consciousness among these populations — until the era of nationalism succeeded in uniting the community on a new, political basis. Similarly, though religions like Buddhism and Christianity may be adapted to pre-existing ethnic communities that they in turn reinforce, as in Sri Lanka and Burma, they may, equally, help to erode ethnic differences, as happened to several barbarian peoples when they converted to Christianity and merged with neighboring peoples, as was the case with Angles, Saxons and Jutes in England.

In the next chapter I shall explore the particular features of ethnic identity that mark it off from other, including religious, identities. For the moment the similarities between religious and ethnic identity need to be stressed. Both stem from similar cultural criteria of classification. They frequently overlay and reinforce one another. And singly or together, they can mobilize and sustain strong communities.

THE ELEMENTS OF 'NATIONAL IDENTITY'

One kind of collective identity, so important and widespread today, is barely mentioned in Sophocles' 'Theban plays. Though they sometimes hinge on conflict between cities, they never raise the question of 'national' identity. Oedipus' identities are multiple, but being 'foreign' (i.e. non-Greek) is never one of them. Collective conflicts are, at most, wars between Greek city-states and their rulers. Did this not, in fact, mar the state of ancient Greece in the fifth century BC?

It was Friedrich Meinecke who in 1908 distinguished the Kultur-nation, the largely passive cultural community, from the Staatsnation, the active, self-determining political nation. We may dissent from his use of these terms, indeed from the terms themselves; but the distinction itself is valid and relevant. Politically, there was no 'nation' in ancient Greece, only a collection of city-states, each jealous of its sovereignty. Culturally, however, there existed an ancient Greek community, Hellen, that could be invoked, for example by Pericles, in the political realm — usually for Athenian purposes. In other words we can speak of a Greek cultural and ethnic community but not of an ancient Greek 'nation'.

This suggests that, whatever else it may be, what we mean by 'national' identity involves some sense of political community, however tenuous. A political community in turn implies at least some common institutions and a single code of rights and duties for all the members of the community. It also suggests a definite social space, a fairly well demarcated and bounded territory, with which the members identify and to which they feel they belong. This was very much what the philosophes had in mind when they defined a nation as a community of people obeying the same laws and institutions within a given territory.

This is, of course, a peculiarly Western conception of the nation. But then the Western experience has exerted a powerful, indeed the leading, influence on our conception of the unit we call the 'nation'. A new kind of policy — the national state — and a new kind of community — the territorial nation — first emerged in the West, in close conjunction with each other. They left their imprint on subsequent non-Western conceptions, even when the latter diverged from their norms.

It is worth spelling out this Western or 'civic' model of the nation in more detail. It is, in the first place, a predominantly spatial or territorial conception. According to this view, nations must possess compact, well-defined territories. People and territory must, as it were, belong to each other, in the way that the early Dutch, for example, saw themselves as formed by the high seas and as facing (literally) the earth they possessed and made their own. But the earth in question cannot be just anywhere; it is not my stretch of land. It is, and must be, the 'historic' land, the 'homeland', the 'cradle' of our people, even where, as with the Turks, it is not the land of ultimate origin. A 'historic land' is one where terrain and people have existed unaltered, and beneficial, influence over several generations. The homeland becomes a repository of historic memories and associations, the place where our sages, sainthood and bravos lived, worked, prayed and fought. All this makes the homeland unique. Its rivers, canals, lakes, mountains and cities become 'sacred' — places of veneration and exaltation whose inner meanings can be fathomed only by the initiated, that is, the self-aware members of the nation. The land's resources also become exclusive to the people; they are not for 'alien' use and exploitation. The
NATIONALS AND OTHER IDENTITIES

In demarcated homeland was felt to presuppose a measure of common values and traditions among the population, at any rate its "core" community. In other words, nations must have a measure of common culture and a clear ideology, a kind of common understanding and aspirations, institutions and ideas, that bind the population together in their homeland. The task of ensuring a common public mass culture has been handed over to the agencies of popular socialization, notably the public system of education and the mass media. In the Western model of national identity many were seen as culture communities, whose members united not on shared homogeneity, but common historical memories, myths, symbols, and traditions. Even where new, immigrant communities equipped with their own historic cultures have been admitted by the state, it has taken several generations before their descendants have been admitted (so far as they have been) into the circle of the "nation" and its Western culture through the national agencies of mass socialization.

