Introduction
Dominant ethnicity: from background to foreground

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Today’s nations are experiencing an unprecedented degree of pressure from the forces of globalisation. In particular, the spread of human and collective rights discourse since the 1960s has mounted an increasing challenge to the model of ethno-national congruence. Nations, nearly all of which were formed on the basis of a dominant, ‘core’ ethnic group, are thus facing pressure to shift their self-definitions from ‘ethnic’ to ‘civic’ criteria. They are encouraged to look to their future rather than their past, to treasure their cultural diversity (past and present) rather than their homogeneity, to recognise the autonomy claims of minorities and to be open to foreign trade, foreign immigration, and foreign (‘multi’) cultural influences. In short, global narratives of liberal multiculturalism, embedded in both global and national institutions, are driving an ever-greater wedge between modern nations and their dominant ethnic groups.

Meanwhile, the aftermath of the Cold War and the attendant loss of ideological discipline have led to a fracturing of many fragile ex-communist and post-colonial regimes along ethnic lines. The new wave of democratisation in the former communist bloc and many parts of Africa and Asia has given a boost to ethnic party systems, accentuating the trend. Iraq and Afghanistan are exhibiting similar tendencies post-9/11, suggesting yet a further dynamic of dominant ethnicisation. Never before have dominant ethnic constituencies been appealed to so narrowly and directly. Add the aforementioned globalising pressures that are denuding the national covering from dominant ethnies, and we uncover a picture in which dominant ethnicity appears more exposed than ever.

Much has been written about ethnic minorities and their relationship to state structures and abstract ‘host societies’. There is also a voluminous literature on nations and nationalism. Burgeoning studies in the fields of citizenship and migration add to the debate. Yet there has been virtually no consideration of the living, breathing ethnic communities which gave birth to, but are by no means coterminous with, the nation–state. These dominant ethnies – no less than their minority counterparts – are engaged in a process of reviving, constructing and adapting their identities and political strategies to the evolving context of late modernity. Due to their indigenous legitimacy
and emotive power, such groups are arguably more central to explaining cultural and political developments than either subaltern minorities or professional state elites. We must therefore make every effort to improve our understanding of dominant ethnicity. How are ethnic majorities like the French of France, the Japanese of Japan, the Hindus of India and the Jews of Israel responding to the pressures of our global era? Are such groups in decline or are they successfully negotiating (or circumventing) the challenge of new global structures and values? These questions comprise one axis of our analysis.

The other concerns the place of politically dominant (or formerly dominant) minorities. As with ethnic majorities, evolving global norms pose a challenge to dominant minorities. In this instance, our post-colonial, post-communist era has generated renewed legitimacy for the idea of democratic self-determination. Notions of suzerainty and hegemonic control have been de-legitimated, and dominant minorities have been forced on the defensive. Rhodesians, Afrikaners, Baltic Russians and North Indian Muslims (see this volume) – all share a sense of loss, and face a crisis of ethnic legitimation. Even so, other dominant minorities, like the ethnic Fijians (see Chapter 12 by Premdas), Tutsis, Alawis or Gulf Arabs, appear as robust as ever. Once more, the focus of this work will be to probe the response of dominant ethnic communities to the new ‘stimuli’ in their environment, to examine whether such groups are in decline, or are successfully negotiating the latest wrinkle of global modernisation.

The development of the specialist literature in the field of ethnicity and nationalism studies has been astonishingly rapid in the past two decades. Indeed, many of the contributors to this volume are recognised as leading figures in this scholarly revolution. Since 1980, great strides have been made toward differentiating the concepts of state, nation, and ethnic group, and sketching the linkages between such phenomena.¹ States place the emphasis on the instruments of coercion, government and boundary demarcation within a territory. Ethnic groups refer to communities of (supposedly) shared ancestry, almost always accompanied by notions of an ancestral homeland and cultural boundary markers. Nations comprise an uneasy hybrid of elements from ethnies and the modern state: they are better integrated, more politically self-conscious and spatially demarcated than ethnies, but can employ a myth of political or ideological origins which is not specifically genealogical. In addition, nations do not always control their own political apparatus, nor must they maintain a monopoly of organised violence over their territory, hence the possibility of ‘stateless nations’.

