1 National identity and foreign policy: a dialectical relationship

> Science and reason have, from the beginning of time, played a secondary and subordinate part in the life of nations; so it will be to the end of time. Nations are built up and moved by another force which sways and dominates them, the origin of which is inexplicable.
>
> Fyodor Dostoyevsky, *The Possessed*

> A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality, if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and others – which make them cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that they should be governed either by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively . . . the strongest of all identity is that of political antecedents . . .
>
> John Stuart Mill[1]

The language of political science contains few concepts more fugitive than that of nation. For every definition proposed, a host of examples appear to qualify or reject it. Ernest Renan defined a nation as

> a grand solidarity constituted by the sentiment of sacrifices which have been made in the past and those that one is disposed to make again. It supposes a past, renews itself especially in the present by a tangible deed, the approval, the desire, clearly expressed, to continue the communal life. The existence of a nation (pardon the expression) is an everyday plebiscite.[2]

Walker Connor, in a simple, elegant way, defined a nation as a group of people "who believe that they are related by ancestry. It is the

[1] John Stuart Mill, "Considerations on Representative Government," in *The Nationalism Reader*, ed. Omar Dahbour and Micheline R. Ishay (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995), 98.

[2] Ernest Renan, "Que'est-ce qu'une nation?" reproduced in *The Dynamics of Nationalism: Readings in its Meanings and Developments*, ed. Louis L. Snyder (Princeton: D. Van Norstand, 1964), 9–10.

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largest group that shares that belief."[3] In darker tones, the Yugoslav novelist Danilo Kis described nationalism as first and foremost paranoia. Collective and individual paranoia. As collective paranoia it results from envy and fear and most of all from the loss of individual consciousness; this collective paranoia is therefore simply an accumulation of individual paranoias at the pitch of paroxysm.[4]

The simplest, and thus broadest, definition of national identity is offered by Barrington Moore, Jr., as "membership in a group that can save an individual from the anxieties of carving out his own meaningful place in the world, especially when the realistic chances of doing so are tiny."[5]

Just as elusive as the definitions of nation and nationalism is the origin of either concept. There exists little consensus over when and where nationalism and national identity became a political force. While many scholars link the birth of nationalism to the French Revolution and the subsequent transfer of loyalty from the institution of the monarchy to the institution of the state, this definition is by no means universally accepted. Hans Kohn, for example, dates the rise of modern political nationalism to the English Revolution in the seventeenth century;[6] Benedict Anderson to the American Revolution and the Creole republics of the New World;[7] and Lord Acton to the Polish partition.[8]

Similarly, scholars do not agree on which social forces propelled the national ideal into the force that it became. Kohn sees nationalism as a substitute for the decline of religion and the rejection of "Cold Etatism" after the Peace of Westphalia.[9] Ernest Gellner, on the other hand, considers cultural bonds and linguistic links in a highly literate, modern society as the key to national assertiveness,[10] while Anthony D. Smith argues that the driving force of nationalism is industrialization's dislocation of the intelligentsia and subsequent creation of

[3] Walker Connor, "From Tribe to Nation," *History of European Ideas* 13:. 1/2 (1991), 6

[4] Danilo Kis, "On Nationalism," in *A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia*, ed. Mark Thompson (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), 337.

[5] Barrington Moore, Jr., *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1978), 488.

[6] See Hans Kohn, "The Origins of English Nationalism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 1 (1940), 69–94.

[7] See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London and New York: Verso Press, 1993), ch. 4.

[8] See John Acton, *Essays on Freedom and Power* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1956).

[9] See Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background* (New York: Macmillan, 1945), 188–89.

[10] See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983).

ethnocentric nationalism as a means of reinstatement.[11] Miroslav Hroch, analyzing the dynamics of the birth of national identity, sees a three-stage process, occurring primarily in "non-historic" nations (i.e. nations who either lack an indigenous elite, or whose elites were assimilated into an imperial culture).[12] The first stage occurs when the local intelligentsia develops an interest in artifacts of a distant past and peasant traditions to validate a sense of national separateness; the second witnesses the spread of the idea of cultural separateness from a narrow circle of intellectuals to the masses, usually peasants; and the third takes place when overtly political organizations result, fusing the intellectuals and the masses and creating a broad-based national movement, following the path common throughout the nineteenth century.[13]

Despite the elusiveness of the subject, however, a general consensus has evolved concerning the existence of a powerful link between romanticism and nationalism. In the words of Mostafa Rejai, "Romanticism rejects the idea of the self-sufficiency of the individual and emphasizes the identification with the external whole, with something outside oneself. . . Nationalism is the political expression of Romanticism."[14] This chapter contends that this emotional, albeit irrational, sense of nation and national identity plays a vital role in forming a society's perception of its environment and is an extremely important, if not driving, force behind the formation of its foreign policy because national identity helps to define the parameters of what a polity considers its national interests at home and abroad.

A polity's national identity is very much a result of how it interprets its history – beliefs and perceptions that accumulate over time and constitute a society's "collective memory." Since the memories of societies, much like those of individuals, are inconsistent and selective, the national identity is subject to what layer of a polity has the custodianship of the collective memory. As will be shown later, a transfer of the custodianship of a polity's collective memory will often lead to a fundamental redefinition of the "national idea" and, with it, the parameters of a polity's national interest.

The prevailing theory of what motivates nations to adopt a specific

[11] See Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (New York: Holms & Meier, 1983).
[12] For example, the Czech elite were Germanized, the Slovak elite were Magyarized, and the Ukrainian elite were either Polonized or Russified.
[13] Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of a National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
[14] Mostafa Rejai, *Political Ideologies: A Comparative Approach* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1991), 29.

course of action in international conduct is that of the Realist school. While scholars stress different specific factors, mainstream scholarly analysis of the forces shaping international behavior generally agrees that the state is a rational actor. Hans Morgenthau, the father of modern political Realism, asserted that man's political behavior is motivated by two primeval instincts: selfishness and lust for power.[15] Henry Kissinger, along with many others, emphasizes the balance of power among states as the prime determinant of states' behavior.[16] Marxist political scientists tend to see foreign policy as an external reflection of the power-based "correlation of forces" between classes within a society.

