

sets. They were the Kurds, the police forces, soldiers, and agents, and especially the Shia. The more dangerous man the Americans."

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was allegedly the masked man who slit the throat of Nancy's Berg and that of a Korean hostage in June 2004. It is difficult to know whether this document attributed to him is authentic, but it is borne out by operations. It will provide one more changing piece of evidence against the argument that Sa'adun's fall would automatically purge Iraq of jihadis from Al Qaeda and similar organizations.

So worrying was the threat of terror that the transfer of power was advanced by 48 hours. Paul Bremer left Baghdad on June 28 without fanfare. The new government, hand-picked by the United States and U.N. Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, immediately announced the death penalty just before Sa'adun Hussein and eleven top leaders were finally decapitated in an air force (Iraqi) court by their U.S. captors on June 30.

Particularly problematic for the United States and Europe was the taking of hostages from Western countries for the purpose of blackmailing their governments. After the Madrid attack of March 11, 2004—which demonstrated that terrorism was capable of striking a European capital directly and intervening in the democratic process by changing the outcome of elections—an Italian hostage was taken captive in the Sudan triangle and eventually assassinated. During the ordeal, his kidnappers demanded that Italians take to the streets to force their government to call back its troops from Iraq. This troubling development showed more clearly than ever that the war on terror did not end with the fall of Baghdad. On the contrary, it had escalated. While the United States was focusing attention on fending off the insurgency in Iraq, jihadis and their fellow travelers were staging a new attack from the rear: on the battlefield of Europe.

The Battle for Europe

The bombings in Madrid on March 11, 2004 established Europe as the new frontline for terrorist attacks. Before 9/11, Europe had provided a sanctuary where Al Qaeda's planners could complete preparations for their global jihadist operations. They had converged in the mountains of Afghanistan. But with events in Madrid in spring 2004, Europe emerged as the primary battlefield on which the future of global Islam will be decided.

In Germany, Mohammed Atta (an Egyptian), his flat-mate Ranaid bin al-Shibh (a Yemeni), and other conspirators from North Africa or the Middle East had formed the "Hamburg cell" that became the main operational base for 9/11. Their points of contact were mosques whose imams were fascinated by the Afghan jihad and especially the charismatic Bin Laden. The German security forces' ignorance of Arab Middle Eastern networks (as compared to their familiarity with Turkish and Kurdish organizations, since those regions provide most of Germany's Muslim immigrants) benefited the jihadists, who were able to go about their activities relatively undisturbed. Consequently, Germany became a favorite site for settlement of Muslim activists in the years preceding the attacks on the United States. The German legal system, in which a very strict burden of proof protects those accused of a crime to pre-

another, and the possibility of a return to freedom seems to have worsened to the advantage of a number of shadow agents.

In Spain, tactical and operational coordination meetings were held in Tangier in July 2001, during the final planning phase for September 11. In November 2001, Abu Dalicun, a naturalized Spaniard of Syrian origin who had previously placed his trade as a second-hand clothes salesman and traveler throughout the world during the 1980s, was jailed on suspicion of having been in contact with Al Qaeda's activists. Spain harbors a large Moroccan population, partly illegal, whose networks, hiring places, and contacts across the country are important crossroads for jihadists. clandestine immigrants crossed the Strait of Gibraltar at night on flimsy wooden boats to try their luck in Europe. In the 1990s, during the Algerian civil war, Islamist militants of the GIA (Group for the Liberation of Algeria) and the AIS (Islamic Salvation Army) used the Iberian peninsula as a stopover on the way to safe havens in Britain and Canada.

In England, Londonistan became a sanctuary for global Islamist extremism beginning in the 1980s. It was the place where a letter of recommendation was forged for two terrorists from Belgium who, on September 11, 2001, in a prelude to Al Qaeda's attack, assassinated the Afghan commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, a much feared opponent of the Taliban. One of Londonistan's leading figures at the time was the Syrian Abu Mubash al-Sufi, who, like Abu Dalicun, acquired Spanish citizenship by marriage. He was, along with his colleague Abu Qaeda, another character on the socialist jihadist stage.

In Belgium, the GIA set up several cells in the 1980s that were immune from investigations of the French intelligence services. Since 2001, many militants, especially of North African origin, have been arrested there. Police operations were also undertaken in

France, Italy, and the Netherlands to dismantle branches of Al Qaeda, and authorities in those countries have made many arrests. A French national of Moroccan origin, Zacarias Moussawi, was imprisoned in the United States. Among the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay are dozens of Europeans—young men from immigrant families of North African, Middle Eastern, Turkish, and Iranian origin—who were captured in Afghanistan by the U.S. army during the first phase of the war on terror. Since their encounter with the military operation that the Bush administration hopefully named "Enduring Freedom," they have been detained in secret without being officially charged with any crime or allowed access to lawyers.

Several young European converts to Islam have been placed on trial. The most notorious was the jihad leader Richard Reid, a British citizen arrested for attempting unsuccessfully to blow up his sneakers on a flight between France and the United States in December 2001. These arrests and sentences have drawn attention to a hitherto neglected phenomenon: the conversion to Islam of growing numbers of European young people from working-class backgrounds. In France alone, the number of converts is estimated at around fifty thousand. Even if jihadist militants make up a tiny minority of this vast group of enthusiasts, converts are of great concern to security services. Because insurgents will choose not to display their new faith overtly, can easily evade authorities. For this reason, conversion is an intense focus of terrorist networks.

Before Al Qaeda existed, Europe faced Islamist terrorism on its territory. France was the victim of two successive waves. The first, during the 1980s, originated among Lebanese Shia linked to Khoreseini's Iran, and the second, in the 1990s, originated among the Algerian GIA's local contacts. But the source of this terrorism was foreign, and the Islamist constituency in France, which was

small at that time, had any minimal integration with the militants. In the past twenty-five years, the French government has taken an uncompromising attitude in combating terrorism, by consistently refusing to grant political asylum to radical Arab or Islamist leaders. The goal has been to prevent them from proselytizing among France's mostly North African Muslim population, which is the largest Muslim group in Europe. What French officials fear is that the social malaise felt by Muslims in the suburbs of major cities, living for the most part in below-standard housing projects and experiencing relatively high rates of unemployment, will be expressed as religious extremism, leading eventually to violence and terrorism. The French political model seeks to promote—with varied success so far—a policy of integration, individual by individual, that will lead to upward social mobility among the relevant populations, just as it has for the republic's other citizens. This policy does not discriminate either positively or negatively—for or against persons based on their religious affiliation. Islam is granted the same rights and duties as other faiths. Its free exercise is guaranteed on condition that it respects the public order. It receives neither recognition per se nor funding from the French state.

Britain has adopted a diametrically opposed policy. In the last decades of the twentieth century, radical ideologues of global Arab Islamism, hunted down in their home countries, found refuge in Londonistan. Today, they continue to benefit from political asylum and freedom of expression, no matter how extreme, as long as they do not implement their ideas on British territory. Underprivileged classes of Muslims in Britain, most of whom are from the Indian subcontinent, share neither a language nor family ties with the Arab ideologues of North Africa and the Middle East, and Scotland Yard therefore has been less concerned than French intelligence services with the possible contagion of extremism among these groups. Although Tony Blair's cabinet went along

with the Bush administration's war on terror in the Middle East, British terrorism was in fact considered innocuous to attack—until warning signs led Her Majesty's Government to contemplate a radical overhaul of its policy.

In November 2003, while President Bush was visiting London, terrorist attacks in Istanbul targeted British banks and a consulate—a first for Islamist terrorism. Then, in March 2004, stocks of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, used in explosives, were discovered in a London suburb, leading to the arrest of several young British of Pakistani background. These events shook up many accepted notions of Britain's invulnerability. The terrorist movement's fragmentation—as evidenced by the Casablanca and Madrid attacks, which were carried out by relatively unsophisticated fanatics who, though inspired by Bin Laden, had no organizational ties to the movement—part to Al Qaeda, nor training in the camps of Pakistan or Afghanistan—set off alarm bells. Free agents are not concerned with the refugee status of jihadist ideologues in their British sanctuary, and therefore feel no restraint on their actions. This fact invalidated the security calculation on which Londonistan's existence was predicated.

British multiculturalism has traditionally celebrated distinct ethnic or religious groups of foreign origin and has empowered community leaders to promote law and order through activities centered on mosques, temples, and other houses of worship. Following the March 2004 discovery of explosives in London, a first step was taken away from this doctrine when the president of the United Kingdom's Commission on Racial Equality—a body that had made multiculturalism its cornerstone—called to the media that “the word is not useful; it masks the wrong things. Multiculturalism suggests separatism. What we should be talking about is how we reach an integrated society, one in which people are equal under the law, where there are some common values—democracy

rather than violence, the common currency of the English language, honoring the culture of these islands." During demonstrations in support of the young Muslim men incarcerated in connection with the explosives, bearded non-identifiers in traditional Pakistani Islamic attire, also British subjects, reacted to the crackdown by burning the Union Jack in the middle of London, about the "Al-amin akhbar" for the cameras.

