Political demography asks how shifts in the balance of population between groups affects power. Elsewhere in this volume, we have seen how differential growth between nation-states, often linked to age structure, affects international politics. In similar fashion, the population balance between broader world regions, such as the West and the Islamic World, is of pressing concern to policymakers. Within nation-states, these anxieties are reproduced at the micro-level, as groups based on age, ethnicity and other social criteria grow or contract at different rates, affecting internal configurations of power and culture. Religion is yet a further category which slots into this domestic matrix, but, unlike ethnicity, it operates strongly on both the macro and micro levels. Hence religions can change their relative size within countries, and within the globe as a whole. Islam, for instance, may simultaneously grow in Europe and within the world’s population. Furthermore, these trends may be organically connected.

To some extent, religions tend to track differential ethnic population growth. This is because religion often serves as a boundary marker distinguishing competing ethnic groups – even if individuals are not very religious. We see this in secular contexts like Northern Ireland (with Protestants and Catholics) or the former Yugoslavia (Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim). Certainly these conflicts, notwithstanding Dr. Paisley, are properly classified as more ethnic than theological. Yet - in contrast to ethnicity, religions have stronger supranational properties, raising the possibility of civilizational dynamics which
link nations and ethnic groups together that share the same religious heritage. ‘Supra-ethnic’ entities certainly exist, captured in movements like pan-Arabism, Negritude or ‘Asian values’. However, these movements can often appear nebulous, lacking the ideological resonance of religio-civilizational unities like pan-Islamism, Orthodox Christianity, evangelical Protestantism or Catholicism.

What, then, is religion? Rather than enter fully onto this fiercely contested semantic terrain, we opt to follow the definition of religion as actions, beliefs and institutions which invoke the supernatural. (Taylor 2007: 429) Notice that we do not cleave to Durkheim’s sociological approach to religion which would view immanent ideologies like socialism, large-scale enthusiastic gatherings like sports or concerts, or the personality cults of celebrities and academic ‘stars’ as religions. (Durkheim 1995) Part of our quest is to speak of the relative power of major (civilizational) religions, to ask which religions are rising or falling and how this affects politics.

This is not sufficient, however, since many countries have a dominant faith rendering the balance between religious traditions moot. In fact, in half the world’s countries, the dominant religious tradition accounts for over 80 percent of the population (see figure 1).
In addition, many countries maintain restrictions on religious freedom and/or strong normative sanctions against religious switching. (Grim and Finke 2007) This greatly impedes religious change. But even in such environments, religious preferences can take the form of differences in religious intensity – i.e. the degree of religious traditionalism and practice within a particular faith. Are conservative, moderate or secular groups growing? Is attendance at services rising? The demographic properties - fertility rates, age structure, net migration rates - of ‘traditionalist’, ‘modernist’ and ‘nonreligious’ segments of the theological spectrum are often highly consequential. Typically, they matter more than groups’ relative success in winning converts in what are often highly regulated religious marketplaces. In this paper, we consider how demographic forces affect the relative share of both religious traditions and religious intensity groups. We examine both the domestic and global contexts, and present cohort component
projections which enable us to peer, with a great degree of predictability, into the religious future.

Religion and Politics

The realms of God and Caesar are never completely separated. In some cases, the link between religion and politics is official, while in others, it operates tacitly. Daniel Philpott sets out four major routes by which religions can directly influence politics: 1) through being established by the state as an official religion; 2) by a state promoting the religion through legal and judicial powers in areas from education and taxation through matters of burial, dress and speech; 3) through a state restricting other religions’ freedom of worship and banning conversions and intermarriage; and 4) when a state consecrates the power of religious officials to hold political power and appoint state officials, as in Iran. (Philpott 2007: 507) Even if there is a constitutional separation of religion and state, as in the USA, religions may still exert indirect influence on politics. Electoral cleavages and party systems; foreign and domestic policies; mass culture and national symbolism - all may be affected by the plate tectonics of religion, even in secular democracies.

So much so that religion is one of the strongest electoral cleavages in religiously plural democracies. Furthermore, a country’s level of religious pluralism, or religious fractionalization, is a significant predictor of its likelihood of becoming embroiled in civil war. (Fearon and Laitin 2003) Nearly all of today’s wars are civil wars, i.e. take place within states rather than between them. During 1945-99, 40 percent of civil wars claiming at least 1000 battle deaths involved religion. Most of these mapped onto the
two-thirds of civil wars that were ethnically-motivated, but in ten cases, major civil wars took place entirely within one religious tradition. Most of these – 90 percent – were struggles within Islamic countries between Islamists and their rivals in government and civil society. (Toft 2007) The same is true of terrorism: whereas just 2 of 64 movements were religious in the 1980s, this jumped to 46 percent by 1995. (Philpott 2007: 520)

Broadly speaking, shifts in religious traditions mimic ethnic shifts in their effects. For example, the growth of European Islam has sparked both ethnic and religious disquiet among the secular/Christian majority, with ethnic and religious anxieties reinforcing each other. (Coleman 2006) Religion and ethnicity do not always overlap, however. In Germany, Holland or Latin America, religious change did not affect ethnic composition, and was therefore less likely to contribute to violent conflict. The rise of Pentecostalism in Brazil, Korea and China has led to hand-wringing among the Catholic or secular/Confucian majority, but does not carry the same ethnic implications as in the previous instances. (Martin 2001) In some cases, confessional pillarization (i.e. Austria, Holland) can contain religious conflicts, and secularization can ameliorate the sharp edges of religious cleavages. Yet this may only be true for shifts in the relative power of different religious traditions. What we shall see is that the pitch of religious conflict can rise when cleavages come to revolve around differences in religious intensity rather than tradition.
Ethos or Ethnos?

The American literature on religion and politics draws an important distinction between the ethnoreligious and religious restructuring paradigms. (Guth, Kellstedt et al. 2006) The ethnoreligious perspective places the emphasis on religious denominations, the quasi-ethnic identities bequeathed by history into which individuals are often born, and which structure the concrete congregations to which individuals belong. The ascriptive aspect to many religious denominations means that they are often linked to ethnic groups. This is true not only of archetypal diasporas like Jews, Hindus and Armenian Christians, but also of Catholics (linked to Irish, Polish, Southern Europeans and Hispanics), Lutherans (German, Baltic or Scandinavian) and Black Protestants. Even Mormons and Mennonites partake of this ethnic character.

