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Contemporary Nationalism in the Western World

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GODFRIED VAN BENTHEM VAN DEN BERGH

## Contemporary Nationalism in the Western World

### I. *An Exploration*

UNTIL VERY recently the subject of contemporary nationalism in the Western world was considered more or less dead. It seemed as if the mature democracies of the West were moving slowly but surely to establishing the institutions necessary to cope with their mutual dependence. Differences arose not between nationalists and internationalists, but between federalists and functionalists, between regionalists and universalists, or between "Europeans" and "Atlantacists." Nationalism was considered a thing of the past, linked to the unspeakable atrocities committed in its name. Nationalism had to be transcended to build a new world, so it was better to believe it no longer existed.

This was made easier by the fact that nationalism is a very vague concept. It does not imply a precise reference to a phenomenon in the real world. There are as many definitions of nationalism and its object, the nation, as there are writers about nationalism.<sup>1</sup> Nationalism has manifested itself in many historical forms, and the consequences of nationalist strivings have been both beneficial and disastrous. The evaluation of nationalism as a social force is therefore difficult and often determined by the specific forms and consequences with which the observer has come into contact. To give a contemporary example: if the United States government could have established, beyond doubt, that Ho Chi Minh's nationalism would prove stronger than his communism—thus making Viet-Nam a buffer against China's dominance in South East Asia—his nationalism might have been applauded as vigorously as the nationalism of de Gaulle is detested.

Some more specific reasons can be given for the postwar belief that nationalism in the Western world was a negligible factor. In the first place there was a tendency to identify nationalism with the aggressiveness of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Militarist

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Japan. The rational and enlightened democracies could almost by definition not be nationalist. Sentiments which by any objective standard should be called nationalist were thought of as being only patriotic.

Second, a historicist belief in the inevitability of the development of larger units than the nation-state was prevalent. It was thought that it was in the logic of historical development that both those and universal international organizations would arise in response to the functional needs of the modern industrialized and democratized world. The nationalism of the developing countries did not contradict this belief. It was thought that the phase of nation-building and the accompanying nationalism were necessary to give the cohesion to heterogeneous societies that modernization and economic development demanded. Modernization, in turn, would lead to a more rational appreciation of functional needs and to an attitude toward nationalism similar to the attitude in the West. These beliefs were not often made explicit, but they are implicit in much of the writing on regional and international integration.<sup>2</sup> This might also explain why the United Nations, Atlantic cooperation, and European integration were until recently all equally supported by the political élites of the Western world, without much thought being given to the possibility that these might be or become conflicting objectives.

General de Gaulle has forcibly brought nationalism into the limelight again. Although the above-mentioned historicist belief has led some commentators to call his nationalism "anachronistic," others have tried to describe it as neo-nationalism. Both descriptions stem from the idea that nationalism in the Western world has all but disappeared.

But was that idea correct? There is in any case one social scientist who never had any illusions about the disappearance of nationalism in the Western democracies. Gunnar Myrdal, in his book *Beyond the Welfare-State*, has, on the contrary, analyzed the model: "The Welfare-State is nationalistic."<sup>3</sup>

In the pre-World War I period the process of national integration—implying "spatial and social mobility as between regions and classes, equalisation of opportunities, cultural homogenisation and an increasingly perfected political democracy"—proceeded in a partial world community of the rich countries. Between them labor, capital commodities, and services flowed freely. Since then a series of international crises and the great depression have led to in-

creasingly nationalistic economic policies. These, in turn, have contributed to further international disintegration, which led to even more nationalistic policies. This process is an illustration of Myrdal's well-known idea of circular causation: each change is both the cause and the effect of the other changes, with the result that the changes cumulate.

Although after World War II some effective countermeasures in the field of trade and payments were taken in the context of regional organizations within the zone of the rich countries, the trend toward national economic integration is continuing with "unabating force." In each of the rich countries economic progress is taken more or less for granted; education is continuously being improved; social mobility and sharing in the national culture increase, facilitated by better means of transportation and communication. This has made a further development of the democratic political system possible, so that it now works to bring the economic system into accord with the ideals of liberty and equality of opportunity for all.

The role of the state in economic and social life has become more and more important. From "nightwatchman" or "oppressor" the state has changed into a "provider," into the Welfare or Service state. This development has been accompanied by a modicum of national planning which has "for many reasons, almost by necessity, an autarchic tendency." Economic policies become directed "towards welfare and equality at home, full employment and stability of the national economy, without much thought being given to international integration."

But this process does not operate only at the economic level. Living in a democratic national Welfare state tends to turn people's interests inwards. Their expectations focus on the particular groups and organizations that articulate their interests and take part in the process of collective bargaining by which the decisions in the Welfare state are taken. In this way the Welfare state "builds, ever firmer, its own psychological foundations in people's valuations and expectations." And, "A growing identification with the nation-state, and with all the people within its boundaries, is thus a natural result of the development of the democratic Welfare state." Human solidarity is thereby confined to the boundaries of the nation. When international relations seem to threaten his prosperity or security, the citizen is tempted to assume a nationalistic outlook: "to avoid viewing the international development in a world perspective and from the viewpoint of his ideals of liberty and equality as

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applied to mankind at large, but instead to narrow his vision so as to make it easier for him to put the blame on the foreigners." "In particular," Myrdal adds, "the cold war opens the opportunity to escape responsibility by attributing all threats to a single origin, the world communist conspiracy."

According to Myrdal we must face squarely the fact that "Our democratic Welfare state in the richer countries is protective and nationalist." His remedy is not to eliminate the Welfare state, but to pose the goal of a Welfare world as the logical complement of the Welfare state and to demonstrate that the realization of this goal would be to the advantage of the existing Welfare states.<sup>4</sup> The great merit of Myrdal's analysis is that he focuses our attention on the structural characteristics of the modern nation-state and demonstrates how conducive these are to nationalist behavior and attitudes. The only objection one can make to Myrdal's treatment of nationalism is that he refrains from giving a description of what he understands nationalism to be. Implicit in his analysis, though, is a very broad view of nationalism as both policies and attitudes which are nation-centered, based on a narrow and short-term definition of the national interest. He defines nationalism, one might say, as thinking, attitudes, or behavior which takes the interests of *national* society rather than those of *human* society at heart. Nationalism, in Myrdal's view, contains an element of hypocrisy: it is the application of values held to be universal in a limited "national" framework. He is concerned mainly with *economic* nationalism.

But one can point to a similar process of circular causation with respect to defense. *National survival* is still held to be the ultimate goal of defense,<sup>5</sup> and as long as there is no immediate prospect of a World Order, which can guarantee survival, nation-states will want to defend themselves. Also, because defense implies mobilizing military power, one state's defense is often perceived as a threat to another state's survival. Nuclear weapons have as yet not changed the psychological mechanisms leading to perceptions of threat. As a statement of fact, John Herz is surely right when he points to the extreme "permeability" of the territorial state in the nuclear age.<sup>6</sup> Knowledge of this fact, however, has not only failed to provide us with a solution for the creation of a world-wide institutional framework capable of maintaining peace by having a monopoly of force; it has even seriously hampered defense integration on a regional scale.<sup>7</sup> Nuclear power has not led to the "demise" of the territorial state; it has instead provided a new symbol of national prestige for

the nation-state. And the nuclear stalemate, while being a constraint for the superpowers, has provided new opportunities for independent action by the smaller ones.

This shows us that a government does not have to be guided by an explicit nationalist ideology or by specific nationalistic aims to behave in a nationalistic manner. The structure of the Welfare state and the intractabilities of security may promote nationalistic behavior even by the most internationalist of statesmen.

But the structure of the Welfare state and the security dilemma do not exhaust the catalogue of factors contributing to nationalist attitudes and behavior. The nation-state has developed as, or from, a "national culture society,"<sup>8</sup> as a unit distinguished by "the complementarity or relative efficiency of communications among individuals."<sup>9</sup> These theoretical statements by distinguished researchers of nationalism point to the extremely complicated clusters of feelings, emotions, symbols, ideologies, role perceptions, historical experiences, and patterns of economic, social, and political communication for which the concept "nation" might be considered a shorthand description. In all nation-states nationalist ideologies are still "available": they may be picked up and used again or their premises may still be so self-evident that political issues, or political goals, may derive from them. The nation-state is commonly identified with the fatherland, with "home" in a larger sense, and for this reason commands the self-evident loyalties of its inhabitants. Individual identity and self-respect are, with few exceptions, still related to the image of their own nation and the respect it can command at home and abroad. Probing deeper than ordinary conversation, one will find in nearly every individual a shifting balance of pride and doubt about the qualities of the nation to which he belongs. Indifference about nationality is rare.

