whose lives were barely affected by the changes. The real beneficiaries of independence had been the middle and lower-middle classes of the cities, who identified with the nationalist rulers. In contrast, prior to 1970, the poorer elements of Muslim society seldom appeared on the political scene and were remarkably quiet and weak by comparison with the decade that followed. At the same time, they were undergoing a phenomenal demographic explosion whose effects remained hidden until the 1970s, when an important new generation came of age whose outlook had been shaped only superficially by the traditional religious environment of the ulama and mystical brotherhoods. This generation was wide open to ideas that transformed the familiar language of Islam, as the region tried to grapple with population explosions, rural exodus, and unprecedented wealth from oil exports. These ideas came from the Islamic intellectuals and formed initially around the catalytic thinking of Qutb, Maududi, or Khomeini. But they took shape in different ways in different nations, according to the political, social, and religious structure of each country.

CHAPTER 3

Building Petro-Islam on the Ruins of Arab Nationalism

The 1970s were marked by the sudden emergence of militant Islamist movements in most of the world’s Muslim nations. This growing unrest reached its peak with the triumph of the Iranian revolution in February 1979. A new Islamic Republic was built on the ruins of the shah’s “tyrannical” regime, and the corpora estabished by Ayatollah Khomeini at the beginning of the decade were now the law of Iran. These events overturned ancient perceptions and all the common wisdom about Islam. What had previously been viewed as a conservative, somewhat nostalgic religion, whose social and political relevance was declining in the face of progress and modernization, suddenly became the focus of intense interest, hope, and dread. The radical Islamist movement itself, whose very existence had been unknown to all but a very few, was now associated with a revolution whose scope was vague but whose essential nature appeared to be as radical as it was virulently anti-Western.

The politicizing of Islam during this decade was not confined to the Iranian example, even though that uprising was its most spectacular manifestation. Five years earlier, the financial crown of Saudi Arabia had been admirably demonstrated during the oil embargo against the United States, following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. This show of international power, along with the nation’s astronomical increase in wealth, allowed Saudi Arabia’s puritanical, conservative Wahhabis faction to assume a prominent position of strength in the global expression of Islam. Saudi Arabia’s impact on Muslims throughout the world was less
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nationalists split into two deadly opposed camps: progressives, led by Nasser’s Egypt, Saladin Syria, and Iraq versus the conservatives, led by the monarchies of Jordan and the Arabian peninsula. In this Arab world, the conservatives agreed about only one thing—confrontation with Israel—and even this consensus was not a permanently crippling blow to the Arab defeat in the Six Day War of June 1967. It was the pro-
gressives, and above all Nasser, who had directed the war and been most seriously humiliated militarily. Nasser’s spectacular resignation immediately after the defeat—even though he retired this year and went to the delegation to concede his domestic rival—marked a major symbolic rupture. In effect, the nationalists’ pledge that the Arab states would be annihilated was itself destroyed by the 1967 war.

The trauma experienced at the time by Arab intellectuals resulted in much soul-searching of which the most relentless example was self-critical was the defeat by the Syrian philosopher Saladin al-Azhari. Later on, conservative Saudis called Oll 1967 a form of divine punishment for forgetting religion. They would compile that way, in which Egyptian soldiers went into battle shouting “Land! Soul! Arm!” with the strength of 1973, in which the same soldiers called “Allah Akbar!” and were consequently more insecure. However, it was self-critical: the 1967 defeat seriously undermined the ideological allure of nationalism and created a vacuum to be filled by new years by the Muslim Brotherhood philosophers, which until then had been confined to small circles of Muslim writers, professors, and convicts sentenced to hard labor in camps.

Egyptian students would eventually play a key role in the theological expansion of Mohammad, but not before taking aasser. As the showdown of revolt against Nasser’s regime, they were led at first by socialism which pushed for renewed hostilities against Israel and threatened to become one more revolutionary gesture. The military, February 1979 was the first major challenge, which was backed by the fear of the industrial city of Westbank on the outskirts of Cairo. In the fall, another wave of agitation in the Sofia delta and Alexandria saw demonstrations by students sided to the Muslim Brotherhood—whom they were still a tiny minority.