By contrast, the religious restructuring perspective avows that belief dynamics across religions are more important than the affiliation divisions between denominations when it comes to attitudes and voting behaviour. (Guth, Kellstedt et al. 2006; Wuthnow 1989) Biblical literalists, for instance, can be found within 'moderate' denominations like the Northern Baptists or Episcopalians while theological modernists exist even within 'fundamentalist' denominations like the Southern Baptists. Thus theological intensity crosscuts boundaries of affiliation. Though religious affiliation and religious intensity are related, the fit is imperfect. The only category that neatly fits both the ethnoreligious and religious restructuring paradigms are the nonreligious, who are unambiguously modernist and non-affiliated. Overall, in the United States and the world as a whole, the most religiously fundamentalist tend to vote for conservative parties while religious moderates
and seculars lean to the left. In Catholic Europe, church attendance is one of the strongest predictors of vote choice, with nonattenders backing the left-leaning Social Democrat and attenders opting for the more conservative Christian Democrats. (Guth, Kellstedt et al. 2006; Norris and Inglehart. 2004: 206-7; Girvin 2000) The great exception are immigrants, who tend at once to be more religious and left-leaning than the host population. (Dancygier and Saunders 2006) This reflects the lower socioeconomic status of immigrant groups. However, as with Muslims in Europe or Hispanics in America, immigrants’ social preferences are frequently conservative, as reflected in Hispanic support for Proposition 8, the 2008 anti-gay marriage measure in California and in their opposition to abortion. (Skirbekk, Goujon et al. forthcoming)

In the United States, the term 'culture wars' emerged on the back of changes which reduced the importance of the Catholic-Protestant divide while raising the salience of a new political axis based on religious and moral traditionalism, which crosses ethnic and denominational lines. (Hunter 1991; Fiorina, Abrams et al. 2005) Research shows that as late as 1988, Republican and Democratic respondents differed little in their generally negative appraisal of evangelical political activists. In 1996, by contrast, Republican respondents had greatly warmed to evangelicals while Democrats had cooled, reflecting a new partisan divide. (Bolce and De Maio 1999: 47-8) Meanwhile, religion assumed an ever more prominent place on Republican party platforms after 1992. (Layman and Carmines 1997) In the 1980s, Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority attempted to influence the agenda –especially at state level – on issues like school prayer, abortion and family values. In the 1990s, Pat Robertson’s Christian Coalition picked up the torch from Falwell and added some new issues, notably an alternative science curriculum
(Creationism, Intelligent Design), faith-based social initiatives, anti-gay marriage and
opposition to stem-cell research. (Green, Rozell et al. 2006)

In the largely non-democratic context of the Muslim world, a more violent
version of the same traditionalist-modernist conflict pits Islamists against state
governments, nearly all of which also style themselves Islamic but insist on the right of
the state to supersede religious authority. Earlier, we noted that civil wars have broken
out in nine Muslim countries in recent decades. Political Islam prioritizes the
implementation of *sharia* law and questions the legitimacy of the Muslim state. The
entire apparatus of state-appointed imams and state mosques is pilloried for rendering
Islam subservient to an idolatrous nation-state. Many political Islamists favour the
restoration of an Islamic Caliphate, which would entwine religion and politics. The
exemplar for this system of government is the period of the First Four Righteous Caliphs
following the death of the Prophet. (Esposito 1984: 220) Others trace this lineage all the
way through to 1924, when the Ottomans abolished the Caliphate. Even those political
Islamists who are reconciled to the state, and seek to reform it, deem current governments
to be *takfir* (apostate), and would place loyalty to the Islamic *umma* (community of
believers) above that of their nation-state. Many Islamists seek to return to a judicial
system based on *sharia*, with a strongly patriarchal division of labour and the inculcation
of restrictive social mores regarding dress, alcohol consumption, rock music and
television. The ‘excarnation’ of outward displays of religious practice (i.e. music,
carnival, dancing, drama) by religious puritans was a central aim of the Protestant
reformation, and is also an important theme within contemporary fundamentalist Islam.
(Munson 2001; Taylor 2007: 614)
Similar conflicts have riven the Judaic world. The fast-growing ultra-Orthodox, or *Haredi*, Jewish community has come into conflict with non-Orthodox Jews. The Haredi world is a largely self-contained one with rules governing all aspects of daily life. Like Hutterites or Amish in America, they live in separate communities or districts with little contact with the secular Jewish world. These practices, along with the use of Yiddish in some cases, help to sharpen the boundary between insiders and outsiders as both sides label each other. (Davidman and Greil 2007) The Haredim, in common with conservative American Christians and traditionalist Muslims, have entered the public sphere and begun to influence politics. Orthodox rabbis view themselves as the guardians of the religious purity of the state, and steadfastly seek to exercise this prerogative. Haredi parties have refused to relax proscriptions on civil marriages (only religious marriages presided over by Orthodox rabbis are recognized by the state). They have fought to narrow the definition of who qualifies as a Jew (and hence can be an Israeli citizen or immigrate) to the exclusion of converts and those without a Jewish mother. They also campaign against Sabbath desecration and the violation of kosher norms such as the selling of leavened bread during Passover. (Efron 2003)

Conservative religious movements have been matched in vigour by their secular opponents. In fact, conservative movements can be seen in part as a response to secular individualism and the breaching of traditional mores. This is especially true of the Religious Right in the United States, but, in a more indirect way, is also relevant for conservative Jewish and Islamic movements. The story begins in the 1960s West, where higher education and a new centralised television media achieved mass penetration, acting as a conveyor belt for liberal-expressive values from a small coterie of intellectual
elites and creative professionals to the mass public. (Taylor 2007: 492-5) Across North America, western Europe and Japan, a broadly similar value change, which Ron Inglehart labels a cultural shift to 'postmaterialism', could be observed, leaving its footsteps in successive Eurobarometer and World Values surveys between 1970 and 1988. (Inglehart 1990: 74-5, 252, 262) The 1960s thus polarized the populations in many parts of the world, helping to attenuate moderate religiosity in favour of both secular individualism and conservative religion.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the United States. Since the 1960s, the proportion of nonreligious voters in the electorate has increased, with a notable surge in secularism in the 1990s. (Hout and Fischer 2002: 188) Conservatives have also grown rapidly while mainline Protestants and white Catholics have seen declines in their share of the religious market. The 2004 election illustrates the rising power of both conservative Protestant and secular voters. 78 percent of white evangelical Protestants voted Republican, and, overall, over half of Bush's vote came from 'traditionalists' of all religions while Kerry gained more votes from the nonreligious than from white Catholics. Multivariate analyses show that measures of religious intensity performed far better in models of voting behaviour and partisanship than other socioeconomic and demographic variables. These measures also outperformed religious denomination, lending support to the religious restructuring perspective. (Green, Kellstedt et al. 2007; Guth, Kellstedt et al. 2006; Olson and Green 2006)
The Demography of Religion