Given the dominance that Realist thought enjoys in academic circles, scholars often overlook the psychological aspects of foreign policy. Furthermore, although every member of the international system may strive to enhance its wealth and power, there exists no objective definition of "national interest." As Max Weber observed, some polities seem to be willing to sacrifice a great deal of wealth for an undertaking that may not enhance the state's security or economy but will satisfy "irrational" psychological needs. Expanding his examination of links between ideas and policy, Weber noted:

> Not ideas, but material and ideal interests directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the world images that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interests.[17]

The study of international relations often neglects what William Bloom refers to as "identification theory," a psychological bond that motivates an entire population to support certain external policies even if they cause a great deal of social pain and bring few visible rewards.[18] Harold Isaacs, in *Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change*, cites Erik Erikson:

> [Erikson] says Freud is speaking of identity in a most central ethnic sense suggesting a deep commonality known only to those who share in it, and only expressible in words more mystical than conceptual. Identity, he says here, is a process "located" *in the core of*

[15] See Michael J. Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1986), ch. 6.
[16] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).
[17] Quoted in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 11.
[18] William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

> *the individual and yet also in the core of his communal culture,* a process which establishes, in fact, the identity of these two identities.[19]

Although all nations possess, to some degree, a national identity, these identities vary greatly in their intensity and origin. Nations may derive their sense of identity from common language, religion, geographic location, collective memory, cultural practices, or a myth of common ancestry. Indeed, one can hardly imagine the emergence of an Italian national identity without Dante's *Divine Comedy,* the emergence of a German national identity without Luther's translation of the Bible into the vernacular, or the emergence of a Ukrainian national identity without Taras Shevchenko's *Kobzar.* Nevertheless, while a polity must meet a set of preconditions to form a nation, it is interaction with the outside world, namely the acceptance or rejection of "the other," that allows polities to develop a sense of national uniqueness.

Hans Kohn, in his classic study of nationalism, notes that the distinctive monotheism of the Jews and the ancient Greeks' sense of cultural superiority gave the former the concept of *Amamamim* (non-monotheism) and the latter the concept of *te ethnie* (heathens).[20] This sense of superiority, or at least fundamental difference from other peoples, gave these two groups, along with many others, an identity that transcended clan or tribal identities.[21] Nations such as Great Britain, the Netherlands, the United States, and France (according to Hugh Seton-Watson, "continuous nations," whose identity formation was greatly facilitated by institutions that predated their nationalism) can trace the induction of an identity to prolonged contact with the "other"; an identity that shaped their outlook on the world and formed their policies *vis-à-vis* their neighbors. As William Bloom illustrates, England and France initially forged their national identity as a result of the Hundred Years War, which fostered in England the notion of the "Island of Virtue" and in France the national symbol of the "Maiden of Orleans."[22] Over 100 years later, the prolonged conflict with Spain proved a key factor in the early emergence of the Dutch national identity. The Poles date the birth of their national identity from their conversion to Christianity in 966, reinforced by the battle of

[19] Quoted in Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 64 (emphasis in the original).

[20] See Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism,* ch. 2.

[21] In an interesting departure, Zia Sardar, Ashis Nandy, and Merryl Davies, in their pamphlet *Barbaric Others* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), claim that this notion of "the other" is strictly a Western one.

[22] Bloom, *Personal Identity,* 65.

Grunwald in 1410; the Magyars date theirs from the Battle of Mohács in 1526; the Serbs from their defeat at Gray Falcon Fields in Kosovo in 1389; the Australians from the battle of Gallipoli in 1917; Brazil from the War of the Triple Alliance of 1865–67; and the United States from the "era of good feelings" following the War of 1812 (although most scholars, including Kohn and Liah Greenfeld, argue that the process of identity formation in the United States did not end until the Civil War).[23]

It should be noted, however, that while all nationalist births require a contact with an "other," the contact does not necessarily have to be a short and cataclysmic event as in the above-mentioned cases. National identity may emerge slowly, after incubating for centuries, as in the case of Ireland. There, in addition to a clash of cultures between native Gaelic Catholicism and British Protestantism, the emergence of national identity had other causes. D. George Boyce described these forces, saying, "[A] large culturally, politically and economically advanced country existed side by side with a small culturally, politically and economically retarded (or, to use a less pejorative phrase, less developed) country."[24] In other words, it was the clash with the "economic other" that sharpened the concept of national identity in Ireland. In short, while most nationalisms emphasize a common cultural or historical denominator to a certain degree, most date back to a conflict with an outside power. However, while war may be the fastest and most effective method of engendering a national identity, it is the prolonged contact with other cultures, not war itself, that stirs an awareness of "the other" hitherto dormant. Another important component of the concept of the "other" is that, often, the recognition of the contact's impact is used by nationalist historians to rebuild the concept retrospectively; for example, the revival of the myth of Bar-Kochba and Massada by the Zionists or the revival of Africanism in Brazil.

Using Nietzsche's concept of *ressentiment*, Greenfeld notes that, in many cases, national identity emerges after the introduction (or importation) of one culture into another. Ultimately, the indigenous culture reacts to, and partially rejects, the alien culture.[25] It is generally

[23] Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1945).

[24] D. George Boyce, *Nationalism in Ireland* (London and New York: Routledge Press, 1995), 383.

[25] Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

assumed that economic modernization produces cultural homogenization on a universal Western model. In fact, modernization may produce precisely the antithetical effect, in essence re-enforcing Samuel Huntington's argument that, "Modernization and economic development neither require nor produce cultural Westernization. On the contrary they promote a resurgence of a renewed commitment to the indigenous culture."[26]

This dynamic and its subsequent impact on foreign policy can be seen throughout modern history. In Russia, for example, both Peter I and Catherine II imposed foreign culture on Russia, but this imposition actually helped to crystallize a sense of Russian identity among the Russian elite. Although the regimes had hoped to use the new elite as harbingers of Westernization, it instead inculcated on *the* Russian rural masses their own identity, and, for them, the Westernized elite became the "other." In Japan, after centuries of isolation and cultural insularity, the people were confronted with the nation's rapid economic and cultural integration into the world community. This gave rise to a sense of national identity based on Japanese national characteristics (*minzokuteki tokushitsu*), stressing the uniqueness of the Japanese while underplaying the characteristics of the outside world.[27]

Although the common perception is that *ressentiment* results from Western cultural imperialism, this phenomenon has occurred in Western Europe as well. As the German historian Karl Bracher argues, the imposition of the French political and cultural model on the traditional German polities in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century led to the birth of a collective German nostalgia that, in turn, culminated in the German romantic movement and with it a rejection of French rationalism, a process that profoundly affected German domestic and foreign policies.[28] As the German case illustrates, *ressentiment* of the "other" is a constantly evolving concept. Using Hroch's model, one can see that when the German national identity stemmed primarily from a rejection of French cultural hegemony and rationalism (driven primarily by Herder and his fellow intellectuals), the "other" was France. By the mid nineteenth century however, when custodianship of the German national idea was appropriated by

[26] Samuel F. Huntington, "The West and the World," *Foreign Affairs* 75: 6 (November/December 1997), 37.