While this unrest was brewing in Great Britain, in France various Islamist groups and television preachers on Arab satellite channels protested the new French law that prohibited the wearing of religious symbols in school—and in particular (though not exclusively) the Islamic veil. The bearded and veiled demonstrators went to the streets four times between December 21, 2003, and February 2, 2004, brandished the tricolor. The women draped themselves symbolically in a great display of red, white, and blue, to invoke their rights as French citizens: liberty, equality, and fraternity were the rallying cries raised to defend the right to wear veils at school.

Thus, for political purposes, Islamists on either side of the Channel took advantage of their citizenship in a European state with a liberal tradition, but in opposite ways, according to opportunity: the national flag was burned in one country, brandished in another. In both cases, however, fundamental questions about the content of citizenship were being raised, with integration and separatism for Muslims in Europe hanging in the balance.

WHEN TERRORISM LINKED to Al Qaeda erupted in the heart of Madrid in March 2004, the Islamist movement took advantage of the crisis to increase its visibility among European young people of Muslim background and to blackmail European governments.

One statement on the Internet, attributed to Zawahiri, threatened France, which was considered an enemy of Islam since it forbade Muslim girls to wear the veil at school. Another, attributed to Bin Laden, suggested a three-month truce (hudna), starting on April 15, 2004, with "our neighbors to the north of the Mediterranean" if the states that had sent troops to Iraq along with the United States pulled out. "Following the positive signs shown by recent events and the opinion polls indicating that most of Europe's peoples desire peace." Probably referring to the decision of Spain's new socialist government, elected after the March 11 attacks, to withdraw from Iraq, the statement proposed such. In traditional Islamic geopolitical discourse, that term means "truce" between Muslims and parts of the "land of unbelief" which are therefore no longer targets of jihad.

The day before Bin Laden's statement was posted an Italian hostage, kidnapped along with three of his companions in Iraq, was executed by his captors, who identified themselves as the Green Phalangists of Muhammad. The four hostages had been displayed to the world through video images broadcast by Arab satellite channels. In a message issued immediately after the abduction, the kidnapers made three demands: an official, public apology from Prime Minister Berlusconi for the outrages he had committed against Muslims and Islam; a precise schedule for the withdrawal of Italian troops from Iraq; and the release of all the imams and mosque preachers under arrest in Italy. When no response from Rome was forthcoming, the kidnapers, after assassinating one hostage, broadcast a second message on April 26, accompanied by video footage of the three survivors. This second message addressed the Italian population directly and promised to free the surviving prisoners if, five days later, on the occasion of the May 1 celebrations, mass protests forced the government to pull its troops out.

Whether or not Bin Laden's statement was authentic, and what

ever the identity of the kidnappers. It was now clear that public opinion among Europeans had become a new weapon in the war on terror. It would be exploited by terrorists who had an accurate understanding of political life in the West and the intention to pressure or the democratic process at a time of their own choosing in Italy, on Workers' Day, in Spain, just before the legislative elections.

But the militants' strategy of using Europeans in the war on terror went beyond manipulations of public opinion. The Madrid attacks relied primarily on homegrown Islamist militants of Moroccan background, aided by global jihadists. Most were Spanish residents leading ordinary lives. In some cases, socially well integrated—lives. Without undergoing indoctrination or brainwashing or detention in an Afghan training camp—without a transition experience of any kind—grocers, mobile phone repairmen, and real estate agents suddenly became recruits bent on waging a jihad or terror, assisted by a few experienced militants who themselves blended into the multicultural Spanish social landscape.

March 11, 2004, sounded an alarm for the French and British security apparatuses. It revealed the flaw in Paris's logic of forbidding entry to activists in Spain, radical Islamist ideologues were few and far between and those who were present led discreet lives: so hunting known activists away at the door was not enough to keep susceptible individuals among Europe's Muslim population from making contact with a jihadist recruitment agent. March 11 challenged London's strategy at a deeper level: granting political asylum to extremist ideologues in Londonistan in return for orderly behavior offered no guarantee that their sympathizers would not be transformed, overnight, into terrorists. In late May 2004, Britain drew a few logical conclusions from this dead-end strategy and began to make changes. Londonistan's most media-friendly denizen,

Abu Hanzala al-Nasri, an Egyptian Islamist-jihadist imam who had lost an arm and an eye in Afghanistan, and whom the British press had dubbed "Captain Hook", was arrested at the request of an American judge. His extradition to the United States was pending—though it could not be implemented until he was stripped of his British citizenship.

Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries evolved public policies that fell between the French and British extremes, with regard to both anti-terrorist measures against jihadist activists and the debate over the integration of immigrant populations of Muslim background. Over ten million immigrants from Muslim countries live in Western Europe as a whole. Their children were born in Europe, for the most part, and hold citizenship in a European nation. They were educated in European schools, they speak European languages, and they are accustomed to European social practices. As far as many of these young people are concerned, the battle for Europe is fought by two opposed camps, between which they attempt to find their way, according to their personal identities, interests, and opportunities.

A positive, optimistic vision of the future would see the vast majority of these young people as the ideal bearers of a modernity, bequeathed or them as Western Europe's newest citizens. By the example they provide, they are potential purveyors of these values to the Muslim countries from which their families emigrated. They offer an alternative to increased religiosity, which has served as both an ideological shield for corrupt authoritarian regimes and as an outlet for the social rage of a dispossessed population. In this reading of the future, Europe's young Muslims will become the international vectors of a democratic project whose success they themselves embody—by blending in with Arab or Muslim traits with acquired European ones. They will participate fully as Muslims in

the most dynamic, creative civilizations of a universe civilization, while rejecting extremism along with the violence and chaos that follow in its wake. The first generation of university graduates among Muslim immigrants' children in Britain, France, and Germany have already begun to take their place as educated, activist citizens of Europe and the world. They possess the skills and perspective to build bridges with North Africa, the Middle East, or Pakistan and assist those countries in emerging from the quagmire.

A more negative teaching of the future would focus on young people at the opposite extreme, whose rigid Islamic identity leads them to reject cultural integration into the European environment and to embrace cultural separatism. Some—a minority—will pass from voluntary secession into violence, expressing social resentment through hatred that they justify on religious grounds. Others, more numerous, will be sublimed to turn inward, to cancel communities, or to dream of emigrating from the land of unbelievers back to the land of Islam. Both of these separatist attitudes have their roots in the salafist teachings and influence of some Saudi Arabian preachers.

The first group—adherents of jihad—concerns not only the "imperial" regimes of the West but also the "apostate" ruling family in Riyadh. Many of them left the outskirts of Lyon, Paris, Koblenz, or Birmingham to a time to gain experience in the camps of Pakistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, or Georgia, awaiting the right moment to accelerate the Islamization of Europe, as called for in Bin Laden's declarations and Zarqawi's reasoning. In the meantime, they gather with other young sympathizers and look at videos or DVDs of armed jihadists, veterans of war who left their neighborhoods as ragged children and returned as weathered combatants, bearded, crowned in glory, and guaranteed a place in Paradise. These heroes bypassed unemployment, identity crises, and

even drug addiction by going off to fight the infidels on one of the frontlines between Dar al-Kufr (the land of unbelief) and Dar al-Islam.

The second group of separatists—also highly influenced by salafism—is explicitly nonviolent and pietistic. Jihadist zealots count themselves *dhurriyyat* "sheikhs" because its partisans obediently follow the injunctions of Saudi sheikhs who show no hostility to the *Kiyadh* regime. These sheikhs offer instant legal opinions, *fatwas*, on the behavior of devout Muslims wherever they may happen to be, accessible through telephone numbers and email addresses posted on salafist websites. Opposed to violence—which they combat relentlessly with Quranic verses, Prophetic sayings, and rulings of *ijma'*—these salafists nevertheless adhere to a version of Islam that imposes complete cultural separation from the West. When a sheikhs imam takes control of the prayer room in a working class neighborhood on the outskirts of Paris, problems related to railing often arise in nearby secondary schools in the following weeks and months. The new preacher's injunctions galvanize young male zealots, who reinforce his influence by applying social pressure on the young women in their neighborhood.

Here is an example of the kinds of questions put to one of Medina's principal salafist sheikhs, Kabi al-Madkhali, and the answer he gave on a French website run by the movement *Ignofidian*: medialibah_soumah.fr/cv/fr/

Q. Is it allowed to take the contraceptive pill in the following cases? We live in a country of unbelief and will be able to undertake the *hijra* (emigration) toward a Muslim country in five years at most. We do not want to have children; here, we fear that they receive a bad education.

