Cantonisation: historical paths to territorial autonomy for regional cultural communities

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ABSTRACT. Since the First World War, grants of territorial autonomy have been a widespread means by which regimes of diverse ideologies and political cultures have attempted to address the demands of regional cultural communities within their borders. Cantonisation, or asymmetrical decentralisation along territorial-cultural lines, has been a common form of territorial autonomy employed by these states. Yet, despite its importance, little is known about whether and why such cantonisation measures have helped or hindered the search for peace and stability in culturally heterogeneous states. Part of the answer lies in analysing the historical-political contexts, or historical paths, by which cantonisation arrangements have emerged. Comparative analysis identifies five such paths: international settlements; state-building; democratisation or transitions from authoritarian rule; democratic maintenance; and decolonisation. Each of these paths poses distinctive problems for the evolution of the cantonisation arrangement.

Scepticism persists about the practical ability of territorial autonomy arrangements to resolve tensions in culturally plural states. From the former Yugoslavia to the Basque Country, from Quebec to Tibet, separatism and violent conflict have not been averted even where regional cultural communities have had some degree of autonomy. The philosophical convictions dominant in many states, whether democratic or authoritarian, further undermine territorial autonomy as a viable response to regional cultural claims. The institutional recognition of group rights that autonomy entails appear to violate the liberal democratic tenets of equality and individual rights. It also clashes with traditional notions of state sovereignty, with their centralising and homogenising implications.

Despite these problems, the parties to many current conflicts involving regional cultural communities demand and even employ territorial autonomy. Ethnically defined territorial autonomy proved unable to maintain the integrity of the Yugoslav and Soviet federations under communism. Yet, the division of Bosnia into autonomous ethnically defined units has been the basis of most proposals to end the tragic war and salvage
the post-communist state. Promises of 'special status' for Chechnya within Russia also have been pivotal to attempts to satisfy separatist forces (*The Economist*, 31 August 1996). Indeed, the post-Cold War international community is generally more favourable towards territorial solutions to communal conflicts than at any time since the Second World War. Both the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and, to a lesser extent, the Council of Europe, have moved towards viewing territorial autonomy as a constructive means of resolving some conflicts involving regional cultural communities (Dalton 1994; Schumann 1994).

Ironically, given its growing importance as a conflict management technique, little is known about the circumstances in which territorial autonomy has been used in the past, especially why it has succeeded or failed to promote peace, stability and respect for human rights in particular states. Much of the existing literature consists of individual case studies rather than comparative analyses that contribute to theory-building. These studies generally focus on explanatory variables such as the nature of the political institutions used; the degree of formal and *de facto* autonomy given to the regional cultural community; the role of identity, socio-economic circumstances, and political culture; and international responses. While important, these variables are not a complete explanation.

The present article argues that the ability of territorial autonomy arrangements to ease tensions in culturally plural states is also related to the historical-political context in which the territorial agreement emerged. That is, the historical paths by which culturally defined communities gain autonomy influence outcomes. In making these arguments, the article identifies and focuses on a particular form of territorial autonomy defined as asymmetrical decentralisation along territorial-cultural lines, or cantonisation. As a starting point for further research, the article offers a taxonomy of the five major paths by which cantonisation arrangements have emerged since the post-First World War peace settlement. They are (1) international settlements to resolve the status of disputed territories; (2) newly installed authoritarian regimes expanding into and consolidating their control over new territory; (3) polities negotiating transitions from authoritarian rule; (4) consolidated democracies confronted with unassimilated regional cultural communities; and (5) dependent territories undergoing decolonisation. Citing examples of each path, the article explores the hypothesis that each of these routes to cantonisation raises distinctive theoretical issues and poses characteristic problems for the resulting autonomy arrangement.

What is cantonisation?

Typologies of territorial autonomy rarely encompass the actual complexity of political arrangements in culturally plural states. They generally identify
confederation, federation and regional devolution, including local govern-
ment and, more recently, meso-government. These ideal types are assumed
to be made up of symmetrical subunits. The implication is that states,
being creatures of homogeneity resistant to the political recognition of
cultural difference, treat all their component units the same. In practice,
however, states confronted with regional cultural communities often make
exceptions.

One of these asymmetries is cantonisation, meaning the granting of
special autonomy by a central or federal state to a locally chosen legislative
or executive body with jurisdiction over a territory whose boundaries
delineate or approximate those of a regional cultural community. Like all
forms of territorial autonomy, cantonisation involves uncomfortable com-
promises for both the state and the substate community: it denies the state
the nationalist logic of cultural and political homogeneity; it denies the
regional cultural community the nationalist logic of secession and indepen-
dence. Moreover, its asymmetrical character challenges the principles of
formal subunit equality and uniformity of need on which the purest forms
of federalism and regional devolution are built. Cantonisation involves
recognising a territory's claims to a distinct cultural identity, however
contested, by giving it a status and authority different from substate units
with no recognised claim to cultural uniqueness.