[27] Kosaku Yoshino, *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological Inquiry* (London and New York: Routledge Press, 1995).

[28] See Karl Dietrich Bracher, *The German Dilemma* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

the political and commercial classes of Germandom, the national interest acquired a far more utilitarian goal, emphasizing the creation of an autarkic economy. The "other" then shifted from the French to the free-trading British. Friedrich List attacked Adam Smith's views of economics, and by inference Britain, because of its "boundless cosmopolitanism, dead materialism, and a disorganizing particularism . . . *A nation must be cemented by a national economy.*"[29]

A spectacular example of how a foreign presence can spawn a new national identity is India. The national identity of the diverse peoples of the Indian subcontinent resulted directly from a reaction to the British Raj, giving these peoples a collective experience, as well as inducing the *ressentiment* process among India's British educated elite. The Nehru family's decision to burn their British manufactured clothing in favor of native dress, while at the same time remaining champions of Westminster democracy, illustrates the process of nation building. Similarly, the birth of an Algerian identity among Arabs and Berbers, traditional rivals, grew out of resistance to French colonial rule.

In short, national identity serves not only as the primary link between the individual and society, but between a society and the world. Foreign policy, with its role as either the protector or the anchor of national identity, provides the political elite with a ready tool for mass mobilization and political cohesion. This cohesion is essential for all societies to function. There are those who have argued that the routine use of foreign policy to secure legitimacy is unique to countries where the political elite feels particularly vulnerable and national identity is rooted not in institutions, but in a romantic national movement. This notion, however, is misplaced. All countries frequently use national identity to articulate their foreign policies and in turn, rely on foreign policy as a foundation of their legitimacy.

William Pfaff, in *The Wrath of Nations*, perceptively notes that the United States, founded on an ideological basis with a constitution and a commitment to universal values, has always used a distinctly American moralism in its foreign policy as a source of national identity.[30] Its hostility to the Bolshevik regime in the 1920s was based not only on a perceived threat to the country's security but also on the

[29] Louis L. Snyder, *Roots of German Nationalism: The Sources of Political and Cultural Activity* (New York: Barnes & Nobel Books, 1996), 15 (emphasis added).

[30] William Pfaff, *The Wrath of Nations: Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 163.

potential communist assault on the American mythos of universal mission. As Gordon S. Wood wrote, The Bolsheviks "threatened nothing less than displacement of the United States from the vanguard of history. The Russians, not the Americans, now claimed to be pointing the way toward the future."[31]

Similarly, Margaret Thatcher's efforts to block deeper European integration were an attempt to preserve British integrity; in her eyes, any transfer of powers to Brussels would undermine Britain's courts and parliament, both vital components of Britain's institution-based national identity. France's spirited objections to subjecting its entertainment industry to the competitive regulations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade were presented not as a defense of an economic asset, but as a policy dictated by the need to preserve France's culture. Generations of French citizens have considered their culture part of France's universal profile and a cornerstone of its national identity.

Most modern polities rely on a legitimizing mythology. The conduct of foreign policy, by extension, is one means of affirming that mythology and thereby legitimizing a governing elite. This relationship is, however, more central in countries in which legal institutions play a relatively marginal role in the process of nation building. In countries where romantic nationalism is prevalent, foreign policy assumes disproportionate importance; by enhancing national prestige, the political elite can appropriate national symbols and retain control over the dynamics of national identity. Since the symbols of national identity hold great political power, the political elite jealously guards them from usurpation by non-governmental actors.

Once mobilized, though, such symbols can trigger great pressures and may force decisions the elite would rather not make. One example is Egypt's President Nasser's decision to harness pan-Arab nationalism in May of 1967 to buttress the sagging popularity of his regime. A case can be made that this tactic created a momentum in the country toward a confrontation with Israel, for which Egypt was not militarily prepared and which resulted in a humiliating defeat. Following this debacle, the Egyptians, who until 1967 had based their identity on their leadership of the Pan-Arab movement, were forced to redefine themselves *vis-à-vis* the other Arab states, and indeed, the rest of the world, focusing on their Egyptian rather than their Arab identity.

[31] Ibid., 185.

Typologies of nationalism

Although nationalism has no specific ideology and no two cases of national identity are the same, one can discern five separate categories of relationships between national identity and the conduct of foreign policy. The first group consists of national identities based on political institutions rather than mythologies of common blood ancestors, religion, and language. These are English-speaking countries such as the United States and Great Britain, whose political institutions were built on the foundations of eighteenth-century rationalism, which remains the underpinning source of legitimacy. Because of their Enlightenment origins, these polities assume that their political systems are rational and their political values universal. As a result, the foreign policies of these countries tend to be simultaneously legalistic and endowed with a sense of mission.

Grounded in these core beliefs, early American policy soon gave rise to Manifest Destiny and, 100 years later, Wilsonian idealism – the former committing the United States to export its values throughout its hemisphere in the nineteenth century[32] and the latter extending the commitment to a universal scale in the twentieth century. As Robert Osgood wrote, "With a mixture of self-righteous and genuine fervor [Americans] interpreted their own history as a prime example of this truth [of American moral superiority] and based their assertion of the American mission upon faith that their lofty example would shed enlightenment abroad."[33] Despite the oft-stated observation that, under the façade of moralism, Washington pursued a Machiavellian foreign policy, Tony Smith, in his book *America's Mission*, argues convincingly that the United States is unique in its consistent association of universal democracy with its own national well-being.[34]

Although Britain's foreign policy has rarely reached the rhetorical level of America's, it nonetheless has also sought to spread the universal values of rationalism. This British attitude was perhaps best articulated by Daniel O'Connell on the floor of the House of Commons. Commenting on the merits of the 1832 Reform Bill, O'Connell said,

[32] Albert Katz Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1958).
[33] Robert E. Osgood, *Idealism and Self Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 17–18.
[34] Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

> The effect of the Reform Bill would be to give the democratic principle in this country an impulse it had not yet received, and that spirit, urged on by the sympathy the people had for liberty, would press upon the government of this country – would press too, upon the stock-jobbing government of France – and would compel the unpopular monarch there to sympathize with the feelings of the people of France, and encourage the people of Germany . . . to range themselves with every rational government and insist upon justice being done to Poland.[35]

Thus, British pronouncements ranging from "white man's burden" within the colonial empire to upholding "the rule of law" and defending "little Belgium" (which led to Britain's entry into World War I) were framed in the language of universal values.

