

## Chapter 2. The European Community: A brief survey

The West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, expressed in a press conference 8 October 1971 in very simple form some of the basic strategy in the growth of the European Community:

Once the matter of entry has been dealt with, the way will be open for further progress towards a currency and economic union, and for closer cooperation in foreign policy.

The membership issue concerns what in EC language is called *extension*, and in social science parlance is called the *domain* of this unification of countries. The issues Brandt mentioned – currency union, economic union, cooperation in foreign policy – concern what in EC parlance is referred to as *deepening*, and in social science jargon as the *scope* of the integration.<sup>2</sup>

These are the two axes along which the European Community can be discussed. And Brandt's statement could just as well have been made earlier in the history of the European Community and in an inverted form: 'Once the matter of deepening has been dealt with, the way will be open for progress towards a larger membership'.

This has been the logic of EC development: deepening with constant membership, followed by extension with constant issues, followed by deepening with constant membership, and so on. We may refer to this as the staircase hypothesis (Fig. 1).

One thing at a time, not both extension and deepening simultaneously.<sup>3</sup> The secret of the success of the European Community so far is perhaps its ability to combine a clear view of the goal, 'une union sans cesse plus étroite entre les peuples Européens'<sup>4</sup> with pragmatism and a measure of restraint lest the process go too fast.

First, the background: Winston Churchill's celebrated speech in Zürich in 1946 where he said: 'We should construct some kind of United States of Europe'. The result was the Council of Europe in 1949, immediately

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Fig. 1.

given a large domain and a broad scope, but with little real power. In its Council of Ministers, decisions *have to* be unanimous,<sup>5</sup> i.e. each government has a veto. The Council of Europe is only one more intergovernmental organization, nothing less, nothing more.

The plan launched in the declaration of 9 May 1950, by French foreign minister Robert Schuman in cooperation with Jean Monnet, was very different.<sup>6</sup> Here the domain was limited to two countries, France and Germany; the scope was limited to coal and steel, but the organization was really supranational. The unification was made on the basis of an insight often ascribed to marxists: the idea that economic organization is basic. As expressed in the *Werner Report*:<sup>7</sup>

Economic and monetary union thus appears as leaven for the development of political union, which in the long run it (the Community) cannot do without.

This insight is in fact the common heritage of conservatives, liberals, and marxists alike, in an era that perhaps started around the Industrial Revolution, and is still almost equally fascinated with production and productivity.

The insight was then implemented with a textbook-like clarity starting with something very concrete, coal and steel, building power around a solid nucleus of economic organization. The next step came already 18 April 1951, when the Two became the Six: the Paris Treaty established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The scope was constant, but the domain was extended significantly and in a way typical for this process: the nucleus is very strong (France and Germany), whereas



three of the four new members are rather small in comparison (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg). *Four* new members at a time seems almost to be a rule . . .!

The first of the Communities was thereby established, and started functioning. Then came one of the few mistakes in the process, although it almost succeeded: the effort to deepen the cooperation significantly by adding a European Defense Community (EDC). In the night of 31 August 1954 this treaty, which by then had been signed by the Six's governments and ratified by five parliaments, was rejected by the French parliament – but only barely so, 319 against 264 votes in favor (the Communists and the Gaullists voted against, on well-known and different premises). We shall return to this in chapter 8.

Efforts towards deepening did not stop for that reason – they only took a different direction. On 25 March 1957 came the two Rome treaties launching the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) – matters that had been well prepared after the June 1955 conference in Messina. The major task of the EEC very quickly centered on a customs union, completed 18 months ahead of schedule (1 July 1968) with abolition of internal tariffs and a common external tariff (CET) operating around the Common Market; *and* a common agricultural policy (CAP). A decision to introduce in all six countries a uniform system of value-added tax was made 8 February 1967. And on 1 July 1967 the High Authority of the ECSC and the Commissions of the EEC and Euratom were merged so that the European Communities from that time on would have one Commission, one Council of Ministers, and one European Parliament.

In the period subsequent to the Rome treaties not only considerable deepening took place. There was also extension of membership – only that the new ‘members’ were not first-class European members as envisaged in the Rome Treaty § 238, but second-class non-European members according to Part IV of the Treaty. The First Yaoundé Convention was put into force 1 June 1964, associating 18 earlier dependencies of the member states with the EEC, 14 of them former French territories, 3 of them Belgian, and 1 of them Italian (‘Italian Somalia’).

