

## **The Orange Order in Ontario, Newfoundland, Scotland and Northern Ireland: A Macro-Social Analysis**

This paper will attempt to sketch the outlines of the 'big picture' of Orangeism, with a special focus on the largest Orange jurisdictions: Ontario, Newfoundland, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Of the major centres of Orange activity, Liverpool in England, New Brunswick and some of the southern Irish border counties are excluded though we will touch on these cases - as well as the rest of Canada - where appropriate. This paper will also focus on the relatively neglected twentieth century, which is when the Orange Order, like most other fraternal societies, reached its organizational zenith and strongest membership levels. Once again, however, the broad sweep of this paper will, where appropriate, encompass the latter half of the nineteenth century.

This article is deliberately cavalier in its approach to disciplinary boundaries and the restrictions imposed by them. Historians insist upon a narrowly delimited time period while political scientists fetishize the Order's political impact while ignoring its social and geographical aspects. The anthropologist insists that unstructured interviews and participant observation are vital, the historian prefers the archive and the political scientist plumps for statistical accuracy. This paper will address - and transcend - all of these perspectives.

This interdisciplinary approach also suffuses my attitude to sources. I use geographical, archival, interview and quantitative methods as well as participant observation. In theoretical terms, I am as interested in what happens over space (ie geography) as over time (history). I seek to explain the sociology of Orangeism, why its membership rises and falls over time and place, and what this says about modernity. On the other hand, I am interested in Orange political influence: why did/does the Order get involved in politics, what are the contours of its political theory, what are its tactics, and how important is its influence on both high politics and the mass mobilization of the electorate at local level.

The Orange Order is too multifaceted a phenomenon to be easily placed in a disciplinary box. Even its own members cannot agree on whether its function is cultural or religious, and the extent to which it should get involved in politics.<sup>1</sup> Having said this, we need a conceptual base from which we can best understand the Orange Order. This concept is that of ethnicity, specifically *dominant ethnicity*.

### Ethnicity

Students of ethnicity and nationalism are bedevilled by the same interdisciplinary character of their subject matter as students of Orangeism. This is not surprising. Ethnic groups may be defined as large-scale communities whose members believe themselves to be of shared ancestry, and who use one or more cultural markers (ie. language, race, religion) to differentiate themselves from neighbouring ethnic groups.<sup>2</sup> Religion is commonly used as an ethnic boundary marker where language and racial features are similar between adjacent groups, i.e. Serbs/Croats, Irish Catholics/Ulster Protestants, Indian Hindus/Muslims.<sup>3</sup> Religion also serves to contextualize ethnicity, such that the homeland becomes 'sacred' territory blessed by god, the people style themselves chosen by God and blessed by Him.<sup>4</sup> Often, the ethnic community may see its wars as part of a wider religious crusade or jihad.<sup>5</sup> This goes beyond Islamic

ethnies like the Arabs or Christian ones like the Poles and Ukrainians. The Sinhalese, for example, see their role as defenders of Buddhism in a sea of Hinduism and Islam.

Will Kymlicka, in common with many North American writers, views ethnicity as synonymous with minorities. He distinguishes 'ethnocultural groups' which are characterized by their non-territorial immigrant character, from 'nations' which are living in their homelands.<sup>6</sup> Such a device is, unfortunately, spurious, since majority groups can be just as 'ethnic' as minorities.<sup>7</sup> Nations, on the other hand, can be 'civic', and define themselves through politics, mass culture and ideological myths of origin that transcend genealogy. Nobody would accuse the polyglot Eritreans or Americans of being ethnic groups even though both are nations. The key concept when examining Orangeism is *dominant ethnicity*. By dominant ethnicity, I refer to the ethnic community within a nation - whether state or sub-state - that believes the nation to be 'its' nation, and is politically hegemonic. Often this group is also economically and culturally advantaged, and demographically dominant.<sup>8</sup>

In the case of English Canada, Northern Ireland, the west coast of Scotland and northwest England, the dominant *ethnic* group was 'British-Protestant'. This was frequently an amalgam of Scottish, Irish, English, and - in the case of Liverpool - some Welsh Protestant bloodlines. To the extent that the dominant group was truly mixed-Britannic, it could freely express a powerful 'Britannic nationalism' through the symbolism of Empire.<sup>9</sup> Where there was a strong indigenous Protestant ethnic group with its own pre-British history, as in the North or East of Scotland and in much of England, Orangeism did less well. There, people thought of their Britishness in civic terms as sitting on top of their Scottishness or Englishness. On the other hand, in the Britannic melting-pots of Northern Ireland, Canada, and, to a slightly lesser degree, Liverpool and west-central Scotland, Orangeism thrived.

