ETHNIC OR CIVIC NATION?: THEORIZING THE AMERICAN CASE

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ABSTRACT

The United States has often been viewed by ethnicity and nationalism scholars as the quintessential civic nation historically defined by its commitment to eighteenth century liberal ideology. This paper takes issue with such a perspective. Instead, the United States, for nearly its entire existence, is shown to be an ethnic nation characterized by non-conformist Protestantism and pre-Norman, Anglo-Saxon genealogy. This self-styled 'American' ethnie sought to reshape the nation in its own image and saw its destiny in Puritan, millennial terms. Faced with large flows of non-British immigrants, the 'Americans' employed techniques of Anglo-conformity in an attempt to transform the newcomers into 'WASP's. When this process was viewed as inadequate, movements of cultural nationalism and immigration restriction developed which resulted in the institution of a set of boundary-defending practices that began in the 1920's and continued into the 1960's. Developments in the 'West' have since ushered in the era of liberal civic nationhood in which the U.S. has participated. In this manner, America's shift from ethnic to civic nationalism is not exceptional, but instead reflects a broader value shift in Western culture.

Introduction

Imagine, my dear friend, if you can, a society formed of all the nations of the world...people having different languages, beliefs, opinions: in a word, a society without roots, without memories, without prejudices, without routines, without common ideas, without a national character, yet a hundred times happier than our own.¹

So wrote Alexis de Tocqueville to his French readers in his optimistic 1830's description of the new American republic. This exceptionalist view of the American nation has been uncritically accepted by most scholars (American or otherwise) ever since. Recent
examples include Seymour Martin Lipset ('The First New Nation'), Wilbur Zelinksy ('American nationalism has been international in character from the outset') and Liah Greenfeld ('the Ideal Nation').² Were these authors, Tocqueville among them, correct in viewing the United States as a cosmopolitan civilization based upon eighteenth century liberalism? This paper argues that they were not. It does so in two ways, both of which are unprecedented. First, it brings together the disparate historical literature on American Anglo-Saxonism and white Protestant 'nativism'. Second, it casts this material, which necessarily spans the history of the United States itself, within the theoretical purview of recent 'ethno-symbolic' theories of nationalism.

**Theoretical Orientation**

The first step towards understanding this paper's position requires a grasp of where the 'imagined community' of the United States ranks along the particularism-cosmopolitanism continuum.³ At the particularism pole lies the ethnic group, in which boundaries of territorial space (real or imagined) and shared ancestral roots in time are specified and marked off by symbolic 'border guards' like language, race or religion. Nations may be less particularistic in that they have definite spatial boundaries, but in contrast to ethnies need not specify genealogical boundaries. Nations lying closer to the particularism pole are called ethnic nations, whereas the more cosmopolitan are labeled civic nations.⁴

Moving toward the ethnie's polar opposite, we encounter cosmopolitanisms themselves, which are universal in territorial-ancestral scope. Some cosmopolitan movements, such as the environmental movement or Socialist International, may have little territorial or political cohesion. On the other hand, many cosmopolitanisms have been attached to territorial civilizations. Sometimes these are based on a shared culture and polity left over after the ethnic core has atrophied (i.e. Rome, Assyria) whereas others are based on a civil religion (i.e. Dar-ul-Islam, Christendom). The history of cosmopolitanism is one of finitude: all have ended up either fragmenting into constituent ethnic parts or forming new ethnies, as is the case with sects like the Druze.⁵ Based on this particularism-cosmopolitanism axis then, I will argue that by global standards, the United States was not only less than cosmopolitan, but was in fact an ethnic nation. It is
only very recently that it took on a more civic complexion, an act soon followed by other nations in the Western world.

With regard to ethnicity theory, the U.S. case should be framed within the broader ethnogenetic process. Typically, ethnies form either through *fission* from a parent stock: i.e. Ulster Protestants from Scots, Dutch from Greater Germans, Quebecois from French, Afrikaners from Dutch; or *fusion* with other ethnies or ethnic fragments: i.e. Mexican Mestizos from Aztecs and Spanish Creoles, English from Anglo-Saxons, Normans and Celtic Britons or Japanese from Chinese, Koreans and Southeast Asians. Fission and fusion are processes that create ethnies, but more often, as Barth points out, ethnic boundaries tend to remain relatively stable while population flows back and forth across the boundaries. During such a process, ethnies accrete new members to their core through assimilation. The Zulus, Greeks, Jews and Magyars are all good examples of ethnies that have absorbed newcomers arguably more numerous than the original core stock.

Given the foregoing, we can now specify the nature of American ethnicity: it emerged through ethnic fission from an English Protestant parent stock and, like most ethnies, followed the Barthian model and employed methods of dominant-conformity to accrete diverse immigrant populations to its ethnic core while maintaining its ethnic boundaries. What complicates this otherwise simple picture is a) the reflexivity of American society represented by its high standard of record-keeping and b) the nature of American liberalism, which occasionally presented itself in the form of cosmopolitan rhetoric.

The latter should not lead us to believe that Americans saw themselves as a Liberal Cosmopolitanism. On the contrary, for Americans, Liberalism was a symbolic border guard that actually reinforced their sense of particularity! The notion that a cosmopolitan idea can be used for particularistic purposes should not come as a surprise, for, as John Armstrong shows, ethnogenesis was nowhere more prevalent than along the medieval boundary between Christendom and Islam, two universal ideas that formed the boundary symbols that distinguish Christian ethnies like Croats and Spaniards from Islamic groups like the Bosnian Muslims and Berbers. In this respect, the American ethnie's Liberalism was a universalist idea that distinguished it from illiberal ethnies both on its southern and northern borders and in Europe.
Though the symbol of liberalism proved useful in reinforcing American ethnic particularism, one should not gloss over the underlying theoretical conflict between liberalism and ethnicity. There was this tension in American culture, one which gave serious consideration to both liberal principles and ethnic boundary defense and furiously tried to marry the two. This is borne out by a less selective analysis of the writings of those very authors most often used to provide examples of the cosmopolitanism of America. For instance, had exceptionalist scholars probed a little less selectively into Emerson's writing, they would find him torn between viewing nations as 'mobs' and asserting that:

> It ought to be written in a settled conviction....that all events proceed inevitably from peculiar qualities of the national character which are permanent or ever slowly modified from age to age.\(^{10}\)

Moreover, Emerson's famous assertion that the United States was 'the asylum of all nations...Irish, Germans, Swedes, Poles and Cossacks… Africans and Polynesians' must be balanced against his declaration, around the same time, that:

> It cannot be maintained by any candid person that the African race have ever occupied or do promise ever to occupy any very high place in the human family...The Irish cannot; the American Indian cannot; the Chinese cannot. Before the energy of the Caucasian race all other races have quailed and done obeisance.\(^{11}\)

Tocqueville's writing contained similar dualities, at once commenting on the cosmopolitan rootlessness of the United States while opining that:

> There is hardly an American to be met with who does not claim some remote kindred with the first founders of the colonies; and as for the scions of the noble families of England, America seemed to be me to be covered with them.\(^{12}\)
Tocqueville also repeatedly referred to the Americans as the 'English race in America' or the 'Anglo-Americans', indicating that he felt the three terms were basically interchangeable. It seems Tocqueville's cosmopolitan view of America was merely a rhetorical tool used only in his more futuristic moments. The same duality can be observed in the writings of Jefferson, Franklin, Hamilton and even Crèvecoeur and probably has its roots in the Old Testament. As Conor Cruise O'Brien notes, the bible's message at this point was largely particularist, as when it was written:

Now therefore, if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people: for all the earth is mine. And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation. (Exodus 19:5-6).

