The End of Multiculturalism?
Why and to what extent has Multiculturalism in Britain failed.

Abstract

This paper argues that the failure of Multiculturalism as a political concept is driven by a combination of theoretical and deep rooted social pressures. To support these claims I will make the following arguments: first, the failure of Multiculturalism to replace Liberal-Integrationism as the dominant political model, can be attributed to the liberal nationalist history of the English nation state which (i) restricts the extent to which British liberal institutions can accommodate cultural pluralism; (ii) limits the wider appeal of a Multicultural national identity which rejects the concept of a ‘core culture’; and (iii) exposes the inherent weaknesses of Multiculturalism as a political concept in the Western European, nation state context. This incompatibility has no specific ‘start date’ but is woven into Britain’s, and by extension England’s institutional, demographic and cultural fabric.

Second, the mill town riots and 7/7 attacks exposed long term public grievances over immigration, community cohesion, labour market insecurity and expressions of English national identity. The interaction of these long standing ‘social pressures’ with emerging ‘top down’ national security concerns drove the policy debate, resulting in a shift away from the ‘celebration of difference’ and towards ‘integration’.

I conclude by arguing that the prominence and increased visibility of these twin pressures has shifted the political discourse towards a form of integration based on liberal-nationalist ideals which embraces diversity while acknowledging, albeit tentatively and implicitly, the dominance of the nation state’s traditional core culture.
Introduction

During a speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2011, David Cameron echoed Chancellor Merkel’s earlier remark that Multiculturalism had ‘utterly failed’ by declaring that ‘under the doctrine of state Multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream. We have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong’ 1. While the Prime Minister's statement was, in many ways, a retreading of a well worn path, it highlighted the centrality of Multiculturalism to both the domestic and international agenda.

The desirability of Multiculturalism both as a form of national identity, and the extent to which cultural difference is accommodated, continues to provoke animated debate amongst academics, politicians and the general public. The debate ‘emerged in response to real events such as economic globalisation, the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, the sharp rise in asylum-led immigration starting in the early 1990s, the continuing arguments about the speed and desirability of European integration, devolution within many of the historic nation states of Europe, and most recently the place of Islam in Europe’ 2. Feeding into this debate are concerns over the relevance of ‘Englishness’ in 21st century Britain, the fusion of immigration and citizenship within the broader framework of national security and whether a welfare state can be sustained in a diverse society. At a local level, concerns over immigration has associated Multiculturalism with concerns over the allocation of council housing, the marginalisation of the ‘English working classes’ from the labour market and the exploitation of voter discontent by far right parties such as the English Defence League (EDL) and the British National Party (BNP). It is necessary at this juncture to note the following point; there is a tendency in the literature to use the terms ‘English’ and ‘British’ interchangeably. While this study will inevitably contain references to ‘Britain’, I will focus on the impact and debate surrounding Multiculturalism in ‘England’.

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1 David Cameron (2011), Speech by David Cameron, Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Munich Security Conference, 5th February 2011
Literature Review

There is an ever increasing body of studies charting the ‘end of Multiculturalism’ and a detailed review of all the relevant literature would be overwhelming.

I focus on the most influential critics in this field, which can be split into three broad categories; the first focuses on the ‘top down’ government response to the Bradford Riots, 9/11 attacks and 7/7 bombings which places the failure of Multiculturalism within the context of national security concerns and their impact on government policy and human rights. Derek McGhee’s ‘The End of Multiculturalism?’ (2008), looks in detail at the policy response of the New Labour government. He argues that these events spurred a number of key note speeches by both Gordon Brown and Tony Blair to re-forge a new patriotic language of Civic Nationalism as a means of mastering the challenges of terrorism, immigration and integration. This culminated in a re-configuration of human rights which were shifted from away from its traditional focus on minorities, to the protection of established values of the ‘British liberal’ majority. ‘This is clearly a major shift that perhaps signals the emergence of post-Multiculturalism in Britain...as marking a dramatic shift away from the public lip service paid to the ideals of multiculturalism and celebrating diversity towards one which simultaneously marks out minority communities and cultures as an obstacle (or threat) to a viable modern national identity and demands their submission and dissolution within it’ 3. McGhee argues that despite a number of policy initiatives and political rhetoric against Multiculturalism post 2000, what actually emerged was a ‘reflexive Multiculturalism’ whereby it was publicly damned, but embraced at a local level. Shane Brighton, ‘British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Foreign Policy: Integration and Cohesion in and Beyond the State’, views the framing of the ‘Muslim question’, as an attempt by the New Labour government to justify the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and explain the 7/7 bombings as an issue of ‘integration’.

The second approaches the subject from the angle of ‘community cohesion’ which criticises Multiculturalism for its tolerance of separateness and its role in fostering religious fundamentalism. The dominant theme in this category is the relationship between Multiculturalism and the emergence of home grown terrorism - in his seminal paper ‘Europe’s Answer to Londonistan’ (2005), Gilles Kepel argues that Multiculturalist policies allowed certain Muslim groups to retain their community structures which were unsuited to accommodating 2nd and 3rd generation ‘rebels’. Without a sense of belonging to their

religious kin and lacking a national identity, these individuals were seduced by the violent spectacle of Salafi-Jihad. For Kepel, Multiculturalism in Britain failed because community leaders were unable to ‘keep their flocks in check and instil in their followers religious and moral values conducive to the maintenance of public order’ 4. In a series of blogs and newspaper articles Melanie Phillips focuses on both real and perceived problems within Muslim communities, taking particular issue with the ‘liberal establishment’ for its refusal to listen to public concerns over immigration and extremism. Phillips’ articles are a mixture of brutal honesty and tabloid hyperbole but her arguments are nonetheless influential and, at times, persuasive. Trevor Phillips, the former head of the Commission for Racial Equality was the most powerful critic of Multiculturalism due to his position in the New Labour government – his claims that Britain was ‘sleepwalking into racial and religious segregation’ (2004) represented, if not the first, but certainly the most prominent public attack on Multiculturalism by a mainstream politician. His emphasis differed from that of Melanie Phillips – whereas her articles are from the viewpoint of ‘angry’, mainly white Britons, Trevor Phillips argues that Multiculturalism was merely a form of ‘have a nice day racism’ which justified the exclusion and ghettoisation of black and ethnic minorities on the grounds of ‘tolerance’.

The third category argues from the perspective of ‘citizenship’, and that Britain has/should ‘move beyond Multiculturalism’ and embrace a new form of integration. The most prominent academic in this category is David Goodhart, whose Left wing academic credentials have added weight to his strong views on Multiculturalism. In an article in Prospect magazine titled ‘Too Diverse?’ (2005) and a follow up paper ‘Progressive Nationalism: Citizenship and the Left’ (2006), Goodhart argues for a stronger government stance towards integration and that the Left’s Social Democratic values can be preserved through an inclusive, civic nationalism which embraces Britain’s multi-ethnic and multi-racial character (see chapter 3). Contained within this wide ranging commentary of British society since 1945 is a mention of the theoretical tensions between liberalism and Multiculturalism which will be built upon in Chapter 1. Goodhart’s work echoed an earlier publication titled ‘After Multiculturalism’ by Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (2000) which cites the alienation of ‘white Britons’ due to the accommodation of Multiculturalist policies and argues for shared narratives of integration. ‘We need to ensure that valuing diversity is seen as being about enabling everybody to succeed, not special treatment for favoured minorities’ 5. There are significant areas of overlap between Brown’s and Goodhart’s articulation of a ‘post Multiculturalism’ Britain; first, both agree with the basic premise that British identity, and the nation state in general, should change to accommodate the forces of globalisation

5 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, After Multiculturalism, The Foreign Policy Centre (2000), pp78.
while accepting value diversity as a ‘public good’; and second, both subscribe to a de-Anglicised ‘British nation’ tied together by liberal political values - essentially, Goodhart and Brown converge on the idea of a Cosmopolitan Civic Nationalism. Goodhart is braver than most academics in separating ‘Englishness’ and ‘Britishness’ and acknowledging English national identity as the dominant core culture, but he fails to acknowledge the tension between expressions of the former and Multiculturalism, nor does he extrapolate this to his own brand of de-Anglicised British Nationalism which borrows substantially from Multiculturalism - Brown herself is particularly loathe to disentangle the constituent national identities that underpin the political concept of Britishness. However, unlike Brown, Goodhart does provide significant policy suggestions to foster integration including heavily restricted immigration, ID cards and citizenship tests for new arrivals which he argues are consistent with the Left’s views on social solidarity.

Aims and Objectives

The purpose of this paper is twofold; first, to assess the theoretical tension between Multiculturalism as a distinct political model and the peculiarities of the English nation state. Secondly, to explain how the emerging intellectual debate and the rejection of Multiculturalism by the political class were driven by the growing visibility underlying social pressures.

I argue that this paper represents an important addition to this field of study for the following reasons; first, few studies explore the uneasy theoretical tension between Multiculturalism and the liberal nationalist origins of the English nation state - in particular, there are a dearth of studies that explicitly address the tension between attempts to forge a new de-Anglicised ‘British nation’ which ignores distinct unitary expressions of English national identity. Nor do they discuss in sufficient detail the limits to which liberal institutions can accommodate Multiculturalism within the Western nation state context.

