In passing, let us note that Carr's typology has been criticized by Smith for failing to allow for the possibility of a wave of anti-colonial nationalisms or renewed European and Third World secession nationalisms. This, according to Smith, reflects the moral and teleological basis of his analysis, as well as its Eurocentrism (1996a: 183). This brings us to the third stage of the theoretical debate on nationalism, heralded by the end of the Second World War.

1945 to the Late 1980s

The experience of decolonization, that is the dissolution of colonial empires and the establishment of new states in Asia and Africa, coupled with general developments in the social sciences, inaugurated the most intensive and prolific period of research on nationalism. The earlier studies of this period were produced under the sway of the modernization school, then ascendant within American social science. This was mainly caused by the incursion of American political scientists into the debate. Actually, political scientists like Apter, Coleman, Binder, Halpern, Pye and Emerson were more interested in the general problems of development than nationalism *per se*. However, the processes of nation-building were central to political and economic development, and it was not possible to study these processes without taking nationalism into account. Smith argues that the contributions of modernization theorists were crucial in that they helped to shift the study of the causes and consequences of nationalism away from its European setting on to a broader, global plane (1983: 258).

The point of departure of modernization theories was the classical sociological distinction between 'traditional' and 'modern' societies. Drawing on this distinction, scholars of the period posited three different stages in the modernization process: tradition, transition and modernity. In these accounts, modernization signified a breakdown of the traditional order and the establishment of a new type of society with new values and new relationships. Smith summarizes this line of argument aptly:

> To survive painful dislocation, societies must institutionalise new modes of fulfilling the principles and performing the functions with which earlier structures can no longer cope. To merit the title, a new 'society' must reconstitute itself in the image of the old . . . Mechanisms of reintegration and stabilisation can ease and facilitate the transition; among them are collective ideologies like nationalism which spring up naturally in periods of social crisis, and appear meaningful and effective for the participants of the situation. (1983: 49–50)

Nationalism, then, has a clear 'function' in these accounts. It can provide identity in a time of rapid change; it can motivate people to work for further change; it can provide guidelines in such fields as the creation of a modern educational system and of a standard 'national' culture (Breuilly 1993a: 418–19). The archetype of such functionalist accounts was Daniel Lerner's *The Passing of a Traditional Society* (1958).

Lerner's book was based on the story of three characters from Balgat, a little village in Turkey, near the capital Ankara (Smith 1983: 89–95). These characters represented the different stages of the modernization process: the village Chief, contented, paternal, fatalistic was the epitome of traditional Turkish values; the Grocer, restless, unsatisfied, was the man of transition; and Tosun, Lerner's informant from the capital city was the man of modernity. The underlying logic was simple: 'all societies must pass from a face-to-face, traditional stage through an ambivalent, uncertain "transition" to reach finally the plateau of the modern, "participant" and national society and culture' (Smith 1983: 90). That there will be a transition to the Western model of society was undisputed: the only thing that mattered was 'pace'. Where did nationalism stand in this picture? Although nationalism only received a passing mention in Lerner's story, it was implicitly there as the ideology of 'Transitionals', to use Smith's term (*ibid.*: 94). It was a natural part of the transition process, an inevitable consequence.

Lerner's account was a typical example of a whole range of theories inspired by the modernization paradigm. All these accounts shared the basic assumption that nationalism was a concomitant of the period of transition, helping to alleviate the sufferings caused by that process. Predictably, functionalist theories of nationalism have been subject to many criticisms. The main objections to such accounts can be summarized as follows:

- Functionalist theories derive explanations from end-states. In these accounts, consequences precede causes and events are treated as wholly beyond the understanding of human agents (O'Leary 1996: 86). This inevitably limits the range of choices initially open to individuals who might respond rationally to their situation, hence redefine and modify it (Minogue 1996: 117; Smith 1983: 51). Smith argues that there are a large number of cases of traditional communities which failed to develop any form of protest when subjected to modernization. Most functionalist accounts, he continues, cannot cope with these exceptions (1983: 51). Moreover, Smith notes that most of the goals that are thought to be served by nationalism are logically and historically posterior to the emergence of a nationalist conceptual framework: thus, they cannot be invoked to explain it.
- Functionalist explanations are too holistic. The functions of nationalism, that is solidarity or modernization, are such large terms that one can hardly connect something as specific as nationalism to them. In the light of this observation, Breuilly asks the following question: 'Is one suggesting that without nationalism these things could not be achieved' (1993a: 419)?
- Functionalist theories cannot explain the variety of historical responses to modernization. Smith asks: 'Why was Pakistan's type of nationalism of the so-called neo-traditional kind, whereas Turkey's was secularist? Why the Bolshevik response in Russia, the Fascist in Italy, the socialist in Yugoslavia and Israel?' (1983: 53).
- There are a multitude of functions which it is suggested nationalism can serve. For some, Breuilly observes, it helps modernization; for others, it helps maintain traditional identities. There is no agreed interpretation: nationalism is associated with different functions in different contexts (1993a: 419).
- Functionalists tend to simplify and reify the ideal-types of 'tradition' and 'modernity'. The reality, however, is much more complex. Moreover, these types are modelled on Western valuations (Smith 1983: 50).

Another variant of the modernization theories is the so-called 'communications approach', generally associated with the idea of 'nation-building'. The most illustrious exponent of this approach

was the American political scientist Karl W. Deutsch (1966). Deutsch begins by defining a 'people' as a large group of persons linked by complementary habits and facilities of communication. For Deutsch, '[m]embership in a people essentially consists in wide complementarity of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders' (1966: 97). Drawing on these preliminary conceptual clarifications, he proposes a functional definition of nationality:

> In the political and social struggles of the modern age, *nationality*, then, means an alignment of large numbers of individuals from the middle and lower classes linked to regional centers and leading social groups by channels of social communication and economic intercourse, both indirectly from link to link and directly with the center. (*Ibid.*: 101)

In the age of nationalism, nationalities press to acquire a measure of effective control over the behaviour of their members. They strive to equip themselves with power, with some machinery of compulsion strong enough to make the enforcement of commands possible: 'Once a nationality has added this power to compel to its earlier cohesiveness and attachment to group symbols, it often considers itself a *nation* and is so considered by others' (*ibid.*: 104–5). This process is underpinned by a variety of functionally equivalent arrangements. More specifically, what set nation-building in motion were socio-demographic processes like urbanization, mobility, literacy and so on. The communications mechanisms had an important role to play in this scenario. They had to provide new roles, new horizons, strange experiences and imaginings to keep the process going smoothly (Smith 1983: 99).

The communications approach in general and Deutsch's model in particular had their share of criticisms:

- The crucial defect of this approach, Smith argues, is its omission of the particular context of beliefs, interpretations and interests within which the mass media operate. The mechanisms of communications were always those developed in the West and their effects outside the West were held to be identical to the Western results (1983: 99, 101).

- The conception of mass communication in these theories is uni-dimensional. Communication systems do not convey one single ideology, that is 'modernization', and the messages conveyed are not perceived in the same manner by the individuals that make up a community. In fact, Smith notes, 'exposure to mass communications systems does not automatically carry with it the desire for "modernity" and its benefits' (1983: 101).
- Breuilly remarks that intensified communications between individuals and groups can as often lead to an increase in internal conflict as to an increase in solidarity. Moreover, such conflict or solidarity may be expressed in terms other than nationalist ones. The structures of communication do not indicate what types of conflict and solidarity exist within a particular community and therefore cannot in itself predict what kinds of nationalism will develop (1993a: 406–7).

Deutsch's work gave a fresh impetus to the debate on nationalism. The 1960s saw the burgeoning of interdisciplinary interest in national phenomena, a sudden increase in the number of studies which treated nationalism as a subject in itself and, partly as a result of this, a diversification of theoretical perspectives. It was in this context that the pioneering works of the modernist approach, namely Kedourie's *Nationalism* and Ernest Gellner's *Thought and Change*, were published. Modernist explanations became the dominant orthodoxy in the field until the early 1980s.

