— *Five* —

DEMOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING

Settlement and Deportation

The king shall populate the countryside by creating villages on virgin land or by revising abandoned village sites. Settlement can be effected either by shifting some of the population of his own country or by immigration of foreigners. The settlers in the villages shall mainly be Sudra agriculturalists, with a minimum of one hundred families and a maximum of five hundred. The villages shall be sited so as to provide mutual protection.

Kautilya, *The Arthashastra*, 2.1.1.3: 179—fourth century B.C.

There are two ways to think about the relationship between demography and security. The first, addressed in chapters 1 to 4, is to consider how changes in demographic variables—in the size, distribution, and composition of a population—influence a country's political stability and its perception of threats to its security. The second is to examine how governments have sought to change demographic variables in order to enhance their security. We thus now reverse the causal arrows to ask these questions: Under what conditions do security concerns of governments lead them to attempt to affect—or "engineer"—demographic variables? What policy instruments do they employ? What are the security consequences for themselves and for others?

Demographic engineering entails the full range of government policies intended to affect the size, composition, distribution, and growth rate of a population. From this perspective demographic engineering includes the many policies pursued by governments to promote or slow population growth, including, for example, family subsidies to promote fertility and anti-abortion policies as well as pro-abortion policies. Many of these policies, it should be noted, have been adopted by states concerned about security, not simply development. As is well known, during the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s both France and Germany promoted population growth as part of an effort to expand military manpower through conscription.

Forms of State Intervention

In our analysis of demographic engineering, we shall focus primarily on state policies to move or remove populations, for it is these interventions that have had and are likely to have significant effects on the security of states and of peoples. We consider five forms of state intervention.

The first is that of *addition*: policies to promote the movement of dominant national or ethnic groups as settlers into areas populated primarily by subordinate or minority groups. We use the term "settlers" here to denote people who have entered a territory under the auspices of political authority, distinguishing them from the more typical "migrants" who have moved without such encouragement.[1] Governments may engage in this form of demographic colonization through population transfers for any one or more of the following reasons: to establish the hegemony of a dominant ethnic group, to enhance their political control over a people or territory, to prevent the rise of secessionist or irredentist movements, and to diminish the prospects of arms flows and financial support to border populations.

The questions that need to be asked about the demographic strategy of addition are: Why are these migration settlement policies adopted? What policy instruments are employed to induce the migrations? What are the political responses of the local population to the settlers? Do the policies generate violent conflict and secessionist movements, or do they solidify political control? Do they lead to a refugee flight and conflicts with neighboring countries? In short, what are the internal and international security consequences of settlement policies?

The second is that of *subtraction*: policies designed to remove certain (often minority) populations out of the country or from

one portion of the country to another in order to solidify national or regional identities or to enhance national security—in short, to "unmix" populations that may have lived mixed together over centuries. An analysis of policies to unmix populations by forcing flight would consider the circumstances under which such policies are adopted, the internal conflicts they generate, and their consequences for relations between the sending and receiving countries when the movements are across international borders.

Since forced population movements intended to unmix populations almost invariably provoke an international response, what are the options available to the international community for dealing with states that engage in such practices and in addressing the question of resettlement or repatriation of those who were forced to move?

A third demographic engineering approach, *substitution*, combines the first two by moving certain groups out while moving others in.

The fourth set of demographic engineering policies promotes *outmigration*—emigration to other countries so as to generate domestic and international benefits of both an economic and a political character. The governments of many migrant-origin countries either explicitly or implicitly follow this policy, in the belief that emigration provides a "safety valve" and thereby reduces political pressures among a domestic population which might otherwise become restive. They also expect to capture substantial economic benefits from the inflow of foreign exchange in the form of overseas-worker remittances to families remaining behind, financial investments from their overseas migrants, and increased inflow of technology from their higher-skilled nationals working abroad. Some seek further advantages of a political character, attempting to utilize their overseas populations to influence the domestic politics and foreign policies of the receiving country. In order to maximize such economic and political benefits, sending country governments sometimes invest heavily in efforts to sustain relations with their citizens who have migrated abroad. Some of the new transnational communities—people born in one country who live in another but retain strong cultural, economic, and political ties with their country of origin—have called for the establishment of dual citizenship, including voting rights, demands that pose awkward and increasingly contested issues of national identity and national security. Several countries have now granted dual citizenship or

dual nationality to their overseas migrants. What are the likely consequences for the migrants, for their relationship with the local population, with their country of origin, and with their country of residence?