Secondly, while I am not disputing the importance of the ‘war on terror’ in shaping government counter terrorism policy and the ‘integrationist consensus’ that emerged, I do question the tendency to identify the ‘top down’ reaction to the London bombings as the primary reason for the abandonment of Multiculturalism by the political class. By contrast, I will argue that political opposition to Multiculturalism was driven, primarily, by a growing awareness of simmering ‘bottom up’ concerns including immigration, job market insecurity and expressions of English national identity which dictated government attitudes to Multiculturalism.
Finally, this paper will pay due attention to polling data regarding public attitudes towards immigration, national identity and Multiculturalism. Primary sources include an interpretation of British Social Attitudes surveys regarding the acceptance of cultural pluralism in schools, while public attitudes towards immigration and Multiculturalism are explained following an assessment of Migration Observatory and Ipsos Mori surveys. The impact of these social pressures on the policy agenda are explained through an assessment of key policy papers including the ‘Cantle Report’ (2001) and the latest version of the government's ‘PREVENT Strategy’ (2011) - these papers have been accessed online or obtained in hard copy. An interview with Labour MP, Jon Cruddas completes this paper’s primary research. The interview plan is attached to the bibliography. In sum, this paper offers a ‘fourth hypotheses’ which approaches the failure of Multiculturalism through the prism of nationalist pressures, both ‘social’ and ‘theoretical’.
Chapter Summary

Chapter 1 – What is Multiculturalism? charts the domestic origins and international influences of Multiculturalism in Britain, provide a clear definition and explain the differences between Cosmo and Communitarian Multiculturalists. This section explains the significance of the Race Relations Acts in the 1960s-1970s culminating in the Runnymede Trust Commission on the Future for Multi-Ethnic Britain in 1997. Dovetailing into processes at a domestic level, I assess the influence of Canadian Multiculturalism and the intellectual climate post 1989.

Chapter 2 – Theoretical Critique explores the theoretical tension between Multiculturalism’s core assumptions and the liberal nationalist origins of the English nation state. In this section, I explain how the historical experiences and philosophical dominance of liberalism in British institutions, has/will continue to act as a long term ‘block’ on Multiculturalism, while assessing the weaknesses of forging a new national identity based on cosmopolitan values.

Chapter 3 – Social Pressures assesses the long term 'bottom up' social pressures including concerns over immigration, strong public attitudes favouring integration and expressions of Englishness, which drove the intellectual and political debate.

Chapter 4 – The Top Down Response examines how the growing visibility of these social pressures shaped the academic consensus and the policy making process. This section looks at the interaction of these pressures with emerging national security concerns, while acknowledging Multiculturalism’s impact on the ‘integrationist’ discourse.
Chapter 1

What is Multiculturalism?

Definition

Multiculturalism consists of four interrelated but distinct aspects: First, Multiculturalism is a specific citizenship model which can be contrasted with the Assimilationist and Liberal-Integrationist approaches. Secondly, it refers to government policy which recognises ethnic pluralism within the state’s legal framework. Its acceptance of ‘group rights’ allows community leaders to speak and lobby for particular laws on behalf of their ‘ethnic’ members; Thirdly, it ‘alludes to an ideal - a society that regards pluralism as both a true reflection of society and an aspect of society worth preserving...one in which the norms of civic behaviour and the modes of social interaction are respectful, even supportive, of ethnocultural and ethnoracial pluralism’ 6. This acceptance of difference is expressed through the articulation of multi-ethnic national identity based on the Cosmopolitan values; and finally, it is a demographic fact; Britain, and the population of England, consists of a diverse range of people with different ethnic, racial and cultural characteristics.

On a practical level, Multiculturalism manifests itself in the following forms; state level involves a formal embrace of Multiculturalism as the state’s guiding principle akin to Trudeau’s announcement in Canada; local level involves the implementation of policies which address specific minority concerns - for example, democratic participation, poverty, problems with policing and discrimination.

Advocates of Multiculturalism in Britain can be split into two categories; Cosmopolitan-Multiculturalist and Communitarian Multiculturalist.

Cosmopolitan Multiculturalism

This strand can be split into two sub groups; the first espouses a post-ethnic ‘melting pot’ society where multi-culture is tolerated without the political recognition of distinct cultural groups. For example, Hall argues for a ‘laissez-faire, secular multiculturalism that is less receptive to the recognition of groupings in general, and ethno-religious community

identities in particular’. This approach advocates a secular state model whereby the state is denationalized and behaves according to neutral secular values. The second, more dominant group, is represented by Bhikhu Parekh and Tariq Modood and consists of two aspects; first the formation of a new, pluralist national identity based on Cosmopolitan values which relegates English identity from its historic position as a ‘core’ culture to ‘one of many’ multi-cultures. ‘Multicultural accommodation works simultaneously on two levels: creating new forms of belonging to citizenship and country, and helping sustain origins and diaspora…these hyphenated identities, on this understanding, area a legitimate basis for political mobilization and lobbying, not attacked as divisive or disloyal’. The second aspect involves reforming public services and institutions to reflect cultural difference. ‘The pluralist model is based on a vision of society in which its different cultural communities, interacting with each other in a spirit of equality and openness, create a rich, plural and tolerant collective culture’. For example, Cosmo-multiculturalists would support Sikh/Muslim/Jewish only social services and black only trade union meetings.

**Communitarian Multiculturalism**

This strand rejects ‘cosmopolitanism’ and argues that all groups should retain their cultural boundaries and be granted collective rights over their own affairs. Parekh compares this approach to the millet system used by the Ottoman Empire ‘which rests on the belief that human beings are culturally embedded and find their fulfillment in their membership of specific cultural groupings’. Advocates of this approach are criticized across the political spectrum due to their antipathy towards forging a shared national identity and support for the fragmentation of the British legal system. An example of Communitarian Multiculturalism would involve the separation of Britain into separate legal and ethnic enclaves with exclusive use of Jewish and Shariah Courts to settle disputes.

**Domestic Origins**

Britain’s changing racial and cultural demography since 1945 has had a profound impact on the emergence of Multiculturalism as a political concept. In the aftermath of the Second World War Britain suffered from a combination of labour shortages and economic stagnation. To aid post war reconstruction Parliament passed the Citizenship Act (1948)

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10 Ibid, pp11.
which awarded British citizenship to ‘fit and proper persons’ from the ex colonies. The arrival of individuals from the Caribbean meant that ‘by the 1960s Britain had, for the first time, to find problems arising out of its transformation into a multiracial society’ 11. During the 1950s and early 1960s ensuring harmonious race relations was identified as a national objective but changing social attitudes following the impact of the cultural revolution shifted the debate towards solving issues of minority integration and citizenship.

The arrival of Roy Jenkins as Home Secretary marked the implementation of the first Race Relations Act (1965) which prohibited discrimination on the grounds of colour, race, ethnic or national origins in public places. This was followed by the Race Relations Act (1968) which dramatically widened the scope of the original act outlawing discrimination in housing and employment ‘and established a Community Relations Commission to complement the work of the Race Relations Board’ 12. A further Act (1976) was implemented ‘to cover acts of the crown, educational establishments and authorities, trade unions and certain clubs and associations’ 13. The previously dominant Assimilationist model which expected minorities to adopt the majority culture at the expense of their own cultural practices, was challenged and ultimately replaced by the ‘Liberal-Integrationism’. For Liberal-Integrationists, integration was more of a ‘two way process’ whereby all individuals regardless of their racial and/or cultural background were protected in exchange for the acceptance of a British political values such as democracy, secularism, sexual equality and free speech - their acknowledgement of English as the ‘core culture’ is less explicit than proponents of assimilation, but Liberal-Integrationism implicitly presupposes a matrix of beliefs and institutional processes founded on liberal nationalist origins. These moves were not unopposed - Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in 1968 marked the emergence of a ‘New Right’ discourse which continues to hijack expressions of English national identity today. Furthermore, the rejection of the Swann Report (1984) by the Conservative government shows that race and cultural relations have not been plain sailing. However, changing social and political attitudes coupled with changing demographics, discredited proponents of Assimilation and has seen the deepening of laws protecting minority rights and cultures in Britain since the mid 1960s.

The recommendations of the Runnymede Trust – ‘The Commission on the Future for Multi-Ethnic Britain (CMEB)’ (1998) represented the synthesis of Multiculturalism as an official political movement – while the ideological foundations of Multiculturalism in Britain had been laid between 1960-1980s, it previously lacked a formal political expression as a distinct model. The findings of the CMEB should therefore be viewed as the first

11 Blackstone et al, Race Relations, pp23.
‘Multiculturalist manifesto’ which articulated a clear alternative to the Assimilationist and Liberal-Integrationist approaches. The aim of the commission was twofold; first, to counter racial discrimination by expanding the remit of the Race Relations Acts; and second, to provide a number of policies to assist in Britain’s and, by extension, England’s transformation into a Multicultural state. These policy recommendations included the formation of a government advisory commission on diversity issues, a British Equality Act leading to the formation of a single equality commission and, most importantly, that the UK government should formally declare itself as a multi-ethnic state. Modood and Meer argued that the shift from minority *protection* to minority/group *recognition* represented a logical advancement of the race relations acts of the 1960s and 1970s in light of Britain's increasing ethnic diversity due to rising levels of immigration and underpinned by the belief that lifestyle ‘diversity’ had been accepted as a public ‘good’. For its advocates, the Multiculturalist approach represented an evolutionary form of liberal-egalitarianism more suited to the realities of 21st century Britain.

**International Influences**

Canada’s adoption of government policy and a new national identity embracing cultural pluralism played a major role in influencing British Multiculturalism. The term itself originated during the cultural revolution of the 1960s in the United States, Australia and Canada to describe the emergence of identity politics including, amongst others, ethnicity, and sexual freedom. In Canada, Multiculturalism was both a political movement and a new national identity originating from its history as an ‘immigration nation’. ‘Their histories of migration and settlement meant that migrants were more readily seen as prospective co-citizens and the nation was seen as multi-ethnic in its source’ 14. The emergence of Multiculturalism can be traced to the decline of Britain as an imperial power which saw a crisis in English Canadian identity and allowed a pluralist conception of national identity to emerge. ‘As British imperialism lost all relevance in the post war period, the myths associated with English Canada as a bulwark of British values in North America first frayed then later snapped’ 15. In addition, the chronic labour shortages led to the relaxation of previously restrictive immigration laws to aid post war reconstruction.