Kedourie's conservative attack on nationalism was a milestone in the evolution of the theoretical debate. For him,

> nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century . . . Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government. ([1960] 1994: 1)

As we have seen earlier, Kedourie traces the origins of this doctrine back to German Romantic thought. He explains it in terms of a revolution in European philosophy, showing how this revolution took place and which thinkers have contributed to it. He attaches a great weight in his account to the role played by Kant's epistemological dualism, the organic analogy developed by Fichte and his disciples, and historicism. But the story does not end here. The revolution in ideas, Kedourie holds, was accompanied by an upheaval in social life: 'at the time when the doctrine was being elaborated, Europe was in turmoil . . . Things which had not been thought possible were now seen to be indeed possible and feasible' (1994: 87). At this point, Kedourie draws our attention to the low social status of German romantics whose upward mobility was blocked at the time (Smith 1983: 33). The younger generation was spiritually restless, dissatisfied with things as they were, eager for change. This restlessness was partly caused by the legend of the French Revolution. But what really caused it was 'a breakdown in the transmission of political habits and religious beliefs from one generation to the next' (Kedourie 1994: 94). Kedourie's depiction of this situation is quite vivid:

> The sons rejected the fathers and their ways; but the rejection extended also to the very practices, traditions, and beliefs which had over the centuries moulded and fashioned these societies which suddenly seemed to the young so confining, so graceless, so devoid of spiritual comfort, and so unable to minister to the dignity and fulfilment of the individual. (*Ibid.*: 95)

According to Kedourie, this revolt against old ways can also explain the violent nature of many nationalist movements, because the latter, ostensibly directed against foreigners, were also the manifestation of a clash of generations: 'nationalist movements are children's crusades; their very names are manifestoes against old age: Young Italy, Young Egypt, the Young Turks' (*ibid.*: 96). Such movements satisfied an important need,

> [the need] to belong together in a coherent and stable community. Such a need is normally satisfied by the family, the neighbourhood, the religious community. In the last century and a half such institutions all over the world have had to bear the brunt of violent social and intellectual change, and it is no accident that nationalism was at its most intense where and when such institutions had little resilience and were ill-prepared to withstand the powerful attacks to which they became exposed. (*Ibid.*)

These frustrated, but passionate, young men turned to literature and philosophy which seemed to give way to a nobler world, 'a world more real and more exciting than the real world', failing to notice that philosophical speculation was incompatible with the civil order. However, there was no effective means to control the 'musings' of young men since they were not the fruit of conspiracy: 'They were inherent in the nature of things; they have emanated from the very spirit of the age' (*ibid.*: 100).

'This is a powerful and original thesis', Smith comments (1983: 34). But this originality did not make it immune to criticism. The major objections to Kedourie's account can be summarized as follows:

- Gellner disagrees with Kedourie on the question of Kant's contribution to the doctrine of nationalism. For him, 'Kant is the very last person whose vision could be credited with having contributed to nationalism'. In fact, 'if a connection exists between Kant and nationalism at all, then nationalism is a reaction against him, and not his offspring' (1983: 132, 134). Smith joins Gellner here and argues that even if Kedourie's interpretation of Kant is right, he forgets Kant's debt to Rousseau (1983: 35).
- As noted at the beginning of this section, Gellner argues, *contra* Kedourie, that we shall not learn too much about nationalism by the study of its own prophets (1983: 125). Similarly, Smith accuses Kedourie of 'intellectual determinism'. The social and political factors in Kedourie's account, for example the blocked mobility of the German intelligentsia, the breakdown of traditional ways, are overshadowed by the developments in the intellectual arena: social factors become contributory or intervening variables in what amounts to a single-factor explanation (1983: 37–8).
- Smith objects to Kedourie's use of the 'need to belong', arguing that this factor does not provide an answer to the following questions: 'why only at certain times and places it was the nation which replaced the family, the religious community, the village'; 'why does this need appear to affect some and not others in a given population'; 'how can we measure it in relation to other factors'? Without these answers, Smith concludes, the argument is 'a piece of circular psychologism' (1983: 35). A similar point is made by Breuilly who argues that 'identity needs' cover much more than nationalism. He notes that some of those who have suffered from an identity crisis turned to other ideologies – of class, of religion; some accepted the changes that have taken place and sought simply to advance their interests as much as possible under the new conditions; some turned to drink; and about most we know nothing. He also remarks that nationalism has not received its strongest support from those groups which one would imagine to have been most damaged from an identity crisis (1993a: 417).
- Finally, Smith maintains, Kedourie's model does not explain how ideas have contributed to the breakdown of existing structures. He notes that rapid social change has occurred before the eighteenth century as well. Traditional institutions were always criticized, most of the time by the younger generations. Why, then, did nationalism appear so sporadically in earlier eras? What was unique about the recent onslaught on tradition (1983: 39–40)?

