

Levels or Changes?: Ethnic Context and the Political Demography of the UKIP Vote

Eric Kaufmann, Professor, Department of Politics, Birkbeck College,

University of London, UK

e.kaufmann@bbk.ac.uk; twitter: @epkaufm; web: www.sneps.net

Abstract

Does contact with ethnic minorities make native whites more or less concerned about immigration – and how does this affect voting for populist right parties? This paper asks how ethnic diversity and change affect white support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in Britain in the 2010-15 period. In so doing, it underscores the contradictory responses evoked by *levels* and *changes* in minority presence. Extant work posits that both work in the same direction on white threat perceptions. This work instead holds that local minority levels and changes work at cross-purposes: minority increase contributes to whites' sense of threat while minority levels produce contact effects in the direction of inter-ethnic accommodation. In addition, this analysis adds to work on contextual effects by applying a more rigorous technique for addressing the problem of selection bias, casting doubt on the notion that there is 'white flight' of anti-immigration whites away from diverse areas or toward whiter neighbourhoods. Finally, few have remarked that today's ethnic changes contribute to tomorrow's ethnic levels. Since minorities are attracted to areas that already minority-dense, the two measures are strongly correlated. This presents a paradox – how do threat effects associated with change become contact effects? The data here suggest that yesterday's changes fade through habituation and contact while yesterday's ethnic levels become increasingly salient for contact over time. This local-level harmony does not, however, translate onto the national stage. At higher levels of geography, more diversity does not necessarily result in increased contact or minority legitimacy. Instead, ethnic levels and changes nationwide predict growing opposition to immigration, which is associated with voting for UKIP and other populist right parties.

Paper presented at the American Political Science Association meetings,

San Francisco, CA, September 3, 2015

Contextual Effects

This paper is framed by established perspectives of contact and threat theory drawn from the contextual effects literature on attitudes and voting. The *contact* hypothesis, originally developed by social psychologists, argues that when members of the dominant ethnic group, i.e. native whites in the US or White British in the UK, have the chance to positively interact with minorities and immigrants in their locale, they become more comfortable with them and feel less threatened. This leads native whites to express more positive views of immigration. Greater local diversity is associated with more interethnic contact, which reduces ethnic animosity (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). The social science literature on contextual effects finds a similar pattern of positive contact effects on immigration and outgroup attitudes and voting for small geographies below that of the ward/census tract, i.e. containing less than 10,000 population (for some examples from the US, see Yancey 1999; Gilliam et. al. 2002; Oliver & Wong 2003; Ha 2010; for Europe, see Lubbers et. al. 2006; Bowyer 2008; Rydgren & Ruth 2011; Biggs & Knauss 2012). Thus Kaufmann and Harris (2015) locate 24 studies using contextual variables from low geographies and discover that three-quarters report a positive contact effect.

In higher geographical contexts, the pattern appears to be reversed, with larger minority share predicting a threat response in over 80 percent of studies (Kaufmann and Harris 2015). Whites who live in diverse countries, cities, counties or British Local Authorities, viz. in geographies with populations above 100,000, can still inhabit white neighbourhoods or suburbs where they experience little direct contact with minorities. In white areas adjacent to diversity, threat effects from minority proximity are at their maximum while contact is only marginally greater than in farther-flung homogeneous districts (Rydgren

and Ruth 2013). Thus, against the contact hypothesis, the *threat* hypothesis claims that diversity stimulates white opposition to immigration. Work on the racial threat hypothesis, beginning with the landmark studies of Key (1949) and Blalock (1957) revealed higher levels of white segregationist voting in Southern counties with higher proportions of African-Americans, as in the Mississippi Delta or coastal South Carolina. Later work generalized these findings to the Midwest and Northeast (Stein et al. 2000: 286). As Robert Putnam notes, diversity, far from incubating toleration, often results in heightened inter-ethnic conflict (Putnam 2007).

Beyond the contextual literature, this work is concerned more broadly with the question of *political demography* – whether population change arising from differences in birth, death and migration rates, or age structures, between populations, affects politics (Goldstone et. al. 2012). This paper contributes to work on differential ethnic population growth, a subfield of political demography which examines the effect of ethnic change on collective perceptions and behaviour (i.e. Toft 2007; Fearon & Laitin 2011). While some scholars claim that ethnic communities attempt to engineer ethnic demography (Morland 2014; Bookman, 1997) through immigration restriction or pronatalism, for instance, others respond that ethnic boundaries are fluid, permitting politically-motivated ethnic boundary change to dissipate demographic change (Brubaker 2004; Roediger 1991). The constructionist approach flags up the role of nationalist entrepreneurs who exploit political opportunities, or a media which frames issues and sets agendas to determine the salience of public concerns (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). This view privileges the social and political supply side against ethno-demographic change.

Levels vs. Changes

Echoing the political demography perspective, scholars have recently questioned whether variation in *levels* of minority presence offers the best test of the contact and threat hypotheses. Instead, they counter that the accent should be placed on ethnic *change*, which induces a sense of dissonance among native-born whites. Thus Hopkins (2010) finds that native-born white Americans in ethnically-changing neighbourhoods, when sensitised by the salience of immigration in the news, are significantly more anti-immigration than those in more demographically stable areas.¹ Harris (2012: 177, 220) uncovers strong positive effects of minority change on the extreme right British National Party (BNP)'s ward-level vote share using ecological analysis. Newman (2013) shows that rapid minority increase in previously non-diverse counties is associated with greater white American hostility to immigration. Abrajano and Hajnal (2015: 132) report that a high rate of Latino growth in a county is associated with a positive – albeit weak – stimulus to anti-immigration views. Individuals with authoritarian personality profiles are particularly sensitive to change: their preference for order interacts with local ethnic shifts to produce highly negative attitudes to immigration (Johnston, Newman and Velez 2015). Qualitative work, meanwhile, finds abundant evidence of white anti-immigration mobilisation in ethnically transforming locales such as Carpentersville, Illinois, Farmer's Branch, Texas or Barking and Dagenham, England (Vicino 2013; Gest, forthcoming).

Against this, Hopkins (2011), in a study of British and American data, finds that levels matter as much or more than changes, with both predicting elevated anti-immigration attitudes. Abrajano and Hajnal (2015: 147, 149-50), despite their county-level results supporting the threat hypothesis find, using the NAES 2000 and 2004, few consistent effects of zip-code minority levels or changes on American anti-immigration sentiment. Instead, they report that a higher level of County Latino share is associated with stronger white anti-

immigration attitudes. Against this, Schachter, using GSS panel survey data for 2008-10, locates a significant dampening effect of a county's proportion Hispanic on white immigration attitudes, though this washes out in fixed-effects specifications (Schachter 2015).