The elimination of laws that discriminated against individuals on the grounds of race, religion or nationality triggered the arrival of both European displaced persons and non-European migrants. The rapid changes in Canada’s demographics post 1945 were

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complemented by events in the USA during the 1960s which cemented the popularity both politically and socially of an ‘anti discrimination message’. ‘In the aftermath of the Holocaust and in the shadow of Black civil rights movement in the United States and anti colonial struggles in the developing world, Canadians rejected public manifestations of racism in their own society’ 16. The dominance of the liberal message encouraged ethnic minority leaders to demand recognition for their sacrifices during the war effort and their role in Canada’s economic reconstruction. Following the recommendations of the Royal Commission (1967), the Canadian state embraced the concept of Multiculturalism as a form of national identity and public policy. ‘The official Canadian policy (of Multiculturalism) was announced on 8 October 1971 by Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau. It offered a vision of Canadian identity based on cultural pluralism. It eschewed formal recognition of any single, overriding Canadian cultural identity based on cultural pluralism’ 17. The state has since played an active role in promoting cultural difference, for example, the Canadian government funds local ethnic social services and has embraced idea of cultural pluralism in its education system. Canada’s success as a Multicultural state provided a ‘roadmap’ for British Multiculturalists of how cultural recognition could positively influence social cohesion and economic dynamism.

The intellectual climate post-1989 played an important role in cementing the desirability of identity hybridity and pluralist conceptions of national identity amongst political elites. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the apparent end of ‘extreme ideologies’ marked the re-emergence of liberal cosmopolitanism. But post Cold War cosmopolitanism differed from its Kantian forefather in that it was aggressively anti-state preferring supranational institutions, NGOs and international law in the form of the Human Rights Act as alternative nodes of power. For Cosmopolitans, *individual freedom* from coercion represented the ultimate form of *national security* and the state’s assimilationist tendencies should be rejected. This ‘intellectual revolution’ was driven by the belief that the forces of globalisation had stripped the nation state of its traditional powers to compel. For Bobbitt, the 21st century had seen the emergence of the ‘market state’ whose legitimacy was based on its ability to maximize individual opportunity rather than act as a protector of a particular nation or culture. He argued that individuals were no longer bounded to a territorially defined sense of nationhood, but were instead world citizens. The boom of information technology and the rapid expansion of market capitalism had rendered state boundaries as obsolete by opening up communications between individuals across national lines. Both factors, it was argued, eroded the nation state’s role both as an economic manager (represented by the decline of territorially bounded national industry),

16 Ibid, pp19.
and its ability to enforce homogeneity on its citizenry. ‘Nation states no longer have to play a market-making role. In fact, given their own troubles, which are considerable, they most often just get in the way. If allowed, global solutions will flow where they are needed without the intervention of nation states’ 18 . For globalists, the nation state was now a ‘post national state’ characterised by hybrid identities, dual citizenship and cultural pluralism underpinned by the free movement of peoples across national borders – the concept of Multiculturalism as both a citizenship model and a set of social ‘ideals’ flowed from, and was reinforced by, the globalisation discourse that emerged in the early 1990s.

Cosmopolitanism represented a new European idea of national identity underpinned by memories of the Holocaust and Hiroshima which represented the tragedies of 20th century nationalism. ‘Cosmopolitanism means openness to different cultures…a cultural disposition involving an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness towards peoples, places and experiences from different cultures, especially those from different nations. Cosmopolitanism should involve the search for, and delight in, the contrasts between societies rather than a longing for superiority or for uniformity’ 19. In Britain, the globalisation and liberal cosmopolitan discourse was increasingly accepted by the political class with New Labour amongst its most enthusiastic cheerleaders. This was complemented by a liberal approach to immigration in the name of economic efficiency, the increased visibility of minority issues and the perception that Britain was at ease with its Multicultural future. Political manifestations included Tony Blair’s ‘Cool Britannia’ and Robin Cook’s declaration in 1997 that Britain was a ‘chicken tikka masala nation’, which moved William Hague, much to the chagrin of the Conservative party, to describe Britain as an ‘immigrant nation’.

Summary

The publication of the recommendations of the Commission for the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (1998) marked the formal arrival of Multiculturalism as a distinct alternative to the Liberal-Integrationist model in Britain. But its intellectual origins can be traced to a combination of domestic socio-political developments and international events arising from the cultural revolution throughout the 1960s-1970s. By the 1980s, the term ‘Multiculturalism’ gained momentum as a social movement and became popularized by the ‘progressive Left’ to describe increased demands for minority recognition, and the accommodation of cultural pluralism into the state’s legal framework. Following the findings of the Scarman Report, Multiculturalist policies were increasingly implemented to

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deal with local concerns over minority representation. New Labour’s acceptance of the ‘globalisation discourse’ and the articulation of an increasingly extreme Cosmopolitan vision of Britishness, sidelined distinct expressions of English national identity and appeared to pave the way for a full on embrace of Multiculturalism as a distinct political model. However, as I argue in subsequent chapters, the formal declaration of Multiculturalism as an official state policy was resisted, and Multiculturalist policies at a local level were attacked due to a combination of social and theoretical pressures.
Chapter 2

Theoretical Critique

Liberalism v Cultural Pluralism

The theoretical tension between cultural pluralism and the liberal bias of Britain's political institutions is a major reason for the failure of Multiculturalism to replace Liberal-Integrationism as the dominant citizenship model. ‘Pluralism can be broadly defined as a belief in, or commitment to, diversity or multiplicity…as a descriptive term it can assume a variety of forms. Political pluralism denotes the existence of electoral choice and a competitive party system. Moral pluralism refers to a multiplicity of ethical values. Cultural pluralism suggests diversity of lifestyles and cultural norms’ 20. It should be noted there are significant areas of overlap between pluralism and liberalism; first, Modood and Parekh argue that while Multiculturalism challenges certain liberal assumptions it ‘presupposes the matrix of principles, institutions and political norms that are central to contemporary liberal democracies’ 21; second, Liberalism’s internationalist bent lends itself to certain pluralist values such as hyphenated identities and lifestyle diversity which represent the highest form of individual liberty; and third, on a practical level, the protection of human rights regardless of race, culture or ethnicity and the acceptance of organizations such as the Muslim Council of Britain, are cornerstones of liberal democratic societies and an example of the liberal nation state’s capacity to accommodate cultural diversity. However, the relationship between liberalism and pluralism can become strained and reach a ‘tipping point’ if pluralism is pursued at the expense of liberalism. Multiculturalism postulates a two way process of interaction which recognizes majority and minority cultures/groups as distinct communities. For illustration, it’s useful to view the debate as a sliding scale between ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ acceptance of cultural pluralism.

Multiculturalists argue from a maximalist perspective that cultural difference should be formally recognized by state institutions. Modood argues that British institutions should be reconceptualised to incorporate non-Christian religious organizations into the state framework – he highlights the need for a racial equality agenda and the accommodation of Muslim faith schools. ‘It also includes the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords (2000) that in addition to the Anglican bishops who sit in

21 Modood, Multiculturalism, pp7-8.
the house by right as part of the Anglican establishment, this right should be extended to cover those of other Christian and non-Christian faiths’. By contrast, advocates of Liberal-Integrationism argue from a minimalist perspective that cultural difference should be tolerated at a social level but not explicitly recognized by the state – ‘Liberal citizenship is not interested in group identities and shuns identitarian politics; its interest in ‘race’ is confined to anti-discrimination and simply as an aspect of the legal equality of citizens’. Liberalism champions ‘individual rights’ preferring a ‘colour blind’ approach towards minority integration which does not accept the premise of group rights. The dominance of liberal philosophy within British political and institutional traditions has been, and will continue to be problematic for advocates of Multiculturalism - the Communitarian ‘millet’ model is a threat to the consistent rules and everyday reciprocities required to sustain a liberal society. In particular, the fragmentation of the British legal system into separate cultural enclaves undermines the unity of the British state itself. By contrast, aspects of the Cosmopolitan ‘pluralist’ model can be accommodated within the state’s liberal framework, but it remains ‘boxed in’ by non-negotiable political and institutional red lines. As Goodhart argues, ‘Modern liberal societies cannot be based on the simple assertion of group identity – the very idea of the rule of law, of equal legal treatment for everyone regardless of religion, wealth, gender and ethnicity conflicts with it’.