### The Importance of Ethnic Associations

Ethnic groups do not spread their descent myths, boundary awareness and heroic memories through the air. Rather, concrete institutions are required to carry forth the collective memory. These may be organs of state, but when the state's elite is either foreign or uninterested in the fate of the ethnic community, the community turns inward to its 'civil society' of religious institutions and secular associations. Ethnic groups, in Don Handelman's (1977) typology, run the gamut from tightly-knit communities with strong associations to loose ethnic 'categories' like white Americans, who lack such institutions.<sup>10</sup> Many ethnic groups are nourished by networks within religious organizations. However, secular associations also play a role in the modern period - and many of these are offshoots of religious bodies or are quasi-religious in character. The Afrikaner Broederbond, Hindu RSS, French-Canadian St. Jean Baptiste Society, the Irish Gaelic League and Gaelic Athletic Association are all examples of this phenomenon. In Egypt, the Freemasons provided the nexus for a nascent Arab nationalism in the 1870s.<sup>11</sup>

In the United States, a series of working-class and rural Native-Protestant associations have represented the 'old-stock' white Protestant population in defense against Catholic immigrants from Ireland and elsewhere. These included the Order of United Americans, who were also influential in the Know-Nothing movement which, by 1854, had united its disparate local movements into a national party organization which would likely have taken the presidency but for the Civil War.<sup>12</sup> In the 1890s, the American Protective Association, with over a million members, filled this role. In the 1910s and 1920s, the second Ku Klux Klan stepped into the breach and its

membership swelled to six million, mainly in northern states like Indiana and Oregon where religion, not race, was the key issue. But these movements lacked the institutional permanence and symbolic durability of the Orange Order, and thus failed to survive serious crises. Perhaps the closest American cousin to the Orange Order was not the puny American Orange Order, but the Evangelical Alliance for the United States, which sought to unite the fragmented denominations of American Protestantism against the Catholic 'menace' beginning in 1847. However, its ecumenical energies were absorbed into the Federal Council of Churches whose ecumenism eventually escaped from its sectarian box during 1905-10. This revolution saw the Protestant crusade pitched overboard in favour of toleration and overtures to Catholicism, which reinforces the contention that American Protestant associations lacked the durability of symbols and outlook which characterizes Orangeism.<sup>13</sup>

### Orange Membership Trends over Time

Let us begin with a sociology of Orangeism. In trying to explain the causes of Orangeism, one of the more useful techniques is to examine the trajectory of membership across both space and time in order to try and link these trends to broader social trends. Given that the Order was founded in 1795 and spread within thirty years to Scotland and Canada, we are justified in describing Orangeism as a modern (i.e. post-French Revolutionary, democratic) phenomenon. A stable organization like the Orange Order thereby provides a good yardstick for assessing the transition from industrial modernity to post-industrial or 'high' modernity.<sup>14</sup> If Orange membership and political influence rose with modernization but declined with the advent of post-industrial modernity, this suggests that there may be something qualitatively different about this 'postmodern' phase.

In theoretical terms, this research intersects with three major debates: social theory, social movements theory, and ethnicity/nationalism theory. The analysis attempts to explain which forces drive the growth and decline of a large-scale social movement over place and time. Another implication of this project for social theory concerns the cause of fluctuations in Orange membership and power. Here, one axis of debate centres around whether the engine of social change is the techno-economic 'base' of society (the position held by orthodox Marxists and many rational choice theorists) or its cultural-symbolic 'superstructure,' the explanation favoured by many in the Durkheim-Weber tradition.<sup>15</sup> To these 'economistic' and 'culturalist' theories, one must add the more recent empirical political theories which ascribe independent causal power to institutional processes and events.<sup>16</sup>

Debates in social theory have their correlates in social movements theory, particularly in the work of Robert Putnam. Putnam's recent research, using American data, attempts to explain the decline in 'social capital,' or voluntary association, in the United States. Fraternal societies like the Orange Order or Freemasons, Putnam notes, are amongst the hardest hit by recent developments. Putnam surmises that the rise of television accounts for much of the change, and that a significant difference in attitudes toward civic engagement exists between pre and post-World War II generations.<sup>17</sup> This techno-economic explanation is challenged by 'culturalists,' who contend that attitude changes are the significant factor, and by empirical political theorists who point to the causal impact of events like the First World War or institutional forces like the federal government.

This paper assesses cultural, techno-economic and institutionalist explanations for changes in patterns of Orange membership over time and place. Accordingly, this


paper attempts to test high-level theories with empirically grounded research, thereby bridging an important divide in social science. At a more middle-range level of analysis, ethnicity/nationalism theorists are concerned with the question of whether ethnicity, dominant or otherwise, tends to decline in high modernity. One school of thought, modernization theory, holds that this is precisely the case.<sup>18</sup> To some degree, Steve Bruce, a leading authority on comparative Protestant politics, subscribes to this viewpoint, claiming that Protestant hegemony in Britain and North America has declined due to the combined impact of secularization, Protestant schism and structural differentiation.<sup>19</sup> Which of these forces, if any, are significant in accounting for changes in Orange membership and power? Our analysis will shed important light on this question.

