Submission to Casey Review

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Dear Review Team

In response to your request for input pertaining to the Casey Review, I am submitting this brief based on extensive quantitative survey research using British survey data from the period 2009-15 as well as over twenty years studying national identity, ethnicity and religion.

The top lines are that <u>isolation does not increase extremism, but does detract from the aim of 'One Nation.'</u> Extremism is less a social integration problem like malnutrition than a <u>'Big Data'</u> network problem like Ebola. Because it is contagious, all cases of extremism need to be identified: we need to map the network and treat infected individuals. Reducing the social isolation of Muslims, by contrast, has mixed effects on extremism (indeed, <u>Muslims in strongly Muslim areas are less likely to endorse extremism</u> than Muslims in integrated or white areas). Instead extremism is best tackled through social network analysis, targeted intervention and enhancing Muslims' community resilience and links with the police.

However, while isolation does not contribute to extremism, it slows secularisation and intermarriage, and, by extension, assimilation. This makes it more difficult for Britain to absorb large numbers of immigrants without fanning majority disquiet. Reducing isolation can thereby further 'One Nation' aims even as it has a marginal effect on extremism.

Finally, I advocate a shift in the way we think about national identity, away from state-led, 'one-size-fits-all' integration based on either multiculturalism or civic symbols. What I instead endorse is *multivocalism*, which embraces deep British identities of minority and majority alike. It celebrates *both* the time-hallowed English symbolism of John Major's county cricket grounds *and* the diversity of Robin Cook's Chicken Tikka Masala. The first reflects the way many rural White Britons see the country, the second how urbanites and minorities often perceive it. Both are valid British national identities. Neither should be promoted to the exclusion of the other, nor emasculated in the name of an anodyne inoffensive Britishness. National identity is complex, varying from person to person as it emerges from the interactions of individuals and groups 'below' the state. Government's role is to validate - within the limits set by British values - groups' different windows on the British soul. This flexibly celebrates the diverse ways people focus *on Britain*, as distinct from a multiculturalist approach which focuses on ethnic homelands outside Britain.

**Executive Summary**

Section 1

- **The share of Muslims who endorse violent religious extremism is similar to other religious groups**
- **Muslims who endorse violent extremism to defend animal rights are 30 times more likely to endorse violent religious extremism. The pattern is similar for other religious groups and seculars. By far the strongest predictor of Muslim support for violent religious extremism is Muslim support for violently addressing other social justice issues. One recommendation is therefore to monitor secular extremist groups for links to religious extremists**

- **Muslims in more Muslim areas are <u>less</u> likely to endorse violent extremism than Muslims in diverse or white areas. Since Muslims are already moving away from their areas of concentration, it follows that no measures are needed to encourage Muslim residential integration**

- **Muslims in wards with a low share of whites are more likely to endorse violent extremism. 'Superdiverse' neighbourhoods, with many minority groups but few Muslims, are associated with a somewhat elevated degree of Muslim support for extremism. As Muslims are increasingly moving away from their own concentrations to superdiverse areas while whites are vacating them, the policy recommendation would be to implement measures to retain or attract white residents to such areas**

- **Muslims who have more non-Muslim friends are less likely to endorse violent extremism than Muslims whose friends are all Muslim. Thus measures to encourage social interaction between Muslims and, especially, whites, is to be welcomed**

- **White Britons' likelihood of strongly opposing immigration, or voting for far right parties, is unaffected by how well integrated local Muslims are**

- **White British support for the BNP in local elections is reduced by the local presence of Afro-Caribbeans, a group which has extensively intermarried with the White British. White vs. Afro-Caribbean youth violence has also largely disappeared as the two groups have mixed**

- **The above suggests that isolation has a <u>marginal</u> and <u>complex</u> relationship with extremism. It is unclear whether isolation dampens or increases extremism, but the overall effect is small, accounting for no more than 1-2 percent of the variation in support for extremism**

Section 2

- **National identity is generated more from 'below' by the 'Big Society' of private actors and groups than from the top-down by the state**

- **Britishness is a complex system in which each individual and social group sees Britain in a somewhat different way**

- **Government should move toward *multivocalism*, as distinct from multiculturalism or civic nationalism. This means Westminster should celebrate different ways of identifying with Britain. This will strengthen British identity and is distinct from multiculturalism, which shifts the focus from Britain to ethnic homelands abroad. It also differs from civic nationalism, which flattens all perspectives in favour of a statist 'hymn sheet' of common symbols which alienates both white and minority Britons**