With these complexities in mind, the following descriptions of specific instances of nationalism have been written with the purpose of trying to isolate the "nationalist" aspects of the behavior, ideologies, and attitudes of a number of countries in the Western world. The emphasis is different in each: the ideology of a great actor (de Gaulle); historical experience and Welfare state nationalism (Britain); a specific historical problem (Germany); the experience and social structure of a small country (the Netherlands); attitudes (European nationalism); and the historical experience of a country which suddenly found itself a world power (the United States). The common denominator of all these aspects of nationalism is that

they focus on ideas, attitudes, and behavior which presume that the nation-state is and will continue to be the most important unit of human organization. The descriptions may sometimes seem slightly one-sided, but that is a result of the perspective taken. Their purpose is to explore the varieties of contemporary nationalism in the Western world, not to give a comparative theory; yet some conclusions will be advanced.

. II. *The Nation as Person and Idea: The Nationalism of General de Gaulle*

It cannot be denied that the nationalism of de Gaulle—his policies and ideology—has been beneficial for France itself. After the thirties, full of discord and feuds between the different political and social groupings, marked by an “orgy of self-laceration and doubts”;<sup>10</sup> after the humiliation of the quick defeat by Germany; after Vichy and the occupation; after the disastrous colonial wars, Diem Bien Phu, Algeria, and the threat of civil war unleashed by the OAS, France needed someone or something to return to her a certain measure of self-respect, pride, and national cohesion. One has to admit that Stanley Hoffmann is right when he says that the “confident nation” of de Gaulle is better than the “confused and bitter” nation of the thirties and the postwar period.<sup>11</sup>

This judgment, however, implies a view of de Gaulle’s nationalism as a means to heal the wounds of the past and as an instrument to make of France a stable, established nation-state.<sup>12</sup> If this were so, would the excessive nationalism characterizing de Gaulle’s foreign policy have been necessary? Would it have had to be so dogmatic with respect to supranational forms of organization? It would be misleading to explain de Gaulle’s nationalism purely as a pedagogical instrument in which he does not really believe. De Gaulle’s nationalism is an essential and deeply ingrained part of his personality and view of the world.

De Gaulle sees himself as having been called to lead France to its destiny. He is able to perceive this destiny by the grace of his special intuition: “Toute ma vie je me suis fait une certaine idée de la France” is the first sentence of the memoirs of de Gaulle. He goes on: “The emotional side of me tends to imagine France, . . . as dedicated to an exalted and exceptional destiny. . . . But the positive side of my mind also assures me that France is not really herself unless she is in the front rank . . . . In short, to my mind, France

cannot be France without greatness."<sup>13</sup> It would be wrong to say that de Gaulle identifies himself with France in the sense that he wants to use France for his own greatness. He sees himself as the inspiration of France, as the executor of her destiny. This gives him the right to speak for France, as he did in 1940 in London without being the "official" representative of his country: "Devant la confusion des âmes françaises, moi, Général de Gaulle, soldat et chef français, j'ai conscience de parler au nom de la France."

De Gaulle's belief in the destiny of nations implies a view of the nation as some kind of organic entity with a distinct personality. It is not this particular biological metaphor, however, which has influenced de Gaulle's thinking, but the biological metaphysics contained in the philosophical writings of Bergson. This becomes clear from de Gaulle's early and, for his political philosophy, most illuminating book, *Le Fil de l'Épée*.

For de Gaulle the nation is the only constant and immutable unit in history. Ideologies go, but nations remain: "Je me refuse à entrer dans une discussion valable sur le sujet de la querelle idéologique entre Pékin et Moscou. Ce que je veux considérer ce sont *les réalités profondes qui sont humaines, nationales et par conséquent internationales*. L'étendard de l'idéologie ne couvre en réalité que des ambitions."<sup>14</sup>

The nation is a human entity which is also superhuman because it has "duration" (Bergson's concept of time) and forms a continuous stream of life. By belonging to a nation, the individual can participate in a life transcending his own lifetime. He is thus admitted to the continuity of life, to the flow of time.

The nation, like every living being, is a center of action—not of a fixed (determined) amount of action, but of a quantity of potential action. To exhaust these potentialities fully or at least as far as possible gives the nation "grandeur" and leads her on to achieve "gloire." The intellect cannot grasp this truth; the will to "grandeur" finds its source in intuition. Intuition will guide the individual inevitably toward identification with the nation, if he wants to partake of the stream of life. The life-force (*élan vital*) must lead to national greatness. But national greatness is not achieved by prosperity. Prosperity is a useful result of intellectual effort, but, if prosperity and personal happiness are posited as the ends of life, stagnation and inaction are the undesirable outcome. Alfred Grosser says that for de Gaulle: "The lot of the French is not an end, but a means to improve the destiny of France."<sup>15</sup>

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What should be the goals of the leader of France? Because the world consists of a number of nations—with different destinies and interests—foreign policy must reign supreme. As Grosser has written: “A nation may be regarded as a human entity which acts in a world made up of other such entities. In this perspective, foreign policy is the only true policy. The sole aim of internal policy is to assure order and unity, and to develop an influence to be used abroad.”

The first necessity is to give the nation the maximum of “puissance”: “Le profond ressort de l’activité des meilleurs et des forts est le désir d’acquérir la puissance.”<sup>16</sup> But the nationalism of de Gaulle is not warlike or aggressive. De Gaulle’s conception of the role of France has much in common with his ideas on leadership.<sup>17</sup> To the nations which accept France’s leadership, the leader is benevolent. But France must be able to raise her voice in the concert of nations—and be listened to—because she is destined to lead. But what France does for her own greatness also serves the world. The mission of France is universal.

Apart from the leader, the nation needs an instrument of authority: the state. But the state is subordinated to the will to greatness of the nation as interpreted by the leader.<sup>18</sup> The state therefore should not be “une juxtaposition d’intérêts particuliers dont ne peuvent sortir jamais que de faibles compromis,” but “une institution de *décision, d’action, d’ambition*, n’exprimant et ne servant que l’intérêt national.”<sup>19</sup> Above all else, the nation needs an instrument of power: “la situation de la France a profondément changé. Ses institutions nouvelles la mettent en mesure de *vouloir* et *d’agir*. Son développement intérieur lui procure la prospérité et *la fait accéder aux moyens de la puissance*.” The only instrument of power which gives a nation rank in this age is a nuclear force. The “force de frappe” is therefore above all a necessary attribute of the nation, to be acquired by the nation with her own means. Without her own nuclear force, France would not be able to follow her destiny, because she would be hampered in the exercise of her free will by the will of others. Without a nuclear force, France cannot be really independent: “We would no longer be a European power, a sovereign nation, but simply an integrated satellite.”<sup>20</sup>

The nation is for de Gaulle thus both the highest value and the most profound reality (“une réalité profonde, qui est humaine”). Every nation has a special destiny and therefore specific interests. Human reality is “nationale et par conséquent internationale”; it is

structured on the nation-state. Federalism and supranational institutions—composed of bureaucrats and technocrats, trying to represent a fictitious common interest instead of the only real, the national, interest—are unnatural and therefore pernicious. Integration is a bad word: nations cannot merge, for they have different destinies and interests. If their interests coincide, they can cooperate and coordinate their policies. That this is a necessity in the age of industrialization and development is very well realized by de Gaulle. But, in his conception, there are definite limits to the possibilities of international cooperation. There must be as little institutionalization as possible, and, when international institutions are necessary, the final say has to remain with intergovernmental institutions. Cooperation and coordination must be based on the autonomy of the participating nations. To integrate the French nuclear force in an Atlantic defense “partnership” or “federation” would be a crime against France, for the destinies and interests of Anglo-Saxons and French cannot remain identical over a longer period. This is the basis of de Gaulle’s attitude, and all arguments for the “force de frappe” based on strategic hypotheses (even though they may be rational within their own context) are rationalizations of his overriding concern with “la France.”