Since the 1970s, modernization theory has been eclipsed as the main paradigm in ethnicity and nationalism theory by more conflict-based approaches. These advance the notion that ethnic groups either resist decline or increase their social importance in post-industrial modernity. This is prompted by improved methods of communication, which facilitate greater group consciousness.<sup>20</sup> This occurs because ethnic media and education networks become both more intensive and more extensive, all within an atmosphere of increased awareness of other groups. This paradigm would construe Orange decline as either temporary, or as an aspect of the 'translation' of Protestant tradition from the Orange Order to new social constellations like sports teams or Unionist marching bands.<sup>21</sup> Here again, the analysis will try and assess the relative merits of these two main approaches. In summary, the research will provide a compelling test of some of the major approaches in social theory, social movements theory and ethnicity/nationalism theory.

### Membership Trends Over Space

The first place to begin is by looking at Orangeism internationally. What is strikingly clear is that by the year 1900, Orangeism, like the British Empire, was a worldwide movement in which only a minority of members resided in Northern Ireland - or in Ireland as a whole. In that year, the International Grand Council of the World reported that there were over 5000 Orange lodges worldwide, including some 1700 in Canada (including Newfoundland), 1600 in Ireland and 800 in the United States. The key figure, however, is not the number of lodges reported, but the dues paid - which reflects total membership. Here we find that Ireland and Canada account for at least 90 percent of the total.<sup>22</sup> Yet the irregularity of dues payments makes it difficult to pinpoint the accurate figures beyond rough proportions. Taking data for Northern Ireland, Scotland and Canada from elsewhere and deducing English numbers on a dues basis, we find that the membership is dominated by Canada and Ireland (notably Northern Ireland) in the twentieth century.<sup>23</sup>

Figure 1




Source: see note 23

Canadian (including Newfoundland) membership exceeded that in Ireland by the turn of the century, despite having a similar Protestant population base. Canadian membership peaked in 1920, at which time Canada accounted for almost sixty percent of international membership (if we exclude the smaller jurisdictions of the United States, Australasia and Eire it is 61.6 percent). The Canadian lodges also had twice the membership of their Northern Irish counterparts at this point! Sharp membership decline in much of Canada outside Newfoundland in the 1920-38 period reduced the Canadian advantage so that by the end of the Second World War, Northern Ireland had edged ahead of Canada. The 'Ulsterization' of the Order continues to this day with over 60 percent of members now based in Northern Ireland. The Canadian organization has experienced such heavy decline that there is now little difference in size between the Scottish, English and Canadian branches of the organization!

In Canadian terms, Ontario, New Brunswick and Newfoundland have been the leading Orange provinces. Yet New Brunswick's prominence belongs more to the nineteenth than the twentieth century. Its 11 percent share of Canadian membership in 1901 had declined to six percent by 1918. In the 1918-25 period, New Brunswick's membership was again cut in half, and it never recovered. On the other hand, Ontario and Newfoundland generally comprised around three-quarters of the membership in the twentieth century, though Newfoundland became increasingly important after World War II and now makes up half the Canadian membership.<sup>24</sup>

Figure 2.




Source: see note 24

In making sense of these trends, one must always be mindful of the target population of British-origin Protestants. On this basis, we can calculate the per capita strength, or 'density' of Orangeism among the Protestant male adults of each of the major jurisdictions. Taking 1920 - the period of greatest Orange strength - as a baseline, we find that the most Orange spot in the world was Newfoundland. In 1920, over a third of its adult male Protestants were Orange members - a staggering statistic when we bear in mind that many more would have been initiated into the organization but may not have been current members. Membership density in Northern Ireland was

considerably lower, at one in five of the target population. Ontario membership density was just half of Northern Ireland, with west-central Scotland well behind at under 2 percent.<sup>25</sup>

Figure 3.




Source: See note 25.

### Regional Variations

In regional terms, membership density also varied a great deal. For instance, within Northern Ireland during much of the twentieth century, roughly a third of Ulster Protestants from west of the Bann River were Orangemen while only one in ten east of the Bann (i.e. Antrim, Down, Belfast) were in membership. The origins of this difference are various. Arguably most important is the religious makeup of the respective parts of the province. Catholics are far more numerous west of the Bann, and this area has generally had only a slim Protestant majority throughout the twentieth century (now a Catholic majority). In addition, the established Church of Ireland and its associated traditions are strongest in Fermanagh, and weakest east of the Bann. Presbyterianism is much stronger East of the Bann (especially in Antrim), and Methodism has a firm base in Belfast. These churches were linked with tenants-rights and workers-rights campaigns against the established Ulster 'squirearchy', Belfast bourgeoisie and the established Church of Ireland since the late eighteenth century. For a long time in the nineteenth century there were few or no lodges in Antrim and Belfast, and the mostly Scottish-settled East Bann - majority Protestant and highly Presbyterian - was not fertile ground for the Orange movement.