The fault lines between liberalism and cultural pluralism were exposed following the publication of cartoons by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in 2005 which depicted the Prophet Muhammad in a satirical/offensive manner. For Multiculturalists, cultural pluralism can only flourish in a society that accommodates and recognises the sensibilities of particular cultural groups. In this regard, Cosmo-Multiculturalism owes a debt to Republicanism with its emphasis on public deliberation and compromise which fosters bridge building between different communities; it is revealing that in the context of post conflict reconstruction, advocates of Republicanism are in favour of limiting free speech and regulating ‘hate speech’ to prevent further conflict. In Britain, the Danish cartoons, like the Rushdie Affair (1989) were viewed as an affront to Islam and highlighted that certain minority communities had their own ideas regarding integration. The implementation of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act (2006) represented a victory of sorts for Multiculturalists by balancing free speech with minority protection. Under the terms of the act it is now an offence to possess, publish and distribute materials threatening religious hatred, and permits the police to arrest without warrant anyone suspected of using words which constitute threatening behaviour. However, the Act’s path through the parliamentary process was far from smooth; it was initially rejected by the House of Lords in 2001 and

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22 Ibid, pp80.
23 Ibid, pp49.
was widely criticised upon implementation for stifling free speech and encouraging, rather than eliminating, segregation due to its recognition of particular group sensitivities – ‘the Liberal conception of equality between individuals is extended to the case of Churches, of nations, of sexes. These classes are indeed not regarded by the Liberal as classes, but simply as associations, for limited purposes, of individuals’ 25. The suspension of the traditional rules of free speech to pander to the sensitivities of a particular social group, was not only viewed as an offence to the ‘liberal majority’ but also acted as a lightening rod for criticism against Britain’s Muslim population who became viewed as a threat the state’s liberal tendencies. This conflict between liberalism and pluralism is often neglected when considering British Multiculturalism; unlike the debate over Multiculturalism’s purported role in inflaming Islamic Fundamentalism, it takes place ‘away from the cameras’ and is embedded in the theoretical leanings and political culture of Britain’s political institutions. Understanding the tension between Britain’s ‘liberal bias’ with its emphasis on individualism and Multiculturalist demands for group recognition, is critical to explaining the dominance of the Liberal-Integrationist approach and why maximalist demands for Multiculturalism have hit, and will continue to be obstructed by, an institutional and philosophical ‘brick wall’.

**Liberal Nationalism v Cosmopolitanism**

The failure of Cosmo-Multiculturalists to forge a new multi-ethnic national identity which rejects the dominance of a core culture can be attributed to the following reasons; first, it fails to account for the particular historical development of the ‘state’ and the ‘nation’ in Western Europe. Smith argues that Western nations emerged from pre-modern ethnic cores ‘whose myths and memories, values and symbols shaped the culture and boundaries of the nation that modern elites managed to forge’ 26. He identifies two forms of ethnic community that gave birth to different types of nation formation; ‘lateral aristocratic’ and ‘vertical demotic’. The fusion of the English nation occurred via a ‘lateral aristocratic’ process - ‘he (Smith) chose the term lateral by pointing out that these ethnies were at once confined to the upper strata and geographically spread out to form close links with the upper echelons of neighbouring lateral ethnies’ 27. In this process of nation formation, ethnic commonality was initially confined to state elites including the aristocracy, the clergy and prominent merchants. The endurance of this elite culture depended on an extensive process of bureaucratic incorporation - ‘through a series of

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revolutions in the administrative, economic and cultural spheres, the state was able to
diffuse the dominant culture down the social scale’ 28. In England, this bureaucratic
revolution during the 17th century extended the core culture to the middle classes and
was complemented by a revival of Anglo-Saxon myth amongst intellectuals which re-
called a mythical pre-Norman golden age of nationhood. As a result, English culture
became identified with the particular bureaucratic and political processes of the English
state including popular participation in the political system and citizenship. Attempts by
Multiculturalists to reject the mono cultural history of the English nation state and
synthesize a new, de-Anglicised multi cultural Britishness conflicts with this historical
process. For Blunkett, there are significant dangers if the core culture is treated simply as
‘one of many’ – ‘Extreme cosmopolitans, and their close cousins, extreme multiculturalists
are wrong…it is not just that national feeling can become dangerous if it is not allowed to
express itself. A sense of identity, patriotism or whatever we choose to call it, can in fact
be a progressive and generous force’ 29.

Secondly, a Multicultural national identity based on cultural pluralism fails to account for
the liberal nationalist origins of the Western nation state. Liberalism’s indelible legacy on
the English constitution and the fusion with English identity can be traced to the Liberal
political dominance of the 19th century, whereby ‘Liberals presented themselves as the
only true defenders of the people, the only force energized by the moral power of public
opinion, the only party able to uphold England’s identity as a land of liberty’ 30. Between
1830 and 1886 messianic liberalism was fused with the peculiarities of English national
identity and feelings of cultural superiority encouraged by the success of the British
Empire. This relationship was reinforced during the democratic revolutions across Europe
in 1848 which ‘initially galvanised the forces of liberalism and nationalism but ended in
their large scale defeat’ 31. Following the defeat of their European counterparts, English
liberalism assumed mythical qualities and saw the construction of a series of ‘patriotic
discourses around the themes of constitutionalism, tolerance, fiscal accountability, free
trade and Christian humanitarianism’ 32. England was portrayed as the last bastion of
liberty and, like their American cousins fused liberal philosophy with English nationalism.
For English liberals, ‘nationalism has stood for liberty, not only in the sense that it has
resisted tyrannous encroachment, but also in the sense that it has maintained the right of
a community to work out its own salvation in its own way’ 33. In the modern context, while
‘liberal’ nationalist states have a more open conception of the national community and are

28 Ibid, pp179.
31 Ibid, pp172.
32 Ibid, pp387.
33 Blease, English Liberalism, pp12.
more inclusive of individuals with different ethno-cultural backgrounds, the English nation state remains wedded to its liberal nationalist origins. For Kymlicka, ‘public institutions may be stamped with a particular national character (i.e. the institutions may adopt the language, holidays and symbols of a particular national group)’ 34. For example, English is the official language of government institutions and Christian events are marked as public holidays. As a result, while minority religious events are acknowledged and tolerated, they are not officially recognised by the state as minorities are ‘expected’ to acknowledge the primacy of the nation state’s core culture.

The relationship between liberalism and nationalism in the Western nation state context therefore, is problematic for advocates of Multiculturalism for two reasons; (i) the viability of Western liberalism rests on the assumption that the state and the majority culture are indivisible and engaged in a mutually legitimizing relationship. Maximalist demands for Multiculturalism conflicts not only with the liberal bias of British institutions, but with the interplay between the English state and expressions of English identity. While this relationship is based on a series of myths woven during the Renaissance and imperial ages, it continues to be of relevance to the practice of democracy in the 21st century which, to paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, identifies democratic participation with a defined ‘people’. For Van Den Berghe, ‘the entire history of Western democracy has been inextricably linked with the triumph of nationalism as the basis of state legitimacy. Democracy supposedly expresses the will of the people, and the people have implicitly been identified with the dominant ethnie in each state’ 35. This tension explains why the accommodation of Multiculturalism provokes fierce debate in other ‘lateral aristocratic’ nations such as Sweden, France and Spain. While multi-ethnicity and certain aspects of Multiculturalism can be accommodated within liberal democracies, a ‘full on’ embrace of a pluralist national identity remains more compatible with frontier states which derive their legitimacy from the acceptance of multi-culture.

By contrast, ‘In the United States, Canada and Australia, colonist-immigrants have pioneered a providentialist frontier nationalism;41 and once large waves of culturally different immigrants were admitted, this has encouraged a plural conception of the nation, which accepts, and even celebrates, ethnic and cultural diversity within an overarching political, legal and linguistic national identity’ 36. In short, a state’s citizenship model will reflect its demography, political tradition and particular conception of national identity - in

36 Ozkirimli, Theories, pp180.
Western Europe, the Multiculturalist citizenship model subverts the historical and nationalist origins of the liberal nation state; and (ii) Multiculturalists have a tendency to subsume Englishness within a broader/inclusive British political identity. For example, the findings of a British Social Attitudes survey in 2006 reflect this tendency - 73% of respondents either ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly’ agreed that ‘being English is too often confused with being British and people don’t always realise that there is a difference between Britain and England’. While it would be unfair to pin the blame for this confusion on advocates of Multiculturalism alone, their failure to acknowledge both the complex relationship and distinction between Britishness and Englishness undermines Multiculturalist attempts to articulate a new national identity. In short, attempts by Cosmo-Multiculturalists to re-imagine post Anglicised ‘British nation’ are ill founded - rather than bypassing English traditions and attempting to forge a new identity based on the ‘celebration of difference’ and ‘shared British values’, they should be questioning how English national identity could be re-invigorated within an overarching British political identity.

Thirdly, a new cosmopolitan national identity lacks emotional resonance and symbolic resources. Cosmo-Multiculturalists argue from an instrumentalist and globalist perspective that national identities can constructed by state elites. Following the findings of the CMEB, advocates of Multiculturalism argued that Britain’s, and by extension England’s, transformation into a ‘Multicultural state’ could be achieved by a combination of government declarations and policy initiatives. However, as Smith argues, national identities are forged through a combination of ‘bottom up’ pressures including the persistence of symbols, myth and historical memories as well as elite manipulation. Criticism of Cosmopolitanism therefore can be broken down into two strands; (i) Cosmopolitans/globalists argue that traditional, national cultures will be superseded by new forms of identity based on post national values and a ‘pick n mix’ approach to individual identities. But attempts to forge a national identity based multi-ethnicity and the ‘acceptance of difference’ lacks rootedness. The core identities of Britain’s constituent nation states have particular histories and cultures based on shared memories; in England, these include the ‘achievements’ of the British Empire, the two world wars, the Peasants Revolt and the signing of the Magna Carta.

These events, along with many others, are commemorated in monuments, written histories and public holidays that have fused a Whiggish narrative of nationhood, belonging and place. By contrast, a Cosmo-Multicultural national identity lacks history and leaves a number of questions unanswered – what is it? what are its symbols? when was

37 Source: BSA 2006
its ‘golden age’? how does it translate into a ‘shared’ experience?. More generally, the
globalist thrust of Multiculturalism ignores the persistence of nations which have survived,
and even flourished in the age of globalisation. For Smith, ‘we are still far from even
mapping out the kind of global culture and cosmopolitan ideal that can truly supersede a
world of nations, each cultivating its distinctive historical character and rediscovering its
national myths, memories and symbols in past golden ages and sacred landscapes’ 38;
and (ii) Cosmo-Multiculturalists ignore the ability of nations and core ethnies to absorb and
to be changed following interaction with other cultures over time – it can be argued that
Multiculturalist demands for cultural pluralism could be accommodated within the existing
identity of Englishness without recourse to the acceptance of group rights. For Goodhart,
‘contrary to the blood and soil caricature of the Left, Englishness has been a rather open
ethnicity, And, increasingly, its symbols are embraced by ethnic minority citizens too’ 39.
There are question marks too over the ‘newness’ of hybrid identities and whether
integration into a core culture is incompatible with cultural and racial diversity; for
example, Jewish-English, British-English, or Muslim-Scottish.