Yet despite the predominantly ethnic tone, the selective reader could tease out some universalist passages such as:

Know ye therefore that they which are of faith, the same are the children of Abraham. And the scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith, preached before the Gospel unto Abraham saying, In thee shall all nations be blessed. So then they which be of faith are blessed with faithful Abraham (Gal. 3:6-9).\textsuperscript{13}

In the Bible, as in the writing of many Americans, a predominantly ethnic message is in tension with the logical implications of an underlying universalist communal philosophy. Nevertheless, the cosmopolitan utterances should not be construed as representative of the temper of the times.

The Colonial Period

Just what was the temper of American nationality? David Hackett Fischer writes that the United States began as a collection of cultural regions based around core English settler ethnies. In New England, the Puritans were dominant, in the Middle Atlantic
States, it was the Quakers, in the Coastal South it was the South English Cavaliers and in the Appalachian hinterland, Anglo-Scottish Presbyterians predominated. The social characteristics of these founding groups are given in figure 1 below.

Figure 1. English Origins of American Cultural Regions in the Colonial Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Region of Origin</th>
<th>East Anglia</th>
<th>South and West</th>
<th>North Midlands</th>
<th>Anglo-Scottish Borderlands</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American destination</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>Delaware Valley</td>
<td>Backcountry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion of migrants</td>
<td>Congregational</td>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>Friends (Quaker)</td>
<td>Presbyterian and Anglican</td>
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<tr>
<td>Origin of immigrant elites</td>
<td>Puritan ministers and magistrates</td>
<td>Royalist younger sons of gentry and aristocracy</td>
<td>Quaker traders, artisans and farmers</td>
<td>Border gentry and statesmen</td>
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Most of this 'colonial stock' had arrived in the seventeenth century from Britain. Hence it is not surprising that the American white population on the eve of revolution was over 60 per cent English, nearly 80 per cent British and 98 per cent Protestant. Immigration usually did not make up more than 15-20 per cent of the colonies' white population growth. This was especially true in New England, which rigorously selected its immigrants in England. Colonial America, while relatively homogenous ethnically, did however embrace great sectarian diversity. Yet despite this diversity, a unifying characteristic of American Protestantism was its non-conformity: Quakers, Mennonites, Congregationalists, Huguenots and Baptists are conspicuous in this regard. Even the Anglicans, supposedly an established church, were far less hierarchically organized in the United States than in Britain: 'vestries performed many of the functions normally reserved in England for rectors or vicars; there was no Anglican bishop in the colonies, and rumors that one might be installed touched off a political storm in the 1760's.'
The four ethnic regions of Anglo-America were to gradually fade into purely cultural entities, with each region acting as a vehicle of assimilation, moulding successive waves of immigrants into a particular regional cultural pattern. This fading was accompanied by the rise of a New England-influenced American ethnicity. New England was special for several reasons, not the least of which was its Puritan sense of election which lent itself to nationalism. This had its start in the Old Country. For instance, Cromwell said of England that: 'If anyone whatsoever think the Interest of Christians and the Interest of the Nation inconsistent, I wish my soul may never enter into his or their secrets!' Later, in New England, the Puritans began to describe their new home as a New Canaan, or Promised Land. In the words of Increase Mather: 'Where was there ever a place so like unto new Jerusalem as New England hath been?' Added to this were the exhortations of the Puritans' first leader, John Winthrop, who uttered the famous words: 'We shall be as a City upon a Hill, the eyes of all people are upon us....we shall be made a story and a byword throughout the world.' The eschatology of the Puritans was clear. They were the elect that would lead an errand into the wilderness to erect a new Garden, a Shining City that would signal the arrival of the Millennium without a significant apocalypse.

The New Englanders' moralism, their optimism and their this-worldly vision formed the foundation of American national identity. As we shall see, the New Englanders' emphasis on purity was also of significance, especially with regard to American ethnicity. More generally, however, there occurred the spread of New England ideas, millennial and neoclassical, throughout the states. This movement included the South, something evident in the names of many Southern cities, among them Athens (Georgia), Augusta (Georgia) and Alexandria (Virginia).

The neoclassical movement was preceded by earlier forms of national integration, the first of which were Protestant revival movements. John Armstrong has noted that religion provided one of the few vehicles of mass communication in the pre-modern era and it was religion that was largely responsible for American national integration in the eighteenth century. The first such movement was the Great Awakening of 1725-50 led by, among others, Jonathan Edwards. This revival spread like wildfire across the colonies from New England to Georgia and is described by some as the first instance of American self-consciousness. Meanwhile, the increasingly vibrant intercolonial trade pattern
helped erode entrenched regional and state identities. Some evidence for this is provided by the eighteenth century standardization evident in the vernacular architecture of American farmers in both the North and the South.  

**The American Revolution**

Important as they are, none of the pre-Revolutionary integration movements could rival what followed in significance. The American Revolution of 1776-83 quite simply changed the terms of reference of the American colonists. The Revolution was an event born of both material and cultural parents. The British restrictions on American wool exports (1699), the American steel industry (1750) and the dynamic New England shipping industry were irritants, as were rising tax levels - used to pay the British soldiers whose job it was, among other things, to prevent the westward expansion of American settlement.

The latter policy (Proclamation Acts of 1763 and 1774) was particularly incendiary as it threw up barriers to what Americans perceived as their destiny of expanding westward their millennial state. The Proclamation Acts were seen as part of a British Grand Design that was rumoured to include the installation of an Anglican bishop and the eradication of American liberties. Fanned by protest literature like Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* and encouraged by British Whig intellectuals like Edmund Burke and Charles James Fox, members of the colonial Whig elite like Thomas Jefferson and George Washington became convinced of the need for independence, often just a year or two before the Revolution.  

The Revolution was by no means a clear-cut nationalist movement, but began as a civil war that split Whig and Tory in Britain, the United States and in what was to become Canada. In fact, in much of the Middle Atlantic and in parts of the South, Tories were a majority, but eventually, the Whig vision prevailed and the Revolution began to be woven into a new American ethno-history, in which a nation of small-farming Davids had vanquished the Imperial Goliath. For instance, a Russian observer noticed that every American home contained a likeness of Washington which was worshipped like Orthodox icons were in his homeland.
Meanwhile, chroniclers like Yale president Timothy Dwight, Jonathan Edwards' grandson, saw Washington as a latter-day Joshua leading his flock into the Promised Land:

The chief whose arm to Israel's chosen Band  
Gave the fair empire the Promised Land  
Ordain'd by Heaven to hold the sacred sway  
Demands my voice and animates my lay.26

Many scholars would concur with the view that an American sense of community arose, complete with its heroic mythology, but most would label this a civic national process rather than an ethnic one. Yet from the outset, the words and actions of Americans indicate that a growing sense of American ethnicity underpinned the civic rhetoric. This ethnicity grew out of a sense of isolation that Oscar Handlin calls 'the horror' of rootlessness brought on by the colonists' incessant migration and the ontological meaninglessness of living in alien surroundings.27 Anthony Smith sees this as a process of group psychology, in which a people seek to achieve a measure of this-worldly immortality through identification with a group rooted in land and kinship.28 The result is ethnogenesis.