Figure 4. Orange Lodges, Northern Ireland, Weighted by Size




Source: Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland returns. Digital boundaries courtesy of Ordnance Survey of Northern Ireland.

Outside of Northern Ireland, we find other striking patterns. In Scotland, as can be seen in figure 5, there are virtually no lodges outside the central belt (i.e. in regions like the Highlands and Borders), and there is a marked concentration of lodges on the west coast around Glasgow and greater Clydeside. This is no accident: virtually all Irish settlement from the famine period onward came to the west-central area, though Dundee, in the Northeast, forms a partial exception. Curiously, Dundee received little Irish-Protestant immigration. On the other hand, counties like West Lothian and Ayrshire received relatively large numbers of Irish-Protestants and fewer Irish Catholics and became among the strongest Orange counties. In Ontario (see figure 6), Dufferin County, north of Toronto, has the highest Orange density, and for good reason. The 1931 census found that 51 percent of Dufferin's British-Protestant residents were of Irish ancestry, the highest of any Ontario county. This predominance is less starkly evident in the heavily Orange Grey, Bruce and Peel counties early in the twentieth century, suggesting that other factors (which we will explore in a minute) were also important.




Figure 5.  
Orange Lodges, Scotland, 2001, Weighted by Size



Source: Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland returns. Digital boundaries courtesy of EDINA/UK Borders.


Figure 6. Orange Lodges, Ontario, c.1975



Source: Houston, Cecil and William J. Smyth. 1980. *The Sash Canada Wore: A Historical Geography of the Orange Order in Canada* (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press)

This brings us to Newfoundland, where there has been virtually no Irish-Protestant settlement. Here a different dynamic from other locales appears to operate. Orange lodges are clustered throughout Newfoundland except for the Catholic St. Mary's Bay on the southern shore of the Avalon peninsula. A closer look at Orange density, though, shows that the Order's strength is greatest outside the more densely-populated Avalon along the south and east coasts of 'mainland' Newfoundland. In the long right-angle sweeping from Fortune and Placentia to Trinity and Bonavista bays, over a third of adult male Protestants would have been Orangemen in 1945, rising to half in the Burin peninsula. On the other hand, little more than 5 percent of St. John's Protestants were Orangemen, and Orange strength was not much greater in Labrador, Humber and Grand Falls.


Figure 7. Orange Lodges, Newfoundland, 1961 (Weighted by Size)



Source: Grand Lodge of Newfoundland Returns Book; Digital Map courtesy of Alvin Simms, Department of Geography, Memorial University of Newfoundland

A multiple regression analysis of membership density on the 1945 Newfoundland census finds that the only reliable predictor of Orange strength is the close-knit nature of the population (measured by proportion of migrants from other census divisions), and, marginally, the sex ratio of men to women. Religious denomination does not enter the picture and the proportion of Catholics is strikingly insignificant. Transience, defined as the proportion of residents from another district, is greatest in St. Johns and more outlying districts like Labrador or the paper-producing community of Grand Falls. Can we find a similar pattern elsewhere? Interestingly, a map of Orange density in Northern Ireland (see figure 8) today shows precisely the same pattern: Belfast, Londonderry and smaller urban centres are extremely weak Orange areas as indicated by light colours. Even in the west Bann Orange heartland, larger towns like Dungannon, Lurgan and Cookstown form light patches of weak Orangeism within the fiercely Orange rural hinterland. Thus towns (which tend to have a greater proportion of in-migrants than rural areas) tend to be less fertile ground for Orangeism.

Figure 8. Orange Density by District Electoral Area, Northern Ireland, 1991 (no data from Co. Antrim)



Source: Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland returns; Ordnance Survey of Northern Ireland; Census of Northern Ireland 1991.

### Historical Trends


A geographical analysis is useful for highlighting membership trends over space - but the factors that cause Orange membership to be stronger in one area than another are often not the same factors that explain membership fluctuations over time. For example, Orangeism may be stronger in counties of Ontario or Scotland first settled by Irish-Protestants. But once this initial pattern has been established, membership fluctuation may have more to do with other forces. In addition, a multiple-regression analysis that looks at a wide range of different variables will be useful in teasing out the leading causes of shifts in membership density.

