This attitudinal configuration affects interethnic behavior. It has long been known that general attitudes of distrust are correlated with interethnic antipathy. What is more, suspicion is acted upon. In Sri Lanka, for example, a common Sinhalese view that Tamil grader were giving extra marks to Tamil papers helped produce a policy of ethnic weighting of grades, and I have heard a grader in Malaysia admit to ethnic favoritism, on the assumption that graders from other groups were doing the same: "everyone favors his own race." In an array of societies, it is believed that officeholders will use their authority for the exclusive or disproportionate benefit of their own ethnic groups. In the concise language of a Guyanese survey respondent: "Indian for Indian—black for black." If there is such suspicion, coupled with an absence of faith in the impartiality of public institutions and a belief that those institutions are nonetheless inordinately important in shaping the fortunes of ethnic groups, it becomes vital to capture them. Politics becomes urgent, and it is not easy to fashion institutions that can mediate group claims.

WINNING THE CENSUS

As an entitlement issue, the census is a splendid example of the blending of group anxiety with political domination. On the one hand, it is common to encounter anxiety-laden perceptions of the fecundity or illegal immigration of competing groups; these produce considerable overestimates of the population of outgroups. In this sense, the census is related to the fear of extinction discussed in Chapter 4. On the other hand, since numbers count in the quest for political domination, the hope of a group is to enlarge its relative share of the population. Numbers are an indicator of whose country it is. As ingroups fear higher rates of natural increase on the part of outgroups, they simultaneously aim for a gens


136. See G. D. Khosla, A Taste of India (Bombay: Jaico, 1970), 144–49.

The census shows nicely the capacity of ethnicity to stand ordinary processes on their head. In a severely divided society, we have seen that an election can become an ethnic head count. Now it is clear that a census needs to be "won." So the election is a census, and the census is an election.

THEASYMMETRY OF GROUP CLAIMS

Group claims are not necessarily equal. Some groups seek domination, not the mere avoidance of it. Some seek to exclude others from the polity altogether, and some seek merely to be included on equal terms. If all groups merely wanted inclusion, distrust and anxiety would still make ethnic conflict serious, but more tractable than it is. What makes it intractable is that claims to political inclusion and exclusion have an area of mutual incompatibility.

Consider the Pushtuns (Pathans) of Afghanistan: "As a vigorous and aggressive people, they have felt that they are destined to rule and have never for a moment doubted the rightness of their occupancy of the pinnacles of power. They have not wanted to share power with other groups or to accommodate their soaring ambitions." For inclusion, parity of power would be sufficient. To achieve the exclusion of others, however, confining them to parity is inadequate.

Ethnic conflict is often in the zero-sum category, but not always. Claims may not be perfectly incompatible. The claim to exclude need not be absolute; it may only be a claim to priority. Political claims can therefore be scaled, from equality to priority to exclusivity. Still, even priority can be gained only at the expense of political equality.

The asymmetry of the claims means that they are also relative. What is sought is not necessarily some absolute value but a value determined by the extent to which it reduces another group's share. Demands are often cast in relative terms, and conflict-reducing proposals that involve expanding the pool of goods available to all groups typically lack appeal. 44 Not "how many?" but "what fraction?"—that is the key ques-

44 See, e.g., Far Eastern Economic Review, July 11, 1980, p. 11, reporting a Malay leader's demand for controls on the economic progress of non-Malays. Proposals to expand the number of Malay university students simply by increasing the number of places were also opposed by Malay back-benchers on the ground that relative, not absolute, numbers counted. Interview, Kuala Lumpur, Feb. 29, 1968.

47 Mosca, The Rising Class, 39.
ing" South Indian laborers in their midst. The same advice is given to businessmen by a Maharashtrian party magazine. According to the title of an article, "Losing a Customer Is a Specialty of Marathi Shopkeeper." Maharashtrians, concludes Mary K. Bantremen, "are being urged to acquire the manners exhibited by the "maharati" when their leaders oppose."

The message of all of these articles is that the qualities that formerly served to distinguish a group from the undesirable ways of ethnic strangers are now seen to be undesirable. There is no longer a consensus in the argument that, while ethnic strangers are not more behavior is irreparable. Now they achieve more precisely because their behavior is more worthy. Inapplicably, one's own elites say so.