This period is better known in Europe for another move in the direction of extension: the requests for negotiations and the applications for membership by the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway. When on 14 January 1963 President de Gaulle declared that Britain was not ready for Community membership a possible interpretation, in line with the general staircase hypothesis, might be that the Community was not yet



ready for British membership. Deepening had not gone far enough for extension to take place.

At the time it happened and even today, it is customary to emphasize de Gaulle's personal motives, his particular feelings towards England, and so on. But it might be equally or more fruitful to see de Gaulle's attitude as a reflection of a Community not yet ready to absorb new members – a feeling that new members will have more of an impact on the Community than it will have on them. In retrospect, de Gaulle's action may therefore well have strengthened rather than weakened the integration process. On 27 November 1967 this was still valid: de Gaulle's second rejection of the UK was announced at a press conference. By this time France, not only de Gaulle, knew very well of what it was speaking. From 1 July 1965 till 17 January 1966 France boycotted the institutions of the Community, manifestly because of the failure to reach agreement on the financing of the common agricultural policy. Evidently, the house was not in order!

The first green light since the Rome Treaties were signed in 1957 (and implemented as of 1 January 1958) that the Community was now prepared to go ahead was the communiqué from the summit meeting in The Hague, 1–2 December 1969 with general agreement to complete, enlarge, and strengthen the Community. From that point on, the growth of the EC has been accelerating, as have also the plans for its growth. On 4 March 1970 the Commission submitted a three-stage plan for full monetary and economic union by 1980; and on 31 July 1970 the foreign ministers of the Six submitted the Davignon Report to heads of government, suggesting ministerial meetings on political cooperation, particularly foreign policy harmonization, on a biannual basis. This was followed up by the meeting of 19 November 1970 in München where the foreign ministers of the Six for the first time, among other matters, emphasized the need for harmonization of voting in the United Nations.<sup>8</sup>

Needless to say, in the period after the Hague meeting a number of other issues were dealt with – nuclear research and also non-nuclear scientific research, the definition of medium-term economic policies, the creation of a short term mutual aid system of \$ 2 billions, steps towards common industrial policy, power given to the European Social Fund to retrain and resettle workers, a common fishery policy, the Mansholt Plan to modernize farming, and so on. But it is characteristic of the European Community that interests have focussed on the long-range plans, particularly on the ten-year, three-stage plan for full economic and monetary union with 1980 as a target date.

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The period after the Hague meeting has also been the period of negotiations with the four applicant countries, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway. That does not mean that extension has been at a standstill. In this period what we could call third class membership, looser agreements than the Yaoundé Convention, of various kinds, became prominent on the horizon of the Community. There had already been a pre-history in Europe: the association agreement with Greece signed 9 July 1961, with Turkey signed 12 September 1963, both according to § 237 of the Rome Treaty with a view to both countries some day becoming full members of the Community. Association status in this case could be considered a waiting room for the countries that for political or economic reasons were not sufficiently similar with the original Member States. After the 1967 military coup in Greece the association agreement was practically speaking suspended. Greece was put in a frigidaire inside the waiting-room – but with one leg outside. These agreements must therefore be differentiated from the much looser agreements with Yugoslavia (19 March 1970), Israel and Spain (1 October 1970) and Malta (1 April 1971).

But the real extension at the level below full membership took place outside Europe. Nigeria signed an association agreement with the EC on 16 July 1966, and even though the agreement never took effect because of the civil war raging in that country, it was significant as a first inroad into Commonwealth territory. More important was the Arusha convention signed on 26 July 1968 between the EC and Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania – an association agreement renewed on 24 September 1969. Its significance will be discussed in chapter 6.

That brings us up to the present situation. What is ahead on the two axes of deepening and extension? These are the basic questions, since these have to be answered to evaluate to what extent that superstate is becoming a superpower: in other words, to what extent the EC's bid for power at the very top level of the world, even to the point of making the world Eurocentric again and creating a Europe with a center in the EC, will become reality.

To explore this question we could imagine two types of methodology.

We could take as our point of departure politicians' expressions of *intention*. The late 1940s and the early 1950s saw a plethora of statements about a coming United States of Europe; many of these statements were carried over into the early beginnings of the EC, particularly by its founders. Or, we could take a more recent pronouncement on how a leading EC statesman, Chancellor Willy Brandt, sees its future role:<sup>9</sup>



I am sometimes amused when I read stories about the new triangular world situation into which we may get – Washington, Moscow and Peking. I myself think it will be more of a square or rectangular situation, with Western Europe the fourth corner – at least if we look as far ahead as the end of this decade.

