quickly dissipated. This is where fundamentalism enters the picture. It developed in explicit opposition to secularism. Jewish and Christian fundamentalists insisted on the most demanding readings of Scripture and tradition as a bulwark against secularism and 'secularised' faiths such as Reform Judaism and Anglicanism. Islamic fundamentalism was born out of resistance to secular ideas of nationalism, socialism and liberalism which were once admired by anti-colonial and postcolonial Muslim elites.

Bracketing immigrant religiosity for the moment, what is fascinating is how well certain fundamentalists have protected their boundaries. Modernity has empowered them to build a parallel world apart from the mainstream, complete with schools and universities, media and even separate beaches, hotels and shopping malls. Of course, joining a fundamentalist American church, Salafi mosque or ultra-Orthodox *kollel* involves sacrifices. Even for those born into the sect, the appeal of the outside world is strong. However, members' social ties are often totally bound up with the sect. Should they choose to exit, they leave behind friends, family and

identity - a much bigger step than dropping a moderate religion which forms just one compartment in a multifaceted life.

Modernity allows institutions to extend their reach, get organised, keep better records and more effectively monitor and communicate with their members. This is why the modern state is so much more effective than premodern empires and has well-defined borders. Religious groups also benefit: fundamentalists are increasingly able to sharpen their boundaries and retain members while winning converts from moderate religions. The established, inherited, moderate religions which used to reign unchallenged are being dismembered by secularism and fundamentalism. Once secularism rears its head and fundamentalism responds with a clear alternative, moderate religion strikes many as redundant. Either you believe the stuff or you don't. If you do, it makes sense to go for the real thing, which takes a firm stand against godlessness.

There are several varieties of fundamentalism. Some rely on conversion. In order to proselytise most effectively, their members need to be integrated into the wider society so they can meet as many potential converts as possible. The risk of course is that retention will fall as members interact with the outside world. The open evangelical approach of Pentecostals or Jehovah's Witnesses is effective in building membership in developing countries but fares poorly in developed societies where the pull of secularism is strong. In the modern west, the most successful groups are what I term *endogenous growth sects* – those that segregate themselves off from society and grow their own. The Hutterites, Amish, ultra-Orthodox Jews, Salafist Muslims and American Mormons are the best known examples. They benefit from the strong communal boundaries and membership retention that ethnic groups possess, but supercharge it with a universalist fervour. This sense of divine mission encourages the

sacrifices needed to rear larger families. Because western populations are flat or declining, all are increasing their share of the population at unprecedented rates.

Nowhere is their amazing growth more evident than in the Jewish world. Ultra-Orthodox, or Haredi, Judaism - which some claim to be no more than a century old - was disproportionately savaged by the holocaust. At the end of World War II, the Haredim looked to be a fading relic. The new state of Israel and the wider Jewish diaspora indulged their needs, largely out of pity and nostalgia. Then, in the 1950s, the Haredim began to cordon themselves off and increase their fertility advantage over other Jews. With increasing retention of members and three times the birth rate of other Jews, their share of world Jewry began to skyrocket. In Britain, they are only 17 percent of Jews but account for 75 percent of Jewish births. In Israel, they have increased from a few percent of Jewish schoolchildren in 1950 to a third of all Jewish pupils. In both cases, they may form an outright majority by 2050.¹⁶

Fundamentalists have less of an edge in other faiths, but even a small fertility advantage in the presence of high membership retention is enough to ensure compound increase over generations. The early Christians of the Roman empire grew from 40 converts in 30 A.D. to 6 million in the year 312. Their growth rate was 40 percent per decade, somewhat less than the Mormons have enjoyed since 1850. Evangelical Protestants increased - mainly though higher fertility - from a third of American white Protestants born in 1900 to two-thirds of those born in 1975. In all parts of the world, fundamentalist fertility exceeds moderate religious fertility, which in turn outpaces secular fertility. As the world's population levels off and begins to fall with the demographic transition, this throws fundamentalist pronatalism into sharper relief. As they resist population decline, they will begin, like the Haredim, to increase their share of the total.¹⁷

