Condemned to Rootlessness: The Loyalist Origins of Canada's Identity Crisis

Introduction

In the view of the English-speaking Canadian media, Canada has an identity crisis, a situation attributable to divisions within the Canadian body politic that are regularly expressed in constitutional bickering between Quebec and the Rest of Canada and between the provinces and the federal government. Yet the identity crisis in the lifeworld of the average English-Canadian appears to possess a somewhat different quality. The following statement from Rod Lamirand, a resident of Surrey, B.C., expresses the subjectivity of this existential unease with remarkable accuracy:

'We [our family] were isolated, self-sufficient, cut off from a close community and from our pasts...Our family was not drawn into a neighborhood of friends because of a shared difference from mainstream society. We didn't have a name for the cultural majority because for the most part they were us. We were part of the dominant cultural society and we had no real culture. The great wash of pale European blood that saturated this continent was uniform in color only. Much of what survived is a hodgepodge of eclectic, meaningless routines...We were the product of white bread and instant coffee, Hollywood and the CBC....' (emphasis added)

The connection between the Canadian identity crisis mentioned in the English-Canadian media and Lamirand's statement might appear distant. Surely, one might ask, the latter reflects a problem that should be labeled 'English-Canadian' rather than 'Canadian.'

It is the position of this paper, however, that the discourses of English-Canadian and Canadian identity are inextricably bound. The connection lies with the fact that the
English-Canadian *ethnic* core, which is of Loyalist origin, has spawned a *nation*, English Canada, which in turn has dominated a multi-national *state*, Canada. Hence English Canada's salient identity is with the Canadian state, whose self-conception it also articulates. This means that fissures in the Loyalist ethnic core that gave rise to the nation will in turn be transmitted to the state level. Bearing this in mind we may better understand Seymour Martin Lipset's classic observation:

>National identity is the quintessential Canadian issue. Almost alone among modern developed countries, Canada has continued to debate its self-conception to the present day. One of its leading historians notes that it 'has suffered for more than a century from a somewhat more orthodox and less titillating version of Portnoy's complaint: the inability to develop a secure and unique identity. And so...intellectuals and politicians have attempted to play psychiatrist to the Canadian Portnoy, hoping to discover a national identity....The reasons for this uncertainty are clear. Canada is a residual country. Before 1776, Anglophone Canadians possessed the same traits that distinguished other American colonists from the British. Then...the new nation to the south developed a political identity formulated around the values set out in the Declaration of Independence....There is no ideology of Canadianism, although Canada has a Tory tradition derived from Britain and is, like the United States, descended from a North American settler and frontier society.'³

Following Lipset, it is argued here that the existential problem of the English-speaking Canadian *conscience collective* stems not from the linguistic divisions *between* English and French Canada but rather from the divisions *within* English Canada. This represents a view very different from that which may be found in most analyses of Canadian identity, whether by journalists or academics.⁴
The nature of the internal cleavage within English Canada consists, as Lipset noted, of a tension between American and British inheritances. Each inheritance in turn consists of two parts. The first involves a dual political culture of, on the one hand, American 'Whig' liberalism and, on the other, British 'Tory' conservatism. This ideological divide has been fairly well-documented in the literature. The second part consists of a dual ethno-symbolic inheritance: an American folk culture revolving around a pioneering New World lifestyle and a British set of myths, symbols and collective representations. This latter, more particularistic phenomenon has been only superficially addressed in the literature and never from the standpoint of theories of ethnicity.

This paper asserts that Lipset's Hartzian focus on the divergent political cultures bequeathed by British and American sources provides an insufficient explanation of English-Canadian existential anxiety. In failing to address the ethno-national consciousness of English-Canadians, Lipset's assertion about the fragility of Canadian identity, while true, remains incomplete. Lipset's position must therefore be complemented by an investigation into the role played by the ethno-symbolic traditions which accompanied the British and American political cultures. The aim of this essay is to explore this omission: to incorporate some of the insights recently developed by theorists of ethnicity and nationalism into the analysis of Canadian identity.

Any effort of this type must first consider the connection between nations, which are products of modernity, and their pre-modern ethnic antecedents. According to A.D. Smith, ethnic groups, or ethnies, loosely defined, are communities of descent symbolically attached to a particular 'homeland.' Nations, on the other hand, are communities of territory and mass culture, whose members are linked economically, politically and socially. States, in turn, are political units which may encompass several nations, as in the case of Canada.

Based on these definitions, the Canadian state consists of at least two major nations: English Canada and Quebec. In turn, each has its roots in an ethnic core: in the
case of Quebec, this core is *Canadien*, and in the case of English Canada, it is Loyalist-Britannic. As Smith notes, most nations emerge when pre-modern ethnic polities undergo a 'triple revolution' of modernization: economic, military-administrative and cultural-educational. In the process, the ethnic core attempts to assimilate ethnic minorities into itself in a project of nation-building. Of course, this attempt to remake the citizenry along the lines of the dominant ethnie is seldom completely successful, with minorities often rejecting the 'high culture' of the new nation-state. Notwithstanding this minority resistance, what is important is the manner in which the new nation's symbols display continuity with that of the founding ethnic group. Smith explains why this is the case:

'Since *ethnies* are by definition associated with a given territory, not infrequently a chosen people with a particular sacred land, the presumed boundaries of the nation are largely determined by the myths and memories of the dominant *ethnie*, which include the foundation charter, the myth of the golden age and the associated territorial claims, or ethnic title-deeds.'

Moreover, national cultures are intimately linked with their ethnic pasts because the quest for national solidarity and legitimacy causes the state to seek recourse to unifying myths of common historical origins and genealogical descent.