Cantonisation is found in unitary states, the special status of Corsica in
France under the statut particulier being one example. It coexists with
federal arrangements, the additional powers and authority of Quebec within
Canada being illustrative of this. That such well-established democratic
states as France and Canada employ cantonisation is, perhaps, not
surprising. More unexpectedly, authoritarian states and those undergoing
transitions from authoritarian rule have also employed cantonisation as a
strategy for coping with cultural difference, as the taxonomy below
illustrates.

A taxonomy

In the interest of simplicity and space limitations, the taxonomy offered is
open-ended, the historical paths identified being broad and suggestive rather
than exhaustive. Moreover, any empirical case of cantonisation will have
features of more than one of the five paths. The taxonomy associates
particular cantons only with the path that appears dominant or most
analytically relevant. The taxonomy also excludes regional cultural commu-
nities whose autonomy predates the First World War, such as the relation-
ship between the Channel Islands and Isle of Man and the United Kingdom
(UK). The special status of most of these territories is based on dynastic or
feudal ties, not on the nationalist claims that characterise twentieth-century
cantonisation.
The definition of cantonisation used is deliberately broad so as to encompass a diversity of constitutional arrangements offering a wide range of *de facto* and *de jure* local control to the canton. However, it excludes those forms of asymmetrical decentralisation that involve only administrative or executive deconcentration, such as the Offices for Scotland and Wales within the UK. The transfer of authority to locally selected bodies that characterises the former is qualitatively different from mere deconcentration and riskier for the state because of its potential to dramatically shift the balance of political legitimacy and power to the cantonised community.

The path of international settlement

Most cantonisation arrangements have an international dimension. However, in a few cases cantonisation has come about directly through the actions of outside states, acting singly or in concert and enforcing the arrangements through international agreements. Some instances of cantonisation by international settlement have emerged at the ends of wars, when victor states could impose new regimes on defeated or weak states. Others are linked with attempts to resolve the status of territories claimed by two or more states. Still others are attempts to end minority conflicts that have become internationalised through the involvement of regionally powerful outside states with ethnic links to the disputed territory. The ability of outside states to overpower the domestic preferences of the core state and regional cultural community concerned is both the strength and weakness of cantons that emerge by the international settlement path.

A first group of international settlement cantons emerged under the minority treaties imposed by the First World War victors and the League of Nations on Ruthene-inhabited regions of Carpathia within Czechoslovakia; the Swedish-speaking Åland Islands within Finland; and Memel Territory within Lithuania, where the Port of Memel was inhabited by ethnic Germans. Internationally imposed and secured cantonisation was used to placate and protect regional cultural communities who, having had their own claims to self-determination rejected by the victorious great powers, found themselves in newly created 'national' states highly intolerant of minorities within their borders (Hannum 1990).

The subsequent demise of two of the three League imposed cantons suggests international settlement autonomy agreements are only as strong as the international order and balance of power that made them possible. With the disintegration of the League of Nations and the delicate post-First World War international order, the demise of the cantonisation treaties for Memel and Carpathia was only a matter of time (Claude 1969).

By contrast, the Åland Islands survived the interwar years as a canton that still flourishes today. The activities of the League and neighbouring Sweden provide part of the explanation, illustrating how outside states can
help overcome the initial reluctance of domestic actors to make the compromises needed for cantonisation to work.\(^9\) Today, islanders seem to feel that domestic constitutional guarantees provide more security for their autonomy than international pressures and treaty guarantees (Jansson et al. 1990). However, Åland’s autonomy probably would not have come about had it not been for the intervention of outside states.

The Åland case also illustrates the critical role of external states with cultural ties to the canton. Sweden’s anti-irredentist stance and its bilateral agreement with Finland securing Åland’s autonomous status have provided more lasting support for the cantonisation settlement than multilateral support through the League. The international settlement canton of South Tyrol (Alto Adige), a German-speaking region within Italy, is further evidence of the value of such bilateral pressures. Under the portion of the 1946 Italian Peace Treaty known as the De Gasperi–Gruber Agreement, the victorious Allied Powers required Italy to give some autonomy to South Tyrol, which had been taken from Austria-Hungary and attached to Italy after the First World War.\(^10\) However, the influence of the Allied Powers on Italy quickly declined. It was ongoing Austrian pressure that eventually secured a form of autonomy satisfactory to South Tyroleans under a 1969 agreement negotiated among the Austrian and Italian states and canton leaders. In 1992, the Austrian government formally declared that Italy had finally implemented the reforms required under the 1969 accord (Alcock 1994).

