

Popular conceptions of nationhood in old and new European member states: Partial support for the ethnic-civic framework

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Abstract

One of the most influential theories in the study of nationalism has been the ethnic-East/civic-West framework developed by Hans Kohn. Using the 2002 Eurobarometer survey on national identity and building on earlier survey studies, this article examines whether the Kohn framework is valid at the level of popular understandings of nationhood. It scrutinizes the framework both conceptually – do people define nationhood in civic or ethnic terms? – and regionally – is the East indeed more ethnic than the West and the West more civic than the East? It will show that identity markers cluster in a political, a cultural and an ethnic dimension. Respondents do not see these dimensions as competing sources of nationhood, however. The article further lends some support for the regional component of the framework. Lastly, it argues that it is the intensity of national identifications rather than their qualitative nature (ethnic-civic) that correlates with xenophobia.

Keywords: Nationalism; civic-ethnic; West-East; national identity; survey data; attitudes.

The sudden occurrence of (sub-state) nationalist sentiments and violent ethnic conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of Communism caught many scholars by surprise. In accounting for these phenomena, they rediscovered the ethnic-civic framework developed by Hans Kohn in World War II. Essentially this theory argues that civic nationalism became the dominant ideology in a few core states in Western Europe and America while ethnic notions of nationhood prevailed in Eastern Europe and the peripheral areas of

Western Europe. Although few authors embraced this idea wholeheartedly, many of them started using the ethnic-civic terminology and allowed it to influence their writings. From the mid 1990s however a growing body of literature seriously questioned the validity of the ethnic-East/civic-West framework both conceptually and empirically.

Recently a number of studies have appeared that explored the extent to which the ethnic-civic divide is reflected in popular notions of nationhood. That is, does the population at large define its feeling of national belonging in ethnic-civic terms or is the ethnic-civic distinction a purely academic construct, driving academic debates but not having any impact on the national affiliations of the common man? Analysing survey data of the 1995 edition of the International Social Survey Programme [ISSP], these studies, in brief, showed that people's conceptions of nationhood indeed clustered in an ascriptive (ethnic) and a voluntarist (civic) dimension. However, they did not find pronounced differences between East and West in the relative importance of ethnic and civic criteria.

This study will critically engage and complement these earlier studies by examining the survey data of the Eurobarometer 2002 edition on national identity. It will address a number of questions that these studies omitted or only partially investigated. First, it will explore whether there are underlying dimensions in people's minds, and if so, to what extent these dimensions coincide with the ethnic-civic dichotomy and relate to those found in the previous studies.

A second question this article addresses is whether civic and ethnic conceptions of nationhood are mutually exclusive or, on the other hand, reinforcing one another. That is, do people (instinctively) make tradeoffs in a sense that a preference for, say, a civic notion of nationhood is automatically at the expense of an ethnic one, or are these notions of nationhood non-competitive? In much of the literature there is an implicit understanding that ethnic and civic national identities exclude each other. It is assumed that the two cannot go together because the former is seen as a reflection of liberal inclusive attitudes and the latter as a manifestation of conservatism and xenophobia. But is there tension between the two identities at the level of popular understandings of nationhood?

Third, we will examine whether there is a regional difference in the degree of endorsement of the various identity markers. Stated more directly: is the East indeed more ethnic than the West and the West more civic than the East? As the Eurobarometer survey included questions that covered all aspects of the ethnic-civic distinction, we can explore its regional component to the fullest extent.

Fourth and last, this study will investigate the relationship between identity markers and xenophobia. Is it true that people who predominantly support ethnic criteria of nationhood display more

negative attitudes towards immigrants than people who endorse civic criteria, as many experts believe, or is the qualitative nature of national identities irrelevant for opinions on ethnic others?

Analyses of the Eurobarometer data will reveal that the identity markers addressed by the ethnic civic framework cluster in three distinct dimensions: *political*, *cultural* and *ethnic*. The markers clustering in these dimensions are found to be correlating positively with one another, which indicates complementary rather than mutually excluding notions of nationhood. Consequently, we will argue that a three-dimensional model is better suited to represent popular notions of nationhood than a crude ethnic-civic dichotomy or a continuum with ideal types as poles. In addition, and in contrast to previous studies, this study will show some support for the regional breakdown of the ethnic-civic framework. However, doubt is cast on the stability of this identity pattern. Finally, we will contend that it is the intensity of national affiliations rather than their qualitative nature (ethnic-civic) that appears to be related to xenophobia and feelings of closeness to ethnic others.

First, a brief outline will be given of the ethnic-civic framework and of the criticism it evoked. The second section discusses the results of the studies on national identity that used the ISSP survey. Analyses of the Eurobarometer data are presented in section four. The article concludes by discussing the patterns found and sketching some implications for existing theories on national identity.

The ethnic-civic dichotomy and its fate in the 1990s and after

Kohn (1944; 1962; 1994) believed that the idea of the nation first arose in countries with a strong bourgeoisie and/or traditions of liberalism and decentralized rule (Great Britain, France, United States, Switzerland and The Netherlands). This new idea – labelled civic nationalism by Kohn – inspired millions by propagating the nation as a political community of citizens with equal rights and duties. Man was to be liberated from the social bonds: church, class, serfdom, family, that had kept him ignorant for centuries. Central to the new ideology was the notion that every person, irrespective of religious, ethnic or class background, could freely join the nation as long as (s)he swore allegiance to a set of political principles and institutions representing the nation's values and objectives. A nationalism of a different kind developed in countries with feudal economies and strong absolutist rule, Kohn argued. Unmitigated by other pressures or interests in society, this ethnic nationalism commanded an individual's absolute commitment to the nation, an attachment overriding all other loyalties. It rejected the notion of voluntary association and the representation of the nation as a modern political community involved

in and committed to contemporary social issues. Instead it regarded the nation as an everlasting natural entity that had slowly evolved from prehistoric times. Membership of the nation was fixed, being grounded in descent, native language, religion and customs and folklore. According to Kohn, the ethnic brand of nationalism prevailed in Germany, Central and Eastern Europe and the periphery of Western Europe (e.g. Ireland and Spain).