The 1970s have witnessed a new wave of interest in nationalism. The input of neo-Marxist scholars who emphasized the role of economic factors in their accounts was particularly important in that context. Significant contributions of the period include Michael Hechter's *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966* (1975) and Tom Nairn's *The Break-up of Britain* ([1977] 1981) amongst many others. The debate received a new twist in the 1980s. The works of John Armstrong (1982) and Anthony D. Smith (1986) laid the groundwork for an 'ethno-symbolist' critique of modernist theories. Ironically, the great classics of the modernist approach were also published in this period. Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*, Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* and Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger's *The Invention of Tradition*, all published in 1983, set the scene for the ardent – sometimes even polemical – discussions of the last decade (all these theories will be discussed at length in Chapters 4 and 5). With these studies, the debate on nationalism reached its most mature stage.

From the Late 1980s to the Present

I have argued before that we have entered a new stage in the debate on nationalism since the end of the 1980s. This argument

will be substantiated at length in Chapter 6 which is devoted to recent approaches. Here, I will briefly consider the following question: what separated the studies of the last decade from those of earlier periods?

The answer is quite simple: some of the studies produced in this period tried to transcend the 'classical' debate – which covered most of the twentieth century and reached its heyday in the last three decades – by questioning the fundamental tenets upon which it is based and by adding new dimensions to the analysis of national phenomena. What underlay these attempts was the belief that the classical debate has become unnecessarily polarized around certain issues, such as the modernity of nations, and failed to address many problems the analysis of which might greatly enhance our understanding of nationalism. For example, mainstream scholars did not attempt to understand why nationhood is still so basic to modern politics and culture. They did offer various explanations of the 'origins' of nations, but they took 'our' nationhood – or, one might say, 'nationhood-in-the-present' – for granted. Not satisfied with such simplistic accounts, a number of recent studies tried to identify 'the factors that lead to the continual production and reproduction of nationalism as a central discursive formation in the modern world' (Calhoun 1997: 123; Billig 1995).

Moreover, the classical debate ignored the experiences of the so-called 'marginal' groups. Ethnic minorities, blacks, women, postcolonial societies could hardly find themselves a place in the mainstream literature. Again, a range of studies produced in the last decade tried to compensate for this decades-long neglect (see for example Chatterjee 1986; Bhabha 1990b; Yuval-Davis 1997).

Finally, the interaction between the studies of nationalism and research conducted in other fields, like diasporas, multiculturalism, identity, migration, citizenship, racism, increased. To this were added the insights gained from alternative epistemological approaches like feminism or postmodernism. These allowed for a richer understanding of the dialectic of national self-identification. In the light of these observations, I think, it can be fairly concluded that we have reached a new stage in the study of nationalism, in fact a stage which promises to be more prolific than the previous ones.

Main Questions, Fundamental Problems

The preceding discussion has suggested that the 'academic' debate on nationalism reached its most mature stage in the second half of the twentieth century. Many of the issues discussed in the literature took shape in that period. In this section, I will try to identify the main questions around which the contemporary theoretical debate revolves. These are:

- What is the nation? What is nationalism?
- What are the origins of nations and nationalisms? To what extent are they modern phenomena?
- What are the different types of nationalism?