The connections between these entities are equally subtle, and are the subject of intense controversy between those of constructivist and historicist bent. Broadly speaking, this epistemic debate does not provide a central focus for this volume, though it enters into the discussion of several of our authors.² According to ‘ethno-symbolist’ theorists, some ethnies were transformed into nations in the modern era, while others, often due to their
territorial dispersion, lack of political ambition or low level of self-consciousness (i.e. Balinese, Cajuns, Aragonese), did not emerge as nations. Moreover, of those ethnies that successfully achieved nationhood, many (such as Scots, Tibetans) have failed to achieve modern statehood. Dominant ethnicity refers to the phenomenon whereby a particular ethnic group exercises dominance within a nation. Notice that the dominant ethnie need not dominate the state in which ‘its’ nation resides. This is the case, as Danielle Juteau points out in her chapter, with the pures laines Québécois, who dominate the nation of Quebec but not the Canadian state. In fact, it is possible for a culturally dominant nation to be politically subordinate (for instance, Euzkadi and Catalonia under Franco’s Spain).

This of course flags up the variety of ways in which an ethnic group can be dominant: demographic, cultural, political, and economic. In pre-1960s Quebec, for instance, pures laines Québécois dominated culturally and politically but not economically. Today, many ethnic minorities (i.e. Chinese, Indians, Lebanese and Whites in developing countries) control the local economy but are politically weak, hence, argues Sino-Philippine Amy Chua, their vulnerability to genocide in a world of economic liberalisation and populist democratisation (Chua 2003). In many colonial settings, settler ethnies like the Rhodesians, Americo-Liberians and Afrikaners have enjoyed political, but not cultural dominance. In the medieval Baltic and Czech lands, German-speakers dominated the high culture, economy and polity, but the folk culture of the peasant masses remained as a springboard for the development of future Latvian, Czech and Estonian dominant ethnicity. Demography is also illusory since certain culturally dominant ethnies, like the Iraqi Shiites (see Chapter 3 by Wimmer), Surinamese Creoles or Melanesian Fijians (see Chapter 12 by Premdas), do not even comprise a plurality of the population.

The two sides of dominant ethnicity: indigenousness and power

This brings us to the two key ingredients of ethnic dominance: indigenousness and power. Richard Schermerhorn’s concept of an ‘elite minority’ (1970) and Anthony Smith’s articulation of the term ‘core ethnie’ (1986) are cardinal points of departure for this investigation. The tradition that follows from Schermerhorn stresses the political side of the equation, concentrating on the raw political power of ethnic groups (minority or majority) and their ranking within ethnic power systems. Donald Horowitz’s (1985) work is in this tradition, and Ashley Doane’s important sociology of ‘dominant-group ethnicity’ (1993, 1997) maintains the focus on politico-economic hegemony as the metre of dominant ethnicity.

Yet what remained to be crafted in the 1980s was a conceptual framework for cultural dominance which related ethnie to nation. In fact, it was not until 1986 that the term ‘core ethnie’ was first used by Anthony Smith, who had refined the concept sufficiently to be able to provide a definition of
‘dominant ethnie’ within the pages of his *National Identity* (Smith 1986: 138; 1991). In this work, Smith emphasised that nations are built around ‘ethnic cores’ or ‘dominant ethnies’ which furnish the nation with its legitimating myths, symbols and conceptions of territory. ‘Though most latter-day nations are, in fact, polyethnic,’ notes Smith:

many have been formed in the first place around a dominant ethnie, which attracted other ethnies or ethnic fragments into the state to which it gave a name and cultural charter … since ethnies are by definition associated with a given territory … the presumed boundaries of the nation are largely determined by the myths and memories of the dominant ethnie, which include the foundation charter, the myth of the golden age and the associated territorial claims, or ethnic title-deeds.