For Nasser, the creation of a better ideological canvas was a major issue because it challenged his legitimacy as a progressive. At the same time, the Palestinian cause, which led to the Arab states behind.
ational, with the arrival in 1960 of Yasser Arafat to the head of the autonomous Palestinian Liberation Organization by gaining control of their own destiny and establishing an Independent Authority for the Palestinian people. Arafat’s leadership was instrumental in the early stages of the Palestinian struggle for independence. Meanwhile, in 1976, tensions between King Hussain of Jordan and the Palestinian organizations escalated in the form of refugee camps located in the eastern part of the country. During this period, Jordan’s influence on the Palestinian refugee camps was significant. The Jordanians believed in the importance of maintaining their influence in the Palestinian camps, and their policies were aimed at ensuring their continued relevance.

Arafat, the leader of the PLO, played a crucial role in unifying the Palestinian people and establishing a sense of national identity. His leadership was pivotal in organizing the Palestinian people and creating a sense of solidarity. Arafat’s establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in 1994 was a significant milestone in the Palestinian struggle for self-determination.

By 1978, the Israeli government, under the leadership of Menachem Begin, had declared an end to the negotiations process. This marked the beginning of a new phase in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli government’s decision to annex the West Bank and East Jerusalem further escalated the tensions between the two countries. This annexation was seen as a violation of international law and sparked widespread international condemnation.

The Palestinian National Authority was established in 1993 as a result of the Oslo Accords, which were signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The establishment of the Authority was a significant achievement, as it represented a step towards self-governance and self-determination for the Palestinian people. However, the Authority faced numerous challenges, including the Israeli government’s reluctance to grant full autonomy to the Authority.

The emergence of militant Islamist groups in the 1980s and 1990s was a significant development in the Middle East. These groups sought to establish an Islamic state and to achieve their goals through violent means. The rise of militant Islamist groups was symptomatic of the growing frustration of the Palestinian people with the Oslo Accords and the failure of the international community to achieve a just and lasting peace.

The Oslo Accords were signed in 1993 and were intended to bring about a permanent peace between Israel and the Palestinian people. The Accords established a Palestinian Authority and provided for a limited degree of self-governance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, the Accords were not able to overcome the deep-seated differences between the two sides, and the Palestinian people remained unsatisfied with the outcome.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the Palestinian people continued to face significant challenges, including continued Israeli occupation, economic hardship, and political instability. The emergence of militant Islamist groups was a reflection of the growing frustration of the Palestinian people with the Oslo Accords and the failure of the international community to achieve a just and lasting peace. The rise of militant Islamist groups posed a significant threat to the stability of the region and to the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Between 1950 and 1970, population growth in the Muslim world approached 3.5 percent—double the rate of population growth. In 1975, with urbanization and literacy advancing apace, the cohort under 24 years old represented over 40 percent of the total population. The world of Islam, which had previously been predominantly rural and governed by a small urban elite with exclusive access to reading and writing, now underwent a radical transformation. The arrival of this wave of Islamic young city dwellers. The newcomers were confronted with challenges of every kind, for which the traditional knowledge passed on to them by their uneducated parents was largely useless. Their situation was in stark contrast with that of their parents and ancestors, who had had no choice but to remain in the villages to which they had been born, having grown up in the narrow confines of their village. The social and cultural chasm between the two generations was wide and deep, and there had been nothing like it since the dawn of Islam.

The young urbanites of the 1970s were far from prosperous, however. They lived together under precarious conditions on the outskirts of cities—on the outskirts of the megahed of the Middle East, and the ghettos of Turkey. But secondary schooling and, to a lesser extent, higher education in the cities had given this new generation not only access to newspapers and books but also greater expectations of upward mobility. Young people were now able to select and compare information sources, express themselves (formally in public) and to confidently oppose the ruling national elites by drawing on their own cultural resources. This was a cultural leap forward, but it was not matched by the expected social progress. The result was frustration that quickly turned to resentment of the elites, who were accused of monopolizing state power and depriving the young of the influence and wealth that were their due. Secular and political discontent was most commonly expressed in the cultural sphere, through a rejection of the nationalist ideologies of the ruling elites in favor of Islamic ideology. This process began on the once left-leaning university campuses which were now, in the early 1970s, controlled by Islamic movements. The Islamic intellectuals propagated the ideas of Othul Mandala and Khomenei, who had not achieved a mass following because their advocacy had been neither numerous enough nor aggressive enough to embrace theories of total revolution—even though they had been sufficiently versed in their own modern, Western languages to understand the discourse and identify with the principles involved.