The civic-ethnic distinction has inspired many authors. In an echo of Kohn, Greenfeld and Chirot (1994) identify two types of nations: a political nation, which individuals can become part of either by birth or voluntary participation, and an ethnic, collectivistic nation, the membership of which is ascribed by descent (blood). They associate the first type with Britain and France and the latter with Germany and Russia (see also Hagendoorn and Pepels 2000). In similar vein, writing about the nation-building projects in the Soviet successor states, Kolstø (2000, p. 2) argues that whereas in the West the nation has traditionally been understood as a community of citizens held together by a common territory, common government authority, a 'rival concept that sees the nation as a cultural entity ... has deep roots in the eastern part of Europe, not least in Russia'. Brubaker (1992) used Kohn's framework to account for differences in citizenship and immigration policies between France and Germany. Other scholars have been quick to put the label *ethnic* on the nationalisms that followed the fall of Communism and the break-up of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia (e.g. Ignatieff 1994; Snyder 1993).¹

The ethnic-civic dichotomy has also attracted a great deal of criticism. Still relatively mild in his critique is A.D. Smith (1991). He agrees with Kohn that Western and Eastern models of nationhood have different historical roots, but he opposes a crude classification that assigns nations to mutually exclusive ethnic and civic categories. Instead he contends that

'Every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized' (Smith 1991, p. 13).

Thus, in Smith's view, the ethnic-civic framework would correspond more to an ideal type model resembling a continuum with two poles than to a typology or classification (Kaufmann and Zimmer 2004; see also Zubrzycki 2001). Every nation would be located somewhere on this continuum with some occupying a position closer to the civic end and some closer to the ethnic end.

Kymlicka (1999), Nieguth (1999) and Nielsen (1999) have been more disapproving of the ethnic-civic dichotomy. They have argued that the ethnic category, capturing both inclusive and exclusive concepts, should be decomposed into a cultural dimension (language and religion) which is in principle open to outsiders and an ascriptive one (kinship, ancestry and race) which is not. Moreover, Nielsen (1999) objects to the term civic nationalism if this is taken to mean liberalism, democracy and state-territorialism and seen as contrasting with an intolerant antidemocratic ethnic nationalism. Pointing to the Latin American countries and their experience with military dictatorships, he argues that non-ethnic, territorial nationalisms can be quite antidemocratic. He therefore concludes: 'Talk of civic nationalism had better be dropped from our political vocabulary (*ibid.* p. 127).

Equally critical is Kuzio (2001, 2002). He contends that both Western and Eastern nations rest on strong ethnic foundations and that the former have only become more civic in outlook since the 1960s. Drawing on writings of Kaufmann (2000) and A.D. Smith (1998), he advances an evolutionary model that relates the proportional mix of civic and ethnic practices in a given state to the age of that state and to the consolidation of democratic institutions – i.e. the younger the state and the less opportunity it had to develop a solid democracy, the more ethnic it still is (Kuzio 2002).

Schöpflin (2000) is particularly outspoken on the ethnic-East/civic-West idea. According to him, 'the proposition that there is a Good Western nationalism (civic, democratic, peace-loving etc) and a Bad Eastern nationalism (nasty, brutish and anything but short)' represents a 'truly lazy' attitude (*ibid.* pp. 4,5). Indeed, he may be said to be taking Kuzio's argument one step further by arguing that from the nineteenth century onwards Western states needed ethnicity to create credible national communities. These communities, he goes on to say, were necessary for the ever-increasing levels of consent that the state had to win for its expanding role in society. 'Without ethnicity', Schöpflin (2000, p. 6) boldly states, 'it is difficult to secure democracy'. Yet, he does contend that ethnic sentiments are currently stronger in the East than in the West due to the former region's particular experience with Communism:

Communism eliminated all possible civic institutions and codes of conduct, it turned these societies into civic deserts where the micro-level patterns of behaviour were governed by mistrust and characterized by atomization. It was hardly unexpected, therefore, that ethno-nationalism should have acquired the saliency that it did; there was no other identity in the public sphere that could have played this role (*ibid.* p. 279).

Lastly, Zimmer (2003) made an important contribution to the ethnic-civic debate. He criticizes the ethnic-civic dichotomy for grouping inclusive/exclusive notions and identity markers in one category (either ethnic or civic). This, he argues, is misleading since it presupposes that those who favour a deterministic understanding of nationhood by definition use ethno-cultural markers and those who endorse an inclusive vision political markers. In reality, however, the former could well rely on political markers and the latter on cultural issues, depending on the issues and political opportunity structure of the day. He therefore proposes to disengage identity markers - 'symbolic resources' in his terminology - from the ethnic-civic distinction so that the remaining dichotomy reflects exclusively inclusive/voluntarist vs. ascriptive/organic notions of nationhood - 'boundary mechanisms' in Zimmer's terms (*ibid.* p. 178). He further identified four symbolic resources (political values/institutions, culture, history and geography) that political entrepreneurs use to back their inclusive or deterministic visions of the nation with.

The ISSP survey: No differences between East and West in understandings of nationhood

Until the end of the 1990s the ethnic-civic debate had been very much a theoretical exercise dominated by historians and political scientists. If any empirical data were at all studied these usually involved statements by politicians, discussions in the media or policy documents. Little attention was paid to the attitudes and opinions of the common man, partly because of a lack of data. The 1995 ISSP survey, however, which focused on national identity and attitudes towards immigrants,² made it possible for the first time to examine to what extent the ethnic-civic framework is reflected in popular notions of nationhood. To the knowledge of the author so far four studies have used this source to explore the popular bases of national identity. Jones and Smith (2001a; 2001b), the authors of two of these studies, have investigated underlying dimensions in people's minds. They based their analysis on the following question in the survey:

Some people say the following things are important for being [e.g., truly British, Spanish, Hungarian, etc.]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is. . . ? 1 (*very important*), 2 (*fairly important*), 3 (*not very important*), or 4 (*not important at all*).

- To have been born in [respondent's country].
- To have citizenship in [respondent's country].
- To have lived in [respondent's country] for most of one's life.

- To respect political institutions and laws of [respondent's country].
- To feel [British, Spanish, Hungarian, etc.].
- To be able to speak [the dominant language in respondent's country].
- To be a [believer in the dominant religion/denomination of respondent's country (e.g., Protestant, Christian, etc.)].

Using a rotated factor analysis they found that the answers to this question clustered in two distinct dimensions, one capturing the items *born*, *citizenship*, *lived* and *religion* and labelled 'ascriptive/objectivist' by the authors and another correlating strongly with *laws*, *feel* and *language* which they labelled 'subjectivist/-voluntarist'. Surprisingly, these dimensions cut right across the ethnic-civic dichotomy as traditionally conceived. The notion of voluntarism, for instance, is commonly associated with a civic understanding of nationhood but the voluntarist dimension in Jones and Smith's study also includes language, an element that is usually grouped in the ethnic category. Likewise, the idea of ascription (i.e. of fixed traits) is attributed to the ethnic model of the nation but Jones and Smith's ascriptive dimension also incorporates *born*, *citizenship* and *lived*, political items that are commonly said to belong to a civic identity. The authors concede, however, that the items may have been understood differently in the various national contexts. Thus, whereas place of birth (*born*) may have been associated with the state and its territory in countries like France and the USA which are commonly believed to have strong traditions of civic nationhood, the same item may have been understood as a substitute for descent in countries with reputedly stronger ethnic visions of the nation.