(1991: 39, emphasis added)

Smith’s argument would suggest that the critical element in dominant ethnicity is indigenousness, the idea that this is ‘our’ nation, and that ‘we’ deserve to be in control of its government and territory. In many ways, such an argument is especially potent in the modern, post-imperial age, when ‘foreign’ rule is deemed illegitimate. As Theodore Wright notes in Chapter 2, this is an owl of Minerva that has flown at dusk for numerous aristocratic ethnies (i.e. the Anglo-Irish, Zanzibari Arabs, Indian Mohajirs). Few nationalist conflicts are not in some way related to a struggle over whose territorial claim has priority, and the international legitimacy of self-determination claims is partly grounded in questions of indigenousness. Even where two groups can trace their history back for many centuries or even millennia (for instance, Tamils and Singhalese, Jews and Palestinians, Serbs and Albanians), questions pertaining to indigenousness are central, and express themselves in archaeological, linguistic and historical controversies. Similarly, one of the engines behind anti-immigrant politics and attempts at cultural purification (especially vis-à-vis language) is a sense that foreign cultural borrowings are not really ‘authentic’ or indigenous, hence their illegitimacy in the eyes of Romantic ethno-nationalists in the Herderian mode.

Given the increasing relevance of indigeneity-driven dominant ethnicity in the post-colonial and post-Berlin Wall epoch, it is surprising that little has been written on dominant ethnicity. Instead, the focus has been on the larger but fuzzier targets of nationalism and citizenship. Certainly no major conceptualisation of dominant ethnicity has taken place beyond an encyclopaedic definition and one journal article. This book is therefore the first of its kind, and represents a new step in the maturation of ethnicity and nationalism studies, away from both the Anglo-centric equation of ‘ethnic’ with ‘minority’ and toward a more precise elucidation of the concept of dominant ethnicity within its conceptual atmosphere of ethnicity, nationalism and statehood.
Part I of the book, ‘Conceptualising dominant ethnicity’ makes this aim explicit. In Chapter 1 Anthony Smith expands upon his ground-breaking concept of the dominant ethnie and places it in historical, geographical and theoretical context. Theodore Wright examines the fate of formerly dominant ethnies in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 3 Andreas Wimmer places dominant ethnicity within his theory of ethnic closure – as an intrinsic component of the modernisation process. I attempt to provide a synthesis of relevant literature while proposing a number of avenues for future theoretical debate. Though the first four chapters are explicitly conceptual, they are far from labouring alone in this task. All of our contributors engage with the concept of dominant ethnicity, and in many cases authors suggest new ways in which dominant ethnicity may be theorised. Here, for the first time, hermeneutic light is being directed toward dominant ethnic groups, which are interrogated not as abstract states, nations or host ‘societies’, but as ethnic communities like any other.

This volume is deliberately catholic in its geographic reach and disciplinary focus. Furthermore, our essayists disagree on many normative points, and most would certainly take issue with many observations made in this Introduction! Interdisciplinarity is especially evident: contributors span the humanities and social sciences. Consequently, we see discussion of dominant ethnicity as it relates to discourses in anthropology, sociology, politics, geography, international relations and history. We are thus interested in such cultural questions as the narration of dominant ethnic myths, symbols and histories, the operation of ethnic boundaries (i.e. endogamy, residential segregation, immigration restriction, assimilation), the interplay between traditional and modern concepts of identity and space, the intersections between dominant ethnicity and other identities like region or class, and the way in which dominant ethnicity is nested and mobilised in the private and public spheres.

Politically, our contributors are interested in the mechanisms by which dominant ethnies control their state or provincial governments. Is violence used, or is hegemony effected through majority ethnic party mobilisation and/or control of key posts in the legislature, executive and judiciary? Why have some dominant ethnies yielded power to subaltern groups while others appear to have strengthened their hand in recent decades? The precarious nature of dominant ethnic unity is also an important theme: Mancur Olson (1982), famously writing from a rational choice perspective, suggested that large groups tend to fragment and are less effective than smaller political actors. Yet certain dominant ethnies seem to be successful in their ecumenical strategy of mobilising their members across lines of region, class, and even language or religion.