This is not the method we shall employ here. The relationship between openly professed intentions and what is happening in the world of facts is too loose to permit any solid influence. The Council of Europe is in itself evidence of how little intentions mean when not backed up by capabilities. In addition, professed intention is one thing, the real intention quite another – and usually available only in retrospect.

But the major objection is that the quotation method attributes too much weight to intention, too little to structure. It also assumes that politicians are aware of what they are doing, that they have insight in the forces they are riding on, trying to stem, or trying to unleash. For this reason we will base ourselves much more on an analysis of the structure emerging so far, and extrapolate from this. Professed intentions may some times precede, some times antedate, some times not even touch at all what is going on.

*What is going on is evidently continued deepening and extension.* As to the deepening there is little reason to doubt that the goals indicated in the Werner and Davignon Plans will be reached, possibly even before the target date of 1980, with some modifications. But this is not because it is written in the plans, nor because there is a professed intention to adhere to the plans in one way or another. Rather, it is simply because the fusion process already started in the European Community *must* lead to a chain reaction. In fact, the process will have much deeper consequences than those that happen to be spelt out in the two Plans which have been the subject of so much public discussion, particularly in the applicant countries.

With fusions at various levels of major industrial organizations, e.g. in automobile and airplane production,<sup>10</sup> it is obvious that other aspects of capital have to merge, towards a monetary and economic union. If capital merges, labor has to do the same: European Community trade unions will be an obvious consequence of the European multinational corporation, capable of undertaking joint negotiations, launching joint strikes, and so on.

If the secondary sector of the economy of the Member States is organized so well at the Community level, something similar has to hap-

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pen to the primary and tertiary sectors. So far, CAP has been run from the top; a safe prediction is that a farmers' organization for the total European Community will emerge. Correspondingly with the tertiary sector: the growth in the field of European Community INGOs (inter-nongovernmental organizations), is already explosive, as a natural mechanism in order to get into position for joint negotiations with the authorities of the Community.<sup>11</sup>

At the same time, if all this takes place around the basic interests individuals have because of their jobs, it will also happen at the level of values, because of shared ideology. In other words, EC parties will become more and more Community parties organized at the European Community level, and less and less coordination between the members of the European Community. Already today the members of the European Parliament are organized in the 'official' political groups: Christian Democrats, Socialists and Liberals – and in addition the European Democratic Union, which consists only of members of the French Gaullist Party. The Italian Communist Party has been represented since 1969, but its members are too few to form an official group. This process will continue outside the European Parliament.

The point here, however, is not that the European Community will be biased against radical parties to the right or to the left. The EC is built around the solid nucleus of economic and political structure that the member states have in common. With sufficiently strong communist parties in most of the countries this will probably sooner or later be adequately reflected. The point is that parties will tend to become increasingly transnational, dealing directly with the EC, and the national level will become less dominant. This will also tend to make parties in the EC countries much more similar.

These chain reaction processes are so obvious that one could rather ask the question in reverse form: which are the groupings most likely to be excluded from this general process of transnationalization? We would assume that these would be groups, or interests, that

- 1) are not even well articulated at the national level, or
- 2) are not found in a majority in the member states, or
- 3) do not have sufficient resources to organize transnationally.

As to the first category we would think particularly of groups in outlying districts, or in the national periphery in general; such as islanders in Northern Norway, or old and lonely people.



In the second category we could think of groups and interests related to major group conflicts, such as the conflicts found in Belgium, in the UK (Wales, Scotland, Ulster), in France (Bretagne, but also in South-eastern France<sup>12</sup>) and to some extent in some other countries. Since these conflicts are not found in all countries, and certainly not in the same form, it will be difficult for the groupings to find each other.

With the third case a good example might be the general situation of high school students and university students. It is not difficult for the European Community to organize meetings to discuss 'the problem of youth', 'the university crisis', and similar topics – but participants in these meetings will usually be ministers of education, bureaucrats, and others in the school systems, lecturers and professors. Those who might be interested in organizing conferences to discuss 'the problems of middle-aged males', 'professorial rest' instead of the perennial 'student unrest', would be short on resources, not only in the trivial sense of travel funds or funds to set up an organization, but also when it comes to finding people with time and opportunity to participate in such meetings *as a part of their job*.