The fifth set of demographic engineering policies aims at *restriction of entry*. Control over entry is a core attribute of state sovereignty, and few question the right of governments to decide whom to admit for work, permanent residence, and citizenship. Globalization has diminished the importance of borders with respect to the flow of trade, capital, and information, but borders continue to be important in controlling the movement of people. The erosion of controls over the former, however, has made it increasingly difficult for governments to control the latter.

As illegal migration has grown and as government refugee and asylum policies have increasingly become used (and often misused) as vehicles for migration, governments have sought new ways to deal with unwanted entries. Many governments are using their military for control over land borders, not against invading armies but against illegal population entry, employing naval forces and coast guards to interdict ships with passengers seeking illegal entry or political asylum, negotiating arrangements with their neighbors to tighten their entry and exit points, and introducing tighter labor controls to deter employers of undocumented workers and to reduce the incentives for illegal entry. From a security perspective, important key questions are whether military forces can be efficacious in controlling entry, what kinds of military forces and techniques can be employed, whether their use jeopardizes trade and tourist flows across international borders, and what challenges they pose for the international refugee regime.

Settlement Policies

The movement of populations by governments as a strategy for establishing territorial control is an ancient practice. Conquest was a two-stage process: The first was military conquest, the second was colonization—the movement into a territory of one's own people to settle the land, build or gain control of the urban settlements, and establish the political authority of the victors. Examples abound: Greeks settled in Sicily, Romans and the Normans in the conquered Saxon territories; waves of invaders settled in

northwestern India; the defeat of the Serbs by the Ottomans in 1389 was followed by the settlement of Muslims in Kosovo. With the purchase of the Louisiana Territory by President Jefferson, and the subsequent military victory over Mexico that resulted in the incorporation of much of the Southwest, the United States engaged in a systematic policy of land settlement. The movement westward—the so-called frontier policy—involved the extension of political control over newly purchased or conquered territories and the extension of political control over local populations—Native Americans or Mexicans. The real estate policies adopted by Congress provided the basis for land settlement by setting the terms of the use of "free" land, while military force was provided by the federal authorities to protect the settlements—on the whole, a policy very much in the spirit of Kautilya, quoted at the beginning of this chapter.

Turning to Europe and Asia, internal colonizations via population transfers have long been a widely employed demographic policy in both Russia and China. From the middle of the nineteenth century Russians moved to Central Asia, following the Great Game conquests of the Czars in Bhukara, Kiva, and regions to the north in what is now Khazhakstan. Under Stalin, Russians were induced to migrate to the newly conquered Baltic territories, and minorities (most notably Koreans) were removed from international border areas where they might seek arms and political support from their ethnic brethren. The process of Russification would later leave millions of Russian-speakers behind in the successor states to the Soviet Union, where their citizenship status has become problematic. Similarly, in Chinese Central Asia successive Chinese regimes pursued a policy of moving Han Chinese to areas under their control in Mongolia, Gunzu, Xinjiang, and Tibet. Since the Chinese government declared the annexation of Tibet in 1951, there has been a large influx of Han Chinese, in many cases encouraged by the Chinese government. Supporters of the Dalai Lama assert that this is a form of "cultural genocide," a planned effort to outnumber the few million Tibetan indigenes; in 1997 the Dalai Lama warned, "The very survival of Tibetans as a distinct people is under constant threat." In response, the Beijing government claims that the Han migration to Tibet is part of an ambitious effort at economic development for the desperately poor region. The Tibetan government-in-exile claims that Han Chinese already outnumber indigenous Tibetans; the Chinese government reports than less than 5 percent of the region's population are Han. Independent assessment of such claims is impossible, although one press summary estimates the Han population to be in the range of 15 to 23 percent of the total (Chu 1999).[2]