In addition, proficiency in the dominant language (*language*) might have been understood as an indicator for integration into the larger (civic) community in migrant nations like Australia and the US, while it may have been regarded as referring to native language (i.e. an ascribed characteristic) in countries that have no tradition of immigration. For these reasons, Smith and Jones decided to omit any reference to the ethnic-civic distinction in their characterization of the two aforementioned dimensions. Interestingly, their analysis also revealed that in most states the ascriptive dimension carried greater weight than the voluntarist dimension. They therefore conclude: 'our findings suggest an unanticipated homogeneity in the ways that citizens around the world think about national identity' (Jones and Smith 2001a, p. 45), despite 'distinctive discourses and policies on national identity, associated with specific religious, social, economic and historical trajectories' (*ibid*, p. 58).

A third study using the ISSP survey focused on national pride, national sentiment and xenophobia (Hjerm 2003). The question in the survey on national pride was the following:

How proud are you of [country] in each of the following?

- | | | |
|--|---|------------------|
| 1. <i>The way democracy works.</i> | } | <i>political</i> |
| 2. <i>Its political influence in the world.</i> | | |
| 3. <i>[Country's] economic achievements.</i> | | |
| 4. <i>Its social security system.</i> | | |
| 5. <i>Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society.</i> | | |
| 6. <i>Its scientific and technological achievements.</i> | } | <i>cultural</i> |
| 7. <i>Its achievements in sports.</i> | | |
| 8. <i>Its achievements in the arts and literature.</i> | | |
| 9. <i>[Country's] armed forces.</i> | | |
| 10. <i>Its history.</i> | | |

Using factor analysis Hjerm distilled two dimensions from the answers to this question, one clustering the first five indicators which he interpreted as 'political', and one grouping the last five indicators which he labelled 'cultural'. Interestingly, comparing national pride levels in Eastern and Western Europe, Hjerm found similar levels on the cultural dimension but differing ones on the political dimension, with Western countries exhibiting higher values of political national pride than Eastern states. Although labelling the second dimension as cultural seems rather far-fetched, clustering as it does items as diverse as armed forces, history, and achievements in sport, arts and science, the East-West difference on the more coherent political dimension is noteworthy as it is in line with the traditional ethnic-East/civic-West view.

Unlike the aforementioned studies, the fourth study using the ISSP data source (Shulman 2002) did not investigate whether the items of the survey clustered in one or more dimensions. Focusing on the same indicators as Jones and Smith and using an additional question on the sharing of *traditions*,³ Shulman assumed beforehand that the indicators *born, citizenship, lived, laws and feel* reflected a civic understanding of nationhood and the items *language, religion and traditions* a cultural sense of national identity. He took eight countries from the survey to represent the West and an equal number to represent the East. Shulman's main finding was that there were as many indicators contesting the civic-West/ethnic-East argument as supporting it.

In addition, the items that supported the argument showed much larger differences within each of the regions than between the two regions. These findings led Shulman (2002, p. 583) to conclude that:

Imperial and communist rule have not pushed Eastern European nationhood in a strongly cultural direction while greatly weakening civicness. And whereas most of the West has a long tradition of democracy and relatively strong and stable political institutions, cultural conceptions of nationhood are alive and well.

The studies of both Jones & Smith and Shulman suggest that there are no substantial differences between regions in the strength of civic/voluntaristic or ethnocultural/ascriptive identities. Thus, the East-West component of the ethnic-civic framework seems to be absent in popular conceptions of nationhood. Yet, as we have seen, Hjerm's findings on national pride do seem to support the East-West divide. This apparent contradiction makes sense if we take a closer look at the items clustering on Hjerm's political dimension. Three of these items (the way democracy works, economic achievements, social security) refer to achievements that Western nations can obviously take much greater pride in than Eastern states simply because the latter have just begun developing their democracies and recovering from the post-communist socio-economic crisis.

The Eurobarometer 2002 survey: Non-competitive notions of nationhood

Valuable as the ISSP survey has been in uncovering popular conceptions of nationhood, it nonetheless had two major drawbacks. First, as pointed out by Jones & Smith, a number of items, notably *born* and *language*, could have been interpreted differently by the respondents, which makes it difficult to assign meaning to underlying dimensions in the data. Second, the survey did not contain the crucial criterion of genealogical descent, a fact much deplored by Shulman. Because of this, the ethnic category of the ethnic-civic framework could not be tested to the fullest extent. Moreover, as descent is unequivocally an ascriptive characteristic (Zimmer 2003), it could have greatly bolstered Jones & Smith's dimensions if it had been included. The Eurobarometer survey on national identity compensates for the imperfections of the ISSP survey as it does include the item of descent ('common ancestry' in the survey).⁴ Moreover, it also contains the item of 'common history and common destiny', a characteristic that is commonly associated with an ethnic understanding of nationhood. The survey was held in Great Britain, East and West Germany, Greece,

Italy, Spain, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland and contained the following question on national identity:

Different things or feelings are crucial to people in their sense of belonging to a nation. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? "I feel (NATIONALITY) because I share with my fellow (NATIONALITY) ...

1. I do not feel (NATIONALITY)
2. A common culture, customs and traditions
3. A common language
4. Common ancestry
5. A common history and a common destiny
6. A common political and legal system
7. Common rights and duties
8. A common system of social security/welfare
9. A national economy
10. A national army
11. Common borders
12. A feeling of national pride
13. National independence and sovereignty
14. Our national character
15. Our national symbols (the flag, the national anthem, etc.)

Respondents were asked to express their level of agreement with each of the items on a scale with the values of 1 (strongly agree), 2 (tend to agree), 3 (tend to disagree), 4 (strongly disagree).

It must be noted that the question on national identity in the Eurobarometer survey was worded quite differently from the one in the ISSP survey. Whereas the latter asked respondents to evaluate the importance of certain personal characteristics for making some one a true [nationality, e.g. Dutchman], the former asked them to state the importance of certain characteristics buttressing one's *own* sense of national belonging. The ISSP survey therefore taps much more directly into the issue of open or closed membership of the nation and therefore into Jones & Smith's voluntarist-ascriptive dichotomy (or Zimmer's boundary mechanisms) than the Eurobarometer. It could be argued that because of its specific wording the Eurobarometer relates almost exclusively to properties underpinning national identity (political, societal, cultural, historical, state-symbolic, i.e. the symbolic resources in Zimmer's terms). In other words, the Eurobarometer data primarily cover the qualitative nature of national identities rather than inclusive or excluding notions of nationhood.

