Demographic Radicalization?: The Religiosity-Fertility Nexus and Politics

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Abstract:

We live in a world undergoing a 'second demographic transition', i.e. where fertility is dropping below the replacement level. This has already happened in the West and East Asia, and will take place soon in Latin America and much of the rest of Asia. Under such circumstances, we might ask whether pronatalist religious literalists can increase their proportion of a (shrinking) population. This paper takes a look at three paradigm cases from each of the Abrahamic faiths: conservative Christianity, ultra-Orthodox Judaism and fundamentalist Islam. It asks whether demographic dynamics coupled with strong retention of children within the faith can lead to sufficient socio-demographic change so as to alter the course of politics within a society. The paper advances a theory that this dynamic of 'demographic radicalization' gains traction as societies modernize and fertility (and religiosity) becomes a matter of choice rather than habit. This paper summarizes existing work, then analyzes data from the General Social Survey 1972-2006, European Social Survey 2004, World Values Survey of 1999-2000, supplemented by the Youth, Emotional Energy, and Political Violence Survey of 2005 in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It deploys multivariate analysis on fertility and conservative religiosity, as well as cohort-component demographic projections to make its case that demographic radicalization is an emerging reality on the world stage.

Introduction

In their masterful and wide-ranging account of religion and politics worldwide, Norris and Inglehart remark:

One of the most central injunctions of virtually all traditional religions is to strengthen the family, to encourage people to have children, to encourage women to stay home and raise children, and to forbid abortion, divorce, or anything that interferes with high rates of reproduction. As a result of these two interlocking trends, rich nations are becoming more secular, but the world as a whole is becoming more religious. (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 22-23, emphasis added)

Norris and Inglehart draw our attention to two developments. First, the proportion of the world that is religious is growing. This could be temporary: an artefact of high fertility in religious parts of the world which tend to be poorer than secular Europe and East Asia, and which will fade as the world goes through its demographic transition. There is a great deal of truth in this, but as Norris and Inglehart remind us, religious growth is not merely a coincidence. Hence their second point: the teachings of all major faiths are pronatalist. To the extent that individuals cleave to literalist versions of their faith, we may expect religious pronatalism to increase, which in turn may propel further growth in the population of religious fundamentalists. This raises a potential security issue, which we will explore in a moment, especially in the medium and long term.
Global religious trends are well-documented and exhibit a rise in conservative religiosity. Conservative Judaism, Protestantism and Islam are the leading outriders of this movement, but radical Hinduism and charismatic Catholicism are also on the rise. (Johnson and Barrett 2004; Toft and Shah 2006) These developments inform two major debates. The first concerns secularization (or its reversal), in both its ‘public’ (i.e. separation of religion from the state) and ‘private’ (decline of personal piety) dimensions. The second involves international security, whereby the rise of conservative religiosity may enlarge the pool of suppliers of, and/or recruits to, terrorism. This phenomenon, which I term demographic radicalization, will be the main focus of this work, though the issue of secularization intersects with it at several junctures.

Demography and Conflict

Demographic changes tend to occur more gradually than economic or political shifts, with the exception of migration – i.e. sudden migrations of refugees to new regions (Palestinians to Lebanon, Hutus to Eastern Congo, Kosovars to Macedonia) leading to instability. Among the long term demographic shifts are changing age and sex structures which can render societies more prone to conflict, especially ‘youth bulge’ conditions whereby economic and political structures fail to absorb rapidly growing 18-30 year-old populations. (Urdal 2006) Differential population growth between nations, ethnic groups or religions can affect the domestic or international balance of power and also induce moral panics about the loss of identity.
There are several reasons why demographic pressures are on the rise. First, modernity leads to demographic transition, but this advances in uneven fashion between and within nations. Much of the developing world has only begun to move through its demographic transition in the past few decades. Uneven transitions produce differential population growth rates between ethnic and national groups which may generate migratory flows due to modern improvements in long-distance transportation and communication. Sociologically, modernity accelerates processes of reflexivity, making nationals and ethnics more aware of their identities and boundaries. (Giddens [1985] 1996) Modern principles of popular sovereignty and democratization simultaneously increase the importance of numbers in politics. When monarchs or dictators control politics, internal ethno-religious balances are virtually irrelevant. Once elections decide politics, the mass mobilisation and growth of one’s ethnic, regional or religious base becomes a top priority. This is exemplified by the shift from Shia minority-dominated autocracy to Sunni majority democracy in Iraq: the change in regime type was accompanied by an ethnic/sectarian succession. (Kaufmann and Haklai 2008)

Differential Ethnic Population Growth and Violence

Does ethnic change lead to ethnic conflict and possibly even violence? In parts of the world where ethnic boundaries are rigid, assimilation is rare and ethnic endogamy is the rule, ethnic change may fuel conflict. Migration (in and out) and fertility differences lie behind many modern ethnic conflicts. In Northern Ireland, shifts in the balance between Catholic and Protestant have been an unseen driver of antagonisms, raising fears
among Protestants. This spurred the Protestant-dominated Stormont regime to stall reforms in the hope of encouraging Catholic emigration, which in turn stoked Catholic grievances. (Patterson and Kaufmann 2007) Protestants dominated 65:35 when the province of Northern Ireland was created in 1921. However, the higher Catholic birth rate and reduced Catholic emigration to Britain after 1945 shifted the balance of the population in favour of Catholics. Today, the balance is around 53:47 and Gerry Adams of the Irish republican Sinn Fein party stakes his long-term strategy on the eventual achievement of a Catholic majority in the province. This majority could, according to the provisions of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, successfully vote for a reunification of Ireland against the wishes of a future Protestant minority. Today, conflict between Protestant Orange marchers and Catholic residents is often caused by the expansion of Catholic population into formerly Protestant or previously uninhabited areas adjacent to marching routes, such as Portadown's Garvaghy Road, the scene of violent confrontations in 1985-7 and 1995-2001. (Kaufmann 2007)

Lebanon, like Northern Ireland, was carved out of a larger entity (Greater Syria being the analogue of Ireland) and was intended to be a Christian-majority state. Over time, however, Christian emigration and higher Muslim fertility altered the population balance to the point where Christians are now an acknowledged minority. This proved so contentious that no census has taken place in the country since 1932. The arrival of large numbers of Palestinian Muslim refugees from Israel after wars in 1948-9, 1967 and 1973 further upset the finely balanced demographic picture, leading to instability. The Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1990 was not a purely ethnic affair, but much of the fighting broke down along ethnic lines. Even so, the use of ethnic community guarantees (such as
a presidency which rotates between Christian and Muslim) and the ban on the census provided a form of insulation from demographic change which may have benefited the country since the end of the Civil War. Yet not all groups were included. Shias’ delayed demographic transition led to their expansion which has strengthened the position of Hezbollah, who now want a greater say at the Lebanese table. The multiplicity of groups: Christian, Druze, Shia, Sunni, leads to fractiousness, but may also help to limit binary polarisation, in contrast to Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka and other highly divided conflict areas. These factors did not, however, prevent the outbreak of conflict in 2006, which threatened to degenerate into renewed civil war.

Across Lebanon’s southern border, in Israel-Palestine, one can find some of the highest levels of fertility ever recorded in modern societies. In 1998, Palestinian women in Gaza had a fertility rate of 7.41 children per woman. Ultra Orthodox Jewish fertility in Israel was similar. Demographer Philippe Fargues convincingly argues that ethnic conflict, along with unemployment, is an important factor in propping up fertility rates among relatively well-educated Jewish and Palestinian women in Israel-Palestine. (Fargues 2000) Overall, Arabs are increasing as a proportion of the population of both Israel-Palestine and Israel proper. The withdrawal of Israel from settlements in Gaza is viewed as part of a wider policy of demographic retrenchment since Jews will be a minority in greater Israel-Palestine within a decade.