However, international settlements may actually destabilise cantonisation arrangements if key domestic actors feel that outside states cannot be trusted or that the agreement is illegitimate because it was externally imposed. These are major problems in Bosnia, where some Bosnian Serb and Croat groups do not accept the terms of the Dayton peace accords by which the neighbouring states of Croatia and Yugoslavia have committed them to a cantonised Bosnia. Following the 1991 Gulf War, the United States-led international coalition established a militarily secured canton to protect the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq from Iraqi government military attack (Fuller 1993). The Baghdad government’s refusal to recognise the de facto autonomous region raises questions about its long-term survival should the international military presence be withdrawn.

Similar questions persist about the future autonomy of Hong Kong and Macau. The last European enclaves on the China coast, the two territories will be incorporated into the PRC in 1997 and 1999, respectively, with canton status guaranteed by international agreements.\(^11\) Under the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, the British dependent territory of Hong Kong will become a Special Administrative Region of the PRC. It is promised a high degree of autonomy except in foreign affairs and defence, retention of its liberal and capitalist social and economic systems for fifty years, and some democracy, the extent of which is the subject of much controversy. The 1987 Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration provides the
Portuguese administered territory of Macau autonomous status similar to Hong Kong. However, neither the British nor Portuguese governments have the clout to enforce the accords alone once they transfer the territories to the PRC. Ever protective of its sovereignty, the PRC government is extremely distrustful of the internationalised nature of the agreements, particularly that for Hong Kong. Attempting to reduce external influences it regards as pro-democratic and, therefore, subversive, the regime has already tried to curtail the autonomy promised to Hong Kong in the Joint Declaration (see Cheek-Milby 1995).

The state-building path

State-building involves, among other processes, the activities whereby a central regime penetrates and develops effective control over quasi-sovereign or sovereign political units on its periphery (Tilly 1975). Cantonisation is one of the ‘anti-state institutions’ used in this process. The term was coined by Charles Tilly (1975) to describe the strategies states use to co-opt potential rivals, but which appear to contradict the general homogenising thrust of the state-building process. Allowing subordinate political units some autonomy reduces the benefits states accrue from centralising and harmonising extraction and control policies, as well as from homogenising populations. However, such concessions also potentially lower the costs of state-building if they reduce resistance to penetration and control by the state. This is not always the case, as cantons emerging by the state-building path are subject to considerable strain due to tensions between the simultaneous imperatives of state penetration required by state-building and those of state withdrawal demanded by cantonisation.

Communist authoritarian state-building

In this century, culturally heterogeneous communist states – the Soviet Union, PRC, Yugoslavia, and Vietnam – have used cantonisation extensively during their most intensive state-building phases. This generally was during or in the immediate aftermath of wars of conquest or colonial liberation when the new communist regimes’ survival in the face of hostile outside states and domestic rivals required the support or passivity of regional cultural communities (Connor 1984).

The Soviet theory and practice of ethno-territoriality was the model consciously employed by all of these states. During the Russian Civil War, the Soviet state’s promises of self-determination for major non-Russian regions were often decisive in regaining parts of the country (Connor 1984; Tishkov 1992). Once in power, Soviet leaders gave selected regional cultural communities limited autonomy within a complex hierarchy of culturally defined autonomous territories. Within fifteen formally symmetrical federal
units, known as union republics, granted to such communities as the Ukrainians and Belorussians, smaller regional cultural communities such as the Chechens, Ossetians and Buryats were given ‘titular’ status in cantons designated autonomous republics, autonomous provinces or autonomous regions.

The tensions between state penetration and control and canton autonomy were particularly stark in the Soviet Union. Despite the seemingly generous autonomy provisions in the Soviet constitutions, the actual degree of political autonomy allowed the cantons varied over time and space and was often overwhelmed by the centralised power of the communist party-state apparatus and command economy as well as the political and economic domination of majority Russians. However, the titular regional cultural communities in the various Soviet cantons did have some authority to develop their national languages, national-language education and national-language administrations based on native cadres, among other privileges (Connor 1984).

Similar policies and problems characterise the other communist states that followed the Soviet model. In the PRC, where state-builders chose a unitary version of the federal Soviet ethno-territorial system, the central government set up some eighty-eight autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties, most in the eight years after founding the PRC in 1949 (Mackerras 1994). While clearly subordinate to the centralised party-state, China’s early cantonisation policy brought these communities a proportional number of representatives on government bodies within the autonomous areas and other privileges similar to those in Soviet cantons. Policies aimed at reforming and modernising society along socialist lines – particularly related to land reform, marriage law and taxation – were applied in modified form or with a slower pace in most cantons (Dreyer 1976; Connor 1986; Mackerras 1994). In Yugoslavia, the regime set up a formally symmetrical layer of culturally defined federal republics, among which Serbia itself contained the cantons of Kosovo, with its ethnic Albanian majority, and Vojvodina, with its large concentration of ethnic Hungarians. During the war against the French and the US, much of which they fought from minority territory, the Vietnamese communists set up the Thai-Meo (later Tay-Bac), Viet Bac and Lao-Ha-Yen Autonomous Regions. The former two cantons survived until the communist victory in 1975 but were dismantled shortly after, suggesting they had outlived their role in co-opting minority populations during the crucial phases of state-building (Connor 1984).

