‘Dominant ethnicity’ and the ‘ethnic-civic’ dichotomy in the work of A. D. Smith

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ABSTRACT. This article considers the way in which the work of Anthony Smith has helped to structure debates surrounding the role of ethnicity in present-day nations. Two major lines of enquiry are evident here. First, the contemporary role of dominant ethnic groups within ‘their’ nations and second, the interplay between ethnic and civic elements in nationalist argument. The two processes are related, but maintain elements of distinctiveness. Smith’s major contribution to the dominant ethnicity debate has been to disembend ethnicity from the ideologically-charged and/or anglo-centric discourse of ethnic relations and to place it in historical context, thereby opening up space for dominant group ethnicity to be considered as a distinct phenomenon. This said, Smith’s work does not adequately account for the vicissitudes of dominant ethnicity in the contemporary West. Building on the classical works of Hans Kohn and Friedrich Meinecke, Anthony Smith has also made a seminal contribution to the debate on civic and ethnic forms of national identity and nationalist ideology. As well as freeing this debate from the strong normative overtones which it has often carried, he has continued to insist that the terms civic and ethnic should be treated as an ideal-typical distinction rather than a scheme of classification.

Arguably the fulcrum of Anthony Smith’s research is the ethnie-nation link. One axis of this debate is represented in the early contributions to this special issue, namely, what are ethnies, when did they arise, and what has been their historic relationship to nations. A second – perhaps more contemporary – offshoot of this thinking is the role played by ethnicity within nations in the so-called ‘modern’ period up to the present time. This is the main problematic with which this article will concern itself. Within this framework, two strands of research recommend themselves. These include a) the place of dominant-group ethnicity within contemporary nations; and b) the nature of the ‘ethnic versus civic nation’ conceptual dichotomy and the dialectic between these two ways of constructing nationalist arguments.
One of the most distinctive vistas which Anthony Smith’s work opened up for us as postgraduate students at the LSE in the mid-1990s was the novel way in which he conceptualised ethnicity. Those of us from a sociological tradition, particularly in the English-speaking world, come from an environment in which ethnicity is a difficult phenomenon to study. To begin with, there is the classical-cum-Orientalist and anglo/euro-centric tradition of viewing ethnicity as residing exclusively in the exotic ‘Other’. This has then been overlaid by a strongly normative, New Left discourse which sought to reverse the patronising and negative tendencies of Orientalism. Though the new radicalism claimed to be making a sharp break with the anglo-centric tradition, it actually represents a continuation of many of the earlier exoticist themes. Thus, for example, the idea of exotic cultures as repositories of mystery and meaning (in opposition to a dessicated Western rationality) remains in both romantic and radical versions. One subtext is that authenticity and *ethnicity* – a relatively new term in the English language – resides in those strange foreign peoples who have retained something that we Western moderns have lost.

A second, related theme is that ethnicity is possessed by those who are politically or geographically marginal. Hence the link between ethnicity and an egalitarian politics. Here it must be stressed that many early Orientalist writers and travellers were far from the intolerant crusaders or rationalistic imperialists of caricature. Many were among the more cosmopolitan and tolerant of their time – though they are judged differently today. Take the American example. The so-called ‘Parliament of Religions’ held in Chicago as part of the Columbian exposition of 1893 featured representatives of many world religions and sects, largely from colonial lands in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Though derided as a classic example of the colonial mindset, many of the supporters of this venture were representatives of the city’s liberal cultural vanguard, members of freethinking *cénacles* like the Free Religious Association. They were among the few in their society who supported a more relativistic attitude toward other faiths (Arieli 1991).

Later, the Liberal-Progressive ‘Settlement’ movement and the bohemian ‘Village Renaissance’ in New York urged Americans to study the ways of the derided European immigrant groups and become more appreciative of the cultural ‘gifts’ these groups had to offer as opposed to the ‘over-organised’ nature of Anglo-Saxon Protestant modernity. Following this strand through the Chicago school of Robert Park in the 1920’s through to Donald Young’s pioneering *American Minority Peoples* (1932) and finally to the federal Ethnic Heritage Studies program of 1972, we can see definite linkages between the romantic exoticism of the nineteenth century and the multiculturalist radicalism of today.

The Austrian-Jewish social psychologist Gustav Ichheiser famously remarked that if the Jews obtained a state of their own, they would behave in much the same way as other ethnic groups. Here Ichheiser was mischievously firing a shot across the bow of the cosmopolitan mainstream within diaspora Jewry which viewed the Jews as uniquely placed – by virtue of their alienation...
from a state – to provide universal intellectual and moral leadership. He is also noteworthy for the way in which he remarked that many popular beliefs, though often heavily skewed by prejudice, are predicated upon a kernel of truth (Ichheiser 1949).