In the former Yugoslavia, differential rates of ethnic population growth likewise form an important conditioning factor behind the conflict. In the first Yugoslav war (1992-4), Slack and Doyon discovered that between 1961 and 1991, the proportion of Muslims increased from just over 25 percent to almost 45 percent of Bosnia's population
while Serbs dropped from 43 to 32 percent of the total. Part of this change had to do with
census terminology and identity-switching, but much could be explained by a younger
Bosnian Muslim age structure and higher fertility, combined with Bosnian Serb
outmigation. Districts (opstinas) where ethnic change was most rapid tended to be hit
hardest by anti-Muslim violence during the 1992-4 war. Serbs in areas of Bosnia with
comfortable Serb majorities and small Muslim minorities were much less active in aiding
the ethnic cleansing campaign. (Slack and Doyon 2001)

Similar dynamics were at play in Kosovo several years later. Between 1945 and
1961, Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo had roughly similar rates of population growth.
However, between 1961 and 1991 the proportion of Serbs dropped from 23.6 percent to
just 9.9 percent due to higher Albanian fertility and further Serb outmigation.
Milosevic's campaign of anti-Albanian ethnic cleansing in 1999 must be traced to his
expansionist 'Greater Serbia' nationalist ideology. Even so, the decline of the Serb
population had given rise to an alarmist discourse among local Serbs in Kosovo which
fed into the conflict. (Toft 2002: 81)

In Asia, a prominent example of immigration-driven ethnic change is taking place
in the northeastern Indian state of Assam. A Hindu-majority tongue of Indian territory
which extends into 99 percent Muslim Bangladesh, Assam has long been host to large-
scale illegal (but peaceful) Bengali immigration. Muslims grew at a rate of between 30
and 50 percent in the period 1971 to 1991. They now comprise over 30 percent of
Assam's population and are 'believed to control the electoral verdict in 60 of Assam's 126
Assembly constituencies'. Numerous battles have taken place over whether large numbers
of Muslims have the legal status necessary to add their name to the electoral rolls.
(Hussain 2005) The growth of the Muslim population has been the catalyst for violent Assamese attacks against unarmed Bengali workers since the 1980s and an Assamese political movement has long demanded the deportation of illegal Bengali immigrants. (Wiener 1983) This conflict is regional, but on the wider Indian level, the growth of the Muslim population in India through higher fertility and an (often exaggerated) degree of illegal immigration has been a foil for the Hindu nationalism of the BJP party and its quasi-paramilitary sister association, the RSS. The Muslim population's fertility advantage over Hindus in India as a whole was 10 percent at partition in 1947, but now stands at 25-35 percent. Only a fraction of this gap can be explained by relative Muslim poverty. Muslims grew from roughly 8 percent of the Indian total in 1947 to 14 percent today, and are projected to rise to 17 percent by 2050 and 19 percent by 2100. These are not staggering numbers, yet have proven useful tinder for Hindu nationalists and sparked sporadic violent reprisals against Indian Muslims. (Bhat and Xavier 2005: 399)

We see similar constellations at work in sub-Saharan Africa, despite the greater fluidity of ethnic boundaries as compared to the European, Middle Eastern and Asian cases reviewed thus far. A more fierce competition for resources, as well as weaker states and national identities may account for higher levels of ethnic violence in this region. (Fearon and Laitin 2003) Violence is often sparked by intra-national migration between regions (coupled with international flows) which was often first encouraged by colonial rulers seeking labour to open up new agricultural lands in sparsely settled areas. Yet these lands lay in other tribes' 'traditional' territory - here we bracket the question of ethnic memory and invention of tradition - and hence carried the seeds for conflict. Migrations often continued or intensified after independence. In Côte D'Ivoire, northern ethnic
settlers (Diuola, Senoufo, Malinké) who initially were encouraged by the French to move South in the colonial period, continued to migrate after independence. The tribal-territorial nature of many African states meant that such migrations crossed ethnic boundaries, and could form the basis for populist anti-migrant campaigns of 'autochthonous' rights. In Côte D'Ivoire, many northern migrants originate from areas in neighbouring countries, to the point where some 26 percent of Côte D'Ivoire's population is comprised of non-nationals. 'Northern populations, such as the Malinké, Senoufo, and Dioula,' writes Marshall-Fratani, 'have migrated massively south, becoming in some cases the dominant population in southern towns'. In 1998-99, Laurent Ggabo, a southern political entrepreneur, mobilised his FPI party on a violently anti-immigrant, pro-'autochthon' ticket, and his election in 2000 was marked by outbreaks of anti-northerner paramilitary violence which became a marked feature of the electoral landscape in this once-peaceful society. (Marshall-Fratani 2006) In Uganda, migration-linked violence is localised in the southwestern Kibaale district, where the considerable movement of ethnic Bakiga into Bunyoro ethnic territory lies behind violent 'autochthonous' politics there. (Green 2008) The Kenyan electoral violence of January 2008 fed on anti-Kikuyu nativist feeling whose roots reach back to postcolonial Kikuyu settlement of the traditionally Maasai/Kalenjin Rift Valley province. More recently, anti-immigrant violence in South Africa has been linked to large scale international migration from neighbouring Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Though African ethnic identities like Kikuyu, Wolof or southern Ivoirian are known to have relatively fluid boundaries and to grow through assimilation, there is a limit to their short-run fluidity and they function within a tense, resource-constrained, weak-state environment.¹ All told, ethnic demographic change can

¹ For more on the fluidity of African ethnic boundaries, see (Posner 2005).
set the stage for ethnic conflict if ethnic boundaries are rigid or the politico-economic environment is unstable.

From Ethnicity to Religion

Most of the world’s wars since 1945 have been fought within states rather than between states. Most of these are ethnic conflicts, but about half of all civil conflicts averaging over a thousand battle deaths per year now involve religion. In most instances, as in Israel-Palestine, religion serves to reinforce an ethnic conflict. However, in ten instances since 1940, conflicts took place wholly within one religion, with nine of these being intra-Islamic battles. These almost always involve struggles between militant Islamists and moderate/secular forces. (Toft 2007) This represents a considerable rise over the period up to the 1970s, when secular ideologies like Marxism (i.e. PLO) or pan-Arabism (i.e. Baathist regimes) were more frequently implicated in Middle East conflict. Political Islam has also generated an impressive rise in domestic and transnational terrorism since the first World Trade Center bombings which killed six people in 1993. Some of this terrorism is linked to ethnic or sectarian grievances, as with Palestinian suicide terrorism, Sunni terrorism in Iraq or the Kashmiri-linked Mumbai bombings of 2008. However, a significant component is purely religious, and includes the activities of transnational groups like al-Qaeda as well as those of domestic militants in Muslim-majority societies like Algeria, Egypt, India, Indonesia and Pakistan.

Will the resurgence of conservative religion – notably but not exclusively within Islam - lead to a greater security threat? Some avert that conservative religion is peaceful
and often quietist, focusing on a full spectrum of religious injunctions as opposed to the narrow set of militant passages and ‘emergency clauses’ which enjoin the believer to take up arms to defend the faith. (Appleby 2008) Research with Arab barometer data confirms that the religiously devout are no more likely to advocate violence and applaud 9/11 than the less religious. (Tessler 2008) While it is undoubtedly the case that religious fundamentalists are largely nonviolent, it is nonetheless true that religious terrorists are all fundamentalists. None interpret the words of their holy book in metaphorical terms. Unlike ethnonationalist terror groups like the IRA, they would never claim to be nonbelievers for whom religion is a mere symbol. Thus, all things being equal, an increase in fundamentalists’ share of the population increases the pool of potential religious terrorists, even if that pool is very small. Note that religiously conservative societies probably contain fewer secular terrorists, so this statement does not imply that the growth of religious conservatism will spawn a rise in aggregate terrorism (we have seen that the number of civil wars has remained constant since 1945), only that it enlarges the pool of potential religious terrorists. But religious terrorism is an extremely important form of security challenge today, hence the need to comprehend the demographic dynamics which may help drive it. Islamic religious terrorism is the principal species of transnational security threat today, thus it behoves us to improve our understanding of the demographics of its target population.

The Demography of Religious Conservatism
Recall that differential ethnic population growth has been implicated in a number of ethnic conflicts. This raises the possibility that the same may hold for differential religious population growth between fundamentalists and the moderate/secular population. We are used to thinking about the high fertility of particular religious traditions, such as Catholicism or Islam. However, demographers have increasingly found that as societies modernise, differences between religions become less important than differences within religions unless religion serves as a marker which is mobilised by self-conscious ethnic identities. (Westoff and Jones 1979) This is extremely relevant today, because an important postulate of second demographic transition theory is that values are increasingly linked to fertility behaviour as societies modernise. Whereas the first phase of transition is affected by material changes like urbanisation (which renders children more costly and less beneficial), falling infant mortality and the availability of contraception, latter-day declines are more consciously ‘chosen’ on the basis of values and attitudes. Conservative religious values come to be associated with higher fertility while liberal or secular values predict lower birthrates. (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004; van de Kaa 1987)

Demography pulsates with increasing velocity in the modern period because prior to this both religious conservatives and others had high fertility, cancelled out by high mortality. Only as mortality falls do differences in fertility become more important – and here we find that conservative religious groups have not responded to falling infant mortality as others have: by dropping their fertility to the replacement level, or below. (Skirbekk 2009)When everyone had ten children and eight died before they reached adulthood, beliefs didn’t matter. Today they do. Religion is particularly important in
ethnically homogeneous societies or in contexts where ethnic cleavages fade, because religiosity can more easily come to the fore as a political cleavage.

Israel and the Jewish Diaspora

Nowhere is the religiosity-fertility nexus as stark as in Israel and the Jewish diaspora.