**English-Canadians in the North American context**

A brief look at some of the ethnies that shared the North American continent with the English-Canadians in the nineteenth century will serve to illustrate Smith's point. In present-day Quebec, centred on the St. Lawrence, was a population of French-speaking *Canadiens* who traced their origins back to the permanent settlement of Quebec City by
Samuel de Champlain in 1608. Moreover, this population could trace its ancestry to a mere few thousand French settlers, most of whom had arrived in the seventeenth century under the colonization scheme of Jean-Baptiste Colbert. In New France, as in New Spain, criollo ethnic consciousness began to develop vis-à-vis the metropole, accentuated by the fall of New France in 1763. By the 1820s, a new middle class, sprung from the upper levels of St. Lawrence habitant society, fomented the first French-Canadian nationalism.12

This nationalism, which took on both conservative and liberal forms, later came to fixate on the territory of Quebec, a nation whose culture was to flow firmly from the Canadien ethnic core. We can see this ethnie-nation link in the writings of prominent Quebec nationalists. For instance, Abbé Lionel Groulx's statement, in 1922, that Quebecers are bound organically to 'la patrie naturelle' meshed well with Maurice Duplessis' description of Quebecers' cultural markers as 'la foi, la langue, [et] la race'. The ethnie-nation logic was also confirmed by René Levesque, who pronounced in 1968 that 'we are children of that society, in which the habitant, our father or grandfather, was still the key citizen...we are, even more intimately, heirs to the group obstinacy which has kept alive that portion of French America we call Quebec.'13 Even if we fix the settlement date of New France at 1600, which is considerably earlier than effective settlement took place, the genesis of French-Canadian ethnicity occurred in under two hundred years.

This achievement was not as unusual as it might seem, for, to the south of the French lay the 'Americans', an Anglophone people who had developed a sense of ethnic consciousness by 1820. Many might question the assertion that American ethnicity ever existed. In fact most observers prefer to see the United States as an 'exceptional' nation, a political union of disparate states founded on civic principles of universal liberty that was unlike any previous creation.14 However, a close examination of American history reveals that this was not so. From the beginning, the homogeneity of the colonial
population ensured that an ethnic consciousness grew up alongside the civic state. This homogeneity is evident in the origin of the free population of the United States at the time of the American Revolution: it was over 60 per cent English, nearly 80 per cent British and 98 per cent Protestant.\textsuperscript{15}

Each major region of the United States had its core ethno-religious group, all of which were British Protestant. New England was dominated by East English Congregationalists, the Coastal South by South English Cavaliers, the Middle Atlantic by the Quakers and the great swath of Appalachian backcountry from Pennsylvania to Georgia by 'Scotch-Irish' Presbyterians.\textsuperscript{16} These groups were drawn together by a shared belief in individual liberty and by the generally non-conformist nature of American Protestantism, a feature which even permeated the supposedly established Episcopal and Presbyterian churches. Further unity was provided by New England's idealism, which gave to the United States a providential role in bringing about the millenium on earth. The nation-wide religious revival known as the Great Awakening (1725-50) helped disseminate such ideas, which were furthered by the American Revolution (1776-83) and by a second Great Awakening during 1780-1830.\textsuperscript{17}

The Revolution, meanwhile, took on religious significance and was interpreted ethnically by the Founding Fathers as the final realization of the primitive Anglo-Saxon liberal impulse, which, freed from its Norman (i.e. British) oppressor, was chosen to do its work in the New World. In other words, Americans were descended from oppressed Anglo-Saxons who had self-selected themselves from Britain as immigrants to America.\textsuperscript{18} As Thomas Jefferson noted to John Adams in 1776, the Americans were:

'The children of Israel in the wilderness, led by a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night; and on the other side, Hengist and Horsa, the Saxon chiefs from whom we claim the honour of being descended, and whose political principles and form of government we have assumed.'\textsuperscript{19} (emphasis added)
Several cultural markers framed this new myth of descent, namely the English language, the Protestant faith, Liberal individualism and a northern European phenotype. Linguistically and religiously distinct from the French to the north and west and the Spanish to the south, the Americans also asserted their ideological distinctiveness from the British across the Atlantic and their racial particularity vis à vis the blacks and natives within.

Anglo-conformity, meanwhile, had colonial origins and spurred the expansion of the American ethnic core, absorbing non-English groups like the Huguenots, Welsh and a considerable number of Dutch and Germans. As Richard Burkey put it, 'although pockets of European ethnicity still remained, by 1820 the great majority of the citizens of the new country were subscribing to a new ethnicity - American; only the racial groups were excluded from membership.'

Considering that the Puritans had arrived in Massachusetts in the 1620s, the gestation period for the American ethnogenie was roughly two hundred years, similar to our conservative estimate of Canadien ethnogenesis. Some might argue that these new formations on the North American ethnographic landscape can be attributed to their seventeenth century antiquity. This thesis can be refuted, though, if we examine the origin of an ethnic group whose roots begin in the mid to late eighteenth century.

At this time, a mixed-race population descended from French fur traders and Cree Natives began to congregate at Red River, in latter-day Manitoba. Less than a century later, between 1815 and 1850, a sense of Métis ethnic consciousness had crystallized. As Jacqueline Peterson writes, this new Métis 'nation' possessed numerous cultural markers, notably a distinct language, syncretic cosmology and religious repertoire, as well as unique modes of dress, cuisine, architecture, dance and music. To this was added, after 1815, a quasi-military political organization, a flag, a bardic tradition, a rich folklore and a national history.
All of which begs the question of Anglo-Canadian ethnogenesis. If other populations managed to develop distinct descent communities with unique cultural attributes and a sense of indigenous territoriality, what happened to the group of Tory refugees from Revolutionary America and their later accretions? As we shall see, the new English-Canadian society failed to develop a sense of indigenous ethnic consciousness due to a peculiar contradiction within its founding myth.

The Coming of the United Empire Loyalists

As noted, the British Protestant population of the colonial United States shared many similar cultural orientations, most notably an individualistic, democratic temperament, which suffused both their secular lives and their brand of Protestantism. Nevertheless, within this population there existed a number of fault lines, the most important of which was loyalty to the Crown. In New England and Virginia, both populous areas, support for the Crown was weak and civilian protest against the colonial administration common. Boston, home of New England providentialism, was a particular hotbed of agitation, and considered any legislation that blocked its commercial and religious destiny as cause for revolt. For instance, in 1765, a mob, angry at the imposition of the Stamp Act, destroyed the houses of Governor Thomas Hutchinson and that of Andrew Oliver, a prominent colonial official. A few years later, similar violence prompted the police to strike back, in a famous incident known as the 'Boston Massacre.'

Civil disobedience such as this did not lead to a widespread feeling for independence, however, something which Jefferson, Washington and other American Whigs didn't even consider until 1774-5. Even less well-known is that many Americans opposed independence after it was declared. Some estimate that as much as one-third of the American population was loyal to the Crown at this time. During and after the Revolution, social pressure on Tory supporters was immense. After the Declaration of
Independence, Tories came under increasing persecution from angry mobs. Tarring and feathering, 'riding the rail' and the destruction of property were the favoured means of intimidation by 1776. The mob, which was organized around citizens' bodies like the Sons of Liberty, had its activities backed by Test Law legislation from the Continental Congress, which required that all citizens swear allegiance to their state and abjure allegiance to the Crown. Furthermore, in 1777, with the Congress low on funds, it was agreed that Loyalist property would be seized and sold to replenish government coffers. In New York alone, over £3,600,000 worth of Loyalist property was confiscated.  