What kind of foreign policy goals have followed from de Gaulle’s type of explicit nationalist ideology?

Defenders of the Gaullist position regarding the necessity of ending American hegemony in the Atlantic framework have often based their defense on de Gaulle’s “Europeanism.” It can indeed be said that de Gaulle is also a European “nationalist”: he thinks that Europe, as “*mère de la civilisation*,” has a special destiny and that Europe’s great past ensures her great future. Stanley Hoffmann has, because of this, written that “Europeaniser les Européens” should be considered one of the most important goals of de Gaulle.<sup>21</sup> But the form of the United Europe de Gaulle has wanted to create has given sufficient foundation to the suspicions of his partners in the Six that his European purpose was but a cover for his desire to impose a French instead of an American hegemony on them.

De Gaulle’s “Europeanism” has thus suffered from a fatal ambivalence and from considerable confusion. The relations between French nationalism and European nationalism have never been made clear. The only “Europe” that would be able to fulfill de Gaulle’s desire for independence from the United States is a Europe de Gaulle cannot imagine. His insistence on the necessity

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of an independent French "force de frappe" has made it much more difficult to defend his version of a political union of the Six. He could probably have attracted more support if he and his ministers had not made it absolutely clear that the French "force de frappe" can become "European" only as a protecting umbrella spread out by France over the Six, but remaining under the exclusive jurisdiction of France.

But de Gaulle's aims for Europe have not been determined solely by his European nationalism. De Gaulle's view of human reality as founded on the continuity and persistence of nations implies that lasting peace can be achieved only by some sort of "equilibrium." It is possible to explain de Gaulle's European policy and his attitude toward the United States and NATO as an attempt to hasten the change from one system of world equilibrium—the bipolar system, which cannot last because it is based on ideological rather than national solidarities—to another system in which France (and Europe) will be able to play a more important role. This has been done in a one-sided, but lucid, and very illuminating book, *L'Europe de l'Atlantique à l'Oural*, written by the theoretical economist and former president of the French European movement, René Courtin.<sup>22</sup>

Courtin believes that the clue to de Gaulle's foreign policy goals can be found in the seemingly elusive formula "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals," which de Gaulle has used time and time again.<sup>23</sup> He thinks this implies a view of the future world equilibrium as being based on the coexistence of three great powers: in the West, the group of Anglo-Saxon nations; in the East, China; and, in the center, a reconciled greater Europe. This means that Russia must again have replaced the Soviet Union. Marxist ideology cannot change the essential qualities of the Russian nation. Russia is a "nation blanche d'Europe, conquérante d'une partie de l'Asie . . . en face de la multitude jaune qu'est la Chine, innombrable et misérable, indéstructible et ambitieuse."<sup>24</sup> China will make claims to Siberia, the Algeria of Russia. The Urals have been chosen not only because they are the traditional geographical border of Europe, but also because the real, the white Russia stops there. The Atlantic Alliance will have to disappear: it was anyway but a consequence of the mistakes of Yalta and Potsdam, not a permanent framework in which France would find her destiny.

Courtin thinks that de Gaulle wanted to use the Europe of the Six, led by France as the only nuclear power, as a counterweight

to Russia in the great European confederation to be. Germany would be lured in because it could be reunified. The attractiveness of this scheme for Russia would lie in the recognition of existing borders, the withdrawal of American troops and weapons from the continent, the dissolution of NATO, and a German pledge never to acquire nuclear weapons. The task of the great European confederation would then be the coordination of foreign policy toward the Anglo-Saxons, China, and the developing world.

Courtin even believes that de Gaulle already saw a chance to achieve this at the time he broke off the negotiations between the EEC and Britain, but that his scheme misfired completely. It seems more probable, however, that de Gaulle, in January 1963, wanted only to explain his vision of the future to the Russians to see whether they had any interest in this conception—and was rebuffed. But it is entirely plausible that de Gaulle indeed considers the kind of world equilibrium described by Courtin as the ideal situation for France to play an important role in a stable world of nation-states. De Gaulle's style of politics, and the fact that only *he* determines foreign policy, makes it possible for him to entertain both long-term objectives and goals which are intermediate from the point of view of the long-term objective, but have direct advantages in the transitory period. For example an independent "force de frappe" provides France with diplomatic and bargaining power both in the Atlantic Alliance and in the great European confederation of the future; a political union of the Six on de Gaulle's terms would enhance the power of France, could become a focus of attraction for other European countries, and could serve eventually as a counter-weight against Russia in the great European confederation. But, as it is not certain how long the thawing of the Soviet Union and the reassertion of the Russian nation will take, the transitory period might last a long time. This means that one should always provide oneself with fall-back positions; a position of leadership in the "tiers monde," good relations with Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and even China. Nevertheless, it seems that there is less emphasis on "Europe" now in French foreign policy than before. De Gaulle's ambitions for Europe have been frustrated, and the new world equilibrium is, in any case, distant. It seems that de Gaulle has given up wanting to change the international system and has fallen back on a policy which tries to maximize French prestige and influence in the existing international environment.

The Europe of the Six is now considered useful only as a means

to give France some economic advantages. The supranational ambitions of the EEC, until recently acquiesced in because the Six might have developed into the independent political unit de Gaulle wanted it to become, must now disappear. If the European Commission were to become the strong political body which it could and if the EEC were to develop further along the lines of the Treaty of Rome, France might find itself severely limited in its liberty of action. The role of the Commission must therefore be curtailed for both ideological and practical reasons.

De Gaulle's provocation of the 1965 crisis in the Common Market<sup>25</sup> provides a severe test for the theory of supranational integration, which is based on the conception of a process which moves forward until the supranational and national arenas of decision-making have become inextricably linked, and which acquires its dynamism from the rewards which the participants receive.<sup>26</sup> The interest groups in France behave according to this theory, that is, they disapprove of de Gaulle's actions. But it is now doubtful whether the economic rewards of the supranational method—which leaves unresolved the crucial questions of human identity and solidarity which nationalism answers—will prevail over the socio-psychological rewards of nationalism from which de Gaulle derives his power.

### III. *British Nationalism: "The Lion, the Ostrich and the Gentleman"*<sup>27</sup>

The British empire could not have been built—and certainly not maintained—if its growth had not been accompanied by the awakening of the nation and of nationalism. But, in Britain, nation and state were contained within "natural borders." British insularity is an important determining factor of the character of British nationalism. The security of the insular position has contributed to the relative smoothness with which the British political system could evolve gradually toward tolerance, freedom, and democracy. The Puritan revolution was too early to upset continuity as much as the French revolution did, and it gave Britain a national ideology: the messianic belief in the British mission to bring religious freedom and political liberty to the world. In the nineteenth century this ideology was put forward in a secularized form by John Stuart Mill, who considered the British nation to be the most suited to spread his ideas "on liberty" to the other peoples of

Europe. If British influence in the world were weakened, the cause and practice of freedom would be weakened too.<sup>28</sup>

A revolution was not required, however, for the political emancipation of the British people, but evolution instead of revolution has lent the British establishment its peculiar conservative and octopus-like character. This characteristic of the British social structure might have led to the complacency which made Arthur Koestler compare the British nation in peacetime with an ostrich taking its head out of the sand only in wartime to change miraculously into a lion.

Most of the British empire was built before the heyday of nationalism in the period 1870-1914. British parliamentary government, even before the French revolution, was admired and misinterpreted by Montesquieu as the "trias politica" model for France to follow. Britain led the industrial revolution: it had in London the first world financial center and the first big modern navy; it was also the first world policeman. Britain was already a *status-quo* power in the nineteenth century.