'White Flight' and Selection Effects

One explanation for the aforementioned pattern of divergent white responses to diversity conditional on whether minorities are found at higher or lower geographies, is the 'hydraulic' theory of minority incursion. Namely, that a high presence of minorities pressures intolerant whites into leaving a neighbourhood but not the wider area. Migration theory tells us that most moves take place over small distances (Crowder and South 2008) for reasons of cost and information, thus those who leave a neighbourhood are likely to reside within the wider district or metropolitan area. Thus attitudes in diverse locales would be expected to vary substantially from the non-diverse locales nearby. To test the white flight argument, previous work has employed an instrumental variables approach to address self-selection, often regressing place of residence on attitudes to outgroups (e.g., Ha 2010; Gay 2006; Branton and Jones 2005). This approach claims that whites in diverse locales differ from those in homogeneous places on the ethnocentric attitudes captured by the dependent variable, i.e. anti-immigration sentiment, but not on the ethnocentric attitudes used as instruments for it, such as preference for a white neighbourhood. In response, Abrajano and Hajnal (2009) remark that 'Most studies of contextual effects have been plagued by concerns about selection...Existing studies often try to control for various aspects of this selection but in the end few have been able to solve this fundamental problem. '

Cross-sectional approaches based on analysing the character of population stocks can take us only so far. What is needed is work which tracks the longitudinal flow of attitude populations over time and place. This is, as yet, impossible with American data due to the small sample size of the few longitudinal attitude surveys (i.e. GSS panel data) which capture outgroup attitudes or voting, and the lack of attitudinal items on larger-scale longitudinal surveys such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Some work has been done with voter registration data to examine partisan self-selection in the US (Cho et al. 2013), and with longitudinal data on partisanship in Britain (Gallego et. al. 2014), both of which find no significant sorting effects – but neither examines self-selection on the basis of racial or immigration attitudes. 'What are the mechanisms through which racial context operates on thoughts of mobility?,' asks Maria Krysan. 'Although the optimal approach for answering questions about motivations would be to use longitudinal data that measure both attitudes and behavior at the individual level, these data do not exist (Krysan 2002).'

Some scholars find that outgroup animus affects mobility, such that those who are less comfortable with minorities are more prone to leave diverse places. Oliver and Wong (2003), for example, find that white neighbourhood preferences significantly predict negative white attitudes to outgroups. Other authors, using hypothetical neighbourhood ethnic composition showcards associated with the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), find that whites who express negative attitudes to outgroups prefer whiter neighbourhoods (Krysan 2002; Charles 2005). A replication of the showcard study in the Netherlands finds a similar pattern (van Londen 2012) and this appears also to be true in Britain.²

Yet the fact remains that these are relationships between sets of attitudes rather than between attitudes and behaviour. Respondents may say they prefer to move but may not actually do so. However, if the attitudinal relationships also hold for actual mobility behaviour, one can claim that the contact effects observed at lower geographies are spurious,

and are actually being produced by white flight and avoidance, i.e. self-selection. This would imply that threat theory offers a better explanation for the pattern of relative white tolerance in diverse areas than contact theory. British longitudinal data thus permit a dynamic test of self-selection that helps adjudicate between the contending claims that has thus far been impossible with American data.

Data

I use several sources for this research. In order to measure UKIP support and the political profile of White British movers, I use the Understanding Society (UKHLS) survey. Understanding Society is an annual longitudinal study of approximately 45,000 individuals, including a minority boost sample. I use linearly interpolated 1991, 2001 and 2011 ward-level British census data which is attached to individual survey records in the Citizenship Survey and UKHLS. A common 2001 ward geography is used to link census data across the three census dates.³ Note that UK wards average approximately 6,500 population so offer a good example of a low-level geography in which we might expect to find contact effects.

While similar to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in the United States, UKHLS contains modules covering a wider array of subjective measures. Party vote, political participation, political attitudes, reasons for moving, attitudes to locale and national identity are included in at least some survey waves. This permits a fuller examination of the beliefs of whites who leave, enter and remain in diverse areas, enabling me to generate a four-year longitudinal panel dataset of White British incomers to, outmigrants from, and stayers in, diverse or homogeneous wards. The sample consists of 170,460 person-years, of which 124,524 person-years of responses are obtained from approximately 46,500 White British

individuals. 83 percent of the wave 2 sample responded in wave 3, though attrition rates are higher among ethnic minorities, youth and movers.⁴

Several robustness checks are conducted. The British Election Study (BES) 2015 Combined Internet Panel Study permits us to examine the effect of Local Authority ethnic levels and changes on reported UKIP vote in the 2014 European election. Data is drawn from waves 1 and 2 of the BES (Fieldhouse et. al. 2015), a sample of over 24,000 individuals across the UK including almost 6,000 UKIP voters.

To assess how ward ethnic context affects white attitudes to immigration, I draw on the Home Office Citizenship Surveys, which sample approximately 15,000 respondents per year - 5,000 from non-European minority groups and 10,000 whites (Office for National Statistics and Home Office 2011; Office for National Statistics and Home Office 2010). The survey was conducted biennially or annually in England and Wales between 2001 and 2011. Ward-level geocoded data for the 2009-10 and 2010-11 surveys have been obtained through survey firms. Other years are not available at the geographic scale required.⁵ The pooled 2-year sample yields approximately 16,000 white British respondents, the target group. The survey is rich in questions pertaining to attitudes toward immigration, ethnic relations and perceptions of locality.

A final source is 2010, 2011 and 2012 Local Government election results from the University of Plymouth Elections Centre, which are attached to 2011 ward-level census data. This permits the analysis of a much larger sample of UKIP (and BNP) voters than is possible in surveys such as UKHLS.⁶

Method

The analysis proceeds as follows. I begin by examining individual-level UKIP voting from four waves of the UKHLS. This analysis includes a test of the ‘white flight’ hypothesis. This is followed by several robustness checks. The first focuses on immigration opinion in the Citizenship Surveys. This followed by an analysis of UKIP voting in the British Election Study (BES) using Local Authority (LA)-level contextual parameters (as ward-level parameters are not yet available for BES due to disclosure risk). Finally I include an ecological analysis of UKIP and British National Party (BNP) voting at ward level for the years 2010-12.

UKIP Support in the UKHLS

As noted, I first perform an analysis of support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) at individual level, using Understanding Society (UKHLS) data.

Dependent Variable: The dependent variable for this study is comprised of the combined response to the questions ‘If there were to be a general election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be most likely to support?’ and ‘which party do you feel closest to?’⁷ While party support and vote intention are discrete variables, there is a close relationship between the two. Moreover, the two questions are asked of different respondents in each wave, so amalgamating them does not duplicate responses. One of the response categories in both questions is ‘other party’, followed by a write-in option. This is where a UKIP or other populist right response may appear. This generates 2091 UKIP person-years

out of approximately 130,000 White British person-years of data on the two political questions across waves 1-4.

UKIP support amounts to just 2 percent of the sample (3.1 percent of White British who supplied a political response) in wave 4 [2012-14]. This is a considerable undercount given UKIP's actual 2014 European election popular vote of 26.6 percent and 2015 general election result of 12.6 percent. Wave 4 is largely drawn from 2012-13 responses, and while UKIP support was rising in this period from a lower base (16 percent in 2009 European elections, 3 percent in 2010 general election), the structure of the UKHLS partisanship questions underestimates UKIP support and we must be attentive to the possibility this selects for more committed UKIP partisans. Particular individuals do account for multiple person-years of data, yet the data show a notable increase in UKIP support in wave 4 and considerable individual variability. For instance, only around 20 percent of UKIP supporters in a given wave were supporters in the previous wave; for vote intenders, this rises to 35 percent. Among vote intenders in a given wave less than 15 percent were party supporters in a previous wave, and vice-versa. Once again, the dependent variable is a dummy for UKIP support or vote intention in a given year.

Independent variables:

Individual-level variables include age, sex, highest educational qualification (run as a continuous variable) and income, which previous analyses suggest would predict a UKIP vote (Ford and Goodwin 2014). Contextual parameters are drawn from the census. These include the proportion of the ward of residence comprised of non-European ethnic minorities and the rate of non-European minority increase in the ward since 2001. Similar shares are

calculated for levels and changes of ‘White Other’ population (mainly Eastern European) and for combined non-European and European ‘minority’ total.