In their comprehensive work on religion and politics worldwide, Norris and Inglehart remark:

One of the most central injunctions of virtually all traditional religions is to strengthen the family, to encourage people to have children, to encourage women to stay home and raise children, and to forbid abortion, divorce, or anything that interferes with high rates of reproduction. As a result of these two interlocking trends, rich nations are becoming more secular, but the world as a whole is becoming more religious. (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 22-23, emphasis added)

Norris and Inglehart draw our attention to the fact that the proportion of the world that is religious is growing. This is confirmed by the most comprehensive data we have on religious affiliation, as compiled by the World Religion Database (WRD), shown in figure 2. (Johnson and Grim 2009) These data only measure affiliation, thus tell us little about the intensity of belief within these religions. Still, they are instructive. The first point to note is that the fastest-growing religion, Islam, has expanded – and is expected to further expand - almost entirely through rapid population growth in Muslim countries. Christianity, which is three times more successful at conversion than Islam, is nevertheless attached to slower-growing societies, and has only barely maintained its global presence. Other faiths are more reflective of rapid social or political changes. Atheism/nonreligiosity has gained from Christianity in Europe and in a few European
settler societies, but has lost substantial ground since 1970 with the demise of world communism. ‘Other’ (principally animistic) faiths have declined sharply due to conversion to Christianity and Islam, principally in Africa.

Figure 2.

![Past and Projected Global Religious Affiliation (World Religious Database)](chart)

Source: Johnson and Grim 2009

Why is religiosity on the rise? Two explanations present themselves. First, we could be witnessing an indirect effect whereby religiosity grows via poverty. High fertility (children per woman) in religious parts of the world which tend to be poorer than secular Europe and East Asia could be boosting the religious share of the total. Within countries, higher fertility in poor and religious regions, or among poor and religious individuals, could be driving religious growth. If this were the sole reason for today’s trends, however, we would also expect levels of world income and education to be falling
since less educated and wealthy women have larger families than their better educated and wealthier compatriots. This clearly is not happening, even though high fertility among populations with low levels of human capital exerts a strong drag on income and education levels. This is because few desire to remain poor and uneducated, and improvements in human capital are rapid enough to overcome the fertility advantage of those with lower levels of human capital.

Religion, of course, operates differently from income and education. Whereas the poor and uneducated desire upward mobility, it does not automatically follow that the upwardly mobile desire secularity. They may well be attached to religion for reasons (identity, existential security) that are not related to material satisfaction. This introduces a ‘stickiness’ to religion, allowing it to benefit from population growth among the poorest and least educated without necessarily losing adherents to upward mobility. The net result is population growth and rising global levels of religiosity. The impetus behind this trend is largely demographic, expressed through both population growth in religious countries and religious immigration to less religious societies. Some aver that material insecurities lie at the heart of the rise of religion, thus its rise is temporary. Norris and Inglehart, for instance, maintain that as income, education and equality rise, this reduces the appeal of religion. The demographic transition also lessens the impact of religious population growth among those with lower levels of human security and capital. They thus foresee developed countries, regions and individuals eventually becoming dominant enough over their less developed counterparts such that secularism gains the upper hand over religion worldwide. Like world income and education before it, secularism will begin to rise. (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 54)
But such prognoses must surmount a second hurdle, namely that the teachings of all major faiths are pronatalist and endorse traditional gender roles which are linked to higher fertility levels. To the extent that individuals cleave to literalist versions of their faith, we would expect religious pronatalism to increase its impact within the population. Fundamentalist religious pronatalism – regardless of income and education trends - will in turn propel further growth in the population of the conservatively religious. Today’s boom in conservative religiosity is mainly sociological. This is certainly true of evangelical Protestantism, charismatic Catholicism, Islam and even Hinduism. (Johnson and Barrett 2004; Toft and Shah 2006) Conservative (Orthodox) Judaism, however, has little appeal to the non-Orthodox, and draws most of its power from demography. In addition, even cases of sociological revival are reinforced by important demographic mechanisms. These suggest that the conservative revolution in religion will be of lasting significance even if the sociological mechanisms which are spurring it eventually fade.

The Demography of Conservative Religion

Recall that differential ethnic population growth has been implicated in a number of ethnic conflicts. This raises the possibility that the same may hold for differential religious population growth between fundamentalists and the moderate/secular population. We are used to thinking about the high fertility of particular religious traditions, such as Catholicism or Islam. However, demographers have increasingly found that as societies modernise, differences between religions become less important than differences within religions in determining fertility. (Westoff and Jones 1979) This
aligns with the religious restructuring perspective, and also with second demographic transition theory (SDT), which posits that values are increasingly linked to fertility behaviour as societies modernise. (Lesthaeghe 2007; van de Kaa 1987)

Demography pulsates with increasing velocity in the current period because prior to this both religious conservatives and liberals had high fertility, cancelled out by high mortality. If anything, liberals had a demographic advantage because of the association between liberal theology, higher income, lower infant mortality and larger numbers of surviving offspring. Only as mortality falls do differences in fertility become more important – and here we find that conservative religious groups have not responded to falling infant mortality as others have: by dropping their fertility to the replacement level, or below. (Skirbekk 2009) When everyone had ten children and eight died before they reached adulthood, beliefs didn’t matter. Today they do. Religion is particularly important in ethnically homogeneous societies or in contexts where ethnic cleavages fade, because religiosity can more easily come to the fore. Whereas the first Demographic Transition is affected by material changes like urbanisation (which renders children more costly and less beneficial), falling infant mortality and the availability of contraception, latter-day declines are more consciously ‘chosen’ on the basis of values and attitudes. Conservative religious values come to be associated with higher fertility while liberal or secular values predict lower birthrates. (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004; van de Kaa 1987) Here we consider the demography of the major Abrahamic Faiths in their respective heartlands.
Israel and the Jewish Diaspora