It is important to note at the outset that these are not the only questions addressed by the scholars of nationalism. However, even a cursory glance at their writings will reveal that most of the other issues they explored derive from these three questions. In that sense, they can be regarded as 'primary' questions, that is questions that most – if not all – theorists address, as opposed to 'secondary', or derivative, questions that appear in particular studies. Some of these secondary questions will also be mentioned in the discussion that follows. It should also be stressed that the number of primary questions and the priority attached to any one of them varies. While some scholars argue that it is not possible to understand nationalism without first agreeing on basic definitions, others contend that the most important problem is the relationship of nationalism to the processes of modernization. Still others, on the other hand, set out to develop typologies, holding that a theory that will explain various forms of nationalism cannot be devised. These different viewpoints will also be explored below.

What is the Nation? What is Nationalism?

In a recent essay, Tilley argues that 'most arguments in the academia could be resolved if people would first take the time to define their terms' (1997: 497). Nowhere is this principle better demonstrated, she continues, than in the proliferating literature on ethnicity. The same could easily be argued in the case of nationalism.

In fact, this is probably the only point on which there is a general consensus among the scholars of national phenomena. How, then, can we account for this lack of agreement or, to put it differently, for the existence of a plethora of definitions, each stressing a different aspect of their subject-matter?

Walker Connor, an eminent scholar of nationalism who has written extensively on the problems of definition, answers this question by pointing to the widespread misuse of the key terms, in particular the 'interutilization' of the words 'state' and 'nation' (1994: 92). Actually, the origins of this confusion go back to the 1780s, when Jeremy Bentham invented the term 'international' for what we would now call 'interstate relations' (I owe special thanks to Fred Halliday for reminding me of this point). As Connor notes, the tendency to equate nation with state is not restricted to the academia. We can observe its reflections on the political scene, as the misnomers the 'League of Nations' or the 'United Nations' demonstrate (*ibid.*: 97).

What underlies this confusion is the ambiguity of the relationship between 'nation' and other, 'kindred', concepts such as ethnicity, ethnic group and so on. That nationhood is different from other objective criteria forming the basis of individual or collective identities such as class, region, gender, race or religious belief is commonly accepted. But the degree to which each of these elements contributes to the construction of national identities, hence to the definition of the nation, is a source of great controversy. The differences of opinion that exist on this subject are echoed in the competing definitions circulating in the literature. While some scholars emphasize 'objective' criteria like religion, language or race, others stress the importance of 'subjective' criteria such as self-awareness or solidarity in the definition of a nation. Most scholars employ a combination of the two. A similar disagreement exists between those who see the nation as a 'self-defined' (that is self-awareness) entity and those who see it as 'other-defined' (that is recognition by the international community).

The case of nationalism is no more promising. As Breuilly notes, nationalism can refer to ideas, to sentiments and to actions (1993a: 404). Each definition will have different implications for the study of nationalism: those who define it as an idea will focus on the writings and speeches of nationalist intellectuals or activists; those who see it as a sentiment will concentrate on the development of language or other shared ways of life and try to see how these 'folk ways' are taken up by the intelligentsia or the politicians; finally, those who treat nationalism as a movement will focus on political action and conflict (*ibid.*).

On the other hand, Kellas contends that nationalism is both an 'idea' and a 'form of behaviour' (1991: 3). Nationalism is a 'doctrine' for Kedourie (1994: 1), an 'ideological movement' for Smith (1991a: 51), a 'political principle' for Gellner (1983: 1) and a 'discursive formation' for Calhoun (1997: 3).

So far, I have argued that the study of nationalism has been severely impaired by the misuse of the key terms, which is in turn caused by the ambiguous relationship of the concepts of nation and nationalism to kindred concepts – such as ethnicity, ethnic group and so on. However, there are two more factors that exacerbate this situation.