Results

Results of a logistic regression of UKIP vote, with robust standard errors, is presented in table 1. The first point to notice is that individuals in the most recent wave are associated with a significantly greater likelihood of supporting UKIP. This reflects the rising trajectory of UKIP over the 2012-14 period (Ford and Goodwin 2014).⁸ As expected, older, male, less educated and poorer voters are significantly associated with support for UKIP, reflecting the ‘left behind’ social profile advanced by Ford and Goodwin.

Table 1. Model of UKIP Support, 2009-14

	All minority	Visible minority	White 'Other'
2011 wave (ref 2010 wave)	-0.347*** (.077)	-0.349*** (.077)	-0.348*** (.077)
2012 wave (ref 2010 wave)	-0.107 (.075)	-0.110 (.075)	-0.108 (.075)
2013 wave (ref 2010 wave)	0.676*** (.073)	0.673*** (.073)	0.669*** (.073)
age	0.028*** (.002)	0.027*** (.002)	0.028*** (.002)
female	-0.708*** (.064)	-0.708*** (.064)	-0.707*** (.064)
education	-0.004*** (.001)	-0.004*** (.001)	-0.004*** (.001)

income	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
minority increase 2001-11	0.015**		
	(.005)		
minority % 2001	-0.016***		
	(.004)		
visible minority increase		0.018**	
		(.006)	
visible minority % 2001		-0.013***	
		(.004)	
white 'other' increase			0.032*
			(.013)
white 'other' % 2001			-2.392
			(1.244)
constant	-4.459***	-4.440***	-4.448***
	(.150)	(.151)	(.150)
N	128144	128306	128144
Individuals	46515	46528	46515
Pseudo R²	0.0564	0.0562	0.0559


Source: UKHLS 2009-14. *p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.001.

Focus on the effects of the contextual parameters in the lower half of the table. Notice that the share of minorities in a respondent's ward of residence predicts a significantly lower likelihood of supporting or intending to vote for UKIP. Yet changes in minority share are associated with the obverse: a significantly elevated likelihood of backing UKIP. Levels and changes have disparate effects in the hypothesised direction. The change effect for UKIP voting is robust to the substitution of 1991 or 2001 minority share for 2011 minority share.

Non-European minority demographics exert stronger effects in this model than the share of European minorities, but use of different indicators than the 'White Other' census category - such as comparing the share of ward population from post-2004 EU accession states who arrived after 2001 with non-Europeans arriving after 2001 – produces a stronger European than non-European effect. There is also a .45 correlation between the two minority population shares at ward level, which complicates interpretation, though variance inflation tolerances ($VIF < 4$) are not breached. All told, while these results indicate that UKIP voting is more sensitive to non-European than European minority levels and changes, this result should be interpreted with caution.

The main point to take away is the pattern of disparate contextual effects from minority levels and changes on the dependent variable. Figure 1 shows that as we move from 0 to 50 percent minorities in their ward, White British respondents' predicted probability of supporting UKIP falls from .02 to .005. Ethnic change predicts the opposite: a decline in minority share of 20 points over 2001-2011 in a respondent's ward is associated with a probability of voting UKIP of just .009. However, in wards with a 20-point increase in minority share over this period, this rises to .023.⁹

Figure 1.



Self-Selection Tests

Our findings thus far show that higher shares of ethnic minorities in a White British individual’s ward predict lower UKIP support. Contact theory would explain this as the result of positive contact between whites and ethnic minorities. However, threat theorists could legitimately demur by claiming that anti-immigration whites tend to disproportionately leave diverse areas, which explains white tolerance at higher levels of local minority presence. Therefore we need to address the endogeneity, or self-selection, problem posed by ‘white flight’ and avoidance. As Abrajano and Hajnal (2015:151) comment, ‘any further conclusions

about neighbourhood context will have to wait until more rigorous testing can incorporate selection issues at lower levels of aggregation.’ This paper addresses this concern.

To test for self-selection, we need to know whether UKIP-voting whites tend to disproportionately outmigrate from, or avoid, diverse areas. Our modelling strategy is to first test for ‘white flight’ from diverse areas, and second to address white avoidance of such areas among white domestic migrants. The UKHLS, as a longitudinal, large-sample survey containing questions on voting, permits us to do this in a way that is not yet possible with US data. The PSID contains no political questions and the GSS panel survey arguably lacks adequate sample size – for instance, there were just 40 white individuals who moved tract within their county in the 2008-10 GSS panel (Schachter 2015). We attach census data for 1991, 2001 and 2011 assigned to a common ward geography.

Our first model asks whether UKIP-voting White British respondents are more likely to leave a ward with a large share of non-European minorities than non-UKIP voting White British respondents. The dependent variable in model 1 is a dummy coded 1 for a move out and 0 for remaining in, or moving within, a ward.¹⁰ If threat theorists are correct, we would expect UKIP voters to be disproportionately represented among those leaving diverse areas, provided we control for confounding predictors of mobility such as age, income, marital status and education. We restrict the analysis to White British respondents.

The dependent variable in model 2, which is restricted to White British movers, is the difference in minority share between origin and destination ward. This measures how the share of minorities changes with a white individual’s move. An individual who moves from a ward with a large share of minorities to a homogeneously white ward scores a strong negative (in theory up to -100) whereas a respondent who moves from a homogeneous to a diverse area would show an increase in ward minority share of up to +100. Thus the dependent

variable could in theory span -100 to +100 though the actual range in the data is -79 to +86. If threat theorists are correct, we would expect UKIP voters to be overrepresented among those leaving high-minority wards and underrepresented in the flow towards them.

Model 1 considers white flight. Here the key parameter is the interaction between UKIP support and share of minorities in origin ward. The data show a small effect for minority share, suggesting that White British respondents are more likely to move from (rather than remain in) diverse wards as compared to white ones, but within the white flow, UKIP voters do not stand out. That is, whites who back UKIP and live in diverse wards are not significantly more likely to leave their ward than non-UKIP voting whites in similarly diverse wards, or UKIP-voting whites who live in lily-white wards. This casts doubt on threat theorists' contention that self-selection of UKIP supporters out of diverse wards accounts for the relative tolerance, i.e. low UKIP voting, of whites in high-minority contexts.

Model 2 examines white avoidance. The higher the share of minorities in a respondent's ward of origin, the bigger the drop in the share of minorities experienced as a result of a move. This is mainly an artefact of the supply of alternative wards: any person, white or otherwise, who lives in a high minority ward has very few higher-minority wards to choose from. This said, the data (not shown) reveal that whites leaving high-minority wards choose significantly whiter areas to move to than minorities originating from similar areas even when population density and deprivation are accounted for. But what is most important for this analysis is that while whites and minorities differ in their mobility, UKIP and non-UKIP supporters do not. The main effect and interactions for UKIP support are not significant.


Table 2. Models Predicting Mobility (White British Respondents Only), 2009-14

	<u>Model 1</u> ¹¹ Logistic regression predicting move out of ward, robust std. errors	<u>Model 2</u> ¹² GLS linear regression predicting increase in minority share in ward due to move
Mover (lag)	.791 (.063)***	
Minority population share in ward (lag)	.003 (.001)*	-.372 (.012)***
UKIP supporter (lag)	-.074 (.196)	-.877 (4.109)
UKIP supporter x Minority population share (lag)	.004 (.008)	.363 (.421)
Pseudo R ² /R ²	.130	.472
N	77,950	3868
Groups	34,327	3365

Source: UKHLS 2009-2014. *p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.001. For control variables, see model footnotes.