Although Russification and Sinification—the words imply both population colonization and the extension of the dominant culture and its language to native peoples—are perhaps the largest and most well known examples of internal population transfers, there are numerous other contemporary examples. These include the Philippine settlement of the Moros region in Mindanao; Javanese settlement of Sumatra and other outer islands; Burman settlement of the Bengali-speaking Rohingya areas near the borders of Bangladesh; Bangladeshi settlement of the Chittagong Hill Tracts with its Buddhist population; and Bhutanese settlement of southern Bhutan and the forced deportation of Nepali-speaking residents. Moving outside of Asia, there are the examples of Moroccan settlement of the disputed territories in the Western Sahara, and Israeli settlements in the Arab populated West Bank. South Africa under the apartheid regime instituted internal pass laws and systematically removed Zulu and other native peoples from white townships. Before World War II, the government of France encouraged French settlements in Algeria, an area they regarded as more than a colony but less than a French *département*. A similar policy guided the Japanese settlement policy of Manchuria in the 1930s and the Portuguese settlement of Goa, Mozambique, and Angola.

What were the consequences? Did colonization solidify political control by the state over its territories? In some instances, the answer is clearly yes. By sheer numbers, political control, and military action, the United States settled the territories to the west, leaving the Native American and Mexican populations in subordinate economic, social, and political conditions, too weak to engage in little more than futile protests and sporadic armed struggles. In other instances, the breakup of the colonizing state and the loss of the territory left the settlers in a precarious situation—no matter whether a result of defeat by outside powers in the case of Japan, the disintegration of the state from within in the case of the Soviet Union, or a "liberation" struggle by the occupied peoples in the case of Algeria. Japan removed its settlers from Manchuria following its defeat; the *pieds noirs* fled Algeria to resettle in France; however, the bulk of the Russian-speakers (an estimated 25 million) remained in the "near

abroad," those states previously part of the Soviet empire. The primary political and social effects of many of these colonization policies were upon the countries of origin, or in the case of the Russians, upon the settlers themselves and their relationship with the host governments.

In other instances the native populations of the settled areas fled, particularly when the settlement process generated armed conflict with the local population. Again, examples abound: conflicts and refugee flights among the Bengali-speaking Muslims in Burma, the Buddhists in Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts, and Tibetans in southwest China. The imposition of settlers upon a native population often resulted in conflicts with neighboring countries as refugees fled across international borders.[3]

There are also numerous cases of conflicts between settlers and the native population, or between a native population and a government perceived as an occupier, when both natives and settlers choose to remain *in situ*. Contemporary cases include the Palestinians in relation to the government of Israel and the Jewish settlers; Uighurs in relation to the government of China and to the Han settlers; Moros in relation to the government of Philippines and the Christian settlers; various ethnic groups in Sumatra, East Timor, and Irian Jaya in relation to the settlers and to the government of Indonesia; Albanians of Kosovo in relation to the Serbs and to the Serb government; Kurds in Western Anatolia in relation to Turk settlers and to the government of Turkey. One should also include Russians living in Estonia, Kazakhstan, and several other former republics, where the government of Russia has been pressing for dual citizenship for the Russian-speaking population living in the "near abroad." In none of these cases has there been a mass exodus, although one should quickly add "thus far" to remind us of how politically and demographically fragile is each of these regions.