Here there is a parallel with Anthony Smith’s work. Like his co-religionist Ichheiser, Smith’s work runs against the normative grain of his contemporaries. It does so in two important ways. First, in eschewing the tendency of modernist scholars like Hobsbawm, Gellner or Anderson to sever nations from their ethnic pasts, Smith, like Ichheiser, is implicitly suggesting that the counterintuitive explanation, while cognitively impressive, is not necessarily correct. The popular belief that nations have continuity with pre-modern roots thus has an Ichheiserian core of truth which turns out to be quite substantial. Second, and more germane to this discussion, Smith successfully disembeds ethnicity from the ideologically-charged, anglo-centric discourse of ethnic relations and places it in historical context. Ethnic groups are no longer defined by their exoticism or marginality, but rather by characteristics (i.e. popular name, myth of shared ancestry, concept of homeland, ethno-history) which are attributable to oppressors and oppressed alike. This notion greatly influenced Yael Tamir, whose *Liberal Nationalism* reflects many of the theoretical advances made by Smith (Tamir 1993).

This latter departure is a useful example of counterintuitive reasoning in that it questions taken-for-granted ideas about the ‘ethnic’ as Other. Yet, unlike the arguments of constructivists, this readily rings true with our investigation of the empirical world. ‘Yes’, we might say, the idea of an English ethnie in Britain or French ethnie in France makes sense and can be usefully compared with, for example, the Japanese in Japan, Persians in Iran or Javanese of Indonesia. In recasting the ethnie-nation distinction on the basis of pre-modern v. modern rather than periphery v. metropole, Smith allows us to usefully compare ethnies and nations and the myriad connections between them.

This approach is also clearly superior to the efforts of political theorists like Will Kymlicka, who view the ethnie-nation distinction as hinging purely on the issue of territoruality (Kymlicka 1997: 59). Thus an American Jew who steps off a plane in Tel-Aviv leaves her ethnicity at the airport, to be recollected for the return journey. Kymlicka also informs us that ethnic groups really are cosmopolitan entities uninterested in ‘ethnic descent’ while nations are content with an official high culture and are otherwise infinitely elastic in their accommodation of difference. By relying on this conceptual sleight-of-hand, Kymlicka connects the dots of his theory, but detaches it from the reality. Meanwhile, the ethnic realities which Kymlicka does acknowledge are exclusively minoritarian (Kaufmann 2000).

Smith’s reconceptualisation of ethnicity, by contrast, de-centres it from its Anglo-European moral centre, thereby opening up space for ‘us’ as well as the ‘others’ to possess ethnic identity. In rescuing this term for generalised use, he renders his theory useful as a template for case study or comparative research. This is precisely the kind of meso-level theorising which some suggest as a
critical way forward in bridging the solitudes of social theory and empirical research (Mouzelis 1995). To be sure, Schermerhorn spoke of dominant majorities and dominant minorities as early as the late sixties (Schermerhorn 1970). Yet this important work only really concerned itself with the political charge of ethnic relations. Lost in the discussion of the ‘dominant’ aspect of dominant ethnicity was any discussion of the ethnic part of the equation. To do so would entail a consideration of the interiority of dominant ethnicity, of the ontological connections between ethnicity and nations and the nature of charter ethnic group myths and symbols.

The first attempt to probe the cultural-ontological dimension of dominant ethnicity appeared with Smith’s *Theories of Nationalism* (1971). Here he speaks of ‘revivalist’ nationalism as the alter-ego of ‘reformist’ nationalism. Smith argued that the Janus-faced character of nationalism could either lead the nation outward toward ‘reformist’ modernisation in the pursuit of scientific credence, or inward, toward its ethnic particularity, in search of spiritual legitimacy (Smith 1971: 246–54). This theme resurfaced in *The Ethnic Revival* (1981) with the idea that ethnic revival – whether within or outside the nation – provided meaning and continuity in a post-religious age. Notice that the question of political hegemony is largely tangential to this debate, hence its originality. Smith’s investigation into the ‘revivalist’ nature of dominant-group ethnicity influenced the work of John Hutchinson, who postulates that ethnic groups seek revival in response to what their intellectuals perceive as a weakening of the group’s cultural self-awareness (Hutchinson 1987).