## Section 1. Isolation and Extremism

My starting point in this section is that policy must be data-driven, not story-driven. According to behavioural economists such as Daniel Kahneman, we are attracted to stark imagery and compelling causal accounts. As in Michael Lewis' tale about the sports statistics revolution, *Moneyball*, vivid hunches and the stories scouts circulate often distort reality. My view, elaborated below, is that the integration debate has suffered from too much emphasis on stories and not enough focus on data. Qualitative impressions, such as the look and feel of majority Muslim neighbourhoods or English flags on working-class housing estates, capture our imagination. They might reflect an underlying reality but equally may obscure it.

Vignettes are not representative unless collected in large quantities using unbiased sampling techniques.

Instead, much of our qualitative data is usually procured as a response to rare events like riots, which attract journalists and qualitative researchers. Those on both Left and Right pick and choose anecdotes. Many remember Oldham in 2001 but quickly forget it decisively rejected UKIP in 2015. Quiet places are ignored, so the sample is biased. Therefore it is important to incorporate robust, representative survey data which helps us bear in mind the 'dogs that didn't bark', such as silent but successful isolated neighbourhoods - whether White working-class or Muslim-majority.

Main Points

1. <u>Isolation and extremism are largely independent of each other.</u> There is a relationship, but it is modest and complex, with different aspects of isolation pulling both toward, and away from, extremism. The net effect is broadly neutral.

1.1 <u>The strongest support for religious violence comes from those who endorse political violence in general.</u> There is a powerful association in Citizenship Survey data between endorsing political violence in general, and supporting religious violence in particular. Or between those agreeing that violence in defense of animals, or as a weapon against general injustice, is permissible, and support for religious violence.

These attitudes are rooted in psychology and ideology, not a person's ethnicity, income, education or isolation. Muslim views resemble those of non-Muslims. Support for religious violence differs little from support for other forms of violence. For example, among the 5,430 British Muslims in the 2009-11 Citizenship Surveys who said it was always wrong

to use violence to defend animal rights, just 57 (1%) backed the use of violence in the name of religion. For the 1,069 Muslims who said it was sometimes permissible to use violence to protect animals, fully 30% agreed that violence in the name of religion could sometimes be justified. Among UK-born whites, 23% of those who backed violence to protect animals also did for religion. Hence a policy recommendation for detecting religious extremism is to monitor links with secular extremist movements.

1.2 Muslim isolation reduces support for violent extremism among British Muslims, probably because younger members of Muslim ethnic groups such as Pakistanis are under greater social control, and may feel more secure, in 'their' neighbourhoods. British Muslims living in an area dominated by their own ethnic group are less likely to express support for religious violence.

Figure 1 shows that as the share of Muslims within a ward's (population averaging 6500) non-white population increases from the lowest (5%) to highest (59%) category, controlling for other characteristics, the chance that a Muslim living in that ward endorses religious violence falls from around 1 in 10 to 1 in 20. This echoes work such as Kawalerowicz and Biggs (2015) which found that London rioters were significantly more likely to come from polyglot neighbourhoods than from isolated ethnic neighbourhoods where their own ethnic group held sway.

Figure 1.



Probability of saying religious violence sometimes justified (N=4138 UK Muslims)

*Predicted probability* (y-axis, values .05, .1, .15)

Muslim share of minority population (1=least, 5=most)

Source: Citizenship Surveys 2009-10, 2010-11 (ONS & Home Office). Note: confidence intervals also displayed. Model controls for ward deprivation and the person's age, income, education, region and sex.

1.3 <u>The higher the share of nonwhites in a ward, the higher the level of extremism</u>.

While Muslim isolation seems to reduce extremism among British Muslims, the reverse is true for minority share even when we control for ward deprivation and density. This may seem a paradox, but may be explained by the fact that wards with a large share of non-Europeans are less cohesive and have lower social capital than whiter wards (Laurence and Bentley 2015). Figure 2 shows how minority share and Muslim share work at cross-purposes. In a ward in England and Wales with almost no Muslims, a Muslim person has an

18 percent likelihood of saying violent extremism is sometimes justified when other characteristics (age, income, area deprivation, education, region, share of nonwhites) are held constant. In a totally Muslim neighbourhood, all else being equal, this falls to 11 percent.