If Soviet-style cantonisation helped these states reduce their short-term state-building costs, its longer term contribution to political stability and the avoidance of violent conflict has been mixed. Despite Marxist predictions that ethnic identities would whither away, cantonisation has had the unintended consequence of increasing political mobilisation on ethnic lines in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the PRC (Gladney 1991; Lapidus
The potential for territorial autonomy to encourage nationalism and communal conflicts is not unique to communist states (Nordlinger 1972; Hannum 1990; Zartman 1990; Frye 1992). However, such developments may have particularly destructive potential in such states because communist regimes discourage the development of alternative foci for identity and community interests outside the party-state. Thus, when central party-state authority weakens or breaks down, such as in the former Soviet Union, regional cultural identities fostered by cantonisation have a stronger potential to serve as a ready made, and sometimes the only, locus for opposition (Rakowska-Harmstone 1992; Tishkov 1992; Verdery 1993).

Non-communist authoritarian state-building

There are few twentieth-century examples of new non-communist authoritarian regimes using cantonisation to secure control over semi-autonomous peripheral polities. This is partly because, in contrast to new communist states, most post-colonial states in Africa and Asia inherited ready-made boundaries from the colonial period that other states have collaborated to maintain. Nonetheless, a few newly installed non-communist regimes have agreed to cantonisation to secure control over rebellious regional cultural communities. In 1946, during the civil war against the communists, the Nationalist Chinese government conceded regional autonomy to the breakaway East Turkestan Republic lead by Turkic Muslims and White Russians in north-west Xinjiang province. Its military options reduced by troop commitments elsewhere, the Nationalists used cantonisation to quell the separatists (Dreyer 1976; Mackerras 1994). Under the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, the regime of Ga’afar Nimeiri conceded significant autonomy to southern Sudan, a culturally distinct region that the British had administered as a separate colony and that subsequently resisted incorporation into independent Sudan. The agreement, which survived until 1983, ended seventeen years of war between this predominantly African-oriented, Animist and Christian region and Sudan’s largely Islamic, Arab-oriented north (Alier 1990; Woodward 1990).12

The state penetration that necessarily accompanies cantonisation by the state-building path may create intolerable strains if it results in the political mobilisation of either the regional cultural community or the state’s dominant cultural group. According to Ted Gurr (1993), authoritarian polities do not have available to them the legal and political institutions based on attitudes of tolerance that help democratic polities diffuse the demands of mobilised cultural groups. This may help explain the failure of cantonisation to avert communal conflict in regions like Tibet and Muslim Xinjiang in the PRC.
Cantonisation

The path of democratisation or transitions from authoritarian rule

Cantons that emerge during the uncertain process of democratisation or transitions from authoritarian rule confront their own stresses. These stem from tensions between the egalitarian, individualistic and majoritarian principles often associated with democracy and the tolerance of asymmetry and group rights demanded by cantonisation. In many states, decentralisation and regional autonomy movements have been associated with forces considered inimical to progress and modernisation.

Democratisation and cantonisation have become historically linked processes in several ways. Authoritarian governments are often highly centralised and, intolerant of the claims of regional cultural communities, characterised by both communal protest and rebellion (Gurr 1993). Regional autonomist or separatist movements sometimes emerge as key opponents of these regimes. In such circumstances, demands for liberalisation and democratisation may coincide with demands for recognition of local identities and aspirations to local self-government. The support of regional cultural oppositions becomes essential for the success of the post-authoritarian regime. Key leaders may also see political decentralisation as a means of averting a resurgence of authoritarianism.

Cantonisation has twice emerged as part of democratic transitions in Spain, illustrating these links. In the 1930s, the short-lived Second Republic accommodated Catalan and Basque demands for self-government. The crushing of both democracy and regional autonomy under Franco set the stage for a second democratic transition with a strong regional autonomy dimension. Rallying against the Franco regime's attempts to destroy their local languages, cultural traditions and self-governing institutions, Catalan, Basque and Galician leaders became important opponents of the government. Consequently, negotiations to re-establish democracy after Franco's death had to address regional demands. The result was canton status for the three 'historical' regions within a country-wide system of autonomous regional governments (Gunther et al. 1986; Keating 1993).