Given this state of anarchy, it is unsurprising that the majority of Tory supporters either renounced their old loyalties or went underground. Yet a hard core of Tories remained loyal to the Crown and these 19,000 Loyalist troops proved themselves among the most effective British fighting forces. Retreating to the Quebec border, they mounted a series of raids in upstate New York and Pennsylvania before ceasing their activities in response to the peace at Versailles in 1783.

A year later, these soldiers and their families left for the colonies of Quebec and Nova Scotia. There they joined 200,000 French Canadians and a small enclave of roughly 14,000 English-speaking settlers, effectively creating the basis for a new society. Prior to the arrival of the Loyalists, Governor Carleton of Quebec had assumed that the [British North American] colonies 'must, to the end of time, be peopled by the [French] Canadian race, who have already taken such firm root, and got to so great a height, that any new [British] stock transplanted will be totally hid....' By 1800, the situation had changed: the colonial population of some 300,000 was 30 per cent English-speaking.

The Social Bases of Loyalism

The reasons for Loyalism were as varied as the Loyalists' social backgrounds. Categories of people most likely to become Loyalists included the British-born,
Anglicans and the Colonial Elites (political and religious). Least likely to be Loyalists were Presbyterians, New Englanders, the yeoman middle class and Scotch-Irish Backcountry settlers. Notwithstanding these generalizations, the Loyalist-Patriot divide also owed much to timing and local circumstance. Thus in the North Carolina Backcountry, many Scottish Highlanders became Tories because their hated Scotch-Irish neighbours were pro-Independence Whigs.

Loyalism could also be a result of personal differences of belief system. The example of the American political elite is illustrative in this regard. For example, Benjamin Franklin's son William was a Tory and Colonel John Butler of the Tory Butler's Rangers, 'found himself confronted by his Whig cousins, Colonel William Butler and Colonel Zeb Butler.' The idiosyncratic nature of the Loyalist-Patriot split meant that many people literally found themselves 'caught' on the wrong side after the war. As Dennis Duffy notes, 'no array of facts has yet supported a profile of the American Tory that limits him to a particular social class or group.' If any one factor could be found to account for Loyalism it would be that Loyalists tended to be marginal types: un-assimilated Dutch and Germans, Anglicans in Congregationalist New England, Presbyterians in the Episcopalian South and Pacifists like the Quakers. As W. H. Nelson notes: 'almost all the Loyalists were, in one way or another, more afraid of America than they were of Britain.'

The Tory Culture of the Loyalist Elite

The Loyalists were Americans, but were led by a Tory elite that differed in several ways from the Whig elite to the south. For one thing, many of the Loyalist elite were Anglican and supported the idea of a national English church, a concept frowned upon by sectarian U.S. Protestants. In addition, the Loyalist elite believed in the importance of order and sought to achieve change within the British system rather than
through rebellion. In the years following their migration to Canada, they evolved an ideology of anti-Americanism whose rhetoric the Loyalists hoped would be matched by American failure. The cautiousness of Loyalism with regard to change was matched by their sense of marginality and defeat, linked to both their expulsion and the outsider status of the groups from which many Loyalists derived.

The American Culture of the Loyalists

The Loyalists' Tory elite was not wholly representative of the majority of Loyalist refugees, who were basically Anglo-Americans inclined, for either economic or symbolic reasons, toward allegiance to the Crown. What implications did this have for the ethnic identity of the Loyalists? To answer this question we must identify the link between culture and ethnicity.

John Armstrong's analysis is useful in this regard. He has noted that linguistic boundary divisions between Slavic, Germanic and Latin language families often gave rise to ethnic boundaries. He makes a similar point with respect to religious difference, illustrating how the medieval Islam-Christendom frontier produced many an ethnic group. Benjamin Akzin's notion that ethnic groups are strengthened by cultural 'similarity-dissimilarity' patterns supports Armstrong's thesis. When seeking to differentiate the Americans from the English, for instance, we have noted how the differing ideology, theology, dialect, lifestyle and landscape of the Americans served as crucial markers which American intellectuals could use to develop a separate sense of American ethnicity vis-à-vis Britain.

In the (Anglo) Canadian case, however, no such cultural differentiae presented themselves vis-à-vis the United States. Most Loyalists spoke with an American accent, believed in liberal democracy and individualism, shared an 'American' landscape and pursued a pioneering North American lifestyle. Hence they were culturally
indistinguishable from the Americans, a pattern which offered little grist for the nationalist mill of later generations of English-Canadian intellectuals, confounding Anglo-Canadian ethnogenesis.

The War of 1812

1807 had marked the start of American Whig fervour in the United States in support of the French cause. By 1812, the United States had joined the French in declaring war on Britain. Federalist opposition was suppressed and republican mobs, a throwback to the anti-Tory mobs of the Revolution, roamed cities like Baltimore, where they destroyed a Federalist newspaper. British regulars began engaging American forces at Detroit, Niagara and Michilmackinac, where a combination of British and Loyalist troops successfully repulsed a more numerous American invading force. General Isaac Brock, a Loyalist leader and prominent Upper Canadian, was dubbed 'Father of his People' for his victories at Michilmackinac, Detroit and Queenston Heights, where he died heroically.

At the same time, the British Navy blockaded the coast and sent reinforcements to Halifax while Upper Canadians and British militias fought inland. Although York, the capital of Upper Canada, was burned, the British side successfully invaded Virginia and razed Washington, the new capital of the Republic. Having occupied Washington and tightened its blockade, the British began to talk peace with the Americans, something which was achieved by 1815.
Already, the War was being turned to mythical ends in Upper Canada: Britain had defended her colonies and Providence had ensured the

'Triumph of virtue over vice, of a good cause over a bad one...Together, Upper Canadians came to believe, they had vanquished the forces of tyranny and oppression. Out of the war there arose a sense of community, an awareness of being Upper Canadian, which encompassed all settlers. The War of 1812 came to be considered by many as the colony's rite of passage into young adulthood.'41

The Genesis of Loyalist Consciousness

Maintaining British form while acting out liberal, American substance is the best way of describing the Loyalist psyche, and it was this psyche which remains integral to understanding the English-Canadian mind today. Anthropological approaches to ethnicity describe the substance/form distinction in terms of the etic/emic dichotomy. The term etic refers to the 'analyst's concepts, descriptions and analyses.'42 Etic forms of identity rely upon objectively verifiable cultural differentiae. Hence we may regard the Loyalists to be etically American by virtue of their folk culture and lifestyle.