Conversely, the dotted line shows that Muslims in virtually all-white neighbourhoods – controlling for other characteristics including Muslim share - are less likely (11 percent) to support violent extremism than those in wards that have few whites (where 18 percent endorse violent extremism). In other words, places with a large share of nonwhites, but where few of these are Muslim, are associated with higher support for violent extremism whereas whiter wards where most minorities are mainly Muslim (i.e. parts of the North West) seem to produce the lowest support for extremism.

The direction of Britain's ethnic mobility is away own-group concentration and toward high-minority 'superdiverse' neighbourhoods. This may lead to lower social cohesion and a slightly increased risk of violent extremism among British Muslims. However, this view has to be balanced against the finding (outlined in 1.4) that superdiverse neighbourhoods offer more opportunities for inter-ethnic mixing, which helps reduce extremism.

In policy terms, an important aim should be to stem the disproportionate flow of white families from superdiverse places such as Newham in London or Lozells in Birmingham. One option may be to deploy 'nudges' to retain such residents, such as designing new homes in traditional English period styles with few rooms and large gardens. Another technique may be for local schools to engage with local parents in an effort to stem rumours pertaining to 'white flight' from particular schools.

Figure 2.



Violent Extremism Sometimes Justified,
Muslims only,
2009-11 Citizenship Surveys (N=6,777)

Source: Citizenship Surveys 2009-10, 2010-11 (ONS & Home Office). Model controls for ward deprivation and the person's age, income, education, region and sex.

1.4 While geographic isolation reduces extremism among Muslims, social isolation mildly increases support for religious extremism. British Muslims who mix with, or are friends with, members of other religions and ethnic groups are somewhat less likely to endorse religious violence. Figure 3 shows that there is nearly a 2 point difference in support for religious extremism between Muslims whose friends are all Muslim and those whose friends are less than half Muslim.

Figure 3.



**Religious Violence Sometimes Justified (N=4048 British Muslims)**

(Y-axis: Predicted Probability, .04 to .08)

(X-axis: Proportion of friends that are Muslim (1=all to 4=less than half))

Source: Citizenship Surveys 2009-10, 2010-11 (ONS & Home Office). Note: confidence intervals also displayed. Model controls for ward deprivation, ethnicity and religiosity, and the person's age, income, education, region and sex.

1.5 White British people in strongly white areas are neither more nor less likely to endorse political violence.

1.6 White isolation has disparate effects on white attitudes. Whites who have friends and mix often with members of other ethnic groups are less opposed to immigration and less likely to vote for a far right party such as the BNP. However it is unclear how much of this is because mixing makes whites more tolerant as opposed to tolerant whites being more likely to form friendships with minorities.

1.7 <u>White British people in heavily white places</u> are more opposed to immigration and more likely to support UKIP than whites in diverse areas, but <u>less likely to support the BNP</u>. <u>Social capital and trust (among whites) are higher in white areas</u> than in diverse areas. Again, isolation pulls in different directions so there is no simple relationship between lily-white environments and extreme attitudes.

1.8. <u>Whether local minorities are well-integrated or not, segregated or not, socially housed or not, or wealthy or not, appears to have little impact on local White British attitudes</u> to immigration or their proclivity to vote for a far right party. The only factor that sometimes matters is whether minorities are Muslim or Afro-Caribbean, with support for the far right lower where minorities are predominantly Afro-Caribbean and higher where Muslim (Kaufmann and Harris 2014).

1.9 This doesn't mean that white voters' perceptions of how well minorities are integrated *nationally* doesn't matter, just that local integration seems unimportant. This last point is key because segregation prompts negative *national* media coverage, which can sway majority opinion well beyond the segregated locale.

1.10 Though integration does not reduce extremism in the short term, it goes without saying that it does so in the long term. If integration leads to intermarriage and secularism, and subsequently assimilation, Islamist extremism becomes impossible. The point may be banal, but it bears mentioning. Though the sample of secular Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in the Citizenship Surveys is too small to make valid generalisations, it is noteworthy that not one of the 23 Pakistanis and Bangladeshis without religion in the dataset supported religious violence. Furthermore, one reason white-black violence has become rare in Britain is because there has been so much intermarriage, cultural interchange and mixing between the two groups. Difference has been absorbed, much as Boris Johnson's Turkish, Iain Duncan Smith's

Japanese, and Nigel Farage's French ancestors assimilated into the ethnic majority over generations. This represents a cultural loss for immigrant groups, but also reduces tension and permits the majority to be more relaxed about immigration.