The most visible aspect of today's demographic revolution is the changing ethnic composition of western populations. But demography moves in mysterious ways. Ethnic fertility levels are rapidly converging in the West: Muslim fertility is sinking to Christian rates just as Catholic fertility declined to Protestant levels during the twentieth century. The long-term action therefore lies *within* each faith, where fundamentalists are pulling away from moderates and seculars. Unlike ethnic fertility gaps, the religious-secular divide is, if anything, widening. This makes perfect sense when you contrast secularism's individualistic women's liberation ethos with the pronatalism and gender traditionalism which fundamentalists extol.

Even more remarkable is that fundamentalists are making common cause across lines of faith tradition. In the United States, many white and black conservative Protestants, Mormons, white and Hispanic Catholics, Jews, and, prior to 9/11, Muslims, back the religious right's agenda. Their combined effort helped defeat gay marriage in California in 2008. In Europe, interfaith coalitions challenge liberal abortion and blasphemy laws. Inside the bureaucratic corridors of the UN, the Vatican, American Protestant fundamentalists and Islamists are joining hands to fight family planning and women's rights. As Islam grows in Europe, there is a good chance that Europe will follow the American path away from native-immigrant ethnic spats to trans-ethnic 'culture wars' over religious concerns like abortion and gay rights.

Where, we might ask, is this process taking us? Marx predicted that the contradictions between labour and capital would result in the inevitable collapse of capitalism. Thesis and antithesis collide in a dialectic of change, and a higher stage of social evolution is reached in socialism. Daniel Bell spotted socialism's weaknesses by the 1930s, and instead offered a culturalist version of Hegel's dialectic. The discipline required to work, save and accumulate capital, which Calvinism first

produced, is contradicted by capitalism's hedonistic ethos. The antinomian individualism which capitalism produces ultimately destroys the system. Yet capitalism seems to have adapted to libertinism rather well. Severe social problems like crime, homelessness, indebtedness and family breakdown have not caused it to fail.

Francis Fukuyama believes that liberal capitalism has outlasted its challengers to emerge as the final form of human organisation. Though Fukuyama is often superficially criticised as a polyanna, the idea that liberal capitalism is the apotheosis of human development remains current. As John Gray laments, it 'is still widely believed. It shapes the programmes of mainstream political parties...guides the policies of agencies.'¹⁸ This contrasts with the classical view that the invasion of advanced societies by more 'vigorous' barbarian ones is a constant of human history. Medieval Arab historian Ibn Khaldun believed that nomadic incursions were a necessary part of a cycle in which the social cohesion of decadent civilisations was renewed. Fukuyama, however, holds that military technology insulates liberal capitalism from that fate.

Does it? Demographic sluggishness was one aspect of decadence which Khaldun, like Cicero and Polybius before him, decried. Hundreds of years later, none other than Adam Smith, paragon of the Scottish Enlightenment, would remark that 'Barrenness, so frequent among women of fashion, is very rare among those of inferior station. Luxury in the fair sex, while it inflames perhaps the passion for enjoyment, seems always to weaken, and frequently to destroy altogether, the powers of generation.'¹⁹ When one considers the demographic deficit of liberalism, it is hard not to conclude that religious demography is its Achilles heel. Religious fundamentalism cannot conquer from the outside with guns blazing, but can achieve

power gradually, over generations, from within. Liberalism's demographic contradiction – individualism leading to the choice not to reproduce – may well be the agent that destroys it. In a sense this is a modification of Bell's argument: individualism is fatal, but its effect is mediated by demography.

This is not the only possibility, of course. If liberalism manages to seduce enough religious children to its message, it could yet prevail. The excess children of the faithful might even complement the demographic deficit of the nonreligious. Hopefully this book will show that in an age of desiccated secular creeds, the chance of attracting sufficient fundamentalists to secularism is low. And while fundamentalists can be smashed by Soviet or Nazi-style repression, this contradicts liberalism's very own principles. Secular liberalism is on the horns of a dilemma. The secular Zionist attempt to woo the Haredim using the carrots and sticks of integration may not succeed. The Haredim are an extreme case, but in the long run, liberalism will have to face up to the gauntlet that fundamentalists have thrown down. We are all Zionists now.

