

depressing to sing it too often or to take it too seriously. National anthems, flags and histories can grip one within a vice of irrationality unless they are balanced by other loyalties, both those closer to the ground of ordinary living and those more universal. Chapter 8 will consider the function of religion both as a constructor of ethnicities and nations – and we have seen already many examples of both – and as their restrainer, even a challenger through the creation of alternative human communities able to claim in certain circumstances a more absolute commitment.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Religion further considered

I

We all know the story of how Stalin remarked derisively 'The Pope: how many divisions has he got?' It is an ironic commentary upon the futility of that question that the Stalinist empire fell apart at the point when it had to recognise that Catholic nationalist Poland was the one entity which it absolutely could not digest. Stimulated by a Polish Pope, an answer had been given. One could add that the one entity which the British Empire, despite centuries of bullying, absolutely failed to digest was Catholic nationalist Ireland. And if there is one area of Europe today which has absolutely failed to conform to its liberal standards of political behaviour, it is Orthodox nationalist Serbia. In each case we see the defiant power of a nationalism grounded in religious identity. The bond between nationalism and religion has seldom been so deeply rooted or so powerful as in these three cases, yet most of Europe's nationalisms have had fairly close religious ties, as we have seen particularly in regard to England. There have, nevertheless, been a few nationalisms, such as those of Scotland, Switzerland and Italy, where religion has played no more than a rather subsidiary role.

This chapter will look at our subject again from the religious end, discussing, first, a variety of ways in which religion contributes powerfully to nation-construction and nationalism, and, secondly, the universalist and anti-nationalist dimensions of Christianity and Islam. Throughout this book the examples studied have almost all been Christian ones. I have indeed argued that every ethnicity is shaped significantly by religion just as it is by language, yet in my opinion it is no accident that beyond that early stage when one

comes to a study of nationhood itself it is Christian peoples that have been under discussion. The reason is not simply that our discussion has been largely restricted to Europe. There is more to it than that. The nation and nationalism are both, I wish to claim, characteristically Christian things which, in so far as they have appeared elsewhere, have done so within a process of westernisation and of imitation of the Christian world, even if it was imitated as western rather than as Christian.

The only real exception I would admit to this claim is that of the Jews. Indeed they may well be called the true proto-nation in that the Old Testament provided the model in ancient Israel which Christian nations have adopted. Yet from the fall of Jerusalem in the first century until the establishment of Israel in the twentieth, the Jews were so far from being a nation-state or a political entity at all that they had really ceased to look like a nation in the terms in which we are speaking. The huge paradox of Jewish history is that the people who gave the world the model of nationhood, and even nation-statehood, lost it for itself for nearly two millennia and yet survived. If they lost state, land and in consequence after a while any sort of nationalism, becoming for the most part intensely apolitical, they retained the core identity of a nation through the exercise of collective memory, the usages of religion based upon a specific literature. Whatever their spoken language, Jews were held together by the Hebrew Bible and related texts. Furthermore, they were in consequence held together as a nation rather than an ethnicity. Indeed, different ethnicities, such as Ashkenazim and Sephardim, emerged within it. It was extraordinary that so numerous a people containing within it so many educated and even wealthy people should neither have a state of their own nor be incorporated into any other state except rather marginally. The marginality was ensured by the Christian or Islamic foundation of the states in which they lived. It is the deprivation of politics that strikes one most forcibly about pre-twentieth century Jewish existence, yet in secularised states not grounded upon ethnic nationalism that was neither absolute nor irremovable. The American example here is paradigmatic. But the more the political order around them nationalised itself in an ethnic way during the nineteenth century, the more anomalous the Jewish position again became and the more inevitable the rise of Zionism. Zionism was not a religious movement. Jewish religion was fully

acclimatised in a diaspora existence and was in fact for long highly unsympathetic towards Zionism. Zionism was a nationalist movement stimulated by the pressure of other nationalist movements within the European world. Its goal like theirs was the creation of a nation-state and it is lamentable that studies of nationalism regularly avoid its consideration. Here, if anywhere, the basic order runs: nation, nationalism, nation-state. Yet it is also true that before the nationalism the nation could seem almost invisible. Indeed for many individual Jews their Jewish identity could be correctly classified as ethnic and religious while their national identity was English, French or German.¹ For some this is still the case.

The long hiatus in Jewish national history, and the fact that modern Jewish nationalism and nationhood come at the end rather than at the start of a chain, is why it has seemed acceptable to start a study of the construction of nations and nationalism with England, seen as effectively the world's proto-nation within the continuities of modern history, even though in terms of Christian history England is also preceded by the more isolated examples of Ethiopia and Armenia.

The third branch of the Abrahamic monotheistic tree is Islam, a world religion which shares so much with Judaism and Christianity. But on this point it has remarkably little in common, as I will hope to demonstrate. Christianity has of its nature been a shaper of nations, even of nationalisms; Islam has not, being on the contrary quite profoundly anti-national. A great deal of vague discussion about the relationship between religion and nationalism is blighted by the easy assumption that every religion is likely to have the same sort of political effect. It is not so.

To turn to the religious stimulation of nationalism. This seems normally an overspill from one or another aspect of the religious contribution to the construction of nationhood itself. The more influential religion was in the latter, the more it is likely also to influence every expression of the former, whereas a nation whose basic construction owes little to religious factors is far less likely later to generate a nationalism with a religious character to it. We need then, primarily, to review the different, if inevitably overlapping, ways in which Christianity has shaped national formation, and I propose to do so under seven heads: first, sanctifying the starting point; second, the mythologisation and commemoration of great

threats to national identity; third, the social role of the clergy; fourth, the production of vernacular literature; fifth, the provision of a biblical model for the nation; sixth, the autocephalous national church; seventh, the discovery of a unique national destiny.