The Anglo-American world's faith in its institutional superiority reached a level of triumphalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as Anglo-Saxon politicians continually evoked divine providence as the source of authorization for specific foreign policy decisions. Justifying Britain's international role, William Gladstone (who belonged to the anti-imperialist camp) declared, "It is in the nature of things – it is in the design of Providence, that besides the concerns of the vast empire over which this little island rules, we should be meddling in the business of almost every portion of the Globe."[36] In a similar vein, US Senator Albert J. Beveridge described America's global mission in the following manner: "We will not renounce our part in our mission of our race, trustee, under God, of the civilization of the world."[37] In even more extreme fashion, President William McKinley claimed that an angel called on the White House and urged the United States to take up arms against Spain, thus precipitating the Spanish–American War in 1898.

Although the Anglo-Saxon democracies often combine moralism with Machiavellian skills in their conduct of foreign policy (and both Great Britain and the United States have provided numerous examples of cynicism, hypocrisy, and perfidious manipulation of national values), the universal application of their values has played a role in the formation of policy in these countries. A rhetorical bias in favor of democracy, human rights, and international law, however selectively applied, remains a vital element in foreign policy formation and

[35] Quoted in A. J. P. Taylor, *The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy 1792–1939* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1958), 43.
[36] Ibid., 85.
[37] Louis Leo Snyder, *The Dynamics of Nationalism: Readings in its Meaning and Development* (Princeton: Van Norstrand, 1964), 278.

legitimization. The rhetorical use of these values to rationalize the Gulf War is a recent example of the Anglo-Saxon tendency to use morality as a justification for policy choices.

Consistent with their belief in the Anglo-Saxon universal mission, the United States and Britain, during their expansionary phases, were not so much interested in exporting their language or culture as they were in advancing their brand of parliamentarism, political accountability, and impartial justice. This had a profound impact on the British empire and on the early development of the United States. For example, although Thomas Jefferson showed enormous interest in expansion across North America, the crucial issue for him was not the creation of a single state, but rather that the new states shared similar institutions. In fact, young Jefferson expected that several institutionally similar republics would emerge across the continent, rather than a single continent-wide state.[38]

For the British, as well, the advancement of their institutions took precedence over the maintenance of their empire. In his defense of American independence, Edmund Burke argued that a common notion of liberty and constitution was what bound the people of Britain and America: "Deny [the Americans] this participation of freedom, and you break the sole bond which originally made, and must still preserve, the unity of the empire."[39] Emphasizing the centrality of institutions, Richard Cobden, a founder of the Manchester School, argued that the purpose of British imperialism was not to create a vast, single entity governed from London, but rather entities that shared the same enlightened institutions and values and a commitment to free trade with Britain. For both Britain and the United States, free trade and democratic institutions, as opposed to possession of territory, are the primary guarantors of peace and prosperity.[40]

A second category of national identity is found in polities emerging from imperial or colonial domination. Not surprisingly, such nations express a strong sense of cultural and political *ressentiment* directed at the intruding entity and are generally found in Central and Eastern Europe, Mexico, and parts of Central and South America. In these

[38] See Merrill D. Peterson, *Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: a Biography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).
[39] Quoted in Richard Hofstadter, *Great Issues in American History: A Documentary Record* (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), 43 (emphasis added).
[40] See Richard Cobden, *England, Ireland and America* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1980).

cases, *ressentiment* has produced an intense feeling of political and social injustice inflicted on the indigenous peoples, profound cultural defensiveness, and a fascination with the past. The East Europeans tend to stress their eighteenth century roots; Mexicans and Peruvians, their pre-Columbian past; and Brazilians, their African heritage. Both Latin America and Eastern Europe keenly resent their treatment as peripheral European civilizations and their marginalization within the international system.[41] Nationalism in Eastern and Central Europe, where the issue of national identity only appeared following the revolutions of 1848 and has not yet fully crystallized, tends to take a profound cultural form stemming from mythologies of common ancestry, kinship of blood, shared language, and linkage to native soil. The "father" of cultural romantic nationalism, Johann Gottfreid von Herder, firmly believed that ethnonationalism brings out the genius in every people, as long as the people remain in their natural habitat, retaining the mythical link between blood and soil. Thus, according to Herder, biblical Israelites possessed a "genius" that eighteenth-century East European Jews did not.[42]

Herder's fascination with the drive for cultural authenticity stretching to the "dawn of history" drew a far less sanguine response from more contemporary East European thinkers. To the Romanian historian of religion Mircea Eliade, this drive for "roots and authenticity" led to the cultural degeneration of Central and Eastern Europe:

> At the dawn of the modern World the "origin" enjoyed an almost magical prestige. To have a well established "origin" meant, when all is said and done, to have an advantage of a noble origin. "We find our origin in Rome!" the Romanian intellectuals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries proudly repeat. In their case consciousness of Latin descent was accompanied by a kind of mythical participation in the greatness of Rome. Similarly, the Hungarian intelligentsia found a justification for the antiquity, nobility and historical mission of the Magyars in the origins of Hunor and Magor and the heroic saga of Arpad ... This anxiety [to be ancient and ergo noble] is perceptible in all national historians of Central and Eastern Europe. Then too, it was transformed into an instrument of propaganda and political warfare ... with a few exceptions all respective historians confined themselves to national history and finally wound up in *cultural provincialism.*

The passion for "noble origins" also explains the racist myth of "Aryanism" which periodically gained currency in the West, especially in Germany. The "Aryan" model was the exemplary model that must be imitated in order to recover racial "purity," physical strength, nobility, and heroic "ethics" of the glorious and creative "beginnings."[43] While this notion of defending national identity against an inferior "other" may not be unique to Eastern Europe or Latin America, it does play a special role in these regions.[44] Herder, in his defense of the German culture against the French, urged Germans to "[S]peak German! Spew out the Seine's ugly slime."[45] Citing Poland, Rudolf Jaworsky notes that its traumatic history and lack of a strong civil society has given rise to "a tradition of [external] enemies" that serves as the key element of Poland's national identity.[46]