In a multicultural society, the legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology, these are the components of the standard Western model of the nation. Given the influence of the West in the modern world, they have remained central features, albeit in somewhat altered forms, in most non-Western conceptions of national identity. At the same time, a rather different model of the nation springs up outside the West, notably in Eastern Europe and Asia. Historically, it challenged the dominance of the Western model and added significant new elements, more attuned to the very different circumstances and trajectories of non-Western communities.

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NATIONAL AND OTHER IDENTITIES

This ethnic model also has a number of facets. First, obviously, is the stress on descent — or rather, presumed descent — rather than territory. The nation is seen as a fictive ‘super-family’, and it boasts pedigrees and genealogies to back up its claims, often tracked down by native intellectuals, particularly in Eastern Europe and Middle Eastern countries. The point here is that, in this conception, the nation can trace its roots to an imputed common ancestry and that therefore its members are brothers and sisters, or at least kin, differentiated by family ties from outsiders.

This emphasis on presumed family ties helps to explain the strong popular or democratic element in the ethnic conception of the nation. Of course, the ‘people’ figure in the Western model too. But there they are seen as a political community subject to common laws and institutions. In the ethnic model the people, even where they are not actually mobilized for political action, nevertheless provide the object of nationalist aspirations and the focal point of their appeal. Leaders can justify their actions and unite disparate classes and groups only through an appeal to the ‘will of the people’, and this makes the ethnic concept more obviously ‘nation-class’ and ‘popul-лист’ in tone, even when the intelligentsia has little intention of summoning the masses into the political arena. Popular mobilization therefore plays an important moral and rhetorical role, if not an actual role in the ethnic conception.17

Similarly, the place of law in the Western civic model is taken by vernacular culture, usually languages and customs in the ethnic model. That is why lexicographers, philologists and folklorists have played a central role in the early nationalisms of Eastern Europe and Asia. Their linguistic and ethnographic research into the past and present culture of the ‘folk’ provided the materials for a blueprint of the ‘nation-co-hé’, even where specific linguistic revivals failed. By creating a widespread awareness of the myths, history and linguistic traditions of the community, they succeeded in substantiating and crystallizing the idea of an ethnic nation in the minds of most members, even when, as in Ireland and Norway, the ancient languages declined.18

Genealogy and presumed descent ties, popular mobilization, vernacular languages, customs and traditions, these are the elements of an alternative, ethnic conception of the nation, one that mirrored the very different route of ‘nation-formation’ travelled by many communities in Eastern Europe and Asia and one that constituted a dynamic political challenge. It is, as we shall see, a challenge that is presented to this day in many parts of the world, and it reflects the profound dualism at the heart of every nationalism. In fact every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized. Under the Jacobins, for example, French nationalism was essentially civic and territorial; it preached the unity of the republic and the fraternity of its citizens in a political-legal community. At the same time a linguistic nationalism emerged, reflecting pride in the purity and civilizing mission of a hegemonic French culture preached by Barère and the Abbé Grégoire. In the early nineteenth century French cultural nationalism began to reflect more ethnic conceptions of the nation, whether Frankish or Gallic; later these became validating charters for radically different ideals of France. The clerical-monarchist Right was particularly wedded to genealogical and vernacular conceptions of an ‘organic’ nation, which it opposed to the republican territorial and civic model, notably during the Dreyfus Affair.19

Nevertheless, even during the most severe conflicts mirroring opposed models of the nation certain fundamental assumptions tied the warring parties together through a common nationalist discourse. In the French example just cited both republicans and monarchists accepted the idea of France’s ‘natural’ and historic territory (including Alsace). Similarly, there was no real dispute about the need to insculpt national ideals and history through a mass, public education system, only about some of its contents (notably the Catholic dimension). Devotion to the French language was also universal. Similarly, nobody questioned the individuality of France and the French as such; differences arose only over the historical content of that uniqueness and hence the lessons to be drawn from that experience.