The landmark *Ethnic Origins of Nations* (1986) presents us with the first exposition of Smith’s axial thesis regarding the ethnie-nation link. We see, for the first time, explicit mention of the term ‘core ethnie’ and a consideration of how such ethnies become nations. Core ethnies are mentioned as dominant in both cultural and political terms (Smith 1986: 138). Later, Smith refined his ideas to emphasise that nations are built around ‘ethnic cores’ or ‘dominant ethnies’ which furnish it with legitimating myths, symbols and conceptions of territory. In Smith’s words: ‘Though most latter-day nations are, in fact, polyethnic, many have been formed in the first place around a dominant ethnie, which attracted other ethnies or ethnic fragments into the state to which it gave a name and cultural charter... the presumed boundaries of the nation are largely determined by the myths and memories of the dominant ethnie, which include the foundation charter, the myth of the golden age and the associated territorial claims, or ethnic title-deeds’ (Smith 1991b: 39, emphasis added).

Smith’s work is often cited as representative of a perennialist or primordialist theoretical pole. Smith resists such characterisations, instead preferring the label ‘ethno-symbolist’. Unfortunately, too much of this exercise is concerned with the timing of nations’ emergence onto the historical stage, though the question of social motivation is, to our minds, more important. This issue is addressed more subtly in Smith’s work. Numerous fragments from his oeuvre suggest that the motivation behind ethnicity is not biological or
neuro-psychological, as in the work of Van den Berghe, but rather emerges from a blend of cultural-historical path dependency, lived existence and psychological alienation. Thus we are motivated to become ethnic by traditions embodied in our cultural-historical institutions (including the family) and by our ‘diurnal round of work and leisure’ in our particular *habitus*. These push factors are necessary but not sufficient, however, since, as Smith makes clear, the ethno-historicist quest is powerfully motivated by a nostalgic and romantic longing to escape the alienation of a profane and disenchanted modernity and to find continuity, *pace* Debray, in the tales of ancestors which reach back into the past and forward into the future (Smith 1986: 175–6).

This captures an element of dominant ethnicity which escapes standard political accounts. Namely the idea that political or economic domination may satisfy pecuniary motives but provides no answer to the quest for meaning and continuity in the face of modern disenchantment. If the latter matters, as Smith suggests, then ethnic revivals are apt to occur among both dominant and subaltern groups, even in the absence of political imperatives. The multiple ethnic revivals that have taken place among the majority in locations as disparate as Korea or Ireland bear witness to this (Kendall 1998). In short, the tacit assumption that identity politics, recognition and authenticity are minority sports needs urgent revision. Indeed, we may surmise that ethnic revivals can readily take place – often repeatedly – within the dominant group in a nation-state.

Often, manifestations of dominant group ethnicity are labelled ‘ethno-nationalism’. The two concepts overlap a great deal, but they are not identical. Dominant ethnicity can occur in a pre-modern or imperial context, with few links to the idea of the nation. (i.e. Mohajirs in Mughal Empire, Germans in the medieval Baltic, the British in Kenya) The political dominance of Afrikaners in South Africa or economic dominance of Anglo-Protestants in Quebec provide more recent examples. More importantly, today’s norms of Western cultural liberalism (Soysal’s ‘universal personhood’) are increasingly forcing dominant ethnic groups to define ‘their’ nations in inclusive ways that draw an ever firmer line between a once hidden dominant ethnie and its national covering (Soysal 1994). This makes it extremely important to finger dominant ethnicity as an independent political player.

In approaching contemporary dominant ethnicity, we encounter relatively uncharted territory, a vast field of inquiry which has been bypassed by the legions of scholars armed with conventional citizenship studies, nationalism and ethnic politics paradigms. Despite his more nuanced approach, this is also where some of the limits to Anthony Smith’s work appear. Smith certainly recognises the current interplay between dominant ethnies and the nation. He notes the challenges posed by the globalisation of capital, the rise of minority secessionist movements and heightened international migration (Smith 2004). However, whereas Smith’s work on the emergence of the modern nation from its dominant ethnic chrysalis is well-delineated, his work on contemporary dominant ethnicity remains more theoretical and exploratory.
Smith’s approach to the role of nations betrays a curiously ambiguous stance with respect to dominant ethnicity – an equivocation which is less evident elsewhere in his writing. Though firm in his defence of the nation and its resilience in our global era, Smith nowhere states that dominant ethnies have a similar tenacity. At times, when discussing anti-immigration politics, there is the suggestion that dominant ethnicity resists centripetal forces. When considering the challenge of minority ethnic revival, multiculturalism and secession, however, Smith seems to veer toward a different position. Now, national identity becomes far more flexible, able to be ‘recombined’ in such a way as to supersede dominant ethnic symbols and boundaries (Smith 2004). To a degree, this ambiguity is reflected in the way Smith speaks of civic nations, with ideological (as opposed to genealogical) myths of descent as equally capable of capturing the affections of the mass of the population. His reading of ‘immigrant nations’ as lacking a dominant ethnie, but possessing an ideological founding myth which coalesces successive waves of immigrants into a nation, is part of this train of thought (Smith 1984; 1991b: 40).