By extension, the historical development of East and Central European national identities has had a unique impact on the development and exercise of foreign policy in the region. As Hans Kohn noted in his classic *The Idea of Nationalism*, nationalism in Eastern Europe was first and foremost a cultural process, often a protest against external political and cultural domination.[47] Thus, while West European nationalism remained a political development that took on a rationalist, cosmopolitan, modernist, and even positivist character after World War II, East European nationalists adopted the notion of an idealized society that had tragically succumbed to pressure from the outside. Central European nationalism rejected political pragmatism and embraced historical, romantic sentiments. Describing the unique characteristics of East European nationalism, the Hungarian philosopher G. M. Tamas observed:

> [E]thnocultural nationalism, particularly in the extreme shape, has taken hold in Eastern Europe, and cannot and does not answer

[41] Andre Gunder Frank's dependence theory is but one manifestation of the frustration felt by the continent as a result of marginalization within the international community. See Andre Gunder Frank, *On Capitalist Underdevelopment* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1975). Similar resentment toward the West can be observed in the essay by the Hungarian novelist Gyorgy Konrad, "Den westlichen Höhlenforschern zür Aufmerksamkeit empfehlen," in *Mittleuropa: Traum ober Trauma*, ed. H. P. Burmeister, F. Boldt, and G. Meszaros (Bremen, 1989).

[42] See Daniel Chirot, "Herder's Multicultural Theory of Nationalism and Its Consequences," *East European Politics and Society* 10: 1 (Winter 1996).

[43] Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1975), 182–83 (emphasis added).

[44] For historical reasons the notion of defending the nation differs between Eastern Europe and Latin America. While the East Europeans fear physical annihilation by Russia or Germany, Latin Americans tend to fear economic aggression.

[45] Quoted by Daniel Chirot, "Herder's Multicultural Theory," 12.

[46] Rudolf Jaworsky, "History and Tradition in Contemporary Poland," *East European Quarterly* 19: 3 (September 1985), 351.

[47] Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*.

political questions. It is mostly a reaffirmation of identity. Nineteenth century nationalism strengthened the state; twentieth century ethnocultural nationalism is contemptuous of institutions; it is anarchic, that is, it is anarchic in regard of state institutions and especially in regard of supreme state authority.[48]

With the exception of Poland – and to some degree Hungary, whose elites generally perceived themselves as part of the West[49] – East and Central European nationalists historically rejected, in varying degrees, the Western legalistic-national model in favor of nativism or Slavophilia. This trend has found expression in musical and cultural populism, ranging from the efforts of the Russian "Mighty Five" to create a distinctly Russian classical music, to Dvorák and Smetana in the Czech lands, to Liszt and Bartók in Hungary, to Enescu in Romania. But far beyond music, East and Central European nationalism bears heavy burdens of cultural and political *ressentiment* toward external pressures. Granted, no generalization about the emergence of East European national identities is precise, given the different histories and experiences of East Europeans. Poland and Hungary experienced an early emergence of national identity, while in Russia imperial identity preceded national identity. For the Czechs, national identity reawakened in the mid nineteenth century; in contrast, fragmented collective memory and the absence of sustained statehood delayed the emergence of national identity for Ukrainians and Belarussians until the early twentieth century. Nevertheless, the *ressentiment* model of external domination and romantic nationalism has proven consistent in the development of all East European national identities.

In stark contrast to English and American identification with political legalism (which is self-contained and does not rely on the concept of an "other"), East and Central Europeans identify with ideals almost universally determined by rejection of the "other." Unlike the West European, "horizontal" form of nationalism, which developed over time through bureaucratic incorporation by an aristocratic elite, Eastern Europe's nationalism evolved on a "vertical-vernacular" plane that cut across class lines.[50] Given the multiethnic

[48] Gaspar M. Tamas, "Old Enemies and New: A Philosophic Postscript to Nationalism," *Studies in East European Thought* (1993).

[49] Poland's case may be unique: unlike the rest of the region, where *ressentiment* was directed at Western cultural domination, Poland, dominated by Russia and Prussia, directed its national *ressentiment* toward the East and became very pro-Western.

[50] See Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno, Las Vegas, and London: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 55–61.

nature of Eastern Europe, the definition of "other" can be both internal and external, and defined culturally, racially, politically, or economically. Furthermore, a polity may develop a hierarchy of "others" ranging from the external, such as the dominating empire, to the internal, for example, an ethnic minority.

These primordial nationalisms have often been manipulated by the elite to either seize new political and economic privileges (as in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) or to preserve traditional ones (Hungary and Russia).[51] Poland has identified itself as the "Christ-nation" (bastion of Catholicism in a sea of heresy, with a civilizing mission thrown in for good measure); Russia as the "Third (and last) Rome"; Romania as "heir to the Roman civilization engulfed by the sea of Slavic and Magyar adversity"; Hungary as "an island of true civilization in a sea of Slavs"; Ukraine as a "bulwark against Muscovite Tartar despotism."

Given this blend of culture and politics in Eastern Europe, the nearly perpetual state of cultural mobilization, and the resentment of real and perceived pressures from the outside, the foreign policies of these countries have continually reflected goals beyond the commonly defined national interests, such as self-preservation and enhancement of economic prosperity. For the foreign policy of almost every East European country to remain credible at home, a government must also zealously defend the nation's identity. Due to weak political institutions and, therefore, a perennially precarious basis for the political legitimacy of the state, the ruling elites repeatedly have had to "reaffirm [the national] identity" through a distinctly nationalist foreign policy. Issues that would go unnoticed in the West become litmus tests of a government's commitment to the nation.[52] Does the Cathedral of St. Theresa in Przemyśl in eastern Poland belong to the Latin Catholic or Greek Catholic Church? Will Slovakia allow Hungarian language street signs in southern Slovakia? Will the statue of Magyar King Matyas remain in the center of the Romanian city of Cluj? Will Poland tolerate German language church services in Silesia?

Another central factor in the development of national identity, noted by Gale Stokes, is the role of a "zero hour" from which a nation can create a modern identity. In the case of Eastern Europe, the

[51] Robin Okey, *Eastern Europe 1740–1985: Feudalism to Communism* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1986).