Settlement policies thus affect two communities—settlers and natives—and two governments: the host government, and the government and country to which either the settlers or the natives are forced or choose to move. Settlement policies enable a government to establish control over a territory, but the costs can be high: hostile relations between the settlers and the natives, and strained relations with one's neighbors if there are forced deportations. To maintain settler control over an area with a large indigenous population, a high element of coercion is required. Secessionist and irredentist movements must be crushed, protest

movements put down. There is little space available for political democratization that would enable the natives to take matters into their own hands and impose restrictions upon the settlers. If and when democratization does take place, then settlers are at risk—as they are in Baltic states, as they would be if China democratized Tibet and Xinjiang, and when a democratic Indonesian government gives free choice to East Timor and some of the other outer islands with large settler populations.

The movement of one people to the space occupied by another does not in itself necessarily provoke an antagonistic reaction. The central question is whether the local population feels that another population has been imposed upon it, that is, that the settler population represents a conquering power. Under these circumstances the settler population, while a demographic minority, is likely to refuse to be incorporated into the native culture and social order. In turn, the native population—even when the settler population is large—is likely to resist the "tipping" phenomenon, the point at which individuals in a community change their behavior by moving or by assimilating—because they believe that other members of their own community will change their behavior. Tipping is not likely to take place when one community looks upon another as its nemesis—a long-standing rival or enemy whose presence in the territory constitutes a threat to one's culture, social structure, and perhaps even to one's safety.

Under these circumstances the "will to difference," to use Charles Taylor's appropriate phrase (Taylor et al. 1994), is likely to be intense. The native population becomes bound together by its vision of the settlers as a people imposed upon them and of themselves as the victims of oppression, tied together by shared suffering, shared humiliation, and a shared "private" history that must now be hidden from the occupiers. The native population does not regard the settler population merely as migrants, but as occupiers, whose presence is made possible by the political power of a center—Paris, Beijing, Manila, Rangoon, Moscow, Jakarta, Jerusalem—and so their wrath, private or public, is directed not only at the settlers but at the political center. Under these circumstances natives demand autonomy, independence, self-determination, and other measures aimed at restoring their dignity, ending their humiliation, and "returning" to them, as it were, a sense of control over their land and over themselves.

The "will to difference," so characteristic of all nationalist sentiments, is particularly acute for those who regard themselves as a

suffering, humiliated people by virtue of the presence of an imposed settler population. Under these circumstances many of the processes that often obtain between locals and migrants—integration, intermarriage, assimilation, the blurring of differences, the mutual sharing of culture, political accommodation—are resisted and the will to difference is accentuated. The natives may learn the language of the settlers—Uighurs learn Chinese, Estonians learn Russian, Kosovars learn Serbo-Croatian, Chakmas learn Bengali, Rohingyas learn Burmese—but the settlers resist learning the language of the natives. The acquisition by the natives of the settler language does not involve the replacement of the mother tongue but is adopted as a means of dealing with the enemy and with authority.

Settlers, whose migration is motivated by official encouragement, thus differ from migrants in several critical ways. One is that settlers regard themselves as superior to the natives and do not wish to be incorporated into the native culture or to acquire its language. Another is that the natives develop an acute "will to difference." They may learn the language of the settlers, but use their native tongue with one another and not with the settlers. Language and history become interiorized. The native population propagate their language, their culture, their history upon immigrants, but not upon settlers. Settlers are not initially threatened by the local culture; their principal fear is that they will be deserted by the ruling authority that has enabled or encouraged them to come.

The removal of the ruling authority—the departure, for example, of France from Algeria, the Soviet Union from the non-Russian states, the Japanese from Manchuria, the Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique—invariably creates a crisis in the relationship between the native population (now the ruling authority) and the settlers, who have now become politically subordinate. Should the settlers exit? If they choose to stay, do they remain an enclave emphasizing their own "will to difference"? Should they learn the local language and attempt to accommodate themselves to a politically subordinate role? Should they adopt measures to encourage higher birth rates, thereby exercising a kind of "strategic demography"? How the settlers and the native population cope with the new political situation depends upon their numbers, their concentration and location, and their respective places in the occupational structure and in the economy.