For instance, Smith avers that ‘immigrant nations’ like the Americans or Australians differ from the nations of the Old World in their self-conceptions. But a glance at the history of either nation in the twentieth century shows that the nation was defined in an ethnic ‘British’ or ‘WASP’ manner which was more effectively executed than in many ‘old world’ nations. Britain or France, for example, never implemented a racial and ethnic quota system like the American ‘National Origins’ scheme of 1924–65 nor were they gripped by the kind of dominant ethnic fraternalism represented by the American Protective Association or (second) Ku Klux Klan in the USA or Orange Order in Canada.6 The phenomenon of ‘white flight’ in the USA is also far more developed than in Europe, where racial mixture and co-residence is more common (Frey 1996). Furthermore can one seriously doubt the electricity of, for example, Mexican *Mestizo* or Guyanese Creole dominant ethnicity in the present day?

Smith suggests that dominant ethnies furnish the nation with its myths, symbols and public culture, and that this constrains the degree to which new immigrant groups can alter the national culture. But on the critical question of ethnic boundaries, Smith remains ambiguous – he speaks of the new migration as modifying both ‘immigrant’ and ‘older’ nations and introducing elements of pluralism into the national fabric. He adds that both ethnic and civic models of the nation (based on a ‘civil’ religion and public culture) are viable forms. Once again, the limits of civic national pluralism are not clearly specified. For if civic traditions are elastic and adaptable, then it is not immediately clear why the post-colonial ‘nations by design’ cannot succeed as well since these present civil religions and public cultures to their diverse ethnic citizenry (Smith 1995b: 107–11).

Smith partly evades the issue of the future of dominant ethnicity because his primary concern is to consider the viability of nations in relation to other forms of cultural-political organisation like supranationalism and globalisation. There are periodic ethno-nationalist backlashes in civic nations, writes Smith,
but these are presented as complementary rather than antagonistic to the main thrust of his argument: that nations are resurgent. By betting on both the ethnic and civic horses, Smith buys himself out of the conundrum of why there seems to have been a shift from ethnic to civic modes in post-industrial Western nationalism.

Such equivocation is less noticeable in Smith’s excellent riposte to the avatars of globalisation, first expressed in 1990, in which he contends that globalisation makes ‘possible a denser, more intense interaction between members of communities who share common cultural characteristics ...’. He adds that a memory-less, eclectic global culture, wrapped in the universal packaging of a standardised global economy and techno-scientific discourse, has little chance of achieving popular resonance (Smith 1990a: 171–91). Smith’s writings on globalisation and cosmopolitanism provide a much-needed corrective to the lofty pronouncements of globalists like Malcolm Waters, Anthony Giddens and Kenichi Ohmae. In this regard, it serves a very useful function. However, Smith could engage more deeply with the subtler globalisation or social psychology literature which speaks of the nation as one of the layers of governance (and of identity) between the local and global (Held 1995; Hirst and Thompson 1996). The critical question is therefore not whether the nation will survive, but whether it can retain its place as the primary seat of political power and cultural identity.

More also needs to be conceded to those who claim that there has been a decided change in the ideological context in which nationalism operates. Traditional religiosity (except at the elite level), neo-classicism, romanticism, social Darwinism, fascism and even state socialism make better bedfellows with nationalism than neo-liberal cosmopolitanism and expressive individualism. The latter are not entirely new, but have emerged as the ideological victors of the post-Enlightenment epoch, reaching far wider strata than ever before. The rise of scientific history, the eclipse of nationalistic historiography and the concomitant pressure to redefine the nation inclusively were forces which had their origins in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (i.e., Catholic Emancipation in Britain) but crested in the post-1960 period.