### Comparative

One way to test this is to look at changes in the geographic patterns over time. We begin with tests for the period 1891-1961 for Ontario counties and 1861-1991 in Scotland (counties) using census data. We need to bear in mind, though, that censuses are taken only every 10-20 years and that relationships change much more quickly over time than over place. All of which means that any time-series cross-sectional (pooled) analyses will be dominated by the cross-sectional (geographic) differences. Our analysis in figure 9 bears this out. In Ontario, the Irish proportion of the British-Protestant population of a county (defined on the basis of 1931 census data) predicted Orange density almost three times better than the next most prominent factor which was the proportion French-Catholic. Also significant, albeit somewhat less important, were the proportion of Protestants who were members of the Presbyterian and Methodist churches that did not join the United Church of Canada in 1925. This more conservative-Protestant factor, along with measures of rural residence, predicted

higher Orange membership. Finally, the higher the Scottish proportion of the British-Protestant population, the lower the Orange participation.


Figure 9.



Source: Census of Ontario; Grand Lodge of Ontario East reports, 1891-1931; Grand Lodge of Ontario West reports, 1891-1961.

Turning next to Scotland (see figure 10), we find that the by far the strongest predictor is also Irish-Protestant percentage (z-score of 17!), with proportion Catholic weaker than various events at explaining membership, but still significant. On the other hand, proportion agricultural was found to be negatively associated with Orange participation at a z-score of around 3. Recall that this contrasts with the findings in Ontario, Northern Ireland and Newfoundland where rural populations were more close-knit and more Orange. This discrepancy is probably explained by the fact that Irish-Protestant immigrants came to Scotland to work in the industrial cities and towns while Orangeism remained a foreign import among the native Scots population, even in the agricultural areas of west-central Scotland.

Figure 10.



Source: Hechter, Michael. 1976. *UK County Data 1851-1966* (UKDA); Census of Scotland 1971-1991; Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland reports and returns.

In both Ontario and Scotland, Irish-Protestant immigration was the most important factor in explaining the strength of Orangeism among Protestants. In Northern Ireland, the size of the local Catholic population in the county was key for the 1901-1971 period. This factor also looms large in Ontario and Scotland, where the proportion of local Catholics in a county was significantly related to the strength of Orangeism. An extreme case of this can be seen in Northern Ireland in South Down and South-west Armagh (around Keady-Newtownhamilton). These areas are sometimes viewed as 'bandit' (i.e. IRA) country by local Protestants, but the minority status of the local Protestant population has caused them to band together strongly in Orange lodges. As a result, while Orangeism has declined in more Protestant North Down and North Armagh over the past few decades, it has retained its strength in the southern border zones - even as the Protestant population has been migrating away from these areas to the north!

Does Catholic population always stimulate Orangeism? Clearly not. Newfoundland stands as the great exception to the rule of Catholic competition, which we will come to later on. In the meantime, notice that the rural inflection of Newfoundland Orangeism's strength has echoes in Ontario and Northern Ireland, where rural areas are also more strongly Orange. We see this in the relative weakness of Orangeism among Protestants in the 'capitals' of St Johns, Toronto, Glasgow and Belfast. In 1951, the 5000 Orangemen of Toronto represented just under 2 percent of the city's British-Protestant male adult population. In that same year, the 4000 Orangemen of Glasgow represented about the same proportion of that city's target

population while in St. Johns, the 500 local Orangemen formed just 4 percent of the city's adult male Protestant population. In Belfast, by contrast, the city's Orangemen were at the peak of their strength in 1951: roughly 15,000, or about 15 percent of the target population of 110,000 male non-Catholic adults. Yet, historically, the Belfast Order enrolled only about ten percent of eligible Protestants in the twentieth century and today, the 3000 Orangemen in the city number not more than five percent of the adult male Protestant population.

All told, the magnitude of the rural effect is strongest in Newfoundland and weakest in Scotland. In Northern Ireland, the magnitude of the urban-rural trend is a comparatively recent development. In other words, the rural-urban divide within Ulster Orangeism has widened as urban areas have lost large proportions of their membership in response to post-1960 trends. Let us consider this recent development more closely because it turns out to be important in all of our cases.


### The Coming of Post-Industrial Society

Daniel Bell's classic work, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (1973), foretold of major occupational shifts from industrial sectors to 'tertiary' sectors like services and the professions. Bell was also known among sociologists for highlighting the change in the cultural ethos of modern western societies toward 'antinomian' individualism, de-traditionalization and cultural relativism.<sup>26</sup> In a different vein, Robert Putnam points out that from his sample of more than a hundred American chapter-based associations, the general trend was growth until 1929 (punctuated by World War I), followed by decline during the Great Depression, strong recovery after World War II, growth until the early 1960s, and steady decline thereafter. The latter phenomenon Putnam refers to as reflecting a decline in 'social capital' or associational connectedness.<sup>27</sup>