On 8 February, 2007, Israeli economist David Ben David wrote in *Ha’aretz*:

> It is difficult to overstate the pace at which Israeli society is changing. In 1960, 15 percent of primary-school pupils studied in either the ultra-Orthodox or the Arab-sector school systems (these are today's adults). In 1980, this rate reached 27 percent, and last year it was 46 percent. (Ben David 2007)

The trends sketched by Ben David have radical implications in a society founded by secular Zionists (see Figure 1). Both Israeli Arabs and the ultra-Orthodox were opponents of the Zionist project prior to 1948 and are economically less successful than non-Orthodox Jews, yet both groups will be increasingly important players in the Israeli polity due to their growing demographic weight. Even with their small numbers, the ultra-Orthodox already have held the balance of power in the Knesset and are courted by the major parties.

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2 By secular (and secularization), I mean those who a) seek to separate the political sphere from the influence of religious authority; and b) in their private life, do not regularly attend places of religious worship or believe in the sacredness of a particular religious belief system. See Bruce 2002 for the distinction between public and private secularism.

3 Many ultra-Orthodox Jews have come to embrace Zionism, though a minority remain anti-Zionist.
The Israeli case simply illustrates, *in extremis*, a dynamic whose effect moves from the demographic to the social and then to the political sphere. Among ultra-Orthodox Jews (haredim), for instance, fertility rates rose from an already staggering 6.49 children per woman in 1980–82 to 7.61 during 1990–96; among other Israeli Jews, fertility declined from 2.61 to 2.27 (Fargues 2000). In the absence of a large-scale

‘switching’ of allegiance by the children of the ultra-Orthodox, Haredi Jews will double their population, increasing their share of Israel's Jewish population to a whopping 17 per cent by 2020! (Wise 2007) Once a fringe minority, Haredim will emerge as a major political bloc. The idea that Israel is becoming more secular is simply untenable in the face of these demographic trends. What, we might ask, does this mean for the future of Israeli policy with regard to land for peace, the settlements and the status of the holy places of Jerusalem?

Historically, the Haredim opposed the Zionist movement because the return of the Jews to the promised land was supposed to occur through divine intervention. Human intercession – in the form of Zionism - ran counter to God’s Plan. Moreover, the split between Orthodox Jewry and Herzl’s Labour Zionism was severe. Though there were religious supporters of Zionism, most Zionists openly scorned Orthodox Judaism as an antiquated relic responsible for the subordinate plight of the Jews. However, there has been somewhat of a rapprochement in recent decades. To begin with, Haredi parties like Agudat Yisrael and Shas have participated in Israeli politics, sometimes holding the balance of power in the Knesset between Labor and Likud. They have proven pragmatic in their foreign policy preferences, and often support Israeli security measures and the aspirations of Zionist settlers in the West Bank and Gaza.

There is also a small but important Haredi Zionist movement. When separated, Ultra-Orthodox Judaism and secular Zionism are powerful forces. Fused, they enervate each other to produce a potent cocktail. The religious and nationalist strands of Judaism were strongly entwined in the persona of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook. Born in Russian Courland, in what is now Estonia, in 1865, Kook sought to reconcile the two solitudes of
Orthodox Judaism and secular Zionism. He foresaw that Zionism, in leading to an ingathering of the Jews after 2000 years of exile, was a prelude for the spiritual messianic redemption of World Jewry. The sacrifices of the settlers would hasten this redemption.

In 1904, Kook moved to Palestine, where he became the leader of the religious Zionist movement and helped build bridges between secular and religious Jews as Chief Rabbi of Palestine. Later, his son Zvi Yehuda influenced the Hardal political movement of religious Zionism. The religious Zionist movement largely consists of a more modern-Orthodox wing (Mizrachi) branch, but also encompasses an ultra-Orthodox wing (Hardal) which is Haredi in philosophy. Hardal is hawkish in foreign policy, with many of its adherents living in the Occupied Territories and supporting the idea of a Greater Israel.

The Settler movement, notably the Gush Emunim (Community of the Faithful), draws strongly on the religious Zionism of the elder and younger Kooks. One of the tributaries of religious Zionism is the Gush Emunim Underground, a terrorist offshoot of the Gush Emunim. During 1979-84, its members mounted a series of attacks in retaliation for Arab terrorist attacks. Gush Emunim Underground members were implicated in a number of terrorist incidents, including a daytime gun and grenade attack on the Islamic College of Hebron which killed 3 and injured 33. They also detonated two car bombs which maimed Nablus Mayor Bassam Shaka'a and Ramallah Mayor Karim Khalaf. These actions were endorsed by many within the wider Settler movement.

The case of Yigal Amir nicely exemplifies the potential connection between ultra-Orthodoxy and religious violence. On November 4, 1995, Amir, together with his brother Hasai and another accomplice, Dror Adani, assassinated Yitzhak Rabin, the popular
Israeli Labour prime minister. Winner of the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize for his role in signing the Oslo Accords which recognised Palestinian control of parts of the West Bank and Gaza, Rabin was widely reviled by religious Zionists. Amir was no exception. Born into a Haredi family of Yemeni descent, he attended a Haredi elementary school and yeshiva before entering the Israeli defense forces as a *Hesder* student. Though most yeshiva students are exempted from military service, an important number choose to participate in *Hesder* programmes which combine Talmudic study with military service. This provides an important outlet for Haredim with religious Zionist orientations. As one exponent explains it, Hesder helps reconcile the potentially conflicting spiritual and patriotic duties of religious Zionists:

The defense of Israel is an ethical and halakhic imperative - be it because, as we believe, the birth of the state was a momentous historical event and its preservation of great spiritual significance or because, even failing that, the physical survival of its three million plus Jewish inhabitants is at stake.

The author also added an amusing anecdote intended to awaken more otherworldly Haredim to the importance of military imperatives:

The story is reliably told of a leading *rosh yeshiva* (Haredi yeshiva student) who...attended a wedding near the Israeli-Arab border in Jerusalem. At one point, gunfire was suddenly heard and he scurried under a table, exclaiming passionately, "Ribbono shel olam, I want to live! There is much torah which I yet
wish to learn and create!"...I cite the story...in order to point out that, at a certain
distance, one can lose sight of the simple truth that a Jewish soul can only exist
within a Jewish body. (Lichtenstein 1981)

The connection between Amir’s religious conservatism and his terrorist acts makes sense.
But the fact that Rabin’s peace-seeking coalition included Shas, a Haredi party, should
cautions us against jumping to any hasty conclusions. Conservative religion enlarges the
pool of religious terrorists, but can also work for peace – the two are not in contradiction.

An important source of settlers and funding for religious zionism is the diaspora. Therefore it is critical to go beyond Israel to grasp whether demographic radicalization
has affected the other half of world Jewry. The answer is provided by the Tribune, the
principal organ of Britain’s Haredi community, which recently thundered: ‘We will be
the majority by 2050’. The paper’s claims are based on research by historian Yaacov Wise of the University of Manchester. Wise found that Haredim now comprise 17
percent of the UK’s Jewish population but account for three quarters of all British Jewish
births. The high Haredi fertility rate had managed to reverse the long-term decline in the
UK Jewish population. In Manchester, a third of Jews are already Haredi, up from a
quarter just ten years ago. (Wise 2007) Where once the ultra-Orthodox sought to secede
from mainstream diaspora Jewish organizations, now their population surge and
demographically-inspired confidence will put them in a position to take them over during
the course of the twenty-first century.

Once again, demographic radicalization springs from the connection between
religiosity and fertility. Consider the relationship between religiosity and fertility in a
pooled sample of European Jews collected from European Values Surveys of 1981–97 (see Figure 2). Among Jewish women who have completed their fertility (those over-45), the average number of children ever born to women who describe themselves as ‘religious’ is just under 3. Among those who describe themselves as ‘not religious’ this figure drops to 1.8, while atheist women bear less than 1.5. This pattern seems even stronger among a rising generation of Jewish women who have yet to complete their fertility (aged 18-44), with religious women nearly at the replacement level while nonreligious have borne just 1.2 and atheist women 0.7 children, on average.