A. I say to those who use those contraceptive pills for fear of the consequences that were mentioned . . . : Return to a Muslim

country and do not stay in a country of unbelief because of hate, they are vulnerable to many temptations (ling). Worse yet, many of them seem to lean toward apostasy. And their children are exposed to Christianity, carried out through schools.... The answer that I give them is this: instead of relying on a prophet by unlegislated or legislated [sic] means, you face poverty alone. Certainly Allah promises them prosperity, as the Divine Word affirms: an approval, made possible, "And whoever emigrates in the path of Allah will find on this earth abundance and abundance." Surah Qur'an, sura 4, verse 10.

Such an answer addressed to a child by a believer, a result of one tradition of Islam. But the practice has been transcribed by the Internet, with the help of translators. In this example, the French is sufficiently correct to suggest that the author received an average university education. The Quranic citation is considered "approximate" because, in a rigorous interpretation of Islam, Arabic is the inimitable language in which Allah revealed the Quran, and other languages into which it is translated are by definition inferior. The question-and-answer format does away with time and space and creates a direct consultation between a precise situation in Europe, a country of unbelief, the literal salafist translation of Dar al Kitar, and a legal opinion emitted from Mecca. The fatwa is formulated according to the strictest salafist canon: only the injunctions of Islamic sacred text matter; the European social context is devalued, even demonized, in comparison with that norm.

Another question on the same website addresses the customs of Saudi Wahhabism: a woman who lives in Europe asks the sheikh "whether Muslim women are allowed to drive in a land of unbel-

ief." In a question that returns to the matter of children, a mother asks: is it permitted to send them to nursery school, which "occupies" them? "Then, our children learn singing, dancing, painting, and many other things that Allah does not condone." If not, "can we send them twice a week to mosques led by deviated [sic] groups like The Muslim Brothers, for instance, so that our children can learn only the Quran and the Arabic language?" Commenters that, in Saudi Arabia, pit pro-regime sheikhist salafism—the "court ulama," that Rabi al-Madkhali emboldens so perversely—against militant Islamists, with explicitly political ambitions are thus reproduced in identical terms on European soil.

The "deviant" Muslim Brothers targeted on this website are represented in Europe by the various national sections of the UK-based Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE), its French branch is the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF), which has been the main element in the French Council of the Muslim Creed (CFCEM) since its creation under the auspices of the French Ministry of the Interior in the winter of 2000. Unlike the salafists, who preach self-imposed apartheid or advise believers to isolate themselves in a mental ghetto to avoid confrontation by European infidels, the associations emerging from the Muslim Brothers have chosen since 1989 to root themselves in civil society. That year, along with the Berlin Wall, the communist alternative to European liberal society collapsed, and a vacuum opened up for the socialization of classes that had previously identified with Marxism and its offshoots. The Muslim Brothers, always quick to seize political opportunities, rushed into the breach. That same year, the UOIF changed its name to the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (formerly it was in French). This simple substitution of a proposition spoke volumes about the transformation: legal, social, and political environment of French Muslims.

Since that time, the Brothers and their heirs have no longer considered Europe a land of unbeliefs but a land of Islam. Muslim children have now been born on European soil and are citizens of these countries. In France, in the name of Islam, communalist identity, the Brothers began to champion the socialization of these poor young people who, born in the towns as French citizens, had neither adulthood nor to face a bleak job market.

The new perception was also manifest in the demand—approved by the European Farwa Council, an ad hoc Islamic legal organization linked to the FIOE and whose spiritual advisor is Qatar-based Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi—that *taqiya* be applied to Muslims settled on European soil, since Europe was now part of the land of Islam. The movement's theologians called this shipra-*tion* "minority sharia." This new immediate and visible result was the struggle over the wearing of the veil in schools. According to these associations' interpretation of sharia, veiling was a mandatory injunction for young women.

Fifteen years later, when terrorism inspired by Osama bin Laden and implemented by his followers and imitators was weighing heavily on Europe, the continent's Islamic organizations split among various factions in a struggle for hegemony. Each brought a different nuance to its interpretation of relations between Islamic identity and the European environment and each saw the actions attributed to the Al Qaeda network from a different perspective—from fascination, marginal, but present nonetheless, to outright rejection, via denial of its actual existence (these last two attitudes were frequently combined).

Sheikh Qaradawi, whom I met in October 2001 in Qatar, could not find words harsh enough to blame those guilty for the 9/11 attacks. According to him, the terrorists had brought opprobrium upon all of Islam in the West and threatened the progress of con-

version and the strengthening of Islam as political action within the movement—in other words, the accomplishments of the Islamist movement that had caused preaching to triumph over jihad since 1989. This reading of terrorism's impact on Islam's missionary effort in the West, which fit well with the Muslim Brothers' logic, diverged from that of the salafists, who did not acknowledge the "cultural revolution" in 1989 that transformed Europe into a part of the land of Islam. Both branches of salafism—jihadist on the one hand, pietistic on the other—persisted in calling Europe the "land of unbeliefs" not land of Islam.

In traditional Islamic political theory, the "land of unbeliefs" is subdivided into Dar al-Harb, the land of war, where jihad is allowed, and Dar al-Sulh, the land of truce, where Muslims do not engage in violence against unbelievers and infidels. In the pietistic sheikhs' view, Europe is Dar al-Sulh. In the jihadist view, it is Dar al-Harb. The statement of April 13, 2004, attributed to Bin Laden, offered Europe an opportunity to become a land of truce, on condition that European states conclude a treaty with radical Islamism that includes withdrawing European troops from Iraq and

Al salafists preach mental and moral rejection of the surrounding European society, but the jihadists and pietists (sheikhs) have found plenty of grounds on which to wage a merciless battle against one another, especially on the Internet. The pietists devote their efforts to turning young Muslims away from jihad, while protesting them from the "deviant" Muslim Brothers. In every sermon and on every website, their sheikhs denounce the "lost sect" of the Brothers along with the jihadists, whom they lump together indiscriminately. Disciples of the Qatari brothers are identified as "Outbists," and those who admire Sheikh Qaradawi, the preacher on Al Jazeera, are ridiculed. Partisans of Sheikh Sufur, the Syrian

center in London are termed as modern-day heretical "Salafists." Other sects, less known, are not immune from this electronic amoral campaign.

The jihadists do their bit as well, keeping insults on their sheikhist rivals, whom they condemn as "fake salafists" and devotees of *erwa*—the Islamic heresy that allows Muslims to advocate a rigorous version of the faith without ever holding the ruling regime accountable for its corruption. On websites in every European language, whether jihadist or pietist, "trendy" jargon blends in with an intense polemic founded on obscure religious references to medieval scholars whose work was written in abstruse Arabic. In clear, roomy, linguistic shoutouts "E" for "E" in English, "C" for "C'est" in French, minge with a provision of Islamic terminology (ahkam—*qawm Allah*, *al-muqaddim*, *al-Allah*) preside over the mounds of an English text now book (PBLH) for "Praise be upon him" in Arabic script, which deeply religious people pronounce after every mention of the Prophet. All of this debate and intensity seems completely unrelated to the social and cultural reality of European Islam as it is lived in the workers' cities. Yet this strange language serves to express some of the tensions that pull the members of these communities to one side and then the other.

The verbal fireworks of the debate highlight how porous the two branches of salafism really are: to pass from one to the other is quite easy. The intense indoctrination preached by the sheikhists reduces their flock's capacity for personal reasoning, which makes these followers easy prey for a clever, jihadist preacher. Young people who were born in Europe, unbridled into jihad, and are later jailed often follow a typical trajectory. The first stage of brainwashing occurs at the hands of a pietistic salafist imam. Later, they encounter a jihadist recruiting sergeant, who offers to quench their thirst for absolutes through a basic activism. But this progres-

sion is neither systematic nor inevitable, and the intensity of the anti-jihadist polemic preached by pietistic salafists demonstrates their firm determination to protect their flock from incursions by jihadists.

Hostile to participation in any associations or institutions in the land of unbelievers, pietistic salafists carefully mark the borders of the territory where the re-Islamization they control takes place. They are similar, in that respect, to certain ultra-Orthodox Jews, such as the Haredim: one might meet in Jerusalem's Mea Shearim neighborhood or in Brooklyn, for that matter. Both groups preserve their identity through isolation in a ghetto, set off by visible marks. In salafist Muslim neighborhoods, women leave their homes only in a black niqab that covers their faces; men are bearded, with their mustaches shaved, and they wear skull-caps. Because of the shape of their outfits, they are nicknamed "beis" in winter, a huge windbreaker or jacket is zipped up over a white tullebe that reaches to mid-calf; in linen application of the Prophet's saying, "That part of a garment that hangs below the ankles is destined for hell" (Bukhari, 5757). For the most fashionable of the "salafis," that religious injunction gives license to show off their ankles and thus to emphasize the latest model of Nikes, in a marriage of Western consumerism with strict orthodox practices.