Shaping and canonising origins. We have a fascinating recent example in France – the controversy over how suitably to commemorate the baptism of Clovis at Reims by St Remigius in 496. The link between the Frankish kingdom of Clovis and modern France may seem somewhat tenuous but the fact is that Clovis's conversion did effect a stabilisation of identity near the origins of an historical development going from there to here. It successfully fused the Franks with Catholicism to the great benefit of both parties, over against the Arianism of the Visigoths, and it did it at Reims, which became the crowning church for French kings. Important as this event was, it cannot quite evade the implication of a sort of secondariness in the Frankish kingdom itself. The Bishop of Reims was clearly there well before Clovis and, important as all this undoubtedly made Reims, it did not overturn the primacy of the see of Lyons, a primacy symbolising the fact that the Gauls were there before the Franks and continued to be there. St Remigius was reputed to have given Clovis the power to touch for the king's evil. The Franks became the right hand of the Catholic Church, their king *rex christianissimus*, and if the French nation – probably more than any other western European nation – grew out of a state created by a monarchy, then Clovis, his baptism and Reims Cathedral must remain in some special way constitutive of what makes France France. It is not the genetic descent of peoples, but their descent as a collectivity from some defining moment in public history, which really matters. Hence not only did the reactionary nationalism of *Action Française* claim Catholicism to be a necessary component of Frenchness but even a secular republic finds that the baptism of a king fifteen hundred years ago cannot easily be overlooked.

We have seen in chapter 2 how decisively in a number of ways Christianity shaped the origins of the English. Canterbury and its metropolitan authority united England before there was an England to unite, while Bede made the point clear by writing a history which was at once that of the church and of the nation, when there were still half a dozen different kings up and down the land. Alfred, with his strongly ecclesiastical identity, the translator into English of both

Pope Gregory's *Pastoral Care* and Bede's *History*, became effectively England's first king, the heir of Bede and of Augustine of Canterbury quite as much as of Ine or Offa.

When we turn to Ireland or to Serbia, we have a rather different type of foundation charter with the dominant figure of a single saint, Patrick or Sava. No one quite comparable is to be found in England or France and it may be that the absolutely decisive figure of a single founder, apostle and saint, had a more lasting potency for the conception of national identity in religious terms than did the more mixed and regal processes at work elsewhere. It certainly survives the age of Republicanism more easily. Yet almost everywhere at the heart of the early development of Christian nations is to be found a succession of canonised kings. It is the case for Russia and Ethiopia but hardly less – at least in Aelfred of Rievaulx's eyes – for the Kings of England. Christian conversion in the medieval world again and again constructed national identity around a particular kingly line and particular holy places, precisely through the closeness of the church's identification with royal power. It elevates, consecrates and stabilises that power, but is also effectively subordinated to it. A new national identity is thus produced by a sort of religious injection. If Clovis hereafter has the power of touching for the king's evil it is because St Remigius has given it to him but his successors have it ever after. While the immediate recipient of all this is a king rather than a nation, the nation subsequently develops its identity from occupying the imaginative space produced around the king, as Israel existed around David or Solomon, though England is a little different in that the kings, despite Aelfred, actually matter rather less, the national identity having been established to a quite considerable extent ecclesiastically before it was realised regally. In Ireland that is still more the case. The national supremacy of Patrick derives both from what he undoubtedly himself achieved, little as we know about him, and from the lack of a significant line of sacralised kings, whereas Sava, important as he was personally, is not separable in his nation-forming role from the royal line to which he belonged.

Sava was a far more political figure than Patrick, one very easily appropriated by nationalists whereas Patrick's greatness lies in setting so powerful a mark on a country's identity while appearing as unpolitical as Christ. Celebrating St Patrick's Day is, doubtless, often

a highly nationalist affair, but the connection has not the near inescapability there is in celebrating St Sava's.

A different type of religious influence upon a nation's origins comes when it has arisen directly out of religious conflict. Holland is a classic case. One can argue about the degree of distinctiveness of the northern Netherlands in pre-Reformation times, but what determined its independence, separation from the south and basic character was a religious struggle of Protestants against Catholic Spain. The sixteenth-century Dutch predicament was closely similar to that of Elizabethan England and Holland might, indeed, not have survived without the help of an English expeditionary force, but while English nation-statehood already existed, the Dutch did not. Dutch national consciousness and nationalism were, in consequence, still more closely tied to the Protestant identity which caused them to emerge. Compare that with the Portuguese – again, a nation which grew out of religious war, this time the Crusades. Portuguese nationhood was characterised in consequence for centuries by a particularly militant type of Catholicism, aggressive, nationalist, anti-Islamic. The commitment to Christian reconquest of the Iberian peninsula was no less crucial in the construction of Spanish nationhood. For both a militant nationalist Catholicism remained a significant force well into the twentieth century.

These examples suggest that one wide-ranging context for the religious shaping of nationalism is that of a contested frontier. Where a number of countries share the same form of religion, their national character is likely to develop without the sort of continuing religious input which a frontier atmosphere requires: Catholics facing Muslims, Orthodox facing Catholics, Protestants facing Catholics. Whenever a people feels threatened in its distinct existence by the advance of a power committed to another religion, the political conflict is likely to have superimposed upon it a sense of religious conflict, almost crusade, so that national identity becomes fused with religious identity.

This leads on to our second factor, the mythologisation of threats to national identity. I am thinking of such things as the Gunpowder Plot, the siege of Derry, the Battle of Kosovo, or the career of Joan of Arc. Here we have episodes in which national salvation is, or seems to be, at stake. There is nearly always a traitor in the story – Colonel Lundy, Vuk Brankovic, Guy Fawkes, Bishop Cauchon –

and this sharpens up the sense of 'us' and 'them', the absolute duty of loyalty to the horizontal fellowship of 'us', and the moral gap separating us from the other, from the threat to our freedom, religion and laws that they constitute – whether Muslim, Catholic or just the time-serving bishop willing to do a job for his foreign masters. God is on our side most clearly in such events, even if that may only be seen to be the case a lot later on.

Seldom were such events at the time really so decisive. Meaning has largely been read back into them but that does not make it necessarily a false meaning, even in historical terms. It is rather that in retrospect a large process became simplistically symbolised in public memory by a single event or hero figure calculated best to reinforce a special identity. Most events are simply forgotten or cease, at least, to be emotive. If the siege of Derry or Gunpowder Plot becomes ritualised, it is to ensure that each subsequent generation is socialised into a certain us/them view of the world, a view at once nationalist and religious. It is the quasi-religious manner in which these really quite secular events are remembered which seems to make so heavy a load of meaning credible. Such events and their ritualisation do far more than maintain nationhood; they are potent instruments for the promotion of nationalism. Nelson Mandela describes in his autobiography the electrifying effect of the recital of a praise poem to Shaka on detainees in South Africa's first Treason Trial: 'Suddenly there were no Xhosas or Zulus, no Indians or Africans, no rightists or leftists, no political or religious leaders; we were all nationalists . . . In that moment we felt the hand of the great past . . . and the power of the great cause that linked us all together'.²