For these reasons British nationalism has never been rancorous or shrill: it has always been confident, dignified, and a bit arrogant.<sup>29</sup> The British are not conscious of being nationalists. A gentleman is a patriot, not a nationalist.<sup>30</sup>

After 1945 the lion quickly calmed down. Was it the lion or the ostrich that elected Labour? It is difficult to say: Certainly, the king of lions was deposed, but do ostriches like to experiment with nationalization? In any case, the fact that Britain was the only allied country in Europe not occupied during the war (on the Continent the resistance played an important role in the development of the European idea) made British political opinion much less inclined to see the future in terms of becoming part of a supranational entity, of a European federation. On the contrary, Britain still aspired to an independent role in world politics which over the years has been defined in different ways: as leader of the Commonwealth; as junior, but diplomatically more experienced, partner of the United States; or as mediator in the Cold War. It was much more difficult for Britain to admit decline than it was for the Continental powers, which had to start from scratch after 1945. The early decision to build a separate nuclear force was indicative of British aspirations. There were, of course, also more rational reasons<sup>31</sup> for the British search to remain one-up on Europe, but plain nationalism has certainly been an important cause. British hostility to supranational

integration had manifested itself before the days of the Schuman plan. In the Council of Europe, itself a compromise between British pressure (the Committee of Ministers) and federalist ideas (the Consultative Assembly), the British were the leaders of the "functionalists" as opposed to the "federalists." The nationalism of the Welfare state, as referred to in the first part of this article, heavily influenced the attitude of the Labour government. According to Northedge: "There was concern in Labour Party circles lest the postwar mood in western Europe revolt against national sovereignty should sweep Britain into supranationalist arrangements at the moment when the main levers of her economy were being brought, for the first time in peace, under state control at home." Northedge mentions two other reasons for Britain's attitude toward Europe: Britain as a member of a united Europe "might be wholly unable to influence the larger forces outside Europe which were coming to shape the world as a whole" and "it was hard to believe that the Europeans . . . really had the political ability to make a fundamentally constructive advance."

Both Welfare-state nationalism and a traditional nationalist desire to keep "rank" and play a prestigious role in world politics were thus behind Britain's refusal to have anything to do with the integrative efforts undertaken on the "European Continent." The Schuman Plan, the abortive European Defense Community, and the European Economic Community were equally opposed by Britain because of their supranational ambitions. Attlee declared, for example, apropos of the Schuman Plan, "We on this side were not prepared to accept the principle that the most vital forces of this country should be handed over to an authority that is utterly undemocratic and responsible to nobody."<sup>32</sup> The fact that Britain had to remain "independent" was taken so much for granted by Labour and Conservative alike that serious debate on the question of joining Europe started only after the government had already taken the decision to apply for membership in the EEC.<sup>33</sup>

On the other hand, it is perhaps not quite fair to attribute British opposition to forming a part of a federated Europe only to stubborn nationalism. Many Britons would not object to becoming part of an Atlantic federation and some would not even mind if Britain were to become the fifty-first state of the United States.<sup>34</sup> As John Mander remarks: "Frenchmen are foreigners: Americans are not. It is irrational that Englishmen feel this way, but they do."<sup>35</sup> It is not only joining a *supranational* Europe that Britain objected

to, but also joining *Europe*. But there is a certain difference between Labour and Conservative in this respect. The Conservative government took the decision—mainly defended on economic grounds, and without spelling out the political implications—to link Britain to Europe, but Macmillan went out of his way to save the formal independence of the British deterrent at the ill-fated conference at Nassau. And Conservative defenders of the “independent” British deterrent often sound exactly like Gaullists, although they claim to want the “extra diplomatic weight” that the bomb insures mainly to sit in on disarmament negotiations. Labour, on the other hand, was much more ready to give up the independence of the British deterrent—in return for more influence on American decision-making. But, with respect to Europe, Labour has been—no doubt also for domestic political reasons—more nationalistic than the Conservatives. In a speech given at the Labour Party Conference in October 1962 Gaitskell commented that Britain’s entry into EEC might be “the end of Britain as an independent nation” and that “as a province of Europe” Britain could not remain the “mother country” of the Commonwealth. To join EEC “would mark the end of a thousand years of history.”<sup>36</sup> As Nora Beloff rightly remarks: “The European issue had muddled things up.”<sup>37</sup>

The new Labour government at first conformed to the predictions of those Europeans opposed to British entry into the EEC by deciding on the 15 per cent surcharge on imports without prior consultation, not even with its EFTA partners. This “nationalistic” behavior—apart from violating EFTA—was considered contrary to the postwar European code of economic policy. How could a government like that understand the “community method”? But it seems that the Labour government has now made a more realistic assessment of the future of British relations with Europe. And there are no indications that Britain might want to follow the pattern of de Gaulle’s nationalist policies, that is, exploit the international constellation for its own ends. The 1961-1962 debate has in any case had the healthy effect of making the alternatives for Britain much clearer.

#### IV. *The Seduction of the Nation-State: Nationalism in Germany*

The unification of Germany in 1870-71 was supported by popular German nationalism, but brought about by Bismarck with the

interests of the Prussian state in mind. On the basis of the linguistic definition of the German nation—the ideal model of the nation according to Rupert Emerson<sup>38</sup>—however, the German nation-state did not come into being before Hitler's "Grossdeutschland" in 1938. Only then were all those settlements considered as German (the German-speaking part of Switzerland being an obvious exception) caught within German borders. But, as Lemberg remarks, precisely that solution demonstrated that a German nation-state comparable with the French or Spanish nation-states did not belong to the realm of possibilities.<sup>39</sup> It did in any case last only seven years. But the idea of the German nation-state lived on.

Immediately after World War II, however, every German of good will was consciously anti-nationalist. This feeling was so strong in the younger generation that it prohibited any identification with Germany and, therefore, also with the society in which these young Germans had to live. "Ohne mich" (without me) was a widespread answer to a past for which they felt the German nation as a whole should be held responsible. European unification therefore had a particular significance for Germany. On the one hand, "Europe" could be welcomed by many Germans as a new fatherland; on the other hand, because the supranational principle made it possible for Germany to be accepted as an equal partner in the new European organizations, the Germans could feel that "Europe" was not forced upon them. "Europe" not only provided the Germans with a new focus of identification, but also returned to them some self-respect *as Germans*. The enthusiasm for Europe has for these reasons been very strong in Germany.

But it was difficult for Germany to enter Europe without any qualms. Germany was burdened with an old-fashioned nineteenth-century problem that also had to be solved. According to nationalist doctrine, state and nation should coincide; and, since Germany was divided, "reunification" was both morally and politically desirable and necessary. West Germany was an unnatural state, and the G.D.R. did not even exist. Adenauer once declared (during his visit to Moscow): "The division of Germany is abnormal. It is against human and divine law and nature."<sup>40</sup> This nationalist assertion seems so self-evident that most Germans would be reluctant to consider reunification a nationalist issue.

The German national problem has regrettably been intensified by the ideological struggle and by the kind of regime the G.D.R. had to suffer. It was furthermore both symbolized and intensified

by the divided former capital, Berlin. But the successive German governments have not given priority to "reunification." They have tried—within the framework of tight relationships with the movement toward European integration and narrow Atlantic relations—to let the political goals of the Atlantic allies coincide with those of Germany.<sup>41</sup> But, they have not seriously tried to dispose of the "nationalist" problem by replacing the goal of "reunification" by the goal of achieving for the East Germans an existence worthy of human beings.<sup>42</sup> On the contrary, even in German trains, one can still read that there are parts of Germany—of which the borders of 1937 are drawn—"zur Zeit unter Fremdverwaltung" (temporarily administered by foreigners).

But "reunification" has been promoted more by words than by deeds. German foreign policy should, according to its makers, not only be a "reaction to the behavior of the environment . . . but also a reaction to the German past."<sup>43</sup>

Given the definition of "reunification" as at least to a large extent the nationalist problem of recreating a German nation-state, it is possible to use reunification as a thermometer to measure German nationalism: when public and political concern about reunification increases, the temperature of German nationalism rises. That this is in fact the case can, apart from the results of recent public opinion polls, also be concluded from the efforts of German politicians to make nationalism respectable again.<sup>44</sup> To give one example of many: Defense Minister Von Hassel declared that he would like to see an increase of "Heimatliebe" (love of the fatherland) and added: "How open the world may be and how far the free nations may go in their cooperation, only the soil of the fatherland can give the solid basis for personal uprightness and political behavior. The abstract idea does not have the power to bring men and peoples together."<sup>45</sup>

To the desire for reunification and the need for a new German self-respect, as forces which might lead to a resurgence of nationalism, should the influence of the example of de Gaulle on German political thinking be added? "Why shouldn't Germany start pursuing a more active foreign policy directed mainly to the defense of her own interests?" One finds this attitude primarily among the politically interested of the young generation.<sup>46</sup> The so-called German "Gaullists," however—their most important representatives being Strauss and zu Guttenberg—do not defend a nationalist policy in this sense. They do not advocate German behavior

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modeled on de Gaulle's foreign policy, but they want what they conceived of as a Gaullist Europe, politically and militarily strong and less dependent on the United States. But one cannot separate this desire from their criticism of the United States. They think that the United States, by wanting to maintain a *détente* in its relations with the Soviet Union, will be forced to accept the *status quo* of a divided Germany and so act against the German national interest, which they interpret as reunification.<sup>47</sup> The successive German governments, however, have certainly not been led by a nationalist ideology. On the other hand, German policy toward the EEC has often been hesitant, and the German government has—as have all the other member governments—usually held back from widening the powers of the European Commission. To conclude: German nationalism after the war has understandably been very weak, but there are disconcerting danger signals. (Mr. Strauss's raising of the spectre of a new Hitler if Germany were not treated as equal in the nuclear field has been a recent addition.) The future of German nationalism will very much depend on the evolution of domestic politics and the treatment by the German government and political parties of the reunification issue.