One scholar who has studied the nature of this ethnic response in the United States is Rogers M. Smith, who has dubbed it 'Ascriptive Americanism.' Smith holds that many Americans were unaware of liberal rights theories, and were only persuaded to revolt by the religious and cultural arguments that designated them a chosen, white, Protestant people.29 As Armstrong and O'Brien have observed, a sense of election is a feature common to many ethnic groups, especially Protestant ones, and it appears that the Americans were no exception.30 It is also significant that a set of symbolic border guards (what Anthony Smith calls cultural markers) were being used to distinguish the 'Americans' from surrounding populations. The Americans were considered to be White, in contrast to the Natives and the black slaves, they were Protestant and English (in speech and surname), unlike the 'papist' French and Spanish to the south and west, and they were Liberal democrats, in contrast to the British, both at home and in the colonies to the north.
Of these WASP cultural markers, two have been gravely misunderstood. The first is Liberalism, which, as mentioned, was not an indicator of cosmopolitanism, but was itself a cultural marker that enhanced American ethnic particularity. A second item of controversy is the nature of American Englishness. For one thing, American English was a distinct dialect with its own unique inflection. More important than this feature however, was the myth of descent that it alluded to, along with the predominantly English cast of 'typical' American surnames.

The Anglo-Saxon myth

The American ethnie has always been closely tied to its Whig origins and the work of Whig historians helped to define the genealogy of the new Republic. The idea that the pre-Conquest Anglo-Saxons had known a primitive form of freedom that had its roots in the German forests had emerged in England by the sixteenth century. Some of the more radical variants of the theory held that the Anglo-Saxons carried a desire for freedom in their veins, and had a destiny to realize this impulse. John Wilkes and Edmund Burke, for instance, were well-known exponents of this notion, with Burke noting that an English continuity existed, "from Magna Carta to the Declaration of Right…derived to us from our forefathers…" These ideas found a very fertile audience across the Atlantic. Eighteenth century 'Real Whig' historians like James Burgh and Catherine Macaulay stand out in this regard. These interpreters of English history witnessed their work go directly into the American independence movement. In Reginald Horsman's words,

The various ingredients in the myth of Anglo-Saxon England, clearly delineated in a host of seventeenth and eighteenth-century works, now appear again in American protests: Josiah Quincy Jr., wrote of the popular nature of the Anglo-Saxon militia; Sam Adams stressed the old English freedoms defended in the Magna Carta; Benjamin Franklin stressed the freedom that the Anglo-Saxons enjoyed in emigrating to England; Charles Carroll depicted Saxon liberties torn away by William the Conqueror; Richard Bland argued that the
English Constitution and Parliament stemmed from the Anglo-Saxon period....George Washington admired the pro-Saxon history of Catherine Macaulay and she visited him at Mount Vernon after the Revolution.34

Were these prominent Americans merely expressing an abstract ideological exuberance which happened to have an English historical referent? Greenfeld appears to take this stance, arguing that Americans equated Englishness with Liberalism and no more.35 Yet such an argument cannot explain the infatuation with the Anglo-Saxons displayed by the statesmen of the new Republic. More explicit in this regard was U.S. president and founding father Thomas Jefferson, who proclaimed to John Adams after drafting the constitution in 1776 that the Americans were 'the children of Israel in the wilderness, led by a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night; and on the other side, Hengist and Horsa, the Saxon chiefs from whom we claim the honour of being descended, and whose political principles and form of government we have assumed.' 36

Notice that Jefferson has distinguished between the Americans' ideological and genealogical inheritance, both of which he sees as deriving from the Anglo-Saxons. The idea that the Anglo-Saxon English had self-selected themselves through immigration to escape the British (Norman) yoke and bring the torch of freedom to America was a quintessential myth of ethnogenesis.37 Accompanying purified religion and purified liberty therefore, was a purified American genealogy. In this manner, one similar to the Quebecois, Afrikaners and Ulster Protestants, the Americans were performing a feat of particularistic fission from the mother stock which would form the basis for an entirely new ethnic group.

When is the Ethnie?

The Anglo-Saxon myth, meanwhile, was grafted onto American experience. For instance, the New England town meeting was likened to the Anglo-Saxon tribal council and the statements of Tacitus regarding the free, egalitarian qualities of the Anglo-Saxons he encountered were given American interpretation.38 The most widely-read American historians of the late nineteenth century: George Bancroft, William Prescott, John Motley and Francis Parkman, helped popularize the myth as did academics in University English
literature departments. Nineteenth and early twentieth century utterances from American elites like Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson provide further evidence that the Anglo-Saxon myth was a historicist force in the American conscience collective. Roosevelt, for example, explicitly stated in the introductory pages of *Winning of the West* (1889) that: 'The fathers followed Boon[e] or fought at King's Mountain; the sons marched south with Jackson to overcome the Creeks and beat back the British; the grandsons died at the Alamo or charged to victory at San Jacinto. They were doing their share of a work that began with the conquest of Britain, that entered on its second and wider period after the defeat of the Spanish Armada, that culminated in the marvelous growth of the United States. The winning of the West and Southwest is a stage in the conquest of a continent.'

What is less clear is the extent to which the Anglo-Saxon myth penetrated down the social scale. This is a similar question to that posed by Eugen Weber in *Peasants Into Frenchmen* with regard to the French nation: what proportion of the population must hold a particular myth of descent for a category of persons to be considered ethnic, and how similar must the various versions of the ancestry myth be? In the American case, while it is not yet known whether a majority were aware of the Whig formulation of the Anglo-Saxon myth, unless totally isolated from non-WASPs, they were conscious of their WASP cultural markers (White race, 'Anglo-Saxon' in speech and surname, Protestant in religion) and understood themselves to be 'Anglo-Saxon'. Furthermore, the Yeoman representation, which was strongly connected with Anglo-Saxonism, definitely had popular resonance, and has been described as 'the myth of mid-nineteenth century America'.

Finally, many Anglo-Americans were conscious of their descent from the various Anglo-American regional groups. Hence we cannot consider the ethnic Americans to be a merely etic (other-defined) category like the eighteenth century inhabitants of Ukraine and Slovakia. Rather, this was a self-conscious population integrated to the level of an ethnic category with an Anglo-Saxon myth of descent well-developed at the elite level.
Anglo-Conformity

The process of ethnic assimilation that Barth claims has helped maintain ethnic boundaries throughout history had an early start in the United States. An American, Milton Gordon, was perhaps the most clear exponent of this process. From American experience, he formulated three models of interethnic relations: Anglo-Conformity, the Melting Pot and Cultural Pluralism. Anglo-Conformity describes a situation of dominant conformity in which alien populations are transformed into members of the host ethnie, as occurred after 987 in France or after 1778 in Hungary. The Melting Pot involves a process of ethnic fusion in which the host population forms but one element of an emergent ethnie-akin to what occurred in post-1917 Mexico or post-1066 England. Finally, the Cultural Pluralist model implies the existence of the kind of multi-ethnic patchwork that held sway in, for example, the Ottoman Empire or Swiss Confederation. Which model best described the United States? According to both Gordon and Will Herberg, inter-ethnic relations followed a pattern of Anglo-Conformity. Immigrants were to be made into Americans (WASPs) by absorbing American English, American Liberty, American Protestantism and, ultimately, by intermarrying with Americans.