One of the bastions of French salafism can be found in the low-income housing projects of Argenteuil, on Paris's northern outskirts. The rigorous Islamic moral order that prevails there, of a type that one does not generally find in Muslim societies of the southern or eastern Mediterranean, is so obvious that it is sometimes difficult to remember one is in France. Salafists of every persuasion live here, turned inward on themselves and away from a state of unbeliever whose contagion they fear.

On rare occasions when salafists expose themselves to the public

maxima, their discourse unmasked such courage that it can trigger reprisals. The misadventures of Imam Bouziane illustrate this point. This salafist Algerian preacher, who had lived in France since 1979, gave an interview to *Le Monde* in April 2004 in which he asserted his right to bigamy by reference to the *Quran*. He also appeared on television to make further declarations of his views about relations between men and women. Bouziane, who had six teen children by two wives on French soil, so infuriated authorities that he was expelled from French territory—a decision later overturned by an administrative court, which allowed him to continue his mission as before.

It all began innocently enough, as Bouziane explained the differences between salafists and Muslim Brothers. "They have very political goals and strategies, which invites them to make concessions in order to gain acceptance in the West. As for us, the salafists, our goal is purely religious. For example, we do not demonstrate in the street . . . In fact, the salafists do not protest the law that forbids valuing in schools, while the Muslim Brothers participated in those demonstrations." The journalist asked him whether he wished for France "to become an Islamist [sic] country." His candid response partook of the logic that craves the aim of universal belief: "Yes, because people would be happier if they drew closer to Allah. Besides, Allah punishes societies that wallow in sin, with earthquakes, diseases like AIDS . . . And I am very happy when I see French people converting to Islam, because I know they are on the right path."

Bouziane rounded off his explanation of his group's position by making clear what differentiated them from the jihadists—while expressing the skepticism characteristic of all salafists with regard to the identity of those who perpetrated the attacks attributed to

Al Qaeda—and finally presented himself as a granator of social order.

I cannot condemn Bin Laden as long as there is no proof that he is really the one who organized the attacks on New York and Madrid. But if someone proves that he did do it, I would condemn him, because these attacks were counterproductive . . . Those who organize attacks are never salafists. I brought salafism to Lyon . . . Every one knows me here . . . And the DST [Directorate of Territorial Security] knows very well that I have never incited Muslims to organize attacks. That, incidentally, is the reason why some young militants don't like me . . . I firmly condemn terrorism in my sermons, but maybe some people can't hear my advice, especially if they have been victims of manipulation. Unfortunately, I can't do anything about that.

These views, which very clearly expressed the position of salafist Islam in the European environment and distinguished it explicitly from its closest enemies, would not have caused Bouziane any problems with the police—indeed, would not even have earned him public disapproval—had he not been equally frank about salafist views with respect to women: "A Muslim man can have several wives, but no more than four." Asked if he knew that it was illegal under French law to have more than one wife, he replied, "It is licit in the *Quran*." He then went on to explain that the *holy text* allows men, under certain circumstances, to bear their wives, and that an adulterous woman should be stoned. His words, which were coldly repeated and clarified with gestures for television cameras and then broadcast at peak viewing time, aroused consider-

able emotion because they were being expressed unambiguously for the first time. Usually, salafist practice discourages outside curiosity and reserves such comments for sermons at the mosque or anonymous websites. Within their closed community, salafists impose rigorous Islamic norms over state law, but without openly defying it. As one 26-year-old informant noted on oumma.com (French Islam's main website): "Laws made by men are made for them and therefore are always unjust, only Quranic law is good because it is impartial."

Bonziiane was expelled to Algeria under an emergency procedure. But after filing an administrative appeal against the injunction, he returned to France triumphantly a few weeks later, having demonstrated that French law, which had caused his deportation, was fallible. The ordeal only increased his prestige and that of sharia. Bonziiane promptly used the magazine, contending that he did not know what "stoning" (*lapidation*, meant in French and that the word had been put in his mouth by the journalist Islamist organizations and their media contacts, not to mention the imam's lawyer, maintain that he was tricked into portraying Islam in an unfavorable light, in order to incite Islamophobia. Bonziiane's case against the magazine is still pending.

THE EMERGENCE OF SALAFISM within European Islam is a relatively recent phenomenon. In the mid-1980s, when I was conducting research for my book *Les Bonziianes de l'islam* (*The Outsiders of Islam*), this trend was not visible at all. Socialization and rigorous instruction were fulfilled mainly by Tabligh, a movement which advocated a return to rigid faith. It was born in India in the 1920s, at a time when, according to some men of religion, the Muslim

minority ran the risk of losing its identity to the Hindu majority. Tabligh, meaning "propagation" of the Islamic faith, imposed a highly restrictive orthopraxis: followers must dress like the Prophet, sleep as he did on the ground, on one's right side, and so on. Like pietistic salafism, Tabligh imposed on its followers a separation in their daily life from the "impious" society that surrounded them.

Tabligh had an impressive capacity for indoctrination. Some people who returned to Islam or converted through its influence and then later abandoned it—such as the singer, Abdel Malek, of NAP (New African Party), an Islamic rap group from Strasbourg—later accused the movement in retrospect of "striking" Tabligh organized "outings" for advocates who were to preach in neighborhoods and bring a vulnerable population back to the straight and narrow. The logical "outing" to Palermo took place when devotees were considered sufficiently mature. Those who wished to deepen their faith attended the madrasas of Pakistan's Deobandi movement—the same religious schools that indoctrinated the Taliban.

Tabligh peaked in Europe between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, when it focused on marginalized populations—migrant workers deprived of any cultural access to European society, "nose" teens, drug addicts, and others. It declined around 1989, when young people from Muslim families, educated in Europe and now reaching adulthood, began to seek a more intellectual framework for their faith. The movement, unable to respond to their increasingly sophisticated demands, withered, though one of its branches is still represented in the French Council of the Muslim Creed.

Tabligh lost its market share to the pietistic salafists, who concentrated on indoctrination and the UOIF network, whose organizations focused on charity work. The salafists had first arrived in France as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was emerging in Alge-

in 1984 and civil war was raging 1990-1991). France at that time had a population of Algerian origin estimated at around two million people. The influence of the great Saudi sheikhs, such as Mufti Bin Baz, Saoud Bin Athman, or their Lebanese colleague Albani, was crucial in convincing many Algerian sheikhs who had gone underground during the civil war to stop fighting. The Algerian regime, in full cooperation with Riyadh, turned to these eminent clerics for fatwas assigned to bring armed jihadists back to the open legal world. The strategy worked, and the civil war ended in 1991.

The salafists in France spread on French territory through the Algerian diaspora, but a mutilation of US salafism into political action was impossible in France, and so the movement took a much different course, requiring isolation from the daily manners and customs of French society. By focusing on a rigorous interpretation of sacred texts, salafism met the demands of a young, educated generation better than the deliberately ignorant Tablighi propaganda.

As Tabligh faded into the background, its charity network in Muslim communities was replaced not by the salafists but by the UOIF, an outgrowth of the Muslim Brothers. In 1987, the head of the French Ministry of the Interior's office of religious affairs, who had just finished reading *Les barbares de l'Islam*, let me know that I was overestimating the UOIF's potential (it was still in its infancy, and that I had given it a disproportionate place in my analysis of emerging Islamic movements). By 2002 the Ministry of the Interior had made the UOIF the main prism through which to analyze French Islam, thereby reversing its previous policy. (This move from one extreme to the other is not necessarily a sign of keener understanding.)

In contrast with the salafists, the many groups, influenced by

Muslim Brothers ideology, despite differences in method, collectively sought to collaborate with institutions and nongovernmental organizations. They advocated a gradual widening of Islamic influence in European cities through full participation in political, social, and cultural life. This approach was expressed in a dynamic advance on every accessible domain. Charity networks or Islamist "social workers" sometimes paid out of public funds, provided structure in economically depressed areas, where they proselytized among the lost and dispossessed. In the Middle East and North Africa, this kind of activity, carried out by Islamist movements and parties inspired by the Muslim Brothers, had been the starting point for the recruitment of a base among the young urban poor: their opposite, numbers just transposed that strategy to France.

Conducted without fanfare, and with some success by the turn of the twenty-first century, this activity was taken up by French university students, university campuses (which accept almost any high school graduate by the UOIF's student section, the EMF (Muslim Students of France). This organization offered social services to Muslim students, most of whom were from low-income North African families and were poorly acquainted with the cultural cues that would allow them to identify academic options leading to satisfying jobs. Their experience of "destitution in the student environment" (the title of a pamphlet written in the mid-1980s by a member of the "situational international") was acute. The EMF thus acted both as a union that responded to an urgent social need and as a socialization body that aimed to transform poor students from Muslim backgrounds, who were generally indifferent to the politicization of religion, into activists with a new political and religious awareness—in other words, "Muslim youth."