We can see this in figure 2, which is based on table 2, where the confidence intervals for the red line for UKIP-voting whites and blue line for non-UKIP voting whites overlap. That is, with a range of individual and contextual predictors held at their mean values, both UKIP and non-UKIP voting White British respondents originating in wards with 46 percent minorities tend to move to wards which contain 13 points fewer minorities (i.e. are 33 percent minority).¹³ Once again, we find no support for the view that the self-selection of UKIP supporters out of diverse wards explains the finding in table 1 that higher local minority share is associated with significantly lower UKIP voting. This suggests that contact rather than threat best explains our findings as regards to minority levels.

Figure 2.



As a first robustness check, I replace UKIP support with attitudes to immigration as the dependent variable, to see whether we detect the same disjuncture between the effect of ward ethnic levels and changes on white opinion.

Immigration Opinion

Dependent Variable: The dependent variable for this study is the Citizenship Survey question, 'Do you think the number of immigrants coming to Britain nowadays should be changed?' Answers follow a 5-category ordinal scale: 'increased a lot', 'increased a little', 'stay the same', 'decreased a little,' 'decreased a lot.' This variable is far from normally distributed,

with a heavy slant toward reduction. Thus it has been recoded as two distinct dependent variables. The first is a binary reduce/do not reduce dummy variable which groups the roughly 81 percent of UK-born whites who desire a reduction into one category (1), and those favouring the same or more immigration (0) into a second. A second formulation isolates a dummy variable in which the approximately 60 percent of whites who desire that immigration be reduced 'a lot' are coded 1 and others 0. The analysis is restricted to white, UK-born residents.¹⁴

Independent variables:

We test a variety of individual-level parameters. Demographic and economic variables include age, marital status, sex, income, education, accommodation type (renter, owner, council tenant). Contextual parameters are drawn from the 2011 census except where noted. These include the proportion of the ward of residence comprised of ethnic minorities and the rate of minority increase in the ward since 2001. We consider the share of unemployed and population density in a ward. We also consider minority share at Local Authority level.

Results

Table 3 presents a logistic regression of white UK-born immigration opinion (reduce v same/increase) on individual and contextual variables. Only intercepts (not slopes) for contextual variables are considered. As expected from the literature, we find that older respondents and those without formal education qualifications are more opposed to immigration. Women do not differ from men in their attitudes. Critically, for this paper, we

find that the level of minority share in a respondent’s ward of residence predicts reduced opposition while the change in minority population between 2001 and 2011 predicts greater opposition to immigration. Those in more deprived wards evince greater opposition. The pattern of contextual effects aligns with the models in table 1 based on UKIP support in the UKHLS. 81 percent of White UK-born respondents favour reduction and 60 percent favour the ‘reduce a lot’ option. Yet a similar model emerges when we alter the dependent variable from reduce vs. same/increase to reduce a lot vs. reduce a little/same/increase.

Table 3. Predictors of Attitudes to Immigration among White UK-born British, 2009-11

	Reduce	Reduce a lot
Age	0.112*** (.015)	0.172*** (.013)
Female	0.019 (.042)	-0.009 (.033)
No qualifications	0.491*** (.066)	0.585*** (.051)
Ward minority %	-0.025*** (.003)	-0.026*** (.003)
Ward deprivation	0.062*** (.016)	0.111*** (.015)
Ward urban/rural	0.064 (.055)	-0.077 (.053)
Ward minority change %	0.026*** (.007)	0.027** (.009)
constant	0.884*** (.123)	-0.296* (.114)


N	15097	15097
Pseudo R²	0.022	0.032

Source: Citizenship Surveys 2009-11. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

The black set of lines in figure 3 shows that the predicted probability of a White UK-born respondent favouring reduced immigration, with all other variables held at their means, falls from .85 in a ward with no minorities (denoted ‘ML0’) to .62 in a ward comprised of 50 percent minorities, denoted ‘ML50’. Here it is worth noting that 80 percent of the 8850 wards in England and Wales are highly non-diverse: averaging just 6 percent minorities in 2011 while 41 percent of ethnic minorities live in little more than 400 wards, which average 40 percent white (Kaufmann and Harris 2014: 52). Widening confidence intervals suggest less robust inferences as the share of minorities rises toward 50 percent, but the pattern is clear and remains statistically significant, reinforcing the claims of contact theory.


Against this, the red line for minority change in ward shows that as we transition from the sample limit of -4, denoted ‘MC-4’ (i.e. 4 points fewer minorities in the respondent’s ward in 2011 than in 2001) to the sample maximum of +36 (a 36-point increase in minority share in a respondent’s ward between 2001 and 2011), denoted ‘MC36’, this corresponds to a rise in the predicted probability of favouring reduced immigration from .77 to .90. The effect is less than for levels, and is also subject to wider error over much of its span, but is nevertheless statistically significant.

Figure 3.



Repeating the analysis with ‘reduce a lot’ as the dependent variable (see figure 2) reveals a more pronounced pattern. For instance, the predicted probability of a White British respondent favouring reducing immigration by ‘a lot’ declines from .67 to .36 as one moves from zero to 50 percent minorities in the respondent’s ward. On the other hand, the predicted probability of opposition rises from .53 to .76 comparing respondents in wards with the lowest and highest ethnic minority increase over 2001-11.

Figure 4.



Throughout we find the divergent contextual effect of local ethnic levels - which predict a contact effect of reduced opposition to immigration; and local ethnic changes, which predict heightened opposition, i.e. a threat response. This said, the contact effects are stronger, which we see from the slope of the black compared to red lines in figures 3 and 4. Contact effects are also more robust, as indicated not only by the wider confidence intervals for the red lines, but also by the fact that there is a strong (.64) correlation between ethnic minority levels and changes: diverse wards attract more minorities due to ethnic networks and, perhaps, because diverse areas dissuade whites from entering or prompt white exit. Though within acceptable

variance inflation ($VIF < 4$) tolerances for multicollinearity, it is notable that when the models are rerun using 1991 or 2001 minority levels as proxies for 2011 minority level, the significance of minority levels remains while minority change (over 2001-2011) falls out of the equation.

The Local Authority Context for UKIP Voting in the 2014 European Elections

Thus far, our analysis of anti-immigration sentiment and voting has concentrated on the ward, a unit averaging around 6,500 individuals, as a measure of local context. We have seen that higher minority levels are associated with lower, and faster minority changes with higher, anti-immigration sentiment and voting. What happens when we move up to the level of the Local Authority?

The British Election Study (BES) 2015 Combined Internet Panel Study permits us to examine the effect of Local Authority ethnic levels and changes on reported UKIP vote. The dependent variable is a dummy for reported UKIP vote in the May 2014 European elections (1=UKIP vote, 0=No UKIP vote, including non-voters). We also probe immigration opinion based on a 7-point scale for the question 'Immigration undermines or enriches cultural life'. In order to minimise reverse causation, dependent variables are based on responses in wave 2 while independent variables are drawn from wave 1. Only White British respondents are included, which reduces sample size somewhat to 21,660. There are 5,348 UKIP voters in the White British sample, representing 24.7 percent of White British voters, and thus somewhat of an undercount compared to the 26.6 percent obtained by UKIP in the election.¹⁵

The analysis comprises three models, shown in table 4. The first is an OLS of anti-immigration opinion based on the 'undermines cultural life' question. This has also been run

as an ordered logit and the coefficients are similar. Older, poorer, less educated and female respondents are more anti-immigration. The gender finding seems counterintuitive since the Citizenship Survey models in table 3 show that gender is not significantly associated with immigration attitudes (Kaufmann and Harris 2015). More germane to this study, however, is that the familiar effects of levels and changes assert themselves at the LA level. A 1 point increase in LA district minority share in 2001 predicts a .12 point decrease in anti-immigration sentiment on a 7-point Likert scale. Conversely, a 1 point rise in the rate of minority increase in a respondent's district corresponds to a .15 point increase in anti-immigration feeling.