Nowhere is the religiosity-fertility nexus as stark as in Israel and the Jewish diaspora. A recent Israeli government report predicts that by 2012, a third of Jewish primary schoolchildren will be ultra-Orthodox, rising to half if we add the modern Orthodox. Within Israel as a whole, just 41 percent of primary schoolchildren will study in the secular state system, with the balance comprised of modern Orthodox, ultra Orthodox and Arab children. (Wise 2007) These largely religious Jews (along with Arabs) will form the majority of Israelis in the not-too-distant future. These trends have radical implications in a society founded by secular Zionists. Even with their small numbers, the ultra-Orthodox already have held the balance of power in the Knesset and are courted by the major parties.

The Israeli case simply illustrates, in extremis, a dynamic whose effect moves from the demographic to the social and then to the political sphere. Among ultra-Orthodox Jews (haredim), for instance, fertility rates rose from 6.49 children per woman in 1980–82 to 7.61 during 1990–96; among other Israeli Jews over the same period, fertility declined from 2.61 to 2.27 (Fargues 2000). Haredi fertility remains self-consciously high, backed by social networks and taboos which also prevent defection to secular Jewish society. On current trends, Haredi Jews will double their population, increasing their share of Israel's total to an amazing 17 per cent by 2020! The same trends can be observed in the Jewish diaspora, adding further weight to the political rise of the Haredim. (Wise 2007) Once a minor player, they will emerge as a major political bloc. Israeli domestic policy will be most affected, but Haredi influence may also affect
Israel’s capacity to achieve peace with the Palestinians due to Orthodox opposition to concessions over Jerusalem and the status of the holy sites of that city.

Historically, the Haredim opposed the Zionist movement because the return of the Jews to the promised land was supposed to occur through divine intervention. Human intercession – in the form of Zionism - ran counter to God’s Plan. Moreover, the split between Orthodox Jewry and Herzl’s Labour Zionism was severe. Though there were religious supporters of Zionism, most Zionists openly scorned Orthodox Judaism as an antiquated relic responsible for the subordinate plight of the Jews. However, there has been somewhat of a rapprochement in recent decades. To begin with, Haredi parties like Agudat Yisrael and Shas have participated in Israeli politics, sometimes holding the balance of power in the Knesset between Labor and Likud. They have proven pragmatic in their foreign policy preferences, and often support Israeli security measures and the aspirations of Zionist settlers in the West Bank and Gaza. As the number of ultra-Orthodox voters swells, the Haredim will acquire influence in the Knesset and in diaspora Jewish organisations. This will enable the Haredim to advance an orthodox definition of Jewishness within Israel during the course of the twenty-first century. In general, an increasingly Haredi Jewish population may decrease the strategic flexibility of Israeli society, polarising it between otherworldly pacifism and religious Zionist zealotry.

United States

In the United States, white Catholics no longer have higher fertility than white Protestants, but women with conservative beliefs on abortion (whether Catholic,
Protestant or Jewish) bear nearly two-thirds of a child more than those with pro-choice views. (Westoff and Jones 1979) Conservative denominations also have higher fertility than more liberal ones, not to mention seculars. (Hout, Greeley et al. 2001; Skirbekk, Goujon et al. forthcoming) American research also suggests a significant link between various measures of religiosity (congregational participation, denominationational conservatism, attendance) and fertility. Participation in congregational groups is especially important. (Hackett 2008)

Individual-level relationships are reproduced through compositional effects at the state level, hence higher white fertility in states with large Mormon or evangelical Protestant populations. Indeed, there was a correlation of .78 between white fertility rates and the 2004 vote for George W. Bush, an effect strongly mediated by religious traditionalism. (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006) During much of the twentieth century, women in conservative Protestant denominations bore almost a child more than their counterparts in more liberal Protestant denominations. This was the main reason why conservative Protestants increased their share of the white Protestant population from roughly a third among those born in 1900 to nearly two-thirds of those born in 1975. The other, smaller, part of the equation was the decreasing tendency of people to move from conservative to mainline denominations as they improved their socioeconomic status. (Hout, Greeley et al. 2001; Bainbridge and Stark 1985) This may have led to a ‘tipping point’ in the late 1970s when evangelicals were first mobilized as a political force for the Republican Party. (Bruce 1998) This change has biblical parallels. Rodney Stark suggests that Christians’ rapid demographic expansion between 30 and 300 A.D. set the stage for the rise of Christianity as the official religion of Rome after 312. (Stark 1996)
Looking ahead, the hollowing out of the moderate middle will continue, but these trends will be strongly affected by ethnoreligious demography. Table 1 lists 11 major American ethnoreligious groups by their total fertility rate (TFR) in the General Social Survey (GSS). This is a measure of the number of children a woman will bear over her lifetime. What we find is great variation among American religious traditions. The fertility of American Muslims and Hispanic Catholics is well above the 2.08 average, and twice that of the lowest-fertility group, American Jews.