All of this is difficult enough at the national level: it is even more difficult at the EC level. In no way does this imply that the 'problems' indicated will not be dealt with: but they will be handled by those on top, in a dominant position, with inadequate participation from the dominated side. Not even their views will be sufficiently articulated; so the stage is set for a technocratic and bureaucratic type of social engineering.

This will not last. Counterforces will be generated, organization lower down in society will take place, also at the Community level – as a measure of self defense, starting with articulation that may sometimes take violent forms. And at this point one of the ironies of the European Community will become increasingly clear: the more forces in the EC countries strongly opposed to the centralism from Brussels organize and get into effective counter-positions, among other reasons to weaken the central powers of the European Community, the more will the EC grow in vitality. At the moment it is a vast superstructure with a European civil service approaching 10,000 persons (6,200 in the Commission, the secretariats of the Council and the Parliament, in the Court and in the European Investment Bank; 2,500 in the four Euratom research establishment).<sup>13</sup> This superstructure is on top of six nation-states where opposition to bureaucracy is at times very articulate.

But so far there has been practically speaking no opposition at all of a genuine transnational kind against the European Community as such

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– and that is perhaps the major factor that makes the EC different from a superstate *as seen from the inside*. Clearly, it is still much closer to the con-federation of *patries* that has by and large been the French line, than to the supranational integration towards a superstate that has been articulated by the others. Essentially, it may well be the EC's antagonists who may be most effective in pushing the EC towards a superstate formation, for as they organize and transnationalize, EC authorities will also re-group on a firmer and more transnational basis. The day there is a massive demonstration of say, youth and workers from all member states rallying at Commission headquarters in Brussels, in front of the Berlaymount building at the Place Schuman, *and* this demonstration confronts a transnational European Community police force, for instance organized with that particular French CRS expertise – that day the European Community superstate will be a reality.

However, since our concern in this essay is mainly with the impact of the European Community on the outside world, the internal structure is not our major focus. The proposition 'the European Community is becoming a superstate' cannot be proven wrong by referring to some of the cumbersome mechanisms of decision-making and a high level of decentralization that is a part of the reality of the Brussels Eurocracy, as well as for the 188 million citizens found as of 1969 in the member states. It is in the relationship to the outside that the superstate aspect, and possibly also the superpower aspect, will become evident; for instance as the fourth corner in a square or rectangle that Brandt pointed to. A more adequate geometrical figure would actually be a *pentagon*, with Japan as the fifth corner – already alluded to by President Nixon in a speech July 1971, and worked into the plans for the reorganization of the British foreign service.

That brings us to the other axis: what will happen to *extension* in the future? This is not a question of whether the Six will become the Ten; we are thinking beyond that debate. For the sake of the argument let us imagine that as of 1 January 1973 the European Community has ten members; for even if it has only eight or nine the other remaining two or one will probably be so strongly tied to the EC that for all practical purposes they can be considered members. Whether it is an advantage to be only on the receiving side of Brussels decision-making or also on the sending side will depend on whether one views full membership as sharing of decisions that mainly are good, or decisions that also can be bad. In the latter case sharing decision-making may also become sharing guilt. This seems to be the Swedish position.



The Treaty of Rome clearly states that only European states can become members. This gives a potential membership of 30 European states, leaving out the rest of the world. However, at least two simple principles cut down the number of potential future members to far below 20.

First, there is the underlying principle of basic *structural similarity* in the economic and political sphere. The European Community has a number of institutions, and it would be meaningless for a state to join unless it would have a structure where these institutions could plug in. A continental European plug for electrical apparatus does not fit a British socket, as any traveller will know, nor will it fit in a country where there is no electricity at all. In short, the *level of technical-economic development* must not be too dissimilar, and the *institutional political framework* must exhibit basically the same structure. There must be 'opposite numbers', institutions to at least most of the things organized by the Community so far; otherwise membership would be meaningless. Since the Community has not yet come quite so far in its integration process, this means one out of two: either an applicant country must be relatively similar in advance, or it has to adjust. The EC cannot be expected to adjust in any significant respect — not only because of its size, but also because of the complexity of its confederate structure.

The second principle for limiting the number of potential members is, of course, *ideological* (as opposed to structural) *similarity*. Thus, of the two founding members, France and Germany, both were NATO countries and ex-colonial powers; of the Six, all are NATO countries, and five (the exception being the smallest member, Luxembourg) ex-colonial powers; of the Ten, nine are NATO countries (Ireland being the only exception), and six are ex-colonial powers (Ireland and Norway being clear exceptions from this, Denmark somewhat less clear).