Our third religious factor in the affirmation of nationhood is the clergy. Not, of course, always or everywhere. An early medieval, localised, almost uneducated priesthood may not have fulfilled this role, though it is worth noting that Aelfred of Rievaulx, coming from just such a background – the inherited village priesthood of Hexham – shows himself quite remarkably nation-conscious in his works on the *Genealogy of the English Kings* and the *Life of Edward the Confessor*.³ What a clergy with some education and status did in most medieval and early modern societies was to mediate identity between rulers and ruled. In expressing a scepticism about the existence of national consciousness, Hobsbawm remarked that 'it is clearly

illegitimate to extrapolate from the elite to the masses, the literate to the illiterate, even though the two worlds are not entirely separable'.⁴ Just because Croat nobles saw themselves as some sort of a nation, he insists, it does not at all mean that 'the rank and file of the common people', Croat peasants, shared the same sort of consciousness.⁵ Why should peasants 'identify with a "country" that consists of the community of the lords who were, inevitably, the chief targets of their discontents?'⁶ There is, doubtless, some truth in such a contrast, though I suspect it implies an untenable social analysis in which class identity is simply presumed to precede communal identity. Have many of us not continued to identify ourselves as British, however much over long years our rulers, Margaret Thatcher and John Major, have been 'the chief target of our discontents'? But an intrinsic weakness within Hobsbawm's class analysis here seems to me that for traditional Europe it leaves out a third class, the clergy. It was the lower clergy who, living in their parishes throughout Europe, relatively poor, literate, educated in cathedral schools or from the thirteenth century on increasingly in universities, in regular touch with both the landed and the peasantry, fostered a sense of shared local, provincial or national identity. If the very earliest universities were distinctly European, the more they multiplied the more national and even nationalistic in ethos they became. Already in 1214 the students at the university of Paris spent a week celebrating the victory of Bouvines. It is not surprising that Owen Glynn Dwyer wanted to open a couple of Welsh universities. From the sixteenth century seminaries fulfil the same role. They are indeed at times hotbeds of nationalism, but their universal role is to prepare men to teach the illiterate or the barely literate in the vernacular and to do so they themselves needed vernacular religious literature.

The requirements of their work and of the church forced the clergy to think in local, vernacular and, increasingly, national terms. This is most evident from the sixteenth century on, not only with the Protestant clergy publicly committed to vernacular scriptures and services, but also with the Catholic clergy, French, Spanish or Irish. But it in fact began much earlier and the need for it was one of the factors pushing priests into Lollardy or the like. But quite apart from the Lollard case, the pastoral task of the church required an increasing use of the vernacular and of vernacular literature as soon as it became feasible. This is not a reformation development. We see

it already in tenth-century England, in the mission of Cyril and Methodius and probably in every country of western Europe. Linking the classes as the clergy did (and they were often very numerous), they had an inevitable role, through their shared existence as well as through their ministry, in ensuring something of a collective consciousness between rich and poor, literate and illiterate, nobles and peasants. They were not in a narrow way simply teachers of religion, but also of history and much else. Thus Layamon, an obscure priest in a Worcestershire village of the late twelfth century, composed the poem *Brut*, the first history of England in English to include Arthur, Lear and Cymbeline. Doubtless Layamon was unusual in his literary skill but not in the sort of social role he fulfilled. Village priests ensured that the articulation of a nation was shared by every class. This contribution was greatly enlarged through the printing of a vernacular literature even in a pre-Protestant church. Eamon Duffy in *The Stripping of the Altars* has demonstrated how printing in England between its introduction in the 1470s and the 1530s was devoted overwhelmingly to the production of 'a vast range of devotional and didactic tracts, designed to promote traditional piety' of a wholly orthodox kind. Most of this was in English and 'printing gave an enormous impetus to the movement for vernacular religious instruction'.⁷ Many of the texts had in fact already been circulating in manuscript since the fourteenth century. In chapter 4 I have suggested how influential this was in seventeenth-century France, and in chapter 5 its impact for Croat identity. The point for us in this is that it is indicative of the central way in which the clergy simply by doing their job enhanced national consciousness through the widespread diffusion of vernacular literature. It was, I believe, this process going on all across Europe, which, far more than anything specifically political, stabilised the main national identities, as societies separated by their literatures. In the course of the nineteenth century this role of the lower clergy was increasingly taken over by primary-school teachers, or even by university professors.

This brings us to our fourth factor, the encouragement of literature in the vernacular. Any extensive vernacular literature proper to a particular people is intrinsically likely to have the effect of stabilising a conscious sense of national identity. To understand the significance of this for the relationship between religion and

nationhood in the European context, it is necessary to explore further, first the nature of Christianity as a religion of translation and, second, the intrinsic relationship between being a bearer of the Bible, both Old and New Testament, and the fostering of nationhood. Benedict Anderson has claimed the rise of nations and of nationalism only to be possible when the influence of religions with their 'sacred languages' declined. It is a great misconception. Christianity never had a sacred language. If it had one it would presumably have been Aramaic, that spoken by Jesus, the 'Word made Flesh', but Christians quickly abandoned its use as they moved out from Palestine, though a few still use it. But it has never been seen as sacred. Even Greek, in which the New Testament was written, has not been. Only a sort of fundamentalism can make language sacred within the Christian tradition but to do so goes against the whole nature of the religion. What is striking about its history is the willingness again and again to translate – into Syriac, Armenian, Coptic, Ethiopian and Latin in the early centuries, then Slavonic and finally almost numberless other languages. Undoubtedly there were periods of intransigence and linguistic conservatism on the part of authority, especially of the papacy, but it would be quite mistaken to see the centrality of translation to the Christian enterprise as merely a Protestant characteristic; or to doubt that the attempt to make Latin of all languages into a sort of 'sacred' language on the part of Roman clerics was other than a deviation from the Christian norm. The speed with which the vernaculars of western Europe – Welsh, Irish, English, German, French, Dutch and the rest – were colonised by Christian writers is striking and it derives from the nature of Christianity, the absence of any writing by Jesus himself and the commitment to universality which is so clear in the New Testament, to make disciples of all the nations (Mt. 28.19). The Pentecost text in Acts 2 which can be taken as representing the foundation myth of the church stresses precisely a diversity of language – Parthians, Medes, Elamites and the rest, 'we hear them preaching in our own language about the marvels of God' (Acts 2.11). Christianity had, then, the use of the world's vernaculars inscribed in its origins. Neither Hebrew, Greek nor Latin had any special claim on its loyalty and it was quickly recognised that sacred texts remained equally sacred in translation. The early tradition that Matthew's Gospel was first written in Aramaic and then translated