[52] For background, see Janusz Bugajski, *Nations in Turmoil: Conflict and Cooperation in Eastern Europe* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).

imposition of Stalinist uniformity in 1948 deprived the entire region of a liberating *stunde null* that would have enabled it to forge new relations and identities, as did Western Europe following the catharsis of World War II.[53] Instead, the centrality of nationalism and national identity in Eastern and Central Europe gained prominence during the nearly forty years of Soviet domination to become the key weapons in the fight against Soviet hegemony. A disparate group of actors – from Poland's Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński to Romania's neo-Stalinist Nicolae Ceauşescu – used nationalism to defy the Kremlin and thus ensured that nationalism would continue to be a vital force in the politics of Eastern Europe.

Maria Todorova, in her essay "Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Communist Legacy in Eastern Europe," argues convincingly that the main cause of growing tension among the ethnic groups of Eastern Europe stems from Soviet domination. As long as the USSR existed, it provided Eastern Europe with a collective "other" against which all East Europeans developed an inverted nationalism; namely, the idea that "a more backward metropolis served as a catharsis from inferiority complex for a while."[54] Todorova posits that twentieth-century East European nationalism went through three distinct phases: (1) before World War II, a deep sense of inferiority to the West; (2) after World War II, a sense of superiority over the USSR and, by extension, over Russia; and (3) the post-Cold War era, a return to a sense of inferiority to the West. The collapse of the communist monolith not only made the need for redefining national identity inevitable, it also demanded the creation of a new "other" that would become the focus of growing nationalist pressures in Eastern and Central Europe. This new hostility toward the "other" has turned westward, spurred by feelings of rejection, resentment over the region's marginalization, and anger over the West's "betrayal" of Eastern Europe at Yalta, and the perceived failure of the West to appreciate its sacrifices for the cause of freedom. Furthermore, as Owen Harries points out, the West itself has ceased to exist as a cohesive political entity since the disintegration of the Soviet bloc.[55] This has deprived the Eastern European countries of a fixed reference point from which to redefine

[53] Gale Stokes, "Lessons of East European Revolutions of 1989," *Problems of Communism*, no. 40 (September 1991), 19.
[54] Maria Todorova, "Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Communist Legacy in Eastern Europe," *East European Politics and Societies* 7: 1 (Winter 1993), 153.
[55] Owen Harries, "The Collapse of the West," *Foreign Affairs* (September–October 1993).

their national identities and has instead further complicated relations between Eastern Europe and the West.

In many ways Eastern Europe finds its position in the international system analogous to the 1920s Harding–Coolidge era of "normalcy." Interest in Eastern Europe peaked between 1917 and 1919, when leaders such as Ignacy Jan Paderewski, Tomas Masaryk, and Alexander Kerensky captured the imagination of the West. Between 1989 and 1991, Wałęsa, Havel, and Gorbachev contributed to a similar burst of interest in Eastern Europe. This interest has now waned. Europe, to which the East European liberal leaders had hoped to return, has fragmented both politically and economically. East European leaders perceive the West European inability to respond credibly to the Balkan crisis or to speed the process of opening the European Union to Central European democracies as signs of continuing indifference. After a half century of exhausting international activism, the United States has withdrawn into a period of introspection, searching for answers to internal economic difficulties and redefining its own global role.

US policy in Europe also mirrors that of the 1920s, when the United States, the patron saint and role model to East Europeans, concentrated on the integration of Weimar Germany into the international system and ignored the new states of Eastern Europe. In the early 1990s, America's efforts seem to be heavily focused on "Weimar Russia," once again trying to integrate a former enemy into the international system, to prevent its reversion to an anti-status-quo power, while neglecting the smaller states of Eastern Europe. As a result of this perceived neglect and the absence of a larger framework in which to develop a new identity, the East European polities have drawn on the predominant image in their "usable past" – that of the victim. This preoccupation with their historical sense of "damaged self" has led to self-absorption in their unique experience of victimization and has fueled resentment toward Western indifference, cynicism, and betrayal. Even the possibility of NATO's expansion eastward is viewed by many East Europeans as part of a "deal" with Russia. All of these factors are bound to shape their emotion-laden foreign policies for a long time to come.

A third form of national identity can be found in modern France. On the one hand, France is an ancient state, with a venerable political tradition providing a stable reference point for its national identity. On the other hand, the country's tumultuous history has left it with few of the continuous political institutions of the Anglo-Saxon

countries. Therefore, if the Anglo-Saxon countries require acceptance of the legal system of the host country as the price of being "admitted" to host society, and if the ethnic nation-states in Eastern and Central Europe claim that a genetic commonality forms the basis of the nation, the French marker of its national identity is its universal culture. The centrality of culture as a marker of "authentic Frenchness" is a constant refrain in France's definition of itself. Even during the collaborationist fascist regime of Vichy, its leaders claimed that "Frenchness" was a cultural construct. The Vichy constitution overtly stated that, "The French community requires from its members an absolute allegiance. It does not accept into its breast as a constitutive element a race that conducts itself as a distinct community that resists assimilation."[56]

During the late nineteenth century, France experienced a precipitous decline as Europe's premier power. After World War II, the loss of its colonies (in the view of the French, a consequence of their decline in Europe) and the shift of Western culture to the Anglophone world dealt a severe blow to the French historic sense of universalism. Today, French national identity lies at a crossroads. The French Revolution may have bequeathed to France a universal sense of mission, but France's relative decline in power has increasingly put this pursuit out of reach. Summing up the French dilemma, Henry Kissinger noted: "Since the end of Napoleon III's reign, France has lacked the power to impose the universal aspirations it inherited from the French Revolution, or the arena to find an outlet for its missionary zeal."[57] While to the outsider, France's preoccupation with its cultural uniqueness and seeming obsession with *grandeur* often appears incomprehensible or even comical, it is an important feature of the French national identity that is often misunderstood. Because France is a nation created out of diverse and multiethnic peoples, molded by an overbearing central state, it relies on its belief in the superiority of its culture and on the *grandeur* portrayed by its leaders as pillars of its national legitimacy.[58]

The shift from a universal mission to a posture *of raison d'état* engendered in French national identity a defensiveness of cultural heritage combined with a determination to pursue a foreign policy