Moving to measures of the UKIP vote in the European elections, we see that younger voters and women are significantly less likely to have voted UKIP than men, reflecting established scholarship (Ford and Goodwin 2014). Poorer and less educated voters are more likely to report having voted UKIP. The share of minorities in 2001 in a respondent's LA is at borderline statistical significance, and signed in a negative direction, as in the anti-immigration model. Similarly, the coefficient for minority change shows a strongly significant positive value. The final model includes the anti-immigration variable among the explananda on the right-hand side of the equation. This reduces the statistical power of minority levels and changes to some extent, though minority change remains important. This suggests that part, but not all, of the effect of ethnic context at the LA level on UKIP voting operates via immigration attitudes.

Table 4. Models of Immigration Attitudes and UKIP European Election Vote (BES)

	Anti-immigration	UKIP 1	UKIP 2
Age	.006*** (.001)	.025*** (.001)	.025*** (.001)
Female	.088** (.031)	-.451*** (.038)	-.527*** (.040)
Education	-.392*** (.012)	-.179*** (.014)	-.048** (.015)
Deprivation (LA)	.005 (.006)	-.013 (.008)	-.019* (.008)
Population density (LA)	-.004 (.042)	.014 (.049)	.014 (.052)
2001 % minorities (LA)	-.012*** (.002)	-.005 (.003)	-.002 (.003)
'01-11 minority change (LA)	.015** (.005)	.025*** (.006)	.022** (.006)
Anti-immigration			.413*** (.011)
Income band (ref=high)			
low	.161** (.049)	.131* (.060)*	.086 (.063)
medium	.148** (.046)	.014 (.057)	-.035 (.060)
refused to answer	.388*** (.054)	.150* (.064)	.012 (.068)
constant	-2.994*** (.101)	-1.505*** (.121)	-.436 (.130)
R²	.088	.055	.147
N	18609	17541	17541


Source: BES 2015 waves 1 and 2. Data weights 'W1W2' have been applied.

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Now consider figure 5. In terms of marginal effects, based on the 'UKIP1' model in table 4, a move from no ethnic change in a respondent's Local Authority to a 28-point increase, the limits of this sample, corresponds to an increase in the predicted probability of reporting a UKIP vote from .20 to .32 with other variables held at their means. Minority levels in a respondent's LA just fail to reach significance at the .05 level in the 'UKIP1' model. The predicted probability of a UKIP vote varies by four points such that the marginal

probability of a UKIP vote is .23 in the least (1%) and .19 in the most (46%) minority-rich Local Authority when other variables are at their mean values.

Figure 5.




A shortcoming of the above analysis is that we cannot be sure of the extent to which ethno-contextual dynamics at lower geographies such as wards, which comprise Local Authorities, are driving the results or whether higher-level contextual effects are key. Previous work with similar data using multi-level analysis (i.e. Kaufmann and Harris 2015) would suggest that ward contextual dynamics are paramount for contact and change effects. Previous work would also suggest that *both* levels and changes at the higher geography (i.e. LA) should be associated with higher UKIP voting and greater white opposition to immigration - as noted by Abrajano and Hajnal (2015: 132). Until the BES are able to

negotiate access to attach ward census data to the BES, it will not be possible to conduct multi-level (HLM) analysis to ascertain whether higher or lower-level dynamics are central.

Toward Ethnic Accommodation?

Today's ethnic changes feed into tomorrow's ethnic levels, and since minorities are attracted to areas that already minority-dense, the two measures are strongly correlated, as displayed in figure 6.

Figure 6.



Source: Census of England and Wales 1991-2011. See earlier remarks regarding boundary changes and adjustments.

This presents a paradox – how do threat effects associated with change become contact effects? The answer appears to be that yesterday’s demographic shocks fade through habituation, legitimization and contact while yesterday’s ethnic levels become more potent predictors of lower threat levels over time.

As table 5 shows, minority levels gain in predictive power as we go back in time. That is, the coefficient for 1991 minority share exceeds that for 2001 or 2011 minority share in both the UKHLS and BES. Moreover, in the BES, minority share only attains significance in 1991. One could argue that this is because minorities in wards with a long experience of minority settlement are viewed as ‘established’ which legitimates their presence and hence reduces support for UKIP. Contact may not be the only mechanism at work translating minority-rich contexts into more liberal white attitudes to immigration and lower populist right support. The figure likewise reveals that only 2001-2011 ethnic change significantly predicts UKIP support. 1991-2001 change in the same wards, though displaying similar or greater coefficients, is not significant. Naturally such analyses are complicated by multicollinearity: the correlation between 2001-2011 change and 2011 levels is .64. Nonetheless, the analyses in table 5 show acceptable variance inflation statistics ($VIF < 4$) when run as OLS regressions.

Table 5. The Effect of Past Minority Levels and Changes on current UKIP voting

	UKHLS	BES
Levels (controlling for 2001-11 changes):		
2011	-.022*** (.005)	-.005 (.003)
2001	-.022*** (.005)	-.005 (.003)
1991	-.034*** (.008)	-.009* (.004)
Changes (controlling for 2001 levels):		
2001-2011	.021** (.008)	.025*** (.006)
1991-2001	.038 (.022)	.025 (.013)

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. See tables 1 and 4 (both based on 2001 levels and 2001-11 changes) for full model specifications.

Local Election Results

As a final robustness check we examine local level election data. Actual election results contain a far larger sample of UKIP voters (hundreds of thousands) than surveys, and are uncontaminated by social desirability and other response bias. We examine a set of local election results compiled during 2010-12 by the Elections Centre at the University of Plymouth, around the time of the 2011 British census. Local elections only take place across a subset of districts in Britain each year thus a full set of results can only be accumulated over several years. 2010, 2011 and 2012 election results by ward are linked to a dataset containing 2011 ward-level census data. UKIP's performance is also assessed against that of a more radical anti-immigration party, the British National Party (BNP). The BNP enjoyed greater popularity than UKIP in local elections until after 2009, when it fell prey to leadership splits and scandals (Harris 2012).

We only examine wards in which the UKIP and BNP stood candidates. Table 6 shows that UKIP ran in 945 wards over this period and the BNP in 704. Results in the first model in table 4 show that the BNP vote conforms to the previously-noted pattern whereby high minority levels in a ward predict lower anti-immigration sentiment and voting while faster minority change is associated with elevated anti-immigration sentiment and voting. Indeed, this has been the consistent finding of previous work on the BNP (Bowyer 2008; Biggs and Knauss 2012; Ford and Goodwin 2010; Harris 2012). Replicating the analysis with UKIP rather than BNP vote as the dependent variable, we find that the first, but not the second, relationship holds. Results are similar when we divide the dependent variable by the White British share of the population to exclude minority voters. Naturally aggregate results are susceptible to the ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950; Firebaugh 1978). Yet with a properly specified model, these concerns can be minimised even as model fit statistics may be inflated because both voting and ethnicity are geographically concentrated (Knoke 1974).


Table 6. Aggregate Models of UKIP and BNP Local Election Voting, 2010-12

	BNP vote	UKIP vote
% Minority 2001	-0.124*	-0.059*
	(.049)	(.023)
Minority change 2001-11	0.188**	-0.049
	(.066)	(.035)
Total population	0.000*	0.000***
	(.000)	(.000)
% Working class	0.214***	0.218***
	(.031)	(.035)
% Elderly	-0.228***	0.120*
	(.054)	(.058)
Constant	8.498***	5.143**
	(1.758)	(1.845)
N	704	945
R²	0.304	0.230

Source: UK Local Election results (Plymouth Elections Centre) 2010-12 and 2011 Census data. *p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.001.