Emic forms of identity rely instead on the categories used by the natives to identify themselves. Emic forms of identity thereby depend on self-perception and need not be based upon any concrete cultural markers. The classic example of an etic non-group with an emic identity concerns the Lue in Thailand who, though they 'lived in close interaction with other groups in the area...had no exclusive livelihood, no exclusive language, no exclusive customs, no exclusive religion.'43 Thus the Loyalists may be viewed as emically Britannic, a consequence of the British nature of their communal narrative and symbolic attachments.
This mindset developed from the peculiar circumstances that the Loyalists endured.

'[They] resembled closely the persecutors from whom they fled. This fact deprived them of the luxury of unambiguous hatred of their own former adversaries. Rather, their attitude was one of ambivalence: the Loyalists found themselves hating America, but loving and envying it as well. As a result, the Loyalists were deprived of the opportunity of erecting their values - which were virtually identical to those of the Americans - into a national identity.44

One consequence of an ethically groundless emic identity is a liminal, unstable sense of self which goes unrecognized by a generalized Other and is constantly in danger of being challenged.45 In Canada, the Loyalists were challenged, but only in England were they exposed. There, the returning Loyalist '[saw] himself as he really is - a confirmed American...The Loyalist in England suffers excruciating torture. He pines his life away wishing for his homeland. He packs his bag, in anticipation of the trip he will never make.'46 The Loyalists who returned to England were not only exposed to others, but to themselves as well. This is confirmed by Kenneth McRae, who wrote that the several thousand American Tories who returned to Britain were scathing in their indictment of the hierarchical, 'confining' society they found there.47 In contrast to the realistic, dispirited pathos of these returning English Loyalists, the Canadian Loyalists had the luxury of reacting to their situation inauthentically by creating a new, ultra-British identity for themselves. As David Bell notes,

'Robbed of his [American] identity, the Canadian Loyalist invented a new one. It is never a totally adequate substitute, of course. How can it be, when he must continuously deny its very essence, liberalism? "The typical Canadian," an Englishman observed a hundred years ago, "tells you that he is not, but he is a
Yankee—a Yankee in the sense in which we use the term at home, as synonymous with everything that smacks of democracy...." The Loyalist in Canada will always be faced with the paradox of being an "anti-American Yankee." But he has a way out of his dilemma: he creates a myth that helps him survive—he insists that he is British. 48

The British attachments of the Loyalists were soon expressed in the covenantal manner of the Old Testament. 49 Thus after the defeat of Napoleon, we hear Bishop Jacob Mountain of Quebec exclaim: '[We British], happily for ourselves, and for the world, [were] made the instruments of chastising the arrogance and humbling the power of France...[Great Britain was] the delegated instrument of Providence to arrest the progress of anarchy and impiety, and to vindicate the cause of Religion, social order, and regulated Government throughout this habitable earth.'50 Even more stridently nationalist was Anglican clergyman John Strachan, rector of York, who claimed that 'what the Israelites of old were to the surrounding nations, so the British appear to be to the present inhabitants of the world.'51

These exhortations indicate that Anglo-Canadians were being given a purely British view of themselves and their mission. However, within the English-Canadian story was reserved a special series of episodes for Britain's chosen American servants: the Loyalists. For example, Bishop Mountain, while asserting the idea that the British were the elect, claimed that Canadians were Britain's 'highly favoured children.'52 John Strachan was just as explicit when he said in 1814 that Upper Canadians fighting in the War of 1812 'have gained a name among our fellow-subjects which will be forever precious.'53

The message coming from these Canadian Anglicans is that although the British were God's chosen people, the Canadians were the elect of the elect. Notice what these clergymen did not say. They refrained from asserting that Canadians were a separate race
from the British with a separate destiny. Added, therefore, to the lack of unique English-
Canadian cultural markers was a British ethnic loyalty that shrunk from expressions of
ingigenous Canadian-ness. In combination, these factors blocked the process of ethnic
fission which had led to ethnogenesis in the American and Canadien cases.

Challenge of Reform

American substance and British form formed the contradiction that was the
Loyalist. This contradiction quickly became institutionalized as a class divide, especially
in Upper Canada. On one side of the divide lay the Anglo-Canadian rural masses, often
Methodist in religion, democratic in culture and Reformist by temperament, while on the
other resided the Tory elite: Anglican, aristocratic and conservative. This generated a
conflict between Reform and Tory elements which had its roots in the post-Revolutionary
era.

At that time, the presence of settlers with a democratic outlook had forced the
creation of Upper Canada (in 1791), while attempts by the Anglican elite to secure
privileges for themselves and their church were met with equal indignation.54 The
strength of the democratic element can be gauged in Upper Canada by the fact that 60 per
cent of the population was Methodist in 1812. Their nature was attested to by John
Howison, who spent two and a half years in Upper Canada between 1818 and 1820.
Howison described English-Canadian society in the same terms in which Tocqueville
later described American society, writing that the inhabitants of the Talbot settlement on
Lake Erie (near London) formed 'a democracy, such as, I believe, is hardly to be met with
in any other part of the world...any poor starving peasant, who comes into the settlement,
will meet with nearly the same respect as the wealthiest person....'55

Religious matters emerged as an early irritant, as the Anglicans tried to claim
established church status, with attendant land reserves and restrictions on the
solemnization of Methodist marriages. Later, pressure for greater political representation developed and by 1834, William Lyon Mackenzie, a Scottish immigrant, was building a radical movement in Upper Canada. His demands included responsible government, the separation of church and state and other republican proposals.

The difference between Mackenzie's rebellion in Upper Canada and that of Louis-Joseph Papineau in Lower Canada, both in 1837, illustrates how the English-Canadian bipolar (British-American) identity differed from that of the French. Whereas Papineau could frame his struggle as a French nationalist struggle against the Tory English, Mackenzie found himself in opposition to his own English-Canadian-ness. He was thereby forced to defend a position of anti-Tory disloyalty because for the English-Canadian elite, Toryness was equivalent to English-Canadian-ness. Thus his attempt to elucidate an Upper Canadian particularism quickly flowed into Americanism.