**Table 1: TFR (Total Fertility Rate) by religion, United States, 2003**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>TFR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims (MUS)</td>
<td>2.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Catholics (CHI)</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Protestants (PBL)</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalist Protestants excluding Blacks (PFU)</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic Catholics (CAT)</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Protestants excluding Blacks (PMO)</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Protestants excluding Blacks (PLI)</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindus/Buddhists (HBU)</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion (NOR)</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (OTH)</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews (JEW)</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. Population Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.08</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Authors’ calculations based on GSS 2000-2006 and USCB

The roughly 1.2 million American immigrants are disproportionately Hispanic Catholic (over a third of the total), with Muslims and other non-Christian religions greatly overrepresented. Protestants are dramatically under-represented, making up just 6.4 percent of immigrants as against more than half of native-born Americans. (see figure 3)
Immigrants tend to be relatively young, and this, combined with high Hispanic-Catholic and Muslim fertility, will lead to rapid changes in the religious composition of American society. Demography is the most predictable of the human sciences because much future population growth is either encoded in age structure or predicted by slow-changing fertility and mortality rates. Hispanic Catholics, benefiting from a young age structure, high immigration and high fertility will almost double their share of the US religious marketplace, from 9 percent in 2003 to nearly 18 percent by 2043. Protestants of all stripes – black, fundamentalist, mainline – will decline as a proportion of the total, despite being more successful than other faiths in attracting converts. The contrast
between the young, fertile, immigrant-driven American Muslim population and the mature, low-fertility Jewish population is especially striking: by 2020 Muslims are expected to surpass Jews. (See figure 4) Mormons, another small group with high fertility, probably already outnumber Jews among Americans born since World War II. (Sherkat 2001) Neither of these trends would have been thinkable during the twentieth century, when the ‘Catholic-Protestant-Jew’ picture of the nation, popularized by Will Herberg (1955), remained uncontested. What’s more, demography, and not religious switching, is playing the major role in this rearrangement of the American religious landscape.
Figure 4: Share of Total Population for 11 Religious Categories (Constant Scenario)

Source: General Social Survey (GSS); Author’s calculations
One exception to this rule is the growth of the nonreligious, or ‘secular’ American population. This has occurred mainly through defection from other American religions. Demography will also play its part since secular Americans are far younger than average (28 years old, as against 39 for the typical Protestant Fundamentalist\(^2\)), and therefore poised for future growth. On the other hand, seculars’ TFR stands at just 1.66, among the lowest fertility of any American religious group. This will cause American seculars to age rapidly even if they maintain their current flow of young defectors: by 2043, the average nonreligious American will be 41, older than the typical American Protestant Fundamentalist. This aging, combined with low fertility, will cause the fast-growing seculars to peak around 2030 and begin a slow decline thereafter. In effect, while American individuals will be secularizing, America as a whole will be growing more religious.

Secularism also bears on the modernist-traditionalist question that is the focus of the religious restructuring perspective. A good barometer of these populations are attitudes towards biblical literalism, homosexuality and abortion. Here what is revealing is how wide fertility differences are between modernists and traditionalists. Whereas the fertility gap between Fundamentalist and Liberal Protestant women is just 16 points (2.13 to 1.84), the gap between those holding traditionalist and modernist attitudes on a GSS homosexuality item is 52 points, and for attitudes to abortion it stands at 64 points (2.47 vs 1.83). More importantly, focusing on the key 40-59 segment of females who have completed their fertility, this margin appears to be widening, confirming the predictions of SDT that values are becoming more important in determining fertility. (See table 2)
Table 2. Traditionalist-Modernist Fertility Gap, Children Ever Born (CEB) for Women 40-59

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Abortion Always Wrong (Y/N)</th>
<th>Homosexuality Always Wrong (Y/N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pre-1985</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-95</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2006</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GSS 1972-2006

Attitude populations are less rooted in social structure than ethnoreligious populations since ‘traditionalists’ do not have their own denominations. However, more traditionalist or modernist congregations and churches within denominations are ‘real’ and help to root these attitude populations and pass their values on to subsequent generations. Building in assumptions about the age structure, fertility, immigration and switching behaviour of these populations over the life cycle, we find that American religious conservatism will most likely strengthen in the years to come (see figure 5).

Figure 5. Projected Trends in Opinion Under Various Scenarios

Source: Goujon, Skirbekk et al. 2007; Skirbekk, Goujon et al. Forthcoming.
The paradox is that the American population will grow more diverse, limiting the power of American evangelical Protestants and the Republican Party, but will simultaneously empower a multi-faith coalition of moral conservatives. In this sense, California’s Proposition 8 may be a sign of things to come. It passed with a combination of white evangelical, black Protestant and Hispanic Catholic support in a state that also voted overwhelmingly - 61 percent - for Barack Obama’s Democrats.

Europe

What of European Christianity? The conventional wisdom holds it to be in free fall, especially in Western Europe. (Bruce 2002) This is undoubtedly correct for Catholic Europe, while Protestant Europe already has low levels of religious practice. Yet closer scrutiny reveals an increasingly lively and demographically growing Christian remnant. Several studies have examined the connection between religiosity - whether defined as attendance, belief or affiliation - and fertility in Europe. Nearly all find a strong, statistically significant effect even when controlling for age, education, income, marital status and other factors. (Adsera 2004: 23; Frejka and Westoff 2008; Berghammer, Philipov et al. 2006) Traditionally, education was seen as the key determinant of a woman’s fertility rates. Yet in many of these European studies, a woman’s religiosity is as or more important than her level of education in determining the number of children she will bear over a lifetime.

Today, many who remain religious in Europe wear their beliefs lightly, but conservative Christianity is hardly a spent force. Data on conservative Christians is
difficult to come by since many new churches keep few official records. Reports from the World Christian Database, which meticulously tracks reports from church bodies, indicates that 4.1 percent of Europeans (including Russians) were evangelical Christians in 2005. This figure rises to 4.9 percent in northern, western and southern Europe. Most religious conservatives are charismatics, working within mainstream denominations like Catholicism or Lutheranism to ‘renew’ the faith along more conservative lines. There is also an important minority of Pentecostals, who account for .5% of Europe’s population. Together, charismatics and Pentecostals account for close to 5% of Europe’s population. (WCD 2008) The proportion of conservative Christians has been rising, however: some estimate that the trajectory of conservative Christian growth has matched that of Islam in Europe. (Jenkins 2007: 75)