A rotated factor analysis performed on the Eurobarometer data revealed that the aforementioned items grouped into five dimensions (see Table 1 which presents data of the ten countries grouped together⁵). The first dimension, which is the most powerful in terms of variance explained, could be labelled 'patriotic' as it clusters the items *national pride*, *independence*, *national character*, *symbols*, and to a lesser extent *borders*. It is more interesting, however, to examine dimensions two, three and four since the items they cover relate to the ethnic-civic framework. As we can see, dimension two neatly groups items referring to the political and social system, which makes it plausible to interpret this dimension as political. This result corresponds to Hjerm's findings on national pride and confirms the contention that there is a distinct political dimension to conceptions of nationhood. Interestingly, dimensions three (labelled cultural) and four (labelled ethnic) demonstrate that the items of *culture* and *language* should clearly be seen as a separate category distinct from the items *ancestry* and *history*. This supports the aforementioned criticism of Kymlicka, Nielsen and Nieguth that the ethnic category as

Table 1. Factor analyses of fourteen national identity items (data from ten European countries; $N=8655$)

Item	Dimension				
	1	2	3	4	5
	(patriotic)	(political)	(cultural)	(ethnic)	(army&borders)
culture	0.278	0.224	<u>0.752</u>	0.312	0.080
language	0.208	0.217	<u>0.822</u>	0.256	0.139
ancestry	0.257	0.187	<u>0.374</u>	0.758	0.182
history	0.297	0.288	0.298	<u>0.762</u>	0.109
legal system	0.256	0.762	0.180	0.303	0.126
rights and duties	0.267	<u>0.823</u>	0.212	0.166	0.084
social security	0.210	<u>0.827</u>	0.151	0.085	0.249
economy	0.254	<u>0.677</u>	0.147	0.135	0.472
army	0.393	<u>0.363</u>	-0.006	0.239	0.705
borders	0.413	0.250	0.326	0.085	<u>0.678</u>
national pride	<u>0.776</u>	0.227	0.189	0.202	0.261
independence	<u>0.766</u>	0.343	0.176	0.122	0.200
national character	<u>0.789</u>	0.266	0.209	0.195	0.164
symbols	<u>0.762</u>	0.167	0.188	0.248	0.228

NB: 1. The first item ('I do not feel [nationality]') was excluded from the analysis.

2. Items that show loadings of more than 0.5 are underlined.


3. The percentages of variance explained of the five dimensions were 23.1, 22.0, 13.2, 12.0 and 10.9 respectively. The corresponding eigenvalues were 3.24, 3.08, 1.84, 1.68, and 1.52.

traditionally conceived should be split into a cultural and an ethnic component.

It has to be noted though that the pattern of dimensions for the group of ten states as a whole does not necessarily correspond to that of individual states. Not only may the dimensions differ but also their order of importance. Whereas West Germany for instance follows more or less the general pattern, Hungary presents a strongly contrasting picture. Not only do the cultural and ethnic items cluster in one dimension instead of two, also the order of the dimensions is reversed with the ethno-cultural dimension capturing the highest percentage of variance. Yet, if we group the countries into two regions – Western Europe and Eastern Europe – and carry out the aforementioned factor analysis by region, then both halves of Europe display the same pattern of dimensions as the one for all countries together.⁶ Western Europe follows the general pattern precisely, both in the nature of the dimensions and in their importance, Eastern Europe shows the same dimensions but in a slightly different order of importance.⁷ Thus, the dimensions identified in Table 1 have cross-regional validity.

Interestingly, Table 1 also shows that all items correlate positively with the five dimensions. This pattern of positive correlations is even more clearly visible from a table of correlations between pairs of items (see Appendix 1 which displays items of both the Eurobarometer and ISSP surveys). The positive correlation between for instance *ancestry* and *rights* (0.44) in the Eurobarometer data means that the higher the level of agreement expressed with common ancestry as an identity marker so the stronger the support for common rights and duties as a resource underpinning one's identity. The inference we can draw from this is that people apparently see *ancestry* and *rights*, and all the other items in both the Eurobarometer and ISSP surveys, more as non-competitive complementary concepts than as mutually exclusive identity markers. This finding has important consequences for theories on the nature of the ethnic-civic framework. It shows that when applied to popular notions of nationhood this framework cannot be conceived as a dichotomy. Nor can it be viewed as a continuum with ideal-typical constructs because a continuum also implies competing concepts (the more one moves to one end of the continuum the further one moves away from the other end). If we are at all to visualize the conceptual nature of popular understandings of nationhood, it would be more appropriate to picture these understandings as a three-dimensional model resembling a cone or a pyramid (see Figure 1).

The fact that the models of a dichotomy or a continuum are unsuitable to describe popular notions of nationhood does not mean that they cannot accurately represent intellectual discourse. Indeed,

Figure 1. *Popular understandings of national identity*

contrary to the population at large, many academics, intellectuals and politicians do consider ethnic and civic markers to be competing visions of the nation, the tension between the two visions surfacing when citizenship and immigration issues are debated in the media.

Partial support for the regional component of the ethnic-civic framework

Now that we have established that the markers associated with the ethnic-civic framework cluster in three dimensions (political, cultural and ethnic), we can examine differences between countries and between regions in importance assigned to these dimensions. Table 2 presents the mean scores for each country and each region (Western Europe, Eastern Europe) on the three dimensions.⁸ The lower the score, the higher the level of agreement expressed with a particular dimension. Scores higher than 2.5 indicate on average disagreement with a certain dimension buttressing national identity. The mean scores on the dimensions were calculated by (1) adding up the respondent scores of the items clustering in a dimension, (2) dividing the resultant figure by the number of these items (producing the respondent dimension scores), and (3) taking the average of the respondent dimension scores. Appendix 2 shows the average scores on the individual items for the ten countries and the two regions.