Examining the occasionally fragmentary record of membership across Northern Ireland, Scotland, Ontario West and Newfoundland during 1901-2004 in figure 11, we find some similarities in historical membership trends.<sup>28</sup> The period from 1900 until 1914 was one of rising fortunes for all branches of the Order. This was particularly the case for Newfoundland, where membership quadrupled inside twenty years. In Ontario West, membership doubled in the period 1900 to 1920, and in Scotland, membership had doubled between 1900 and 1913. Gains were more modest in Northern Ireland, as indicated by County Down figures, but even here, membership in 1920 was up by 50 percent over its 1900 level. World War I itself, which featured such gruesome campaigns as the Battle of the Somme, claimed a disproportionate death toll among the Ulster 36<sup>th</sup> and Newfoundland Regiments. Its impact on membership was not, however, uniform. Even taking into account variations in record-keeping, it is startling to see how the Great War led to membership decline in Scotland and County Down (and probably the rest of Northern Ireland), but had no effect on the rising trajectory of Ontario and Newfoundland Orangeism. After 1918, Ontario West membership reaches its peak and begins to decline. Newfoundland membership and County Down membership also peak in the 1918-20 period and enter a period of decline. Scotland, however, rebounds strongly after 1918 – one possible explanation being the explosive sectarian controversy generated by the 1918 Education Act which introduced state funding for Catholic schools.<sup>29</sup> Ontario West membership patterns begin to diverge at this point. Whereas Newfoundland, Scotland and County Down (Northern Ireland) have their ups and downs, Ontario West's decline appears steadier and more protracted. All

jurisdictions decline during the Great Depression (1929-33) and recover during 1941-2, but by 1942, Ontario West was the only jurisdiction to have fewer members than it did at the start of the century.

Figure 11.




Source: GOLI return sheet, 1901-1965, GOLI returns 1966-2004; GL Co. Down reports 1901-2004; GLNF reports; GOLS reports 1901-1966; GOLS returns 1967-2003; GOLOW return sheet 1901-1995

Figure 12 shows how things developed in the post-1945 period. Here we include figures from the Canadian and Newfoundland Ladies Orange Benevolent Association (LOBA) and we have a better record of Northern Ireland-wide data. In County Down and Ontario West, the postwar membership peak is attained in 1949-50. Northern Ireland membership as a whole peaks around 1960 (this a balance of mid-50s peaks for the East Bann counties and mid-60s peaks for West Bann counties).<sup>30</sup> Canadian Orangewomen peak in the mid-50s, but their Newfoundland sisters continue growing strongly until 1963. It appears as though Newfoundland Orangeism (men and women) held its strength for 5-10 years longer than in Ontario.<sup>31</sup> Recall Robert Putnam's work which showed that chapter-based organizations peaked in the US around 1960 and declined thereafter. This 'Putnam effect' linked to generational changes in attitudes toward 'joining' and social connectedness shows up strongly in the Canadian jurisdictions, whose numbers are in free fall by the early 60s. In Northern Ireland, decline is delayed by the violence of the Troubles which leads to a membership 'bounce' between 1969-72, but thereafter, the rate of decline is similar to that of the Canadians. Scotland appears to buck the trend, and membership remains buoyant until 1987, when it begins to decline in line with the other jurisdictions. The exact source of Scottish exceptionalism is somewhat mysterious, though 1987 was the date of the Pope's first visit to Scotland – a major setback for Orange political aspirations and an event that may explain subsequent decline. Also, the Scottish case is really only exceptional for males, since Scottish female membership, which exceeded male membership during 1930-50, peaked in the early 1950s and junior membership reached its peak in the late 1960s.



Figure 12.



Source: See figure 11. Also Newfoundland LOBA Reports 1945-1999; LOBA of Canada Reports 1923-1959.

### The Role of Events

We explained much of the geographical membership variation in terms of three key cultural factors (in descending order of importance): Irish-Protestant ethnicity, proportion local Catholics and Protestant denomination. Economic factors like occupation, houses, mortality and class were insignificant predictors of Orange density in all areas, though the rural/urban divide (linked to the divide between close-knit *gemeinschaft* and looser *gesellschaft* societies) seems to matter in all jurisdictions apart from Scotland. On the other hand, the tone of the discussion above explaining membership fluctuations over time suggests that events like the world wars, depression or episodes of political violence are key. But are they? One way to find out is to interpolate (i.e. ‘connect the dots’) decennial census data to bridge census years and compare this annual estimated data with annual membership figures, major historical events and population data. This is an extensive exercise which I have only completed for Scotland (1861-2001), but the results suggest that cultural factors (notably Irish-Protestant ethnicity and proportion Catholic) remain the strongest predictors of membership variation, economic ones the weakest and events lay in between in terms of power in predictive membership change over time and place.