There is also the international environment to consider: global or supranational institutions can exert diplomatic and economic pressure (i.e. in Fiji or South Africa), while foreign governments can sustain short- or long-distance influence over the dynamics of dominance (i.e. the USA in Liberia,
Syria in Lebanon). International norms, whether of self-determination, state sovereignty or individual rights, similarly intrude into our picture. The influence of norms of self-determination, for instance, has helped to hasten the collapse of empire in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, along with the European and Turkish ethnic elites who ran them. However, the application of international norms may be uneven, thus while European colonial elites are no longer in power in many developing countries, dominance by one ethnic group (or a coalition of groups, as in Jordan) appears to be a de facto norm that basks within the protective shell of state sovereignty.

**Dominant ethnicity, ethno-nationalism and national identity**

A number of themes run through this volume. The first involves the distinctiveness of dominant ethnicity as a concept. Dominant ethnicity is not ethno-nationalism, though there is overlap between these two concepts. First of all, dominant ethnies pre-date our modern age of nations. Second, many states are characterised by inter-ethnic conflict over power, wealth and symbolic recognition in which nationalism plays little part. Turning first to the former phenomenon, many empires were controlled, at least in part, by an aristocratic ethnie. Theodore Wright, in his fascinating chapter, mentions the role of the Mohajirs in the Mughal Empire, but we could devise an extensive list that includes such ethnies as the Austro-Germans and Magyars in the Habsburg Dual Monarchy and Anatolian Turks in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, tribal confederation or a position on a religious or imperial frontier often crystallised the ethnic identities of groups as diverse as the Armenians, Zulus, Swiss-Germans, Poles and Vietnamese – groups which occasionally held sway in their particular region (Armstrong 1982; Smith 1986).

Cycles of integration and disintegration characterise many empires and the occasional combination of ethnic unity and imperial disunity meant that many pre-modern ethnies enjoyed periods – however fleeting – of ethnic dominance within their homeland. It is therefore the case that many, if not most ethnies have been dominant somewhere at some time in their history. Indeed, this near-universal experience typically becomes grist for the ethno-nationalist revival mill, a template for ethnic elites in search of a ‘golden age’ of unity and strength (Smith 1997). In the more recent epoch, dominance is sometimes achieved by minority groups as formerly centralised nation–states devolve power to regions or federal units. Danielle Juteau’s discussion of pures laines Québécois’ dominant ethnicity in the province of Quebec in Chapter 5 provides a case in point. The Welsh, Flemish, Catalans and others furnish similar examples, though dominance in these cases is rarely complete.

This brings us to a second important difference between dominant ethnicity and ethno-nationalism. Even if ethno-nationalism (i.e. separatism) is not evident, ethnic competitors usually jockey for the prize of dominance,
both in their regional homeland and in a state’s economic, political and symbolic arenas. This was especially pronounced in the run-up to decolonisation but is nearly everywhere a pervading theme. In Donald Horowitz’s words, ‘Evidence that control of the state is a central ethnic conflict objective is abundant.’ In the immediate decolonisation period, for instance, Maronites demanded a Lebanese state with a Christian character and control over Lebanon Mountain, the Hausa-Fulani jealously guarded their claims over northern Nigeria, Sinhalese and Tamils struggled for dominance in Sri Lanka, and North African states like Chad, Mauritania and Sudan were riven by rivalries between Arab and African ethnies for control (Horowitz 1985: 187–9). In some cases, a dominant ethnie like the Kikuyu in Kenya or Tutsi in Rwanda emerged, in others, as Wright points out in this volume, formerly dominant ethnies lost power, while in still other cases, ethnic systems remained unranked and contested.