Likewise, large-scale changes in popular attitudes toward race and religion (not to mention drink, sex and other mores) have been repeatedly documented in social attitude surveys between 1945 and the present. These beliefs have trended in a liberal direction on cultural questions for decades, even as economic questions elicit responses that vary back and forth over time (Inglehart 1990; Mayer 1992). The individualism that spawned higher rates of divorce, psychotherapy and out-of-wedlock marriage has led to a decline in ‘social capital’, the connectedness embodied in associations like churches, patriotic societies and ethnic fraternities. This has eroded long-standing electoral cleavages and reduced political participation, causing political realignments. Should we be surprised that this trend also leads to more inter-ethnic, inter-religious and inter-racial marriage? The result appears to be a growth of a symbolic ‘pick and mix’ approach to individuals’ ethnic and
religious heritage. This seems to point, over time, to a post-ethnic attenuation of these historic identities (Putnam 2000; Gans 1994; Alba 1990).

The possibility that trans-national ‘lifestyle’ enclaves and subcultures, with their cultural boundaries, cues, superficial narratives and residential segregation, can usurp ethnic-national identity is very real and needs to be considered (Bellah 1996 [1985]; Chaney 1996). With the increasing diversity of Western cities, their liberal-egalitarian ethos and the upward mobility of ethnic minorities, we can expect to see an increasing disjuncture between lifestyle enclaves and ethnicity. Naturally, those members of the dominant ethnicity who do not make it into the university-educated ‘New Class’ will reject the multicultural order and support the ethno-nationalist right. But the forces of liberal-egalitarianism have greater access to social and political capital and maintain politico-cultural hegemony in a much more secure manner than their predecessors of the inter-war period.

The social differentiation of today vastly supersedes the functional specialisation noted by Spencer, Durkheim and Parsons. The antinomian, ‘modernist’ cultural ethos of the latter twentieth century focuses on novelty, difference, change and immediacy (Bell 1976). Thus, in addition to occupational specialisation, we now have a fragmentation of meaning, generated by individuation, which splinters public culture and taste into more specialised segments. This produces lifestyle frames like ‘hippie’, ‘bobo’ or ‘yuppie’ which often have primary meaning for modern individuals. The ‘ethnic’ segment of the dominant ethnicity is increasingly marginal in the West: concentrated among its lower-educated and peripheral members. This hard core represents an important minority, but, at least in the West, it has lost the hegemony it once possessed and the Far Right does not seriously threaten the existing order.7 At the mainstream level, even minority nationalists (i.e. Scots, Catalans, Quebecois) feel compelled to define their projects as ‘civic’.

This major shift of the past 30–40 years – from ethnic to civic, from dominant ethnic to multicultural, from *gemeinschaft* to individualism – needs to be recognised and incorporated into a more wide-ranging contemporary theory of dominant ethnicity and nationalism. This should take account of the new egalitarian individualism, of instances of ethnic and national decline, of assimilation as well as differentiation. Though many corrections must be made to Smith’s notion of perpetually-reviving nationalism, the case is far from lost. A careful specification of the limits of current liberal-egalitarian trends in particular contexts can provide the needed corrective to the utopian rhetoric of hyper-globalists like Waters or universal-individualists like Fukuyama.

The foregoing discussion has highlighted the importance of questions of ‘civic versus ethnic’ types of nations/nationalism more generally in Anthony Smith’s writings. Given the centrality of this topic in recent research (see Brubaker 1992; Soysal 1994; Fahrmeir 1997; Schnapper 1998; Gosewinkel 2001; Zimmer 2003b), it is worth examining Smith’s own contribution to this scholarly debate in somewhat greater detail. Yet before doing so it might be useful to locate its place in relation to the central concern of Smith’s work,
namely the possible connections and continuities between pre-modern
ethnic communities and modern nations. The first point that needs to be
noted in this regard is that, like the discussion concerning dominant ethnicity,
the debate over civic and ethnic forms of nationhood is almost exclusively
focused on the modern period. A glance at Smith’s definition of ‘nation’ makes
this obvious in that many of the elements he attributes to the modern nation – a
mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties
for all members (Smith 1991a: 14) – form the institutional core of the civic
nation-state. The latter is commonly underpinned by a civic ideology that
stresses the need to create, foster, and constantly improve the national
community, its institutions and public culture. This is not to say that ethnic
understandings of the nation become irrelevant under modern conditions,
but they will almost certainly be counter-balanced by the rhetoric of
civic nationalism.

In more specific terms, the conceptual differentiation between civic and
ethnic forms of nationhood has played a part within two separate (if closely
related) areas of Smith’s work. The first relates to his concern with nationalist
movements and with the formation of nations and nation-states, while the
second pertains to his interest in the ideology of nationalism and in the
construction of nationalist arguments. Smith has approached the former theme
from a more sociological and typological perspective, while in his treatment of
the latter he has often adopted a more explicitly historical and inductive
method. Although the two themes are closely linked in his oeuvre, making this
distinction will allow us to identify changes in his work that affected his writing
on civic-versus-ethnic dichotomy.