The participation of regional cultural community elites in anti-authoritarian oppositions also meant that regional autonomy has been high on the political agenda during the current transition from authoritarianism in Ethiopia. Autonomist and separatist groups from Tigre and Eritrea spearheaded an ultimately successful war against the authoritarian government of Mengitsu Haile Mariam. In the mid-1980s, the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) deepened the politicisation of ethnicity in Ethiopia by initiating the establishment of ethnically-based satellite organisations to increase its support as it moved into other regions. By the time the TPLF-led opposition overthrew the Mengitsu regime in 1991, the ethnic character of resistance to oppression was firmly established. The new TPLF-dominated Ethiopian government set up a country-wide scheme of self-governing regions and subregions based in large part on ethnolinguistic
criteria. Ironically, according to Mutua (1993), the new Ethiopian govern-
ment is now using ethnic self-government to suppress the emergence of a
genuine, state-wide opposition.15

Post-communist East and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union
illustrate other ways in which cantonisation and transitions from author-
itarian rule intertwine. In several of these states, the process of liberalising
and democratising authoritarian political and economic systems encouraged
political mobilisation expressed as ethnically oriented political parties and
national or autonomist movements (Frye 1992; Goldman et al. 1992;
Lapidus 1992; Linz and Stepan 1992). Only a few of the possible
explanations will be mentioned here. Linz and Stepan (1992) have argued
that, because the first competitive multiparty elections in the Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia were held at the substate rather than the state-wide level,
they fostered appeals to regional ethnic identities as a means of mobilising
electors against the centre. The dismantling of communism may have also
aggravated social relations by sparking competition for control of the
economic and political resources being restored to the citizenry (Verdery
1993). Ethnicity may be the set of symbols most easily mobilised in the
articulation of grievances and hopes because other potential sets, be they
ideological or class-based, were subjugated or eliminated during the
communist period (Linz and Stepan 1992).

In a few cases, states have responded to ethnic political mobilisation with
cantonisation agreements. Most prominently, the Russian government has
signed a treaty with the government of Tatarstan that grants the region
more autonomy than other republics in the revamped federation (Teague
1994). The largely ethnic Russian Crimea within Ukraine had its regional
autonomy restored in February 1991, including its right to its own
government and president (de Nevers 1994; Solchanyk 1994). In 1994, the
government of newly independent Moldova conceded some autonomy to
the breakaway Dniestr Republic, which has a large Russian-speaking
community (King 1994).

A more fundamental link between nationalism and democratisation may
also help explain the emergence of cantonisation agreements during
attempts to install and consolidate democratic institutions in some culturally
heterogeneous states. A democratic polity requires the citizens’ voluntary
acceptance of political procedures that result in governments with legitimate
claims on their obedience (Linz and Stepan 1992). However, this agreement
cannot exist unless these same citizens first accept as legitimate the state and
its claims to govern a particular territory and population. Thus, Rustow
(1970: 350) has argued that the single background condition required for
democratisation is that ‘the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be
must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community
they belong’. Linz and Stepan (1992) go further. They maintain that
agreements about whether the state and its boundaries are accepted as
legitimate by citizens precede agreements about democracy. Perhaps,
however, a transition from authoritarian rule can begin without the prior acceptance of the state's jurisdiction by politically or geographically peripheral regional cultural communities. However, if the transition to democracy is to be successfully consolidated, it must eventually win the consent of such peripheral communities. In this sense, attempts by the post-Marcos Philippine government to use cantonisation to end costly and prolonged insurgencies in Muslim Mindanao and the aboriginal highlands of north-central Luzon are part of its efforts to consolidate the country's fragile new democracy (Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 Dec. 1989, 15 Feb. 1990; The Economist, 24 Aug. 1996).

Once cantonisation begins, its survival partly depends on the durability of the underlying democratisation process. Moreover, the failure of cantonisation to manage the tensions in culturally plural states can itself undermine democratisation. This interdependence has twice been evident in Spain. In the 1930s, the autonomy of the 'historical' regions became caught up in the conflict and political disintegration preceding the Civil War, falling apart completely under Franco's subsequent repression of peripheral nationalities (Keating 1993). The attempted coup that tried to topple the newly democratic Spanish government in 1981 was partly motivated by concern that regional autonomy and other concessions to regional nationalists threatened the integrity of the state (Preston 1986).

If democratisation makes cantonisation possible in some states, it can also undermine special status regions in the longer term as demands for equality and reciprocal rights for all regions mount. Such pressures exist in authoritarian states, but are more easily ignored by regimes not dependent on the ballot box. In post-Franco Spain, initial concessions to the 'historical' regions escalated into a generalised move to regional autonomy. By the mid 1980s, autonomy statutes had been agreed across the state, although the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, along with Andalucia, retained the highest degree of self-government.