By the early 1970s, the Islamic intelligentsia taking shape on the campuses of Egypt, Malaysia, and Pakistan began to spread throughout the Muslim world, courtesy of the networks and financial clout of the Saudi Wahhabis following the 1973 war. At first, the goals and tactics of the intellectuals were diverse: it was only after the growing company of the real intellectuals that they began to focus on Islamism as their weapon in a new battle for political domination, and to find recruits in various milieux whose class interests were more diverse.

Among the new recruits, two social groups were particularly susceptible to Islamic persuasion: one was the large wave of young urban poor from deprived backgrounds, whose parents had come in from the countryside. The other was the devout bourgeoisie, a class excluded from political power and economically hemmed in by military and authoritarian regimes. These two groups were both committed to the sharia and to the idea of an Islamic state, but they did not view that state to be the same way. The former imbued it with a socialist-revolutionary content, while the latter saw it as a vehicle for asserting power for themselves from the incumbent elites, without fundamentally disturbing the existing social hierarchies.

This divergence of interests lies at the very heart of contemporary Islamism. The Islamic intelligentsia’s role was to give this clash of social agendas and reconcile the two groups to the shared pursuit of power. The intellectuals did this by concentrating on the moral and cultural dimensions of religion. They were the broadest base of support—and in Iran it was broad enough to command the day—when they mobilized both the young urban poor and the devout bourgeoisie with an ideology that offered a vague social agenda but a stable focus on morality. Everyone in the movement could understand and interpret this ideology as they chose, given the openness of the religious language in which it was couched. On the other hand, whatever the coalition between the young urban poor and the devout bourgeoisie dissolved, the more radical and more moderate elements canceled one another out and the Islamist movement failed to seize power. In Algeria, for example, the Islamic intelligentsia’s ideology was too weak to unify the two groups, and as a result a civil war raged from 1992 to 1999 between the radical Groupe Islamique Arabe (GIA) and the moderate...
Armed Islamic groups, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization, have been active in the region, often using tactics that have been successful in other conflicts. The success of these groups has led to an increase in support for Islamic political movements in the region. However, the ultimate goal of these movements remains uncertain, and their impact on the region's political landscape is yet to be determined.
the different schools of Sunni religious law established in all major regions of the Muslim world. 

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more and more prominent. Some found in new residential areas several mosques, which were built in that was called the Islamic "international style" and lit with marble and green marble. This brought the Islamic architectural tradition into Islamic cities. A civic culture focused on reproducing styles of life that prevailed in the past, often on the site of an older mosque, which included remains of pre-Islamic structures. The architectural style was characterized by a range of materials, colors, and patterns that were used in the past, and included elements of traditional Islamic design, such as arched windows, decorative tiles, and intricate carvings.

In addition, the Saudi government invested heavily in building new mosques, which were often designed to reflect traditional Islamic architecture. These mosques were not only places of worship, but also served as important cultural centers, where people could come together to celebrate traditional festivals and events. The government also supported the construction of new mosques in areas where there was a growing demand for religious space, such as in urban centers and tourist areas.

The Saudi government's investment in mosque construction was part of a broader strategy to promote Islamic culture and values. By investing in new mosques, the government was able to reinforce its influence and control over religious and cultural institutions. This was a key part of the government's efforts to build a national identity based on Islamic values, and to promote a sense of community among its citizens.