Horowitz’s path-breaking work on ethnic dominance considered struggles over demographic increase (manifested in ‘winning’ the census and restricting migration into homeland regions), and also detailed the way in which groups clamour over economic resources, government posts and symbolic status. Struggles over symbolic status, though often concerned with official language or religion, also tend to involve conflicts over indigenousness. For instance, in highly multi-ethnic settings such as Trinidad, Mauritius, Suriname or Belize, the question of which group became ‘dominant’ was very much a matter of chance, since a diverse array of groups arrived within a relatively short space of time. However, the relative timing of migrations (which saw African slaves arrive first, followed by Asian indentured labourers), the tendency of colonial elites to favour Creoles in the colonial power structure as well as the stronger propensity for African descendants to adopt European culture, has given African-Creole groups the edge. Neither the more ‘indigenous’ Amerindians, the more numerous Asian Indians nor the more politically and economically dominant Europeans possessed the requisite degree of indigenousness and power to prevail. As a result, creolised Dutch or English has emerged as an assimilative lingua franca and the national identity, shaped in the image of the Creole dominant ethnie, has achieved significant assimilative success among subaltern groups (Eriksen 1993; St. Hilaire 2001).

Other analysts have probed the twin-track strategies of dominant ethnic groups who simultaneously narrate both their own ethnicity and the broader national identity in fragmented societies. Such groups often take the lead in suppressing separatist claims in the name of ‘national unity’. In Ghana, for example, David Brown remarks that the nation’s leaders, who hail from the Akan dominant ethnie, tend to stress an ecumenical national unity. Yet the appeal to a sense of dominant Akan ethnicity has accompanied this quest. Whereas such an appeal first manifested itself in the demonisation of the Ewe minority, subsequent leaders like Jerry Rawlings managed to soften this rhetoric. Even so, frequent appearances in Akan costume helped to assuage
the dominant ethnie (Brown 2000: 110–25). Likewise, in cases as diverse as Indonesia (presidents in Islamic dress), Singapore (‘speak Mandarin’ campaign), the USA (nearly all presidents have been WASP) and China, a recognition of ‘diversity’ does not preclude the leadership’s overtures to the dominant ethnie.

**Expansive and restrictive strategies**

Just as dominant ethnicity may be expressed in either political or cultural terms, it can take on either expansive or restrictive form. Expansive dominant ethnic strategies seek to project dominance outward to new lands, and in so doing may be content to let dominant ethnic particularity lapse in favour of a broader national or imperial construct. Restrictive strategies focus on purifying the dominant ethnic core of external influences and often involve instruments like immigration restriction, deportation, endogamy and cultural refinement. Restrictive dominant ethnies will not, in contrast to their expansive cousins, trade their ‘soul’ for power, and are in principle prepared to accept the secession or federation of minority ethnies. Many situations involve both strategies: the winners of the First World War (i.e. those that chose the correct side, like Romania) were only too pleased to enlarge their territories and deal later with their new-found heterogeneity through the high-pressure assimilation tactics of the ‘nationalising state’. In response, irradiist ‘homeland nationalisms’ among losing nations like inter-war Hungary or Germany attempted to enlarge the ethnic homeland by annexing adjacent territory inhabited by co-ethnics in other states (Brubaker 1996; Zimmer 2003: Chapter 4). Serbian ambitions to carve out a Greater Serbia through ethnic cleansing or Indonesia’s policy of sending Javanese settlers to East Timor or West Irian suggest that other groups wish to have their cake and eat it too.