For instance, he asked that supporters be 'more Canadian' in their 'habits and feelings' and to throw away their 'lip-loyal feelings and sayings of other countries,' while substituting 'the word patriotic for the word loyalty.' Yet as part of this programme, the advantages of joining the United States were attractively put forth. It seems that Canadian political liberalism had only one symbolic resource: Americanism. Thus while movements toward liberal-democratic reform (including rebellion) in the United States and French Canada contributed toward ethnic self-definition, similar movements in English Canada led toward ethnic dissolution because Toryism was at the heart of English Canada's Loyalist founding myth.

In addition, Mackenzie's use of the term 'Canadian' seemed to indicate that the American cultural markers of most Upper Canadians: speech, lifestyle and liberal philosophy, were expressive of Canadianism, as opposed to the aristocratic, imperial, mercantile elitism of Tory Loyalism. The extent to which his sentiments (though not his actions) were shared by the mass of the population is unknown, but S.D. Clark claims that most Canadians were in fact anti-Tory in ideology, wishing only to be North
American. Though exaggerating somewhat, Clark draws our attention to the polarity between the American-Methodist-Reform and British-Anglican-Tory components of Anglo-Canadian identity.

This crack in the English-Canadian body social was only sealed following the growth of British reform movements, which helped legitimate those in Canada. These tended to argue that Britain was the source of true liberty as opposed to the lawless slave republic to the south. For example, Joseph Howe, a Nova Scotia reformer, countered his monarchist critics, asking where, 'excepting the British Isles...upon the wide surface of the globe...[is] an equal amount of freedom, prosperity and happiness...enjoyed?'

Meanwhile, the large number of Irish Protestants streaming into the country combined strong British loyalty with democratic radicalism, undercutting the Tory-Loyalty tie. By the 1850s, Lord Durham had delivered his infamous report, responsible government had been achieved in Canada and a new reciprocity treaty had been signed with the United States. This was an age of liberalism, and a new synthesis of British loyalty and democratic liberalism emerged under George Brown's Clear Grits. Commenting on the pivotal 1859 Reform Convention, Brown wrote, 'Perhaps the most distinctively Canadian characteristic of the debate was the play and counter-play of British and American influences. Expressions of loyalty [to the Queen], thrown about with the greatest zeal, were invariably cheered to the echo Annexation was condemned on all sides, and solemn warnings were given of the possible dire results of encouraging dangerous associations with the republican relative.' The new liberal-Loyalist synthesis that Brown consummated helped sever the connection between class, ideology and loyalty by the time of Canadian Confederation in 1867. This helped redefine the English-Canadian national conundrum as a purely formal contest between British symbolism and American lifestyle imagery.
The British Ascendancy

The new synthesis between loyalty and liberty that had been secured in English Canada set the stage for the creation of a unified Britannic consciousness that cut across the fault line of ideology. Thus between Confederation and the end of World War I, the British pole of Anglo-Canadian identity dominated. This new ethnic consciousness named the Loyalists as a chosen founding people, but framed this sense of chosenness very much within the fold of the British Empire. In other words, while the Loyalists were chosen, they were merely part of a broader Elect, and their deeds existed to serve the Empire. There issued therefore, a parallel development of Loyalist mythology and Britannic sentiment.

Loyalist Revival in the post-Confederation period

Several events served to generate a sense of ethnic nationalism among English-Canadian intellectuals in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The first was the Fenian threat of 1866 and the general suspicion of the United States aroused by the slogan of Manifest Destiny. With boundaries in dispute and friction along the border, the local environment was ripe for expressions of Canadian particularism. The second factor had less to do with local events than with international currents of romanticism borne ashore from Europe. In particular, the works of Sir Walter Scott, which also inspired the Confederate rebels in the United States, were of great influence.

Scott's work was particularly well-suited to the Loyalists because of their defeated position - a wound that needed treatment with the medicine of romanticism. This romanticism, 'chiefly the historical romances of Sir Walter Scott, would soon make poetic the plight of the loser, the colourful refugee torn from his former existence and plunged into a harsher one..."64 Meanwhile, victory in the war of 1812 was viewed as an
act of redemption, as Scott's romanticism was seamlessly interwoven with Protestant covenantalism:

'Sir Walter Scott's evocations of a vanished feudal Scotland had decked out defeated minorities in gorgeous robes. Now theories of popular and mass sovereignty, however alien and remote, gave to 1812 the aura of a people's war...the despised minority became a saving remnant, and the stout-hearted pilgrim-refugees an exemplar of the collective heroism and strength to be found in the common people.'

Victory in the War of 1812 was not only a vindication of the suffering of the Loyalist exiles, but provided proof that God was rewarding the Loyalists for honouring their covenant with Great Britain. Some of the more important English-Canadian works inspired by Scott during this period included Charles Mair's *Tecumseh* (1886), Sarah Anne Curzon's *Laura Secord* (1887), William Kirby's *Canadian Idylls* (1888) and Agnes Maule Machar's *For King and Country* (1874). These tomes generally reinforced the lineaments of the Loyalist myth: the exile from Egypt (America), the redemption (the gift of Canada), the construction of a garden of Eden out of the wilderness (a civilized, orderly, un-American Canada), and the vindication (victory in 1812) achieved through fealty to the covenant (loyalty to the Crown).