In 2003, when the vast majority of university students, disenfranchised with the left-leaning student unions, were no longer vot-

ing, the EUMC got its delegates elected to student councils for the first time. This success was reminiscent of the situation in Egyptian and Algerian universities in the 1970s and 1980s, when student as sacanations close to the Muslim Brothers had made a breakthrough on campuses through intense charity work, scholarships, subsidies awarded especially to women students who had taken the veil, and a panoply of social services.

These activities of the U.O.H. while highly effective, were designed to avoid excessive publicity. In other arenas, however, Islamist organizations have sought maximum visibility to stage the plight of European Muslims. The conflict over veiling in schools and the public demonstrations it provoked was one example. By casting Muslims in the role of victims, Islamist organizations sought the attention of the media. Various human rights groups, antiracist organizations, environmentalists, priests, teachers, anti-globalization activists, Trotskyites, and sometimes also fascist groups chimed in with support. Islamist organizations responded in different ways to these new allies, depending on how they defined "concessions" in human Bourziane's terms: that might corrupt Muslim identity or even lead to its being co-opted. Each one weighed the threat of corruption against the benefits of alliances with various state institutions and with non-Muslim political, religious, or social parties and movements, from the far left to the far right of the political spectrum.

This dilemma of corruption (or co-optation) versus manipulation is reminiscent of the internal debates among Western Europe's communists in the twentieth century. On one side, the Popular Front or Union of the Left in France and the "Historic Compromise" in Italy advocated intense participation in institutional and political life. On the other side, a class-against-class party line favored an ideological break with the "bourgeoisie," in order to strengthen the public perception of the party's opposition

to the political establishment. The function of the category "non-proletariat" provided context, in terms of social identity, with the hated "other," just as the category "unbelievers" provides contrast for Islamist ideology.

When they were in a position of strength, Europe's communist parties portrayed themselves as the unchallenged champions of those who suffered, and this bare line attracted a plethora of fellow travelers or sincere democrats—less charitably described, in the intimacy of self-meetings, as "useful idiots." When they were in a position of weakness, communists were forced to make ideological compromises by associating more closely with noncommunist democrats, who gradually led them to abandon the dictatorship of the proletariat and accept democracy. This path ultimately led to the decline and dissolution of West European communism.

The Islamists also managed to attract useful fellow travelers— indeed, sometimes the very same individuals the Communist Party had once captured. This shift of loyalties was made easier by the fact that some Islamists championed the cause of the lower classes — which, they claimed, were now for the most part Muslim. Priests, teachers, sociologists, and other non-Muslims attended the congresses of movements inspired by the Brothers' ideology, and in so doing granted them a seal of approval, thus reassuring police authorities and the media of these organizations' good intentions.

The presence of these non-Muslims dissociated Islamists on the north side of the Mediterranean from their brothers on the south side, whose rallying cry was the creation of an Islamic state on the ruins of colonialism (just as the dictatorship of the proletariat was to be built on the ruins of the bourgeois state—a catchphrase that served a similar purpose in mobilizing the foot soldiers of communism). Among Europeans, this bellwether slogan would have frightened secularists and Christians.

As was the case with Western communism, it is difficult to know

whether: changes in Marxist vocabulary accurately track structural transformations in ideology or whether they are merely rhetorical artifice to mask a hidden agenda. This is an important point of contention, not just for the Muslim Brothers' Caucasians in Europe and America today but also for those betting for and against them. It will determine the movement's evolution and the way it is perceived both from within and from without, by militants, sympathizers, and potential recruits, as well as by Western institutions and public opinion-makers. The basis for such a challenge lies in an ethnic-religious minority in Europe today, but the group is destined to undergo considerable expansion if only because of its high birthrate and foreseeable further immigration. How it manages its relationships with its non-Muslim allies will determine whether Marxist ideology becomes "democratic" in this European context and as such could be exported to the Muslim world—or, on the contrary, becomes increasingly radical, as strongholds within European society pass on the rigid, aggressive ideology originating on the other side of the Mediterranean.

The galaxy of factions emerging in Europe from the Muslim Brothers' ideology has a more diverse social base, however, than that of the communist movement. For example, one finds a pious intellectual party bourgeoisie that aspires to the status of social unionist—recognized and consolidated by European states as the manager of the Muslim community it claims to represent, while defining the contours of that community in religious terms. In Britain, the U.K. Islamic Mission, founded by disciples of Mawdoodi, the Pakistan ideologue, tries to play this role. It seeks to function as an *intellektuelien*, while providing the British state with various services, such as awareness training for police officers. In France, the role is taken up by the UOIF.

Starting small in the mid-1950s, the UOIF expanded its social,

political, and media visibility gradually by bringing together tens of thousands of people at its annual congress in Le Bourget, a northern working-class suburb of Paris. This event, which blends religious and political speeches with a huge market selling "ethnic" products, books, tapes, and other sundry Islamic paraphernalia, is reminiscent of the Communist Party's annual gathering: "Fête de l'Humanité" had become "Fête de l'Islam." Like any movement seeking to derive political capital by controlling the behavior of its popular base, the UOIF needed to resolve the contradiction between the aspirations of its constituency and the tactical constraints imposed upon its leaders as they grappled with state policy. Besides the Moroccans from Bordeaux, who have centralized the organization since the 1990s and whose members are always dressed up in dark wets and ties, appropriate garb for meeting counterparts in the state apparatus, the UOIF includes more popular figures who wear T-shirts or other casual clothing (though never a jellaba, which identifies the wearer as a salafist) and are more in tune with the aspirations of militants and their sympathizers in the organization. The tensions within this diverse group are acutely reflected in a small, popular book by one of the organization's best-loved leaders, who regularly appears on television: talk shows. Farid Abdelkrim. Its title is *Nœud bou la France?*

Nœud bou is a popular expression widely used in North Africa to curse someone's father, and by extension the son and his lineage. In oral usage, the abbreviation *bou* (for Abu, father of) designates any kind of relation to an object; for instance, *bou fitya*, literally "father of a beard," designates a person with a beard, that is, an Islamist or salafist militant. The title of Abdelkrim's book can thus be rendered *Down France*. It raised objections, especially from Dali Boulakeur, dean of the Muslim Institute at the Paris Mosque (a rival of the UOIF) and president of the French Council of the

Muslim Creed, who denounced it as a seething anti-racialist attack. Written in an easy colloquial style that resembles the slang used among young North Africans, *Nouveau la France* is a brutal text that seeks to speak plainly to a country blackened first of all by its colonial exploitation of North Africa a generation earlier.

The cover is illustrated by a comble exposure of the author and his father in front of what looks like a shantytown: the brick is dedicated "to our mothers, to our fathers." Named the blood spilled by Muslims from North Africa fighting in French uniforms during both world wars nor the sweat of migrant laborers, living under deplorable living conditions, who rebuilt France and Europe for a pitance after 1945, has made their children, as far as the French or indeed Europeans in general are concerned, full fellow citizens. Since they are denied such recognition, the author demands: "Oh sweet France! Are you astonished that so many of your children continue in a singing *new! boy to France*, and cannot your fathers?" How could one, Abdelkrim asks, be surprised that young people resent those they denigrate as *huffar* and *goueres* from the North African colloquial term *gouari*, which also means infidel?

According to the author, however, the expression of this social rage—which the book illustrates through numerous anecdotes in which "native" French people "chickens", come across as odious or ridiculous and in which their institutions are systematically disparaged—should not lead to self-destructive violence. Rather than casting blame, he believes it is necessary to rebuild one's identity on a political-religious basis that will be capable of sublimating the loss of cultural and social markers, as he explains in a chapter titled "Young and Muslim!"

Before going further, we are going to put an end to all the names that are used, some [supposedly] in North

African no longer", to designate young people "emerging from immigration." Whether you are white, tanned or black, you have to reject slurs and pet names that put you in the category of "we don't know who you are." You are not a North African or an Arab. You are still less a bear or the second generation of anything at all. No, you are an outer-city teen. No, you are none of those things. You are neither an Islamist nor a fundamentalist. . . . Yes, in France you are at home. And whether you apply the precepts of Islam, or you are non-practicing, if you do not renounce the faith in your heart, you are Muslim. Therefore, you are a young Muslim. Respect starts here! With the way you see yourself and who you want to be. If in you will be able to demand respect from others. As far as I'm concerned, in the following pages and forever, you were, are, and will be a young Muslim.