Figure 2

The divergent trajectories of ultra-Orthodox and other Jews is accentuated by the vanguard fertility behaviour of secular or moderate Jews. In Europe, we have seen that nonreligious Jews over age 45 already had below replacement fertility in the period 1981-97. Though we do not have specific information on the ultra-Orthodox, we can get at this by looking at a microcosm of European Jewry – Britain, where census data on religion enables us to look more closely at relevant trends. The story of British Jews is really that of two communities: a demographically vibrant but economically deprived segment, the ultra-Orthodox, and an aging, economically successful majority of secular/moderate Jews. The latter are also more susceptible to assimilation and intermarriage, accentuating their decline within British Jewry. Contrast the age pyramids of the Jewish communities of Salford, near Manchester, with that of Leeds. (Figures 2a and 2b) Salford’s Jews are primarily, though not exclusively, ultra-Orthodox, while Leeds has very few haredim.
Figure 2a

Source: Graham, Shmool and Waterman 2007: 44

Figure 2b

Source: Graham, Shmool and Waterman 2007: 43
Taking the principal centres of ultra-Orthodoxy in Britain, Salford and Hackney (in East London), we find just 10 percent of the Jewish population over 65 and approximately 35 percent under 14. Countrywide, nearly a quarter of British Jews are over 65 and only 16 percent are under 14. In Leeds, the proportion under 14 is just 12 percent and well over a quarter are over 65. (Graham, Schmool et al. 2007: 40-44)

In the United States, the General Social Surveys of 2000-2006 show that Jews have the lowest fertility of 11 ethnoreligious groups (1.43). As in Europe, this low fertility is combining with low rates of conversion to reduce the Jewish proportion of the American population. Among those born after 1945, there are now more Mormons than Jews, and Muslims will overtake Jews by 2025, perhaps heralding a historic sea change in American foreign policy, with its traditional support for the state of Israel. (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006) Within this largely secular/moderate Jewish community, the Haredi minority are estimated to have increased their share of the American Jewish total from 7.2 to 9.4 percent over the short period 2000-2006 alone, calculates Professor Joshua Comenetz of the University of Florida. (Hoover 2006) Most American ultra-Orthodox Jews live in greater New York, either in traditional tightly-knit Hasidic settlements in Brooklyn, or in new, outlying rural settlements. The small Hasidic settlement of Kiryas Joel, in Orange County, New York, for example, almost tripled in population, from 6,000 to 18,000, between 1990 and 2006. (Kraushaar 2007) Ultra-orthodox Jews are politically significant because they are more likely than other Jews to vote Republican. This is mainly because of Republican support for faith-based social policy and traditionalist moral values. Yet, for some ultra-Orthodox and modern-Orthodox Jews, the affinity between Christian Republican and Jewish religious Zionism
also matters. Republican support for more muscular pro-Israeli foreign policies may also prove attractive to some.

Religious beliefs shape fertility, but can also shape other aspects of demographic behaviour. Intermarriage, for instance, is a burning demographic issue among American Jews, since roughly half of young Jews now marry those of other faiths. The identities of their children are unclear, but the phenomenon has sparked a debate in the Jewish community over how best to keep these ‘part-Jewish’ Jews within the fold. Mainstream Jews have suggested a relaxation of traditional Jewish matrilineal descent rules to enable those with Jewish fathers but non-Jewish mothers (such as myself!) to remain Jewish. However, the ultra-Orthodox have resisted these initiatives in America because they purportedly stray from orthodoxy - much as they have in Israel when discussing ‘who can be a Jew’ and thus emigrate to Israel under the provisions of the Law of Return. Haredim have tended to withdraw from the wider society, but have actively participated in politics in both Israel and the diaspora. As the number of ultra-Orthodox voters swells, the Haredim will acquire influence in the Knesset and in diaspora Jewish organisations. This will enable the Haredim to impose an orthodox definition of Jewishness on mainstream Jewish institutions during the course of the twenty-first century. In general, an increasingly Haredi Jewish population may decrease the strategic flexibility of Israeli society, polarising it between otherworldly pacifism and religious Zionist zealotry.

On the one hand, more quietist Haredi voters may increase the power of post-Zionism and the forces of peace. Yet one should not overstate this outcome. Most Haredim support the state of Israel, and understand that they would do far less well in a Palestinian state – this is certainly reflected in the pragmatism of their elected
representatives. More important therefore is the significant minority of the ultra-Orthodox (as well as the modern Orthodox) who combine orthodoxy with Zionism. Religious Zionists have been responsible for a numerous Jewish terrorist actions in recent years. A demographically-fuelled religious Zionism will generate increased recourse to sacred rather than strategic logics. This may box in Israeli policymakers, precluding solutions to some of the thorniest problems in the peace process, such as territorial boundaries, and the status of Jerusalem and its Holy Places. Where these problems call for splitting the difference, a religiously doctrinaire approach seeks absolutism. This cannot bode well for the security of this region in the decades to come.

That said, religious Zionists are a distinct minority within Haredi society. The bulk of the Haredi population will probably continue to support pragmatism in foreign policy while insisting on puritanical domestic cultural policies as well as continued state support and military exemption for yeshiva students. This may make Israel a more socially conservative society, but will contain the risk of Israeli state intransigence. The wildcard, of course, will be increased religious Zionist terrorism – whether directed against Israeli Arabs or against liberal Israeli targets.

United States

The United States is no exception to the trend of demographic radicalization. This has accentuated as ethnic and confessional differences faded in the late twentieth century, bringing religion to the fore as a political issue. As American society became more ethnically porous in the 1970s, alliances were forged across Protestant, Catholic and
Jewish lines by moral traditionalists. This alliance was subsequently drawn into politics in the 1980s as the newly-coined 'Moral Majority' by three conservative activists, Richard Viguerie, Paul Weyrich and Howard Phillips. Fittingly, the first two were Catholics, the third a Jew, and their chosen figurehead was the late Jerry Falwell, an evangelical Protestant. (Bruce 1998: 148-9) The new ferment prompted Robert Wuthnow to remark that 'the major divisions in American religion now revolve around an axis of liberalism and conservatism rather than the denominational landmarks of the past' (Wuthnow 1989: 178). The term 'culture wars' emerged on the back of these changes, reflecting not only socio-religious changes, but the opening up of a new political axis based on religious and moral traditionalism, which crosses ethnic and denominational lines. (Hunter 1991; Fiorina, Abrams et al. 2005)

In the United States, white Catholics no longer have higher fertility than white Protestants, but women with conservative beliefs on abortion (whether Catholic, Protestant or Jewish) bear nearly two-thirds of a child more than those with pro-choice views. Conservative denominations also have higher fertility than more liberal ones, not to mention seculars. (Hout, Greeley et al. 2001; Skirbekk, Goujon et al. forthcoming) American research also suggests a significant link between various measures of religiosity (congregational participation, denominational conservatism, attendance) and fertility. Participation in congregational groups is especially important. (Hackett 2008)

Individual-level relationships are reproduced through compositional effects at the state level, hence higher white fertility in states with large Mormon or evangelical Protestant populations. Indeed, there was a correlation of .78 between white fertility rates
and the 2004 vote for George W. Bush, an effect strongly mediated by religious traditionalism. (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006). During much of the twentieth century, women in conservative Protestant denominations bore almost a child more than their counterparts in more liberal Protestant denominations. This was the main reason why conservative Protestants increased their share of the white Protestant population from roughly a third among those born in 1900 to nearly two-thirds of those born in 1975. (Hout, Greeley et al. 2001)

The political theology of conservative Christianity does not incline towards violence in the United States today, and global charismatic and Pentecostal Christianity – with a few notable exceptions such as the Lord’s Resistance Army of Uganda - shares the same pacific orientation. (Berger 2008) However, shifts in context and interpretation could change this, as there are historical resources in the bible which could be used to motivate armed conflict. It is also worth remembering that there have been domestic terrorist incidents (bombing of abortion clinics, Oklahoma City bombing) that have been inspired, at least in part, by a fundamentalist reading of the bible. The National Abortion Federation has tracked anti-abortion terrorism for several decades. It documents 7 murders, 17 attempted murders, 41 bombings, 173 arson attacks, 100 butyric acid attacks, 157 incidents of assault and battery, 4 kidnappings, and 385 death threats between 1977 and 2006. (NAF 2008) While political context will always be the key ingredient in determining security threat levels, religious demography can tilt the terrain in favour of, or against, religious terrorism. A more fundamentalist America, for instance, will be a society in which domestic terrorism (on issues of abortion, in particular) may well increase.
Conservative Christianity is relatively weak in Europe, though there is a statistically significant connection between religiosity, right wing ideology and voting for conservative (though not far-right) parties. (Minkenberg 2008) Though there has been some violence against gays and non-Christians in Europe, this is not linked to conservative Christianity. However, as in the United States, this may have more to do with the political context of our day and age, and could change. At that point, the religious demography of Christian Europe may become more significant.

What of European Christianity? The conventional wisdom holds it to be in free fall, especially in Western Europe. (Bruce 2002) This is undoubtedly correct for Catholic Europe, while Protestant Europe already has low levels of religious practice. Yet closer scrutiny reveals an increasingly lively and demographically growing Christian remnant. Several studies have examined the connection between religiosity - whether defined as attendance, belief or affiliation - and fertility in Europe. Most find a statistically significant effect even when controlling for age, education, income, marital status and other factors. (Adsera 2004: 23; Frejka and Westoff 2008; Berghammer, Philipov et al. 2006) Traditionally, education was seen as the key determinant of a woman’s fertility rates. Yet in many of these European studies, a woman’s religiosity is as or more important than her level of education in determining the number of children she will bear over a lifetime. In Spain, women who remain practicing Catholics are now considerably more fertile than their non-practicing sisters, which wasn’t the case as recently as 1985.
This is most likely because only those truly committed to religion remain attenders while nominal Catholics have dropped away as Francoist conformity collapsed after 1975. Since the more religious are more fertile, the departure of nominal, uncommitted attenders helps unmask the connection between religiosity and fertility.