### Individual Data: Class, Religion, Ethnicity

Much of the analysis we have presented is based on county-level aggregate data which compares census and membership. But individual-level records largely confirm our findings. For instance, an analysis of all findable lodge masters and secretaries (256 in sample) from the Scottish Orange directory of 1881 against the

nominal census of Scotland in that year paints a clearer picture: fully 72 percent were Irish-born.<sup>32</sup> The average age was 39, almost all were working-class (just 4.8% were nonmanual), with a slight majority in skilled as opposed to unskilled trades. Given the occupational background of most inhabitants of central Scotland at the time (which was not vastly dissimilar to this), the birthplace of Scottish Orangemen stands out far more dramatically than their occupational profile, which confirms our thesis regarding the relative importance of religio-ethnic over structural factors. It also confirms the ethnic Irishness of Scottish Orangeism.<sup>33</sup>

No ethnic data are freely available for years after 1881 (1891 and 1901 data is available for a fee), but we can still track occupational data through valuation rolls. Examining the valuation rolls of 1911 for Glasgow shows a much higher representation of petit-bourgeois occupations like shopkeeper and clerk than in Scotland as a whole in 1881. Fully 27 percent of our sample of 99 masters and secretaries from the city were in this category in 1911.<sup>34</sup> Again, this reflects the occupational structure of the city and should dispel any notion that Orangeism was a unique product of class, as opposed to ethnoreligious, relationships. That said, the class profile of Scottish Orangemen did increasingly stand out after the 1950s because it was essentially the same as it was in 1881 while the country as a whole had shifted in a far more post-industrial and professional direction.<sup>35</sup>

A similar exercise was conducted for Ontario (East and West) in 1901. Here we were able to find 345 masters and secretaries. There is very strong representation from farmers, but a fair sprinkling of both petit-bourgeois (ie clerk, hardware store owner) and some professionals. Again, what stands out is not class but ethnicity: 61 percent of Ontario Orangemen were of Irish ancestry as opposed to just 29 percent of the Ontario Protestant population. On the other hand, Scots and English are both underrepresented within the Order in 1901. In terms of religion, the largest overrepresentation is Anglican (32% vs. 17% in the Ontario Protestant population), but it is worth noting that Methodists are also overrepresented by nine percentage points. Indeed, the largest ethnoreligious group in the Ontario Order is Irish Methodist (23.5%) followed closely by Irish Anglican (22.3%) with Irish Presbyterian a distant third at 13.9 percent. One major difference from Scotland concerns birthplace – over 85 percent of the Ontario sample were born in Ontario and just 6.7 percent hailed from Ireland. Though twenty years might have made some difference to the nativity of Scots Orangemen, this provides pretty strong evidence that the Order assimilated much better in largely rural Ontario than it did in industrial west-central Scotland.<sup>36</sup> The conversion of the Irish to North American Methodism is further proof of their adaptability, for they did not bring it from the Old Country. To wit, in no county in Ulster did Methodists account for more than eight percent of the Protestant total.<sup>37</sup> Host receptivity was also important: much of the literature on Scottish Orangeism emphasizes the suspicion and aloofness of the native Scots population to what was seen as a foreign import.<sup>38</sup>

Yet another factor may have been the source regions and adaptability of the original Irish settlers. Akenson notes that most Irish-Protestants in Canada hailed from Ulster border counties like Cavan and Monaghan – these being conservative agricultural counties settled by English planters, Church of Ireland in religion and strongly Orange.<sup>39</sup> By contrast, Brenda Collins proffers that between a quarter and a third of Irish immigrants to Scotland in the 1880-1910 period were from strongly Presbyterian Antrim alone while Hutchison estimates that roughly 60 percent of Irish immigrants to Scotland in the 1876-81 period came from the four most Protestant counties (Antrim, Down, Armagh, Londonderry).<sup>40</sup> Thus - in contrast to the prevailing

wisdom - it seems that Scotland's Irish-Protestant immigrants were generally drawn from the least Orange sections of Ulster while Canadian Irish-Protestants originated from the most Orange regions.

A similar exercise for Northern Ireland on a smaller scale using 1901 textual nominal census data showed that half of the 93 Belfast lodge masters and secretaries sampled were Church of Ireland in religion, as opposed to 39 percent among the general Protestant population in the city. In terms of class, 81 percent were manual workers, with a 50-30 tilt toward skilled operatives, and 18 percent were petit-bourgeois. Among district officers, the Church of Ireland factor was even more important: 53 percent of our sample of 39 Belfast officers and 63 percent of our Tyrone sample of 33 hailed from this established denomination – the latter in a county where only 50 percent of Protestants were Church of Ireland. In terms of age, district officers were 47 in both counties, but just 34 among local lodge masters and secretaries. Both the Tyrone and Belfast class profiles show that Orange district officers were part of the middle or elite classes: in Belfast, 46 percent were petit-bourgeois and 8 percent professional. In Tyrone, 23 percent of district officers were professionals or ministers. However, in terms of the wider swath of membership – as illustrated by the local lodge sample for Belfast – neither class nor denomination jumps out as strikingly significant in 1901 though the Church of Ireland is significantly overrepresented.<sup>41</sup>