The average scores of Table 2 reveal that respondents express moderate to high levels of agreement across the board. Not one country shows on average disagreement with any of the three dimensions. This high level of consensus means that the differences between the countries and between the regions are not overly impressive. Yet, the differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level and do go in the expected direction: East European countries consider cultural and ethnic criteria more important markers of nationhood than the Western countries, the difference between the regions being the largest on the ethnic dimension.⁹ Vice versa the

Table 2. Mean scores on dimensions of national identity across ten European countries and two regions

	Cultural	Ethnic	Political
	(cultural + language)	(ancestry + history)	(legal system + rights&duties + social security + economy)
West Germany	1.69	1.88	1.90
Greece	1.28	1.26	1.47
Italy	1.64	1.83	1.88
Spain	1.57	1.70	1.68
Great Britain	1.57	1.72	1.78
Austria	1.46	1.81	1.78
East Germany	1.54	1.70	1.88
Czech Republic	1.48	1.65	2.03
Hungary	1.35	1.47	1.92
Poland	1.41	1.42	1.56
East	1.44	1.56	1.84
West	1.53	1.69	1.74

NB: 1. On each dimension the difference between the mean scores of the two regions is statistically significant at an 0.01 level.

2. The N of each country score ranges from 766 (Great Britain) to 1013 (Hungary). Approximately 1000 respondents were interviewed in each country. The lower N of Great Britain is explained by the many British respondents who indicated that they did not feel British (item one). We excluded these respondents from the analysis.

political dimension is deemed less relevant by the Eastern countries. The results are thus clearly in line with the ethnic-East/civic-West argument.

Nonetheless, it must be noted that the variation between countries within a region is substantial. Thus, Greece, as a West European state, has the lowest score on the ethnic and cultural dimensions of all countries, which indicates that it attaches more importance to these dimensions than the four Central European states. Similarly, Poland's average score on the political dimension is much lower than that of the other East European states and it is the second lowest score of all countries. Close scrutiny of the data in fact shows that the respondents of some countries express high levels of agreement with all three dimensions (e.g. Greece and Poland), whereas the respondents of other countries are much more reserved across the board (e.g. West Germany, Italy). This may reflect different attitudes towards social surveys and participating in them as a respondent. Respondents in some countries might for instance have felt compelled to provide positive answers, leading them to state high levels of agreement, while respondents in other countries may not have felt a similar pressure.

In order to control for the propensity to state either high or low levels of support for all three dimensions, we subtracted the scores on the political dimension from those on the ethnic and from those on the cultural dimension (Table 3). The resulting figures indicate the *difference* in support between the ethnic and the political dimension on the one hand, and between the cultural and the political dimension on the other. The lower the score, the stronger the backing for the ethnic or the cultural dimension relative to the political dimension. As we can see, the familiar ethnic-East/civic-West pattern emerges even more clearly from the data of Table 3. Hungary and the Czech Republic top the list of both the ethnic-political and cultural-political columns.¹⁰ Moreover, all East European countries are in the top five of the ranking list of countries in the ethnic-political column with Greece being the only exception. On the cultural-political column the pattern is slightly less clear because Poland has a score that is so different from the other Eastern states. Aggregated to the regional level, the data show that there are substantial and statistically significant differences between East and West, with the former attaching much more importance to the ethnic and cultural dimensions in relation to the political dimension than the latter.

Yet some important reservations have to be stated. First, Eastern Europe is represented by just four countries. In the ISSP data set the variations between the nine East European countries were at least as large as those between the Western states. Thus we might have witnessed larger differences within Eastern Europe if the Eurobarometer survey had included more East European countries. Second, it is

Table 3. *Differences of mean scores between the ethnic and the political dimension and between the cultural and the political dimension across ten European states and two regions*

	ethnic minus political		cultural minus political
Hungary	-0.46	Hungary	-0.58
Czech Republic	-0.38	Czech Republic	-0.55
Greece	-0.21	East Germany	-0.34
East Germany	-0.17	Austria	-0.32
Poland	-0.14	Italy	-0.25
Great Britain	-0.06	West Germany	-0.22
Italy	-0.05	Great Britain	-0.21
West Germany	-0.02	Greece	-0.19
Spain	0.01	Poland	-0.16
Austria	0.03	Spain	-0.12
East	-0.29	East	-0.41
West	-0.05	West	-0.22

surprising to find West Germany and Austria occupying such low positions on the ranking list of countries on the ethnic-political column. Austria even has a positive score indicating that its respondents show slightly stronger support for political markers than for ethnic markers. This result is not in line with the ethnic-East/civic-West idea as originally formulated by Kohn as he grouped the German-speaking countries firmly in the ethnic category. Instead, the fault line in the Eurobarometer data appears to run along the former Iron Curtain, the former communist states all expressing stronger support for the ethnic dimension vis-à-vis the political dimension than the traditional capitalist states of the West (Greece being the only exception). Related to this issue is the comparatively low level of support by the former communist countries for the political dimension. This is not so surprising as it might appear at first glance if one reconsiders the items of which this dimension is composed. As was the case with Hjern's political dimension of national pride, two of these concern the national economy and the social security system. Thus, one could again argue that in view of the modest level of real incomes and social services in former communist countries in relation to Western countries it is quite logical to find only lukewarm support for these items in Hungary and the Czech Republic (see Appendix 2).

This conjecture, in turn, raises a number of interesting questions. For instance, have West Germany and Austria always shown such high levels of support for the political dimension in relation to the ethnic dimension? If so, then Kohn was wrong to assume that an ethnic conception of nationhood prevailed in the German-speaking countries at the turn of the century (at least as far as mass attitudes on national identity are concerned). If not, then Austrians and West-Germans must have moved away from a mainly ethnic to a predominantly political view of the nation, a shift that might well be related to the post-war success of these countries in developing a strong economy, a generous welfare system and a stable democracy. If it can be proved that such a process has indeed occurred, then might we not expect the same identity change to happen in the former communist states as they develop their economies and democracies?

Ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation: Do they at all matter?

The reason why the ethnic-civic framework continues to receive so much scholarly attention is the assumption by many academics and policy-makers that civic conceptions of nationhood promote inter-ethnic tolerance and a positive attitude towards immigrants. By contrast, ethnic definitions of the nation are seen as contributing to xenophobia and racism. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer survey did

not contain questions on attitudes towards immigrants. Yet it did ask respondents to state how close they felt towards Jews, Gypsies and various other nationalities. This question was worded as follows: 'I would like you to tell me how close you feel to the following groups of people'. Respondents could state their answer on a four-point scale ranging from 1 (very close) to 4 (not at all close). If the aforementioned assumption were true, one would expect the ethnic and, to a lesser extent, the cultural dimensions to display a negative correlation and the political dimension a positive correlation with feelings of closeness towards Jews and Gypsies (i.e. the stronger the support for the ethnic and cultural dimensions, the weaker the feelings of closeness; the stronger the support for the political dimension, the stronger the feelings of closeness).