Secularisation is, however, a slow process. Figure 4 shows that most historically non-Christian ethnic groups in Britain remain highly religious, with fewer than 2 percent of South Asians claiming no religious affiliation. The secular component of these groups has risen during 2001-2011, but in real terms, the change is trivial.

Figure 4.



Source: 2011 Census of England and Wales (ONS 2013).

Minority isolation, which reduces intermarriage, is very much part of this story, with Sikhs (5%), Muslims (7.8%) and Hindus (8.8%) having inter-religious marriage rates below 10 percent (ONS LS 2001). Figure 5 shows inter-ethnic marriage rates which reflects a similar dynamic. Having said this, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are far more likely to marry a White Briton than each other, never mind a Sikh or Hindu. Thus in the 2001 census sample, of 8136 Pakistanis in couples, just 25 had married Bangladeshis, compared to around 400 who married whites. Of 15584 Muslims in the sample, 940 were married to Christians but just 31 to Hindus (ONS LS 2001).

Figure 5.



Source: ONS LS 2001.

Minority isolation limits both intermarriage and religious change. Figure 6 shows that while there are few nonreligious Bangladeshis or Pakistanis, there is a significantly larger share in wards with a small proportion of Muslims. It is not possible to determine if secular Bangladeshis and Pakistanis moved to these areas or less Muslim areas influenced them to secularise. However, several studies show that selective in- or out-migration does not explain why some wards are more conservative or liberal, pro- or anti-immigration, than others (Gallego et. al 2014; Kaufmann and Harris 2015). In all probability, given the limits on people's ability to move, less Muslim areas tend to encourage greater Muslim secularisation.

Muslim secularisation is not related to age as in the Christian population. Indeed, neither age, income or education are associated with Bangladeshi or Pakistani nonreligiosity. However, isolation is important. Muslims who state that 'all their friends are of the same race' are significantly less likely to be nonreligious than those with inter-ethnic friendships, and the strength of the effect is similar to that found for living in a heavily Muslim ward.

Figure 6.



Likelihood that Pakistani or Bangladeshi has no religion

Source: Understanding Society, waves 1-4 (UKHLS 2014).

Muslims are no more extremist than those of any other faith, but clearly Islamist extremism falls as the pool of those affiliated with Islam declines. Overall, we might think of the relationship between integration and extremism as taking a 'u'-shape: integration initially produces a bit more extremism, but if integration produces mixing and intermarriage, it reduces extremism. This said, the effect is not large either way: in the Citizenship Surveys, isolation and mixing with other groups accounts for only 1 percent of the variation in extremist attitudes among Muslim respondents.

Extremism: a big data problem

In their book *Big Data*, Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier (2013) describe a world in which causal hypotheses such as 'isolation causes extremism' tested on survey samples are replaced by an "N=all" world in which every instance of a phenomenon like extremism is mapped using Big Data techniques like social media analysis, geographic plotting of police reports or web search monitoring. With an epidemic like Ebola, for example, it is crucial to identify all carriers and their networks. The opposite is true for malnutrition, which doesn't spread, but instead stems from poverty or isolation and can be targeted using traditional social science survey methods, i.e. isolating poor populations who can be integrated through social programmes.

I have shown that extremism is much more like Ebola than malnutrition: it has few social predictors. Geographic and social isolation, as with class, education and income, only marginally affect it. Thus the best approach is to identify carriers and trace their networks. In this sense, extremism is best tracked using network analysis rather than social background analysis. In policy terms, this means Big Data and crowd monitoring of extremist networks to isolate the vulnerable. Targeted intervention, community policing and resilience involving cooperation with Muslims is the most appropriate method to tackle extremism. Social integration, by contrast, has but a marginal and ambivalent effect.

## Section 2. British National Identity

I have argued that isolation does not abet extremism. Yet extremism is not the only, or main, impetus behind an integration policy. Social equality, social connectedness and uniting the population behind a common national identity are arguably as important. Here my comments

will focus on national identity, which is a symbolic prerequisite for winning support from the British population for the welfare state and collective goals. One need only look at tension in the European Union to see how the lack of a common identity impairs the health of democracy and the policy process.