Demographic Engineering and Security

To engineer, as a transitive verb, is to lay out, to construct, to manage: One engineers a bill through Congress; the state can also engineer the movement of people. The implication of the notion of demographic engineering, therefore, is that the movement of peoples is not the consequence of social and economic trends—such as differentials in wages or employment opportunities across regions. Nor does demographic engineering refer to all actions by the state that result in the large-scale movement of populations—for example, the failure of government to deal with a famine, or the neglect of the environment, or the construction of a large dam which will displace a segment of society. Demographic engineering implies that the movement itself is deliberately induced by the state; it is not the consequence of another policy or program. The political reasons for inducing movement and what policy instruments are utilized vary. The instruments are on a continuum, ranging from the use of military force to deport a population—round them up, terrorize and/or humiliate them, put them on trains or trucks—to the opening of agricultural lands, the provision of loans and subsidies to encourage outsiders to settle.

Why is demographic engineering of interest from a security perspective? Demographic engineering policies often generate hostility not only among peoples but toward the state itself. Deported populations are invariably resentful at having been uprooted from their territorial homeland and for generations may seek to be reunited with their native land. In this sense, of course, land is not simply property with market value, but a place to which one is emotionally attached. It is not simply land, but a *home*land.

Colonizers, in contrast, are not necessarily hostile to the state—indeed, they may be pleased that new opportunities for land or employment at high wages have been provided. It is the host population, the natives, who turn against the state for having brought in outsiders. The very presence of settlers is a constant reminder that the policies once adopted by the state were illegitimate and that perhaps the state itself remains illegitimate. The natives may thus turn against both the settlers and the state. Just as deported people may for generations long to return to their native land, so too a native population may for generations resent the presence of a people whom they regard as colonizers. At some point in time,

of course, a deported people may, as it were, give up, or a native population may either absorb or be absorbed by the colonizers, but the process is likely to be long and contentious.

Once again it is necessary to remind ourselves that these processes have significant international consequences. The native population may launch a secessionist movement, a civil war that invites international attention and external intervention. Settlers and natives may engage in a political struggle that leads to armed conflict. Natives or settlers may flee across international borders to seek asylum, thereby generating conflicts with a neighboring country and engaging the attention of international human rights and refugee organizations. Minorities, whether deported populations or native populations, invariably seek support from their co-ethnics elsewhere. The Great Game, the most effective weapon of the weak (Rubinstein 1983), is to internationalize domestic conflicts.

Notes

1. The particular use of the word "settlers" here should be distinguished from another usage in discussions of migration, which refers to that fraction of temporary international migrants who "settle out" and become permanent residents.
2. For a more detailed study, see Banister (2001: 287).
3. For a study of this area, see Tirtosudarmo (2001).

— *Six* —

Population Unmixing

The unmixing of peoples, or what is now pejoratively described as "ethnic cleansing," can be the result of a government policy, the outcome of an extended historical process, or a combination of the two. Cities, regions, entire countries have been demographically transformed as much by the exodus of populations as by in-migration. Places that were once demographically predominantly of one "people"—it is easy to slip into an essentialist language—can be transformed as their populations move elsewhere. This chapter describes some of the major instances of population unmixing, why they occurred, the circumstances under which the process is seen as threatening, and to whom.

The origins of the "ethnic cleansing" terminology, so closely associated with the 1990s wars in the former Yugoslavia, is itself clouded in ambiguity. Some attribute its first use to the contested region of Nogorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. Others point to Croatia: William Safire (1993) quotes a Serbian building supervisor living in Croatia in July 1991: "Many of us have been sacked because they want an ethnically clean Croatia." In the same month, Croatia's Supreme Council alleged that Serbian expulsions of Croats was aimed at "the ethnic cleansing of the critical areas ... to be annexed to Serbia." A *New York Times* correspondent in the former Yugoslavia observed in July 1992 that the "precondition" for the creation of a "Greater Serbia" "lies in the