into Greek is evidence of that, as are the translations into Latin and Syriac already in the second century. Christianity did, then, take a culture of translation for granted. It also had in the New Testament numerous references to the world as one of 'peoples' and 'nations', and in the Old Testament it offered a model of what a nation looked like. Regino of Prüm writing his *Chronicon* about the year 900, set out what may be called the normative Christian view of human society as follows: 'Just as different peoples (*diversae nationes populorum*) differ between themselves in descent, manners, language and laws (*genere, moribus, lingua, legibus*) so the holy and universal church throughout the world, although joined in the unity of faith nevertheless varies its ecclesiastical customs among them.'⁸ Here the unity and universality of the church is not in question; it inevitably limits the degree of specifically religious diversity acceptable between nations but it takes the existence and differences of the latter for granted and does not rule out a diversity of ecclesiastical custom reflecting national differences.

Within the unity of Christian faith, the full diversity of nations, customs and language comes simply to be taken for granted. No one reading the New Testament as a primary guide to the way the world is could have much doubt of that. This brings us to our fifth factor – the Bible as the mirror through which to imagine and create a Christian nation. In central New Testament terms nations might be encouraged but there could be no place for a single chosen nation. It is the church itself which is the New Israel. Nevertheless the Old Testament provided a detailed picture of what a God-centred nation would look like and of the way God would treat it if it was faithful. Why should God behave differently now? Why should one's own, New Testament-sanctioned nation not be vouchsafed an Old Testament style providential role? One finds already in writers like Bede the application to their own people of what one might call Old Testament political economy, an economy that included belief in divine predilection for a particular people. John Barbour, the fourteenth-century Scottish poet, saw national resistance to the English in terms of the story of the Maccabees. Such comparisons seemed so natural and even so apparent in one's own case. Theologically one might be held back from suggesting too special a status for a particular people but in terms of some sort of political or historical destiny it could be hard to deny it, and the more the Old Testament

was translated into the vernacular and accessible to a theologically untrained laity, the greater the likelihood of claiming for one's own nation a divine election, so powerful was the Old Testament example working on the political imagination of a Christian people. We have seen this particularly at work in medieval France and seventeenth-century England, but it is curiously revealing to find that even Rousseau, secular prophet of the new nationalism, when lecturing to the Poles on how to be a nation, appealed to the example of Moses, as the ideal nation-builder.

This tendency was enormously stimulated by our sixth factor, the development of autocephalous state churches, primarily within the Orthodox tradition, especially among the Slavs, but also in Protestantism. The total ecclesiastical autonomy of a national church is one of the strongest and most enduring factors in the encouragement of nationalism because it vastly stimulates the urge to tie all that is strongest in God's Old Testament predilection for one nation and New Testament predilection for one church contemporaneously to one's own church and people.

All the aspects considered hitherto can easily coalesce under our final heading, a nation's holiness and special destiny. Once a Christian history has been constructed for a nation from the baptism of a first king and on through great deliverances, a history of a people's faith and divine providence, once the Bible is mediated upon in one's own language with all the immediacy this could bring, once one's own church is fully independent of any other and identified in extent with that of the nation, the more it seems easy to go the final step and claim to be a chosen people, a holy nation, with some special divine mission to fulfil. The Old Testament provided the paradigm. Nation after nation applied it to themselves, reinforcing their identity in the process.

Hobsbawm devotes a couple of interesting pages to the concept of 'Holy Russia', following Michael Cherniavsky's *Ussr and People*.⁹ With Russia Hobsbawm briefly links 'holy Ireland' and 'holy Tyrol'. Why should they be holy and why stop there? For Cherniavsky a land could not be holy 'unless it could put forward a unique claim in the global economy of salvation'¹⁰ which Russia could do as the heir to Byzantium which made of Moscow the 'Third Rome'. That is fair enough but, as Hobsbawm suggests, Russian peasants hardly needed such an ecclesiological argument to convince them that Rus was

God's chosen land. Such a conviction derives rather from a popular theology of creation and incarnation biblically reweaving themes of primal religion, the sacredness of local space. Such intuitions are caught up in the life of the Christian Church, in its liturgical round at once seasonal and biblical, to provide the conviction that this people, our people, has been chosen by God as Israel was chosen. We find in the Ethiopians, as I suggested in chapter 6, an excellent early example, symbolised by the wonderful myth of the carrying off of the Ark of the Covenant by Menelik from Jerusalem to Aksum. Ethiopia becomes in consequence the true Christian Israel. Undoubtedly, in Frankish eyes, the French were little less. And, in English eyes, the English. In Serb eyes, the Serbs. And, finally, the Americans, though 'finally' may prove the wrong word. Each people sees its 'manifest destiny' clearly enough. Why precisely the Tyrol should do so, I do not know but, doubtless, they have a good reason.

Once, as I was walking along Offa's Dyke, I stopped at a cottage, remote from anywhere, to ask for a glass of water. As I was drinking it, the old woman who had offered it, and a cup of milk as well, asked me, a little hesitantly, whether Offa might be one of the kings we read of in the Bible. The Bible is so easily indigenised. By its very nature and the church's retention of such lengthy Israelite histories it hints at a continuity of more than a theological kind between it and us. The whole concept of a 'Holy People', divinely chosen but enduring all the ups and downs of a confusing history, seems so very applicable to life nearer home. Of course for the early Christian and for the universal church's permanent theological vision that concept is realised in a universal community of faith and by no means in any one nation, but for ordinary Christians, lay and clerical, that can seem too remote, too unpolitical. Even as good a theologian as Bede can help rationalise the universal.

Anthony Smith¹¹ has denied that German National Socialism is properly to be recognised as a nationalism on the rather odd grounds that it is incompatible with a nationalist vision of a plurality of free nations. But can one really define the membership of the nationalist club in such polite terms and is it not actually very anti-historical to do so? Does any powerful nationalism ever really hold that other nations matter equally with one's own? I would argue that at this point the German National Socialist type of nationalism, despite its particularly violent character, is in principle quite close to normative

nationalism, a norm with a biblical background. The root of the more extreme wing of European nationalism lies precisely here, in a widely held Christian assumption that there can only be one fully elect nation, one's own, the true successor to ancient Israel. The contrariness of this to Christian belief is something we shall return to later, but what matters now is to recognise how powerful it has been in Christian experience. It seems too that the more powerfully one identified one's own nation as chosen, the more one might want to eliminate the first chosen nation, the Jews, from the face of the earth. The more intense nationalisms within the European sphere have grown out of a series of such identifications, one often reacting to another, even if they have mostly, though not entirely, adopted a secularised form of it in the modern era. What one must not be deceived into thinking is that modernised, secularised forms of nationalism in any way represent its beginning. Moreover the hard religious rock which led to such identifications in the past still provides enormous strength to national struggles at the popular level.