All ambivalence has gone out of group evaluation. The sentimentiality of the former colonizers rules for the "dignity, politeness, and nobility" of the backward groups finds no echo in the views of leaders of these groups. Politeness, it is said, is not conducive to achievements; aggressiveness is better. That elites should feel this way—and that it should cause stress—are both understandable. There is some evidence that people with more foreign contact are more critical of their group's aspirational qualities. Such broader horizons would certainly characterize ethnic elites—and there is also evidence that less advanced groups tend to be somewhat more prejudiced toward outgroups. The two together add up to conflicting pulls on members of backward groups. Ingroup attributes are denigrated, and the models advanced for emulation are the very outgroups that are especially disliked.

The whole message is made more difficult by the fact that backward groups usually claim, and often receive, preferences of one kind or another. Compensatory measures are demanded to offset the presumed superior ability of advanced groups to compete. Backward groups demanding them are convinced of their inability to compete on equal terms. Our aims, notes a Tagalog in support of preferences, "are not as much as theirs. So how can we ever catch up?" On this basis, Lulas and Sighthole have received preferences in university admissions.


94. Rapoport and Abraham, "National Seeminess and Foreign Contact," 72, 74.

95. Bulatao, "Ethnic Attitudes in the Philippine Census, 146, 140, 144, 146.


Malays have been beneficiaries of a variety of preferential programs, and Maharashtrians and Telanganas have been accorded preferences in employment. "It," explains a Maharashtrian government leader, "you have two plants, one with handy roots and broad leaves, and the other with only weak roots and small leaves, they do not seek the water, the soil nutrients, or absorb the sun's energy with the same efficiency. The weak plant needs more attention so that it can catch up and one day produce beautiful fruit." Preferences, says a proponent, are "medicinal"—it "cannot be withheld if a patient continues to be sick." The law is indeed catching up, for now it is taken as given that collective inequality is an important good and also that the presence of achievement motivation is good for national approval, its essence gone for depreciation. There is concern between these two—collective equality and achievement motivation—and both have been pursued. "The Government's policy," said a Northern Nigerian official, "is to support both, but at the same time to protect the weak." But it does not end there. Critics recognize that preferential policies are a deviation from norms of equal treatment, typically rationalized as a temporary expedient. Consequently, groups that receive preferential treatment are under constant pressure from leaders to justify their benefits by performance. Performance is felt to erode rejection of the very traits that come with one's ethnic identity and adoption of those posited by people who, at bottom, are believed unworthy of emulation. Early socialization sends one message to group members; political elites send another, quite different message.

THE FEAR OF EXTINCTION

There is a race-against-time element in the felt necessity to catch up. A backward group needs to catch up fast, because, as just noted, preferences cannot be justified forever, and the group must also catch up "before it is too late." The future looks uncertain. In fact, backward groups have frequently exhibited severe anxiety about threats emanating from other groups. One form this anxiety takes is apprehension about being dominated and being turned into "beavers of wood and drawers of water." Complementarily, leaders are depicted as being excessively gener-
Bihar, India: If tribal do not have their land, "then they will become extinct like the American Indians."

Burma: Many Karen believe that a Burmese-dominated nation... will mean their gradual extinction as a community or at least permanent neglect and inferiority to the Burmese.

Philippines: "The feeling of urgency and fear of eventual extinction [on the part of Philippine Muslims] should be understood by those in power..."

Cambodia: Khmer fear they may lose their identity as a people, "like the Cham," a people of the ancient Champe Kingdom absorbed centuries ago by the Vietnamese.

Assam, India: "The Assamese think that their individuality is in danger of being wiped out by foreign and non-Assamese elements..."

Sri Lanka: "Lacking a strong culture, the people... are considered vulnerable. For there are not certain societies where traditional cultures were abandoned because of extinction within our living memory. Some of the South Sea Islands have become depopulated..."

Von M. D. Velikov notes a comparable fear of "dying off" among Turkish Greeks—"within fifty years no Turk will be left on the island"—and connects it to a low group "self-concept" among groups in the West that have used the same language of extinction as the Baratke and the French Canadien.

To a considerable extent, such apprehensions reflect demographic insecurity. The Philippines, Muslims and the Assamese have experienced extremely high rates of in-migration of ethnic strangers in recent decades, and the Assamese are in close proximity to East and West Bengal, with between them, a Bengali population amount times the Assamese population. The Filipinos are outnumbered by the Indians in their midst. The Sikhs, a bone majority in the Punjab, are surrounded by a sea of Hindus outside the Punjab. The Sinhalese, a large minority in relation to the Tamils in Sri Lanka, are a minority in relation to the Tamilans in India. Comparative observations have been made about the Fijians and the..."
GROUP ANXIETY AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

To an outsider observers, the fear of being subordinated to the superior numbers or capacities of another group and disappearing must be regarded as extreme and irrational. Still, these apprehensions persist, coloring group relations in many ways. How do we explain them?