In tandem with developments in the literary sphere went those in the realm of history. In New England, American historians were openly nostalgic, celebrating the virtues of Jeffersonian Yeoman Republicanism and comparing ancient Anglo-Saxon society with that of rural New England. In the same manner, English-Canadian historians in the 1880s, many of Loyalist descent, coupled the nation's development firmly to its Loyalist past. They described the Loyalists as the cream of colonial America
and actively tried to weave images of old English aristocracy into their own nostalgic personal narratives.69

This historiography worked its way into popular consciousness through literature, civic celebrations like the Loyalist centennial of 1884, and via the school system. This was especially evident in Ontario where Sir George Ross, the minister of education, had close ties to Sir George Taylor Denison, an influential Loyalist intellectual.70 The result was that the Loyalist revival generated a sense of identification with the United Empire Loyalists that transcended the ranks of actual Loyalist descendants. This attitude is exemplified by writer Charles Mair, who told George T. Denison that he felt 'as much a U.E. Loyalist as you or anybody.'71

**The Development of Britannic ethnic nationalism**

Charles Mair exemplified the connection between Loyalist origins and a new sense of pan-British ethnic identity that united all the British peoples of the Empire. The Empire had figured prominently in the Loyalist covenant and the Loyalists always acted with subservience to the idea of British unity. Mair, for example, wrote heroic Loyalist literature, yet framed this within a grander British narrative in his drama *Tecumseh* (1886):

>'For I believe, in Britain's Empire, and
In Canada, its true and loyal son,
Who yet shall rise to greatness, and shall stand
At England's shoulder helping her to guard
True liberty throughout a faithless world.'72
This imperial consciousness has been ably described as 'Britannic' by Douglas Cole. As he puts it,

'Imperialists were imperialists in large measure because they were acutely conscious of ethnic ties and ethnic differentiation. Their own ethnic consciousness was deeply British ("Britannic" is a less confusing word) and Anglo-Saxon. Their ethnic identification, bolstered by commonality of culture (e.g. language and institutions), by common ethnic origin (e.g. "race" and ancestry), by the feeling of a common history, and by the belief in a common destiny, has all the characteristics of nationalism.'

The nature of Canadian pan-Britishness, or Britannicism, was enriched by its United Empire Loyalist mythology and the two were often bound together. For instance, many of those in Canada who supported the idea of imperial federation also drew on Loyalist mythology for inspiration. In fact, George T. Denison and George R. Parkin, two of the chief spokesmen of imperial federation, were keenly interested in the mythology of their Loyalist roots. As Carl Berger notes, 'the loyalist tradition was to provide one of the most potent elixirs to Canadian imperial sentiment and the descendants of the loyalists were to constitute the major source of the [Imperial Federation] League's support.'

The Imperial Federation League, with its support for closer ties to Britain and its scorn for Reciprocity, claimed a quarter of Canadian parliamentarians in 1890 and it was in this period that it was led by the illustrious D'Alton McCarthy. McCarthy's Celtic Protestant background is significant in that it illustrates the power of Loyalism among the English-Canadian majority in 1871, over half of whom were Scottish or Irish Protestants. Most of these were British immigrants of the 1815-65 period who flocked to Upper Canada, where they reinforced rather than retarded the Loyalist-Imperial connection.
The case of the Ulster Protestants is particularly germane here. Nearly equal in numbers to the Scots, the largest immigrant group, the Ulsterman's traditional loyalism, expressed through the Orange Order, took easy root in English Canada. The Orange Order had been founded in Brockville, Upper Canada in 1830 and by 1860 had grown to include, by some estimates, a membership of 100,000. More a social institution than anything else, the Orange Lodge was not exclusively Ulster-Scot in membership, but welcomed many of Loyalist descent within its ranks. Meanwhile, since one in four English-Canadians was Irish Protestant, the Order was to take on great significance as a bastion of Loyalism: 'By providing, as it often did, the shock troops of Canadian toryism, it [the Order] proved to be one of the most important consequences of the recent British immigration. An element had been introduced into Canadian life that was to have remarkable durability over the next century and more.'

This congruence of loyalisms allowed the Orangeman to submerge his Protestant loyalty within Canada's United Empire Loyalist mythology. The new synthesis is best expressed by Clarke Wallace, grand master of the Orange Association of British North America, who proclaimed that: 'it is not religion which is at the bottom of the matter but...race feeling.' This kind of sentiment was in turn reciprocated by George Sterling Ryerson, president of the United Empire Loyalist Association, who gave his assent to the Orange-influenced Protestant Protective Association during the Manitoba Schools question.

As for the Scots, who were equal in size to the Protestant Irish by 1871, they could identify with Loyalism not only through their British immigrant origins, but through their political prominence in Canada, exemplified by figures like Prime Minister John A. Macdonald and Fathers of Confederation like George Brown, Alexander Tilloch Galt and Oliver Mowat.

A series of conflicts helped reinforce the new English-Canadian identity and develop it into a nationalist movement that integrated imperial and local events. These
conflicts included the Crimean War (1854-6), the Riel Rebellions (1869-70, 1885), the Manitoba Schools Question (1890), the Boer War (1899-1902) and the First World War (1914-18). In many nationalist addresses, rhetoric about the glory of Empire was linked with the idea of the Britannic blood tie and the special position of English Canada.

This appears relatively consistent throughout the period. Thus petitioners for donations to the Crimean campaign in 1850's St. Catharines could speak as 'members of the same body [as England], in whose veins the same blood circulates.' This was clarified by George T. Denison, who prophesied that the British race would grow soft 'unless the new blood in the Colonies will leaven the mass.' Some sixty years after Sebastopol, the Britannic sentiment had become institutionalized. This may be observed in prime-minister to be R.B. Bennett's 1914 address to his Empire Club audience. In it, he urged them to accept

'Proudly the responsibilities of...race and breed...What a splendid trust it is, to think that you and I are trustees for posterity, that you and I will one day be measured by the manner in which we have discharged our obligations to those subject races and the millions of people that must one day fill the great fertile plains of South Africa and New Zealand. If that thought sinks into our minds, how can you and I think of independence, how can we be concerned about an independent Canada? Eight or nine million people could not discharge the responsibilities that have come down to us; we cannot be true to the race from which we are sprung.'

The Anatomy of Canadian Britannic Ethnicity

Earlier in this paper it was asserted that the Anglo-Americans, French Canadians and Métis developed an indigenous sense of ethnic identity. Moreover, each was
associated with a national community that possessed clearly defined cultural and territorial aspirations. In the case of English Canada, the train of events that began with the Loyalist migrations of 1784 and culminated in the First World War helped to establish the English-Canadian national identity along Britannic ethnic lines.

This ethnic core proved flexible enough to assimilate new immigrants, most of whom came from ethnic groups loyal to Britain. In genealogical terms, the Canadian Britannic looked to Britain, but conceived of the United Empire Loyalists as a special branch of the British family. In terms of nationalism, the cultural and political focus of the English-Canadian nation was also Britannic, though there existed the hope that Canada would one day play a role within an Imperial Federation that would equal or surpass that of Britain herself. These self-conceptions never, however, privileged the Canadian identity over the imperial one. In reserving ultimate salience for the Britannic tie, the English-Canadians bucked the trend of their fellow North American ethnies, failing to make a symbolic break with the mother stock, the motherland and the mother country.