The example suggests that some formulations of democracy clash with cantonisation more than others. Cantonisation was feasible in Spain partly because the democratic opposition largely regarded democratisation and decentralisation as interconnected and compatible demands, if only for reasons of political expediency. However, in post-communist East and Central Europe, a more firmly majoritarian and nationalistic conception of democratisation has dominated, making cantonisation more difficult. In these states, liberalisation and democratisation have coincided with liberation from external domination, be it Russian or Serbian. The resulting link between democracy and national assertion through the rule of ethnically defined majority communities has created a situation in which governing parties are less tolerant of the autonomist demands of regional minorities (Pusić 1994; see Slamin 1992).
The path of democratic maintenance

A fourth path to cantonisation has been that of consolidated democracies. This path includes cantonisation arrangements agreed in democratic states in response both to pressures from substate communities for politico-territorial recognition of their distinctive cultural identity and to the state’s own economic, administrative and political needs. According to Sharpe (1993), the decentralist trend evident in many consolidated democracies since the late 1960s is a response to both country-wide and local pressures including: rational-functional forces such as uneven economic development, urbanisation and regional planning needs; sectional interests linked to political parties, politicians and state bureaucracies; central state fiscal pressures; and ideological imperatives based on the association of decentralisation with democracy. The impetus for cantonisation may involve elements of all of these. However, the linking of decentralisation with a deepening of democracy takes on particular symbolic and functional importance.

We have already emphasised that democratic processes imply a citizenry that accepts as legitimate the state’s claim to govern a particular territory or, at minimum, a citizenry committed to using democratic constitutional means to change state boundaries. At the same time, institutionalised democracies do experience high levels of grievance about economic, social and political rights and high levels of mobilisation for communal protest (Gurr 1993). Thus, the dynamics of democratic maintenance in consolidated democracies necessarily involve, among other activities, the ongoing processes whereby central or federal governments and mobilised regional cultural communities continuously negotiate to maintain the latter’s acceptance of the legitimacy of the state’s claim to jurisdiction over them. Sometimes the state resorts to cantonisation in an attempt to win this acceptance. In this way, some states come to recognise substate communal equality alongside the individual equality more traditionally associated with democracy (Sharpe 1993).

As in new democracies, tensions between the two forms of equality persist, creating a resistance to asymmetry that both shapes the way in which cantons emerge in consolidated democratic states and threatens their long-term survival. As a result, cantons emerging by the democratic maintenance path may encounter less resistance if they are part of a policy of state-wide decentralisation. The departure from Jacobin tradition that led the French government to grant Corsica special autonomy under the 1982 statut particulier was part of a package of local and regional government reforms that created a layer of locally elected regional assemblies across the country. Although its autonomy is restricted, the island gained a unique legal status and more state subsidies and autonomy in educational, social, and cultural policies than other metropolitan regions (Hintjens et al. 1995).
Corsica’s special status was also facilitated by the island’s relative peripherality, geographically and economically, and its problems with violent separatism. Where a regional cultural community is less peripheral, its cantonisation may trigger pressure for reciprocal devolution in other regions. This Spanish ‘snowball’ effect mentioned earlier is discernible in Canada. The political battle between predominantly francophone Quebec and majority anglophone provinces partly flows from concern that the recognition of group rights demanded by Quebec threatens the principles of individual rights and provincial equality. The Quebec government’s demands for more autonomy have triggered reciprocal demands for further transfers of authority to the other provinces. They have also encouraged demands by aboriginal community leaders for formal and practical recognition of their claim to a right to self-government. The federal government has already negotiated major cantonisation arrangements with the Cree-Naskapi in Quebec, the Sechelt Indian band in British Columbia, and the Inuit in the Eastern Arctic (Fleras and Elliott 1992).

Democratic polities, unlike many of their non-democratic counterparts, cannot easily remain coherent if they consistently deny the rights of major communal groups (Gurr 1993), or if they must suppress large nationalist or autonomist movements over long periods (Linz and Stepan 1992). The governments of white-ruled apartheid South Africa and Israel denied economic and political rights to major cultural communities under their control while retaining a democratic polity for their politically dominant populations. They faced the protracted mobilisation of and violent protests by these repressed communities as a consequence. Both governments used cantonisation to try to resolve the resulting contradictions. In 1993, the Israeli government agreed to limited Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza occupied territories. The South African government tried to use cantonisation as a transitional stage on the way to setting up formally independent states for blacks. Beginning in 1963, the apartheid regime created ten formally self-governing ‘tribal’ homelands in which all black South Africans were given citizenship and political rights. Most of the international community and the domestic anti-apartheid movement universally condemned the homelands policy as an attempt to disguise white political and economic domination in a cloak of ‘national’ territorial self-government and ‘decolonisation’ (Dugard 1980; Stultz 1980; Meredith 1988).