First of all, the fear of subordination needs to be marked as a characteristic feature of life in unrated ethnic systems. These resemble two or more societies in one environment, and for this reason they give rise to inevitable uncertainty and discomfort that I shall treat more carefully later.

Second, the fear of extinction and swamping in particular can be identified societally as an anxiety of inclusion. Anxiety reactions are characterized by a "disproportion between the external stimulus and the response," and in extreme cases that disproportion is also extreme. Whatever fear flows from a recognizable danger and gives rise to a proportionate response, anxiety flows from a diffuse danger of exaggerated dimensions; it limits and modifies perceptions, producing extreme reactions to modest threats. It has often been remarked that ethnic politics in severely divided societies is characterized by extreme demands. To understand the context of group anxiety from which such extreme demands emanate is to make the politics of such societies far more comprehensible.

Third, there are relationships among self-esteem, anxiety, and prejudice. Prejudice allows a discharge of hostility, thereby reducing anxiety. A correlation has also been found between lack of individual self-esteem and degree of hostility toward ingroups, and the same relationship should hold for group self-esteem. Aggression, says Volk, of the Cyprus case, can be seen as an effort to assert a group’s existence by means by which it gains a sense of worth. The exaggeration of threats, prejudice

Group Composition and Sources of Conflict

apparently had little material stake. In particular, Inukshuk communities were concerned that they might lose their ethnic identity, despite very few indications that this might actually occur.

It seems clear now that the Inukshuk, like the Shoshone, for Bannock, the Mayan, the Inuit, the Tlingit, the Assiniboine, and a great many other groups, were troubled by various group comparisons with the "dynamic" Inukshuk in their midst. This development of manual work, inclined to consumption expenditure, and stereotypic as lazy, the Inukshuk are an acknowledged the Inukshuk propensity to hard work but concluded themselves with a view of the Inukshuk as unsuited and drab. The Inukshuk were given to anxiety-laden perceptions—for that is precisely what their exaggeration and for which they consider: they are textbook symptoms—and they were also inclined to conflict behavior based on their anxiety. Understandably, their view of the situation did not appear toloyd to be realistic, and that is why it searched for an explanation in the realm of leadership manipulation and deception. A more fruitful explanation, however, lies in the distinguishing role of group members to which the Inukshuk and comparable groups were subject, evaluations that led them to want to do something to restore their self-esteem. The participation of members in the conflict, hard to explain on the basis of narrow group "interests," is easy to explain on the basis of vivid comparison. Since the individual "sense of identity is the feeling of being a worthy person because he fits into a coherent and valued order of things," ego identity depends heavily on affections. A threat to the value of these affections produces anxiety and defense. For this reason, people often express hostility toward those who suggest uncertainty about the correctness of their own behavior and that of the groups to which they belong, and they often do so as a proportion to the character of the threat that presently confronts them.

A Positional Group Psychology

The sources of ethnic conflict are not to be found solely in the psychology of group juxtapositions, but they cannot be understood without a psychology, an explanation that takes account of the emotional contamina-

114. Bemheim and JACOBS, Social Change and Morality, 139.
115. As Jocelyn says, society also has got social at work. "Fear, Guilt, and Harm," in Bates, Society and Personality, 304-306.
117. See the article by Harry A. Marcia, Jr., "Terror and Emotion at the Multiple Emotions or Other Emotions," Journal of Social Psychology (Aug. 1933): 116-25, at emotion. See also Ekstein, Psychological and Social Science, 164.
118. See Chapter 3, pages 175-76, above.
there is more time to work on policies concerning secession and, because of their reluctance to secede, more latitude regarding the actual substance of policies that might prove sufficient to avert secession. There is also, however, more time for both sides to prepare for the battle when it comes; to cement foreign alliances;/1 to ensure that the organization of the secessionist movement and the uprising region for war. This extra time, preparation, and organization are likely to ensure that the resolution of the fighting, when it eventually occurs, will be clear-cut.

WHEN PATHS CROSS: RECURRENCE THEMES IN SECESSION

There are times in the development of knowledge when classification is more important than the identification of common elements. Secession, a phenomenon that has been discussed in usually homogeneous terms in a case in point, I have been at pains, therefore, to emphasize the existence of different paths to secession. Nevertheless, there are also elements common to all the paths, elements submerged in taxonomy.