Moving to the wider spectrum of European Christianity, we find that fertility is indeed much higher among European women who are religious. The European Social Survey (ESS) of 2004 asks ‘how religious are you’, and provides a scale from 0 to 9. In a sample of ten west European countries (chosen because they were the only ones sampled in all three waves of the European Values Survey), the number of women who were very religious (6-9) was similar to those with low religiosity (0-4). However, the fertility of the two groups differed greatly. Women who said they were very religious (6-9), bore, on average, 1.95 children, as against 1.42 for those in the least religious (0-4) deciles. Among those 45 and over, the difference was 14 percent (TFR pf 2.39 v. 2.07), but in the under-35 group, the gap was a whopping 159 percent (TFR of 1.42 v. .53). The stronger effect in younger age cohorts suggests an emerging, ‘second demographic transition’ dynamic. Data from the 2000 European Values Survey in the same countries reaffirms the pattern, albeit more modestly: ‘religious’ women have a 24 percent fertility advantage among the under-35s as against 10 percent for the over-44s. Part of this is due to a tempo effect of religious women bearing children earlier, and only time will tell how much of the gap will be closed by less religious women in the years ahead.

Today, most of those who remain religious in Europe wear their beliefs lightly, but conservative Christianity is hardly a spent force. Data on conservative Christians is difficult to come by since many new churches keep few official records. Reports from the
World Christian Database, which meticulously tracks reports from church bodies, indicates that 4.1 percent of Europeans (including Russians) were evangelical Christians in 2005. This figure rises to 4.9 percent in northern, western and southern Europe. Most religious conservatives are charismatics, working within mainstream denominations like Catholicism or Lutheranism to ‘renew’ the faith along more conservative lines. There is also an important minority of Pentecostals, who account for .5% of Europe’s population. Together, charismatics and Pentecostals account for close to 5% of Europe’s population. The proportion of conservative Christians has been rising, however: some estimate that the trajectory of conservative Christian growth has outpaced that of Islam in Europe. (Jenkins 2007: 75)

In many European countries, the proportion of conservative Christians is close to the number who are recorded as attending church weekly. This would suggest an increasingly devout Christian remnant is emerging in western Europe which is more resistant to secularization. This shows up in France, Britain and Scandinavia (less Finland), the most secular countries where we have 1981, 1990 and 2000 EVS and 2004 ESS data on religiosity. EVS and ESS data indicate that generations born after 1945 are as likely to attend as older cohorts. Though just 5 percent of people attend in these societies, nearly half describe themselves as religious, and their presence indicates a flattening out of the long secular trends of the twentieth century. (Kaufmann 2008)

Unfortunately, we have no direct source of information on the fertility of Pentecostals and charismatics in Europe. A worldwide study suggests that Pentecostals have higher fertility than others in the United States, but not in Latin America, Africa or Asia. (Pew 2006: 40) This could signify the lack of a religiosity-fertility link, but may also result
from a greater outworking of second demographic transition dynamics in the more
developed context of the USA. Certainly there are significant data limitations in both the
WCD and Pew studies, thus more research is needed in this area in order to substantiate
whether Pentecostals have higher fertility in the second demographic transition contexts
of northern, western and southern Europe.\(^4\)

Finally, a major source of conservative religious growth in Europe is immigration.
The main flows involve conservative Muslims, from the Middle East (especially North
Africa) and South Asia, and conservative Christians, largely hailing from Africa and the
West Indies. West Europe’s population of non-European extraction is projected to triple
between now and 2050, from roughly 4-5 percent to 12-15 percent, possibly reaching as
high as 25 percent in societies like Holland, France and Britain. (Coleman 2006) The
majority of these new citizens will be from conservative Christian and Muslim
backgrounds. Few of these newcomers will be secular. Perhaps 60 percent will be
Muslim, who, as we shall see, show few signs of secularisation. (Jackson, Howe et al.
2008: 123) But religious immigration goes beyond Islam to encompass Christianity,
which is reaping a demographic dividend nearly as impressive. In England, more
Muslims attend mosque on a weekly basis than Anglicans attend church, but Christianity
is hardly stagnant: 58 percent of London’s practicing Christians are nonwhite.
(Islamonline 2005) The Global South is today’s engine of world Christianity, symbolized
by the appointment of Ugandan-born John Sentamu as Anglican Archbishop of York in
2005. At the epicenter of global southern Christianity stands Pentecostalism, its most
exuberant, fast-growing form. A quarter of the world’s Christians are now believed to be

\(^4\) For example, the WCD suggests that as many as a third of Britons are charismatic, Pentecostal or
evangelical Christians in a country where church attendance is less than 12 percent. The Pew study presents
data showing the total fertility rate (TFR) of India at 1.4 and Kenya at 2.5, both severe underestimates.
Pentecostals, with most of the past half-century’s growth taking place through conversion among Catholics in Latin America, Animists in Africa and Buddhists or secularists in East Asia. (Jenkins 2007; Martin 2001; World Christian Database 2008)

The urban church is essentially an immigrant church in Britain, but this is also becoming true elsewhere in Europe. In France, evangelical Protestants have swelled from 50 to 400 thousand inside 50 years, chiefly because of immigration. Even Catholicism and mainline Protestantism benefit. In Denmark, immigrants fill the once ailing Catholic churches and have prompted a demand for more. (Jenkins 2007: 93-6) In Ireland, Polish and Lithuanian Catholics are replacing increasingly nonreligious young Irish in the churches. In Europe as a whole (including Russia), pentecostals and charismatics have exploded in numbers, expanding in step with Islam. Currently there are more evangelical Christians than Muslims in Europe. (Jenkins 2007: 75) In Eastern Europe, as outside the western world, Pentecostalism is a sociological and not a demographic phenomenon. In Western Europe, by contrast, demography is central to evangelicalism’s growth, especially in urban areas. Alas, immigration brings two foreign imports, Islam and Christianity, to secular Europe.

The Muslim World

In most Muslim contexts, the demographic transition is still in its early or middle stages, so we would not expect to see as dramatic an effect. Still, we might ask: do Islamists have higher fertility than moderate Muslims, and what might we expect in terms of Islamist population growth and the demographic radicalization of Islam? In some
cases, conservative Islam clearly delayed the onset of secular demographic processes, raising fertility. In Jack Goldstone's words, 'Some countries – mainly those with large Muslim populations – have been quite resistant to a reduction in birth rates; thus their population growth rates have remained high.' (Goldstone 2007) Pakistan is an interesting case, because it contrasts markedly with poorer Bangladesh next door. In Pakistan, religious authorities resisted birth control more than Bangladesh, whose principal brand of Islam has historically been less puritanical. The result is that Pakistan’s population will hit 467 million by 2050, 188 million more than if it had adopted a Bangladeshi-style programme from the 1970s. (Cleland and Lush 1997) In Pakistan, 40 percent of the population is under 14. Total fertility rates in Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen and the Palestinian Territories, for example, still exceed 5 children per woman. (Jenkins 2007: 8, 21; Fargues 2000)

Among the many Muslim societies that have embraced family planning, none is more striking than Iran. In the 1960s and 70s, the Shah pursued a westernization policy focused on getting women outside the home into education and work, and making contraception widely available. Fertility began to decline. Then came the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq War in the 80s:

Appropriate Islamic public dress and appearance were codified and these rules strictly enforced; gender segregation was pervasive in public places; and domestic roles of women were glorified. Early marriage and motherhood were encouraged. Legal marriage ages were lowered to 9 and 14 for females and males, respectively. Family planning was labeled an imperialist plot to reduce the
number of Muslims. Many family planning clinics were closed and clinic personnel transferred to other jobs. Fertility increased after the Revolution due to these changes and other pronatalist policies (some linked to the Iran-Iraq War).

(Abbasi-Shavazi, Hossein-Chavoshi et al. 2007)

Iran did eventually change course, as policymakers and intellectuals lobbied clerics, who eventually sanctioned family planning as in keeping with the precepts of Islam, but the story is far from over.