The path of decolonisation

A fifth path to cantonisation has been that of decolonisation, where metropolitan states have conceded various types of self-government to their overseas colonies and other non-contiguous culturally distinct dependent territories. Like cantons linked with other historical paths, those emerging
in colonial contexts are often subject to movements demanding more autonomy or full independence. However, such movements take on a particular character in decolonisation cantons and have more often led to independence. They are influenced by the post-Second World War international system, which has regarded full independence as the preferred outcome of decolonisation and awards significantly more rights to states than to other types of political units.

Most decolonisation cantons are islands in the Caribbean or Asia-Pacific whose small size and relative poverty make independence a costly option. Particularly after the Second World War, cantonisation was a means by which these dependent territories gained some measure of internal political autonomy without foregoing the economic, political, citizenship, and security benefits derived from attachment to a metropolitan state. The latter, for its part, gained certain foreign policy and security advantages. So, while most colonies rushed to achieve independence, a wide variety of autonomy arrangements emerged or evolved from earlier self-government institutions to accommodate continuing links between the US, UK, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and New Zealand and their remaining overseas dependencies.

Among them, various 'associated state' arrangements formally confer quasi-confederal or quasi-federal autonomy on the former colony in that the canton has the right to unilaterally opt for independence if it follows certain procedures.\textsuperscript{16} The metropolitan state generally retains authority over defence and foreign affairs, while the 'cantonised' state has authority over matters of local concern and can sometimes also conduct aspects of its own foreign policy. The 'cantonised' state also generally receives financial and other aid from the metropolitan state, where its citizens usually retain some citizenship rights. Examples include the relationship of free association between New Zealand and the Cook Islands and Niue (Hoadley 1992); the arrangements that formerly linked the Caribbean territories of Antigua, St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St Lucia, Grenada, Dominica and St Vincent to the UK (Thorndike 1975); and the linkages between the US and the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (Hoadley 1992;).\textsuperscript{17} The dominion status of southern Ireland from its emergence as the Irish Free State in 1922 to its achievement of full independence as the Republic of Ireland in 1937 is an earlier example of this quasi-confederal form of cantonisation.

Other decolonisation cantons have more restricted autonomy than associated states. These include the cases of Northern Ireland under the devolved Stormont rule from 1921 to the imposition of direct UK rule in 1972; Netherlands Antilles and Aruba within the Netherlands (Hannum 1990); the self-governing status of the French overseas territories of New Caledonia, Polynesia, and Wallis and Fortuna, and the collectivités territoriales of St-Pierre et Miquelon and Mayotte (Hintjens \textit{et al.} 1995);\textsuperscript{18} Greenland's home-rule status within Denmark; and Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana's commonwealth links with the US.
In theory, cantons originating by the decolonisation path give the overseas territory the best of both worlds: a high degree of self-government with the benefits of economic subsidies from and citizenship rights in the metropolitan state. In practice, these cantons are often caught in a permanent state of limbo. They remain economically dependent: economic subsidies raise average incomes, but do not solve the structural problems of their highly peripheral economies. Moreover, they forego the dignity and other psychological, political and practical benefits accruing to independent states. Michael Reisman's comments on Puerto Rico's canton links with the US apply to other decolonisation cantons too:

In terms of general social and economic development measured in either GNP or per capita income, association has been a beneficial arrangement for most Puerto Ricans. In terms of self-respect, dignity and national identity, association has been less successful. And woe to him who fails to weigh these intangibles in the balance; they are among the most explosive factors of this century. (Reisman 1975: 121)

Such tensions characterise all cantons in which the citizens' sense of cultural separateness is reinforced by their perception of themselves as economically and political dependent. However, such sentiments take on a special urgency in decolonisation cantons because of the ingrained expectation that decolonisation should lead to independence, not continuing dependence.

**Conclusions**

Cantonisation has become a global phenomenon in the twentieth century. The sheer diversity of the types of states and the circumstances in which it has been used attests to cantonisation's usefulness and flexibility as a technique for managing the competing claims of states and regional cultural communities.

Nevertheless, it is striking that most states, and many regional cultural communities, have only adopted such decentralisation arrangements under duress. Whether the context is an international settlement, state-building, a transition from authoritarian rule or decolonisation, most cantonisation accords are associated with changes of regime and the constitutional traumas and violence that often accompany such upheavals (see Horowitz 1986). It is only in the context of democratic maintenance and some cases of decolonisation that significant numbers of states and regional cultural communities have agreed to cantonisation without the impetus of a regime change. However, even here, cantonisation arrangements have frequently been impelled by political violence, Corsica's *statut particulier* and Palestinian self-rule being two examples.