This certainly indicates the political profile, but if the EC were mainly concerned with economic affairs one might say that NATO is an outside activity of most of the member states, and that the status as *ex-colonial* power is exactly that, something belonging to the past. The difficulty is that the EC is more than an economic organization. In the field of foreign policy this becomes particularly clear in the Davignon Report with its drive for foreign policy harmonization.

Even if this had not been the case it is quite clear that the EC cannot be said to be politically neutral. It is based on a certain type of economic relationship to the rest of the world, to be explored in chapter 3, that induces a structure with very particular political consequences. Since it

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produces dependency relations, reactions in other countries are bound to occur, to accumulate, and sooner or later to taken on sharper and sharper political consequences. Nothing social is neutral in its consequences, and at the giant level even less so – for which reason membership is clearly not an act of political innocence.

The consequence of these two principles of structural (economic and political) similarity and non-neutrality (to use an understatement) are easily found by anyone wanting to scan the European scene for potential members of the Community.

*First*, the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries, and Albania, are of course excluded, for both reasons. The absence of structural similarity is clear enough: there is neither a mildly centralized market economy, nor a parliamentary democracy. Political alignment there is, but with the opposite side. That excludes eight countries; the number of potential candidates is now down to twelve.

*Second*, there are the non-aligned countries in the middle of Europe: Sweden and Finland in the North, Switzerland and Austria in the Center, Yugoslavia to the South. With the exception of Yugoslavia, all four could fit from the point of view of structural similarity, since both economic and political institutions are largely the same – as evidenced by the fact that they are together with the Six, or with the Ten for that matter, in the Council of Europe. But non-alignment is incompatible with non-neutrality, whether that non-alignment is voluntarily self-imposed or imposed from the outside. That excludes five more countries, and the number of possible candidates for full membership is now down to seven. But it should be added that so close forms of association may develop (with Sweden, Switzerland, Austria) that any political virginity becomes purely technical.

Third, the three island countries in Europe: Iceland to the North, and Malta and Cyprus in the Mediterranean. All might offer some difficulties from the point of view of economic similarity. Iceland, for instance, has a high standard of living, but its economy is so much based on fishing that it has relatively few of the institutions of a modern industrialized society. The political similarity should offer no particular problem, however. But all three of them seem increasingly to adopt a non-aligned stand with a certain anti-Western admixture, and however close their association with the EC may become in the future we doubt that they will become full members. So, if this excludes three more, the number of possible candidates is now down to four.

*These are the four countries that we would see as candidates for ex-*



*tension of the European Community: Turkey, Greece, Spain, Portugal. With these countries entering, the Ten will become the Fourteen. Although there is a marginal chance that some countries in the second and third categories above might join sooner or later, we think this is likely to be the maximum number in the foreseeable future because at that time the European Community will start producing a polarization that will sharpen the cleavage between it and the rest of the world.*

Concretely, what would be the circumstances accompanying membership for these four Southern European countries?

Ideological alignment presents no essential problem in this connection: three are already NATO members, and the only exception, Spain, is for all practical purposes a member of the Western alliance. Three are ex-colonial powers, Greece being the only exception. In fact, if they were to become members, the political configuration so clear in the EC from the very beginning would merely be completed: of the thirteen European NATO members, twelve would be in (Iceland being the only exception, and by that time Iceland would probably already have a long history of non-NATO membership) with Ireland and Spain being the only non-members. Moreover, all countries with a colonial tradition in Europe outside Russia would be included, nine altogether. The latter is rather important, for if we add together the territories once included in the British Empire, the French Communauté, the Spanish, Portuguese and Italian empires, the Belgian and Dutch colonial possessions, the Turkish Ottoman empire and the impact of German colonialism (in Eastern Europe more than in Africa, Asia, and Oceania) very few parts of the world are untouched. In fact, the rest of the world would include almost only China and Japan. With some very minor exceptions Western Europe was spinning its net of dependency relations and extending its bloody paths of colonization all over the world. The world was, indeed, Eurocentric; and Europe did, indeed, have its center in the West!

Thus, the major reason why we believe that the Ten will become the Fourteen derives from the assumption that the European Community is born out of social inertia, as an effort to turn history backwards and give rebirth to the old world structure, although in the trappings of the last third of the twentieth century.

Even if there is no difficulty with political alignment, the factor of similarity rules out immediate membership for the four. With the criteria currently employed by the Community Turkey would appear ruled out because of low level of technical-economic development, whereas Spain



would be ruled out because of the absence of parliamentary democracy and certain human rights. Portugal and Greece may be ruled out for both reasons.