Overall, the course of family planning in Muslim countries is one of qualified success. Yet state policy can change course if determined conservative factions gain power. Religious motivations may also dovetail with nationalist pronatalism. Outside of sub-Saharan Africa, Muslim fertility seems most resistant to decline in conservative Muslim societies like Yemen, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In Pakistan, the strong Deobandi fundamentalist movement has attacked the country’s family planning policies as a western import linked to decadence, and an imperialistic attempt to control the Muslim population. They cite Koranic verses extolling the virtue of children and marriage and instructing families not to kill children during times of want. Sometimes fundamentalists dredge up the anticolonial Islamic Puritanism of Maulana Maudoudi, who, in a 1937 tract, savaged birth control as a western plot against Islam which would introduce western promiscuity and women’s liberation into Pakistan. (Karim 2005: 50-51)

Elsewhere the threat is deadly serious. In Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas, Taliban insurgents have taken to killing healthcare workers involved in family planning.
Threats, kidnappings and assassinations have brought family planning to its knees in disputed areas. After murdering a female healthcare worker in Kandahar, Taliban insurgents wrote to her employer. "We took up arms against the Infidels in order to bring Islamic law to this land," they crowed in a letter bearing the seal of the Taliban military council. “But you people are supporting our enemies, the enemies of Islam and Muslims...Personnel were trained to distribute family planning pills. The aim of this project is to persuade the young girls to commit adultery." (Blackwell 2008) In rural areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, local religious leaders exercise great influence over people’s views on contraception. In Taliban-dominated southern Afghanistan, people tend to accept the prohibitionist views of their conservative imams. (Mehtab Karim, private conversation, Pew Forum, Washington, November 2008)

Shades of this posture are likewise evident among radical Islamist factions in mainstream states, where their arguments may dovetail with the secular imperatives of nationalists or politicians who seek an enlarged power base. Palestinian nationalism has long been pronatalist, with its politicians, journalists and poets singing the praises of their ‘demographic weapon’ against Israel. (King 2002: 386) Though secular and Islamist nationalists both extol the virtues of pronatalism, it is noteworthy that fertility rates are higher in Gaza, a Hamas bastion and stronghold of the Islamist-inspired second intifada, than in the secular, Fatah-controlled West Bank. (Fargues 2000: 469-70) Even in Turkey, where the temperature of conflict is lower, Islamist nationalists have played the pronatalism card. Prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP), cut his teeth by attacking contraception and abortion to woo both nationalist and Islamist audiences. In 2002, two years before he was elected,
Erdogan pulled few punches: "To recommend to people not to procreate is straight out treason to the state," Erdogan told a crowd gathered to celebrate the opening of an AKP office in Istanbul. "It's a means of wanting to erase the history and the surface of the land". Having played on nationalist registers, he moved to religion: “Have babies," he told the crowd. "Allah wants it." (Caldwell 2005)

Iranian hardline president Mahmoud Ahmadinedjad is no stranger to this issue. He is seeking to change the course of Iranian family policy, advocating renewed population growth. Criticizing Iran’s below-replacement fertility rate, he wants Iran’s population to grow from its current 70 million to 120 million. Along the way, he favours scaling back women’s participation in the labour force to concentrate on reproduction. "I am against saying that two children [per woman] are enough”, thundered Ahmadinedjad. ‘Our country has a lot of capacity. It has the capacity for many children to grow in it. It even has the capacity for 120 million people. Westerners have got problems. Because their population growth is negative, they are worried and fear that if our population increases, we will triumph over them.” Unfortunately for this maverick, Ahmadinedjad faces an established opposition, backed by a majority of Iranians and many senior clerics. (Cincotta 2006; Tait 2006) Factionalism within the regime is intense, and popular sentiments play a role in determining which faction gains favour. Iran’s quasi-democracy means that Ahmadinedjad must be mindful of his popularity, which could stay his pronatalist hand.
Most Muslim governments, even those under Islamist sway – are succeeding in their family planning efforts. But there are some cautionary notes. First, Muslims – like many minorities - tend to have higher fertility when they are in the minority. (Goldscheider 1971) In Malaysia, Egypt, Lebanon or Albania, where Muslims are a comfortable majority, their fertility differs little from that of non-Muslim minorities. (Westoff and Frejka 2007) In Europe, India, Thailand, Russia, China and the Philippines, the Muslim fertility advantage over other groups is greatest. This is particularly true of ethnoreligious conflict zones like Israel-Palestine or India where a significant Muslim fertility advantage persists despite urbanisation and equivalent access to contraception. (Morgan, Stash et al. 2002; Moulasha and Rao 1999) Yet fertility rates among most Muslim minorities are also on their way down. This is particularly noticeable among European Muslims, whose fertility is falling toward host country levels. In Austria, the number of children expected to be borne by Muslim women over their lifetime (TFR) declined from 3.09 in 1981 to 2.34 in 2001. (Goujon, Skirbekk et al. 2006: 13) Similar trends have been observed across all of western Europe. In Switzerland, Germany and the Netherlands, Turkish-born women now have an expected fertility rate of less than two children. This reflects the decline in Turkey itself. Pakistani and Somali fertility is highest among European Muslims, followed by North Africans and Turks, but all are falling fast. (Westoff and Frejka 2007)

A central argument here is that fertility differences rooted in economic underdevelopment or unselfconscious, ‘traditional’ cultural differences (i.e. Protestant v.
Catholic, Muslim v. Christian) will fade in the absence of ethnoreligious conflict. Those who merely happen to be Muslim but lack a mobilised commitment to political Islam will experience declining fertility as their economic situation develops and access to family planning improves. On the other hand, differences based on either mobilised Muslim ethnic identity (i.e. Palestinian, Moro) or religious intensity/conservatism (i.e. political Islam) will endure or widen as societies enter the second demographic transition.

Religious fertility among Muslims will be driven increasingly by conservative subgroups and individuals rather than states, because states are mindful of secular considerations (i.e. reducing dependency ratios and pressure on resources) whose imperative points toward family planning.

To investigate the emerging vista of second demographic transition Islam, we shall redirect our attention to individual-level data. One of the few attempts to examine the link between Islamist religious beliefs and fertility comes from a study by Eli Berman and Ara Stepanyan in 2003 which 'investigates every data source the authors could find on radical Islamic communities' to examine Islamist fertility. (Berman and Stepanyan 2003: 1) The datasets compiled came from disparate corners of the Muslim world: Indonesia, rural Bangladesh, rural parts of the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, and Cote D’Ivoire in West Africa. The principal indicator of Islamism was whether children were sent to madrassas, or Islamic religious schools. Some 13 percent of Indonesians sampled attended madrassas, but the proportion attending elsewhere was only about 2 to 3 percent. The authors found that 'fertility is higher and returns to education are generally lower among families that send children to Islamic schools'. (Berman & Stepanyan 2003: 30)
However, the model coefficients for Islamic schooling were much weaker than those for overall education and were strongest in the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Elsewhere (Indonesia, Bangladesh, Cote D’Ivoire), attendance at madrassas proved significant, but only in some models. Figures 3 and 4 show that the Islamist fertility premium varies considerably between different societies but is nowhere greater than about 30 percent. These results confirm that Islamism is a significant determinant of fertility, but not to such an extent as to suggest imminent growth in the Islamist population on the scale of the ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel who have a 3:1 fertility advantage over non-Orthodox Jews. (i.e. Fargues 2000) Let us also bear in mind the generally small numbers (2-3 percent) of Islamists in these samples, though the proportion of those sympathetic to fundamentalist Islam may be much wider than the madrassa-attending population. A better point of comparison therefore is the United States, where the fertility premium of conservative over mainline Protestants appears to be very similar to that between Islamist and non-Islamist families. (Roof and McKinney 1987) The 15-20 percent fertility advantage enjoyed by religious west Europeans over their nonreligious fellow citizens is also of similar magnitude. (Kaufmann 2008) They intimate that demographically-driven radical change may occur in Islamic countries, but over a period of a century or more rather than a generation.
Source: Berman and Stepanyan 2003
What of Islamism? The first thing to bear in mind is Ernest Gellner’s classic view that puritanical Islam is an advanced phenomenon that tends to fan out from urban centres of learning. It is in many respects a modernizing movement that confronts the more heterodox folk Islam of the countryside. (Gellner 1981) When it acts as a competitor to rural, sufi traditionalism, we would not expect Islamism to be associated with higher fertility. This appears to be the case in Iran, where traditionalist (but less Islamist) ethnic peripheries of Kurds and Baluchis have the highest fertility while more Islamist Persian districts are no more fertile than average. (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2006) In Turkey, at province level, Islamic religiosity seems unrelated to fertility. Instead, higher fertility seems to be related to illiteracy rates and, to a lesser extent, higher unemployment rates.
Table 1 and figure 5, for example, show that provinces which support the ruling Islamist AKP are more religious (in terms of religious students and mosques per capita) and have more married people and fewer divorcees, but are no more fertile than provinces like Istanbul which are less keen on the AKP.\textsuperscript{5}

Figure 5.

Source: Author’s calculations; Turkish national statistics.