The Decline of Canadian Britannicism

One of the consequences of the First World War was a reaction against nationalism, especially among intellectuals in Western Europe and North America. The historiography of the English-speaking world reflects this change of mood. Prior to 1914, few historical works criticized British or American nationalism. However, in post-war Britain, the anti-nationalist Union of Democratic Control (founded 1914) helped launch internationalist historiography's ascent toward paradigmatic status. As P.M. Kennedy noted, after 1919, 'the key [history] books were written by members of the Union of Democratic Control; all were widely read and accepted almost completely in the English and American universities.' In the meantime, ethnic nationalism and race thinking had
fallen out of favour in the same intellectual circles. English-Canadian thinkers such as Frank Underhill were quick to pick up on these trends and attempted to de-legitimate the intellectual basis of ethnic Britannicism. This did not, however, signal an immediate end to Canadian Britannicism, which remained strong on the popular level, something evident from 1940's survey research.

Since the Second World War, however, many believe that both Britannicism and Loyalism have waned in English Canada. Others go further and argue that British loyalty has been replaced by an attachment to American ideas and cultural icons. This comes out clearly in George Parkin Grant's *Lament For a Nation* (1965), a 'Red' Tory polemic against growing American (and hence laissez-faire) influence. Grant wrote that the defeat of the Diefenbaker government in 1963 marked the end of Canadian nationalism. He spoke of how, for the generation of Ontarians of the 1920s, the 'character of the country was self-evident. To say it was British was not to deny it was North American. To be Canadian was to be a unique species of North American.'

Grant went on to attack the liberal, 'anti-British nationalists of English-speaking Canada in the 1930's [who] have nearly all [become] consistent continentalists' as well as the corporate elite, whom he considered to be in league with the former. In conclusion, he lamented the Americanization of Canada and its abandonment of Tory principles while pouring scorn on the Whig interpretation of history which viewed the United States as modernity incarnate. He went on to predict that 'as consumption becomes primary, the [Canada-U.S.] border appears an anachronism as the facts of our society substantiate continentalism, more people will explicitly espouse it.'

Concern about American influence has also been a staple of mainstream left-wing discourse. In *Nationalism or Local Control* (1973), the Canadian Left's overwhelming support for an anti-American nationalism is clearly expressed, George Woodcock being the only significant dissenter. For instance, Ed Broadbent, later a leader of the social-democratic NDP, cited the power of American multinationals and the homogenizing
influence of American culture as reasons to adopt a Canadian nationalist approach. Broadbent reiterated this position during the free trade debates preceding the 1988 general election and put forth the view that Canadian distinctiveness rested on its tradition of interventionist government, which ensured a more egalitarian distribution of wealth.

The Canadian Left's vision may be viewed as merely the latest attempt to establish a new basis for Canadian identity. Furthermore, Canadian politicians and intellectuals' efforts to establish a new Canadian identity based on Nordicity in the first half of this century, or Multiculturalism in the second half, may be explained as attempts to surmount the decline of Britannicism. In this manner, English-Canadians hoped to be able to escape from their historical British-American dilemma, thereby establishing a secure collective identity. Of course, with much work remaining to chronicle and explain the twentieth century decline of Canadian Britannicism, such observations must remain tentative. However, if these remarks can stimulate further research in this area, then they will have been worthwhile.

Concluding Remarks

At the outset, it was noted that the Canadian 'identity crisis' referred to in the English-speaking Canadian discourse could best be analyzed in terms of the divergent British and American strains within the English-Canadian psyche. Each of these involved an ideological and an ethno-symbolic component. Primary attention in this essay has been given to the latter, and an attempt has been made to focus on the struggle between English-Canadians' British symbolism and American lifestyle.

It has been proposed that this division prevented the emergence of a distinct English-speaking Canadian descent community. Since such communities provide the symbolic basis upon which nations are formed, the insecure Loyalist origins of the
English-Canadian nation bequeathed to it a legacy of ontological instability. This state of non-ethnicity (David Bell terms it 'non-nationhood') which arose in English Canada should not be confused with a positive statement of ethnic identity.

Loyalist-Britannic Canadianism properly understood was not an independent ethnic consciousness, but, like the identity of loyal South Africans, Australians, Rhodesians and even Ulster-Protestants, acted as a liminal state of mind lying between a British and an indigenous ethnicity. The most significant reason why such a mindstate was so often found in ex-British settlements is that the prestige of the British historical narrative contrasted so sharply with the novelty and parochiality of the local pioneering tradition that political and cultural elites clung to the old identity. Thus in nineteenth century Canada, the elite favoured membership in the British Empire not only as a 'direct political, military and economic counterweight to (American-driven) continentalism,' but also as 'a route to prominence on the world stage.'

It seems that the lure of British origins for the English-Canadian was akin to the lure of Arab descent for the Mauritian Indian in the 1970's. Both involve what Karl Deutsch would call the prestige factor influencing the direction of intergroup assimilation. In the case of English Canada, the prestige of British identity prevented the settler population from asserting a separate self-consciousness based on their new surroundings, selective genealogy and unique local history. Added to this was the fact that the English-Canadians were ethnically indistinguishable from the Americans. The result was a confused sense of English-Canadian ethnic consciousness, which, after 1867, fed directly into a crisis of 'Canadian' national consciousness.

After the First World War, Canadian ethnic Britannicism, like American Anglo-Saxonism, came to be de-legitimated. Since the 1960s, a similar development has occurred in Quebec. This has caused much consternation and soul-searching, as is readily evident from the discourse in the United States and French Quebec. Nevertheless, the existence of a unitary ethnic antecedent has given the Americans and French-speaking
Quebecers a stronger sense of national identity and an important resource for cultural renewal.  

In the nation of English Canada, by contrast, the duality of its ethnic antecedent has circumvented this possibility, giving English-Canadians no sense of cultural rootedness. This has forced them to rely ontologically on a Canadian state that by definition must act as a neutral organ of compromise, a factor painfully obvious during recent constitutional negotiations. At once British and American, the Loyalist heritage leaves the contemporary English-Canadian trapped, resulting in an anxiety which is seamlessly projected onto the Canadian state.