Many such conditions could be singled out as contributing to the emergence of separatist sentiment regardless of the character of the separate group or region. For example, Crawford Young has rightly noted that three major factors were fought against military regimes inanasceivable to the political influence of the secessionist region.71 The development of a highly centralized, ethnically based party system may have the same effect of producing consciousness—especially if the majority groups that control the center are themselves divided by intraclass party competition. Such divisions, we shall see, frequently encourage intragroup ethnic potential secessionary. One can identify this pattern in Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Burundi, and Chad. When, too, the occurrence of violence, particularly in the form of ethnic conflict, seems to blur the growth of separatist inclinations, the form of ethnic conflict is often of military conflict is often of military conflict can serve as signs that alternatives to secession are unappealing or that negotiations would be futile. Such events catalyze secession.

There is another kind of common conditions that seem to have a more direct causal relation to the emergence of separatist inclinations in the free world. Two such conditions are especially powerful; the loss of group members through assimilation and the migration of ethnic strangers into the potentially separatist region.

The secession of the Kingdom of Asante, among others, was due, in large part, to the influx of group boundaries. Migrants from all of these groups to towns in the territory of neighboring ethnic groups often became, respectively, Arabized, Castellanized, or Assimbled. In the Indian Peninsula, too, Sikhs left their distinctive identity threatened by the prospect of absorption in the much larger Hindu community. In Sri Lanka, uncontrolled, among the Ceylon Tamils have recurrently been targets for conversion to Buddhism and to the Sinhalese language, to the alarm of the Tamil community. In each case, separation is linked to boundary maintenance.72

Even more prominent is the question of repatriation. Over and over again, ethnically differentiated societies provoke a separatist response. The influx of European, German, south German, and Catholic, and Muslim, and Buddhist Thais in southern Thailand are among many instances. How seriously in migration is a matter of the case. In the case of Minamar, for example, the Minamar state is not so much leaving their territory by specified deadlines; when a deadline was ignored, the Minamar state itself proceeded to kill high officials who came from other states.73

Government-sponsored colonization schemes that bring ethnic strangers into the region are uniformly regarded as plans to overwhelm the existing majority in the region by weight of numbers. In Sri Lanka, for example, the government's efforts to place Sinhalese settlers in the South in the Galle Oya Valley, a movement designed to integrate traditional Tamil and Sinhalese homelands, Sinhalese have been moving into the heavily Tamil Eastern Province, creating fears that Tamil majorities and pluralities will become minorities.74 Sinhalese motives are often attributed to governments that promote ethnically differentiated

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73. For an economic analysis, see the 1970, p. 36; ibid., 1971, p. 35; J. G. Banfield, Communities, June 23, 1972. This type of movement is accompanied by a neighboring Minamar, where Minamar is the number of people and Nepalese immigration grows. For an analysis, see I. M. I. K. Arumugam, "The Tamils of Sri Lanka," 1.
colonization schemes. The Kurds, for example, accused the Iraqi government of attempting to Arabize Kurdish areas in the 1970s by evicting Kurds and replacing them with Arab settlers. Whatever the motives, an end to such settlement is both a goal of separatism and a common negotiating demand of separatists. The Baisakhs and, again, a word frequently invoked. And since the relations of groups to regions are an integral part of separation, disputed territories are a common accompaniment of separatist movements: the Kurds claim the Kirkuk region, which the Arabs say is an Arab majority; the Basques demand the inclusion of Navarre province within their territory, though it is in the Basque province; Muslims have claimed sovereignty over some Christian-majority areas of the Southern Philippines and Muslims in Southern Thailand seek a state that will encompass a large part of the Thai-majority Songkhla province.

Some groups have had to worry simultaneously about out-migration and assimilation, on the one hand, and colonization and territory, on the other. Prominent among such groups have been the Basques, whose language is spoken by only a minority within the Basque country, whose concern, beginning in the nineteenth century, has been with the "invasion of maketos," the invasion of Spanish in-migrants, and who speak of the "process of Basque extinction." The Kurds of Iraq have also been concerned about both issues. They have demanded double restrictions: an end to Arab colonization and a prohibition on posting Kurdish civil servants outside of Kurdish areas. They wish to keep Kurdish elites at home—and keep them Kurdish—and to keep others out. In point of fact, these two issues are part of the same underlying ethnic drive to render group boundaries secure. This drive, relative group size is a major area of contest. Hence the central place accorded related issues of intermarriage, relative birth rates, and who will speak what language. Relative group size in the undivided state as a whole is threatened by

77. "Our province has been ravaged by Persia," in "Kurdistan: The Story of an Ancient Civilization," 495.