This Anglo-Conformity had its roots in the pre-Revolutionary era with the Society for Propagating Christian Knowledge among Germans. Founded in the mid-eighteenth century by Benjamin Franklin and Anglican minister William Smith, the society pursued what it called the 'anglicization' of Pennsylvania's large German population. After the revolution, attempts to have federal laws printed in German (1796) and to gain official status for German in schools and courts (1837) were rebuffed. The result was a gradual assimilation of Pennsylvania's German population. This was especially pronounced among the Mennonites, whose close theological affiliation with the Quakers rapidly created an 'extended cousinage' among the different ethnies of eastern Pennsylvania. Other groups to undergo assimilation included the Welsh and Scots, whose languages were all but dead in America by the early nineteenth century, as well as the Huguenots, who in the nineteenth century disappeared entirely.

More important still was the WASP form to which these non-English groups were assimilating. In addition to adopting the American English language and the American belief in liberty, they even began to alter their surnames. Among Pennsylvania Germans,
for example, Zimmermann became Carpenter and Rittinghuysen was changed to Rittenhouse while among the Huguenots, revolutionary Paul Revere's surname reflects a change from the French Rivoire while John Greenleaf Whittier's mother's family had originally been called Feuillevert. All of these developments led Americans like John Jay and Jedediah Morse to consider their people 'essentially English' in ancestry in the same way outsiders like Tocqueville did.

A halt in immigration also contributed to the assimilation process. The War of Independence, for instance, brought immigration to the colonies to a virtual standstill and during the 1793-1814 period, only three thousand immigrants arrived per year. This hiatus created the conditions in which the various ethnic groups in the new country drew closer together and lost their differences. As Burkey puts it, 'although pockets of European ethnicity still remained, by 1820 the great majority of the citizens of the new country were subscribing to a new ethnicity-American; only the racial groups were excluded from membership.'51 Since the racial groups were not entitled to participate in civic affairs they cannot be considered part of the American nation and, therefore, the Americans at this point must be considered one of the world's first ethnic nations.52

The years that followed the revolution ushered in new forms of national integration that further unified the American ethnie. We have already noted how neoclassicism swept the nation in the early years of the nineteenth century. This was accompanied by a second Great Awakening (The Great Revival) that took place during the 1780-1830 period which encompassed much larger numbers than the first Revival and, due to its revolutionary timing, had a more pronounced nationalist tinge to it, fusing Christian and romantic imagery. At the time, American ethnic nationalism was expansionist and optimistic, viewing its successful colonization of Texas (1836-45) and defeat of Mexico (1846-8) as evidence of an ethnic teleology.53

Though some southern writers tried to redefine their region's ethnicity as variously Norman or Celtic after 1850, they ultimately failed because the term 'Anglo-Saxon' had already became synonymous with 'American' throughout the nation.54 Tocqueville's observation that Americans from various states knew their entire nation better than any French provincial and were rapidly assimilating to a common type was confirmed in the ancestry of the nation's presidents. Prior to 1856, all but one were of
single ethno-regional origin. After that date, presidents like James Buchanan could trace their bloodlines to two or even three of the four English American founding groups.55

**Romantic Nationalism in the United States**

'When we see, among the happiest people in the world, groups of peasants directing affairs of state under an oak, and always acting wisely, can we help but despise the refinements of those nations which render themselves illustrious and miserable by so much art and mystery'?56 With characteristic aplomb, Jean-Jacques Rousseau expressed the *zeitgeist* of a new cultural movement known as romanticism which took root in eighteenth century Europe and proved especially influential in the following century. Based on the idea of raw nature as the source of power and wisdom, it carried within it a critique of rational, civilized modernity.

In Germany, romantic scholars like Herder, Hegel or Fichte developed the idea that nations are organic outgrowths of nature whose natural destiny is to express themselves through independent statehood.57 This led intellectuals to espouse a similar vision in other countries, hence 'the romantic vision of the scholar-intellectual, redefining the [ethnic] community as a 'nation' whose keys are unlocked by the 'scientific' disciplines of archaeology, history, philology, anthropology and sociology...disciplines that aptly express the spirit of the new *Gesellschaften*.'58

Scholars in America, like their European counterparts, participated in these romantic nationalist activities. Earlier, we described the romantic American interest in Anglo-Saxon liberties, an interest which pre-dated the Revolutionary era. This line of thinking had inspired Jefferson to tell English radical John Cartwright 'that he hoped Virginia would divide its counties into wards of six miles square, for these 'would answer to the hundreds of your Saxon Alfred.' In each of these wards Jefferson wanted an elementary school, a militia company, a justice of the peace, a constable, responsibility for the poor and roads, local police, an election of jurors, and a "folk house" for elections.'59 Jefferson's vision glorified the Yeoman, or independent farmer, as the cornerstone of the Republic, and he believed that the nation gained strength from the Yeoman's contact with nature.
In the early nineteenth century, American romantics embraced Jefferson's vision, but also endorsed a bombastic, expansionist Americanism, exemplified by the view that the American continent was to be settled by the surging energy of the 'primeval' Anglo-Saxon race. Walt Whitman captured this spirit of ethnic chauvinism well when he exclaimed: 'What has miserable inefficient Mexico...to do...with the mission of peopling the New World with a noble race?'

Whitman's interest in Anglo-Saxon philology, part of a widespread literary movement in the 1850's known variously as Gothicism or Anglo-Saxonism, can be explained as another instance of romantic thinking, but it manifests a more introspective nature. This *hubris* also infused the myth of the Yeoman Republic, which appeared jeopardized for the first time and gave rise to a nostalgic response. Hence the Gothicism of Whitman, Poe, Emerson and others was characterized, in the 1850's, by a nostalgic sensibility that scorned the expansionist, utilitarian industrialism of the new America. Washington Irving's *Rip Van Winkle* (1819) and Nathaniel Hawthorne's *Ambitious Guest* (1835) provide early examples of this thinking. In both cases, there is a lament that the acquisitive attitude of the Yankee has left him blind to nature's more sublime virtues. In a similar vein, in *Among the Hills* (1869), John Greenleaf Whittier wrote:

> Our yeoman should be equal to his home,  
> Set in the fair, green valleys, purple walled,  
> A man to match his mountains, not to creep,  
> Dwarfed and abased below them.

In the minds of romantic nationalists, the new economy, which increasingly bound farmers to agents from urban centres, was seen to undermine their independence, and, by extension, that of the Yeoman Republic. Cities were viewed as sinful and nature, once scorned as a source of depravity and treated in utilitarian terms, came to be lauded as a regenerative force for the nation. This sentiment clearly animated Boston reformer-socialist Wendell Phillips, who in the 1860's proclaimed that: 'My idea of a civilization is a very high one, but the approach to it is a New England town of some two thousand inhabitants, with no rich man and no poor man in it; all mingling in the same society...That's New England as it was fifty years ago....[The] civilization that lingers
beautifully on the hillsides of New England, nestles sweetly in the valleys of Vermont, the moment it approaches a crowd like Boston, or a million men gathered in one place like New York, it rots.65

**The Republican Golden Age**

The theme of the Golden Age has been arguably a universal among nations and ethnic groups since Hesiod first introduced the concept. It represents an idealized period in the past when the collective was seen to be united and heroic. Typically, the romantic nationalist views the present as an age of decline and seeks to use the myth of an idealized past to revive the virtues which were seen to characterize the national ethnic group during its Golden Age.66 The nostalgia that pervaded the writing of many mid-nineteenth century Americans may thus be considered a form of romantic yearning for a purer, more 'natural' Golden Age Republic. It was this nostalgia which eventually fired the ethnic nationalist phenomenon known as nativism which proved so potent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