Usually, such strategies fail, thus the frequent decision to opt for power over culture in expansive fashion. If dominant ethnicity remains expansive, the preferred method for maintaining its boundaries is through assimilation rather than exclusion (Barth 1969). In such cases, dominant ethnicity remains ‘hidden’ and a broader nationalist or imperial appeal takes place, though this can ultimately lead to a decline of dominant ethnic consciousness or its disappearance altogether. The British, Ottoman, Habsburg and, as Geoffrey Hosking details in Chapter 8, Tsarist/Soviet empires often submerged the identity of the dominant ethnie in their quest for power and territory. Ethnic decline is especially likely in the case of empires which engaged in large-scale cultural borrowing or slave labour importation (i.e. the Assyrians, the Romans, the Normans) (Smith 1986). It is perhaps indicative that many of the cases which experienced a decline of dominant ethnicity (i.e. the USA, Canada and arguably Britain) were or are expansive in nature.

With the collapse of empire, rump states like Hungary, Britain or Turkey were faced with crises of identity. They could either return to imperial scale
a ‘greater’ strategy that involves more power/territory but less ethnic homogeneity) or turn inward toward a ‘little’ nationalism that stresses the dominant ethnie’s cultural particularity. Israel’s choice between a more homogeneous pre-1967 state or an expanded occupied territory (see Chapter 10 by Yiftachel and Ghanem) presents one form of this dilemma. The renewed focus on ‘little’ Englandism in Britain in the wake of de-colonisation and devolution suggests that a different route is possible (Bryant 2003). The American and Anglo-Canadian examples (see Chapter 2 by Wright and my Chapter 4 on this), in which ethnic homogeneity was ‘traded’ for the increased politico-economic power which immigrants brought to the country, might be viewed as a ‘third way’ forward.

Dominant ethnicity: why now?

Numerous restrictive–expansive dilemmas are now being created for dominant ethnies by today’s separatist movements and immigration inflows which open up space between ethnie and nation. Given the post-colonial, post-Berlin Wall collapse of empire, and the surge in international migration associated with globalising technologies, it is not surprising that so many dominant ethnies find themselves under pressure to choose between restrictive ‘ethnic’ and expansive ‘national’ strategies. We can add to this a dominant ethnic ‘legitimation crisis’ brought on by the new post-1960s’ Western discourse of cultural liberalism and multiculturalism. This current of thinking, inflected by the New Left and carried by a post-industrial, post-materialist educated elite, has come to prominence in Western culture and its global institutions. The result, as Dominique Schnapper notes, is an attack on both restrictive and expansive boundary-maintenance techniques, especially in the West. Such a stance splits ethnie from nation, precluding both an expansive recourse to republican nationalism (see Schnapper’s Chapter 6) and a restrictive focus on protecting the dominant ethnic core.

Part II of this book ‘Dominant ethnicity in transition’, considers these challenges as they pertain to cases where empires have collapsed (i.e. Britain, Russia/USSR) or immigration has surged (i.e. WASPs in Canada and the United States, the French in France and pures laines Québécois in Quebec). Such groups are unused to thinking of themselves in ethnic terms, having long since viewed ‘their’ nation as an extension of themselves (Resnick 2001). Dominique Schnapper suggests that the French nation tried to transcend its ethnic base to embrace a wider community of citizens, while Danielle Juteau avers that such a transformation is an illusion, and republican nationalism merely provides a foil for dominant ethnicity – a shift from restrictive to expansive boundary-maintenance. Hence the difficulty of pures laines Québécois in retreating from the national podium to ethnic ‘lower ground’. Like Ted Wright, I point to the importance of liberal-egalitarianism in fomenting ethnic decline among WASPs in North America while Steve Bruce in Chapter 7 suggests that similar tendencies,
along with the fissiparous nature of the Protestant faith, were among the factors that led to a decline in the Protestant identity of the Scots, English and Welsh in Britain.

Part III, ‘Dominant ethnicity resurgent’, adjusts the focus to a new, and probably more widespread, set of cases. In Japan, as Keiko Yamanaka makes clear in Chapter 9, or in Israel (see Chapter 10, Yiftachel and Ghanem), the new norms of universal personhood have generally failed to unseat a well-entrenched ‘ethnocracy’. This does not mean there are no liberal constituencies: Yamanaka’s focus on local progressive actors in Hamamatsu, and the persistence of a robust ‘post-Zionist’ sector of opinion in Israel illustrate the tension between dominant ethnicity and the new multicultural liberalism (Hazony 2000; Yadgar 2002). In Chapter 12 Ralph Premdas’s fascinating work on Fiji highlights the important role played by liberal norms and their transmission through global/supranational institutions like the IMF and the British Commonwealth in checking some of the more flagrant Fijian ethnocratic tendencies.