### *V. The Nationalism of Small Nations: Dutch Nationalism*

There is a qualitative difference between the position of nations which, because of the nature of their nationalism, their history, their geographic position, and their power potential, are able to fulfill—or to aspire to—an independent role in world politics and nations which are forced to link their destiny to a large whole.<sup>48</sup> It is, therefore, necessary to give at least one example of the latter category, for which I have chosen a country with which I am reasonably familiar.

It can be—and has been—maintained that Great-Netherlands (including most of Belgium and part of the Northwest of France) is a more “natural” nation than the Netherlands. The well known historian Pieter Geyl, after a polemic against the “Belgian” historian Henri Pirenne, published in 1930 the first volume of his *Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Stam*, which, although “stam” means literally “tribe,” can best be translated as “History of the Netherlands Nation.”<sup>49</sup> (Geyl could, of course, not use the word “nation” because it would seem as if he had written a book about the Netherlands, whereas with “stam” he meant the area where

Dutch was spoken.) Geyl tried to demonstrate that the links between North and South had been much stronger—politically, culturally, and economically—than was commonly supposed and that the separation had been due to accidental, mainly strategic circumstances. The implication was that the “real” nation still existed, but did not coincide with the state boundaries.

The fact that this was written as late as 1930 demonstrates that irredentist nationalism has been extraordinarily weak in the Netherlands. There has never been strong support for the Flemish movement in the Netherlands. During World War I the Flemish “activists” turned in desperation to Germany for support—which was repeated by the “Flemish National League” (VNV) during World War II. In the Netherlands only historians, writers—one of the best prewar literary journals was called *Groot Nederland* (“Great Netherlands”)—and national-socialist and fascist groups showed interest in the Flemish cause.<sup>50</sup> Why? Apart from the historical development as described by Geyl, a possible answer to this question may be found in the Dutch social structure. Dutch society is characterized by the phenomenon of pillarization:<sup>51</sup> the whole of social and political life is still organized on the basis of religious and quasi-religious affiliations. But this phenomenon is the consequence of the struggle for emancipation of three religious and political-ideological movements: Catholics, Workers (Socialists), and Orthodox-Protestants against the Liberal-Protestant patrician establishment. I would suggest that all the energies of the emancipating groups, which otherwise could have turned to “nationalist” causes, were consumed in this struggle, whereas the patrician establishment could not care less about the Catholic peasants of the Flemish provinces of Belgium.

In its foreign policy, the Netherlands followed a policy of strict neutrality from 1830 until 1940. Even Hitler could not change that. In 1939, the majority of the Dutch population, including government and political élite, still believed that the Netherlands would be able to keep out of the war.<sup>52</sup> Dutch nationalism therefore took the form of moral complacency, of the feeling that Dutch peacefulness was due to moral virtue and a superior governmental and legal system. The Netherlands has a famous tradition of international law based on the excellent legal faculties of the Dutch universities, but has no tradition of political science or the study of international relations.

After 1945, the break with the past was complete. The Dutch

foreign minister, van Kleffens, declared in the plenary session of the United Nations preparatory conference in San Francisco:

We are ready to accept certain limitations of that more or less complete freedom of action which hitherto has characterized a sovereign State. We should like to see those limitations accepted in the same measure by all States, great and small. If this cannot be obtained at once, and if, together with the other medium and smaller states, we are to set an example in this respect, we shall be proud to do it.<sup>53</sup>

In the Dutch constitution a provision has subsequently been enacted which makes it possible for the Dutch government to give by agreement legislative, executive, and judicial competences to supranational or international organizations (art. 67). Thereafter, the Netherlands has consistently supported (and stimulated: the Messina Conference) European integration, Atlantic cooperation, and international organization.

But the advent of General de Gaulle on the European political scene has brought the Dutch government into serious difficulties. The Dutch do not see Europe as a new fatherland, but conceive of a functional relation between European integration and Atlantic cooperation as two means of achieving a closer bond between the nations of the Western world (of which Atlantic cooperation should have—at least in the near future—priority). But the nationalist de Gaulle has awakened nationalist feelings in the Netherlands too. It is easily acceptable to see one's future as part of a supranational Europe, with ample guarantees for being able to influence the decision-making process, or as part of an Atlantic defense federation led by the benevolent giant on the other side of the ocean. But the prospect of being part of a European political union, dominated by an old-fashioned nationalist or maybe later by a Germany hungry for reunification, makes the Dutch think—and sometimes say—"over our dead bodies." In defense of the Dutch position, "balance of power" arguments sometimes turn up: The leading newspaper *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant* wrote, for example, after Labour won the British elections, that this would not have to influence the negative Dutch attitude with respect to a political union of the Europe of the Six, "because it has always been and still remains a Dutch interest, that our country maintains a certain balance in its relation with the three surrounding big states" and "even a supranational Europe should have an internal equilibrium." This attitude comes close to that of de Gaulle but is in absolute opposition to his political

goals, because the parts of the desired equilibrium are different. But precisely for Gaullists it should be easy to understand how deep Dutch opposition to a Gaullist Europe goes.

VI. *European Nationalism: Supra-nationalism or Anti-Americanism?*<sup>3</sup>

Whether or not it will be possible to call a European federation into being without a nationalism based on the idea of a nation "Europe" is still an open question. But such a nationalism does not exist at the moment. There is no widespread political movement which has as its main goal the making of a new national state out of "Europe." This fact is, no doubt, connected with the difficult problem of the geographical delimitation of "Europe." The Europe of the Six, in any case, "are not—they are not even in the process of becoming—a national community."<sup>64</sup> It seems difficult to conceive of the Europe of the Six as a prospective nation. Stanley Hoffmann discusses the postulate "that Europe is not only a geographical expression but an entity capable of overcoming its divisions . . . ." Although he later speaks of the need for "a sort of collective European nationalism," he does not mention the postulate of a European nation.<sup>65</sup> The explanation for this omission can again be only the arbitrary geographical delimitation of the Europe of the Six.

But it is possible to speak of European nationalism in a negative sense: as an attempt to consolidate the uniqueness and superiority of Europe as "mère de la civilisation" (de Gaulle) and to return to the European countries as a united Europe the power "which it deserves" by making Europe militarily and diplomatically independent of the United States. This type of European nationalism is negative because its only content is the postulate of European distinctiveness from the United States, which turns but too easily into outright anti-Americanism. In fact, anti-Americanism more often than not contains a reference to Europe rather than to the separate nations, perhaps because it is felt that only the resources of superiority of the whole of Europe can justify anti-American assertions.