This is graphically reflected in figures 7 and 8. The x-axis combines minority share and minority change (a combination of low share and fast change is predicted to maximise threat effects), which is plotted against BNP or UKIP vote on the vertical axis. Notice that the slope for BNP vote share is considerably steeper than that for UKIP vote share, reflecting the fact that ethnic change is only significantly associated with elevated populist right voting in the BNP case.

Figure 8.



Source: UK Local Election results (Plymouth Elections Centre) 2010-12 and 2011 Census data.

A clutch of wards in Barking and Dagenham, a Local Authority whose White British population declined from 81 to 49 percent during 2001-11, show very high BNP support. The BNP shocked observers by winning 12 of 51 council seats in 2006, leading to a high-profile 2010 campaign, led by Margaret Hodge of Labour, which mobilised newcomers and former nonvoters to turn out and vote Labour, resulting in the BNP losing all its councillors. This despite the BNP doubling its vote share between 2006 and 2010.¹⁶ In qualitative fieldwork conducted in 2012 in the district, many white respondents cited ethnic change as a motor of BNP support. ‘I voted BNP,’ reported a respondent named Eleanor, ‘I can’t help it. They call them Nazis. But they’re not. They’re Britain for Britain. Labour sent [immigrants] all down here and [Margaret Hodge] won’t tell me where they come from. I think they fiddled the votes, so that the BNP did not get one candidate in.’¹⁷

While UKIP also did well in several Barking wards, and by 2014 had equalled the BNP's 2006 vote share in the district, its performance lagged behind the BNP during 2010-12. This does not appear to be due to competition in the 256 wards in the sample in which the two parties competed because results are similar when these are excluded. Therefore an interpretation of the difference between the BNP and UKIP in this period is that the pattern is affected by each party's social profile. In the UKHLS, the median White British respondent is 49 and lives in a ward that is 11.7 percent minority. By contrast, the typical BNP supporter is 43 and resides in a ward with 12.5 percent minorities while the median UKIP supporter is 57 and inhabits a ward with just 10.1 percent minorities. BNP voters are younger and live in significantly more diverse places than the average White Briton. UKIP voters are older and reside in more homogeneous wards than average. Since ethnic change in a ward is highly correlated with its existing level of ethnic diversity, BNP voters were more likely to reside in wards experiencing ethnic change than UKIP voters.

There is another important issue with ecological data in that UKIP draws some support from both European and non-European ethnic minorities whereas the BNP's vote is exclusively White British. In wave 2 of the BES, for example, 5 percent of 830 non-European minorities, and 10 percent of 1,305 European minorities in the sample intended to vote UKIP at the 2015 General Election compared to 18.4 percent of White British people (these figures are distinct from the 2014 European elections, where UKIP support is much higher). As regards the BNP, only one minority individual intended to vote for the party in 2015, and only one voted for them in 2010. This introduces error into equations whose left-hand side consists of UKIP vote share, making it more difficult to compare UKIP and BNP results. Hence the results of table 6 should be interpreted with caution. Finally, it should be noted that the interaction between low minority levels and rapid minority increase, which underpins

Newman's (2013) 'acculturating contexts' thesis was not significant (or signed in the wrong direction) across all datasets and models.

National-Level Dynamics


Analysis has heretofore focused on the ward or Local Authority as the geographic context, but it is clear that much of the variation in voting or immigration opinion stems from national-level demography, and how national minority levels and changes are framed by media and political elites. Cross-national comparative work has usually found that a larger national share of minorities predicts more hostile white immigration opinion (Quillian 1995; Semyonov and Glikman 2009) though in a few instances there is no significant effect (Citrin et. al. 2008). However, Hatton (2014) maintains that Citrin et. al's finding may be due to the cross-sectional nature of their data, which does not control for unspecified characteristics of countries. Hatton's study of European countries using panel data with country fixed-effects addresses this, and finds that higher minority share across European countries is consistently associated with increasing opposition to immigration, a finding robust to six distinct immigration opinion questions (Hatton 2014). However, Hatton's analysis does not take historic ethnic change, i.e. decennial shifts, into account because accurate comparative ethnic time-series data is difficult to acquire. Indeed, only four European countries collect ethnic census data.

This said, German time-series data shows that ethnic change engenders significant resistance to foreigners while levels do not (Coenders and Scheepers 2008). This work is germane to the British case, where a significant increase in immigration over the period 1997-2001, from roughly 50,000 to 250,000 per annum, took place. Figure 9, drawn from Duffy and Frere-Smith (2014) compares actual net migration with the salience of

immigration and race issues in the Ipsos-Mori issues index since 1992. The polynomial curves exhibit a .78 correlation.

Since 2002, in the presence of higher annual inflows, the British public has ranked immigration as the first or second most important issue. A similar relationship may be observed when plotting immigration against results of the quarterly MP's Survey which asks Members of Parliament to list their constituents' leading concerns. Here again, the proportion mentioning asylum/immigration/refugees broadly tracks net migration (immigration less emigration) figures from the late 1980s to January 2013. Since the early 2000s, the proportion of MPs mentioning immigration-related issues as the primary concern of their constituents has hovered around 60 percent and occasionally reached 80 percent (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 8-9). The relationship between arrivals and public opinion is somewhat of a lacuna in current research, which has typically focused more on the downstream effect of coverage on opinion (i.e. Dunaway et. al. 2010; Hopkins 2011; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015, ch. 5). In part this is because the level of immigration into the United States, where much research has taken place, has not exhibited the same step-change increase evident in Britain since the mid-1990s.

Figure 9.



Source: Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 8. Issues Index question: ‘What do you see as the most/other important issues facing Britain today?’. Issues Index base: representative sample of c.1,000 British adults age 18+ each month, interviewed face-to-face in home. Home Office statistics based on ‘Year ending’.

Figure 9 shows a marked correlation between national-level demographic change and public concern over immigration. Nevertheless, this is not an unmediated response to ethnic change, which was more straight-line than immigration, driven as much by fertility and age structure as migration. Instead, the correlation can be interpreted as a causal chain, with rising immigration propelling increased media coverage and politicisation, in turn interacting with lived experience of ethnic change to produce greater opposition to immigration. This should not be taken as a refutation of social constructionist theories of nationalism. Rather, what figure 9 shows is that given a relatively stable discursive environment and political culture, ethnic change plays a role in elevating ethno-nationalist threat perceptions. Should Britain’s

political culture on ethnic issues move in a more liberal-cosmopolitan direction, the framing of ethnic shifts may alter, potentially reducing the salience of the immigration issue. Further research is needed to test linkages between actual net migration numbers, media coverage and public opinion.


Discussion

This research makes the case that local ethnic change stimulates higher UKIP support while higher levels of locally-established minorities predict lower UKIP support. These patterns are similar to those found for immigration attitudes in Britain and comport with an interpretation in which ward-level ethnic change threatens native whites while ward ethnic levels are associated with threat reduction. The latter is not an artefact of self-selection because white UKIP voters in minority-dense wards are no more likely to leave than other whites, nor are they more likely to move to whiter wards than others when they change residence. While higher-level contexts, in the form of Local Authority minority levels and changes, are significantly associated with the UKIP vote, it is unclear whether this is in fact driven by ward-level dynamics underneath. Further research is needed to parse higher and lower level contextual effects.