The first is the 'idealist' thinking about nations and nationalism. Mainly advocated by nationalist ideologues, but also taken up by mainstream scholarship until the second half of the twentieth century, this way of thinking saw nations as natural and/or primordial entities. Those who espoused this view mostly shied away from defining the nation – which they took for granted – and embarked on devising typologies (Symmons-Symonolewicz 1985: 215). This approach has been subject to growing criticisms from the 1960s onwards and largely discredited by recent studies of ethnicity and nationalism.

The second factor is the close relationship between the concept of nation and politics. As Calhoun remarks, 'the notion of nation is so deeply imbricated in modern politics as to be "essentially contested", because any definition will legitimate some claims and delegitimate others' (1993: 215). Scientific knowledge, methodologies, definitions do not evolve in a socio-historical vacuum (MacLaughlin 1987). Scholars are inevitably affected by the political context in which they develop their ideas, hence the definitions they formulate reflect an intricate complex of interests and relationships. Breuilly sums this up brilliantly: 'the sheer universality and apparent power of nationalism has created a vast range of cases and vested interests which make it difficult to agree upon basic approaches to the subject' (1985: 65).

This brief discussion shows clearly that 'imprecise vocabulary' continues to sabotage our efforts to understand nationalism. Given

the abundance of definitions and the lack of general agreement on any one of them, I have refrained from prioritizing any one definition in the course of this discussion. I have also tried to keep the number of examples at a minimum since many competing definitions of the concepts of nation and nationalism will be provided in the following chapters.

What are the Origins of Nations and Nationalisms? To what Extent are they Modern Phenomena?

The second key question addressed by the scholars concerns the origins and the nature of national phenomena. This question is the forebear of a large number of secondary questions: What is the relationship between nationalism and the processes of modernization? In other words, to what extent are nations and nationalisms the products of modern conditions such as capitalism, industrialization, urbanization and secularism? How did the rise of the modern state affect the emergence of nationalism? How do modern nations relate to pre-modern ethnic communities? Are nations just the lineal descendants of their medieval counterparts? Or are they the recent creations of a nationalist intelligentsia frustrated by the vagaries of the *ancien régime*? Is nationalism a kind of 'myth' invented and propagated by elites who then use it to mobilize the masses in support of their struggle to get or maintain power? Is it a kind of 'opium' diverting the masses from fulfilling their true selves?

One can multiply these questions. But the point is that all these secondary questions derive from the same basic dilemma: to what extent are nations and nationalisms modern phenomena? The attempts to resolve this dilemma have laid the foundations of arguably the most fundamental divide of the theoretical debate on nationalism, namely that between the 'primordialists' and the 'modernists'. Broadly speaking, those who think that nations are 'perennial' entities fall within the former category and those who believe in the modernity of nations and nationalism fall within the latter. This classification is widely accepted in today's literature. The labels attached to the categories may vary: some prefer the term 'essentialist' in place of 'primordialist'; others opt for the epithet 'instrumentalist' or 'constructivist' instead of 'modernist'.

But the description of the categories and the logic of classification remain the same. It should be pointed out that a third category has been added to this classification in recent years. This category consists of 'ethno-symbolists' who portray their position as a middle way between these two polar opposites. Very briefly, ethno-symbolists stress the durability of pre-modern ethnic ties and show how ethnic cultures set limits to elite attempts to forge the nation.

It is important to stress that not all scholars are content with the conventional classification. For example, Conversi (1995) introduces a five-tiered classification with the addition of 'homeostatic' and 'transactionalist' approaches to the categories I have mentioned above. On the other hand, there are also scholars who insist in keeping the twofold classification by merging the ethno-symbolists into the primordialists (see for example Breuilly 1996: 150). In the remainder of the book, I will follow the conventional threefold classification, mainly to represent the general tendency in the field. However, I will also review the criticisms levelled against this classification and introduce my own categorization in the concluding chapter.

What are the Different Types of Nationalism (if any)?