This is a field in which I have been writing and researching for two decades – accordingly I will be applying more theoretical insights here, albeit informed by survey data where possible.

2.0 National identity is a complex, emergent phenomenon, not a one-size-fits-all template handed down by the state. Britishness is more akin to the English language than a hymn sheet or ten-point plan.

The way western governments such as Britain think about the 'cultural work' (Peel 1989) behind national identity remains wedded to the nineteenth template laid down by the French Third Republic (1870-1914). A standard French history text, an Academie Francaise to police grammar, and a common set of national rituals were important in inculcating Frenchness among provincial peasants (Weber 1976). However, this was never the full story and is arguably less important today.

The most recent wave of literature on nationalism emphasises that national identities are not simply handed down by the state, but emerge from below (Edensor 2002; Fox 2014). *Emergence* is the key principle of complexity theory, the idea that order emerges out of chaotic interactions underneath. As applied to national identities such as Britishness, this means that people's daily interactions and interpretations matter for national identity. So do popular musicians, sports teams, television producers, social media entrepreneurs and museums. All shape what it means to be British. Official narratives and the content of school

textbooks is an important part of the conversation, but 'One Nation' is shaped more by the Big Society than by Westminster.

The way English is spoken in this country is moulded by school curricula and grammar textbooks, but has many other influences. So too with Britishness. British values and school history texts are part of the conversation, but only the starting point. The government needs to link liberal values with the symbolism of British life to endow it with meaning. This is clear for the ethnic majority in the case of 1215 and 'ancient English liberties' but similar work could be done by linking liberal values to *British Muslim*, as opposed to Muslim, symbols. Part of the task is to identify which symbols – perhaps speech ('You ain't no Muslim bruv'), food (chicken tikka) or music (bhangra) – best capture Pakistani *British* identity as distinct from Pakistani identity.

While multiculturalism would celebrate Pakistani identity in Britain, what I term *multivocalism* celebrates a common British identity, albeit viewed through regional, class or ethnic lenses. The idea that a symbol can be 'read' in different ways is known as multivocality (Turner 1967). With multiculturalism, minorities are enjoined to look back to their homeland. With multivocalism, minorities focus on Britain, not their homelands, but do so in their own way. They are encouraged to celebrate what is different between them and their co-ethnics 'back home'. For British-Pakistanis, this encourages British Pakistanis to focus on how they differ from Pakistanis in Pakistan, i.e. a London or Birmingham accent rather than a Pakistani one.

*Multiculturalism* is about Pakistani-ness: how Pakistani ethnicity differs from White British ethnicity. *Multivocalism* asks them to focus on their Britishness, but do to so their own way. It is about how the national identity of British-Pakistanis differs from the national

identity of White British people. Ethnicity becomes like class or ideology: another lens on the nation. These are critical differences between multivocalism and multiculturalism.

If Britishness emerges from the 'wisdom of crowds', its content cannot be set by policy documents. Nor can it be found in the mind of any one individual. Like a price in a market, it emerges through the disparate observations and interactions of individuals. The implication for government policy is that a 'hymn sheet' Britishness is destined to fail. Rather, there are many ways of being British, and this plurality should be recognised, within the limits set by British values. Again, we should not confuse plurality with multiculturalism.

## 2.1 Multivocalism, not Multiculturalism

The debate between integrationists and multiculturalists in academia, civil society and government has hit a dead end in the West. Multiculturalism's celebration of difference and denigration of the ethnic majority has been eclipsed by interculturalism and integration in almost all western societies. This is mainly because the challenge of ever-increasing ethnic diversity has unsettled majority populations. To undercut the popularity of the far right, centrist parties such as the French UMP or Labour in Britain have rolled back multiculturalism and aimed for inclusive, 'civic', values-based definitions of the nation. But the shift from multiculturalism to civic nationalism has not produced the desired effect. On the one hand, the white ethnic majority feels its rich identity has been boiled down to a set of inoffensive, abstract 'British values' that differ little from American or Swedish values. On the other, minorities' lived reality of diversity goes unrecognised.