The first phase of European nationalism in the form of anti-Americanism occurred in the immediate postwar period, when it was demonstrated that Europe could not recover without the aid of the United States. As Max Beloff says: "We must admit that

much of the early propaganda for the European idea had a definitely anti-American flavour and that the idea of resisting 'Americanization' [was] part of it."<sup>56</sup> Europeans asserted that political and economic power do not determine the *real* value of a country: spiritual and cultural achievements are much more important.<sup>57</sup> Americans were gum-chewing barbarians, bad-mannered, rude, and materialistic. Everything that embellishes life and makes it worth living comes from Europe. The Americans were also considered politically naive and diplomatically inexperienced: these dogooders had much to learn from the Europeans. In this way both right and left could partake of anti-Americanism. The left had the added reason of holding the Americans largely responsible for the cold war. The right disapproved of American support for independence movements in the colonies and became livid when the United States opposed the Suez adventure of Britain and France. Anti-Americanism has been particularly strong in France, according to Michel Crozier, partly because "America, whose universalistic ideal is so close to the French, seemed in the process of taking over what used to be the glory of French culture."<sup>58</sup>

The European idea has, over the years, been fed by the compensation ideology which I have called European nationalism. A typical nationalist instrument is also the rewriting of history, which, for Europe, has been done by scholars like Henri Brugmans and Denis de Rougemont. Nationalist attitudes without a nation to refer to is perhaps the best description of current European nationalism. Although Hallstein might go a little too far when he says "Everything that has been done in the field of European unification is in the last analysis based on the objective to return to Europe a role in accordance with its traditions, possibilities and self-respect,"<sup>59</sup> it is certainly true that many "Europeans" cherish not only the idea of a European federation, but also the ideal of a powerful Europe.

### VII. *American Nationalism: The Power Without Glory*

American nationalism has, for obvious reasons, not been able to refer itself to the attributes of the nation used by the various nationalisms in Europe: a grandiose history and culture, common ancestors and language, and a classical literature and religion.<sup>60</sup> But a "melting pot" society still needs an ideology to foster national

cohesion. What else could this be but the belief in a special mission? It is possible, however, to discern in the beginning of American history two elements in the American national ideology. Living in a "new world" implied not only the possibility of building an exemplary society based on individual freedom and equality, but also the idea of the "manifest destiny" of the United States to spread the American "nation" over the whole American continent.<sup>61</sup> But the last element lost much of its importance after the "Frontier" had reached the Pacific. Thereafter, only the idea of a special—and universal—mission of the American nation remained.<sup>62</sup> America should bring freedom and democracy to the peoples of the world by example, education, and influence. The American intervention in two world wars was legitimized by the belief in the American mission: see Wilson's fourteen points and, in a somewhat weakened form, the Atlantic Charter. After World War II, the American national ideology remained operative as the solid foundation on which American involvement in the affairs of the world was based. This ideological basis did not cause any embarrassment for the role of the United States in Europe, where the American commitment to defend freedom against modern totalitarianism, at least for a time, had content and significance. But the American mission to defend or bring freedom to other parts of the world is becoming rather hard to defend as the difficulty of defining American objectives in Viet-Nam has demonstrated. In a recent, more sophisticated implicit definition of the American mission, one therefore sees the replacement of "freedom" by "international stability."<sup>63</sup>

The idea that America is the model of a democratic society has also contributed to American support for European unification: a United States of Europe would not only be the best way to get rid of the disastrous nationalisms of the separate European powers, but would also imply the emulation of the American political system, and thus democracy. In August 1948, the State Department declared that the United States "strongly favors the progressively closer integration of the free nations of western Europe . . . it does not make sense to us to contemplate a democratic Europe attempting economic unity without political agreement."<sup>64</sup> Lemberg thinks that this American feeling of superiority in the postwar period has contributed to the development of a compensation ideology in Europe, to the ideas which I have called European nationalism.<sup>65</sup>

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After World War II, the sudden global responsibility of the United States and the struggle against communist power and ideology have also led to the continuous frustration of those who took the American national ideology really seriously. The fact that America was not omnipotent, and that her superior nuclear arsenal was of very little positive use, was difficult for these people to bear. True believers always have to attribute occurrences they do not like to esoteric causes: and so the federal government, and especially the State Department, must be part of an "un-American" communist conspiracy. The supporters of the new radical right—as the McCarthyites before them—are not only extremely conservative, but also extremely nationalistic. But not only the rightist fringe suffers from frustration. Disillusionment with allies and aid is a constant and recurring danger for American foreign policy. The American national ideology implies a certain self-righteousness and a penchant for "dramatic" results. Both can be highly dangerous: the first in relations with allies and the second in the administration and the defense of foreign aid programs. To be the strongest, but probably also the most constrained, power in the world is not easy, and the American national ideology certainly does not contribute to the acceptance of that situation.

If one also defines as nationalism the unwillingness of a country to take part in supranational organizations or to accept in other ways certain limitations of sovereignty, the United States has certainly remained more nationalist than most European countries. A good example is the declaration with which the United States accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, which contains the reservation that this shall not apply to: "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America *as determined by the United States of America.*"<sup>66</sup>

Neither has the United States made it clear that it would be willing to go further than inter-governmental cooperation in an Atlantic framework. It is always being said that Congress would never accept genuine sharing of competences in the fields of economics and defense with Europe unless it were forced to do so. Because of this attitude, the unofficial conference of NATO parliamentarians could not evolve into a NATO parliamentary assembly. But there is no reason to believe that the American government is more disposed to relinquishing sovereignty, especially in the fields of foreign policy and defense.

### VIII. *Some Concluding Remarks on Nationalism and World Order*

The preceding descriptions have been an attempt to demonstrate the persisting significance of nationalism—ideas, attitudes, behavior—in the group of nation-states which, according to all the typologies of development and modernization, are the most advanced. These were thought to be the most likely candidates to transcend nationalism and the nation-state; and, for some time, it appeared that they would. In the period 1961-1962—when Britain was negotiating with the EEC—it was not terribly farfetched to view EEC as the nucleus and catalyst for a process of functional international integration: European integration would lead to Atlantic partnership and to institutionalized relations between the West and various regional groups of developing nations, which would then be forced to organize themselves. More and more “interests” in integration would be created, and these would form the secure foundation for a future world order. This seemed a relevant if not a realistic utopia.

But what Pierre Hassner has aptly called “la surprise nationaliste” has proved this vision to have been an illusion.<sup>87</sup> But the Gaullist vision—that it would be possible to reconcile French and European nationalism through the creation of an “independent” European confederation—has also proved to be an illusion. The effect of his explicit nationalism has been to rule out political union of the Six.

To put the European example in more general terms: even when the government of a country is not led by an explicitly nationalist ideology, there are in every nation certain dominant views of the most desirable future for itself and its environment. When a group of nations agrees on establishing a “common market” with certain attributes of supranationality, not only might they do this for different reasons and with different motives, but their views of the future of the possible political outcome of such a venture might differ so radically that, instead of getting politically closer because of their common enterprise, they might be driven apart. These views of the future are connected with the respective nationalisms of the participants, which implies that it does not exactly help when one of them starts basing its policy on nationalist criteria first. When this is one of the more prominent partners, the nationalist sensibilities of the others are soon awakened too. Ultimate goals then become more important than pragmatic

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progress. Attitudes polarize, and progress is halted. Whether it is possible to generalize on the basis of this example or not, it does show that, for a consideration of the feasibility of alternative international or supranational structures, the precise content of the different nationalisms, namely the views of the world and the future which they imply, can be important.<sup>68</sup> It also shows the danger of explicit nationalism: it has a boomerang effect.

From the discussion in the above sections it seems to follow that as long as nation-states exist—or, rather, as long as states exist, since states will try to create nations out of their populations, as the new states, especially those in Africa, so clearly demonstrate—nationalism will remain alive, or at least dormant. Since nationalism wants to separate or to keep separate, it seems almost by definition disintegrative, dysfunctional, for world order. But this statement needs to be qualified. Nationalism is only one of the potential sources of international conflict. We have lived since 1945 in a world dominated by tension not so much between nationalisms as between ideologies. Ideological differences—although they have not prevented (probably as a result of the nuclear stalemate) the maintenance of a minimum world order (we survive)<sup>69</sup>—are still the most important potential causes of conflict, especially because they have entered into symbiotic relationships with the nationalisms of the superpowers. By disrupting ideological bloc solidarities and loyalties, the nationalisms which reassert themselves in Western and Eastern Europe alike might contribute to weakening the ideologies themselves—especially the perception of the enemy which they contain, but not necessarily the values which rule domestic politics. They then might actually contribute to strengthening the existing world order. One might express this in more general terms by saying that under certain conditions nationalism might be functional for world order.<sup>70</sup> From this statement it is but one step—but an unjustified one on the basis of the existing empirical material—to reassert the claims of nineteenth-century liberal nationalism in a somewhat more sophisticated form. The reasoning goes as follows:

The best possible world order humanity will be able to achieve will have to be based on states. But the requirements of legitimacy, loyalty, solidarity, and development make it necessary that states be based on nations. If this is not the case, domestic conflicts will erupt, and in the present world these have dangerous international implications. Nationalism gives citizens and political élites

alike a firm sense of identity and self-respect. Stable mature nation-states, made up of stable mature individuals, will not harbor aggressive tendencies. Humanity's best chance for achieving a stable world order is, therefore, to create a world of stable nation-states, inspired by creative nationalisms. And, if some fear still remains that nation-states might not always stay stable, let each nation have its own nuclear force to deter military adventures of others; then peace will be assured.