[56] Richard Weisberg, "Leon Blum in Vichy France," *Partisan Review*, no. 3 (1996), 553–70.
[57] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 120.
[58] Robert Gilda, *The Past in French History* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), ch. 3.

affirming France's status as a unique culture and a great power. In their search for legitimacy, successive French governments have called for policies that have provided France with few tangible benefits and thus could be deemed irrational.[59] Nevertheless, these policies enjoyed the broad support of the French public because they responded to a psychological need for a sense of universal mission. France's insistence on maintaining the franc zone and a direct military presence in Africa, costly overseas departments, and a military doctrine alleging full French independence are all burdens on France's economy. Even when France, chastened by the unimpressive performance of its forces in the Gulf War and the European-led debacle in Bosnia, felt compelled to return to the integrated structure of NATO, it did so under the guise of an ill-defined promise to enhance the "European persona" of NATO. While to the outsider these policies may appear irrational, they have enabled the French to overcome a legacy of decline and defeat and have restored its national cohesion and sense of purpose.[60] Attempts to reconcile the needs of France's national identity with the country's limited resources have resulted in a paradoxical foreign policy, parochial in content but universal in its trappings.

A fourth and newer form of national identity emerged in the twentieth century among the former European colonies in Africa and Asia. The genesis of this nationalism is unique. Owing to the manner of colonial partitioning and subsequent multiethnic development, these new countries generally cannot use the East European romantic nationalist model, which implies a certain level of ethnic homogeneity, as a basis of political mobilization. These polities also lack traditional institutions that could serve as reference points for a national identity. Rather, national identities have resulted from rebellion against the colonial power by an intermediary group on behalf of the native population. Generally indigenous themselves, the intermediary group is detached from the rest of the population by virtue of their education or experience abroad. One example can be found in the Arab nationalism of the early twentieth century, which was led disproportionally by Greek Orthodox Christian Arabs who historically mediated between the colonial powers and the Arab masses.[61]

[59] France's expenditure of $7 billion in transfers to Francophone Africa is a case in point.
[60] Stanley Hoffmann, *Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s* (New York: Viking Press, 1974); Philip H. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
[61] George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1938)

India, however, provides the most vivid example of a "denaturalized" elite taking the lead in creating a national identity. Given the enormous size of India, Britain's only hope of administering the vast subcontinent was through the creation of what Thomas Macaulay described in 1835 as "a class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and intellect."[62] The creation of this intermediary group, as illustrated in E. M. Forster's novel, *A Passage to India*, ultimately led to the emergence of a new, educated elite, imbued with the European concept of nationalism and resenting its subordinate position to colonial overlords. By the 1920s, India's viceroy Lord Lytton was lamenting that the Anglicized elite in India had not only failed to shore up the British empire, but had actually turned against it. Lytton described the Anglicized Indians as "Babus, whom we have educated to write semi-seditious articles in the native press."[63] Nehru himself admitted that India's national identity was an "anti-feeling" fueled by the colonial experience rather than an identity built around a common ethnicity or national political institutions.[64]

In general, these kinds of nations create unique models of foreign policy. Once they attain independence, their leaders splinter under the pressure of divergent agendas. This process of disintegration has proven the most severe in post-colonial countries, since they often lack either institutional supports or ethnic homogeneity. As a result of these weaknesses, their traditional relationship – often tension-ridden – with the former colonial power continues to serve as the only unifying element, with notable examples such as Zimbabwe, India, Indonesia, Guinea, and Guyana. In each of these cases, the ruling elite desperately clings to its tenuous identity by repeatedly exploiting the legacy of colonialism's abuses, the inherent injustices within the international system, and general issues of economic and cultural imperialism. Another aspect of post-colonial countries' foreign policies is their attempt to find a broader context for national existence along a regional basis. Thus, membership in such institutions as the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity, and the Non-aligned Movement not only provides post-colonial states with a greater presence within the international system, but also legitimizes and reinforces their "anti-feeling" sense of national identity.

A fifth form of nationalism is theocratic nationalism, which generally emerges in countries whose religion falls outside the mainstream

[62] Quoted in Nigel Harris, *National Liberation* (Reno, Las Vegas, and London: University of Nevada Press, 1993), 168.
[63] Ibid., 168. [64] Rejai, *Political Ideologies*, 7.

of a world religion; namely, tsarist Russia and contemporary Iran. Russia, the only major Orthodox country, used its religious uniqueness to define the rest of Christendom as the "other." By virtue of being the only "true" Christian country, it claimed the right to project its influence beyond its frontiers. Similarly, contemporary Iran, the sole major Shiite Muslim country, grafted national identity onto its unique form of religion while simultaneously claiming the role of "defender of the faith" for the entire Islamic world. Being religious splinters within a larger context, both Russia and Iran used their minority status as a means to acquire legitimacy by asserting themselves as the last bastion against the "degeneration" that allegedly afflicted Sunni Islam or Western Christianity. This reliance on religion as a source of cohesion is particularly intriguing in the case of Iran and the Russian empire, since in both cases the dominant ethnic groups, the Persians and the Russians, were declining pluralities within a multinational state. In short, although both Russia and Iran claimed universal messianic roles based on their theocratic ideologies, both used their state religions to shore up a distinct national identity and the legitimacy of their regimes.

These five categories of national identity are by no means exhaustive. Some national identities do not fall into any of the above categories or they contain only some elements of them. Nevertheless, a remarkable degree of consistency remains between Weber's "governing ideas," despite their malleability, and the formation of foreign policy. Nigel Harris argues that "National claims summarize complex economic and social interests and classes, a coalition that is rarely the same in different times and places; so nationalism does not in and of itself indicate any self-evident aims."[65]

In sum, national identity is neither constant nor immutable, but rather constantly redefined, in part by foreign policy. The relationship between national identity and foreign policy experiences is highly dialectic. Several factors can contribute to these dialectical changes in national identity. Perhaps the most common element altering the national identity of a polity is the metamorphosis or the total disappearance of "the other." The collapse of the Habsburg empire, the disintegration of the USSR, and the withdrawal of European powers from their overseas possessions sharply redefined the "other" for scores of polities. For example, between 1848 and 1948, Czech intellectuals resented the Germans' political and cultural domination and

[65] Harris, *National Liberation*, 22.

tended to stress their Slavic roots and their solidarity with fellow Slavs. After World War II, the definitive "other" of the Czechs shifted from their German-speaking neighbors to the hegemonic, Russian-dominated Soviet Union. In this case, the change in the "other" fundamentally altered the Czechs' national identity. Recent tension between the Czech Republic and Germany over the question of the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, has reawakened again the notion of the Germans as the "other." In the late twentieth century, following four decades of Soviet domination, the Czechs stress their Central European identity. A parallel mutation of a national identity can be observed in the case of the Palestinians who historically viewed themselves as a part of Muslim–Ottoman civilization, however the clash with Jewish Zionists following World War I, and the introduction of a specific "other" led to the substitution of the former identity with an Arab–Palestinian identity.[66] Similarly, late-nineteenth-century Russia saw the German-speaking world as its defining "other," furnishing for the Russians a standard by which they judged their identity. After the defeat of Germany in World War II and four decades of the Cold War, Germany receded in Russia's national consciousness, and the United States became "the other" by which Russians defined their success and failure.