Even so, only in the West can one truly describe dominant ethnicity as in retreat: it is both more visible (due to a questioning of the ethnie–nation link) and weaker (due to its legitimation crisis). On the other hand, the steady resurgence of the ethno-nationalist right in Western Europe, coupled with the wider anxieties over immigration which powered the Schengen agreement, suggest that the fault-line between dominant ethnicity and cosmopolitan liberalism runs through the Western world as well. Indeed, Andreas Wimmer, in considering the Swiss case, proffers that ethnic closure is a principle which, far from being opposed to modernisation, actually helps to constitute modernity itself.

A second major focus of attention in Part III rests on new trends that are largely to be found in the developing world. During the Cold War, many regimes in the developing and communist world were predicated on an ideological consensus which suppressed fissiparous ethnic tendencies. Nkrumah’s Ghana, Congress India and Tito’s Yugoslavia provide three examples. The post-Berlin Wall rise of separatist movements and the mobilisation of ethnic parties in the democratising regimes of Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa have exposed the dominant ethnic underpinnings of many Second and Third World states. Unlike the situation in the West, the ‘outing’ of the dominant ethnie has frequently strengthened it, and sharpened its focus on mobilisation, exclusion and hegemony. In Part I, Wimmer draws our attention to the steady tightening of Sunni domination in pre-2003 Iraq and Mestizo hegemony in Mexico. In this Part, by contrast, Ralph Premdas suggests, in Chapter 12, that dominant ethnicity in Fiji has more path-dependent, colonial roots and thus transcends more recent developments. Chetan Bhatt’s analysis of Hindu nationalism in India, Theodore Wright’s focus on the deprivation of the once-dominant Indian Muslims (see Part I) and Oren Yiftachel and As’ad Ghanem’s piece on Judaisation point to another source of dominant ethnicity: the Diaspora. Though long associated with minority
nationalisms (i.e. Irish, Greek), diasporan ethnic minorities such as overseas Hindus and Jews (not to mention Serbs or Croats) can play a leading role in the resurgence of dominant ethnicity (dominant ethno-nationalism in the Serbo-Croat cases). Communications technology, therefore, provides another medium by which modernity can enhance dominant ethnicity.

Given the geographical limits inherent in any comparative work on ethnicity and nationalism, we are unable to treat a wider array of cases. It would have been useful to include cases from Sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. Kikuyu in Kenya, Tutsi in Rwanda, Baganda in Uganda) or to consider more Arab Middle Eastern examples such as the Saudis, Gulf Arabs, Transjordanians or Syrian Alawi. South America and much of Eastern Europe are barely touched upon. To some extent, a wide range of groups are treated in the first four theoretical chapters. However, there is little question that more research is needed in this area. If this book can help to generate new insights and stimulate further scholarship, it will have been worth the effort.

Coda: normative questions

Though the focus of this work falls squarely within the ambit of ‘empirical’ theory and investigation, there are many normative questions raised by our contributors. Is dominant ethnicity always malign, or are there forms that may be important for human well-being? On a practical level, Brendan O’Leary contends that dominant ethnies lend stability to power-sharing systems (O’Leary 2001). More poignantly, Yael Tamir (1993: 11) has written that:

Liberals often align themselves with national demands raised by ‘under-dogs’, be they indigenous peoples, discriminated minorities, or occupied nations, whose plight can easily evoke sympathy. But if national claims rest on theoretically sound and morally justified grounds, one cannot restrict their application: They apply equally to all nations, regardless of their power, their wealth, their history of suffering, or even the injustices they have inflicted on others in the past.