In many European countries, the proportion of conservative Christians is close to the number who are recorded as attending church weekly. This would suggest an increasingly devout Christian remnant is emerging in western Europe which is more resistant to secularization. Finally, a major source of conservative religious growth in Europe is immigration. The main inflows involve conservative Muslims, from the Middle East and South Asia, and conservative Christians, largely hailing from Africa and the West Indies. West Europe’s population of non-European extraction is projected to triple between now and 2050, from roughly 4-5 percent to 12-15 percent, possibly reaching as high as 25 percent in societies like Holland, France and Britain. (Coleman 2006) The majority of these new citizens will be come from conservative Christian and Muslim backgrounds. Few of these newcomers will be secular. Perhaps 60 percent will be Muslim, who show few signs of secularisation. (Jackson, Howe et al. 2008: 123)
England, more Muslims attend mosque on a weekly basis than Anglicans attend church. But religious immigration goes beyond Islam to encompass Christianity, which is reaping a demographic dividend nearly as impressive. In London, for instance, 58 percent of the city’s practicing Christians are nonwhite. (Islamonline 2005) The Global South is today’s engine of world Christianity, symbolized by the appointment of Ugandan-born John Sentamu as Anglican Archbishop of York in 2005. At the epicenter of global southern Christianity stands Pentecostalism, its most exuberant, fast-growing form. A quarter of the world’s Christians are now believed to be Pentecostals, with most of the past half-century’s growth taking place through conversion among Catholics in Latin America, Animists in Africa and Buddhists or secularists in East Asia. (Jenkins 2007; Martin 2001; WCD 2008)

The urban church is essentially an immigrant church in Britain, but this is also becoming true elsewhere in Europe. In France, evangelical Protestants have swelled from 50 to 400 thousand inside 50 years, chiefly because of immigration. Even Catholicism and mainline Protestantism benefit. In Denmark, immigrants fill the once ailing Catholic churches and have prompted a demand for more. (Jenkins 2007: 93-6) In Ireland, Polish and Lithuanian Catholics are replacing increasingly nonreligious young Irish in the churches. The story is different in Eastern Europe, where religious revival, in both traditional and Pentecostal forms, is a sociological phenomenon attendant upon the collapse of communism, a rise in religious freedom and economic uncertainty. (Froese 2008; Jenkins 2007)

In Western Europe, by contrast, demography is central to evangelicalism’s growth, especially in urban areas. Alas, immigration brings two ‘foreign’ imports, Islam
and Christianity, to a largely secular western Europe. Immigrants generally have a younger age structure and higher fertility than natives, which further drives religious growth. Against this background, the low fertility of the religiously unaffiliated – whether European or American - is notable, as we can see in table 3.

Table 3. Total Fertility Rates by Religion, Europe and the USA, 2001-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Catholic</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal Catholic</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>1.45*</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>1.57*</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>2.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Goujon, Skirbekk et al. 2007; Skirbekk, Goujon et al. Forthcoming.
* Few observations.

We can observe the outworking of these demographic patterns in projections of two fast-growing West European populations, the nonreligious and Muslims. Here we use data from Austria and Switzerland, the only West European countries that have consistently collected census data on religion, enabling us to construct estimates of switching behaviour as well as religious demography. Figure 6 shows two estimates of the nonreligious (‘none’) population of these countries which has expanded extremely rapidly through secularization in recent decades. The first, labelled ‘current’ shows the growth trajectory of the nonreligious on current trends. The second set of lines, labelled
‘low’ asks what would happen if religious defection dropped to zero by the end of the projection period. Notice that the growth curve of the ‘nones’ is convex in all cases, a reflection of weak secular demography. This leads to largely flat growth curves by the end of the projection period, and a slowing of gains to nonreligion through religious defection could result in a reversal of secularization as early as 2020 in Austria and 2025 in Switzerland. This could further attenuate the religious cleavage in European politics and negatively impact the Christian Democrats’ share of the vote.

**Figure 6.**

**Trends in Nonreligious and Muslim Populations, Austria and Switzerland, 2001-2051**

Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Swiss and Austrian census data.

The convex growth lines of the nonreligious contrasts with the concave shape of predicted Muslim growth, which will carry Muslim populations to 11 percent of the total in Switzerland and 17 percent in Austria by 2050. Those of non-European extraction are
expected to comprise between 15 and 25 percent of the population of major West European countries in 2050. Moreover, Austria’s Muslim proportion in 2000 (3.7%) and Switzerland’s (4.2%) are broadly representative of western Europe, and certainly lower than France, whose Muslim population was estimated at 8-10 percent in the same year. Thus we can assume that the Muslim growth trajectories of Austria and Switzerland are broadly representative of those of western Europe as a whole. (Coleman 2006) The general prognosis, then, is for a more secular Europe for several decades, but a return to increased religiosity beyond 2050.

Immigrants and young people tend to participate less in the political process, but are overrepresented in expressions of political violence. This augurs toward a new near-term dispensation in which European leaders can get elected without Muslim and immigrant Christian votes but must take heed of their ‘Muslim street’ when crafting foreign policy. By the 2020s, we should expect to see a rapid rise in the Muslim electorate, which may shift the electoral calculus toward immigrant votes and away from anti-immigrant votes. This can already be seen in municipal elections in Brussels and Antwerp, with their large Muslim populations, where both socialist and Christian Democratic parties have courted the Muslim vote by fielding Islamic candidates rather than trying to compete for white nationalist votes with the far-right Vlaams Belang. (Jacobs, Martiniello et al. 2002)
In most Muslim countries, the demographic transition is still in its early or middle stages, so we would not expect to see as dramatic a religious fertility effect as in Israel, Europe or America. Still, we might ask: do conservative Islamists have higher fertility than moderate Muslims, and what might we expect in terms of Islamist population growth? We can begin at the country level, since governments tend to be authoritarian in many Muslim countries, and hence wield greater influence over religiosity and fertility than in the West. In some cases, conservative Islam clearly delayed the onset of secular demographic processes, raising fertility. Pakistan is an interesting case, because it contrasts markedly with poorer Bangladesh next door. In Pakistan, religious authorities resisted birth control more strenuously than Bangladesh, whose principal brand of Islam has historically been less puritanical. The result is that Pakistan’s population will hit 467 million by 2050, 188 million more than if it had adopted a Bangladeshi-style programme from the 1970s. (Cleland and Lush 1997) In Pakistan, 40 percent of the population is under 14. Total fertility rates in Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen and the Palestinian Territories, for example, still exceed 5 children per woman. (Jenkins 2007: 8, 21; Fargues 2000)