This utopia is refuted by the historical development of nationalism. The liberal nationalist, well-intentioned though he may have been, was a sorcerer's apprentice. The development of a nationalism has never been halted at its point of "maturity," at the point when it fulfills only the positive functions of identity, self-respect, solidarity, and legitimacy procurement and none of the negative functions of being a source of international conflict (through projection of feelings of superiority, missionary zeal, desire for hegemony or spheres of influence or, at its worst, through imperialism), of oppressing other nations or minorities, and of prohibiting more rational—regional or international—forms of organization. Neither has it been proved that nationalism is the *only* way of procuring identity, self-respect, and the like. There are other forms of organization (churches, political parties, voluntary groups) and also certain kinds of activity (science, art, literature) which can, and already do, take the place of the nation in this respect. To admit the positive functions of nationalism, therefore, does not have to imply its endorsement. For this reason, I disagree strongly with Stanley Hoffmann's defense of (de Gaulle's) nationalism, which sounds so perfectly reasonable:

As long as no form of social organisation has yet appeared to replace the nation-state, or as long as the "general society of mankind," whose absence Rousseau noted, is not in sight, the only kinds of nationalism that are unquestionably evil are aggressive nationalism and a nationalism of resentment—Hitler's partook of both. Barring these, the alternative to a sane and sound nationalism of self-respect or pride is apt to be defeatism.<sup>71</sup>

I do not see why the alternative of functional and international integration has to imply defeatism. My own negative attitude toward nationalism is also explained by the fact that it offers no intellectual satisfaction. Nationalism nearly always implies looking for the mistakes of others and glossing over one's own faults. Discussions with nationalists are therefore usually singularly fruitless and annoying. One is often forced into an exchange of accusations,

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justifications, and apologies. Nationalism leads to a falsified view of the world and may therefore corrupt the best of intentions.<sup>72</sup>

But no matter how strongly one may disapprove of nationalism, it remains to be said that it still has much stronger assets than internationalism. The international integration ideology can offer only a utopia, a "process," and universal values (the same as are being applied within national societies) as the basis for its appeal. Nationalism as an integration ideology has a much stronger foundation in language, culture, history, assertions of independence, a sense of "home," and a richness of symbols. The regional movement that can appeal to nationalist feelings and symbols—the European movement—has better chances for success than a similar movement operating in the same setting—the Atlantic movement—which is unable to do this.

In the search for alternatives to the anarchic structure of decision-making by nation-states, we should not limit ourselves to looking for institutional solutions. We should perhaps also try to strengthen the alternatives to nationalism.

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1. For a useful, but deliberately confusing, survey of the most important definitions, see Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 1-14. A systematic analysis of the semantic confusion surrounding nationalism and related concepts and the ideological use made thereof is given in Frederick Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics* (London, 1944), Ch. I.
2. Not all writers have accepted this historicist belief as given. There can indeed be made a strong case for the idea that there are strong socioeconomic and political forces at work in the European democracies leading to the acceptance of supranational institutions as a stable form of government. See Ernst B. Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe," in Stephen R. Graubard (ed.), *A New Europe?* (Boston, 1964), pp. 62-89; for a thorough analysis of the relation between functional needs and institutional international integration, see Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford, Calif., 1964).
3. Gunnar Myrdal, *Beyond the Welfare State* (New Haven, Conn., 1960), p. 159. The following quotations are from an earlier version, *Economic Nationalism and Internationalism* (Melbourne, 1957).
4. For a critique of Myrdal's "functionalist utopia," see Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State, op. cit.*, pp. 461-464.

5. For some time it seemed as if the goal of national survival had been replaced in the West by anti-communism, or in the positive formulation: the defense of Western values. This ideological cohesion, making a partly supranational defense effort possible, is now under severe strain. Even in a staunchly "Atlanticist" country like the Netherlands, in a recent publication the question, "Why do we defend ourselves?" was, after an analysis of the possible supranational motivations, answered by stating "to maintain our national, our own Dutch identity." H. J. A. Hofland. "Waarom verdedigen wy ons," published by "Stichting Volk en Verdediging" (Foundation "People and Defense"), 1964.
6. John H. Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," *World Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (July 1957), pp. 477-493. Herz's proposition that the territorial state became the basic protective unit and therefore the basic political unit in Europe after 1648, because of the "hard shell of fortifications" built along the respective borders, seems to me to need historic verification. His only reference is to Meinecke's "Die Idee der Staatsraison in der Neuere Geschichte."
7. Since the United States could be penetrated by Soviet nuclear weapons, the argument that the United States would not use nuclear weapons to defend Europe has constantly been used to justify national deterrents. Raymond Aron has written: "Les alliances évolueront vers des communautés ou elles se dissoudront: elles ne reviendront pas aux pratiques pré-atomiques." (*Le Grand Débat* [Paris, 1963], p. 272.)
8. Florian Znaniecki, *Modern Nationalities* (Urbana, Ill., 1952).
9. Karl W. Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 162.
10. Stanley Hoffmann, "The French Political Community," in *In Search of France* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 35. On the thirties see especially pp. 21-34.
11. Stanley Hoffmann, "Cursing de Gaulle is Not a Policy," *The Reporter*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (January 30, 1964).
12. That stability is not de Gaulle's major goal also follows from his neglect of the problem of the stability of the French political system after his own death.
13. Citation from the translation of *L'Appel*, "The Call to Honour," (London, 1955), p. 9.
14. Press conference, July 29, 1963. *Le Monde*, July 31, 1963. My italics in this and the following quotations.
15. Alfred Grosser, "General de Gaulle and the Foreign Policy of the Fifth Republic," *International Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (April 1963), pp. 198-213.
16. Charles de Gaulle, *Le Fil de L'Epée*, Ed. 10-18 (Paris, no date), p. 39.
17. *Le Fil de l'Epée* contains a host of prescriptions for leadership, which read as descriptions of de Gaulle's present behavior.

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18. There is also a definite streak of Rousseau in de Gaulle's thought. In his press conference of May 31, 1960, he cited the Rousseauian premise: "Man limited by his nature is infinite in his desires." (Cited in Edgar S. Furniss, *De Gaulle and the French Army* [New York, 1964], p. 247.)
19. Press conference, July 29, 1963. *Le Monde*, July 31, 1963. The disdainful remark against "les intérêts particuliers" is of course directed against political parties and pressure groups. The politics of the "end of ideology" is sacrilege to de Gaulle's conception of politics which for him is the art of action as guided by intuition.
20. Cited in Furniss, *op. cit.*, p. 106. Furniss goes on to explain how attractive statements like this are for the anti-Gaullist nationalists, who were bitterly opposed to de Gaulle over his "abandonment of Algeria." He cites Jacques Gagliardi: "My comrades and myself . . . passionately resisted the abandonment of Algeria. We nourish no excessive tenderness for the Chief of State. . . . But de Gaulle for some years will constitute the only obstacle to the dilution of France in a vast Atlantic market where we will only be a subsidiary of the United States." Furniss thinks that the new weapons and the new military mission, that is, "the contribution of the army to de Gaulle's European statecraft" (p. 243), have provided the French military with a new sense of purpose, thus solving de Gaulle's difficulties with the rebellious army over Algeria.
21. "De Gaulle, l'Europe et l'Alliance," *Esprit*, Vol. 31, No. 318 (June 1963), p. 1058.
22. Paris, 1963.
23. Courtin has collected thirty pages of declarations of de Gaulle concerning this "formule aveuglante de clarté" (pp. 112-142). For a recent statement of his explanation of the French attitude toward German reunification, see his press conference of February 4, 1965. (Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 216, p. 12).
24. Press conference of November 10, 1959. Cited in Courtin, *op. cit.*, p. 123.
25. For this view of the events there is support in a statement by de Gaulle which was made in a conversation with the former President of the High Authority of ECSC, René Mayer, who started to tell de Gaulle how much he had learned from his experiences in Luxemburg. De Gaulle cut him short by saying, "Eh bien! Maintenant il faut tout oublier. J'efface tout et on recommence." *Le Monde*, September 16, 1965.
26. This theory was first developed in Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, Calif., 1958). It has been refined and applied to the EEC by Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Integration* (Stanford, Calif., 1963); and by Ernst Haas himself in *Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe*, *op. cit.*
27. The metaphor of the lion and the ostrich was taken from Arthur Koestler's