Putting to one side Tamir’s use of the term ‘nation’, we might easily apply the argument to ethnic groups. However, as I have pointed out elsewhere, liberal culturalist political theorists like Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, David Miller and Joseph Raz tend to focus on the interplay between nation–states and minority ethnies while neatly sidestepping the difficult issue of dominant ethnicity (Kaufmann 2000a). After all, it is much easier to reconcile a ‘thin’ version of national identity with minority claims than to deal with competing ‘thick’ ones. Yet it is extremely difficult to see how the particularism and diversity associated with ethnic cultures can survive without some form of ‘deep’ cultural dominance over a particular territory.
On the other hand, it is by no means clear that ethnic groups need to control the levers of political and economic power. Here I agree with Danielle Juteau’s conception, in which dominant ethnic groups recognise themselves as ethnic groups like any other and take their place alongside, rather than on top of, fellow ethnies in the state. Perhaps we might conceive of a new global configuration, in which ‘national ethnic groups’, shorn of their dominant politico-economic position, agree to participate in trans-ethnic networks of national and supranational governance.

Notes

1 The explosion of academic journals in this area is one indicator. Nations and Nationalism, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, National Identities, Citizenship Studies, Ethnic & Racial Studies, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies and numerous others service this vital field of scholarly endeavour.


3 See Chetan Bhatt’s Chapter 11 in this volume for a constructivist challenge to the notion of dominant ethnicity.


5 On the role of archaeology, see Díaz-Andreu (2001). Linguistic controversies currently plague the former Yugoslavia, where Croatian, Bosnian Muslim and Serbian scholars have recently marked out their own separate versions of Serbo-Croat (see Conversi 1997). In the nineteenth century, ‘Anglo-Saxonist’ philologists and literature scholars in England and the United States tried to emphasise Anglo-Saxon as opposed to Latin or French-origin words, a practice common in many countries in the Romantic period (Niles and Frantzen 1997). German Romantic scholar Johann Gottfried von Herder, though an advocate of anti-imperial, polycentric pluralism, stressed that territorial-linguistic integrity was critical, and that authenticity inhered in linguistic rather than political boundaries. A more general discussion on the role of archaeologists, philologists, linguists, historians and other antiquarian scholars in helping to revive, embellish or invent ethnicity and nations appears in Smith (1991).

6 See Kaufmann (2000a) for definition, Doane (1997) for article. A number of important area studies touch on the concept obliquely, as with Allworth (1980) (Russia) and a more recent edited volume on Asian majorities by Gladney (1998). Authors like Brendan O’Leary and George Schopflin have made use of the term ‘Staatsvolk’ in their writing, and Ernest Gellner staged a conference on formerly dominant ethnic minorities at the Central European University in Budapest in 1995 (O’Leary 2001).

7 Dominant ethnicity, when it uses the nation as its vehicle for political ambitions and employs nationalist rhetoric, approximates to the term ‘dominant ethnic nationalism’. However, ethnic nationalism is usually used to characterise separatist movements like the Welsh or Flemish which are subordinate in political terms. All of which suggests that ethnic nationalism and dominant ethnicity are relatively distinct, and that it is a mistake to use the former term to describe the latter phenomenon.

8 If we accept the admittedly contentious view of mainstream (for instance, modernist and ethno-symbolist) nationalism scholars that nations are modern. This position is contested by many medievalist historians and some theorists like Adrian Hastings (Hastings 1997).
9 For more on post-materialist value change, see Inglehart (1990).
10 This term was first coined by Oren Yiftachel, and carries a similar meaning to dominant ethnicity.
11 Though liberalism and multiculturalism are frequently seen as opposing concepts by political theorists, they are united in their opposition to dominant ethnicity. Moreover, the more expansive concepts of liberal culturalism developed by Will Kymlicka dovetail nicely with a ‘soft’, cosmopolitan multiculturalism which eschews ethnic boundaries and celebrates hybridity and diversity (Kaufmann 2000b).

References