This suggests that behind the rival models of the nation stand certain common beliefs about what constitutes a nation as opposed to any other kind of collective, cultural identity. They include the idea that nations are territorially bounded units of population and
that they must have their own homelands; that their members share
a common mass culture and common historical myths and
memories; that members have reciprocal legal rights and duties
under a common legal system; and that nations possess a common
division of labour and system of production with mobility across
the territory for members. These are assumptions, and demands,
common to all nationalism and widely accepted even by its critics,
who may then go on to deplore the ensuing global divisions and
conflicts created by the existence of such nations.

The existence of these common assumptions allows us to list the
fundamental features of national identity as follows:

1. an historic territory, or homeland
2. common myths and historical memories
3. a common, mass public culture
4. common legal rights and duties for all members
5. a common economy with territorial mobility for
   members.

A nation can therefore be defined as a named human population
sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a
mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and
duties for all members.49

Such a provisional working definition reveals the complex and
abstract nature of national identity. The nation, in fact, draws on
elements of other kinds of collective identity, which accounts not
only for the way in which national identity can be combined with
these other types of identity – class, religious or ethnic – but also for
the chameleon-like permutations of nationalism, the ideology, with
other ideologies like liberalism, fascism and communism. A national
identity is fundamentally multi-dimensional; it can never be reduced to
a single element, even by particular factors of nationalities, nor
can it be easily or swiftly induced in a population by artificial
means.

Such a definition of national identity also sets it clearly apart
from any conception of the state. The latter refers exclusively to
public institutions, differentiated from, and autonomous of, other
social institutions and exercising a monopoly of coercion and extrac-
tion within a given territory. The nation, on the other hand, signifies
a cultural and political bond, uniting in a single political community

all who share an historic culture and homeland. This is not to deny
some overlap between the two concepts, given their common reference
to an historic territory and (in democratic states) their appeal to
the sovereignty of the people. But, while modern states must
legitimate themselves in national and popular terms at the states of
particular nations, their content and focus are quite different.51

This lack of congruence between the state and the nation is
camouflaged in the many 'plural' states today. Indeed, Walker
Connor's estimate in the early 1970s showed that only about 10 per
cent of states could claim to be true 'nation-states', in the sense that
the state's boundaries coincide with the nation's and that the total
population of the state share a single ethnic culture. While most
states aspire to become nation-states in this sense, they tend to limit
their claims to legitimacy to an aspiration for political unity and
popular sovereignty that, even in old-established Western states,
risks being challenged by ethnic communities within their borders.

These cases, and there are many of them, illustrate the profound
gulf between the concepts of the state and the nation, a gulf that the
historical material to be discussed shortly underlines.52

SOME FUNCTIONS AND PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL
IDENTITY

Let me recapitulate. National identity and the nation are complex
concepts composed of a number of interrelated components –
ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political. They sign-
ify bonds of solidarity among members of communities united by
shared memories, myths and traditions that may or may not find
expression in states of their own but are entirely different from the
purely legal and bureaucratic ties of the state. Conceptually, the
nation has come to blend two sets of dimensions, the one civic and
territorial, the other ethnic and genealogical, in varying proportions
in particular cases. It is this very multidimensionality that has made
national identity such a flexible and persistent force in modern life
and politics, and allowed it to combine effectively with other power-
ful ideologies and movements, without losing its character.

We can illustrate this multifaceted power of national identity by
looking at some of the functions it fulfills for groups and individuals.
National and other identities

In law with the deconvolution listed above, we can conveniently divide these functions into "external" and "internal" objective consequences. The external functions are territorial, economic and political. Nation, race, define a definite social space within which members must live and work, and characterize an historic territory that becomes a community in time and space. They also provide individuals with "shared centers," objects of spiritual and historical loyalties; that reveal the "inner" side of a nation's "moral geography." Economically, nations underwrite the space for control over tangible resources, including landpower. They also elaborate a single division of labor, and encourage mobility of goods and labor, as well as the allocation of resources between members within the household. By defining the membership, the boundaries and the resources, national identity provides the rationale for ideals of national unity. 