The final question concerns the varieties of nationalism. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, this was in fact the only question addressed by a whole generation of scholars, and the classificatory schemes developed by Kohn, Hayes and Snyder were discussed in that context. However, typologies are not peculiar to first-generation studies. Arguing that no single, universal theory of nationalism is possible, some scholars continue to espouse the view that the best way to deal with nationalism is to develop typologies (for example Hall 1993). In their view, nationalism is a chameleon-like phenomenon, capable of assuming a variety of ideological forms. It is not possible to account for all these variations in a single, 'grand' theory. However, this should not condemn us to complete particularism: 'to the contrary, middle ground can be cultivated by delineating various ideal types of nationalism' (Hall 1993: 1).

Predictably, typologies abound in the literature, even if we leave the earlier ones aside. Here, I will just enumerate a few examples: Smith follows Kohn's lead and draws a distinction between a

'Western' civic-territorial model of the nation which produces 'territorial' nationalisms and an 'Eastern' ethnic-genealogical model which produces 'ethnic' nationalisms (1991a: 79–84). Breuilly identifies three categories on the basis of the relationship between the nationalist movement and the state to which it either opposes or controls: 'separation', 'reform' and 'unification'. He then divides each of these categories into two sub-categories according to the nature of the political entity that is opposed, that is 'opposed to non-nation-states' and 'opposed to nation-states' (1993a: 9); Hall introduces a classification that consists of five categories on the basis of the characteristic logic and social underpinning of various forms of nationalism. The titles he chooses for his categories are rather singular: 'the logic of the asocial society', 'revolution from above', 'desire and fear blessed by opportunity', 'risorgimento nationalism', 'integral nationalism' (1993). Alter identifies three varieties, namely 'risorgimento', 'reform' and 'integral' nationalisms (1989). Finally, Sugar distinguishes four types of nationalism in Eastern Europe: 'bourgeois', 'aristocratic', 'popular' and 'bureaucratic' nationalisms.

This list can be doubled or even tripled. But such an exhaustive list would not be helpful at this stage. More examples will be given when discussing the particular theories. Suffice it to say that almost all scholars recognize the multifarious nature of nationalism, while some go one step further and argue that sorting the different types according to their intrinsic features is all that can be achieved theoretically.

Further Reading

There is a vast literature on nationalist ideology. The best source on the genesis of the idea of nationalism, however, is still Kedourie (1994), originally published in 1960. Kedourie's book suffers from an overemphasis on the role of intellectuals, especially the German Romantics, but is very useful for all that. For Rousseau's ideas on patriotism and citizenship see Barnard (1984); for a comparison of Rousseau and Herder see Barnard (1983). Historians' responses to nationalism are the subject of an insightful article by Smith (1996a) [1992]. For Mill's reflections on nationality see the short extract in Woolf (1996) [1861].

The relationship between Marxism and nationalism has been the subject of a heated debate for the last three or four decades. A survey

of the controversy can be found in Munck (1986) and Nimni (1991). On Austrian Social Democrats see Stargardt (1995), who not only provides a review of their main ideas, but also presents a vivid description of the social and political context which shaped these ideas. The reader should also consult Bauer (1996) [1924], the first chapter of his classic *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, for one of the earliest attempts to theorize nationalism within the Marxist camp.

The famous lecture Renan delivered in 1882 can now be found in English: see Bhabha (1990b). For Durkheim and Weber see Guibernau (1996), chapter 1 and James (1996), chapter 4. A concise summary of the relevance of their ideas for the studies of subsequent periods is given in Smith (1998): 13–16.

As we have seen earlier, the first half of the twentieth century witnessed the rise of a number of general historical studies on nationalism. Of these, the following are still relevant: Hayes (1955) [1931], Kohn (1967) [1944] and Carr (1945).

For the modernization theories of the 1950s and 1960s, the work to consult is Smith (1983), originally published in 1971. Smith offers a comprehensive overview of the main theories of nation-building, together with a balanced criticism of them. Among primary sources, Deutsch (1966) [1953], regarded by many as the classic example of the communications approach, and Kedourie (1994) [1960], one of the pioneering works of the modernist paradigm, should be mentioned.