Because of the lack of evident political concern in the New Testament as also within the early Christian community, Christianity does not start – as Islam did – with any clear political model of its own. As a consequence when Christians came to power they were able to go in two very different directions. The one, the nation-state; the other, the world empire. Each appears very early within Christian history. The first state to become Christian was Armenia in the late third century and the survival of the Armenian national identity from then until now is surely one of the more remarkable things in human history. The kingship did not survive, what did do so was the Armenian Bible, liturgy and related literature. The Ethiopian case is closely parallel. One would not expect small kingdoms of that period to survive in any shape or form across fifteen centuries. The key to their national survival seems to me the way that Christian conversion produced both a vernacular literature and the idea of a nation out of which grew a real nation able to endure across the political vicissitudes of the centuries.

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We have seen the national model recur again and again, yet if one looks at some of the central areas of Christian history, one also sees a

quite different one – acceptance of a world empire, the continuation of Rome. Here, Christians were able to feel no less at home. A world empire corresponded geographically and politically to the sort of religious society they saw themselves to be, and they were just as able to find providence at work in Roman imperial history as other Christians found it at work in the development of Armenia, France or England. There was no theological reason to think that because the Jews had had a nation-state, Christians should live in nation-states. Nations exist divided by language and culture, according to numerous New Testament texts, but they can do so within the empire of Rome. Nations, then, but not nation-states. Read Eusebius or Lactantius for the glorification of Constantine and of the providentiality of the empire.

While, in the west, the empire soon after collapsed, the idea of it did not. Its revival by Charlemagne and fitful continuation both as the Holy Roman Empire and as a papal empire across the medieval and early modern centuries into the beginning of the nineteenth century never produced a stable international unity. What it did produce was, on the imperial side, a rather decentralised federation of provinces and cities, and, on the papal, a highly influential unity of canon law. The former never in any way included England; it was soon reduced to little more than Italy and Germany, and then to Germany and contiguous areas alone. Yet it held the heart of Dante. One of the reasons why the medieval empire failed was that it could not work with the papacy, each appearing to threaten the other, yet in point of fact empire and papacy were agreed in asserting a Christendom which was more than a collection of nation-states. And while the final political achievement of neither may appear very considerable on the positive side, on the negative they helped to ensure the lack of development of nation-states until a very late date in both Germany and Italy. The tendency is to ask why these two countries, central to Europe, were so backward in this great 'modernising' development which made so much more progress in rather marginal areas like England and Spain. The best answer seems to be that they had been too deeply affected by a different, and larger, conception of the state, a conception for which in practice the time had not yet come but which, at least arguably, grew more harmoniously out of core Christian experience, the New Testament vision of 'neither Jew nor Greek ... but all are one in Christ'.

(Galatians 3:28) than did the Old Testament inspired nation-state. It is a conception which in our time is coming back into its own.

If the Habsburg Empire was, in its multinationality, the last survival of the central political experiment of the first fifteen hundred years of the Christian Era, the European Community can fairly be seen as its resurrection. Great cities like Cologne and Bologna have spent most of their history happily enough outside nation-states but inside a sort of decentralised empire. For their experience of the nation-state over little more than a hundred years has been sufficiently disastrous to suggest the moral that other ways of structuring sovereignty may be preferred. It seems hardly surprising that they do not feel the kind of antipathy to the European Community which so many people do in England where we have had the longest nation-state history and one which, until recently, proved notably successful in political and economic terms.

The point we need to insist upon is that while the nation-state was largely shaped by a Christian and biblical culture so that without the latter it is hardly imaginable, it was not the only political option consonant with Christian culture or the European tradition and, indeed, in its full form it flourished particularly within Post-Reformation culture. Even though the Middle Ages actually nurtured it, it was at the same time antipathetic to the central political traditions of Catholicism, whether papal or imperial.

But it is far more antipathetic to Islam. Here there was from the start a political model – the world empire based on the *umma*, a community of faith, but based also on the possession of a single, and genuinely sacred, language. Not only was the explicit model of Islam together with its early history opposed to anything like a multitude of nation-states, unlike Christianity, it was also opposed to linguistic diversity. Its culture was not one of translation but of assimilation. This is a point which Lanin Saneh has made effectively in his much-discussed work *Translating the Message*¹² but, interestingly, it was made already by an observant Arab in the sixteenth century who became a Christian and a monk of Dabra Libanos in Ethiopia. Enbaqom wrote his *Anqasa Amin*, 'The Door of the Faith', in 1540 during the Jihad of Gran. It was an apologetic work comparing Islam and Christianity to prove the superiority of the latter and one of his most interesting arguments was that the Qur'an is the book of a single language, Arabic, while the Bible exists in twenty languages

and he cites many of them to prove that Christianity can be at home anywhere.¹³ Enbaqom put his finger on a quite crucial divergence between the two religions. The Muslim attitude to the Qur'an made translation almost impossible. For the religious person it has to be read, recited out loud five times a day, or listened to in Arabic. In consequence the whole cultural impact of Islam is necessarily to Arabise, to draw peoples into a single world community of language and government. And this is what it did. Even the language of Egypt disappeared before it, except as a Christian liturgical language. Nations are not constructed by Islam but deconstructed. That is a fact of history but it is a fact dependent upon theology. Recognition of it should make it all the clearer that the construction of nations within the Christian world was not something independent of Christianity but, rather, something simulated by the Christian attitude both to language and to the state.

While both Muslims and Christians recognise their Abrahamic inheritance, Muslims did not incorporate the Hebrew scriptures into their own as Christians did. This meant that Muslims were never affected by the Old Testament state example in the way that Christians have continuously been even into the twentieth century. While Christianity in consequence has always been politically ambivalent between nation-state and universal state, Islam has never been. It is in every way in principle far more politically universalist and exercises in consequence a religious restraint upon nationalism which Christianity has often failed to do. This does not, of course, mean that Muslim societies cannot develop into nations, only that their religion does not help them to do so, directing them instead towards different social and political formations.