Born of exceptional configurations of political and military power, cantonisation accords all too frequently do not survive subsequent changes in the balance of power in culturally plural states. More comparative study
is needed to uncover why. Such research would do well to regard
cantonisation settlements not as static constitutional configurations and
institutions disconnected from their roots, but as deeply embedded in and
shaped by their particular historical origins.

Notes

1 This article takes as its inspiration Stepan's (1986) arguments about the importance of the
variable of historical path in understanding democratisation processes.
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2 Regional cultural communities are geographically concentrated populations claiming to
have an identity distinctive from that of the state's core, whether that identity is linked to
language, religion, ethnicity, race or way of life. Such identity claims are made on behalf of
populations by elites attempting to legitimise particular entitlements and may or may not be
accepted by the population being so defined.
3 See, for example, 'Bosnia and Herzegovina–Croatia–Yugoslavia: General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes' (1996), International Legal
Materials 35: 75ff.
4 McGarry and O'Leary (1993: 30–1) use the term cantonisation, but define it as 'devolution
organised on an ethno-territorial basis' (see also Sharpe 1979 and Coakley 1993). Although it
also denominates electoral districts, or cantons, in French départements, the term is useful in the
present context because of its association with the territorial accommodation of cultural
differences in Switzerland. Note, however, that Swiss canton and demi-canton boundaries do
not correspond with the boundaries of linguistic, religious and ethnic communities in a
unidimensional way.
5 On meso-government, see Sharpe (1993).
6 Exceptions are Coakley (1993); Watt (1994); see also McGarry and O'Leary (1993); Rokkan
7 This definition excludes cases where external states help bring about cantonisation but have
no formal role in its enforcement, such as the 1993 Israeli–Palestine Liberation Organisation
accord on Palestinian self-rule.
8 Initially granted to protect the islanders' Swedish language and culture, Åland's autonomy
is now one of the most extensive of any canton, extending to aspects of economic development
and external relations (Johansson 1984).
9 For a parallel argument regarding democratic reforms imposed from outside, see Stepan
(1986).
10 The Italian government also granted special autonomy statutes to four other regions
inhabited by regional cultural communities: Sardinia, Sicily, Valle d'Aosta (a region on the
French border with a significant francophone population), and Friuli-Venezia Giulia (a region
bordering what was then Yugoslavia with significant Slovenian and Croat populations as well
as ethnic German and Friulian-speaking minorities). Only the canton statuses of South Tyrol
and Friuli-Venezia Giulia are explicitly guaranteed in international agreements, the latter under
the 'London Agreement' of 5 October 1954 (Keeling's Contemporary Archives 9–16 October
1954, pp. 13821–2) (Weibel 1971; Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls 1972; Schreuer 1981; Lill 1982;
Hine 1993). The Italian cantons also have characteristics of the democratisation path discussed
below because of the participation of regional resistance movements in the anti-fascist struggle
and because anti-fascist democratic parties saw decentralisation as a potential defence against a
resurgence of centralised authoritarian government (Freeman 1993).
11 Although ethnically Chinese and sharing the languages and cultures of the Cantonese in the
neighbouring PRC province of Guangdong, many Hong Kong and Macau inhabitants regard themselves as having identities distinct from their PRC compatriots living under a communist regime. These identities are based on their experience of colonialism, which has created unique ways of life based on largely free-market economies; liberal values; responsive, if not democratic, political institutions; the rule of law; and Chinese values and institutions. Therefore, Hong Kong and Macau can be regarded as regional cultural communities (see Lau and Kuan 1988).

12 Gurr (1993) regards the cantonisation of Southern Sudan as part of democratic reforms. In practice, it is sometimes difficult to determine when cantonisation concessions made by an authoritarian regime mark the beginning of a democratic transition.

13 Gurr's (1993) analysis of 227 communal groups suggests a weak correlation between democratisation and lessened communal conflict due both to the use of democratic means to diffuse conflict, with mixed results, and to communal conflict undermining democratic institutions in some countries.

14 An example is France over much of the last two centuries (see Wright 1984; Guilloreel 1992).

15 It remains unclear whether these regions will have the equal and symmetrical self-governing authority characteristic of pure federalism or an asymmetrical pattern.

16 On factors restricting this right in practice, see Firth (1989).

17 Palau has negotiated a compact of free association with the US, but due to insufficient local support for dropping non-nuclear clauses from its constitution, amendments required for the compact, the agreement had not been ratified by the US Senate and Palau continued formally to be administered as a dependency (Hoadley 1992).

18 The French overseas départements of Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane and Réunion have the same formal authority as metropolitan French départements, but their legislative regime and administrative organisation 'can be subject to specific measures as necessitated by their particular situation'. Whereas French laws are immediately applicable in overseas départements, French laws are extended to overseas territories only by explicit reference (Schwartzbeck 1986: 185 n.2).

References


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