In this regard, the anguished poetry of contemporary Loyalist descendant Dennis Lee, applicable throughout the past two hundred years, seems likely to have relevance into the foreseeable future:

'The Dream of Tory origins
Is full of lies and blanks
Though what remains when it is gone
To prove that we're not Yanks?'

FOOTNOTES

1 The National Unity issue is usually discussed in the New Year's issue of Maclean's magazine. For example, page 12 of the Jan.1, 1990 issue spoke of attempts at national self definition being 'strained by the pull between provincial ambitions and the federal power, by Canada's historical linguistic duality, by regional grievances and especially by the waxing and waning of nationalist sentiment in Quebec.'

2 See the Faces column in the Vancouver Sun, Thursday, August 25, 1994.


4 The sheer volume of work in this area precludes a complete list. A good starting point, however, is provided by Stephen Clarkson's article, 'A Programme for Binational Development' in Peter Russell (ed),
For the classic work in this genre, see Hugh MacLennan’s *Two solitudes* (Toronto: Collins, 1945). More recently, Charles Taylor, in his *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), has addressed a similar theme while expanding his scope to include issues of multiculturalism.

A good compendium of opinion on this subject may be found in Ajzenstat, Janet and Peter J. Smith (eds), *Canada's Origins: Liberal, Tory or Republican?* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press 1995). Especially interesting is Colin Pierce's analysis of 'Egerton Ryerson's Canadian Liberalism' in chapter eight. Also of importance is Rod Preece, 'Tory Myth and Conservative Reality: Horowitz revisited,' in *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory* 2.2: 175-79.


20 Fischer, p. 423.


24 Burkey, p. 158.


27 Wallace, pp. 4-5.


29 Fischer, p. 621.

30 Wallace, p. 16.


36 Armstrong, pp. 81-90.


Errington, p. 80.

Errington, pp. 81, 86.


Ibid.

Bell, p. 23.

Here the case of the Indian Muslims of Mauritius is instructive. In the 1970's, they attempted to claim Arab ancestry in response to the prestige of Middle East oil power, but their identity claims were successfully contested by surrounding groups for whom 'really, the Muslims were just as Indian as the Hindus.' (Eriksen, p. 72.)

Bell, p. 24.

McRae in Hartz, p. 268.

Bell, pp. 23-24.

Conor Cruise O'Brien argues that Protestant ethnic groups like the Ulster-Scots or Anglo-Americans frequently referred to their covenantal obligations (as a chosen people) because this was the nature of the relationship between God and the Jews in the Old Testament. Since Protestants placed comparatively greater emphasis on the Old Testament than did Catholics, they employed the covenantal metaphor more often. See O'Brien, Conor Cruise, *God:Land: reflections on religion and nationalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988). More recently, Donald Harman Akenson has explored this connection with respect to the Ulster-Scots, Israelis and Afrikaaners in *God's peoples: covenant and land in South Africa, Israel, and Ulster* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).


Wise, p. 37.

Wise, p. 34.

Wise, p. 40.


58 Craig 1963, p. 245.


60 Clark, p. 226.

61 Wise, p. 52.


64 Duffy, p. 27.

65 Ibid.


67 Duffy, pp. 4, 93.


69 Berger, p. 88.

70 Berger, pp. 90-98.

71 Berger, p. 108.
72 Berger, p. 65.


74 Berger, p. 78.


76 Akenson, pp. 170-71.


78 Berger, p. 135.

79 Lower, p. 195.


82 Berger, p. 231.

83 For the idea of Canadian election, see Wise, pp. 35-40. The idea of Loyalist superiority can be found in Rasporich, p.150.


85 In the United States, this began with the Chicago Liberal Progressives of 1900-1914, came to include the New York Young Intellectuals of 1912-17 and, by the 1930s, liberal historians like Marcus Lee Hansen, labeled 'America's first trans-ethnic historian.' For more on Hansen, see Shenton, James P., 'Ethnicity and Immigration,' in Eric Foner (ed), *The New American History* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), p.252. The Liberal Progressives are discussed in Lissak, Rivka Shpak, *Pluralism and Progressives: Hull House and the new immigrants, 1890-1919*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). Finally, the

86 Underhill, for instance, was highly influenced by John Dewey and Walter Lippmann, both of whom actively opposed Anglo-Saxonism and viewed pluralism as the way forward for America. Moreover, Underhill urged Canadian radicals to 'go to school' to learn about the new American thinking. In the early 1930's, under the influence of these ideas, Underhill came to oppose the British Empire, characterizing it as exploitative. See Francis, R. Douglas, *Frank H. Underhill: Intellectual Provocateur* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), pp. 83, 93.


88 For example, a 1975 poll found that less than half the respondents wished to see Elizabeth's successor recognized as Canada's head of state, while 30 per cent openly advocated forming a new republic. (See CIPO poll #377, March 1975, question 8.) More recently, a 1993 Angus Reid poll found that 51 per cent of Canadians favoured abolishing Canada's constitutional tie with the British monarchy. (See letter from G.C. Blair Baillie, *Vancouver Sun*, August 29, 1993.)


89 An important source for this argument is Reginald Bibby's *The Bibby Report: Social Trends Canadian Style* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1995). The book statistically illustrates how, more than ever before, English-Canadians are identifying themselves with American television personalities and consuming American cultural products. A related theme runs through Peter C. Newman's *The Canadian Revolution: From Deference to Defiance* (Toronto: Viking, 1995). Newman believes that during the 1985-95 period,
Canadians abandoned traditional Tory notions of deference to authority in favour of a more American-style individualism. Though hyperbolic at times, Newman does provide concrete evidence of change in the form of consumer protests, growing dissatisfaction with government, the rise of the Reform Party and the demise of the Progressive Conservative and Social Credit parties.


91 Grant, p.23.

92 Grant, p.90. Grant was not alone in his Tory condemnation of Whig-Liberal influence in Canada, but was followed in his ideas by other intellectuals, most notably Donald Creighton, whose *Canada's First Century* (1970) has been described by W.L. Morton as 'the full orchestration of *Lament for a Nation*.' (Quoted in Berger, 1986, p. 235.)


97 In this regard, the July 10, 1995 issue of *Newsweek* asked the question: 'What is an American?' in reference to the proliferation of the politics of race and lifestyle. This was also the theme of Arthur M. Schlesinger's *The Disuniting of America* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991). Meanwhile, in Quebec, the demographic decline of the French-Canadian core has generated considerable debate. See Breton,


99 Duffy, p. 119.