\textsuperscript{5} This was confirmed in multivariate tests.
Table 1. Predictors of Voting for AK (Islamist) Party, Turkey, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Coefficient (B)</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>t-statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divorce Rate</td>
<td>-19.68***</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>-4.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly Dependency Ratio</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-3.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosques per Capita</td>
<td>67.59**</td>
<td>23.89</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Ratio</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes for Minor Parties</td>
<td>-0.65***</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>1.76***</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.658</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p <.01; ***p < .001

However, as with the national-level of geography, things change when we focus on individuals. True, bivariate analyses of demographic and health surveys find that traditionalism, as measured by arranged marriage, payment of a dowry, membership in a patrilocal family, rural residence and illiteracy, is the most important determinant of birth rates. Kurdish ethnicity is also associated with higher birth rates.\(^6\) (Yavuz 2005) A recent study of contraceptive use in Iran, based on a 2002 Iranian fertility survey, likewise finds that attitudinal variables are much weaker predictors of the odds of using contraception than education levels. Further tests using a battery of seven attitudinal items related to women's employment find little or no significant relationships between gender role traditionalism and contraceptive use. The authors therefore suggest that secularisation and 'modern' attitudes are not a factor in Iranian contraceptive behaviour. (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2006)

Nevertheless, censuses and fertility surveys, which are widely available for most Muslim countries, are notoriously poor at detecting the influence of religion because they

\(^6\) Of course, Kurds are more religious than average, so a religious effect may operate indirectly.
neglect measures of religious intensity (i.e. belief, attendance). The World Values Survey (WVS) provides an exception in that its recent 1999-2000 wave surveyed a number of largely Muslim countries for the first time. This allows us to correlate fertility with specific indices of religious intensity. This is clear in the WVS’ 1999-2000 wave, the only individual-level survey that permits us to focus on how religiosity and Islamist attitudes are linked to higher fertility. Multivariate manipulation of this survey shows that religious Turks are significantly – if modestly – more fertile than nonreligious Turks.\textsuperscript{7} We shall see that this finding is especially true of urban areas. As second demographic transition theory suggests, it is only when traditionalism fades, material constraints diminish and people’s ideology and fertility are no longer inherited that we would expect the religiosity-fertility nexus to strengthen.

Let us consider the WVS findings in greater detail. The WVS asked 8500 respondents in seven Islamic countries a number of religiosity questions (participation, attendance, belief) as well as whether they agreed that the state ‘should implement Shari’a only’ as the law of the land. The proportion of Muslims favouring Shari’a as the exclusive law of the land was roughly two-thirds, ranging from over 80 percent in Egypt and Jordan to around half in Indonesia, Nigeria and Bangladesh. Responses, restricted to Muslims only, were highest in the Middle East and North Africa, and lower in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. (See figure 6)

\textsuperscript{7} Religiosity was significant at the .05 level, but only barely so (t=2.04). Marital status and education levels dominated the model.
A glance at the Shari’ a question crosstabulated with fertility shows some interesting patterns. In Egypt, for example, we find that those with lower fertility are more likely to disagree with the idea that Shari’a should be implemented as the law. (See figure 7)
In the wider universe of majority-Muslim countries where this question was asked (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria), a similar pattern could be discerned. Yet we know that fertility rates are falling in many of these countries due to urbanisation and education. It could be the case that education and a shift of population to the cities simultaneously lowers fertility and the belief in the appropriateness of Shari’a law. Or perhaps older people, who are more likely to have completed their fertility and/or had more children, are more supportive of Shari’a law. On its own, therefore, our finding that supporters of Shari’a law have higher fertility could be an artefact of unspecified factors like age, education and urbanisation. Urban, educated or younger individuals in Muslim societies might be less supportive of Shari’a and also prefer smaller families.

Let us consider each of these counter-explanations, beginning with rural-urban geography. When we break up the sample into rural and urban residents, we find that the pattern of Islamist fertility holds. Moreover, as figure 8 shows, the effect seems more marked among urban populations. Among city dwellers, fertility is almost twice as high (3.2 v. 1.8) amongst the most pro-Shari’a sector of opinion than amongst those least in favour, whereas in rural areas, the ratio is less than 3:2. We might hypothesize that in rural, underdeveloped areas, religious beliefs take a back seat to material realities, such as access to family planning or the economic benefits of larger families, in discriminating between the more and less fertile. In urban areas, where economic incentives for children are lower and costs higher while birth control technology is more widely available, it may be the case that values are a better discriminant of reproductive behaviour. Urban areas also tend to be seats of puritanical Islamic learning as against the more sufi, folk-based religion of the countryside. (Gellner 1981) Since the countryside is a repository of traditional (i.e. natalist) attitudes to fertility, but is weak in its Islamism, the only way we might spot an emerging relationship between Islamism and fertility is by restricting our gaze to urban areas. Such behaviour could encompass a range of issues, including the nature of appropriate gender roles, the decision to use contraception or other forms of family planning, and whether to have children for pronatalist religious reasons. Indeed, it is well-known that political Islam has drawn strength in urban areas like the Nile Delta in Egypt, and is associated with migration to the cities. (Munson 2001; Kepel 2002; Halliday 2000)
Figure 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Children Ever Born</th>
<th>Str. Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Str. Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City &gt; 100k</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town &lt; 10k</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 2796 respondents in towns under 10,000 and 1561 respondents in cities over 100,000. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.

WVS evidence for the seven countries where the question on Shari’a law was asked seems to support some findings of demographic and health surveys, but not others. For instance, while there seems to be a large fertility gap of some 1.5 children between those with less than secondary and those with greater than secondary education (supporting findings from health surveys), there remains a distinct relationship between support for Shari’a and higher fertility. This seems to hold for both the well-educated and poorly-educated strata of the population, as shown in figure 9.
In order to test these relationships more robustly, we employ a multilevel model of fertility based on the WVS.

**Data and Methods**

Data are drawn from the 1999-2000 waves of the World Values Survey (WVS). Aggregate data comes from World Bank Development Indicators for the relevant year, except for country religiosity which has been computed by taking the arithmetic mean of the individual responses to the WVS question 'are you a religious person' and
apportioning ‘not religious’ and ‘atheist’ responses into a nonreligious total. The WVS also asks a question on support for Shari’a law in a more restricted range of countries.

The multi-level logistic regressions use national-level data as level 2 regressors and WVS data as level 1 estimators. All analysis uses Stata 7.0. The regression sample only consists of women as is standard practice in demography. For previous tables, however, we have included males since male fertility is also of interest to us.

**Individual Variables, from the WVS:**

*Dependent:* **Children:** number of children ever born (resident or otherwise);

*Independents:*

**Marital Status:** married (1), living together as married (2), divorced (3), separated (4), widowed (5), single/never married (6), divorced, separated or widow (7)

**Age:** years;

**Income:** constant Year 2000 US$;

**Education:** highest level of education completed (8 levels arrayed ordinally);

**Shari’a:** ‘Now, what's your opinion about a good government? Which of the following characteristics a good government should have?’ A: 'It should only implement Shari’a's laws.' Strongly Agree (1), Agree (2), Neither (3), Disagree (4), Strongly disagree (5).

*Question asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.*

**Religious Belief:** Factor produced from five questions related to religious belief. See appendix 1 for details. *Question asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan,*
Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Iran, Morocco, Turkey, Uganda and Tanzania.

**Religiosity**: Are you a religious person? Yes (1), No (2), Committed Atheist (3). Question asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Iran, Morocco, Turkey, Uganda and Tanzania.

**Religiosity (Binary)**: Are you a religious person? Yes (1), No (0). No is a recoding of 'No' and 'Atheist'.

**Income category**: lowest to highest

**National Pride**: How Proud are you of your nation? Very Proud (1), Quite (2), Not Very (3), Not at all (4)

We begin our modelling by regressing individual female fertility on measures of religiosity, Shari’a support and the standard control variables listed above. Model 1 includes the Shari’a question (limited to six countries), and Model 2 only includes the religious traditionalism question (asked in thirteen countries) and so generates a sample almost twice as large. Yet the coefficients and their significance do not show major differences between the two models. The results, shown in table 2 show some expected findings, and some less expected.
Table 2. Regression Coefficients on Individual Fertility, Muslim Women in Islamic Countries, 1999-2000 WVS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>-.280***</td>
<td>-.265***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.080***</td>
<td>.079***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Religious Beliefs</td>
<td>.415***</td>
<td>.303***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shari’a Only</td>
<td>.086**</td>
<td>.303***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Education</td>
<td>-.183***</td>
<td>-.190***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Income</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>-.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Religiosity</td>
<td>-2.017***</td>
<td>-.871***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Secondary School Enrollment %</td>
<td>.019***</td>
<td>.017***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country GDP per capita</td>
<td>-2.222***</td>
<td>-1.524***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Population 65+</td>
<td>-.464***</td>
<td>-.596***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>1.910**</td>
<td>1.861***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.403</td>
<td>.432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2682</td>
<td>4828</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p <.01; ***p < .001

NB: Country Total Fertility Rate was dropped from the analysis due to problems with multicollinearity. Note that the question on Shari’a was only asked in six countries while that on religious belief was asked in thirteen countries. Its coefficient sign has been reversed here for easier interpretation. See methodology section for the list of countries.

Marital status and age are standard controls which show similar strong relationships to individual female fertility in all countries. Otherwise, education, at both the individual and country levels, has the strongest effect, along with the proportion of elderly people in a society (an indirect measure of a country's fertility and age structure). Higher GDP per capita is related to lower individual fertility. However, the story is not purely structural. We see, for example, that religious traditionalism (with respect to hell, heaven, sin, afterlife) and approval of Shari’a law are significant predictors of fertility.