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- introduction to the special "state of the nation" issue of *Encounter*. "Suicide of a Nation?" Vol. 21, No. 7 (July 1963).
28. Eugen Lemberg (*Nationalismus*, Vol. I [Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1964], p. 127) points to the emigration of the Puritan nationalist ideology to the United States. One could add that Mill's argument is still being echoed often in Washington.
  29. Not long after the end of the Hundred Years' War, an Italian envoy to the English court observed that Englishmen "think that there are no other men than themselves; and, whenever they see a handsome foreigner they say he looks like an Englishman." Cited in Sir Reginald Coupland, *Welsh and Scottish Nationalism* (London, 1954), p. 7.
  30. The Earl of Sandwich, writing in the *Observer* as part of a series of articles called "What's Left for Patriotism," January 27, 1963, states explicitly that patriotism "is not the same as nationalism" and "In fact, there is nothing 'wrong' about patriotism. It is natural and healthy. . . . But what can a man feel about a group of nations? . . . Human nature does not permit the extension of this basic emotion to a series of initials such as EEC."
  31. Among those, during the period of Labour government, domestic political reasons. For the history of British relations with European unity see for the period to 1954, F. S. Northedge, *British Foreign Policy. The Process of Adjustment 1945-1961* (London, 1962), Ch. 5, "Britain and European Unity," pp. 122-167; and, for the period after 1954, see Miriam Camps' fascinating *Britain and the European Community 1955-1963* (Princeton, N. J., 1964).
  32. Cited in Karl Kaiser, *EWG und Freihandelszone* (Leiden, 1963), p. 72.
  33. Miriam Camps rightly considers this to have been one of the main weaknesses in the British negotiating position, *op. cit.*, p. 518.
  34. For example, Kingsley Amis in the *Observer*, January 20, 1962.
  35. John Mander, *Great Britain or Little England* (Boston, 1964), p. 21.
  36. Cited in Nora Beloff, *The General Says No* (London, 1963), p. 140.
  37. *Ibid.*, p. 141. The muddle is very well reflected in the *Encounter* inquiry among British intellectuals. "Going Into Europe" (December 1963-March 1964). Even though the result was 77 for, 17 against, and 16 indifferent or undecided, the motives for going in were often "nationalist" in the sense that only Britain was considered to be able to pull EEC away from its dangerous "inward-looking" course and to save the Continent for democracy.
  38. Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston, 1962), p. 132.
  39. Lemberg, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
  40. As cited in Emerson, *op. cit.*, p. 430.

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41. In the Berlin question, this policy found its apex in Kennedy's speech in Berlin: "Ich bin ein Berliner."
42. As has been proposed by Karl Jaspers. See for example his "Freiheit und Wiedervereinigung," in Hans-Adolf Jacobson and Otto Stenzl (eds.), *Deutschland und die Welt* (Munich, 1964), pp. 189-197.
43. *Deutschland und die Welt*, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
44. They seem to have two reasons for this effort: to raise the low esteem in which the German army is held by the population at large and, paradoxically, not to let the younger generation lose interest in reunification.
45. Cited in *Die Welt*, February 7, 1964.
46. According to Albrecht von Kessel, "Zweifel oder Bewunderung," *Die Welt*, September 30, 1964.
47. See K. T. Baron von und zu Guttenberg, "NATO and the Need for a New Policy," in David S. Collier and Karl Glaser (eds.), *Western Integration and the Future of Eastern Europe* (Chicago, 1964).
48. See the remarks of Achille Albonetti, "The New Europe and the West," in *A New Europe?* *op. cit.*, pp. 1-37 (esp. pp. 13 and 23).
49. P. C. Geyl, *Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Stam* (Amsterdam, 1930-37), 3 vols.
50. For the latter, see the brilliant study of I. Schoffer, *Het Nationaal-Socialistische beeld van de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* (The National-Socialist Image of the History of the Low Countries), (Arnhem, no date [after 1955]). The Dutch Nazi leader, Mussert, hoped to become fully accepted by Hitler as "leader" of the greater Netherlands: "Then it will be possible to build something really great: The Dutch imperium, stretching from the Dollart to Kales [Dutch for Calais], with the Indies, the Congo, friend of South Africa, and cooperating closely with the big German brother."
51. With the translation of "verzuijing" into "pillarization" I follow the example of William Petersen, "A Nation Adrift, or On Which Course," in *Sociologische Gids*, Vol. II (January-April 1964), pp. 84-91.
52. When the Dutch military attaché in Berlin, Major Sas, warned the Dutch government of the pending invasion in the first days of May 1940, he was not believed by the government.
53. Cited by I. Samkalden, "A Dutch Retrospective View on European and Atlantic Cooperation," in "European and Atlantic Cooperation. The Dutch Attitude." Special issue of *Internationale Spectator*, Vol. 19, No. 7 (April 8, 1965), pp. 626-643.
54. Raymond Aron, "Old Nations, New Europe," in *A New Europe?*, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

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55. See "Europe's Identity Crisis: Between the Past and America," *Dædalus* (Fall 1964), pp. 1244-1297.
56. Max Beloff, *Europe and the Europeans* (London, 1957), p. 24.
57. This is a means of compensation often used in the history of nationalism. After the French revolution, which gave rise to the idea of the mission of France, when Napoleon's armies crossed Europe, the difficult question of the content of German greatness was answered by Schiller's dictum, that only the "geistige Gestalt" (the spiritual and intellectual form) counted, not the political. See Lemberg, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
58. Michel Crozier, "The Cultural Revolution: Notes on the Changes in the Intellectual Climate of France," in *A New Europe?*, *op. cit.*, pp. 602-630. See especially, pp. 618-622.
59. Walter Hallstein, "1963, Jahr der Bewahrung," in *Deutschland und die Welt*, *op. cit.*, p. 331.
60. See Lemberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-264. Also Hans Kohn, *American Nationalism* (New York, 1957).
61. Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansion in American History* (Gloucester, 1958).
62. Edward McNall Burns, *The American Idea of Mission: Concepts of National Purpose and Destiny* (New Brunswick, 1957).
63. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Peace, Morality and Vietnam," in *The New Leader*, Vol. 47, No. 8 (April 12, 1965), pp. 8-10.
64. Cited in Northedge, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
65. Lemberg, *op. cit.*, p. 254.
66. Text in *United Nations Textbook* (Leiden, 1958), p. 268.
67. Pierre Hassner, "Nationalisme et Relations Internationales" in *Revue Française de Science Politique*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (June 1965), pp. 499-528. Hassner thinks the surprise was "la rencontre entre les idéologies universalistes et le nationalisme, et la relative victoire du second," but the term may just as well be applied to the relative (or temporary?) victory of nationalism over European political integration.
68. It might in this respect be possible to push the analysis of the content of the different nationalisms somewhat further than Ernst Haas does in his "eclectic theory of nationalism that stresses ontology and developmental types" (*Beyond the Nation-State*, *op. cit.*, pp. 464-475), which he uses for a similar purpose, namely, of projecting the future international environment and system. Another example that comes to mind is that of Nkrumah, who has defined the mission of Ghana as bringing about African unity.
69. This is not to say that they would have caused the outbreak of a general war if there had not been a nuclear stalemate. Both ideologies claim the

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enemy—imperialism or communism—is inherently militarily expansionist. In both cases these assertions have not been proved.

70. This might also be said of the nationalism of the new states insofar as they have prevented the enlargement of the ideological blocs.
71. In "Cursing de Gaulle is not a Policy," *op. cit.*
72. How this process works in an individual case can be read in the autobiography of a Hitler youth official, Melita Maschmann, *Account Rendered* (New York, 1965).