Arabisation has been resisted by Iranians and Turks as by all the people east of Iran. A single political and linguistic community for the world was impossibly premature a thousand or five hundred years ago, though maybe not now. Arabisation itself might be regarded as a large example of nation formation, comparable to Frenchification, and indeed it has been so judged by some. Given the preoccupation of the modern world with nation-states it is inevitable that some modernisers have imagined an 'Arab nation' stretching from Morocco to Iraq, but it is mistaken to do so and only the imposition of western categories has made it plausible or seem desirable to Arabic speakers. Arab 'nationalism', like Turkish or

Egyptian 'nationalism' dates only from the twenty years or so before the First World War, a time when the impact of European thinking was at its highest and most uncriticised point in the Middle East. It was essentially a western, Christian-rooted, concept quite foreign to Islam, one closely linked with secularisation – as also with the presence of a considerable native Arabic-speaking Christian population, notably in Egypt and Palestine. It remains theoretically possible that the sharing of Arabic will still create an Arab nation but it seems unlikely, any more than the sharing of English does so.

The following quotation from Kalim Siddiqui expresses the specific Islamic approach to the nation with the starkest clarity. In terms of history it may be a simplification, but in terms of Islam's central political and religious ideal it is entirely accurate.

Today we come face to face with perhaps the greatest evil that stalks the modern world – that of nationalism... The path of the *umma* and that of the Islamic movement within the *umma* is blocked by nation-states. These nation-states are like huge boulders blown across our path by the ill wind of recent history. All nation-states that today occupy, enslave and exploit the lands, peoples and resources of the *umma* must of necessity be dismantled.¹⁴

As Christianity split into a diversity of ecclesiastical streams, the dualism implicit within its political agenda – nation-forming on the one side, universalist on the other – was further accentuated. The classical eastern orthodox form stressing the power of the emperor was in principle universalist enough in its vision of Constantinople as the 'New Rome', but in practice Byzantium became a rather narrowly Greek empire, alienating non-Greeks in Egypt, Syria or the west. This combined with its considerable degree of Caesaropapism led to the generation of a type of church-state relationship characteristic of eastern autocephalous churches of a highly nationalist type.

In the west, on the contrary, the central Catholic tradition under papal influence has always veered towards a universalist dimension to the structuring of society, opposed to absolutist claims of national sovereignty. While the Catholic Church has in practice often undergirded nationalism – in Spain, France, Ireland or Poland – there are limits to its national enthusiasm, at least within areas effectively influenced by the papacy. Where, in the early modern period, the

Catholic Church was most completely controlled by a national monarchy as in Spain or France, there the nationalist dimension of Christianity could be allowed as free a rein as in Anglican England, but where, as in nineteenth-century Ireland, the bishops were ultramontanes answerable to the Pope – whose concerns could be as much to placate the British government as to support the grievances of Irish peasants – the Catholic Church was of its nature a restraining rather than inflaming influence upon nationalism.

That is to speak at an institutional level. At a personal, popular or communal level things could be different. The lower clergy could in Ireland be more nationalist than the bishops, though in Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany the opposite could be the case, and ordinary priests often stood out against the new nationalism more firmly than their superiors. The point is that Catholic Christianity, understood in a wide sense, was both incarnationalist and universalist – it tended both to identify closely with particular communities, cultures and nations, and to insist upon a communion transcending such particularities. It oscillated, one might say, between Old and New Testament sources of inspiration. It would be quite wrong to think of Christianity's relationship to the nation in terms of only one of these two characteristics, particularly western Christianity with its long commitment to dualism – the distinction of the two swords in classical Gelasian theory, church and state, pope and emperor. The shrine of Edward the Confessor, saint and king, was central to the royal church of Westminster but the still more popular shrine of Thomas Becket, archbishop and martyr at a king's hands, was central to the Cathedral of Canterbury. Unsurprisingly Thomas's shrine was destroyed with particular ferocity by Henry VIII. Thomas Becket, nevertheless, expressed a dualism central to Christianity which distinguishes the claims of God from those of Caesar and brings with it a necessary restraint upon the claims of sovereignty, not only that of Caesar but of nationalism too. In the words of another Thomas, whom Henry beheaded: 'The king's good servant but God's first'.

The Reformation was fuelled in part by repudiation of just that: both the Catholic Church's more universalist claims and any sort of dualism, under pressure from rulers anxious to monopolise power, temporal and spiritual, within their own dominions. In the later Middle Ages the nationalisation of the church had developed almost

uncontrollably pace by pace with the hardening of national identities through language, literature and state formation. Christianity was entering a new kind of world, which it had itself done so much to engender, but which it was almost powerless to restrain or even to understand. The Rood was removed in English parish churches from its central place above the chancel arch and the royal arms put in its place. The more the monism of Caesaropapism came to prevail within any ecclesiastical tradition, the more the church has subsequently given almost unlimited support to nationalism as well. Within the Protestant world this has been especially the case for Anglicanism and Lutheranism. The political compromise with which the Wars of Religion came to an end in the seventeenth century, *cuius regio eius et religio*, was little less than an abdication of the universalist essence of Christianity in the face of a triumph of state sovereignty, particularist in principle and often nationalist in inspiration. Such a principle was too absurd to work and it led on, inevitably, to a new freedom, though more quickly in some places than others. Protestantism has, however, frequently been pressed along a nationalist road not only by erastianism but also by according greater weight to the Old Testament than Catholicism is prepared to do in the shaping of the Christian mind. Christians in general have always tended to use the Old Testament, especially its historical sections, as providing a set of precedents, pairing a situation there with one here. This leads on only too easily to identifying the general experience of one's people with that of Israel, in a way productive of nationalism and it long made much Protestant thinking naively nation-affirmative. 'It is by God's appointment that nations exist', wrote William Temple in 1915, and their existence is in consequence an 'instrument' of the 'divine purpose'.¹⁵ For Temple as for Rousseau, Moses was the great nation-builder. Temple had been five years before an usher at the Edinburgh Missionary Conference of 1910 where it was affirmed in the Report of its first Commission that 'Christ never by teaching or example resisted or withstood the spirit of true nationalism'.¹⁶