The first of these changes was mainly of a methodological nature. Whereas
in many of his earlier works Smith tended to concentrate on the formation of
nations and the role of nationalist movements in an attempt to create
typologies suited to the comparative study of nationalism (see Smith 1973,
1983, 1986), his more recent publications reveal a more marked concern with
the ideology of nationalism in its various historical manifestations (Smith
1991a, 1995a, 2000). This shift was closely related to his adoption, from the
mid-1990s, of a more dynamic understanding of the key concepts of nation,
nationalism, and national identity. Quite obviously, this partial re-orientation
grew out of his emphatically critical engagement with Eric Hobsbawm’s
concept of ‘invented traditions’ and Benedict Anderson’s view of nations as
While rejecting their radical constructivism, Smith nonetheless began to look
more systematically at the relationship between nationalist actors and their
ideologies on the one hand, and national identity on the other. This led to a
clearer differentiation between two themes that had not been separated in his
earlier work: the formation of nations, national movements and nation-states
in the long historical durée, which Smith now often discusses under the label of
‘perennialism’; and the construction and reconstruction of nationalist
arguments along ‘voluntarist’ and ‘organic’ lines.
The more typological approach is clearly visible in Smith’s pioneering *Theories of Nationalism* (Smith 1971 and 1983). In chapter 8 on typologies, Smith posits the need to identify the diversity within the unity of nationalism. Yet it is characteristic of this early work, which is still under the influence of what in a later study he would call ‘classical modernism’ (Smith 1998), that Smith is primarily concerned with nationalist movements, and only secondarily with their ideology. Unlike Ernest Gellner’s, Smith’s scepticism of theories of nationalism that concentrate on ideology (an approach applied most radically by Elie Kedourie in his seminal book *Nationalism*) is not rooted in an adherence to any kind of materialism (Gellner 1983; Kedourie 1993). Rather, Smith’s early critique of the history-of-ideas approach flows from his emphasis on the political nature of nationalism. After all, in the early 1970s Smith was convinced that a sociology of nationalist movements and their leaders along Weberian lines offered the most promising way forward. For example, in chapter 8 of *Theories of Nationalism* he challenges a number of prominent idealist accounts (by such scholars as Hugh Trevor-Roper, Carlton Hayes, and Hans Kohn). Smith is particularly sceptical of some of the causal correlations proposed in these works between nationalist ideology and the social position of nationalist intellectuals, such as Hans Kohn’s view that the differences between ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ nationalism reflect a contrast between a rational French and English bourgeois middle class and the bookish yet socially marginal sons of German clergymen and civil servants (see also Smith 1991b: 80–82). But Smith’s main point is that these historical taxonomies need to be replaced by sociological ones that concentrate on movement rather than ideology. This leads him to separate pre-independence from post-independence nationalist movements, both of which, he argues, can be underpinned by an ethnic or a territorial type of nationalism (1983: 199–210).

Perhaps it was in his illuminating yet little known essay on ‘Neo-classicist and Romantic Elements in the Emergence of Nationalist Conceptions’ (Smith 1976: 74–87) that Smith for the first time examined different patterns of nationalist ideology in a manner directly relevant to the civic-versus-ethnic dichotomy. In this essay, which effectively represents a theoretically informed piece of intellectual history, Smith explores the origins and early development of European nationalism in the period from 1770 to 1815. He argues that a transformation took place, during the 1770s and 1780s, from the neo-classical veneration of antique themes and role models to a more Romantic concern with ethnic origins. These two visions roughly correspond with the civic and ethnic patterns of communal identity in that the first emphasises political voluntarism while the second stresses organic growth. As the reader soon realises, however, the main point of this article is to question that the transition from the neo-classical to the ethno-historicist was as clear-cut as some historians of ideas had previously suggested. The neo-classical and Romantic viewpoints, Smith insists, were often fused in the thought of early nationalist thinkers and, in spite of important disagreements, neo-classicists and early Romantics shared a number of common features. To begin with, they were...
both opposed to the status quo and to ‘all authority that is external and imposed’. (Smith 1976: 86). In more strictly ideological terms, they represent varieties of eighteenth-century historicism in that both located the source of a community’s energy and unity in its origin. Lastly, each of them attributes a central place to education as a means to accomplish communal regeneration. And it is here, in the sphere of education, that the fusion of the voluntarist and organic elements becomes most apparent in the writings of some of the foremost critics of the French Enlightenment. Hence for Rousseau, education appeared as a means to rediscover, cultivate and strengthen that which was ‘authentic’ and ‘natural’ in a community (Smith 1976: 83–85).9