As we can see in Table 4, this expectation is not at all borne out by the data. All three dimensions show only very weak correlations with feelings of closeness, both in the West and in the East (6 correlations are not even statistically significant at the 0.05 level). Surprisingly, and totally contrary to the expected relationship, the ethnic dimension correlates positively with feelings of closeness towards Gypsies in both the regions. Another unexpected outcome is that ethnicity correlates negatively with feelings of closeness towards Jews in the West but positively with these feelings in the East. This would certainly come as a surprise to those who believe that ethnic sentiments and anti-Semitism are closely related phenomena especially in Eastern Europe.

As the ISSP survey does include questions on attitudes towards immigrants, we can examine whether the pattern of non-correlations from the Eurobarometer also surfaces in the data of that survey. In fact, Hjern (2003) has already used the ISSP survey to correlate attitudes on immigrants to national pride and national sentiment. The question on immigrants was phrased as follows:

Table 4. *Pearson correlations between feelings of closeness towards ethnic others and dimensions of nationhood in two regions*

	West		East	
	feeling close to Jews	feeling close to Gypsies	feeling close to Jews	feeling close to Gypsies
cultural	-0.02	-0.00	0.05**	0.01
ethnic	-0.03*	0.03*	0.03*	0.02
political	-0.02	0.03*	0.02	0.06**

*statistically significant at an 0.05 level

**statistically significant at an 0.01 level

There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in [country]. (By “immigrants” we mean people who came to settle in [country]). How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

1. Immigrants increase crime rates.
2. Immigrants are generally good for [country's] economy.
3. Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [country].
4. Immigrants make [country] more open to new ideas and cultures.

Hjerm constructed an index of what he called ‘xenophobia’ from the answers to this question by combining the values on the four statements (these values ranged from 1-‘agree strongly’ to 5-‘disagree strongly’ on a five-point scale; the values of statements 1 and 3 were reversed to ensure that they go in the same direction). He found East European states (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) to exhibit higher xenophobia levels than West European states (Austria, Britain, Norway, Sweden, The Netherlands). However, correlations with the political and cultural dimensions of national pride were weak in both regions, with many countries not showing statistically significant results (*ibid*, pp. 420, 421). Although the correlations with the political dimension did go in the expected direction (negative – indicating that the more importance assigned to political items of national pride the lower the level of xenophobia), the correlations with the cultural dimension were negative in two of the East European states (not in line with expectation) and positive in four of the five West European states. The first result is in concordance with our finding that correlations between the three dimensions of nationhood and feelings of closeness to Jews and Gypsies are negligible. The last result moreover matches our observation that the correlations between ethnicity and feelings of closeness towards Jews show contrasting directions in Eastern and Western Europe.

Remarkably, Hjerm did find a relation between xenophobia and *national sentiment*, a composite variable he constructed from items referring to feelings of national superiority, unconditional support for one's country and pride in national achievements.¹¹ Having first established that differences between Eastern and Western countries in the levels of national sentiment are small, he then shows that national sentiment is positively correlated to xenophobia in both regions (i.e. the stronger one's national sentiment the higher one's level of xenophobia). However, the correlations between national sentiment and xenophobia are much stronger in West European states than in East European countries (*ibid*. pp. 424, 425). These results suggest two important conclusions: (1) it is not so much the *kind* of national

identity (ethnic, cultural, political) that matters for perceptions on immigrants and foreigners, but the *strength* of national identities and sentiments; (2) Given its stronger connection to xenophobia, national sentiment is a more dangerous phenomenon in Western Europe than in the Eastern half of this continent.

Surprisingly, neither Hjerm nor the other authors who used the ISSP data set correlated attitudes on immigrants to conceptions of nationhood. Combining several databases and making use of multi-level analysis, Jones and Smith (2001b) did relate the voluntarist and ascriptive dimensions of national identity to various demographic characteristics and to macro-social properties such as a state's degree of globalization, its degree of post-industrialism, its degree of internal cultural differentiation and its militarism. They found that all other things being equal the higher a country's degree of post-industrialism, the stronger the support of its population for the voluntaristic dimension. However, they also found strong individual effects, with immigrants, the higher educated and the well-to-do placing more importance on the voluntaristic type than the native-born, the lower educated and people with modest incomes.

To rectify the aforementioned omission, we used the ISSP database to correlate Jones & Smith's voluntarist and ascriptive dimensions to the composite construct of xenophobia.¹² Obviously, the expectation is that the voluntarist dimension and xenophobia are negatively correlated – i.e. respondents who exhibit high scores on this dimension should have lower levels of xenophobia than those with low scores. Conversely, those who express strong support for the ascriptive dimension should have higher levels of xenophobia than those expressing more moderate support. The data of Table 5 produce yet another surprise. The positive correlations between the ascriptive dimension and xenophobia in both Eastern and Western Europe are still in accordance with the expectation, although it is perhaps remarkable to find Western Europe exhibiting the stronger association.¹³ However, what is truly astonishing is that the voluntarist

Table 5. *Pearson correlations between xenophobia and dimensions of nationhood in two regions*

	West	East
	xenophobia	xenophobia
voluntaristic	0.19**	0.18**
ascriptive	0.33**	0.21**

**statistically significant at an 0.01 level

dimension is also positively related to xenophobia in both regions, albeit to a slightly weaker extent than the ascriptive dimension. This means that the stronger a respondent's support for voluntaristic, inclusive notions of nationhood, the higher that person's level of xenophobia. Surely this result must come as an unpleasant surprise to those who think that strong inclusive national identities are conducive to more positive opinions on immigrants and foreigners. Taken together these results provide further evidence for the notion that attitudes to immigrants and (in)tolerance of other cultures are not so much dependent on the qualitative nature of national identities but more on the intensity of these identities.

Discussion and conclusions

This study has examined to what extent the ethnic-civic framework surfaces in popular conceptions of nationhood. Using the 2002 Eurobarometer survey on national identity it has produced a number of interesting results that complement and partially support the findings of studies that utilized the 1995 ISSP survey on national identity.

First of all, we found that the identity markers covered by the ethnic-civic framework clustered in three dimensions: ethnic, cultural and political. The identification of a separate cultural factor, distinct from the ethnic dimension, is an important new finding. The studies based on the ISSP data set could not explore the degree of interrelatedness of cultural and ethnic factors because the ISSP survey lacked questions on ethnic markers. As noted before, the existence of a separate cultural dimension confirms the contention of some critics of the ethnic-civic framework that cultural markers of nationhood should not be grouped in the ethnic category because of their inclusive nature. Another point of interest concerns the boundaries between identity markers. Whereas our findings conform to the commonly held opinion that there are distinct political, ethnic and cultural dimensions to national identifications, Jones & Smith's voluntarist and ascriptive constructs based on the ISSP data cut right across these traditionally conceived dimensions, the former clustering *respect for law, learn the dominant language and self identification* and the latter combining *born, citizenship, length of residence and dominant religion*. These contrasting results seem to support Zimmer's contention that the ethnic-civic framework should be disaggregated into two different modes of interpreting national identity: one relating to boundary mechanisms and another to symbolic resources. Jones & Smith's dimensions seem to confirm the existence of boundary mechanisms, while the present study taps into symbolic resources. Zubrzycki's (2001) study on the debate about the meaning of Polishness in the

media prior to the adoption of the Polish Constitution in April 1997 lends further support for Zimmer's theory. The liberal intelligentsia engaging in this debate turned to events in the past (i.e. a symbolic resource) to support their argument that Poland had a long tradition of inclusive civic nationhood (i.e. a boundary mechanism).