Politically, too, national identity assumes the state and its organs, as their pre-political equivalents in nations that lack their own states. The evolution of political personnel, the regulation of political conduct and the decision of governments are grounded in criteria of national interest, which is presumed to reflect the national well and national identity of the inclusive population. But perhaps the most salient political function of national identity is its legitimation of various legal rights and duties of legal obligations, which define the peculiar values and character of the nation and reflect the age-old customs and mores of the people. The appeal to national identity has become the main legitimization for political order and solidarity today.

National identities also fulfill more intimate, internal functions for individuals' consciousness. The most obvious is the socialization of the members in "national" and "citizen." Today this is achieved through compulsory, standardized, public mass education systems, through which state authorities hope to mediate national devotion and a distinctive, homogeneous culture, an activity that more rigorous pursue with considerable energy under the influence of nationalist ideals of cultural anthrology, and unity. 

The nation is also called upon to provide a social bond between individuals and classes by providing repertoires of shared values, symbols and traditions. By the use of symbols - flags, college...
its Western heartlands, has brought with it confusion, instability, strife and terror, particularly in areas of mixed ethnic and religious character. Nationalism, the doctrine that makes the nation the object of every political endeavour and national identity the measure of every human value, has since the French Revolution challenged the whole idea of a single humanity, of a world community and its moral unity. Instead nationalism offers a narrow, conflict-laden legitimation for political community, which inevitably pits culture-communities against each other and, given the sheer number and variety of cultural differences, can only drag humanity into a political Charybdis.\textsuperscript{27}

This is a familiar indictment, and its scope and intensity proclaim the emotional and political power of the ideal that it so utterly condemns. But an ideal and an identity that can fulfil so many functions, collective and individual, is bound to have the most varied social and political consequences, given the variety of circumstances in which nationalists must operate. We could, equally, catalogue the benign effects of nationalism: its defence of minority cultures; its rescue of 'lost' histories and literatures; its inspiration for cultural renaissances; its resolution of 'identity crisis'; its legitimation of community and social solidarity; its inspiration to resist tyranny; its ideal of popular sovereignty and collective mobilization; even the motivation of self-sustaining economic growth. Each of these effects could, with as much plausibility, be attributed to nationalist ideologies as the harmful consequences bound by critics. No more striking, or revealing, testimony could be offered to the ambiguous power of national identity and nationalism or to their profound relevance, for good or ill, to most people in most areas of the world today.

Why this should be so, and what the deeper roots of the power exerted today by national identities are, we must now explore.

CHAPTER 2

The Ethnic Basis of National Identity

The origins of what we have termed national identity are as complex as its nature. I am not saying simply that the origins of each nation are in many ways unique and that there is great variation in the starting-points, trajectories, rates and timings of modern nations. The very question 'what are the origins of national' needs to be broken down into several further questions, such as: who is the nation? Why and how is the nation? When and where is the nation?

In fact we can conveniently use these questions to seek a general explanation of the origins and development of modern nations in three parts:

1. Who is the nation? What are the ethnic bases and models of modern nations? Why did these particular nations emerge?

2. Why and how does the nation emerge? That is, what are the general causes and mechanisms that set in motion the processes of nation-formation from varying ethnic ties and memories?

3. When and where did the nation arise? What were the specific ideas, groups and locations that precipitated the formation of individual nations at particular times and places?

Through answers to these questions, albeit of a general and necessarily incomplete nature, we may hope to shed some light on the vexed problem of national origins and development.