**'American' Ethnicity Defined**

The Anglo-American myth-symbol complex that had arisen by 1820 and had spread widely by 1850 can be summarized as follows. The 'Americans' believed that:

- They were an elect having a covenant with God to spread Liberalism and Protestant Christianity throughout America and the Western Hemisphere, an event that would herald the millennium on earth;
- They were destined to spread across the West to the Pacific (at the very least), and theirs was a chosen land, a New Israel which at the same time served to regenerate the freedom of the American people;
- Their material and political success showed them to be a chosen people, an elect descended from the pre-Norman, freedom-loving Anglo-Saxons described by Tacitus;
- They knew themselves by the cultural markers of White race, [American] English language/surname, non-conformist Protestant religion and Liberal ideology;
• Their founding fathers included the Puritans and the leaders of the American Revolution. Virtually all the main figures in this ethno-history (i.e. John Winthrop, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson) were of English Protestant origin;
• They were an egalitarian, independent, self-improving Yeoman people: a grassroots pioneer constituency from which organically flowed the American spirit of democracy and pure Christian morality;
• The era of the Yeoman Republic described by Jefferson in an allusion to both the Bible and King Alfred's Anglo-Saxons, constituted a Golden Age for America, to which it should return.

The Protestant Crusade: Responding to Catholic Immigration

The American immigration lull of 1776-1815 was followed by a period of rapidly rising immigration, a flow which was increasingly Catholic in nature, reflecting its origins in Ireland and the German states. As figure 2 shows, immigration began to pick up substantially after the War of 1812, increasing the proportion of population growth attributable to immigration from 3 per cent in 1810 to over 30 per cent in 1851.

Figure 2. Immigration as a Proportion of Population Growth, 1810-1861

Source: (Easterlin, Immigration, p. 2)
More important, British immigration to the United States was running at a mere 20 per cent of the total, substantially less than the numbers arriving from Ireland and Germany. For the first time in its history, most of the immigrants to the Protestant United States were now Catholic. (See figure 3)

**Figure 3. Sources of Immigration to the U.S., 1821-91**

![Graph showing sources of immigration to the U.S., 1821-1891. The graph indicates that British (GB) immigration declined over time, Irish (Ire) immigration peaked in the 1840s and then declined, and German (Ger) immigration increased by the 1880s.](image)

Source: (Easterlin, *Immigration*, p. 2)

Generally speaking, Irish immigrants were attracted to the industrial cities of the north and Germans to the agricultural communities of the Midwest. The concentration of the Irish Catholics in cities like Boston and New York made them more visible to the Anglo-American population than the more scattered Germans. For instance, by 1844, Boston was 25 per cent Irish and by 1853 it was 40 per cent Irish and over 50 per cent foreign white. All this in the city that housed the Puritan elite that saw America in its own image.

Native-born reaction began almost immediately, especially in Boston, New York and Philadelphia. Religious commentators like Lyman Beecher warned that the new immigrants were instruments of papal design and had to be converted immediately by the growing American public school system. The 1830's was also a time for the growth of an anti-Catholic press, beginning with the *New York Protestant*. Meanwhile, popular discontent with Catholic immigrants was given a more sinister twist, with church-burning, looting and mob violence against Catholic priests becoming endemic in several northeastern cities. As Catholics increased from 3 per cent to 7 per cent of the nation's
population, the fervour of the anti-Catholic response increased. Books outlining the evils of Catholicism like Maria Monk's *Awful Disclosures* became huge sellers, mobilizing hundreds of thousands of readers. The decade of the 1840's bore witness to a veritable No-Popery industry, carried through pulpit and penny press alike.68

These currents in American civil society formed what John Hutchinson would describe as a movement of cultural nationalism, a development which gave birth to the more political Know-Nothing movement.69 The Know-Nothings, so called because of their secretive ways, developed out of a series of 1840's political parties, the earliest of which were the American Republicans, who enjoyed instant success in the 1844 Congressional elections where they fielded candidates. Patriotic organizations like the Order of United Americans were also influential in the Know-Nothing movement and, by 1854, the American Party (Know-Nothing party) had united its disparate local movements into a national organization.

In the spring elections of that year, the Know-Nothing Party tore a path through the existing political landscape. As Billington writes, 'The result was phenomenal. Whole tickets not even on the ballots were carried into office. Men who were unopposed for election and who had been conceded victory found themselves defeated by some unknown Know-Nothing.'70 The Know-Nothings had won Massachusetts and Delaware, polled well throughout the Northeast and even did well in parts of the south. In areas where immigrants had settled, the party was especially strong. For instance, in Massachusetts, all but one of the 377 representatives were Know-Nothings. Many other New England state legislatures showed similar tendencies.

The Know-Nothing's legislative goals were to 1) prevent Catholics from running for public office, 2) restrict the franchise to those who could read and write English, 3) impose a 21-year residency requirement for voters and 4) implement a 21-year probationary period for immigrants.71 The goal of the Know-Nothings was to protect the Protestant marker of American ethnicity, a sentiment best expressed by an essayist in a Know-Nothing journal who wrote that 'the grand work of the American Party is the principle of nationality...we must do something to protect and vindicate it. If we do not it will be destroyed.'72 In the mid-1850's, even Catholic newspapers agreed that a Know-
Nothing president was an inevitability. It took the intervention of a great regional issue, slavery, to divide the Know-Nothings and their electorate, destroying the party. Nevertheless, the American Party still polled 25 per cent of the popular vote in the 1856 elections, indicating that the reservoir of Know-Nothing sentiment remained deep.

**The Age of Populism: Ethnic Defense After the Civil War**

The Civil War of 1860-65 distracted the old forces of Anglo-American ethnic defense. However, with war's end, these forces began to regroup under the aegis of Populism. Populism was a grassroots movement that consisted of two discrete sections of the national population. The elite was made up of intellectuals and political figures from old, mostly New England patrician families known as 'Mugwumps' in the American literature. They held to a Jeffersonian view of America and were especially strong in the Boston area, the intellectual hub of the Republic and home to the 'Brahmin' cultural elite. Also in the vanguard of ethnic defense were Protestant clergymen, upset at their declining influence over an increasingly secular, industrialized society.73

The counterpart to the Mugwumps and their clerical comrades-in-arms were the rural masses. An examination of American demographics in 1890 illustrates why ethnic defense took on such a populist tone. In that year, three in four native whites lived in rural areas and just 8 per cent were in cities of more than 100,000 people. By contrast, 58 per cent of the foreign white stock was urbanized and fully one-third lived in cities over 100,000 in population.74 The growth in the foreign stock after 1890 was matched by a growing diversity of immigration sources. Increasingly, southern and eastern Europeans were replacing the more assimilable Germans, Irish and Britons in the migration flow. Thus increased urbanization (figure 4) occurred in tandem with a declining British Protestant population (figure 5), elements of cultural change that added fuel to the Populist fire.
Figure 4. Urbanization in America: 1790-1950


Figure 5. Proportion of the U.S. White Population of British Protestant Descent

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Reaction by rural, native-born, Protestant America against its foreign, urban 'other' began in the 1860's with the formation of the Patrons of Husbandry, known as the Grange. The movement began in New York in 1868 and spread through other states. By 1874, it had 300 branches in New York state alone. The Grange identified farmers as the 'caretakers of the Republic' and equated capitalists and urbanites with corruption and impurity. As member W.McArthur expressed it:

A new world is awakening to life in the realms of the Anglo-Saxon people. This world is the farming class, and it is organizing as the Grange. It is gentle, conservative and peaceful. And, perhaps, it is the harbinger of the golden future, which, ever and anon through the ages, has risen before the vision of the bards and prophets, of whom, verily, the world has not been worthy. This future is not a mere Utopia. The time of peace and happiness, symbolized by beating swords and spears into plowshares and pruning-hooks, will yet dawn upon this strife-cursed and blood-stained world.76

On the east coast, meanwhile, Boston 'Brahmin' writers joined in the romanticist attack. James Russell Lowell and Charles Eliot Norton were especially prominent in this regard, with Lowell recalling the days when Cambridge (Mass.) had been 'essentially an English village' and Norton celebrating the fact that his Ashfield (Mass.) retreat was a town that contained 'but one Irish family' and was thereby a more suitable place to 'write Massachusetts idylls or a New England "Arcadia".'77

The list of other Brahmins opposing the new America included prominent figures such as writer-historian Francis Parkman, M.I.T. president Francis Walker and Harvard professor Henry Adams. Adams had even conducted a special seminar in Anglo-Saxon studies during 1873-74 and later funded a doctoral seminar on this subject with his own money, taking up a tradition established by Thomas Jefferson at the University of Virginia earlier in the century. Adams' work was copied by others, like Herbert Baxter Adams of Johns Hopkins, and was eagerly received by his Harvard students, including Henry Cabot Lodge.78 Among these Mugwumps' clerical counterparts, midwestern preacher Josiah Strong was the most visible, with his 1885 *Our Country* racking up sales of 175,000 by 1916.79 *Our Country* was but one of the tracts warning Americans that they
would be overwhelmed by foreign immigrants as the Romans were by the Goths and Vandals. Another was W.F. Phelps’ periodical, *The Menace*, which had a massive circulation of 15 million in 1915.  

Jack London’s *Valley of the Moon* (1913) provides an example of ethnic nationalism in the literary field. In this novel, a lead character called Saxon Brown engages in a nostalgic lament for the passing of a nation built upon the ‘folk migrations’ of her self-sufficient, pioneering Yankee ancestors. In the novel, London follows in the footsteps of Hawthorne, Cooper, Bryant and Whitman, ushering in a second American Golden Age: the nineteenth century era prior to the closing of the frontier and the rise of urban, immigrant America.

As in the Know-Nothing period, the Populist era was one in which currents of cultural nationalism took on a political bent. The cultural currents were embodied in patriotic organizations like the American Protective Association, which counted a million members by the 1890's. These nationalist sentiments began to find a political outlet in the 1880's with support from the agrarian Grange and Alliance movements. By 1892, the People's Party (Populist Party), drawing on Alliance and Grange support, had mounted a third-party challenge, gaining 8.5 per cent of the vote and by 1896, Populists had won over leadership of the Democratic party, fielding William Jennings Bryan as their candidate. In his famous Cross of Gold speech, Bryan castigated urban America: 'The great cities rest on broad and fertile prairies...Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and your cities will spring up again as if by magic; but destroy our farms, and the grass will grow in the streets of every city in the country.'

Though not primarily concerned with ethnic defense, the Populists and their Progressive successors of 1900-1914 did have this (nativist) plank in their platform, something reflected in the native-born, Protestant background of almost all of 260 Progressive leaders surveyed by Alfred Chandler. Bryan's bid for the presidency ultimately failed on economic grounds, but others emerged to take up the torch of Anglo-American Populism.

The Ku Klux Klan of the 1920's, for instance, had called Bryan the 'greatest Klansman of our time' in reference to his vision of America. The Klan had re-emerged in 1915 in the South, but quickly moved away from its southern, anti-federal, racist roots and took on ethnic nationalist form. Downplaying the importance of Caucasian unity and
Southern regionalism and stressing the Anglo-Saxon-American axis, the Klan rode a wave of popularity that shifted its power base out of the south and into white, rural Protestant states like Indiana, Colorado and Oregon. In its direct dealings, the Klan concerned itself less with local immigrants and blacks, of which there were usually few, and more with broader national themes. The strength of the Klan movement in the 20's was demonstrated by the case of Indiana, in which over a quarter of the state's white men were Klan members. As Leonard Moore explains it:

The main stimulus to the Klan movement had been the deterioration of a sense of cohesion, order and shared power in community life, a process in which Indiana's ethnic minorities played only a small role. It reached its highest levels of membership in the regions of Indiana where economic growth had done the most to alter the traditional sense of community...the most popular Klan activities were those which engendered a sense of community, which drew together disparate social groups through a powerful appeal to white Protestant ethnic identity. These comprised not only the massive demonstrations, picnics and parades, and the well-supported efforts for civic improvements; they also included political campaigns which injected a potent and unique burst of populism into community politics.

Americanization Movements

One consequence of old stock alienation was a heightened emphasis on Anglo-conformist acculturation, with Anglo-Saxon nationalism taking the form of Americanization programs designed to impart liberal, Protestant values and American English culture to the newcomers. In the nineteenth century, great stress was laid upon Protestant education, with separate schools vigorously opposed. For example, in St. Louis in 1864, German language instruction was allowed, but Catholic education was not. The Anglo-Conformist process had been viewed by many as a success in the nineteenth century, with one 1920's writer commenting that few of native stock knew what proportion of their blood was English, Scotch, Irish, Dutch or German.
Despite such evidence of harmonious assimilation, twentieth century immigrants were viewed as a more difficult problem, causing Americanization to reach a crescendo in the 1910's and 20's as wartime hysteria and anti-immigrant populism reached panic levels. '100 per cent Americanism' became the slogan, and was exemplified by such absurdities as the 'America First' campaign of the Bureau of Education, the Committee of One Hundred of the National Education Association or the Conference on Methods of Americanization held in Washington.

The theme had the full force of presidential backing, with Woodrow Wilson telling some newly naturalized citizens that ethnic identity was not compatible with being a 'thorough American.' Theodore Roosevelt's view of the matter exemplified the Anglo-conformist process. In his words: 'the representatives of many old-world races are being fused together into a new type,' a type which 'was shaped from 1776 to 1789, and our nationality was definitely fixed in all its essentials by the men of Washington's day.'

**Reinterpreting the Anglo-Saxon Myth**

In addition to trying to accrete newcomers into their WASP core, old stock Americans made attempts to reinterpret their ethnic myths of descent to explain the immigration process. In the nineteenth century, for example, there was a widespread belief among American intellectuals that their Anglo-Saxon blood and American environment biologically altered the foreigner, making him an Anglo-Saxon. Other thinkers reflected the thought pattern of generations of writers who held contradictory visions of America. For example, Emerson simultaneously called the United States 'the asylum of all nations' while remarking that:

The inhabitants of the United States, especially of the Northern portion, are descended from the people of England and have inherited the traits of their national character...It has been thought by some observers acquainted with the character of both nations that the American character is only the English character exaggerated.
These ideas were reconciled by what Emerson called 'double consciousness', a dualist state of mind that allowed both liberal cosmopolitanism and ethnicity to exist in the same space, a phenomenon which John Higham ascribes to the optimistic temper of the age. With the passing of the nineteenth century, such optimism drained away and writers became ever more convinced that the foreign-born were displacing the natives instead of invigorating them. Greater numbers of American intellectuals were losing faith in the assimilating powers of their Anglo-Saxon ethnicity and the groundswell of Populist agitation that had been building since the civil war eventually made its way into a political movement for immigration restriction. Here can be seen the effect that rapid, diverse immigration had in exposing the contradiction between American ethnicity and American liberalism. From this point in the late nineteenth century, the instability inherent in the liberal American ethnic would be exposed and would force Americans to choose between a liberal, cosmopolitan future and an ethnic, Anglo-American one. In the early twentieth century, the decision in favour of the latter would be made—a decision which was not even close.