These lines convey the essence of the strategy used by the UOIF to capture a young, popular social base. When *Nouveau la France?* came out in 2002, Abdelkrim was president of the IMF (Jeunes Musulmans de France). Young Muslims of France, like the organization's youth section. According to him, whatever the multiple modes of identity that young North Africans, socialized in France, try out, there is only one truth even for those who are unaware of it: their identity is Muslim. All the alternatives are hailed as *zanna*—pretense. Only Islam engenders self-respect and respect from others. To assert oneself by displaying one's Islamic heritage is the necessary condition for full participation in political life.

This compulsory Islamism—except for those who betray their identity—is an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology. In the

biographical notes, the author presents himself as someone who escaped life as a delinquent "mix-ups, fights, dope, hole-ups, robberies, the whole shebang". A police slip-up that caused the death of one of his friends was his wake-up call, leading him back to the mosque. He became an increasingly religious, associative militant, while going back to school, where he eventually received a degree in sociology. Much of his training, he detectable in the quotation above, is most important, by fragmenting a local branch of the UOIF, he discovered the Arabic language, and "a man, then his thought, Hassan al-Banna! And what a man! I owe him, for what little I know, my way of seeing the world, preaching Islam, and making myself useful."

This paradigmatic itinerary shared traits with Malcolm X's life course and was recounted to turn young people into self-aware Muslims. It also was intended to reinforce the UOIF in its struggle with the salafists and jihadis. Within such a frame of reference, *Neuf boy la France?* targeted the salafists when it made fun of "a bunch of cranks (buz) scrupulously following the letter of Islam while ignoring its spirit just as much." Obeying the Islamist movement's customary principle of presentation regarding September 11, Abdulkarim stated that "no tangible evidence exists as to the true mastermind of the attacks," and "only media repetition designated Bin Laden as their despicable mastermind." His reference work on the question was Thierry Meynier's *L'effroyable imposture* (The *Atrocious Imposture*), which denied that a hijacked plane ever hit the Pentagon.

Paradoxically, both the UOIF and the salafists benefited from the September 11 attacks. They drew strength from the social base that Abdulkarim and his colleagues, preachers, or lecturers pulled in and which social workers then organized within their charitable associations. They took advantage of the few months

during which Al Qaeda had not yet claimed responsibility for the attacks to deny that any sort of blame could be placed on Islam, and to accuse the press of distortion. But more important, they also provided answers that addressed the deep feeling of unease among young people who were suddenly faced with the urgent need to define Islam in a way that would exonerate them from the crimes and massacres committed in its name.

Instead of pushing young people away from Islamist organizations, the explosions of September 11 created a vortex into which some young European Muslims were drawn. Leaders and organizations denounced the carnage from within the movement, while granting a blanket exoneration to any activist who identified with the "correct" Islam. Sometimes these leaders placed the blame for 9/11 on obscure forces, including Messiaen or the CIA, and sometimes they claimed a debased sect of Islam. The statisticians, in their conflict with the Muslim Brothers, did not hesitate to suggest that the Brothers were just such a sect. Attendance at the UOIF's Le Bourget congress, which was signaling in the late 1990s, took off once more, and the veil became more visible in schools. Many signs indicated that, as a way of coping with the vague and unjust suspicions directed at bearded men and veiled women, a growing need for a deeper understanding of their faith took shape.

The groups that were in a dominant position to supply such a demand were UOIF and other like-minded Islamist organizations, which favored a strategy of visibility, or the salafists, who preferred greater discretion. Less up-market were two other branches of Islam: the more intellectual mystical sects, where confidentiality or the challenges followers most face discouraged a more general audience, and Islamic institutions that were perceived to be associated with a European state, such as the Paris Mosque.

From the 1990s, both the salafists and the UOIF claimed many

converts among young people who were not from Muslim backgrounds. Some of these young converts found their way to Islam either having grown up on the streets of poor neighborhoods where Arabs preponderate. When young Arab men began to grow beards and go to the mosque, their French, Portuguese, Caribbean, African Christian, or West Indian friends did the same, for fear of coming marginalized at a time when the urban subculture was becoming increasingly salafist, when Christian names were mocked, and when European culture as a whole was devalued. Others were drawn to Islamist organizations after having been alcoholics or drug addicts. Sometimes their redemption came about in prison, following the Malcolm X model, or in the housing projects where some Islamist groups, such as the Tablighi, specialized in retrieving "strays." But idealistic, intellectually motivated students were also recruited by the proselyter of movements active on out-of-city university campuses.

The converts' universe in Europe today is infinitely diverse. Leaving aside those who discovered their new religion through the influence of future imams and who, although their numbers are taken into account by the mosques, feel more or less indifferent toward this formality, there are also intellectuals and artists attracted by Saïdism, who are more loyal to their brotherhood than to the urbane and are not concerned with matters affecting the Muslim community as a whole. Some are rigorously ascetic, but others emancipate themselves from common belief. It is difficult to know what proportion these mystics make up among the fifty thousand "native French" converts Islamic organizations claim; but these mystics are hardly representative of the "social Islamism" that has arisen in recent decades.

Recently, there has been a tendency among certain converts to minimize the break in their lives when they embrace Islam. Un-

til the mid-1990s, converts systematically took a second Muslim name, seeking to translate their Christian name Vincent/Mansur, Régis/Ahmed Malek) or to achieve an alliterative effect (Roger/Raja). But today, outside salafist circles, the fashion is to use only one's original name in public. This can be contained on all sorts of Islamic websites, where intellectual converts play an important part. Many Muslim participants in chat rooms and newsgroups now sign with European names.

This evolution in naming may be due to a growing concern with the need of law-abiding citizens to distinguish themselves from radicals who have moved into jihad and related activities. Radical converts—such as former CIA supporters who underwent training in Afghan or Bosnian camps, or even combined armed robbery with jihadism, as did the "Rochaine gang" in the 1980s—in spite of some people; but most Muslim converts are keen to offset the suspicions that weigh on the majority because of the mayhem caused by a minority. On the other hand, keeping one's Christian name may be, in a few cases (such as that of the shoe bomber Richard Reid), an attempt to deflect the attention of authorities away from militant activities.

PERCEIVING THE RISE of an organized Islamist movement after September 11, the French authorities adopted a two-part strategy. The urgency of the terrorist threat led them to encourage the institutionalization of religious representation for Muslims within France, in order to create negotiators who would receive recognition from the Ministry of the Interior (which is responsible for religious institutions) in return for community policing. The UOIF, which had stayed at arm's length from the government because

of doctrinal loyalty to the Muslim Brotherhood, was chosen to play a leading role, since it seemed more capable than the Paris Mosque of imposing social constraints at a time when law and order were of the essence. The Paris Mosque had traditionally enjoyed a special relationship with the political leadership, especially the right, but it was not attuned to the young people in the outer cities.

By singling out the UOIF, Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy decided to favor an organization with a public, communitarist agenda. Communitarism, which is the opposite of integration, stresses belonging to an exclusive communal identity, in doing so, he failed to send any message to the majority of the country's Muslims who had followed the secularist path and had privatized religious observance. All of a sudden, the secularist French state looked as though it had abandoned its citizens of Muslim descent who were imbued with the secular values of the republic; it treated them as a mere flock for bearded communitarist shepherds.

At the national level, no deputies or senators came from these communities, although they included many upwardly mobile second-generation immigrants from North Africa who had acquired social, economic, or cultural status and importance. Sarkozy favored one particular religious organization as an intermediary: at the a period of time it would transcend its religious function and take over the task of political representation. Critics of this development—whether secularists or UOIF rivals—suspected electoral shepherders to deliver the Muslim vote. In Britain, by contrast, where the political system has consolidated an explicitly communitarist vision of "race relations" as the British say—several parliamentary, deputies, or lords of Indo-Pakistani Muslim origin play the role of mediators between their co-religionists and the state. The social and political diversity of elected representatives, former

union activists in labor, and "brown nannies" among the Tories diminishes the extent of the "Muslim vote."

In December 2002, at the end of a complex process of negotiation, the French Council of the Muslim Creed (CFCM) was finally established. Its representatives were elected on the basis of administrative divisions, each mosque receiving a certain number of votes according to the space it occupied on the ground. This was a totally novel modification of election policy, which favored the UOIF—the only organization that had penetrated the fifteen hundred Muslim prayer rooms across the country through its numerous local franchises. To maintain an equilibrium of sorts within the council, the government made sure that Bouabakar, dean of the Muslim Institute at the Paris Mosque, was appointed president of the CFCM. He had never, however, won Vice-President Fouad Akoun, secretary-general of the UOIF.