ETHNIC AND ETHNO-GENESIS

If myths like that of Oedipus can be seen as widely believed tales told in dramatic form, referring to past events but serving present purposes and/or future goals, then the nation stands at the centre of one of the most popular and ubiquitous myths of modern times: that of nationalism. Central to this myth is the idea that nations exist from time immemorial, and that nationalism must reawaken
applies with far greater force to nationalist rites and ceremonies, for nationalism dispenses with any mediating referent, be it term or deity; its deity is the nation itself. The emotions it unleashes are those of the community directed to itself, self-consciously exclamating itself. The virtues it celebrates are exclusively and solely those of the "national self," and the crimes it condemns are those that threaten to disrupt that self. By means of the ceremonies, customs and symbols, every member of a community participates in the life, emotions and virtues of that community and, through them, re-dedicates him or herself to its destiny. By articulating and making tangible the ideology of nationalism and the concepts of the nation ceremonial and symbolism help to assure the continuity of an abstract community of history and destiny. What are the underlying sentiments and aspirations that nationalism embodies? How they relate to the main references: territory, history and community. This is chapter we now discuss, particularly in domestic and its elaboration in "vernacular mobilization," and its handling of the underlying cognitive maps of a world of nations and to inscribe expressive modalities for collective emulation. To these ends they employed two main strategies: the use of landscape or poetic spaces and the use of history or golden ages. In fact, these strategies were rooted in popular attitudes to space and time and to popular attachments to home and fathers. It was these ancient beliefs and commitments to ancestral homelands and to the generations of one's forefathers that nationalism made use of in elaborating the new ideology, language and symbolism of a complex abstraction, national identity. The new concept of the nation was to serve as a virtual space, a frame with pre-modern mass aspirations and sentiments for local and familial attachments; hereby lay vital part of the wide appeal of an otherwise abstract ideology and language. But perhaps the most fundamental sentiments evoked by nationalism were, paradoxically, those of family — paradoxically because real families can constitute an obstacle to the ideal of a homogeneous nation whereas nationalism embraces this ideal in that extreme form. Thus too was part of David's message in the Gethsemane多种族, mentioned earlier; the women on the right of the picture...
a general family to which such instances belong or which they exemplify, albeit mixed with other elements. It is difficult to avoid recourse to a general concept of the nation and nationalism—when we agree on the importance and uniqueness of each instance, a claim that nationalists, ideally, would gladly support.

Second, to deny the legitimacy of a concept of nationalism in general would prevent us from using general sociological questions about the nature of nations and the ubiquity of nationalism's appeal today and from making historical comparisons between different nationalist ideologies, symbols, and movements. In fact, the same historians who insist on the specificity of each case of nationalism provide such general questions and make these historical comparisons; and this surely is desirable if we are to gauge some understanding of so elusive and complex a phenomenon as nationalism.

Third, the 'contextualists' argument bypasses a fundamental task of the study of complex phenomena like nationalism: the provision of typologies of national ideologies and/or movements. Such typologies recognize the importance of broadly differing contexts without sacrificing the possibility of more general comparisons. Arguing that nationalism exhibits a diversity within unity, they go on to pinpoint the main kinds of ideology and movement in terms of historical period, geographical area, level of economic development, philosophical assumptions, class context, cultural milieu or political aspiration. This is the strategy that I propose to follow here.

This is not the place to consider the various typologies that scholars have proposed. I shall mention one or two, and then briefly mention my own typology as a prelude to an analysis of the cultural matrix and impact of nationalism in Europe. Other typologies are enumerated in other earlier works.48

Undoubtedly, the most influential typology is that of Hans Kolthoff. He distinguished a 'Western', rational and associational version of nationalism from an 'Eastern', organic and mystical version. In Britain, France and America, he argued, a rational conception of the nation emerged, one that viewed it as an association of human beings living in a common territory under the same government and laws. This ideology was briefly a product of the middle classes,

who came to power in those states at the end of the eighteenth century. In contrast, Eastern Europe (the area of the Rhine) had not developed a significant middle class; instead a few intellectuals led the resistance to Napoleon and the ensuing nationalisms. Because they were numerically insignificant and excluded from power, their versions of nationalism were inevitably shall and authoritarian. For the same reason they saw the nation as a seamless, organic unity with a mystical 'will' and 'mission' that only the versatile intellectuals could fulfill. Hence their often leading role in nationalist movements in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Asia.49

This typology can be criticized on a number of grounds. Geopolitical distinction overlooks the influence of both kinds of ideological nationalism in different European communities—the organic version in Ireland and later nineteenth-century France, the rational ideal in some versions of Czech, Hungarian and Zionist nationalism as well as in early West African nationalism.50