The stakes are high. Fundamentalist revolution, as in Iran, Sudan or Taliban Afghanistan is not the primary threat. The authoritarian states of the Muslim world have crushed their Islamist challengers who in turn have lost popularity. Rather, the greatest danger comes from the gradual seepage of puritanical mores into society. Restrictions on freedom of expression, science, recreation, the rights of women, minorities, heretics, gays and converts - even a return to barbaric punishments.

Muslim governments have swiftly implemented shari'a to defang their jihadi adversaries. In the United States, the religious have a monopoly on the highest public offices and the rising waters of fundamentalism lap against foreign policy, foreign aid, abortion and the curriculum. In Israel, the government yields on yeshiva subsidies and

civil marriage, while corporations bend to Haredi boycotts and moral censorship. At least the Zionists have a powerful secular nationalism to deploy against endogenous fundamentalists. Though it has lost some of its shine in recent decades, the Zionist dream becomes relevant with every Palestinian rocket or Iranian nuclear advance. If, or rather when, Europe and North America face similar challenges, seculars will not have the ammunition to respond so robustly. I cannot see a way out.

Evolutionary psychologists marvel at the resources that primitive societies expended on religion. Surely these were extraneous to the process of survival. Some, including Richard Dawkins, maintain that religion served a series of important functions in prehistory. It ensured a high degree of group cooperation for collective goals. Those who were part of hunting and gathering bands that possessed religions had superior survival rates to those who were governed purely by their passions and self-interest. Religious groups passed their genes on more effectively. In the process of natural selection, our ancestors developed a religious sensibility, even a need for it.²⁰

The mechanism of natural selection is demography. Demographers Ron Lesthaeghe and Dick van de Kaa have developed the theory of the second demographic transition (SDT), where values rather than material constraints come to shape fertility and much of society fails to replace itself.²¹ Might it be the case that the second demographic transition is a population bottleneck through which only the devout can pass? One would not have to resort to a genetic argument, though twin studies show a significant inherited component to religion.²² Instead, it may just be that religious ideas, so-called 'memes', are destined to be selected. In Michael Blume's words, when it comes to Creationism vs. Intelligent Design, 'evolutionary theorists brought up far more scientific arguments - but committed believers in supernatural

agents brought up far more children.²³ Scott Atran reminds us that no human culture has survived without some form of religion for more than two generations.²⁴

Those who claim that religion is destined to vanquish secularism forever are no more accurate than those who predict that secular reason will eventually smoke out religious 'superstition.' Sixty years ago, when Orthodox Jews were slaughtered like sheep while their more worldly co-ethnics sometimes survived, one would have returned a different verdict. As the social environment - what Dawkins calls a 'memeplex' - changes, so do the criteria of natural selection and therefore the fittest creed.²⁵ What is today's environment like? We see the collapse of the great secular religions of the twentieth century; the growing importance of values in determining fertility; an uneven demographic transition which is reshaping western populations; the rise of global identity politics; all this in an atmosphere of multicultural toleration. The confluence of these currents creates a nutrient-rich breeding ground for religious fundamentalism.

In what follows, I hope to show how the demography of fundamentalism is beginning to transform the United States, Europe, Israel and the Muslim world. We are still in the early stages of the process, but once trends are in full swing, population momentum will carry them forward for generations. 'If no solution is found,' warns Philip Longman in *The Empty Cradle* (2004), 'the future will belong to those who reject markets, reject learning, reject modernity, and reject freedom. This will be the fundamentalist moment.'²⁶ Our social environment is unlikely to change any time soon. Liberals are simply too committed to the ideal of presentist individualism for themselves and tolerance for others. In matters of demography, they insist on a politically-correct *laissez-faire*. This redounds to the advantage of fundamentalists.

Yet to do otherwise would be to act against liberal principles, selling one's soul in order to win. Secular liberalism lies hoist on its own petard.

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