In The Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986), his most seminal book, Smith combines the sociological analysis of nation formation with an examination of nationalist ideology. Here he also engages, much more explicitly than in his previous works, with the differentiation between different types of nationalism first advanced in the classic accounts of Friedrich Meinecke and Hans Kohn. Building on their scholarly precedents, Smith distinguishes between ‘territorial and ethnic principles and components’, which he sees as the products of two distinct patterns of nation formation. Where the state developed earlier and more vigorously, as was the case in the Western core states of England and France, groups in control of the state (whether a pre-modern aristocracy or a modern bourgeois class) fostered and promoted a national self-image that was predominantly civic or territorial. Here the emphasis was on boundaries, legal institutions, rights and duties, citizenship and common culture. Where the road to state-formation was more protracted and contentious, as was the case in the East, national self-definitions took on a more ethnic form. This often meant that the intelligentsia of a marginal community ruled by a dominant ethnic group in an imperial context drew on ethnic symbols and myths to legitimate its claim to autonomy or, where the nationalist movement was more advanced, to an independent state. Here the stress is on ‘genealogy, populism, customs and dialects, and nativism’. Ethnic nationalists seek to revive, politicise and extend these elements, while they are less concerned with the kind of institutions and rights that are so prominent a concern for those adhering to the civic vision of the nation (1986: 136–7).

Yet Smith nonetheless objects to the widespread tendency of confusing ideal types with actual historical phenomena. In the real world, he insists, the elements associated with the civic nation – territoriality, political and legal institutions, citizenship rights, a common civic culture and ideology – are not universal but embedded in particular historical communities. The concept of a national territory makes this obvious. While territories possess a formal and universalist dimension, manifest in concepts such as boundary’ or ‘frontier’, they are also highly particularistic. This more particularistic dimension finds expression in terms such as ‘historic land’ or ‘homeland’. Another key element of the civic nation – a shared public culture – reveals the same duality. Although modern civic cultures are to some extent created and promoted from the centre, they also historically evolved or, at any rate, must be seen as
consonant with existing historical myths, symbols and memories if they are to resonate within a wider population. The same applies to political and legal institutions. If they are to evoke the necessary emotional attachments and loyalties from a given population, they must be seen as historically evolved rather than merely invented or constructed. ‘Nations’, Smith tells us, ‘always require ethnic “elements”’ because they would be ‘inconceivable without some common myths and memories of a territorial home’ (1991: 40). Conceptually, the nation has come to ‘blend two sets of dimensions, the one civic and territorial, the other ethnic and genealogical, in varying proportions in particular cases’ (1991: 15). He drives home the same point when he states that nationalism, rather than a secular ideology, is merely the ‘secular, modern equivalent of the pre-modern, sacred myth of ethnic election’ (1991: 68–70).

But what precisely, we may ask, caused these changes in the public definition of national identity? What determined the particular blending of civic and ethnic elements in a particular case? How precisely do nationalists define the nation in the face of social and political change? We believe it was Smith’s realisation that his existing concepts would make it difficult to examine these questions adequately that prompted him, in some of his most recent works, to replace terms such as ‘civic’, ‘territorial’ and ‘ethnic’ with ‘organic’ and ‘voluntarist’ (Smith 2000 and 2001). This indicates more than a terminological shift. The former terms are rooted in his typological method and reflect his ambition to construct a conceptual framework that could be used for broad diachronic and synchronic comparisons at the macro level of society. The latter terms, by contrast, are indicative of Smith’s search for concepts that can adequately capture the process-like and fluctuating nature of nationalism and national identity. In a recently published introduction to nationalism, Smith examined the complex blending of voluntarist and organic elements in the works of such thinkers as Renan, Burke, Lord Acton, Max Weber, with each fostering a vision of nationhood that tends to lean more towards either of the two ends on the voluntarist-organic continuum (2001: 13–15).