It is also not clear that Western nationalisms are the product of the bourgeoisie. As we have seen, they owe much to earlier monarchies and aristocratic culture and activities. Similarly, the competitiveness of the bourgeoisie to rational versions of nationalism is a dubious assumption. Witness the often mystical pan-German sentiments of the German industrial bourgeoisie or the support for an organic and 'primitivist' Russian nationalism by wealthy Russian merchants at the end of the nineteenth century.51

There is also the distinction drawn by Flammeng on between the culturally far more developed Baltic and German nationalisms and the relatively underdeveloped Balkan and Eastern European nationalisms, with their lack of cultural and educational resources, which hampered their chances and produced weaker, but still, movements.52

Despite these criticisms, Kolthoff's philosophical distinction between a more formal and a more organic version of nationalism is of great help and useful. It is implicit in the distinction drawn by chapter 1 between 'Western' civic-territorial and 'Eastern' ethno-nationalist models of the nation. Here too we have to treat geopolitical labels critically. Both models can be found in the 'East' in the 'West' in Asia, Africa and Latin America, as well as within many nationalist movements.
Nevertheless, the conceptual distinction has important consequences. Civic and territorial models of the nation tend to produce certain kinds of nationalism movements: anti-colonial movements before independence have been assimilated and "integrationist" movements after independence. Ethic and religious nationalists, on the other hand, tend to give rise to secessionist or diaspora movements before independence and ethnic or "pale" movements thereafter. This oversimplifies a number of situations, but it captures, I think, the basic logic of many nationalisms.

On this basis we can construct a provisional typology of nationalisms around the distinction between civic and territorial nationalism, taking into account the overall situation in which particular communities and movements find themselves both before and after independence, their situations, together with the basic construction, largely determine the political goal of each nationalism. Thus we find the following:

1. Territorial nationalism
   (a) Pre-independence movements whose concept of the nation is mainly civic and territorial will seek to reject foreign rules and substitute a new nation-state for the old colonial territory, these are anti-colonial nationalisms.
   (b) Post-independence movements whose concept of the nation remains basically civic and territorial will seek to bring together and integrate into a new political community.
      (c) These ethnic and territorial will seek to create a new "national" nation out of the old colonial state. These are integration nationalisms.

2. Ethnic nationalism
   (a) Pre-independence movements whose concept of the nation is basically ethnic and genealogical will seek to expand by including ethnic "kith and kin" outside the present boundaries of the "ethno-nation" and the lands they inhabit or by forming a much larger "ethno-national" state through the union of culturally and ethnically similar ethno-nations. These are ethnic and "pale" nationalisms.
   (b) Post-independence movements whose concept of the nation is basically ethnic and genealogical will seek to expand by including ethnic "kith and kin" outside the present boundaries of the "ethno-nation" and the lands they inhabit or by forming a much larger "ethno-national" state through the union of culturally and ethnically similar ethno-nations. These are ethnic and "pale" nationalisms.

This does not preclude that the "ethno-national" movements contain a number of well-known kinds of nationalism, notably protectionist economic and "national" facing nationalisms and racial nationalism.

According to the theory, the later extreme subversion of isle independence, post-independence migration, and territorial nationalism, with which they are, in fact, historically associated, is the case of the "French" nationalisms in the period of French irredentist nationalism over Algeria, Ethiopia, or Latin American independence.

Such a typology helps us to compare nationalisms within each category, and to place nationalisms in broad comparable contexts, while allowing the possibility of more general exploration. This is not to say that the unique features of particular instances of nationalism. On the contrary, the very fact that it has proved necessary to sketch a "correct" and the basic concept and symbols of nationalism suggests the importance of these other features of a particular nationalism that are unique to each case. These specific, historical and cultural are better suited than "political" or "functional" play a vital role in each instance and not just a supporting role. For it is the specific strategies and ideas that provide the symbolization and ceremonial that simmers down the deepest popular emotions and impressions - notably sub-consciously with the many other symbols and ceremonies. The idea of Poland as the "suffering Christ", a mystical figure of redemption that pervades the poetry of Poland's greatest poet, Mickiewicz, is, in all to the redemption of the Madonna of Santa Corona, and the object of a cult of devotion. The Christian Catholic image of suffering and redemption is central to an understanding of the ideology, language and symbol of Polish nationalism. Similarly, the iconography of Hindu heroes and deities, like Shiva and the goddess Kali, by Tilak and his followers, though remote from the ascetic ideology of nationalism, in general, played a vital role in creating a Hindu Indian nationalism that singled out the unique, the
NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