In addition to building new mosques, the Saudi government also provided financial support for the renovation and preservation of existing mosques. This included support for the restoration of historic mosques, which were often damaged or neglected over time. The government also provided funding for the training of mosque architects and engineers, who were tasked with designing new mosques that were both符合 the latest trends in Islamic architecture.}

As it turned out, their policy was reasonably effective in limiting the devastating effects of the 1979 Iranian revolution on Saudi hegemony over Islam. But it proved powerless a decade later to contain the enthusiasm unleashed in the Muslim world by Saddam Hussein when he denounced the alliance between the United States and the West during the Gulf War. The limits of the kingdom's policy of religious propagation had been reached: its innovative financial generosity had won it a following that was more than a decade, and the Wahhabis, it wished to implement, had to face the price of a barrel of oil. An era was over, the end of the Saudi Arabia's era as a tool for gaining influence abroad, it had no choice but to finance all those who claimed to belong to Saudi Islam, and turn the risk of underwriting revolutionary groups that were actively hostile to Riyadh.

In addition to increased migration and the spread of Wahhabism propaganda, a third consequence of the 1979 war was a shift in the balance of power among Muslim states toward the oil-producing countries. Under Saudi influence, the notion of a worldwide "Islamic domain of shared meaning" transcending the nationalist divisions among Arabs, Turks, Africans, and Asians was created. All Muslims were offered a new identity that emphasized their religious community while downplaying differences of language, ethnicity, and nationality. This proposition did not necessarily correspond to any kind of demand on the part of the people to whom it was presented. It often stimulated such a demand, however, when it appeared to promise some kind of upward social mobility, political prestige, or economic advantage. And in the very last, it remained a set of useful guidelines for behavior during this period. The government also provided funding for the training of mosque architects and engineers, who were tasked with designing new mosques that were both符合 the latest trends in Islamic architecture.
decade when Islam was buffeted by the combined effects of population expansion, rapid urbanization, economic stagnation, mass education, and increased political instability.

The beginning of the Islamic council of religious scholars is a significant development in the history of Islam. This council was established in 1979 to address the challenges faced by the Islamic community in the face of modernization and urbanization.

In addition to the formal framework of the OIC, one of the principal sources of Saudi influence was control of the pilgrimage to Mecca, a site symbolic of the unity of the Community of the Faithful throughout the world. The Hajj or pilgrimage, offered the promise of salvation to all devout Muslims. Prior to the advent of modern air travel, it was a difficult undertaking that was rarely accomplished by the vast majority of the faithful. In the modern era, the Hajj has become an increasingly accessible pilgrimage, particularly for those in the fortunate few. Ordinary folk have had the opportunity to participate in this grand event, sharing in the spiritual experience of the million or so pilgrims who gather around the Kaaba at Mecca.

In 1923-24, after expelling the Hashimite dynasty, King Abdul Aziz al-Saud finally took control of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Immediately, the Wahhabis marched the tombs of the prophets—especially of Fatimah, the daughter of the Prophet, whose veneration by the Shiites they condemned as idolatry—and they reorganized the hajj according to their own lights. King Saud's first act was to make the pilgrimage more attractive to pilgrims—such as they supplied his kingdom with the bulk of its revenue before oil money changed everything. In 1924, 50,000 pilgrims visited Mecca, by 1929 the figure had reached 2 million, and since that time it has stabilized between 1.5 million and 2 million per year. In recent years, millions of Muslims from all over the world have realized their dream of the hajj.

In 1960 the king took the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Places, the better to emphasize Wahhabism's role in the control of the most sacred places on earth. The control operated as an essential instrument of hegemony over Islam. It had been and still was violently opposed, first by Saudi dissidents who attacked the Grand Mosque at Mecca in November 1947, and then by Egyptian Muslims in 1962, predominantly because several pilgrims were killed in violent demonstrations. Finally, it was strongly contested by conservative Muslims and all the other radical opponents of the Saudi regime, following the Gulf War of 1990-91.

The Role of Banking and Finance

As a dynamic and tribal region, within which birth and lineage were a precondition of access to oil wealth and power since 1973, the Saudi system was wide open to attack from social groups who did not happen...
Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam

to be "well born." Among Muslims who were out of favor with the rulers in Baghdad, the Sunni scholars were political as well, drawing on religious rhetoric and symbols to advance their own agenda. The Islamic concept of political Islam, however, was not limited to the ruling class. It was a broader phenomenon that encompassed the wider society, including the intelligentsia and the masses. The Islamic concept of political Islam was deeply rooted in the religious and cultural traditions of the Muslim world, and it was a constant source of inspiration and motivation for Muslims throughout history.