This research also reveals that the effects of demographic change fade over time, probably because local white residents become accustomed to minority residents, have positive contact with them, or come to perceive minorities as legitimately belonging in the area. This is an important caveat because yesterday's ethnic changes produce today's ethnic levels. Can we therefore look forward to a harmonious future in which rising minority levels produce greater toleration? Not necessarily. Above the level of the ward (similar to a census tract in the US), notably at the Local Authority level (akin to a US County) or national level,

dynamics may well differ. Minorities are highly concentrated – 40 percent of minorities live in about 5 percent of the wards of England and Wales – and thus the ripple or ‘halo’ of fear they transmit to adjacent homogeneous communities and the nation as a whole may be more important than contact in driving overall attitudes and voting (Rydgren and Ruth 2013; Kaufmann and Harris 2015). Indeed, Britain, like most western nations, is overwhelmingly white across much of its surface area. Even if we adopt a broad definition of minority settlement area including any district with at least 25 percent minorities, the areas labelled ‘settlement’ in figure 10 comprise just 40 of the 376 Local Authorities of England and Wales. ‘Contiguous dispersal areas’ were just 5.7 percent, and non-contiguous dispersal areas only 3.6 percent, non-white in 2001.

Figure 10.



Source: Catney and Simpson 2010: 574

National time series of immigration opinion in England and Wales since the 1980s furnishes evidence that public opinion is associated with actual immigration levels. This adds

weight to arguments from political demography, even as the effects are strongly mediated by politicians and the media. While shifts in Britain's political culture could decouple the link between numbers and opposition – as in Canada after 1971 or, arguably, the United States since the mid-1990s – such discursive changes often require a critical juncture or generational value change to materialise.

References

- Abrajano, M., & Hajnal, Z. (2009). *Latino Context and White Partisan Choices*. University of California San Diego.
- Abrajano, M. & Hajnal, Z. (2015). *White Backlash: immigration, race and American politics*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Allport, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Cambridge, Mass.,: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.
- Biggs, M., & Knauss, S. (2012). Explaining Membership in the British National Party: A Multilevel Analysis of Contact and Threat. *European Sociological Review*, 28(5), 633-646. doi: 10.1093/esr/jcr031
- Blalock, H. M. (1957). Per Cent Non-White and Discrimination in the South. *American Sociological Review* 22(6): 677-682.
- Bookman, M. Z. (1997). *The demographic struggle for power : the political economy of demographic engineering in the modern world*. London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass.
- Bowyer, B. (2008). Local context and extreme right support in England: The British National Party in the 2002 and 2003 local elections. *Electoral Studies*, 27(4), 611-620.
- Branton, R. P., & Jones, B. S. (2005). Reexamining racial attitudes: The conditional relationship between diversity and socioeconomic environment. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(2), 359-372. doi: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00128.x
- Brubaker, R. (2004). *Ethnicity without Groups*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
- Coenders, M. and P. Scheepers (2008). Changes in resistance to the social integration of foreigners in Germany 1980-2000: Individual and contextual determinants. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 34(1): 1-26.
- Catney, G., & Simpson, L. (2010). Settlement area migration in England and Wales: assessing evidence for a social gradient. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 35(4), 571-584.
- Cho, W. K. T., Gimpel, J. G., & Hui, I. S. (2013). Voter Migration and the Geographic Sorting of the American Electorate. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 103(4), 856-870. doi: 10.1080/00045608.2012.720229
- Citrin, J., Green, D. P., Muste, C., & Wong, C. (1997). Public opinion toward immigration reform: The role of economic motivations. *Journal of Politics*, 59(3), 858-881. doi: 10.2307/2998640
- Citrin, J. and J. Sides (2008). Immigration and the Imagined Community in Europe and the United States. *Political Studies* 56: 33-56.

- Crowder, K., & South, S. J. (2008). Spatial Dynamics of White Flight: The Effects of Local and Extralocal Racial Conditions on Neighborhood Out-Migration. *American Sociological Review*, 73(5), 792-812.
- Dunaway, J., et al. (2010). Agenda Setting, Public Opinion, and the Issue of Immigration Reform. *Social Science Quarterly* 91(2): 359-378.
- Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2011). Sons of the Soil, Migrants, and Civil War. *World Development*, 39(2), 199-211. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.11.031
- Fieldhouse, E., J. Green., G. Evans., H. Schmitt, and C. van der Eijk (2014). *British Election Study* Internet Panel Waves 1-2.
- Firebaugh, G. (1978). A Rule for Inferring Individual-Level Relationships from Aggregate Data. *American Sociological Review* 43: 557-572.
- Ford, R., & Goodwin, M. J. (2010). Angry White Men: Individual and Contextual Predictors of Support for the British National Party. *Political Studies*, 58(1), 1-25.
- Ford, R., & Goodwin, M. (2014). *Revolt on the right : explaining support for the radical right in Britain*. London: Routledge.
- Gay, C. (2006). Seeing difference: The effect of economic disparity on black attitudes toward Latinos. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(4), 982-997. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00228.x
- Gallego, A., Buscha, F., Sturgis, P., & Oberski, D. (2014). Places and Preferences: A Longitudinal Analysis of Self-Selection and Contextual Effects. *British Journal of Political Science, FirstView*, 1-22. doi: doi:10.1017/S0007123414000337
- Gest, Justin. *The New Minority: White Working Class Politics and Marginality*, forthcoming monograph.
- Goldstone, J. A., Eric Kaufmann and Monica Duffy Toft, Ed. (2012). *Political Demography: How Population Changes are Reshaping National Politics and International Security* Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Ha, S. E. (2010). The Consequences of Multiracial Contexts on Public Attitudes toward Immigration. *Political Research Quarterly*, 63(1), 29-42. doi: 10.1177/1065912908325255
- Harris, G. (2012). *The Rise and Fall of the British National Party: the demand for extreme right politics in the UK, unpublished PhD dissertation*. Birkbeck College, University of London.
- Hatton, Timothy J. (2014). Public Opinion on Immigration: Has the Recession Changed Minds?. IZA Discussion Paper No. 8248. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2457351>
- Hopkins, D. J. (2010). Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition. *American Political Science Review* 104(1): 40-60.
- Hopkins, D. J. (2011). National Debates, Local Responses: The Origins of Local Concern about Immigration in Britain and the United States. *British Journal of Political Science* 41: 499-524.
- Iyengar, S. and D. R. Kinder (1987). *News that matters : television and American opinion*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Kaufmann, E. and G. Harris (2014). *Changing Places: mapping the White British response to ethnic change*. London, Demos.
- Kaufmann, E. and G. Harris (2015). White Flight' or Positive Contact?: Local Diversity and Attitudes to Immigration in Britain. *Comparative Political Studies*. Advance access at: <http://cps.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/05/06/0010414015581684.full.pdf?ikey=ITiJ2LeLwmKgw0&keytype=finite%2520>
- Key, V. O. (1949). *Southern politics in State and Nation* ([1st ed.]). New York,: A. A. Knopf.