38 Smith, Global Culture, pp188.
39 Goodhart, Nationalism, pp30.
Chapter 3

Social Pressures

Immigration, Integration and National Identity

Grass roots ‘nationalist’ factors have played a major role in the opposition to Multiculturalism at a local level. While the Multiculturalist debate has been absorbed within the national security discourse following 9/11 and 7/7, I argue that it is driven by ‘old’, classically ‘nationalist’ concerns that flow from the insecurities of those that consider themselves as ‘native to the soil’. Polling data indicates long term anti-immigration attitudes amongst the British public which has since crystallised against Multiculturalism. According to data obtained by the British Election Study between 1964 - 2010, and reproduced by the Migration Observatory, respondents were asked whether ‘too many immigrants had been allowed into Britain’ 40. Between 1964-1979 approximately 80% of respondents answered ‘yes’ to the above question. Of particular significance are the findings between 1989 - 1999 where approximately 60% of respondents in this period answered ‘yes’ to an altered question that ‘immigration had gone too far’. Despite the 20% reduction from earlier results, the percentage of respondents expressing strong opinions over immigration levels has remained consistently high. This is significant - the period between 1989-1999 is usually portrayed by critics as the ‘golden age’ of Multiculturalism in Britain, reflected by docile public attitudes towards immigration and cultural pluralism. This is seemingly supported by reports citing that immigration was a low priority amongst voters throughout the 1990s before emerging as a concern from 2000 onwards. According to this view, doubts over immigration and subsequently opposition to Multiculturalism were driven, primarily, by ‘top down’ pressures including economic recession coupled with a hostile tabloid media, and the government reaction to 7/7 and the Bradford riots. However, I dispute this claim - the above data indicates the pre-existence of an underlying opposition to immigration levels which ultimately found an expression through an anti-Multiculturalist sentiment. As Rutherford argues, ‘People imagine a country and economy and their own lives out of control. Many fear a world without borders, not just national borders, but borders that define social order, family life and common decency. Immigration refracts all of these anxieties into a brittle national sentiment’ 41. Multiculturalism, in both its real and imagined forms, exacerbated these fears.

The tension between the increase of new arrivals with long term public attitudes in favour of limiting immigration, subsequently saw the emergence of a narrative which linked Multiculturalism with a ‘chaotic asylum policy’ and ‘separateness’. This is supported by the findings of an Ipsos Mori report titled ‘Doubting Multiculturalism’ in 2009 which concludes that attitudes towards immigration and Multiculturalism often go ‘hand in hand’. ‘These trends in attitudes to immigration tie in with more general ambivalence about the merits of Multiculturalism. When asked directly about Multiculturalism, the British public is divided, but is more inclined to see Multiculturalism as something which threatens the British way of life (38%) than something which makes Britain a better place to live (30%)42. When the findings of the Ipsos Mori report are correlated with the previously discussed immigration data, it is clear that opposition to Multiculturalism as a collection of ‘social goods’, did not emerge out of thin air but rather from long term worries since the 1960s over asylum and the impact on of new arrivals on local communities - while there will always be elements of xenophobia or racism in anti-immigration sentiment, it would be irresponsible to offer these factors as the primary reasons. Polls suggesting that immigration only became a priority for voters post 2000 are therefore misleading – while immigration has only recently emerged as a ‘core issue’, it has always been a long standing concern. On a broader point, the polling data highlights a schism between the Cosmopolitan tendencies of the mainstream political class since the mid 1990s, and the prevalence of small ‘c’ conservative attitudes towards immigration amongst the British public. According to the findings of a British Social Attitudes survey in 2005, 78% of respondents answered ‘too many’ to the question ‘do you agree that too many immigrants have been let into the country or not?’43.

Polling data from a series of ‘British Social Attitudes' surveys indicates a strong preference towards ‘integration’ rather than a ‘celebration of difference’ amongst members of the British public. Respondents were asked a series of questions regarding the extent to which Multiculturalism should be accepted in schools across Britain - in separate polls in 1983, 1987, 1989 and 2007 representing samples between 1500 to 2600 the following four questions were asked; ‘There has been a lot of debate among teachers about how British schools should cater for children whose parents come from other countries and cultures. Do you think in general that schools with many such children should allow them to study their mother tongue 44/should allow those to whom it is important to wear their traditional dress at school 45/receive separate religious instruction at school 46/should
provide them with special classes in English if they require them?’ 47. In the first question, there was little variance in the results across all four polls of which approximately 80% answered ‘no’. The second response reflects a hardening of attitudes towards cultural diversity due to the ‘war on terror’ - in 1983, 49% answered ‘no’. By 2007, there was a 16% swing with the ‘no’s’ totalling 65%. The results of the third poll however, indicate that negative attitudes towards the recognition of religious diversity pre-date the ‘war on terror’ - between 1983 to 1989 approximately 60% of respondents were against the provision of separate religious instruction in schools. The deep rootedness of these attitudes are reinforced by the findings of the Ipsos Mori report 20 years later in 2009, in which 62% of the respondents answered that ‘Britain’ should retain its ‘Christian heritage’. Perhaps surprisingly, this attitude cut across the social divide and included ‘the middle class establishment’, ‘short fused grouser’, ‘anxious white pensioners’ and ‘young rebels’ 48.

The findings of the fourth poll reinforce the dominance of ‘integrationist’ attitudes - in 1983, 83% of respondents answered ‘yes - children should receive special English lessons if they require them’, in 2007, 79% provided the same answer. In summary, following an analysis of polling data charting the attitudes of the British public between 1964 - 2011 the following conclusions can be made; (i) there is a long term trend favouring a reduction in immigration levels which contrasts Multiculturalism’s liberal attitudes towards asylum; (ii) the British public has been against the incorporation of non-Christian religions into the state’s framework since the 1980s, highlighted by broad support for the retention of Britain’s Christian heritage. Once again, this suggests that attempts by both Multiculturalists, and their close cousins Cosmopolitan minded Liberal-Integrationists to incorporate ‘minority religions’ into the state’s framework, could prove to be highly unpopular; and (iii) the British public strongly favours integration over the ‘celebration of difference’, indicating a preference towards a traditionalist/soft assimilationist expression of liberal nationalism. The above findings explain why, unlike their Canadian counterparts, a maximalist acceptance of Multiculturalism at a political level has, and will, continue to provoke significant resistance ‘from below’.

Deep rooted concerns over immigration coupled with Multiculturalism’s failure to connect with the ‘English core’, tapped into deep rooted fears regarding the erosion of the majority culture. Bob Rowthorn, a professor of economics at Cambridge renowned for his anti-imperialist Left wing views, argues from a historical perspective that ‘the starting point is that Britain has a very large ethnic majority, it’s more than 90% and its sub-divided into English, Welsh and Scottish…the fact is that we have a long history as a nation, or

47 Source: BSA 2007
48 Ipsos MORI, Doubting, pp4-5.
combination of nations depending on how you view Scotland and Wales, and it is primarily – until recently – a fairly strong sense of national identity and it was an ethnic identity’ 49. He states that increasing levels of immigration and the focus on minority identities at the expense of that of the majority, has eroded the shared memories and sense of history that underpin English national identity. ‘The notion that somehow the large majority of the society do not have the right to have a memory, and this is reflected in the teaching of history in schools’ 50.

Immigration into Britain has historically been at modest levels meaning that the small numbers of new arrivals could be absorbed into the majority culture and tied into a shared historical narrative. According to data collated by the Office for National Statistics as of 11th August 2011 51, immigration in Britain has increased rapidly since the mid 1990s. In 1995 the number of new arrivals numbered approximately 300 000. Between 2004 – 2009 this number almost doubled to approximately 560 000 new arrivals per year leading to a dramatic change in the cultural and racial diversity of in certain areas. In response to this dramatic demographic change coupled with a longer term malaise in articulating post-imperial visions of both Britishness and English national identity, mainstream politicians and advocates of Multiculturalism preferred to articulate an increasingly de-Anglicised, cosmopolitan ‘Britishness’ based on a diffuse collection of ‘British values’. However, the extreme Cosmopolitan and Multiculturalist focus on minority issues and identities, resulted in its failure to connect with the everyday experiences and historic continuity of the English majority. As Rowntree argues, ‘they (the English core culture) wish to remain the majority, they wish to retain their historical identity...the fact is, in some way we have to create a history in which everyone, or the vast majority, can in some way identify with. That must mean that minorities must accept that the primary basis of history does not refer directly to them’ 52.

Furthermore, advocates of Multiculturalism suffer from a ‘historical blind spot’ which ignores the ‘integrationist tendencies’ of minorities and their desire to develop strong ties to the host nation and its national symbols. This is supported by the findings of an Ipsos Mori survey, ‘Muslim Attitudes: The Real Story’ (2007) which asked Londoners a series of questions including their sense of loyalty and identity - according to a sample of 1005 ‘all Londoners’ 46% of the respondents strongly identified with England; out of a sample of 554 Muslims 41% provided the same answer, while 43% felt a strong attachment to Britain.