Smith undoubtedly deserves a great deal of credit above all for having emphasised the janus-faced nature of nationalist ideology and for moving the debate surrounding civic and ethnic nationalism away from the strong normative connotations typical of the classical as well as some recent accounts on the subject (see Viroli 1995; Ignatieff 1993).10 Nor can there be any doubt that his approach and analyses on this subject are superior to those accounts that associate civic and ethnic nationhood with particular ‘traditions’ or ‘mentalities’ or tend to classify entire ‘nations’ as either ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ (culminating in highly simplistic assumptions about ‘the-Germans’-and-their-obsession-with-blood-and-the-soil versus ‘the-French’-and-the English’-and-their-appreciation-of-rationality-and-civic-liberty). Yet if our concern relates to the discontinuously occurring public redefinitions of national identity rather than to long-term developments, intellectual debates, or citizenship legislation, then the limitations of his approach are revealed. These have become particularly obvious to historians and social scientists studying
national movements and political ideologues rather than focusing on a handful of selected thinkers and intellectuals or taking a broadly comparative approach.

One might be able to overcome these problems if ‘voluntarist’ and ‘organic’ are conceived not in terms of conceptions, principles or ideas, but in terms of mechanisms or metaphors that actors use as they construct nationalist arguments by drawing on particular resources. The resources that nationalists commonly draw upon in different contexts to address particular problems – political institutions and values, cultural traditions and codes, communal history, even geography – can be processed in either voluntarist or organic ways: as the product of human action or, alternatively, as forces that determine the collective ‘character’ of a nation. Some adherents of organic nationalism, for example, rejected the voluntarist connotations commonly attached to the modern nation-state. Instead, they saw the state in naturalistic terms, as an expression of the evolutionary development of the national community, not as a set of deliberately created institutions. The same is true of ‘nature’ and ‘geography’. They too need not be conceived in organic (i.e. deterministic) terms, although this has admittedly often been the case where nationalists made references to the natural environment. Even so, for some eighteenth-century neo-classicists the natural environment was cherished because it could serve as a projection of human ingenuity and an expression of national character. But perhaps the most instructive example is language. While in the French republican tradition language is conceived in voluntarist terms – as something that can be taught, learned, and acquired, for a right-wing nationalist like Albert Sorel language was organic and deterministic.11

Conclusion

This article suggests that Anthony Smith has made important contributions to the literatures on both dominant ethnicity and the ‘ethnic-versus-civic’ nationalism debate. In terms of the former, he has successfully redefined the American term ‘ethnicity’ (as well as ‘nation’) in a more consistent manner than his exoticist and radical predecessors. In so doing, he has opened up space for an exploration of the phenomenon of dominant ethnicity within modern nations. A limitation of Smith’s work, however, is his incomplete specification of the role of dominant ethnicity (as opposed to nations) within post-industrial Western societies. In terms of the ‘ethnic-civic’ discourse, Smith’s work has again successfully abstracted a key concept away from its overly normative and idealist matrix and employed it as a useful sociological typology. Nonetheless, this approach could be improved by a stronger focus on ‘voluntarist’ and ‘organic’ processes as mechanisms rather than ideas – a transition which could improve their utility in empirical situations which are marked by discontinuities in symbolic strategies and social action.
Notes

1 For more discussion, see Kaufmann 2001.
2 There is some purchase in considering this tendency in the light of Roman characterisations of outsiders as ‘natio’, or in disparate foreign words like Welsh, Vlach and Viet (Smith 2004).
3 Ogburn’s theory of cultural lag provides an explicit theorisation of this reasoning.
4 The new White Studies literature only partly redresses this issue since it remains firmly wedded to the idea of an Anglo or European bogeyman which serves as a moral centre for further discussion (Ceaser 1998).
5 Smith’s notion of a ‘diurnal round of work and leisure’ has parallels with Bourdieu’s notion of habitus or Habermas’ use of the term ‘lifeworld’.
6 The Orange Order’s largest jurisdiction in the first half of the twentieth century was Canada, where membership levels, in per capita terms, equalled those of Northern Ireland and far exceeded anything seen in Scotland or England (Kaufmann 2002).
7 The 35 per cent of the popular vote attained by Georg Haider in Austria and the strong showing of the FN in the first round of presidential elections in France represent the high-water mark for the European far-right. In all locations, the combined effort of the media, established political parties and economic interests as well as the popular mood have limited the progress of politicised dominant ethnicity.
8 He discusses this relationship most explicitly in his article, ‘Gastronomy or geology? The role of nationalism in the reconstruction of nations’ (Smith 1995).
9 Smith has provided a more systematic account of the role of historicism in ch. 6 of his book, The Ethnic Revival. See Smith 1981.
10 For an incisive critique of the normative point of view, see Yack 1996.
11 For a fuller outline of these ideas and examples, see Zimmer 2003a.

References