Incommensurable, elements of a genuinely Indian nation. For without such bounds of differentiation there can be no nation. 16

The importance of specific doctrines and symbols of nationalism points towards the deeper meaning of nationalism - the ideology, the language, the consciousness. In a world of nations each nation is unique, each is 'chosen'. Nationalism is the secular, modern equivalent of the pre-modern, sacred myth of ethnic election. A doctrine of polycentric uniqueness, it teaches the universality of 'irreducible culture values'. Where once each ethnic community was a world unto itself, the centre of the universe, the light amiable darkness, now the heritage and culture values from the stovehouse of that same community, selected, reinterpreted and reconstituted, form one unique, incommensurable national identity among many others, equally unique, cultural identities. This means that every culture, even the least developed and elaborated, possesses some 'value' that is irreducible and may contribute to the total fund of human cultural values. Nationalism, as an ideology and symbol, legitimates every cultural configuration, summing up intellects everywhere to transform 'low' into 'high' cultures, oral into written, literary traditions, in order to preserve for posterity its fund of irreducible culture values. Chosen peoples were formerly selected by the deities; today, they are chosen by an ideology and a symbol that elevate the unique and the individual and transform them into a global entity. In former days peoples were chosen for their alleged virtues; today they are called to be nations because of their cultural heritages.

THE CULTURAL MATRIX OF NATIONALISM

A world of cultural diversity, of many 'chosen cultures', is also a world of ethnic historicism. At first sight such a world appears remote from the world of territorial absolutism that saw the birth of nationalist ideologies, symbolisms and movements. Nevertheless, it was in late sixteenth- and early eighteenth-century Western Europe that nationalist ideals, motifs and symbols first appeared. For, while sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Europe witnessed powerful movements of messianic religious nationalism - notably in Holland and England but also in Bohemia and Poland - the con-

cept, ideals, symbols and myths of the nation as an ultimate end in itself had to wait till later and the 'core doctrine and ideological movements later still. 17

We are, of course, tracing complex processes that are never easy to periodize, let alone date. There is no fixed stage, let alone moment, when one can definitively point to the emergence of true nationalism. When historians debate whether nationalism emerged during the early partitions of Poland (LORD ACTON), during the American Revolution (Benedict Anderson), the English Revolution (Hans Kolven) or even Fichte's 1807 Addresses to the German Nation (Kedourie), this tells us a good deal about their different definitions of nationalism but not so much about its emergence. More important, it emists the much longer period of the gestation of nationalism as language and symbol, and as consciousness and aspiration. Since it is extremely difficult to gauge consciousness and sentiment, except indirectly, I shall concentrate on the rise of nationalist concepts, language, myths and symbols, even though our sources are located exclusively among the small European educated classes of the eighteenth century. 18

Already in the nineteenth century we find a growing interest in the idea of 'national character' and 'national genius'. We must turn to Lord Shaftesbury's high opinion of British attainments, to which we may add Jonathan Richardson's comparison of the English with the ancient Greeks and Romans, in which he claimed: 'There is a bawdly Courage, an Elevation of Thought, a Greatness of Taste, a Love of Liberty, a Simplicity and Honesty among us, which we inherit from our Ancestors, and which belongs to us as Englishmen; and 'in Three this Resemblance consists. 22 Similar sentiments can be found in early eighteenth-century France. Father Daniel linked France's greatness to its monarchy, declaring that 'Antiquity itself would find much to admire in the endless productions of the several arts; the thousand marvels that France has produced in our time; while Henri-François Rigaud's portrait of the Paris Parliament of 1713 praised the 'Love of patrie' in which 'the citizens find a patrie and the patrie its citizens. 23

By the middle of the eighteenth century the concept of 'national character' was widely accepted. La Font de Saint-Virien, an influential art critic, looked back with pride to the Grand Style of Louis