**The Restrictionist Movement**

Intellectually, the connection between American dominant ethnicity and immigration restriction runs through Thomas Jefferson, who helped inaugurate the study of Anglo-Saxon at the University of Virginia in the early nineteenth century, to Henry Adams, who instituted a program in Anglo-Saxon studies at Harvard in the 1870's, and finally to Adams' student, Henry Cabot Lodge, who helped defend the Anglo-Saxon character of America on the floor of the U.S. Senate and led the movement toward ethnic quotas in U.S. immigration policy.

At the mass level, while no polls were conducted on the subject until 1937, if editorial opinion is any indication, immigration had never been popular. Its principal backers were large businesses who wished to maintain low wage levels in their factories. Unopposed in the nineteenth century, this business lobby came under attack by both patriotic organizations and organized labour in the early twentieth.
The opposition from organized labour was based on economic considerations but the force behind the patriotic organizations was ethnic defense. The first patriotic societies had emerged during the Know-Nothing Era. After the Civil War, they multiplied, the most noteworthy being the Grand Army of the Republic, formed by Union officers in 1866, the Sons of the American Revolution (1876) and the Daughters of the American Revolution (1890). The latter were initially composed of members of Revolutionary families and spearheaded campaigns of historical preservation, Americanization and immigration restriction. As a united front, the coalition of patriotic societies played a role in pressuring the government to bar Oriental immigrants (in Acts of 1904 and 1907) and by 1921, President Harding had signed America's first ever law restricting European immigration. This law decreed that European immigration would be based on a three per cent quota allocated to each nation based on their share of the 1910 immigrant population.

Since the 1910 immigrant population was considerably less WASP than the U.S. population stock, the patriotic societies continued to push for more exclusive measures. This pressure led to the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 which initially based the immigration quotas on the 1890 immigrant stock. The bill passed overwhelmingly, 323 to 71 in the house and 62 to 6 in the Senate. Interestingly, the 1924 Act did not satisfy the patriotic societies, who wanted the bill based on the existing U.S. population so as to give the British a larger share of the total inflow. By 1929, their pressure had triumphed and a more exclusive national origins principle went into effect, its aim being to freeze the ethnic composition of the national population.

Post-1920's Hegemony

After the flurry of legislative activity in the 1920's, the U.S. settled into a phase of stable, Anglo-Saxon hegemony in which immigration control and Anglo-conformity were institutionalized. In the immigration restrictionist arena, the national origins principle was maintained, though the executive would periodically attempt to gain exemption from the quotas for designated groups. The upshot of national origins legislation was that the proportion of southern and eastern European immigrants dropped from almost 80 per cent to barely 20 per cent in the three decades after 1920 and the 1952
McCarran-Walter Act reaffirmed its commitment to national origins legislation, castigating the failure of the law to achieve a complete freeze on ethnic change.99 This sentiment was expressed even by the framers of the new 1965 Immigration Act (which abolished national origins). For instance, sponsor Robert Kennedy assured his congressional audience that no great changes would take place in the nation's ethnic composition as a consequence of his bill and family-sponsorship provisions were drafted to privilege established groups.100 In terms of Anglo-Conformity, the same attitudes operating to maintain immigration restriction prevailed. Americans' national mood reflected the sense of stable Anglo hegemony that the 1924 Act and years of low immigration had ensured. As Nathan Glazer put it:

In the later '20's the Quota Act took its toll, then the depression began and nobody wanted to come, so for a long time American public opinion lived in the consciousness and expectation that America was completed...No one expected that America would again become an immigrant society.101

The 1930's was also a period of tremendous 'regionalist' cultural revival, with American intellectuals and reformers looking to the golden age of the Anglo-Saxon Yeoman 'folk' for inspiration. Proud dust-bowl southerners en route to California and honest rural Yankees taking on corrupt urbanites were common cultural themes as urbanization and industrial collapse cast a pall over the nation.102

The ethnic, Anglo-Saxon dimension came out even more clearly in the focus on the Southern Appalachian region as an authentic 'American' heartland. This region was romanticized because it appeared to embody the virtues of the old America: classless, rural and, most important, homogeneously 'old American' in ancestry. Originating with the efforts of Protestant 'Settlement Movement' reformers, an entire Southern Appalachian industry developed in the 30's that included annual folk festivals, regional art revivals, home furnishing publications and radio shows.

Emerging from this cultural revival in the early 40's were some of the first self-consciously American cultural styles. One example was bluegrass folk music, another the 'Southern Highland' style of home furnishing. In a 1942 article, the editors of *House and Garden* magazine indicated some of the reasons for the style's popularity. The southern
Appalachian region, it was claimed, served as a source for designs 'as American as corn bread and smoked ham....They search down into our race roots. They carry on an ancient heritage.'

Much of the revivalistic enthusiasm ebbed away after World War II, but enough of an institutional Anglo-Saxonism remained to convince most writers in the 1950's and early 60's that Will Herberg and Milton Gordon were correct in their appraisal of the nation's dominant-conformity to a WASP ideal-type based on figures like Lincoln and Washington. This same theme was reiterated by Peter Schrag who commented that the American motion picture industry, though composed of large numbers of Catholics and Jews, reinforced the Anglo-conformist process by portraying non-Anglo-Saxons in secondary roles with WASP figures given the all-American lead parts. For Schrag, 'the genuine American was [presented as] John Wayne, Gary Cooper, Clark Gable and Gregory Peck, a mythic man who transcended particular films or plots or situations.'

**The Decline of Anglo-Saxon America**

In addition to the examples provided above, evidence of continued Anglo-Saxon influence was provided by liberals like John Higham in the 1950's or Digby Baltzell in the early 1960's who still inveighed against what they perceived as Anglo-Saxon dominance. As liberals, both Higham and Baltzell were advocates of a melting-pot America in which newcomers assimilated not to an ethnic core, but to a set of values embodied in the U.S. constitution. In effect, this line of thinking attempted to resolve the contradiction between American liberalism and American ethnicity once and for all by abolishing the ethnic identity of the American nation.

This resolution of Anglo-American 'double-consciousness' toward pure liberal cosmopolitanism occurred first among select Progressive intellectuals like Randolph Bourne and John Dewey in the 1900-1914 period. However, it was not until the 1930's that intellectual opinion became solidly liberal and began to view the United States as a truly cosmopolitan 'nation of immigrants.' Some political leaders like Harry Truman adopted this position after the Second World War, but the conversion of the mass of the American polity to the 'civic' national view likely did not occur until the great liberalizing value changes of the 1965-73 period.
This was also a period of value change in other parts of the Western world.\textsuperscript{108} And, as a general, non-exceptionalist theory would predict, a liberalization of immigration policies accompanied this change, often well in advance of American policy. Canada, France and Great Britain, for example, never implemented national origins quota legislation and all began admitting nonwhites before the U.S. did. In addition, these relatively smaller nations had long histories of immigration such that by the early 1990's all had large populations of ethnic minorities and larger foreign-born populations than the United States.\textsuperscript{109} In fact, Western Europe as a whole has had a higher immigrant population than the United States since the 1970's and by 1990 had proportionately two to three times the number of foreign-born.\textsuperscript{110} With these developments, the 'ethnic' character of Western European nations is increasingly being downplayed by elites in favour of liberal or multicultural, 'civic' interpretations. The unity of the ethnic national past is similarly in question as the formerly monolithic ethnic cores are, as in the American case, deconstructed into their various migrant strands to reveal 'nation of immigrants' histories continuous with the present. These processes have also been discernible in Australia and Canada.\textsuperscript{111} From this 'Western' evidence, it should be clear that the United States of America, in following an 'ethnic to civic' national trajectory, was part of a broader trend and should not be considered exceptional.