One faction was excluded entirely from the council: the partisans and disciples of Tariq Ramadan, a star preacher among young Muslims. In reaction, his spokesman disparaged the CFCM in very harsh terms, drew ironic parallels between the "rigged" elections and those held back home in Algeria, and compared the UOIF to the local North African assemblies of the colonial period. Like them, it had delivered votes and stability to the ambitious interior minister in return for help in consolidating its hegemony over France's network of Muslim organizations. "The French Council of the Muslim Creed and its local representatives" wrote Ramadan, "are to part of the right, and to Sarkozy in particular, what SOS Racisme and Ni Races Ni Souverains (Neither Races nor Slaves, a women's rights group) are to the socialist party . . . private financing grounds, tools in the new vote collection campaign, the instruments of a fairly crude retrieval policy."

Against the cumbersome maneuvers the UOIF carried out to ap-

through the state, Tariq Ramadan deployed a far different, lighter strategy, one that avoided expending his energy on a laborious effort to garner votes. A charismatic figure whose appeal flowed from his eloquence and his legitimacy as the grandson of Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, this Swiss citizen, whose father had fled to Geneva to escape repression under Nasser, was on *Time* magazine's list of the world's one hundred most influential people in 2004. Unsure whether he was an angel or a demon, the press was roused to stupefied fascination, which reinforced his status, for better or worse, as an international media phenomenon. Unlike the charmless UOIF, he needed no bureaucracy in Weberian terms. Tariq Ramadan embodied the figure of the Prophet, against the managers of the "goods of salvation" who controlled the CFCM.

Ramadan reached out to make alliances with the far left, working a territory abandoned by his rivals—just as the UOIF had done in its flirtation with the right, as exemplified by Minister of the Interior Sarkozy's keynote speech at the Easter 2003 congress. After having charmed (and then, in some cases, discredited) part of the Catholic Church, secular educators from the Teaching League, and the Third Worldist editorial staff of *Le Monde diplomatique*, Hassan al-Banna's grandson completed his triumphal polarizing march that year by establishing himself as the star of another congress. At the European Social Forum held in mid-November 2003 in northern Paris, he stole the limelight from anti-globalization activists on the extreme left.

The charismatic preacher was propelled to notoriety thanks to a profitable little scandal that pitted him against well-known French intellectuals. He made the front pages of *Le Monde* and *The New York Times* alike and appeared on numerous talk shows, where he depicted all his diatribe to seduce viewers of all ages, origins, and

faiths. The minister of the interior, by failing to invite him to join the CFCM, had closed the institutional door of French Islam, but Ramadan came in through the media window, snatching the executive levi's political capital for himself and achieving the status of a martyr in the eyes of his young disciples and a growing number of sympathizers.

The scandal revolved around the question of Israel and the U.S. occupation of Iraq. On October 3, 2003, *oumma.com* published an article by Ramadan, titled "Critique of the [new] Communist intellectuals." The lead explained that the text had been turned down by two prominent French dailies—"thereby instantly granting its author victim status in the eyes of frequent visitors to the site. Challenging "French Jewish intellectuals [who], although hitherto considered uni-valued thinkers, have begun to develop analyses increasingly oriented by communist sentiment, on the national and international levels," with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war on Iraq, but also to "Judeophobia" in the outer cities, he singled out the philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff (who is not Jewish, but who found himself under attack because of his name), then drew up a list in which Alain Finkielkraut, Alexandre Adler, Bernard Kouchner, André Ginkelman, and Bernard-Henri Lévy appeared.

This carefully calculated provocation reminded some of the "ists" of journalists who could be identified by their Jewish family name and were booed by crowds at a notorious extreme right-wing French leaders' meeting. The uproar this action triggered in the Paris press forced Ramadan to recant, while inadvertently dropping a hint of his media manipulation ("I knew Mr. Taguieff wasn't Jewish . . . I had been told, and I checked [emphasis added].") Still, he reaped the benefits of exceptional notoriety. The skill of this provocation forced his targets to react to the unacceptable form of

his article, in effect a blacklist, rather than to the real question raised by Ramadan in the article.

Ramadan's position struck a chord in a part of the French public who felt increasingly that, in France or Europe, any challenge to Israel's policy in the Middle East—indeed, any rational consideration whatsoever of Israel's place in U.S. foreign policy—was swept aside because pro-Israeli interest groups denounced them (immediately as anti-Semitic, though Israel's security, along with guarantee oil supplies, are the two inseparable pillars of the United States' Middle East policy). Unless this factor is taken into account, the Bush administration's war on terror is inexplicable.

The extremely preserved confusion between form and content in Ramadan's "scandalous" article allowed his supporters to point out that the press was defensively evading the main issue. They depicted a benign, formal bit of clumsiness in their hero's mode of expression, a peculiarity that his enemies had magnified and transformed into a cardinal sin. Ramadan thus scored another point: he turned the accusation of "communism," frequently leveled at the Islamist movement, against "Western Jewish intellectuals," while taking over the universalistic position they had abandoned when they became, he claimed, nothing more than the deaf and blind followers of Israel under Ariel Sharon. He deprived Jewish intellectuals of their universalism and took it for himself.

Through participation in the World Social Forum, Tariq Ramadan exchanged his earnings as the Muslim Youth's spokesman—an outfit too tight to accommodate his ambitions and talent—for the gift of the universalist intellectual, capable in the formula Edward Shils uses to describe such an intellectual's function: of "speaking about society's core values." When he intervened in the forum—and in an article published in the mainstream journal *Poetry*, where references to Susan Sontag far outweigh passages

from the Quran—Islam became not a condition of the argument but a conclusion, however implicit.

This posture is taken up in Ramadan's casually studied style of dress. He shuns both the salafists' jellaba with a jacket and sneakers and the LOF leaders' dark suits and ties. He prefers instead a white shirt with a Mao-style collar, worn slightly open. This attire distances him from the salafists' extravagant ordiness and the LOF's excessive conservatism but respects the prohibition on wearing ties, which most exalted Islamists consider a symbol of the cross. Dressed a little like a Revolution-on-Iranian government dignitary (the type that also mixed Third World verbosity with religious verve, but in a stronger cocktail), he stands out because his overall appearance references a different system of meaning. While the Pagan and Revolutionary Guard suppressed their solidarity with the "disinherited" by wearing filthy clothes and roughly shined beards, Tariq Ramadan cultivates a thin, proudly trimmed beard that combines a reference to Islam with seductive elegance. His white shirt belongs at the intersection of several fields of meaning: the revolution (Iranian or Chinese) but also the media-savvy intellectual, a necessary guest on television debates, epitomized by Bernard-Henri Lévy—the first to wear an open-necked white shirt on TV in the 1980s. Tariq Ramadan is playing a faithful variation of that seduction game—all the more faithful because his strategy is to snatch away Lévy's place as a universalist intellectual, after having consigned him to the darkness of Jewish communalists.

Some anti-globalization activists find this posture enchanting, and Ramadan uses bearded young men and veiled young women to fill out meeting halls that would otherwise be sparsely populated by aging middle-class leftists. But his position is somewhat disconcerting to "Young Muslims" who can no longer follow him—as cyberaut "martyrville" wrote on February 18, 2002, in a chat room

called forum_is_avec.com: *Assalamu alaikoum* ass. For a long time now Tariq Ramadan has been saying two different things. He tells us Muslims one thing, and he tells *kouffiers* (unbelievers) what they want to hear. But the big problem today is that the *kouffiers* are aware of this duality in Tariq Ramadan's personality and discourse. He has been stigmatized since he said those anti-Semitic things and it looks like now he wants to correct his mistakes. We Muslims claim: *Assalamu alaikoum wa RahmatuLlahi wa Barakatuh* forby Allah knows. Allah's greetings and blessings upon you! The transcription of Arabic religious phrases is approximate and based on colloquial pronunciation.

After various messages for or against Ramadan, an academic contribution posted the same day in the same discussion group and signed "Ame A." made a positive evaluation of Ramadan's attitude, comparing him to the Prophet, who lacked imbecils in times of weakness. He also judged Ramadan favorably in light of the norms established by the intelligent thirteenth-century jurist Ibn Taymiyya, the ultimate reference for salafists and Muslim Brothers alike, before concluding: "Another thing about TR is that his discourse is very subtle . . . He doesn't tell the *kouffiers* what they want to hear, he uses creative dissimulation, double meaning. An example of his subtlety: he suggests multiculturalism, not communalism, for France; neither of these words appears in the Quran and the Sunna, and what counts is . . . his goals he tries to find so that Muslims living in France can practice the maximum expected of them as a Muslim minority in a non-Muslim country . . . The brothers and sisters should go further than just noting that he has said he doesn't want communalists. They also need to consider the rest of his discourse and its content!"