50 Ibid.  
51 Source: ONS 2011  
52 Rowntree, Diversity, pp7.
The wider popularity of assertive expressions of English national identity is at odds with both Cosmo-Multiculturalists and mainstream politicians who favour a de-Anglicised articulation of ‘Britishness’. According to 2011 Searchlight poll, 48% of the British public would support a new anti-immigration party committed to challenging Islamist extremism, and would support policies to make it statutory for all public buildings to fly the flag of St George or the union flag’. Furthermore, a permanent halt to all immigration was supported by 39% of Asian Britons, 34% of White Britons and 21% of Black Britons. These ‘nationalist’ findings are shot through by the dominance of liberal attitudes towards free speech in which 60% of the population believe that they should be free to criticise religious practices – while this could also be viewed as a negative, after all, insulting an individual’s religion and threatening violence is distinctly ‘illiberal’, the freedom to criticise is a cornerstone of a liberal democratic society. While this poll, as with others, should be treated with a degree of caution, it supports my hypothesis that the concept of Multiculturalism has been forced into a sharp retreat due to a combination of latent ‘bottom up’ pressures and theoretical incompatibility. In addition, contrary to claims by the authors that these findings represent a new politics of identity, they are, in fact, distinctly ‘old politics’ and have not just appeared ‘out the box’. When taken in conjunction with the aforementioned immigration data and attitudes towards cultural integration in schools, it can be seen that these findings are consistent with long term public trends. The rejection of violence and anti-racist sentiment amongst respondents supportive of ‘assertive Englishness’, is not only encouraging but, contrary to first impressions amongst those who equate ‘nationalism’ with ‘violence’, is broadly consistent with the liberal-nationalist origins of the English nation state. This is problematic for advocates of Multiculturalism because it indicates strong support for a shared sense of national identity based on historic, and patriotic expressions of English national identity rather than a laissez faire ‘celebration of difference’.

Jon Cruddas, the Labour MP for Dagenham and Rainham, argues that Multiculturalism has become associated with the exclusion of a ‘white indigenous culture’ which stems from a lack of a proper definition. ‘It remains an elusive category, people shape it into what they want it to be....quite an easy scapegoat which becomes this thing through which everyone refracts their primary concerns’ . There is much merit to this argument - the concept of Multiculturalism remains widely misunderstood by the political class and social commentators alike. While this paper has attempted to chisel a workable definition of Multiculturalism as both a distinct political model and an approach to public policy, there is

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53 Mark Townsend, ‘Searchlight poll finds huge support for far right if they gave up violence’, *The Observer*, 26th February 2011
54 Jon Cruddas, Interview with the author, Westminster London, 7th September 2011
no denying that a lack of clarity over what it ‘actually is’, regularly sees it used by the tabloid media and the far right as a convenient straw man. The tendency to negatively frame Multiculturalism is mirrored at a local level, where it acts as a lightning rod for a smorgasbord of social ills. In response to a question regarding opposition to Multiculturalism at a constituency level he observes that ‘you hear coming back to you things that you hear in popular culture and by the far right, round a framing of a celebration of all cultures rather than a white one. It then becomes a depository for feelings of loss, economic malaise and feelings of dispossession, i.e. Multiculturalism is something which celebrates everything apart from their indigenous role’ 55. The feeling that distinct expressions of English national identity have been sidelined flows from these ‘feelings of loss’ due to the atomisation of society during the era of globalisation. This sense of detachment from a shared, national belonging has been exacerbated by very public expressions of ‘Scottishness’ and ‘Welshness’ since devolution. ‘There is the notion that England is residualised. It is the one which is lost in all of that. Look at the recent Scottish elections - Salmond and Scottish nationalism has been able to define a form of optimistic Scottish identity. Where is the equivalent?’ 56.

The failure of Multiculturalism and the Cosmopolitan minded political class to articulate an inclusive vision of Englishness is twofold; first, it has allowed the far right to take ownership of English nationhood and national symbols; and second, Multiculturalism and Cosmopolitanism are not grounded in working class cultures but associated with an ‘out of touch’, London centric political elite. In response to a question regarding the worrying rise of the English Defence League (EDL), Cruddas argues that ‘it's more worrying than the British National Party (BNP) because it is more grounded in working class culture, it's not associated with ordinary Fascism, it claims to be primarily framed against Islam. The question is can it get away from being a street militia? I doubt it....but it could tap into something out there against institutions, the banks, the political class’ 57. Growing concerns over the Far Right and their ability to tap into, and exploit, existing anger about the allocation of council housing and an alienation from the jobs market, played a significant role in the policy making consensus that emerged. Gordon Brown’s ‘British jobs, for British workers’ and the recent uproar over the Bombardier train contract, flow from this sense of dislocation from the political class. While these pressures have gained greater public and political attention since 7/7, Cruddas agrees that these social pressures are ‘latent’ and centred around a failure to forge a strong sense of national identity and reform institutions, in the face of economic change.

55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
Chapter 4

The Top Down Response

Multiculturalism and the Left

The most vocal critics of Multiculturalism were originally confined to centre-right and right wing commentators and academics. However, the increased visibility of social pressures relating to immigration and expressions of national identity, exposed existing intellectual tensions on the Left between Cultural Cosmopolitans and Social Democrats. The schism between the ‘cultural’ and ‘old left’ was not new, but the ‘diversity v solidarity’ debate that emerged within Left wing academia in the early to mid 2000s was a watershed moment for advocates of Multiculturalism.

David Goodhart is the most prominent Left wing critic of Multiculturalism who argues that Britain’s increased value and ethnic diversity due to mass immigration, threatens the reciprocities required to sustain a welfare state. Goodhart argues from a Burkean perspective that individuals instinctively feel kinship towards our ‘own kind’/fellow members of our ‘in group’ - this does not mean our ‘genetic ’ or ‘racial kin’ but those with whom ‘we’ share a sense of affinity such as fellow members of a national community. For Goodhart, Multiculturalism’s liberal attitudes towards immigration and its celebration of cultural diversity would lead to crumbling public services due to its erosion of the social solidarity required to sustain them. ‘This is an especially acute dilemma for progressives who want plenty of both solidarity - high social cohesion and generous welfare paid out of a progressive tax system - and diversity - equal respect for a wide range of peoples, values and ways of life’ 58. He contends that the high levels of social spending in Denmark and Sweden can be attributed to their cultural homogeneity which fosters a strong sense of solidarity and support for public services - ‘Scandinavian countries with the biggest welfare states have been the most socially and ethnically homogenous states in the west. By the same token the welfare state has always been weaker in the individualistic, ethnically divided US compared with more homogenous Europe’ 59.

Robert Putnam builds on the relationship between social solidarity and immigration by arguing that in the short to medium term, immigration and ethnic diversity inhibits ‘social capital’. While he focusses on the impact of these processes in the United States, they are

58 Goodhart, Too Diverse?, pp1.
59 Ibid, pp5.
instructive to the British debate - the term ‘social capital’ refers to a wide range of activities and includes participation in local political processes, neighbourly interaction between different ethnic groups and attitudes towards community projects and quality of life. For Putnam, ‘inhabitants of diverse communities tend to withdraw from collective life, to distrust their neighbours, regardless of the colour of their skin, to withdraw even from close friends, to expect the worst from their community and its leaders...diversity, at least in the short run, seems to bring out the turtle in all of us’ 60. Findings by leading academics indicating that ethnic diversity damages community cohesion in the short to medium terms, complemented the growing visibility of public concerns over immigration, Multiculturalism and its effect on minority integration. In response, a significant proportion of the British Left openly rejected Multiculturalism and lurched back towards ‘old left’ vices of social cohesion and solidarity as a means of ‘re-rooting’ the citizen within its host society. In keeping with the British public’s long term affinity towards ‘integration’, elements on the academic Left reached a consensus over the need for a reconstructed, state centric national identity based on ‘civic values’ rather than the ‘celebration of difference’.

While the contributions of Brown and Rowthorn in this area are instructive, Goodhart’s work has proven to be the most influential. In his 2004 and 2006 papers titled ‘Too Diverse?’ and ‘Progressive Nationalism: Citizenship and the Left’ respectively, Goodhart assesses British identity, immigration and provides policy suggestions to encourage minority and majority integration into a shared expression of nationhood in an era of globalisation based on liberal values. For Goodhart, ‘a progressive civic nationalism or integrationism for our more mobile and diverse age will look very different from the kind of nationalism that most British citizens would have instinctively signed up to in 1950’ 61.

Underpinning this re-emphasis of traditional social democratic values was a more subtle critique of the globalisation discourse embraced by the ‘Cosmopolitan Left’ post 1989. Jon Cruddas and Jonathan Rutherford argue that globalisation’s commodification of labour has encouraged both a real, and perceived, weakening of national cohesion. ‘Globalisation has devastated people’s ways of life. People fear the loss of their culture and their identity, which provide their lives with meaning. Who are we? Where do we belong? A disorientated culture like our own throws up these questions but it cannot answer them. People are left to cope with uncertainty’ 62. This re-assertion of ‘old left’ vices has combined with an emerging critique of globalisation and the ‘isms’ that flow from

61 Goodhart, Nationalism, pp24.
it i.e. ‘Cosmopolitanism’ and ‘Multiculturalism’. The ‘Blue Labour’ faction within the Labour party exemplifies this emerging opposition to the ‘globalist discourse’ and the changing attitudes of the Left towards the ‘tolerance of difference’ and national identity.