Although Turkey and Greece are only in the § 238 waiting room (Greece with its permission to stay there temporarily suspended), and although Spain and Portugal at the moment can only aspire to the ante-room of the waiting room (trade agreement according to § 113), we nevertheless believe this process may become a relatively quick one.<sup>14</sup> There is no doubt that all four would very much like to become members. This is, for instance, a major platform in the policy of the present Portuguese leadership, partly dictated by economic weakness, but certainly also by a feeling of political insecurity. In all four countries regimes are challenged in a very basic way; in all four countries some type of revolution is a possibility that cannot be ruled out.

To be linked to the European Community and be gradually absorbed into it is not a guarantee against political upheaval, but it may serve as a protective mechanism. First of all, if a small country joins a big community this will serve as a drainage of political energy. The traditional sources of political ferment – exploited workers and frustrated intellectuals – will find refuge abroad, within the confines of the large community. This will work as a defense against extremism from the left, *and* from the right. Not only are the forces of opposition weakened: the forces in position are also strengthened because they become less vulnerable when resources can flow into them from the outside because of their strong ties to the Community.

Our thesis is therefore that the powers-that-be in these four countries, all occupying positions at various places on the fascist end of the political spectrum, will find it in their interest to trade some measures of parliamentary democracy, human rights, and individual liberties for EC membership. The dilemma all four are confronting might be formulated as follows: what is the minimum requirement that would make us acceptable to the European Community, and what is the maximum relaxation in the direction of more liberal regimes we can permit before a chain-reaction ending in some kind of revolution may be unleashed? These minima and maxima are highly subjective estimates, and the condition for a clear 'go ahead' is that the maximum be located above the minimum. But is it? That depends on the requirements of the EC. To take only one variable, censorship: there is considerable difference between the Ten and the other Four. It will take time for these regimes to sort this out, to smoothen a transition towards some type of political pluralism –



and it would be strange if the regimes should survive in all four. For those who see liberal, parliamentary democracy as the highest achievement human society has reached so far, this will be taken as a sign of the healthy impact of the European Community. Most might agree that the regimes in the Four are inferior to the typical European Community society; but it is also highly likely that once these Four are inside, there will be a locking-in effect: the EC giant will extend its pattern to the most remote corner and be extremely hard to change anywhere.

For Portugal this is particularly dramatic, since there will be one more condition under the general heading of similarity: *Portugal has to shed her colonies*. The colonial war has to be brought to an end, and our hypothesis is that this is a low price to pay for EC membership. In what Portuguese authorities have so far said concerning contact with the European Community there is no longer any talk of Portugal overseas, it is only European Portugal. The whole rationale for Portugal's stand in connection with the three possessions in Africa may disappear like mist before the sun, when Lisbon turns towards Brussels.

On the other hand, just as a colonial power becomes an ex-colonial power, colonialism becomes neo-colonialism. But the pattern, once Portugal is inside the Community, would have to be *shared* neo-colonialism: a status for Angola/Mozambique/Guinea-Bissau similar to that obtained for the Yaoundé states. It is therefore highly likely that trilateral negotiations will be started (or have already gone on for some time) between the EC, Portugal, and the liberation movements as to whether the liberation movements would be willing to accept some kind of Yaoundé status for their territories. In that case the EC might be willing to grant membership to Portugal, and Portugal on her side would withdraw political and military control and just become one of the EC countries. There are some indications that this trilateral deal might not work, for the liberation movements in the Portuguese territories are of an older generation than those who fought in the 1950s and early 1960s against the British and the French. They know more as to what may happen afterwards, they have lived in exile in those countries and may have drawn the conclusion. For this reason the Portuguese case for full membership may be a more dubious one than the other three, but not at all excluded.<sup>15</sup>

So this is the picture we consider likely by 1980: up to Fourteen member states, almost all of European NATO and colonial Europe inside. These will be so well integrated that *superstate* is the correct term, although of a slightly new kind.

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But will it be a *superpower*? For that we have to turn to an analysis of the concept of power. The reader who finds that too abstract is recommended to proceed straight to chapters 4 and 5, where the general ideas of chapter 3 will be applied to the EC in a more general way; and to chapters 6 and 7, where they will be applied to third world countries and to the socialist countries in a more specific manner. After that the reader might like to return to chapter 3 for a more theoretical perspective.

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