The Islamic concept of political Islam was also a response to the challenges of modernity. In the face of Western imperialism and colonialism, Muslims sought to assert their identity and sovereignty. The Islamic concept of political Islam provided a framework for rebels to organize and resist the colonial powers. It was a call to action, a rallying cry for Muslims to defend their lands and cultures against foreign侵略.

The Islamic concept of political Islam was also a means of asserting the rights of Muslims in the face of inequality and injustice. It was a call to action for Muslims to demand their rightful place in society, to challenge the status quo, and to fight for equality and justice. The Islamic concept of political Islam was a source of inspiration and motivation for Muslims throughout history, and it continues to be a powerful force in shaping the political landscape of the Muslim world.

Building the Bridge to Islam: The Role of Arab Nationalism

Islamic economic theory was the basis for the establishment of the first Islamic banking and finance system. Islamic banking and finance were based on the principles of justice, fairness, and equality, and they were designed to promote the welfare of all members of society. Islamic banking and finance were also based on the concept of risk-sharing, which meant that lenders and borrowers shared the risks of lending and borrowing. This risk-sharing principle was a key element of Islamic economic theory, and it was a key factor in the development of Islamic banking and finance.

Islamic economic theory was also based on the concept of fairness, which meant that the distribution of wealth was fair and just. Islamic economic theory was based on the belief that wealth should be distributed in a way that benefited all members of society, and it was based on the principle of justice. Islamic economic theory was also based on the concept of equality, which meant that all members of society should have equal access to the resources of the economy. Islamic economic theory was based on the belief that equality was necessary for a just and prosperous society.

Islamic economic theory was also based on the concept of community, which meant that all members of society should have a sense of belonging and a sense of purpose. Islamic economic theory was based on the belief that community was essential for a just and prosperous society. Islamic economic theory was also based on the concept of responsibility, which meant that all members of society should be responsible for their actions and for the actions of others. Islamic economic theory was based on the belief that responsibility was essential for a just and prosperous society.

Islamic economic theory was also based on the concept of balance, which meant that all elements of the economy should be in balance and harmony. Islamic economic theory was based on the belief that balance was necessary for a just and prosperous society. Islamic economic theory was also based on the concept of integration, which meant that all members of society should be integrated into the economic system. Islamic economic theory was based on the belief that integration was necessary for a just and prosperous society.

Islamic economic theory was also based on the concept of cooperation, which meant that all members of society should cooperate and work together. Islamic economic theory was based on the belief that cooperation was necessary for a just and prosperous society. Islamic economic theory was also based on the concept of innovation, which meant that all members of society should be innovative and creative. Islamic economic theory was based on the belief that innovation was necessary for a just and prosperous society.

Islamic economic theory was also based on the concept of education, which meant that all members of society should be educated and informed. Islamic economic theory was based on the belief that education was necessary for a just and prosperous society. Islamic economic theory was also based on the concept of freedom, which meant that all members of society should have freedom of choice and freedom of expression. Islamic economic theory was based on the belief that freedom was necessary for a just and prosperous society.

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the fact, for fear of Nasser, instead, Nasser emphasized the social character of his enterprise by concentrating rates of interest, he appealed to a broad spectrum of small savers—who had hitherto remained outside his official nationalized banking project—by offering them high-interest rates for their deposits. The second sphere was the exclusive domain of the holder of the office of governor. The power and influence of the governor were immense, and he was able to control the entire banking system.

Contemporary Islamic finance really took off after the year of October 1973, with the recording through the banking system of the petrodollar windfall. In succeeding years, the experts who came to work in the oil-exporting countries found themselves with an abundance of cash. This new, international Muslim middle class, which had been brought to the surface at the same time that they were growing wealthy in the economies of the Gulf, now sought a model investment for their savings that would reflect from confiscations, nationalizations, and other modifications that had been brought to believe were not practiced by the official banks of their own countries—especially when those banks were controlled by the government. Many also wanted to make substantial profits from that establishment and invest it as they pleased, once their private needs were taken care of. In fact, they were more than ready to support a private banking system that transcended borders and corresponded to their own social identity. Now expanded to include both their native countries and the countries in which they had earned their newfound wealth, Islamic banks responded well to this unprecedented demand, and they ultimately played an important role in understanding the new social group constituted by their depositors, while creating a devout middle class that was loyal to Saudi interests because it was dependent on them.