The academic Maurice Glasman, Blue Labour’s ‘founding father’, is indicative of a re-emerging left wing nationalism which is suspicious of free markets, supports a heavily restricted immigration policy and argues that Labour should become the party of ‘family and the flag’ - this critique is underpinned by the belief that the nation state, rather than global economic and ideological forces, should dictate the domestic agenda. It should be noted that the broad academic consensus that emerged on the Left against Multiculturalism did not emerge in a vacuum - it was profoundly influenced by a series of grass roots social pressures concerning immigration, national identity and economic grievances which provoked, and continues to provoke, a wider critique of Left wing attitudes towards national identity and immigration. While the intellectual debate was largely ‘reactionary’, it played a significant role in crystallising the various strands of public concerns and social attitudes into a theoretically coherent ‘political package’.

The Policy Making Consensus

David Cameron’s recent rebuke of Multiculturalism at the Munich Security Conference represents the latest in a long line of government criticism, started under New Labour in the late 1990s. The growing visibility of these social pressures, has driven mainstream politicians to articulate a ‘new integration’ which, paradoxically, borrows some aspects of the Multiculturalist discourse. This process can broken down into two interrelated yet distinct strands.

First, government policy post 2001 was profoundly influenced by the Mill Town riots (2001) and the 7/7 London bombings (2005) which brought long standing public concerns over, national identity, immigration and minority integration into the spotlight. The findings of the Cantle Report (2001) brought to light problems of community cohesion and saw the linking of Multiculturalism to ethnic polarisation. ‘The extent to which these physical divisions were compounded by so many other aspects of our daily lives, was very evident. Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives’ 63. In this wide ranging report which tackled urban regeneration, education and local media as well as integration and

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segregation, there was a more subtle, but vital element that damaged the credibility of Multiculturalism. The term ‘diversity’ is often associated with Multiculturalism, but post 2001 ‘diversity’ was stripped from its remit, which became increasingly associated with living ‘parallel lives’, and absorbed within the ideals of liberal-nationalism. In short, government policy since the Cantle Report has increasingly sought to promote ‘diversity’ as a form of civic integration rather than separation and the ‘celebration of difference’. ‘Segregation reduces opportunities for understanding between faiths and cultures and for the development of tolerance. Strong opposition was expressed to increasing the number of faith schools which respondents felt would only exacerbate problems associated with segregation’ 64. This shift in emphasis was noted by Rogers Brubaker who argued that assimilation in a more complex form had returned following the ‘differentialist turn’ during the 1980s and early 1990s - this was not to earlier ‘blood and soil’ conceptions of assimilation, but rather one which acknowledged difference but aimed to make people ‘more similar’. ‘As a normatively changed concept, assimilation, in this this sense, is opposed not to difference but to segregation, ghettoisation and marginalisation’ 65.

Throughout David Blunkett’s tenure as Home Secretary (2001-2004), the relationship between Multiculturalism, immigration and national identity was the focus of a series of policy papers which sought to forge a middle ground between ‘Assimilation’ and ‘Multiculturalism’. The 2002 paper titled ‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven - Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain’, attempted to set out the ‘rights and responsibilities’ of asylum seekers and the need to foster a greater sense of integration based on the idea of shared principles and active citizenship, within the overarching context of immigration reform. ‘Confidence, security and trust make all the difference in enabling a safe haven to be offered to those coming to the UK. To enable integration to take place, and to value the diversity it brings, we need to be secure within our sense of belonging and identity and therefore to be able to reach out and embrace those who come to the UK’ 66. While the paper is at pains to note Britain’s diverse character, there is a definite nod to pre-existing grass roots pressures in three areas.

(i) it sought to allay fears amongst low skilled workers over the impact of new arrivals on wages and the job availability. ‘Our priority will remain investment in the skills and abilities of the existing population...for even at a time of high levels of economic activity and

64 Ibid, pp59.
buoyant employment, the low skill and no skill groupings are likely to be most fearful of the low skill, no skill entrant into the local economy’ 67;

(ii) to confront concerns over ‘British national identity’ while confronting the alienation of white working class communities from the political process and, in some cases, their declining standard of living. This paper built on the themes of the Cantle Report and sought to reconstruct a sense of civic integration through the introduction of citizenship tests and language lessons for new arrivals.

(iii) to improve the tracking of new arrivals and clamp down on illegal immigration portrayed as damaging to community cohesion and exploitation of the welfare state. The ‘Strength in Diversity’ consultation strategy launched in 2004, was more explicit on the differences between ‘Integration’ and ‘Assimilation’ and sought to engage a wide range of people in a debate on how to build community cohesion. In addition, it broadened the causes of the Mill Town riots to include issues of inequality and its relationship to the radicalisation of young people.

The crystallisation between bottom up social pressures and emerging national security concerns in the aftermath of the 7/7 London bombings, saw a hardening of government attitudes towards Multiculturalism and, in particular, Britain’s Muslim population. The complex interplay between these factors saw the concept of Multiculturalism come under sustained attack for its supposed role in allowing Islamic extremism to flourish. Malik argues that, ‘the result “of Multiculturalism” has been to stoke up anger and resentment, creating a siege mentality that makes the Muslim community more inward looking and more open to religious extremism - and that has helped transform a small number of young men into savage terrorists’ 68. It was argued that Multiculturalism’s ‘celebration of difference’ came at the cost of eroding a sense of common values and political equality, leading to the marginalisation of ‘white working class communities’ and English national identity. In the UK, the culturalisation of the ‘war on terror’ resulted in the securitisation of ‘immigration’ and ‘national identity’. The term ‘securitisation’ refers to a process whereby a specific problem is referred to as an existential threat; once an agent becomes ‘securitised’ it is viewed as a threat to the state and justifies emergency measures to prevent and pre-empt its effects - for example, racial profiling of asylum seekers, data mining and the curtailment of civil liberties to protect the ‘law abiding majority’. In the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7, this had two implications for policy makers; ‘terrorism’ was taken out of the public sphere and into the remit of the state; and there was a revision of

67 ibid, pp13.
68 Kenan Malik, ‘Multiculturalism fans the flame of Islamic Extremism’, The Times, 16th July 2005
the security paradigm in which the threat was tackled. Since 7/7, re-forging ‘the nation’ has been framed as a core security concern which emphasises both the security of, and integration into, a ‘law abiding majority’.

The PREVENT Strategy, which forms an integral part of the overarching government anti-terrorist strategy, CONTEST, is indicative of this securitisation of national identity post 7/7. PREVENT takes a three pronged approach to tackled terrorism in the UK; ideological - this involves challenging extremists intellectually; social intervention - target individuals deemed as ‘vulnerable’ to extremist influence and provide education; and institutional - to co-operate and co-ordinate with an array of public bodies including faith groups, health care providers and the wider criminal justice system to prevent the spread of radicalisation.

While it is not the purpose of this paper to assess UK counter terrorism per se, the integration of Britain’s Muslim population forms a core part of the government’s strategy. ‘A stronger sense of belonging and citizenship makes communities more resilient to terrorist ideology and propagandists. We believe that PREVENT depends on integration, democratic participation and strong interfaith dialogue’ 69. On a practical level, the ‘integration’ of British Muslims into a ‘core set’ of values is encouraged through a variety of activities including inter faith co-operation, mentoring for young people and general Muslim forums 70. Multiculturalism, meanwhile, has been depicted not only as a barrier to the rights of the ‘majority’, but a threat to the integration of Muslims into British society. David Cameron’s took this a stage further during his Munich Security Conference speech by linking Multiculturalism to a ‘passive tolerance of extremism’.

Government attitudes towards Britain’s/England’s Muslim population is shot through with a distinct ‘language and flag’ flavour which flow into a wider debate across Europe over the ‘compatibility’ of Islamic culture with Western cultural norms. The debate over Muslim women compared to their ‘liberated’ Western counterparts and worries over the lack of English language skills amongst poorly educated asylum seekers, go deeper than the more recent ‘security dilemma’ and flow from ‘bottom up’ nationalist concerns. In a press conference, Tony Blair argued that debate over the veil reflected ‘the relationship between our society and how the Muslim community integrates within ‘our’ society. There’s a second issue which is about Islam itself, and how Islam comes to terms with and is comfortable with the modern world...we need to confront the issue about how we integrate

70 Ibid, pp29.
people properly into our society' 71. Post 7/7 saw a shift in attitudes towards the integration of British Muslims and the infiltration of ‘grass roots’ pressures towards Muslim communities into the political process. For McGhee, ‘rather than being content to focus on dialogue, participation, reducing inequalities and improving opportunities, the Government has mirrored their uncompromising anti-terrorism laws with a new uncompromising approach to integration’ 72. In 2006, Ruth Kelly and Darra Singh, the Secretary for Communities and Local Government, launched ‘The Commission on Integration and Community Cohesion’ (CICC) contained a strong ‘nationalist’ message. For example, the CICC argued for the restriction of migrants from third world countries whose culture may clash with ‘majority values’ and the need for new arrivals to possess good language skills to aid integration. As McGhee argues, ‘this is directly related to the subtext of the ‘Controlling our Borders’ White Paper that Britain has been importing social problems in the form of migrant communities who have not integrated properly into British society’ 73.

The articulation of an increasingly assertive ‘Britishness’ in the form of ‘Civic Nationalism’ to combat the threat of radicalisation was therefore a logical consequence of the framing of integration as a pressing national security concern. ‘A significant reason why the bombers had attacked London, the suggestion seemed to be, was because they were inadequately integrated...the suggestion that a lack of integration had been central to the bomber’s radicalisation had been accompanied - and thereby directly supported - by the Prime Minister’s denial of any link between the London attacks and Britain’s role in Iraq’ 74. However, the securitisation of national identity and the push to re-forge a ‘British nation’ did not emerge out of thin air. As Brighton argues, ‘this assertiveness in the domestic politics of community can be taken as both a symptom and a further cause of crisis in social cohesion. Its origins can be identified historically within British society as a longstanding thread running alongside and in complex relation with Multiculturalism’ 75. Attempts to encourage integration in the education system has seen a renewed interest at government level in citizenship studies and history. In particular, there is a consensus amongst leading historians and government minister’s that a more ‘nationalist’ history curriculum which is more objective in its assessment of the British Empire and looks more in depth at English history, will reinforce a singular national narrative.