Traditional religious belief shows a robust effect in these models, and support for

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8 Total fertility rate, by contrast, did not come up significant in this model, even with the variable for proportion aged over 65 removed.
Shari’a law - a measure of political Islamist attitudes - is also a significant predictor of fertility at the p<.01 level. Tests with religious attendance show no significant effects when a control for religious traditionalism remains, but attendance emerges as significant when belief is removed from the model. Questions which measure female respondents' view of whether nonreligious people are fit for public office or whether it is better for political leaders to be 'strongly religious' are also significantly correlated with fertility (though slightly more weakly than is true for the Shari’a question).

Few surveys which ask detailed questions on Muslim political attitudes include items on fertility. However, a recent survey of 18-25 year-olds in Egypt and Saudi Arabia asked respondents to specify whether they believe their countries would benefit from lower fertility. The survey also asked about political Islamist attitudes. Figures 10 and 11 below show that in the case of both support for Shari’a law and an Islamic government, Islamists are more likely to favour pronatalist policies than non-Islamist Muslims. For instance, those who feel that the government should implement Shari’a or that an Islamic government where the religious authorities have ‘absolute power’ is ‘very good’ only favour lower fertility by a 60:40 ratio, compared to 90:10 among those who view Shari’a as ‘less important’ or an Islamic government as ‘fairly bad’. These data do

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9 The question reads: ‘Think about what should change to make your country a better place to live, and please tell us if you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with the following. Saudi Arabia will be a better society: If the number of children born to families declined. 1) Agree strongly, 2) Agree, 3) Disagree, 4) Strongly disagree, 9) DK.’ (ARDA 2005 Codebook)

10 Now, I would like to know your views about a good government. Which of these traits should a good government have? It should implement only the laws of the Shari’a. 1) Very important, 2) Important, 3) Somewhat important, 4) Least important, 5) Not important, 9) NA.’ (ARDA 2005 Codebook)

11 I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having an Islamic government, where religious authorities have absolute power. 1) Very good, 2) Fairly good, 3) Fairly bad, 4) Very bad, 9) DK’. ’ (ARDA 2005 Codebook)

12 The data seem to show that extreme Islamo-skeptics are somewhat more supportive of pronatalism, but the numbers in these categories were so small as to render them unreliable.
not directly tap fertility behaviour, but are revealing in that 18-25 year-olds are likely to be at the beginning of their fertility odysseys and thus offer a potential glimpse of what the future may hold.

Figure 10.

Source: Calculated from Moaddel, Karabenick et al. 2005.
Evidently there is an association between conservative religious views and pronatalism among Muslim politicians and the public. This extends from thoughts to concrete behaviour, with Islamist Muslims maintaining significant higher fertility than other Muslims, especially in urban contexts. This is critical since second demographic transition theory predicts that value choice should bulk larger in the more modern setting of the city, where contraception is widely available and economic incentives would ordinarily incline people to choose smaller families. Urban populations of developing regions are expected to increase from 43 percent of the total today to 67 percent in 2050. (Goldstone 2009) In addition to assimilating rural Muslims into urban fundamentalism, this large-scale population flow will usher more of the Muslim world into the second demographic transition. Religion will become increasingly pivotal in determining fertility
outcomes, leading to fundamentalist growth, i.e. the demographic radicalization of Islamic societies. Secularism may also increase with urbanization, though there is little evidence of this to date. Regardless, the principal casualty of a more self-conscious Islamism experiencing a growing fertility premium will be moderate, ‘taken-for-granted’ Islam, which will begin to lose religious market share to fundamentalists, much as liberal Protestants or reform Jews have in the West.

Conservative Islam and Security

There is not space here to summarize the vast literature on conservative Islam and security other than to reiterate that, as with other faiths, Islamist militants are selective in their interpretation of their sacred texts: the Koran and hadith, not to mention sharia and Islamic history. While the resurgence of conservative Islam in the post-1967 period (manifested in the popularity of veiling and increased mosque-building) has been accompanied by a rise of Islamist terrorist groups, much of this movement has been peaceful. Secular violence in the Muslim world, associated with Marxist groups like the PLO, has subsided. Every decade since 1940, roughly twenty civil wars costing over 1000 deaths per year have flared, and there is little sign of a general increase. However, the religious proportion of these wars has increased, and, in turn, the Muslim slice of that religious violence has grown. Indeed, Islam is implicated in 81 percent of the 42 post-1940 civil conflicts involving religion, and 90 percent of the ten civil wars fought within a single religion. Yet just 14 percent of the world’s states are Muslim-dominated. Religious civil wars tend to be more intractable and ‘zero-sum’ in nature than other forms
of civil conflict, and in this sense, more prolonged. (Toft 2007) Islamic terrorists also virtually own the field of transnational religious terrorism.

Many have rightly emphasized the anti-western, quasi-nationalist nature of contemporary political Islam, which extends to the motivation of Islamist suicide bombers. (Zubaida 2004; Pape 2005) Even the doctrine of takfir (denoting Muslims who have strayed from the fundamentals of Islam) which militant Islamists have deployed to justify the killing of Muslim civilians, can be interpreted as an indirect attack on the West, and hence a species of nationalist ressentiment. (Appleby 2008) But this cannot deflect the fact that the bombers, radical clerics and planners are true believers who are willing to die or go to prison for their beliefs. Most Islamic fundamentalists are not violent, but all violent Islamists are fundamentalists. Given that all Islamist terrorists are literalist in their beliefs (albeit selective in their interpretation of their holy texts), it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the growth of religious fundamentalism in the Muslim world will prompt a rise in religious conflict and security threats. This may be counterbalanced by a decline in secular (i.e. Marxist, secular nationalist) sources of violence, but one could equally well imagine a more unstable, bloody security environment. In this sense, Islam’s demographic radicalization, which will increase the proportion of conservative Muslims as Muslim societies modernize, presents a challenge for long-term security in the Middle East, West Asia and beyond.
Conclusion

In the context of the second demographic transition, religious women tend to have more children than non-religious women. Conservative religious families are larger than theologically modernist families. Over several generations, this process can lead to significant social and political changes. Where this takes the form of a rising fundamentalist share of total population, and where this is likely to sacralise politics, introducing the potential for conflict, we may speak of a process of demographic radicalization. This is a medium and long-term phenomenon, but awareness of shifting population composition can lead to instability well before the full impact of demographic change takes place. This is clear in ethnically-tense societies like Israel, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Lebanon, Cote D’Ivoire or Assam.

We have shown that demographic radicalization is most advanced in Israel and the Jewish diaspora, where ultra-Orthodox Jews are poised to become a majority of the Jewish population soon after 2050. In the United States and Europe, fundamentalist Christians have markedly higher fertility than others, but this advantage is typically in the half-child range (roughly a 25 percent advantage) rather than the 100-200 percent fertility advantage enjoyed by the Haredim within global Jewry. Though immigration is another driver of fundamentalist Christian growth in Europe, its impact is as yet quite small. In North America, only small Anabaptist sects like the Hutterites, Amish and some Mennonites maintain a Haredi-like fertility premium. Mormons, a larger group, have intermediate fertility, and have now surpassed Jews among Americans born after 1945. We would therefore expect significant change only over generations, rather than within a
decade. In the Muslim world, Islamic fundamentalism is associated with urban centres of
learning, and hence remains as much a sign of modernity as a marker of traditionalism.
Even so, Islamism is associated with pronatalism, whether in the speeches of politicians
or the views of the masses. Among individuals – especially in urbanised, modern
contexts – Islamism predicts significantly higher fertility. As Muslim society urbanises,
we would expect Islamic fundamentalism to reap a demographic dividend as more
conservative individuals choose larger families. However, the magnitude of demographic
radicalization in the Muslim world seems more in keeping with the American and
European pattern than the Jewish one. This means that significant change will take half a
century, as opposed to the situation in Israel, where startling changes have occurred, and
will occur, within the span of a decade.

These shifts will make these societies more puritanical and less secular, but will
they lead to violence? This paper contends that religious fundamentalism tends to
polarise societies between an otherworldly pacifism and religiously-fuelled activism. In
Israel and its Jewish diaspora, the prevailing mood among the Haredim is quietist, but
there is an important minority of religious Zionists who have been responsible for a series
of Jewish terrorist attacks. In addition, Jewish nationalism has, like its Palestinian
counterpart, grown increasingly religious. In the United States, the overwhelming
majority of evangelicals incline toward individualism and cultural concerns, but a
minority bear millenarian views which undergird Christian Zionist intransigence and
unilateralism in foreign policy. A fringe also are implicated in anti-abortion violence.
Among fundamentalist Muslims, violent militancy is more developed than in Christianity
or Judaism, but demographic radicalization is less advanced. Overall, demographic
radicalization is likely to increase the risk of religious violence for the simple reason that even a small slice within a fundamentalist pie become larger as the pie grows. But this does not necessarily signify a more violent planet: secular forms of violence, be they Marxist or secular nationalist, may abate, reducing aggregate insecurity in the world. On the other hand, demographic radicalization within the Abrahamic faiths may be a prelude to a more violent phase of global politics in which religion plays a role unseen since the Treaty of Westphalia.

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