What I am advocating is multivocalism, something qualitatively distinct from both multiculturalism and the current policy of civic nationalism. This recognises that in allowing

diverse people to attach to Britain in their own way, we strengthen, rather than weaken, British identity. This is not multiculturalism, which encourages minorities to identify in a hyphenated way with their ethnic homeland and a stripped-down version of national identity. Instead, it asks minorities to identify deeply with Britishness, albeit 'their' Britishness. Rather than encourage two separate foci for identity – ethnic homeland and Britain, this perspective has only one focus, the British nation. It treats ethnicity and religion the same as class or region: as lenses through which people 'see' their Britishness (Kaufmann 2008).

Peoples' locale shapes their national identity, which is why the share of Muslims who identify strongly with Britain is 80 percent among those who strongly identify with their neighbourhood but just 63 percent among those with weaker local attachments (Citizenship Surveys 2009-11). Most minorities live in multi-ethnic settings where Britain really does feel like a miniature United Nations: they cannot see this reality mirrored in government rhetoric. Surveys in the US and Europe show that those who live in diverse parts of their country, whether white or minority, greatly overestimate the diversity of their country. Since 60 percent of minorities live in wards that are over 40 percent non-white, they see Britain as more diverse than it actually is.

By contrast, most White British people in England live in the roughly 80 percent of England that averages 90 percent white. Their lived experience is that the nation is not so diverse; moreover, many have deep roots in the country going back generations. Over half of white respondents in a recent British Social Attitudes survey said that having British ancestry is an important aspect of being British. Many identify first as English, Scottish or Welsh. This should not be viewed as 'ethnic nationalism' and hence beyond the pale of discussion. Instead, we need to recognise that there are many viewpoints on the nation, many ways of being British. So long as nobody tries to impose their lens on everyone else, this state of affairs strengthens rather than weakens the nation.

How so? As John Hutchinson (2005) remarks, competing social groups who try to shape the direction of the nation reinforce it, even if their policy proposals clash. The left-wing version of British identity celebrates Levellers, Suffragettes and Keir Hardie while the Right lauds the Industrial Revolution, Empire and Thatcher. Both may appropriate the same symbol, as with left-wing Mods and right-wing Ulster Unionists embracing the Union Jack. However, the net result of a conflict in which protagonists both brandish British symbols is to strengthen, not weaken, their attachment to the country. A British Bangladeshi who connects to British identity through his London accent or musical taste is quite different from a White Briton in Somerset who connects through her ancestry and the landscape. Each identifies with the nation and British values in a different way. Both are legitimate means of belonging so long as there is tolerance for others' modes of attachment.

Multivocalism specifies a very different role for government from multiculturalism or civic nationalism. With multiculturalism, the government celebrates diversity and seeks to sideline and relativise the culture of the majority. With civic nationalism, a few majority symbols are promoted, such as language and a standard history, while minority symbols and many elements of majority culture, such as ancestry or folk traditions, are excluded. Multivocalism instead calls for the government to positively recognise the myriad expressions of Britishness so long as they fall within the 'red lines' set by British values. Britishness inheres in the Crowd, not in a policy document.

Identifying with Britain through one's English ancestry is fine, as is identifying with Britain through its multi-ethnic diversity. The civic nationalist response to Robin Cook's Chicken Tikka Masala speech and John Major's 'Britain will still be the country of long shadows on county cricket grounds' is to banish both in favour of abstract British values. Multiculturalism would revive Cook's approach. Multivocalism, by contrast, endorses both Chicken Tikka and the village green, depending on the target audience. For only by doing so

can we capture the full richness of both visions while retaining the national loyalty of all sections of society. Attempting to impose either, or to neutralise both – as is now the case – only leads to alienation. How can we expect a group of White Britons in rural England to understand their Britishness the same way a Bangladeshi from Tower Hamlets or Scot from Dundee does? Accusations that the government is endorsing contradictory versions of Britishness are easily met with the reply that there is no single way to be British. Ethnicity and religion thus takes their place alongside region and class as diverse perspectives on a common Britishness.

Common reference points such as the NHS, BBC or monarchy do exist, but even these are controversial among those on the right and republicans. Better to limit the number of mandatory items while positively endorsing the rich and creative expressions of Britishness that exist around the country. When it comes to Britishness, 'One Hymn Sheet' is the enemy of 'One Nation'.

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