Modern Protestantism has found it quite hard to disentangle itself from this sort of rather soft use of national categories for political and moral analysis, though the most thoughtful assembly it ever mounted on political issues, the 1937 Oxford Conference on Church, Community and State, wrestled with the ambiguous nature of the nation

and nationalism with a maturity far beyond Edinburgh 1910 or the William Temple of 1915.¹⁷ Those who have often led the way here are some of the Free Churches, though not always. Evangelical Protestantism has frequently combined a strongly universalist loyalty in highly spiritual terms with a very particularist loyalty in political terms. In chapter 3 we saw how easily early Methodists reverted to a very nationalist attitude towards Ireland.¹⁸ But it is undoubtedly within this constituency that the most creative efforts have been made to free Protestantism and Christianity with it from nationalist bondage. It is groups like the Mennonites and the Quakers which have produced a Christian spirit most impervious to nationalism. Thus small non-state churches and very large, highly international, churches are those least affected by nationalism. It was the established state church in east and west which most completely succumbed to it. With time national churches have been increasingly discredited and, of course, some of them, perhaps most notably *Ecclesia Anglicana*, have been transformed instead into international fellowships. Only in eastern Europe has this development, central to modern Christianity, still hardly got under way.

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Nationalism owes much to religion, to Christianity in particular. Nations developed, as I have suggested, out of a typical medieval and early modern experience of the multiplication of vernacular literatures and of state systems around them, a multiplication largely dependent upon the church, its scriptures and its clergy. Nation-formation and nationalism have in themselves almost nothing to do with modernity. Only when modernisation was itself already in the air did they almost accidentally become part of it, particularly from the eighteenth century when the political and economic success of England made it a model to imitate. But nations could occur in states as unmodern as ancient Ethiopia or Armenia and fail to happen in Renaissance Italy or even Frederick the Great's Prussia. If Christianity on one side fostered this development, both creatively and disastrously, it always had another side – whether papal, imperial or free – struggling to reach the surface. Certainly that is the side which those of us who share in the western ecumenical experience mostly prefer to encourage. If religion in the past did so

much to produce, for example, Ireland's present divisions, so that they still appear to be religious divisions, it is no less true that most of what is alive in religion today in Ireland is extremely committed to their overconning. Yet the churches are not only still intensely nationalist in many parts of the world, they also continue elsewhere to reinforce myths and practices which produce the alienation between communities upon which rival nationalisms inevitably feed. To give just one example. I recall listening to a memorable speech by Garret Fitzgerald, at the time Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Irish Republic, at an international consultation on inter-church marriage in Dublin in September 1974.¹⁹ He spoke as a Roman Catholic layman pointing out that intermarriage breaks down social and political barriers while religious segregation, stimulated by Roman canon law, reinforces nationalism, and applied that message to Ireland. I too find it hard to believe that the conflicting nationalisms of modern Ireland would have remained so intense if there had been a wider practice of Catholic-Protestant marriage.

Intermarriage can undoubtedly in some circumstances threaten the very existence of a community, just as in others it can threaten its purity and act as a red rag to a bull in actually exacerbating an existing nationalism. If there was little inter-religious marriage in Belfast, there was a very great deal in Sarajevo. It was seen as a threat to Serbdom and one of the aims of Dr Karadzic's brand of ethnic nationalism was precisely to bring it to an end, to prevent further pollution of Serb blood. Freedom to marry across boundary lines is anti-nationalist. In hegemonic situations, the Sharia and Catholic canon law have both been systematically applied to make of intermarriage an effective instrument for the suppression of a minority community. Only when a relationship of genuine reciprocity is admitted can intermarriage contribute, as it is of its nature shaped to do, to the bonding of contiguous communities.²⁰ The fact remains that intermarriage across ethnic borders strengthens territorial nationhood but threatens ethnic borders and is anathema to ethnic nationalists. Intermarriage and nationalism remain practical contraries and if one wishes to diminish the latter one will not discourage the former. In that charming song, *The Old Orange Flute*, Bob Williamson, a Protestant Dungannon weaver, betrayed his people and their national identity:

This treacherous scoundrel, he took us all in,
He married a papist, named Bridget McGinn
Turned papist himself and forsook the old cause
That gave us our freedom, religion and laws.

A riot resulted and Bob and Bridget fled to Connaught. If he and others like him had stayed in place and multiplied, would not the interweaving of family relationships across the two communities inevitably have created from the bottom up a sense of single nationhood? It was doing so in Sarajevo until ethnic nationalism had to bring such dangerous communion to an end.

I would like to end this discussion of the shaping of nations as of their restraining through a larger vision by appealing to two people, one English, one Irish, in a way I hope appropriate for an Englishman invited to lecture in Ulster. My Englishman is William Shakespeare. I briefly discussed his rather nationalist historical plays in chapter 2, but will now, in returning to him, call attention to a very different work.

The nationalist plays, from *Richard II* to *Henry V*, were written in youthful vigour during the 1590s when English nationalism was particularly vigorous too, the years of the Spanish war at its fiercest. They are ebullient, robust, emphatically English, even if there is at times an underlying, more self-questioning, message, particularly about the relationship of crown to people. But near the close of his active life Shakespeare returned to our theme in a quite other key. *Cymbeline* is a play about Britain not about England. It was, of course, written after James VI of Scotland had become James I of England and the Spanish war was over, thus providing circumstances in which Shakespeare could perhaps think of the nation and the world more ecumenically; there is, despite the almost impossibly complicated strains of the personal story, a sense of tranquillity in *Cymbeline*, of peace regained. It is, nevertheless, the story of an irrational and nationalist Britain, set upon being 'a world by itself', where refusal to pay formal tribute to Rome and the disruption of domestic harmony have been produced by the machinations of a thoroughly evil queen. Remembering Spenser's *Gloriana*, it is hard to discount the suspicion that in this firmly nameless queen Shakespeare is hinting at Elizabeth. *Cymbeline*'s own Roman-named sons have long ago been hidden away in a cave in the mountains of Wales

by another Roman, ill-used by Britain, who has appropriately disguised himself under the name of Morgan. Rome, that universal place where exiled Britons can mix with Frenchmen, Spaniards and Dutchmen, sends her 'gentry' to return Britain to the European fold, and Imogen, Britain's glorious princess, disguised as a boy, is part of the European army. In battle Cymbeline is defeated and captured until rescued by Morgan and his supposed sons. The Romans, captured in their turn, are about to be executed, contrary to all civilised norms, until the wickedness of the queen is at last revealed to Cymbeline together with the identity of his sons. The destructive blindness of nationalism falls from British eyes. Through Wales the true *Romanitas* of Britain is revealed once more and, though victor in battle, Cymbeline promises to restore the payment of 'our wonten tribute'. Thus an exaggerated nationalism is overthrown and peace re-established between Caesar and Cymbeline, Brussels and London, Wales and England, the international community and the nation-state, perhaps even Catholicism and the national church. But it is the British, rather than the English, dimensions of our identity which have made that possible. The path from Rome lies via Milford Haven. The symbolism in this, Shakespeare's final testimony to his fellow countrymen in regard to the matter of nationhood, is mysteriously emphatic, woefully overlooked as it mostly is.