72 Ibid, pp96.
73 Ibid, pp98.
74 Shane Brighton, ‘British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK Foreign Policy: Integration and Cohesion in and Beyond the State’, International Affairs, 83: 1, pp2.
75 Ibid, pp12.
Secondly, it is necessary to chart the changing rhetorical responses of mainstream politicians towards Multiculturalism - the shift in tone from the open acceptance of pluralism in the early years of the New Labour government to the championing of ‘integration’ and ‘shared values’, is indicative of the growing visibility of social pressures in shaping the political discourse. While this rhetorical shift should be treated with a degree of caution, after all, what politicians ‘say’ and what they actually ‘do’ are often at loggerheads, the rhetoric of mainstream politicians has significant impact on shaping the public debate. Tony Blair’s ‘Duty to Integrate: Shared British Values’ key note speech in December 2006 was the watershed moment for Multiculturalism but the ground for its wholesale rejection, at least rhetorically, had been laid in previous ministerial responses - Jack Straw’s lukewarm response to findings of the CMEB in 1998 were complemented by Trevor Phillips’ rebuke of Multiculturalism in an interview with the Times in 2004 - ‘the word (Multiculturalism) is not useful, it means the wrong things...shall we kill it off? yes, lets do that. Multiculturalism suggests separateness, We are now in a different world’ 76. Gordon Brown’s historical assessment of Britishness, liberty and fair play in 2004 77 was a more positive contribution to the changing mainstream political attitudes towards Multiculturalism, and formed the backbone to his later speeches regarding the re-invigoration of local democracy and British institutions.

Blair’s contribution during his 2006 speech at the UK Foreign Office remains the most significant contribution as it crystallised the events of 7/7, the Bradford Riots and public concerns over immigration and identity into a ‘post Multiculturalist’ vision of integration. For Blair, ‘the whole point is that multicultural Britain was never supposed to be a celebration of division; but of diversity...partly the answer lies in precisely defining our common values and making it clear that we expect all citizens to conform to them. Obedience to the rule of law, to democratic decision making about who governs us, to freedom from violence and discrimination are not optional for British citizens. They are what being British is all about. Being British carries rights. It also carries duties. And those duties take clear precedence over any cultural religious practice’ 78. While Blair’s speech was criticised for its ‘half rejection, half acceptance’ stance towards Multiculturalism, there was a definite shift back towards a more ‘one way’ process of minority integration into a defined majority culture. While the tendency to de-Anglicise British identity remained, there was a nod towards the grass roots fears of the ‘majority culture’ and while

76 Trevor Phillips, ‘Genteel xenophobia is as bad as any other kind’, The Guardian, 16th February 2004
78 Tony Blair (2006), Speech by Tony Blair, Former Prime Minister for Great Britain and Northern Ireland, at the Foreign Office, 8th December 2006
attempting to combat the growing visibility of far right intolerance while balancing minority rights.

Cameron’s speech at the Munich Security Conference shared many striking similarities and highlights the durability of the ‘Blair consensus’ towards immigration, citizenship and identity amongst the mainstream political class over the last decade. For example, the ‘rights and responsibilities’ of British citizenship were apparent in Cameron’s and Clegg’s most recent speeches on the need for ‘Muscular Liberalism’ as an alternative to Multiculturalism. ‘Muscular Liberalism’ recalls an earlier movement of ‘Muscular Christianity’ in the 1850s driven by the fear that British cities were experiencing a moral decay due to a declining Christian ethos. For Cameron, its resurrection ties into this political consensus post 20001 which argues for a re-affirmation of core values to aid minority integration and foster a shared sense of nationhood.

A Defence of Multiculturalism

While Multiculturalism has failed to replace Liberal-Integrationism as the dominant citizenship model and come under sustained attack as a guiding principle at a local level, an all out rejection should be cautioned. The British political establishment remains more tolerant towards cultural pluralism than their counterparts in France and Germany. Sarkozy’s rhetoric has been particularly inflammatory towards French Muslims - during a television interview ‘Sarkozy seemed to suggest that French Muslims were against the idea of young girls going to school...he also echoed complaints by the far-right National Front the idea that it is un-French to pray in the street’ 79. In addition, the banning of headscarves and all religious symbols in schools (2004) and the more recent law prohibiting the burkha in public spaces (2011) are representative of a more assimilationist response to minority, and particularly Muslim, integration in France. In Germany, Thilo Sarrazin’s accusation that Turkish Muslims ‘do not integrate well’ should be compared with the comparatively mild language used by mainstream politicians in the UK towards British Muslims. For example, Cameron, like Blair and Brown before him, has reiterated Britain’s acceptance of diversity and the positive impact of immigration on British society.

Government policy continues to support the accommodation of diversity into the Liberal-Integrationist framework provided it is compatible with the state’s liberal principles. Government support for free schools which seeks to apply liberal free market principles to education and the ‘Big Society’, encourages minority participation and cultural

79 Bagehot, ‘David Cameron’s muddled speech on Multiculturalism’, The Economist, 11th February 2011
expressions in the education system. Furthermore, contrary to Cameron’s Munich speech, both open up additional ‘space’ for the Integrationist-Multiculturalist debate to flourish. ‘That (Cameron's denouncement of Multiculturalism) sits awkwardly with his Big Society plans to deliver public services through charity bodies, and especially his enthusiasm for faith schools...but others offer a sharper challenge: evangelical Christian schools, Hindu academies, Orthodox Jewish schools or Private Muslim ones, that - quite legally - devote half a day to theology and Koranic studies and shun all arts and humanities subjects apart from religious education’ 80. Meanwhile, the borrowing of ‘diversity’ by Liberal-Integrationists rather than a lurch back towards ‘Assimilation’, should be viewed as a victory for Multiculturalism and highlights its impact on the current day political discourse.

80 Ibid.
Conclusion

At a national level, Multiculturalism has failed to displace Liberal-Integrationism as the dominant citizenship model in Britain due to its incompatibility with the liberal nationalist origins of the English nation state. This manifests itself in two forms; first, the Western nation state is inextricably linked to the dominance of a core culture flowing from the practices of the dominant ethnic group. While minority cultural practices can be accommodated and re-shape the majority culture over time, Multiculturalist attempts to reduce the majority English culture to ‘one of many’ subverts the implicit relationship between ‘state and nation’. Attempts to forge a ‘Cosmopolitan’ national identity as articulated by Modood, lacks historical rootedness in contrast to the rich narrative and symbolic resonance of English nationhood. While the failure of Multiculturalists to look beyond their often simplified vision of minorities in the West, means that if fails to connect with a wider cross section of society and generate sufficient public support.

Secondly, while cultural pluralism can be accommodated within the Liberal-Integrationist framework, a full on embrace of Multiculturalism conflicts with the historical and philosophical thrust of British institutions. Liberal-democratic states reject Multiculturalist demands for a maximalist acceptance of ‘group rights’, and seek to retain the private-public distinction between minority expressions of racial and cultural identities. Despite the strong Cosmopolitan tendencies of the New Labour government between 1997-2000, whom critics argue oversaw the implementation of Multiculturalism ‘by the backdoor’, there was swing back towards a traditionalist ‘core culture’ oriented rhetoric of Liberal-Integrationism more consistent with the nationalist principles underpinning the British state.

At a local level, the situation is more complex - Multiculturalism has come under sustained attack for encouraging ethnic and religious polarisation, eroding community cohesion and held responsible for the preferential treatment of minorities and minority cultures. The presence of slow burning, and oft ignored public preferences in favour of integration, restricted immigration and support for more assertive expressions of English national identity, drove the shift in mainstream political attitudes following the ‘triggers’ of 7/7 and the mill town riots. While the mainstream political class remain reticent to articulate a distinct expression English national identity, the push towards greater ‘integration’ has seen the concept of ‘diversity’ absorbed into the Liberal-Integrationist framework which acknowledges a dominant, though at present, ill defined ‘core culture’. Dovetailing into this process, is an emerging critique by academics and commentators on the Left against the
Globalist/Cosmopolitan discourse. This rebellion by Multiculturalism’s former ‘core constituency’ has damaged the Multiculturalist brand and renewed discussion over the need for a stronger, less atomised national culture to combat the disorientation caused by global economic and social forces.

However, Multiculturalism has not ‘gone away’ and there remains life in the concept yet. At a social level, Britain is and will continue to be ‘multicultural’ while continued use of the term is inevitable when framing minority issues. Furthermore, despite being blacklisted as the state’s guiding principle, government backed free schools, the ‘Big Society’, coupled with ongoing debates over Islam, globalisation and the far right, ensures that the ‘Integrationist - Multiculturalist’ debate remains a major issue of our time.

14, 928 words including footnotes and bibliography
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Interview Plan

1. Why do you think Multiculturalism has come under attack over the last decade?

2. How would you define Multiculturalism?

3. Describe opposition to Multiculturalism at a constituency level?

4. Did people ever mention Multiculturalism directly and blame it for their problems?

5. Do you believe that expressions of English national identity are ignored?

6. If so, why?

7. What policy suggestions would reinvigorate expressions of Englishness?

8. Are you worried by the EDL and BNP?

9. How important are bottom up, latent pressures?

10. Why did New Labour embrace the ‘globalisation discourse’?

*Interview of Jon Cruddas MP, Labour MP for Dagenham and Rainham, on 7th September 2011 at 3pm.*