- Krysan, M. (2002). Whites who say they'd flee: who are they, and why would they leave? *Demography*, 39(4), 675-696.
- Lubbers, M., et al. (2006). Objections to asylum seeker centres: Individual and contextual determinants of resistance to small and large centres in the Netherlands. *European Sociological Review* 22(3): 243-257.
- Morland, P. (2014). *Demographic Engineering: Population Strategies in Ethnic Conflict*. Farnham, Ashgate.
- Newman, B. J. (2013). Acculturating Contexts and Anglo Opposition to Immigration in the United States. *American Journal of Political Science* 57(2): 374-390.
- Newman, B. J. and Y. Velez (2014). Group Size versus Change? Assessing Americans' Perception of Local Immigration. *Political Research Quarterly* 67(2): 293-303.
- Johnston, C. D., et al. (2015). Ethnic Change, Personality, And Polarization Over Immigration In The American Public. *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Advance access May 22).
- Knoke, D. (1974). Causal Synthesis of Sociological and Psychological Models of American Voting Behavior. *Social Forces* 53(1): 92-101.
- Office for National Statistics and Home Office. (2010). Communities Group, *Home Office Citizenship Survey, 2009-2010*, UK Data Archive Study# 6733.
- Office for National Statistics and Home Office. (2011). Communities Group, *Home Office Citizenship Survey, 2010-2011*, UK Data Archive Study# 7111.
- Oliver, J. E., & Wong, J. (2003). Intergroup prejudice in multiethnic settings. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(4), 567-582. doi: 10.2307/3186119
- ONS (Office of National Statistics). (2013). *Census of England and Wales 2011*. Table CT0010 Ethnic group (write-in responses), wards in England and Wales: www.ons.gov.uk.
- Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90(5), 751-783. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.90.5.751
- Putnam, R. (2007). E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 30(2), 137-174.
- Quillian, L. (1995). Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat - Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe. *American Sociological Review*, 60(4), 586-611. doi: 10.2307/2096296
- Robinson, W. S. (1950). Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals. *American Sociological Review* 15(3): 351-357.
- Roediger, D. R. (1991). *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class*. New York & London, Verso.
- Rydgren, J. and P. Ruth (2011). Voting for the Radical Right in Swedish Municipalities: Social Marginality and Ethnic Competition? *Scandinavian Political Studies* 34(3): 202-225.
- Rydgren, J. and P. Ruth (2013). Contextual explanations of radical right-wing support in Sweden: socioeconomic marginalization, group threat, and the halo effect. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36(4): 711-728.
- Schachter, A. (2015). A Change of Heart or Change of Address? The Geographic Sorting of Whites' Attitudes towards Immigration. *Population Association of America*. San Diego, CA.
- Schlueter, E., & Scheepers, P. (2010). The relationship between outgroup size and anti-outgroup attitudes: A theoretical synthesis and empirical test of group threat- and intergroup contact theory. *Social Science Research*, 39(2), 285-295. doi: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2009.07.006

- Semyonov, M., & Glikman, A. (2009). Ethnic Residential Segregation, Social Contacts, and Anti-Minority Attitudes in European Societies. *European Sociological Review*, 25(6), 693-708. doi: 10.1093/esr/jcn075
- Stein, R. M., Post, S. S., & Rinden, A. L. (FAIR 2000). Reconciling context and contact effects on racial attitudes. *Political Research Quarterly*, 53(2), 285-303. doi: 10.2307/449282
- Toft, M. D. (2007). Population shifts and civil war: A test of power transition theory. *International Interactions*, 33(3), 243-269. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://000248360500003
- UKHLS. (2014). Waves 1-4, 2009-14 *Institute for Social and Economic Research and National Centre for Social Research* (Vol. SN#6614). Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive.
- van Londen, M. (2012). *'Exclusion of Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands: The Effects of Individual and Situational Characteristics on Opposition to Ethnic Policy and Ethnically Mixed Neighbourhoods'*. (PhD dissertation), Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands.
- Vicino, T. J. (2013). *Suburban crossroads : the fight for local control of immigration policy*. Lanham, Lexington Books.
- Wong, C., Bowers, J., Williams, T., & Simmons, K. D. (2012). Bringing the Person Back In: Boundaries, Perceptions, and the Measurement of Racial Context. *Journal of Politics*, 74(4), 1153-1170. doi: 10.1017/s0022381612000552
- Wright, M., et al. (2012). Alternative Measures of American National Identity: Implications for the Civic-Ethnic Distinction. *Political Psychology* 33(4): 469-482.

¹ Some claim that perceptions of immigrant presence do not match reality, and thus the 'treatment' of immigration is inchoate. Yet, while respondents generally overstate the share of minorities and immigrants in their locale, those in more diverse or immigrant-rich zip codes and counties report much higher levels and changes than those in less diverse places (Newman and Velez 2014: 6-7).

² Correspondence with N. Demireva, University of Essex. Showcard studies administered in Bradford, England show similar patterns to the MCSUI, with white respondents preferring white majority neighbourhoods.

³ Potential problems associated with changes in ward boundaries between the 1991 and 2001 censuses are mitigated by use of GeoConvert software (<http://geoconvert.mimas.ac.uk/>, accessed July 2, 2013). To arrive at common 2001-2011 wards, wards are reconstructed from a common geography based on Middle Layer Super Output Areas.

⁴ Martin Mitchell, Debbie Collins and Ashley Brown. 2015. 'Factors affecting participation in Understanding Society: Qualitative study with panel members,' NatCen Social Research.

<https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/research/publications/working-paper/understanding-society/2015-04.pdf>

⁵ I thank Ipsos-Mori for permitting access to ward-level data for the 2009-10 and 2010-11 surveys which makes multi-level analysis possible. Geocoded data for the 2007-8 and 2008-9 surveys has been purchased from NatCen, but NatCen only permit a very coarse banding at the contextual level, which militates against multi-level analysis.

⁶ <http://www1.plymouth.ac.uk/research/ceres/TEC/thecentre/Pages/default.aspx>. I thank Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher at the Elections Centre, Plymouth for access to the data.

⁷ For response categories, see:

https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/documentation/mainstage/dataset-documentation/wave/1/questionnaire-module/politics_w1

⁸ Low support in 2011 compared to 2010 may reflect the positive (for UKIP) effect of the 2009 European election on the ‘who would you vote for’ question as asked in wave 1 (2009-10), compared to 2010-11 when respondents may have interpreted this as referring to the 2010 General Election where UKIP support was much lower.

⁹ Note that, due to distinct sampling frames, the range of minority change (-20 to +20) is somewhat different in the UKHLS data as compared to the Citizenship Surveys, where ward level ethnic change was in the -4 to +36 range.

¹⁰ A move to a ward of similar ethnic diversity is coded 0.

¹¹ The following controls were added to model 1 but not shown in the regression table: population density in ward (lagged), share unemployed in ward (lagged), age, highest qualification (lagged), marital status (lagged), income (lagged) and housing tenure (lagged).

¹² The following controls were added to model 2 but not shown in the regression table: change in ward share unemployed, change in ward population density, age, highest qualification (lagged), marital status (lagged), income (lagged) and housing tenure (lagged).

¹³ Note that the typical drop in minority share with such a move is actually much larger. That is, when we do not control for independent variables such as deprivation or population density, the decline in minority share rises because diverse wards are also urban and poor while the suburban, wealthier destination wards which attract more movers happen to be considerably whiter (Catney and Simpson 2010).

¹⁴ There is no ethnicity question in the Citizenship Survey which permits the isolation of UK-born white respondents who are not of English or Welsh ethnic identity (i.e. Jewish, Irish, Polish). However, UK-born White Other is a minimal category outside London and many whites of Irish background now identify on the census as white British. Again, as the 2011 census revealed, London is an exception, so a dummy variable for London captures much of this effect.

¹⁵ This understates the level of *White British* UKIP support because minorities have a lower rate of UKIP voting.

¹⁶ ‘BNP loses all 12 seats in Barking and Dagenham council,’ *BBC Election 2010*, 8 May 2010

¹⁷ Gest 2015, ch. 3.