Yet the imperatives of state – notably reducing the fiscal drain of a large youth cohort – has nudged even the most reluctant of hands. Among the many Muslim societies that have embraced family planning, few are more striking than Iran. In the 1960s and 70s, the Shah pursued a westernization policy focused on getting women outside the home into education and work, and making contraception widely available. Fertility
began to decline. Then came the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq War in the 80s, and an abrupt end to family planning. But Khomeini’s regime moderated its views as policymakers and intellectuals lobbied clerics, who eventually sanctioned family planning as in keeping with the precepts of Islam, but the story is far from over. (Abbasi-Shavazi, Hossein-Chavoshi et al. 2007)

The other point to remember about fundamentalist Islamism is that it is in many ways a modernizing movement compared to the more heterodox folk Islam in much of the Middle Eastern countryside. (Gellner 1981) When it acts as a competitor to rural, sufi traditionalism, we would not expect Islamism to be associated with higher fertility. This appears to be the case in Iran, where traditionalist (but less Islamist) ethnic peripheries of Kurds and Baluchis have the highest fertility while more Islamist Persian districts are no more fertile than average. (Abbasi-Shavazi, Hossein-Chavoshi et al. 2007) In Turkey, at province level, Islamic religiosity seems unrelated to fertility. Instead, higher fertility seems to be related to illiteracy rates and, to a lesser extent, higher unemployment rates. Figure 7, for example, show that provinces which support the ruling Islamist AKP are more religious (in terms of religious students and mosques per capita) and have more married people and fewer divorcees, but are no more fertile than provinces like Istanbul which are less keen on the AKP.³
Overall, the course of family planning in Muslim countries is one of qualified success. Yet state policy can change course if determined conservative factions gain power. Religious motivations may also dovetail with nationalist pronatalism. Outside of sub-Saharan Africa, Muslim fertility seems most resistant to decline in conservative Muslim societies like Yemen, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In Pakistan, the strong Deobandi fundamentalist movement has attacked the country’s family planning policies as a western import linked to decadence, and an imperialistic attempt to control the Muslim population. (Karim 2005: 50-51) The Taliban have taken up this cause, and pronatalist statements have been uttered by Iran’s hardline Mahmoud Ahmedinedjad and Palestinian leaders. Even Turkey’s moderate Islamist Prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan played the pronatalist card in 2002. “Have babies," he told the crowd. "Allah wants it." (Caldwell 2005)
To investigate the emerging vista of second demographic transition Islam, we shall redirect our attention to individual-level data. One of the few attempts to examine the link between Islamist religious beliefs and fertility comes from a study by Eli Berman and Ara Stepanyan in 2003. The dataset comes from disparate corners of the Muslim world: Indonesia, rural Bangladesh, rural parts of the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, and Cote D’Ivoire in West Africa. The principal indicator of Islamism was whether children were sent to *madrassas*, or Islamic religious schools. Some 13 percent of Indonesians sampled attended *madrassas*, but the proportion attending elsewhere was only about 2 to 3 percent. The authors found that ‘fertility is higher and returns to education are generally lower among families that send children to Islamic schools’. (Berman & Stepanyan 2003: 30) However, while attendance at *madrassas* did predict higher fertility, this was only in true in some countries.

Against this assessment, bivariate analyses of demographic and health surveys in Turkey find that traditionalism, as measured by arranged marriage, payment of a dowry, membership in a patrilocal family, rural residence and illiteracy, is the most important determinant of birth rates. Kurdish ethnicity is also associated with higher birth rates. Muslim religiosity *per se* counts for little. (Yavuz 2005) A recent study of contraceptive use in Iran, based on a 2002 Iranian fertility survey, likewise finds that attitudinal variables are much weaker predictors of the odds of using contraception than education levels. Further tests using a battery of seven attitudinal items related to women's
employment find little or no significant relationships between gender role traditionalism and contraceptive use. The authors therefore suggest that secularisation and 'modern' attitudes are not a factor in Iranian contraceptive behaviour. (Abbasi-Shavazi, Hossein-Chavoshi et al. 2007)

Nevertheless, censuses and fertility surveys, which are widely available for most Muslim countries, are notoriously poor at detecting the influence of religion because they neglect measures of religious intensity (i.e. belief, attendance). The World Values Survey (WVS) provides an exception in that its recent 1999-2000 wave surveyed a number of largely Muslim countries for the first time. The WVS asked 8500 respondents in seven Islamic countries a number of religiosity questions (participation, attendance, belief) as well as whether they agreed that the state 'should implement Shari’á only' as the law of the land. The proportion of Muslims favouring Shari’á as the exclusive law of the land was roughly two-thirds, ranging from over 80 percent in Egypt and Jordan to around half in Indonesia, Nigeria and Bangladesh. It also asks about the number of children ever born to women who hold these views. The first trend to emerge from a crosstabular analysis of attitudes to Shari’á and fertility is that women with more conservative religious views have higher fertility. (See figure 8)
Splitting the sample into rural and urban residents is especially revealing from an SDT perspective: here we find that the effect seems more marked among urban populations. Among city dwelling women, fertility is almost twice as high (3.2 v. 1.8) amongst the most pro-Shari’a sector of opinion than it is amongst those least in favour, whereas in rural areas, the ratio is less than 3:2. We might hypothesize that in rural, underdeveloped areas, religious beliefs take a back seat to material realities, such as access to family planning or the economic benefits of larger families, in discriminating between the more and less fertile. In urban areas, where economic incentives for children are lower and costs higher while birth control technology is more widely available, values may be a better discriminant of reproductive behaviour.

Religious traditionalism (with respect to hell, heaven, sin, afterlife) and approval of Shari’a law remain significant predictors of fertility. Even in multivariate analyses...
which control for age, marital status, education and income. Questions which measure female respondents' view of whether nonreligious people are fit for public office or whether it is better for political leaders to be 'strongly religious' are also significantly correlated with fertility (though slightly more weakly than is true for the Shari’a question). Finally, a recent survey of 18-25 year-olds in Egypt and Saudi Arabia asked respondents to specify whether they believe their countries would benefit from lower fertility. The survey also asked about political Islamist attitudes. In the case of both support for Shari’a law and an Islamic government, Islamists are more likely to favour pronatalist policies than non-Islamist Muslims.