Discussions in this online forum followed an article by Ramadan published in a magazine daily on February 11, 2004, and posted on

communa.com: calling for a demonstration for the right to wear the veil at school, which was to be held on February 24. The Geneva preacher asserted his attachment to universal values, asking "all citizens, without exception, to stand up and say, together, very loudly, that there is no such thing as minority citizenship in France, that these questions are everyone's business, in the same way, and that, after all, the political class itself is encouraging communalism while saying it wants to combat it. Rights are rights, and to demand them is a right."

This text presented the right to wear hijab at school not as the request of a specific community—it would have attracted support only from Islamist groups—but as a question of universal entitlement. This made it possible to include José Bové, the anti-globalization activist, as well as Noël Mamère, the environmentalist and advocate of the right to gay marriage, in the call to demonstrate. (Both refrained from attending, citing previous commitments.) In an attempt at value-switching, similar to the one he had undertaken in denouncing "French Jewish intellectuals," Ramadan turned the accusation of communalism against the French state and its institutions, stepping back of the republic's vaunted universalism and trying to retrieve it for himself, while drawing the basic references on secularism and socialism into his cause: "Voltaire, first and foremost, but also, closer to us, Janinès, must be spinning in their graves, shaken by the betrayal, twice bruised by the carelessness of those who no longer know how to read them . . . Their words are being used, emptied of their spirit."

As in the case of the LOFF, which must reconcile the conflicting demands of a support base influenced by populist preachers and its leaders' desire to be co-opted by certain French politicians, Tariq Ramadan needs to take responsibility for his growing internal con-

muslims. For now, he is attempting to flee the inconsistencies of his position by increasing his territory continuously. Geneva, France, even Old Europe are now too small; the world is his new frontier—fit, New World, cultivated by America. Having perfected his English in the 1990s at the Leicester Islamic Foundation (a British Islamic think tank staffed by Mawdudi disciples), in 2002 Tariq Ramadan announced with great fanfare that he had been hired as a visiting professor at Notre Dame University in Indiana. There, he received academic recognition he does not enjoy in Europe; this seal of approval is intended to strengthen his fragile status in the absence of a structured, hierarchical bureaucracy of the UOIF type.

But he is balanced on a tightrope. Part of his community base accuses him of having betrayed his Islamist affiliation. On the other hand, the television viewers who belong to his universalist target audience were surprised when, in a prime-time debate with Minister of the Interior Sarkozy, he refused to condemn the stoning of women explicitly. He was refused to requesting a "moratorium" on the question, so as not to alienate the part of his support base that follows a rigorous interpretation of Islam's sacred texts. Unless Tariq Ramadan takes responsibility for his growing internal contradictions, they will propel him, like all shooting stars, into the dark night.

AS ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS develop, the issue of gender equality becomes increasingly a field of contention in the battle for Europe. No matter what their priority or strategy in other matters, both salafists and the UOIF consider it imperative that veiling be allowed in schools. Veiling marks the perpetuation of community

control over their fronts and crucial separation from the values of an environment suspected of corrupting Islam. For salafists, all Europe is a land of unbelief, and they are obsessed by the threat of "Christianization" and other deviations that might affect their offspring, such as singing, dancing, road scheduling, sports, or even biology textbooks that contradict divine revelation. The salafist sex women in terms that defy any form of legal equality: this is clear from their declarations in favor of women's seclusion and their predilection for violence against women as a means of imposing correct behavior. Women, on the other hand, are not allowed to bear arms for the same reasons.

The UOIF defends the right to wear the veil at school in public by recourse to universalist, not communitist arguments. In this way they are able to garner support outside the community, without touching the question of legal equality between men and women, which contravenes sharia—a position that is unlikely to win the support of environmentalists, anti-globalization activists, and leftists, even those who champion "authenticity."

In statements targeting the media and mass audiences, demands for the right to veil at school are phrased essentially in terms of multiculturalism, which its advocates present as a core value of modernity. In contrast, secularism is disparaged as oppressive Jacobinism imposed by a declining nation-state. From this perspective, the veiled cybernaut in Arabized Arabia who sent an email to her favorite salafist sheikh in Saudi Arabia to find out whether she could take the pill while living in "the land of unbelief" embodies the values of a new globalized individualism, and personifies a universal democracy where communitist seclusion is transcended by the reach of the Internet.

This vision was taken up during the February 2004 demonstrations by young women who craped themselves in the French flag

and shouted, "Not my husband, not my father. I'm the one who close to cell." Let the Islamist network in the workers' cities exert pressure on women to conform and the preachers call for the implementation of "minority sharia." One socialist activist told the media that Islam authorizes beating one's wife severely. Even a Marxist preacher like Tariq Ramadan, who claims to be a very modern universalist, comes up short on the question of legal equality between men and women, for fear of antagonizing those in his constituency who believe that stoning an adulterous wife is part and parcel of the sharia of Islam.

The uniqueness of a nation is troubled when community identities whatever their origin—ethnic or religious, Muslim, Jewish, or Christian, African, Arab, Asian, or Gaelic—become the overriding theme in wars. Demarcations of hatred between young Muslims and Jews are on the rise, and they become especially acute on the playground the morning after Al Jazeera reports on Israel's repression of Palestinians, showing tanks and bulldozers mowing down Palestinian homes and the funerals of Palestinian victims or "martyrs" killed in suicide operations. Citizens are worried when French educators are refused to grouping students of a given faith together in a single school, to prevent the persecution they endure when they are isolated.

Between July and December 2005, these concerns prompted President Chirac to convene a commission responsible for deliberating the implementation of secularism—or *laïcité*—in twenty-first-century France. Named the Sias Commission after its president, it was responsible for redefining this secular pact guaranteeing the separation of church and state in France. When this public policy was instituted in 1905, France was predominantly rural and was not the target of significant immigration. These laws were passed at a time when *laïcité* was defined as a "disconnecting" from the Catholic Church, which influenced every domain of so-

cial organization with papal bulls rather than democratic debate. A century later, France, like all countries of Western Europe, was undergoing important demographic transformations as millions of people flowed in, most from across the Mediterranean or from the Indian subcontinent. In this context, *laïcité* took on an entirely different meaning. Its goal was no longer to defend freedom of conscience against a dominant Catholic Church, which has lost its arrogance and its powers of constraint, but to bring together populations of diverse origins by establishing rules of coexistence that allowed each individual to express that same freedom of conscience.

Such freedom, however, is undermined by closed community identities that keep a tight rein on liberty or pit the different components of Europe's new population: white against one other or ethnic, racial, or religious grounds. In the early twentieth century, the Vatican brought the weight of the Inquisition and excommunication to bear on the souls of its flocks in Catholic countries. Today, in much the same way, salafism, Islamic Jewish communalism, and some charismatic or evangelical Christian movements—as well as various hybrid sects—endeavor to wedge their congregations into enclaves where indoctrination undermines the basic foundations of individual citizens' freedom of conscience.

While it is an exaggeration to claim, as the Islamists do, that in twenty-first-century Europe the underprivileged classes are essentially "Muslim," the fact remains that populations of immigrant Muslim descent—like all migratory waves in history—are mostly disenfranchised groups. Many obstacles hinder their upward social mobility, and not all of these obstacles arise from xenophobia or racism, still less from Islamophobia (a term invented by the Islamist movement to deflect any criticism directed against it). But discriminatory attitudes play a large part.

In the twentieth century, communism or socialism secured the

dialectical integration of Europe's underprivileged classes into the political centre. That integration was institutionalized through participation in elections and even access to government. Today, these ideologies are irremediably obsolete, as the collapse of the Berlin Wall confirms. European political space no longer contains a party or organization with which those who believe they have been classified unjustly in the social hierarchy can identify. From time to time, in Vienna or Amsterdam, Khomeini or Zaidi, the far right has managed to capture the malcontents' vote, but this is a xenophobic reflex. Its essential target is the "indigenous" European population, defined as the detriment of those with immigrant origins—even if some of the latter are starting to perceive far-right ideology as a means of achieving inclusion and putting forward their own social demands.

It would be naive to imagine that dispossessed young people from the southern and eastern Mediterranean region could integrate seamlessly into European society. That society itself is fragmented by conflicts: social groups struggle against one another, conclude alliances to improve their relative positions, conquer power or grab market share. The recent history of immigration, like that of the lower classes in general, shows clearly that upward social mobility comes about only through political struggle—through radical challenges to the foundations of the social order. It is unsurprising that this conflictual dimension should manifest itself today in discontent among Europeans from Muslim backgrounds, or that religious leaders should take advantage of their plight to advance their own agenda, be it Islamist, antiist, or whatever.

But it would also be illusory to believe that religious leaders are necessarily the only possible representatives of this population—or that this population will be content to define itself exclusively as

"Young Muslims" whose consciousness may be expressed through assault militancy. The battle for Europe is larger than the one that religious leaders would have these young Muslims fight. It is a battle over the right of self-definition. The war for Muslim minds around the world may turn on the outcome of this struggle.