The pursuit of a specific foreign policy may also over time induce a change in the national identity of a polity. When Austria came into being in 1918, most Austrians did not identify with the new state. In fact, Austria's declaration of statehood explicitly stated that Austria's goal was to merge into Germany, ironically making the declaration both a birth certificate and an obituary. However, Austria's successful maintenance of neutrality since 1955 has led most Austrians to internalize the notion of neutrality to such a degree that many objected to membership in the European Union on the grounds that it might compromise the country's neutrality and weaken its identity.

As previously noted, national identities can undergo rapid transformation as a result of military defeat. France's shift from a national identity based on the concept of a civilizing empire to one of a component of a larger European entity can be directly traced to its defeats in Indochina (1954) and Algeria (1962). Polities, though, may respond differently to the same stimulus. The 1956 Suez fiasco taught Great Britain that it was no longer a major power. Hence, it willingly

[66] See Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: the Construction of a Modern National Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), *passim*, esp. ch. 7.

assumed the role of a junior partner to the United States under the guise of a "special relationship." France, whose national identity has suffered far more during this century, responded to the Suez debacle by denying its decline within the international system and pursuing a policy of global assertiveness, even if its impact proved more symbolic than real. Finally, there are times when mere disappointment in a foreign policy can radically alter a polity's perception of its role within the international system. The profound disappointment of the United States in the Treaty of Versailles and the collapse of Wilsonian diplomacy led to a fundamental change in self-perception as it ceased to believe in a universal mission and withdrew into isolationism and unilateralism.

Generational changes can also alter the identity of a polity. The independence of India in 1947, the creation of ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States – but not Britain) in 1948, and the 1956 Suez crisis clearly demonstrated that the British empire was no longer tenable. British politicians of Churchill's generation, whose formative experience was the Boer War, could not imagine Great Britain as a mere component of a larger European entity, shorn of its global mission and forced to subordinate its venerable institutions to the dicta of Brussels. Britain's difficulty in recasting its national identity led former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson to note in 1962 that "Britain [has] lost an empire, and has not found a destiny." It was far easier for prime ministers Harold Wilson and Edward Heath, whose formative political experiences occurred during the Marshall Plan and European reconstruction, to initiate the move from a global to a regional orientation. Even so, nearly a generation after Britain's entry into the European Union, recasting Britain's national identity remains a slow and fitful process.

The concept of national identity is a derivative of a real or imagined collective memory of a polity. Since memory is highly selective, it is vital to consider who has the custodianship of that memory. When the custodian of a national identity changes, so do perceptions of the past and, consequently, the parameters of the national interest. Iran under the Shah utilized the collective memory of Persian empire, Emperor Darius and his universalist, enlightened policies to justify the modernization of Iran and its cultural integration into the "World civilization" under the Palahvi dynasty. The Shah's use of the nation's memory of Darius justified Iran's role as a supporter of the existing world order. After the fall of the Shah, the custodianship of Iran's national identity shifted to the Shiite clerics, who found in their

collective memory an image of Iran as the universal protector of Islam, endowed with a messianic mission to fight against the betrayal of the true Islamic dogma by the infidels, the Sunni Muslims. For the Shah, Iran's "other" was the "backward" Third World from which Iran was trying to break away. For the clerics, the "other" is the godless West, locked in a struggle with "true Iranian" values.

The democratization of Brazil and the decline in the monopoly on power and education of the criollo elite resulted in a shift in that country's identity. While it had viewed itself as a part of the 'enlightened' West (a myth which was bolstered by Brazil's token participation in World War II), it shifted to a greater identification with Africa, Latin America, and the Portuguese-speaking world. Not only does Brazilian culture no longer seek to mimic European patterns, but the country's foreign policy orientation is far different than it was but a generation ago. The demise of Nasserism following the 1967 Arab–Israeli war and the re-emergence of the Egyptian bourgeoisie as the dominant political class led to a shift in the custodianship and hence the definition of Egypt's identity. Nasser had stressed Egypt's Arab heritage and Third World position, charging Egypt with a pan-Arab mission and leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement. Nasser's death in 1970 led to a rediscovery of a distinct Egyptian identity stretching back to Pharoanic times, seeing Egypt as superior to the "young" Arab states and setting much more narrow parameters around Egypt's national interests.

France may well serve as an example of a consistent custodianship of a national identity and therefore, a remarkably consistent set of psychological parameters have set the country's foreign policy. Despite a stormy history of revolutions, defeat, and political turmoil, France's highly centralized state, dirigist economy, and ubiquitous political-bureaucratic elite produced by the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA) and similar institutions dominating the civil service, industry, and financial institutions have resulted in a relatively consistent (however distorted) "collective memory." While France has adapted to the changing realities of the world, the parameters and rhetoric of French policy have remained consistent, though leading to policies which may strike outside observers as pretentious or even quixotic. Robert Osgood once observed:

> Great changes in the way a nation thinks of itself, and acts, come like a tide. They come gradually, almost imperceptibly, in a series of surges and recessions, unevenly, like the waves on the shore. But they come steadily and surely, so that if one fixes one's attention on a landmark upon the shoreline one can measure the advance in the course of time . . . .[67]

Although the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union occurred with dazzling speed, the emergence of a sovereign Poland, an independent Ukraine, and a post-imperial Russia was the result of a slow, almost imperceptible evolution much like Osgood's metaphoric tide. The subsequent chapters explore the evolution of national identity in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia and trace how the evolution of their identities is reflected in these countries' foreign policies.

[67] Osgood, *Idealism and Self Interest*, 429.