In fact, our study of the Eurobarometer data revealed that there are also resources other than political, cultural and ethnic that shaped national allegiances. Four of these clustered in a dimension that we labelled patriotism (which proved to be the strongest predictor of national identity) and two remaining items – army and common borders – in a construct that could be interpreted as state territory. Thus, the markers of national identity are many and varied, and can differ from country to country in kind, importance and inter-relatedness.

What they all have in common, however, is their non-competitive nature: not a single pair of markers shows a negative correlation in either the ISSP or the Eurobarometer database. This is a cardinal finding. As noted before, many authors assume ethnic and political visions of the nation or voluntarist and ascriptive boundary mechanisms to be mutually excluding concepts. Remember that Zimmer (2003) argued that the latter could be conceived as a dichotomy. Yet, valid as this interpretation might be for debates among academics, intellectuals and politicians, it evidently does not apply to popular notions of nationhood. Thus, there may be a distinct difference between the elite and the masses in the way they interpret their national attachments. The author of the aforementioned study on the Polish constitutional debate also seems to arrive at this conclusion when she notes that voter turn-out at the referendum on the Constitution was very low, 'which seems to indicate that the debates that fascinated the elites did not resonate as strongly below' (Zubrzycki 2001, p. 653). Non-competitive notions of nationhood are in fact not strictly confined to the common man. Zimmer (2003, p. 188) himself observes that, in response to the perceived threat from Germany in the late 1930s, Swiss liberals and conservatives united behind the notion of a distinct Swiss cultural *Wesensgemeinschaft*, which effectively 'blurred the boundary between voluntarist and organic conceptions of nationhood'. This suggests that the degree in which political entrepreneurs disseminate these conceptions as contrasting visions of nationhood depends very much on the wider political and social circumstances and on the opportunities these circumstances offer them. To come back to the issue of elite-mass differences, it must be noted that these differences extend to other areas of public opinion as well. Campbell *et al.* (1960), for instance, observed that the left-right dimension in politics does not by far influence the American electorate to the same extent as it does

academics, intellectuals and political professionals. This led them to conclude that 'the closer the individual stands to the sophisticated observer in education and political involvement, the more likely it is that the observer's analytical constructs will bear fruit' (*ibid.* p. 214). It is doubtful whether scholars of nationalism realize that their models are likely to suffer from the same deficiency.

The results of our analyses also revealed quite strong support for the East-West component of the ethnic-civic framework. On average East European respondents accorded more weight to the cultural and, especially, the ethnic dimension and less weight to the political dimension than the respondents from Western Europe. This finding appears to somewhat contradict those of Shulman and Jones & Smith. They found either small or no differences at all between the regions, and on some markers the differences were in the opposite direction from that expected – i.e. the East assigning more importance to some 'civic' markers than the West (see Shulman 2002, pp. 567, 569). Remember, however, that the ISSP data on which these authors based their analyses did not contain questions on ethnic markers and that the difference between East and West was most pronounced on the ethnic dimension in the Eurobarometer data. In addition, it must be noted that Shulman's civic and cultural categories did not coincide with Jones and Smith's voluntarist and ascriptive dimensions. Thus, some items that Shulman considered civic were interpreted as ascriptive by Jones and Smith. Finally, taking a close look at *language* and *political institutions*, identity markers that were included in both data sets, it can be noted that the ISSP and the Eurobarometer showed a similar pattern: Eastern Europe places greater value on language but less value on political institutions than does Western Europe (see Appendix 2 and Shulman 2002, pp. 568, 571). Thus the data of the two surveys are consistent.

Obviously, having established the existence of an ethnic-East/political-West pattern in a given year says nothing about its stability. The question to explore is thus to what extent this pattern of identities is inert, as primordialists would predict, or subject to change, as instrumentalists would argue. As the 2001 Eurobarometer was a cross-sectional survey carried out at a single point in time, it does not give us direct indicators of changes in understandings of nationhood. However, indirectly the data suggest that these understandings are dynamic rather than inert. We noted before that compared to the other countries in the survey respondents in Austria and West Germany expressed strong support for the political dimension relative to the ethnic dimension. This is surprising as West Germany and Austria have traditionally been seen as countries where ethnic conceptions of nationhood prevail. We postulated that ethnic conceptions might indeed have been dominant in Austria and West Germany but that the

success of their post-war democracies and socio-economic systems may have caused a change in the relative importance of identity markers. The post-war political and economic achievements are likely to have increased trust in and therefore identification with public and political institutions among broad sections of the population. We further suggested that the same change might happen in East European countries, provided they succeed in developing stable democracies and prosperous economies. If such a change happened in the East, differences between East and West in the qualitative nature of national identifications might disappear altogether.

A change denoting an increased importance of political markers would strongly support the argument developed by Kuzio that states become more civic in outlook as they grow older and develop stable democracies. On close inspection, one could argue that his argument is in fact quite compatible with Kohn's ethnic-civic model, although Kuzio would probably strongly deny this himself. Kuzio's model does not rule out the possibility that at some stage in the past ethnic sentiments were stronger among Eastern than Western nations. To the knowledge of the author Kohn never asked himself what would happen to national identifications in a given nation *after* that nation had come to define itself ethnically. As Kohn was a *historian* who argued that civic nationalism was a *new* ideology that *arose* from the middle classes at the end of the eighteenth century, it is hard to imagine his contending that ethnic identities once established would be cast in concrete and thus be resistant to change. If Kohn were in a position to agree with the argument that ethnic national identities can gradually adopt more civic/political features within the framework of an independent democratic state, then the opinions of both scholars would not differ.