My Irishman is St Comgall, who founded the abbey of Bangor, only a little outside modern Belfast, in the middle of the sixth century, forty years before Augustine first arrived in Canterbury. Almost everything I have been endeavouring to delineate in these lectures as somehow characteristic of the healthier tensions within the European tradition may find some sort of origin in Comgall's Bangor. It was undoubtedly the most lively centre of learning in Ireland at that time and it looks as if the origins of Irish vernacular literature may well be located in and around Bangor, here in Ulster, that is to say the first step in the stabilisation of national identities. In this Ireland actually leads the way in Europe. Yet Bangor was no less a universalist place. Columbanus had been a disciple of Comgall and dwelt here for many years before setting out for the continent, to found the great monasteries of Luxeuil and Bobbio. Columba was here too and Comgall joined him for a while at Iona in the conversion of the Picts. There is then nothing narrowly nationalist in the legacy of Comgall's Bangor. On the contrary, it points each

way, to the maturing both of Irishness and of an international catholicity.

Yet again, if Comgall's Ireland was already very much one, in language, myth, religion and law, it was also a divided island even, we may say, a little provocatively, between north and south. Let me give an example.²¹ There is a story recorded in later centuries of how when Cormac, son of Diarmuid, King of Leinster, resigned his crown to become a monk, he went north to Ulster to join the community in Comgall's Bangor. Columbanus too had come to Bangor from Leinster and at much the same time. After a while, we are told, Cormac could no longer bear to be absent from his fatherland and Comgall permitted him to return to the South. On the journey he fell asleep on a hillside and in a dream saw all the beauties of Leinster and its people. When he woke up it was enough and, returning to Comgall and Bangor, he stayed there till he died. There can be no question that there was a real unity of Ireland already in Comgall's time just as there can be no doubt of Ireland's already belonging to a still greater community stretching across Europe. But there can also be no doubt that the political model of Irishness, then as for centuries afterwards, allowed Ulster to be sufficiently distinct from Leinster to give Cormac's story its point. I am not wanting to suggest that fidelity to Ireland's most ancient traditions requires the indefinite maintenance of a border between Ulster and the South, but only that the narrowly unitary model of a nation-state which England has marketed seems foreign to the Irish genius. For the latter it would seem natural that at one level Ulster and Leinster are separate realities, at another Ireland is a single national community, at a third the confines of a territorial nation are quite transcended and Irishmen can be at home in Iona, Bobbio, Rome or Brussels. Shakespeare was surely suggesting much the same when he ends *Cymbeline* with Britain's voluntary decision to pay tribute once more to Europe. The king's final command is clear enough:

Let

A Roman and a British ensign wave
Friendly together.²²

What better conclusion can there be to a study of nationalism?

- 6 E.E. Evans-Pritchard, *Nuer Religion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), pp. 287-9; Godfrey Lienhardt, *Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 219.
 - 7 The underlying reason in his deeply traditional Ganda thinking was probably that a Muganda cannot be circumcised.
 - 8 Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 11.
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- 1 For a fascinating discussion of the relationship between Englishness and Jewishness, see James Shapiro, *Shakespeare and the Jews* (Columbia University Press, 1996).
 - 2 Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom* (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1994), p. 188.
 - 3 See Rosalind Ransford, 'A Kind of Noah's Ark: Aelfred of Rievaulx and National Identity', in Stuart Mews (ed.), *Religion and National Identity, Studies in Church History* 18 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), pp. 137-46.
 - 4 E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 48.
 - 5 *Ibid.*, p. 76.
 - 6 *Ibid.*, p. 74.
 - 7 E. Duffy, *The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England 1400-1580* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 77 and 79.
 - 8 Regino of Prüm, *Chronicon, Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum* (65), p. xx, quoted in Susan Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900-1300* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 257.
 - 9 Michael Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
 - 10 Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 49.
 - 11 Anthony Smith, *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979), especially pp. 78-80.
 - 12 Lamin Sanneh, *Translating the Message: The Missionary Impact on Culture* (New York: Orbis, 1990).
 - 13 E.J. van Donzel (ed.), *Linbaqon, Angasa Amin (La Porte de la Foi): Apologie éthiopienne du christianisme contre L'Islam à partir du Coran* (Ieriden: E.J. Brill, 1969).
 - 14 M. Ghayasadhin (ed.), *The Impact of Nationalism on the Muslim World*, (London: The Open Press, 1986), pp. 1 and 4.
 - 15 William Temple, *Church and Nation* (London: Macmillan, 1915), p. 45.
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- 16 World Missionary Conference, Edinburgh, 1910, Report of Commission 1, *Carrying the Gospel to the Non-Christian World*.
 - 17 *The Churches Survey their Task*, the Report of the Conference at Oxford, July 1937, on Church, Community and State (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1937), especially the 'Longer Report on Church and Community', pp. 188-240, significantly owed in its final form to Sir Walter Moberly, chairman of that section of the Conference. The most acute Christian analysis of the nation and nationalism dating from the Second World War period is probably Christopher Dawson's *The Judgement of the Nations* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1943).
 - 18 The case of modern Fiji is also interesting. It is perhaps the most Methodist society in the world, and Methodism has become the core of its nationalism. When more ecumenically minded Methodists came to control the leadership of the church, they were forcibly ousted by nationalists.
 - 19 *Beyond Tolerance: The Challenge of Mixed Marriage, A Record of the International Consultation held in Dublin, 1974*, ed. Michael Hurley (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1975), Appendix II, pp. 188-93.
 - 20 Adrian Hastings, 'Intermarriage and the Wider Society', *Beyond Tolerance*, pp. 1-8, reprinted in A. Hastings, *The Faces of God* (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1975), pp. 117-25.
 - 21 Robin Flower, *The Irish Tradition* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), p. 22; cf. Dáibí Ó Cróinín, *Early Medieval Ireland 400-1200* (London: Longman, 1995), p. 54.
 - 22 *Cymbeline*, 5.5.