Conclusion

This paper has tried to argue against the prevailing view that the case of the United States is exceptional in the annals of ethnicity and nationalism studies because it has never had an ethnic component to its national identity. In fact, an American ethnicity based on an Anglo-Saxon myth of descent whose boundaries were symbolically guarded by several key cultural markers had crystallized by 1820. This 'American' myth-symbol complex had many advocates in both civil society and politics. The Anglo-Americans sought to incorporate new immigrants into their ethnic group, and when the inflow appeared to pose a challenge to the congruence of American ethnie and nation, a defensive response occurred.

Starting in the 1830's in New England and spreading nationwide, ethnic defense, in both its Anglo-conformist and immigration restrictionist forms, enjoyed almost
unbroken strength until the 1920's. The period from the early 1920's until the mid 1960's saw this sentiment become institutionalized and can be characterized as a period of stability in which the dominant ethnic group felt confidence in its ability to mould the white United States into a truly 'American' ethnic nation.

The Liberal Cosmopolitan vision of the United States was a marginal one in the American psyche, coming into its own among intellectuals only during the 1930's and failing to achieve mass popularity until the late 1960's. Since many 'Western' nations have recently reinterpreted their past and opened their borders to become civic 'nations of immigrants', the American experience should not be viewed exceptionally, but should be seen to be reflective of a broader trend.

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Notes


2 Even those who have acknowledged the presence of American dominant ethnicity have tended to explain it as a transient phenomenon, present only as a series of brief "nativist" upsurges against a background of


4 The original distinction between "Eastern" (ethnic) and "Western" (civic) nationalism was made by Hans Kohn. See Kohn, Hans, The Idea of Nationalism: a Study in its Origins and Background (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1946) or Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991), pp. 81-82.


8 The Americans' founding date (1607) differs little from that of the Ulster Protestants, Quebecois and Afrikaners and is far older than that of recent fissions such as that which produced the Anatolian Turks.


12 See, for example, Tocqueville, Democracy, pp. 173-4. For the comments of theorists of American exceptionalism, see Lipset, Seymour Martin, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and


18 Ibid., p.29.

19 Fischer, Albion's, p.23.

20 Armstrong, Nations, pp. 201-203.

21 Zelinsky, Nation, p. 226.

22 Ibid., p.227.


25 Zelinsky, Nation, p.32.


28 Smith, Ethnic Origins, p.175.


31 Sometimes considered a pejorative term, the acronym WASP, which first gained informal usage in the 1950's, is now in regular scholarly use. It is used here for its efficient encapsulation of the cultural markers that delineate the Anglo-American ethnie. For more on the term's origin, see Salins, Peter D., *Assimilation, American Style* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1997), p. 92.

32 Einar Haugen remarks that the dialect-language distinction was often a matter of semantics, with some dialects of the same language being structurally more distinct than separate languages. Thus American English could be invested with ethno-cultural significance. See Haugen, Einar, "Dialect, Language, Nation", *American Anthropologist* 68, 4, 1966, pp. 922-935.


36 Horsman, *Race*, p.22; emphasis added.

37 Thomas Gossett and Dorothy Ross discuss the nature of Americans' adaptation of the Teutonic-Whig germ theory which connected the ancient Anglo-Saxons to the Magna Carta, the Glorious Revolution and other liberating events. In this interpretation, the United States was seen to represent the culmination of the theory. See Ross, Dorothy, "Historical Consciousness in Nineteenth Century America", *American Historical Review*, 89, 4 (1984), 909-928, p. 917; and Gossett, Thomas Frank, "The Idea of Anglo-Saxon Superiority in American Thought, 1865-1915" (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1953), p. 82.


42 A notable exception occurred in parts of the South where the white population knew itself to be merely "White" or "American".


50 Fischer, Albion's, p.423.

51 Burkey, Ethnic, p.170.

52 Walker Connor notes that in 1971, the majority of nation-states had populations in which ethnic minorities comprised over 25% of the population. Furthermore, most analysts would agree that nations are modern and as one of the first integrated mass participation polities, that the U.S. was one of the world's first nations. Thus the free population of the 1820 United States should be considered a nation with above-average ethnic homogeneity. See Connor, "A Nation", p.39.

53 Horsman, Race, p. 235.


55 Fischer, Albion's, p.839.


Horsman, Race, p.23.

Ibid., p.235.

For more discussion of the Yeoman Republic, see Smith, Virgin Land, p. 130.

For a general discussion, see Bernbrock, John E. "Walt Whitman and 'Anglo-Saxonism'" (Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1961).


Smith, Ethnic Origins, p. 192.

Burkey, Ethnic, p.244.


Billington, Protestant Crusade, p. 387.

Billington, Protestant Crusade, pp. 410-413.


Hofstadter, Age of Reform, pp. 144-145 and 151-153.

Easterlin, Immigration, p. 20.

Figures are compiled from Fischer, Albion's, p. 871 and Easterlin, Richard A., Immigration, p.19. The 1920 figures are based on figures for "native-stock" Americans, a designation which includes all white
Americans whose parents were born in the U.S. This is therefore a less than perfect indicator of British stock, but is the best indicator we have.


82 Anderson, White, p. 102.

83 Hofstadter, Age of Reform, p. 35.

84 Ibid., pp. 144-145.

85 Higham, Strangers, p. 287.

86 Hofstadter, Age of Reform, p.292.


91 Gordon, Assimilation, pp. 121-122.

92 See Higham, Strangers, pp. 141-147, Solomon, Ancestors, pp. 68-69, and 130. The racial Anglicization process may be likened to the philosophy of "whitening" as conceived by Brazilian elites in which it was

93 Goldman, "Reconciling," 264.


95 Higham, Strangers, p. 266.


100 See, for example, McConnell, Scott, "The New Battle Over Immigration", Fortune, 9 May, 1988, pp. 94-98 [94]; and Salins, Assimilation, p.208.


107 During the early 1960's, John F. Kennedy, the first Catholic president, made the first televised presidential mention of America as a "nation of immigrants". Later in the decade, immigration policy was liberalized. Meanwhile, public opinion across a whole range of cultural issues became markedly more

108 Ronald Inglehart's work is the best known in this regard. The general change that Inglehart claims to have identified (using survey data) occurred after 1965, with an increase in "postmaterialist" attitudes (particularly among younger cohorts), of which liberalism and egalitarianism were subcomponents. See Inglehart, Ronald *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

109 Daniel Franklin notes that 14 million of the 58 million French are either immigrants, children of immigrants or grandchildren of immigrants. He also cites recent figures that show Britain to have a foreign-born population of 8% while that of France is 11%. See Franklin, Daniel "Migration: New Demands and Approaches For Europe", in Giacomo Luciani ed., *Migration Policies in Europe and the United States* (London: Kluwer, 1993), pp. 18-19.