The Islamic financial system had two spheres that were perfectly distinct from one another, even though they shared the same basic logic. The first sphere supplied a mechanism for the partial redistribution of oil revenues among the number states of the OIC by way of the Islamic Development Bank, which opened for business in 1975. This strengthened Islamic cohesion and increased dependence—between the poorer member nations of Africa and Asia and the wealthy oil-exporting countries. The second sphere was the exclusive domain of the governor of the Office of Governor and the holders of the office of governor. After a few experiments in Egypt, this resulted in the creation of Islamic commercial banks, which began to appear in July 1975. Another threshold was reached with the creation of transnational banking companies. DCM (Dar al-Mal al-Islami al-Hind), the House of Islamic Finance, which was founded in January 1952, by Prince Mohammad Al-Faisal Al-Saud, son of the assassinated King Faisal, and the Al Banaka (Divine Blessings) group, established in 1983 by a Saudi billionaire, Sheikh Salih Abdullah Kamil, in addition to their banking activities, these companies specialized in investment funds and in the 1980s, which saw a major expansion in the Islamic financial system, also witnessed a huge diversification of its investment instruments.

In Pakistan, Malaysia, and Jordan, and even in states as secular as Turkey and Tunisia, Islamic banks, often accompanied by highly favorable fiscal incentives, began springing up everywhere in the 1980s. In these countries, Pakistan, Iran, and Sudan, the banks were managed by autonomous "international" companies, and in Iran they have remained autonomous ever since. Elsewhere, the initiatives mostly came from the private sector. By 1995, there were 144 Islamic financial institutions worldwide, including 35 government-owned banks, 40 private banks, and 75 investment companies.

The stakes in this process were both national and international in significance. For Saudi Arabia and the political-financial markets of the Gulf oil monarchies, the banks provided an opportunity to tighten their links with the local devout middle class in all these countries. For oil states, the interest lay in attracting those same classes and keeping them out of radical Islamic movements. As for the radical Islamists, they saw a golden opportunity to establish a new client outside the control of the established regimes and use it to finance their overthrow. The interaction between finance and militant religion played an especially important role in Egypt and the Sudan, as we will see. Thus, banks became one of the most important factors in the legacies.
Islamism expansion of the 1980s, because the political attitudes of the devout middle class hinged on what became of them.

The middle class tended to adopt different attitudes according to the circumstances prevailing in each country, but in general it used the emergence of the Islamic movement to promote its interest as a new social and cultural entity with a voice of its own. This led to heightened visibility and responsibility for the Islamic cause, which became significantly more middle class as it grew in the 1980s went on. It remained to be seen whether the new bourgeoisie would sacrifice its financial interests to militant zeal if forced to choose between the two.

**Chapter 1**

**Islamism in Egypt, Malaysia, and Pakistan**

While Saudi Arabia was consolidating its grip on the Gulf, many other nations were beginning to emerge into the scene. The three most powerful Islamic movements were those in Egypt, Malaysia, and Pakistan. The first was led by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the second by the National Front in Malaysia, and the third by the Jihadi Movement in Pakistan.

**While the Muslim Brotherhood**

During the summer preceding the October war of 1973, the Egyptian Islamic Association (Islamic Brotherhood) suddenly came to life in student circles, on the occasion of the first summer camps organized for their members. Students and sympathizers attending these camps were initiated into the "pure Islamic life"—which involved regular prayer, study of the Qur'an, and strict adherence to the principles of the Brotherhood's ideology. A network of cadres was planned that would eventually make the association the dominant Islamic voice in the universities of the Arab world. In 1977, the association won a majority in the Egyptian Students' Union, whose procedures had been dramatically changed by Sadat in 1973 at a time when he was convinced that a better way no longer existed.

The success of the association was due mainly to its offer of a "pure Islamic solution" to the social crisis that was affecting Egyptian universities at the time. In the 1970s, the number of Egyptian stu-