This study has to end with a sobering note. Despite the ongoing academic debate on the ethnic-civic framework and the widely shared concern that ethnic nationalism fuels xenophobia and racism, we have not found the type of national affiliations to really matter for attitudes on immigrants and feelings of closeness to Jews and Gypsies. Remarkably, this applied to both symbolic resources (ethnic, cultural and political markers) and boundary mechanisms (voluntary vs ascriptive notions of nationhood). In other words, for their opinions on immigrants and other nationalities, it was irrelevant whether respondents cast their national identities in ethnic or political terms, in an inclusive or excluding manner. What did matter was the level of importance assigned to the identity markers, i.e. the intensity of national identifications. The higher this level, the more negative the perceptions on immigrants. Thus it is not the kind of national identity but its strength that makes the difference. In line with this argument, it is imaginable that people with more tolerant views on immigrants have

more mixed feelings about national identity in general, predisposing them to give only half-hearted support to *all* markers associated with nationhood. In other words, national identity and nationalism may be considered improper and unfortunate phenomena altogether by this group of people.

One final reservation has to be stated that might provide some solace to those convinced of the connection between ethnic/ascribed identifications and xenophobia. Respondents of both surveys were most likely not aware of the consequences of each identity marker for membership of the nation when they filled out the questionnaire. Had they been informed beforehand of the implications of each item for accessibility to the nation and of the classifications and judgements that invisible academics analysing their responses would make afterwards, they might have shown a different pattern of responses.

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Notes

1. For an extensive overview of scholars that were influenced by the ethnic-civic idea and of scholars critical of the distinction, see Kuzio (2002) and Shulman (2002).
2. These countries are Ireland, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, The Netherlands, USA, Canada, Austria, Norway, Australia, Great Britain, Poland, Italy, Latvia, Japan, Sweden, Russia, Slovenia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Philippines, Spain, Germany (West and East separately) and Bulgaria.
3. This question was worded as follows: 'Now we would like to ask you a few questions about minorities in [respondent's country]. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: it is impossible for people who do not share the customs and traditions [of respondent's country] to become fully [e.g. British, German, Hungarian, etc]?' The question had a 5-point agree/disagree scale (*agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly*).
4. Between 27 April 2002 and 10 June 2002, the European Opinion Research Group carried out wave 57.2 of the standard Eurobarometer, on request of the European Commission, Directorate-General Press and Communication, Opinion Polls. The data of this survey can be ordered at the *Zentralarchiv fuer empirische Sozialforschung* of the *Universitaet zu Koeln*, Germany.
5. As they constitute separate categories in the survey I hold East and West Germany to be separate countries.
6. I considered Great Britain, West Germany, Spain, Italy, Austria and Greece to represent Western Europe, and East Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to belong to Eastern Europe. Some observers would include Greece in the East European group, pointing to the long period of Ottoman imperial rule and the lack of civic traditions and institutions in the country. We chose to include it in Western Europe because of its post-war (interrupted) development as a democratic state with a market economy, its early

membership of NATO and its inclusion in the EU in the 1981. We concede, however, that this issue is open to debate.

7. The output of the factor analyses of Germany, Hungary and Western and Eastern Europe can be obtained from the author.

8. In calculating the scores for Western and Eastern Europe I followed the method employed by Shulman (2002): all the respondents were first pooled for each region and then their scores were averaged. The advantage of this approach is that it enables statistical significance tests of differences between the regions. The disadvantage of some countries being overrepresented and others underrepresented because of differing sample sizes, which was a major concern of Shulman, does not apply for the Eurobarometer data because all countries have approximately equal sample sizes.

9. To assess the statistical significance of differences in the regions' mean scores an independent samples t-test was performed on the data.

10. This particular result actually matches the ISSP data set because Hungary and the Czech Republic headed the ranking list of countries on importance assigned to language in that data set as well (remember that language is one of the items constituting the cultural dimension). Moreover, in the same data set respondents in both countries expressed weak support for the item 'respect political institutions and law' (Shulman 2002). This is also consistent with their score on the political items in the Eurobarometer survey.

11. The question covering national sentiment was phrased as follows: "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?" ('agree strongly' – 'disagree strongly' on 5-point scale)

- I would rather be a citizen of [country] than of any other country in the world.
- The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like those of [country]
- Generally speaking, [country] is a better country than most other countries
- People should support their country even if their country is in the wrong
- When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be [nationality]

12. We calculated the voluntarist dimension, the ascriptive dimension and the index of xenophobia in the same way as the dimensions of nationhood in the Eurobarometer data set, i.e. we added up the respondent scores on the items clustering in a dimension and divided the resulting figure by the number of items pooled in that dimension.

13. Western Europe includes West Germany, Great Britain, Austria, Italy, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Spain. Eastern Europe is represented by East Germany, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, Latvia and Slovak Republic.

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Appendix 1. Pearson correlations between national identity indicators

Eurobarometer survey

[illegible]

Appendix 1 (*Continued*)

ISSP survey

	born	citizenship	lived	law	feel	language	religion	traditions
born	-	.50	.57	.10	.26	.26	.41	.27
citizenship		-	.44	.28	.33	.36	.28	.18
lived			-	.16	.36	.37	.38	.25
Law				-	.28	.28	.16	.10
feel					-	.30	.22	.16
language						-	.21	.22
religion							-	.19
traditions								-

NB: 1. The N for each correlation ranged from 9210 to 9630 in the Eurobarometer survey and from 28107 to 29870 in the ISSP survey.

2. All the correlations in the two tables are statistically significant at an 0.01 level.

3. ISSP data: we added the separate question on traditions (see note 3) to the other seven items on national identity.

Appendix 2. *Mean scores on items of national identity across ten European countries and two regions*

	culture	language	ancestry	history	legal system	rights & duties	social security	economy
West Germany	1.79	1.59	1.88	1.89	1.89	1.82	1.92	2.01
Greece	1.30	1.26	1.25	1.26	1.43	1.43	1.56	1.51
Italy	1.71	1.57	1.75	1.92	1.95	1.78	1.91	1.89
Spain	1.61	1.53	1.69	1.71	1.74	1.63	1.67	1.73
Great Britain	1.67	1.46	1.71	1.74	1.80	1.73	1.82	1.82
Austria	1.51	1.41	1.88	1.75	1.78	1.69	1.74	1.92
East Germany	1.61	1.47	1.70	1.71	1.92	1.83	1.88	1.95
Czech Republic	1.54	1.43	1.62	1.68	2.05	1.95	2.10	2.05
Hungary	1.39	1.31	1.48	1.46	1.84	1.84	2.08	1.96
Poland	1.46	1.35	1.42	1.42	1.53	1.56	1.60	1.57
East	1.50	1.39	1.55	1.57	1.83	1.80	1.92	1.88
West	1.60	1.47	1.69	1.71	1.76	1.68	1.77	1.81

NB: The N of each country score ranges from 793 to 1016.