Evidently there is an association between conservative religious views and pronatalism among Muslim politicians and the public. This extends from thoughts to concrete behaviour, with Islamist Muslims maintaining significant higher fertility than other Muslims, especially in urban contexts. This is critical since second demographic transition theory predicts that value choice should bulk larger in the more modern setting of the city, where contraception is widely available and economic incentives would ordinarily incline people to choose smaller families. Urban populations of developing regions are expected to increase from 43 percent of the total today to 67 percent in 2050. (Goldstone 2009) This means that religious intensity may become increasingly pivotal in determining fertility outcomes, leading to fundamentalist growth in Islamic societies. Secularism may also increase with urbanization, though there is little evidence of this to date.

The principal casualty of a more self-conscious fundamentalist Islam experiencing a growing fertility premium will be moderate, ‘taken-for-granted’ Islam,
which will begin to lose religious market share to fundamentalists, much as liberal
Protestants or reform Jews have in the West. The results confirm that conservative
Islamism is a determinant of fertility, but not to such an extent as to suggest imminent
growth in the Islamist population on the scale of the ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel. We
should therefore only expect to see significant demographically-driven fundamentalist
religious revival over generations, beyond 2050. Da’wa, the ‘Call to God’, is already
enjoying a powerful resurgence in the Islamic world due in part to the failure of the
postcolonial state in the Middle East and South Asia. (Wickham 2002: 119-49) This has
reshaped politics in the region, strengthening political Islam. Demography will only alter
this picture if the current revival runs its course and secularism or religious liberalism
begins to emerge. At that point, conservative Muslim demography could act as a brake on
this nascent secularism, with Islamism using its demographic momentum from the
present era to delay or reverse the onset of change.

Conclusion

Changes in the religious composition of a country, and of the world, can have far-
reaching political consequences. Shifts in the balance between religious traditions can
alter the power balance between nations and between what Huntington terms
‘civilizations’. Within nations, shifts in the religious makeup of the population often
mimics ethnic population changes and results in similar anxieties, political realignments
and conflicts. The religious restructuring perspective opens up another aspect of religious
demography, namely the differential growth of traditionalist and modernist/secular
populations. This is more affected by secularization and switching behaviour than ethnoreligious identity, but – especially during periods of more stable affiliation – migration and fertility can be the deciding factors.

In the context of the second demographic transition, religious women tend to have more children than non-religious women. Conservative religious families are larger than theologically modernist families. Immigrants to Europe tend to be more religious than natives. Over several generations, this process can lead to significant social and political changes, introducing value conflict between traditionalists and modernists. Secularization can stall or go into reverse, as we predict will occur in Europe and the United States around 2050. This is a medium and long-term phenomenon, but awareness of shifting population composition can lead to instability well before the full impact of demographic change takes place. Examining the major Abrahamic faiths in their respective heartlands, we find that demographic religious revival is most advanced in Israel and the Jewish diaspora, where ultra-Orthodox Jews are poised to become a majority of the Jewish population soon after 2050.

In the United States and Europe, fundamentalist Christians have markedly higher fertility than others, but this advantage is typically in the quarter to half-child range (roughly a 10-25 percent advantage) rather than the 100-200 percent fertility advantage enjoyed by the Haredim within global Jewry. Though immigration is another driver of fundamentalist Christian growth in Europe, its impact is as yet quite small. We therefore expect significant change only over generations, rather than within a decade. In the Muslim world, Islamic fundamentalism is associated with urban centres of learning, and hence remains as much a sign of modernity as a marker of traditionalism. Even so,
Islamism is associated with pronatalism, whether in the speeches of politicians or the views of the masses. Among individuals – especially in urbanised, modern contexts – Islamism predicts significantly higher fertility. As Muslim society urbanises, we would expect Islamic fundamentalism to reap a demographic dividend as conservative individuals choose larger families than liberals. However, the magnitude of demographic radicalization in the Muslim world seems more in keeping with the American and European pattern than the Jewish one. This means that significant change will take more than half a century, as opposed to the situation in Israel, where startling changes have occurred, and will occur, within the span of a decade.

These shifts will make societies more puritanical and less secular, leading to the further injection of religion and values into politics. Will this lead to violence? Religious fundamentalism tends to polarise societies between an otherworldly pacifism and religiously-fuelled activism. In Israel and its Jewish diaspora, the prevailing mood among the Haredim is quietist, but there is an important minority of religious Zionists who have been responsible for a series of Jewish terrorist attacks. In addition, Jewish nationalism has, like its Palestinian counterpart, grown increasingly religious. In the United States, the overwhelming majority of evangelicals incline toward individualism and cultural concerns, but a minority bear millenarian views which undergird Christian Zionist intransigence and unilateralism in foreign policy. A fringe are also implicated in anti-abortion violence. Among fundamentalist Muslims, violent militancy is more developed than in Christianity or Judaism, but demography is not a factor in Salafi-Jihadi growth. Religious civil wars and terrorism are becoming more common, though levels of violence remain constant. This suggests that religion is not necessarily more violent than other
ideologies, but more violence happens to be religious, replacing socialism and secular nationalism as a mobilizing collectivist ideologies, especially in the Muslim world.

Finally, the impact of religious demography on politics seems strongest in Israel and the Judaic world, with Europe, America and the Muslim world likely to experience transformative change only after 2050.

References


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1 By secular (and secularization), I mean those who a) seek to separate the political sphere from the influence of religious authority; and b) in their private life, do not regularly attend places of religious worship or believe in the sacredness of a particular religious belief system. See Bruce 2002 for the distinction between public and private secularism.

2 'Fundamentalist Protestant' is an established category of the American General Social Survey (GSS).

3 This was confirmed in multivariate tests.

4 Of course, Kurds tend to be more religious than average, so a religious effect may operate indirectly.

5 The question reads: ‘Think about what should change to make your country a better place to live, and please tell us if you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with the following. Saudi Arabia will be a better society: If the number of children born to families declined.

1) Agree strongly, 2) Agree, 3) Disagree, 4) Strongly disagree, 9) DK.’ (ARDA 2005 Codebook)

6 Now, I would like to know your views about a good government. Which of these traits should a good government have? It should implement only the laws of the Shari’a. 1) Very important, 2) Important, 3) Somewhat important, 4) Least important, 5) Not important, 9) NA.’
I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having an Islamic government, where religious authorities have absolute power. 1) Very good, 2) Fairly good, 3) Fairly bad, 4) Very bad, 9) DK. *(ARDA 2005 Codebook)*