As in Scotland, though, these dynamics change over time. Looking at a healthy sample of over 4000 recruits into the Belfast Order in 1961, 1965, 1971, 1981, and 1986, the denominational factor has disappeared and the Belfast Order perfectly reflects the city's denominational mix. In terms of class, however, the background of Belfast Orange recruits is probably very similar to what it was at the turn of the century. As in Scotland, the Order's class position has 'slipped' *vis á vis* the wider society in the twentieth century and there is little representation from the new tertiary and service sectors. Even so, the paucity of petit-bourgeois and professional occupations among these young (early 20s) men is interesting - nonmanual occupations never make up more than 10 percent of the sample. Moreover, the decline of apprentices, from 20 percent in 1961 to under 3 percent in 1986 and the concomitant rise of unemployed recruits from nil in 1971 to almost 15 percent in 1986 reflects the deindustrialization of the city's proletariat in these years.<sup>42</sup>

### Political Influence

We have tracked the sociology of Orangeism as an association representing the dominant Protestant ethnic group, but what can we say about its political activity? Let us begin by noting that the Orange Order has been a political animal in virtually every jurisdiction it has inhabited, at the local, provincial and national levels. Part of this activism is abetted by the training in public speaking, networking and running for office which ambitious Orangemen acquire as they ascend the Orange hierarchy from local through to Grand Lodge. These activities help to equip its members with vital civic skills, something Putnam has remarked upon as a hallmark of many chapter-based associations.<sup>43</sup> More important, however, is the Order's curious position as part pressure group, part association. Pressure groups are known for their short life-cycle, while established associations with deep communal roots like churches are far more enduring, though often less politically active.<sup>44</sup> The Order combines both, which allows it to withstand the vagaries of politics without disappearing, but also creates tension between its political and religious goals. Such a fissure is continually reflected

in debates within the Order between those who want it to have a more active political role and those who feel that its principles and constitution stipulate it to be a religious association.

This controversy flares up regularly in the Northern Ireland Order, where the Grand Lodge's links to the UUP have been bitterly criticized by both right-leaning Independent/DUP voters and leftist Northern Ireland Labour voters since the early 1950s. In 1953, for instance, Grand Lodge's inner sanctum, the Central Committee, felt confident enough in its position to 'call upon every member of the Orange Institution to vote for and support...the [Official] Unionist candidates, and thus to ensure a successful return of a Unionist Government with a triumphant majority.'<sup>45</sup> This blatant assertion of UUP-Orange unanimity did not meet with unanimous approval, however. Speaking for the Belfast County Grand Lodge, Sam Campbell, supported by several Belfast Central Committee members, later opined that many 'Labour men were good enough Unionists.'<sup>46</sup> Here we see that Central Committee, led by Grand Master John Andrews, a former (UUP) Prime Minister of Northern Ireland was encountering stiff resistance from the strong Belfast-based Labourite minority. In Antrim, the opposition came from the Paisleyite/Independentist right. As Antrim Central Committee representative Rev. A.J. Finch argued after the Dungiven Parade controversy of 1953-4: 'The Orange Order exists to defend the cause of Protestantism and not to defend a particular Political Party.'<sup>47</sup> Finch's argument seamlessly flowed fifty years later, when County Antrim lodges were in the forefront of pushing for a severance of the link to the UUP and the County lodge refused to pay its dues to the party.<sup>48</sup>

The literature on electoral cleavages recognizes the cardinal role of voluntary associations like churches, unions or pressure groups in providing the institutional skeleton for the maintenance of political cleavages. Such mass organizations may engage in lobbying, voter mobilization and propaganda efforts, and attempt to influence or control constituency-associations - in the process helping to furnish parties with political candidates. In certain cases, these associations have organic links to major parties which may be explicitly formulated in party constitutions. The link between trade unions and the Labour Party in Britain may thereby be usefully compared with the connection between the Orange Order and Ulster Unionist Party in Northern Ireland. Similar links exist in other societies, for instance the Hindu nationalist RSS fraternity is linked to the BJP party in India, the Afrikaner Broederbond to the National Party in apartheid South Africa, and the St. Jean Baptiste Society is informally networked with the Parti Quebecois in Quebec.

At a local level, the Orange Order has maintained links with conservative municipal politicians in Liverpool, the west of Scotland, and in Ontario – especially in Toronto. In Newfoundland, the Order has been associated with the Liberal Party since Confederation in 1949 and in Northern Ireland it was linked to the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) until 2005. Members of the Order have also been involved with militant Protestant parties led by charismatic figures, but – and this is crucial – the Order itself has generally not endorsed these militant ventures because of its mistrust of street politics and its desire to tuck to the centre of its constituency.<sup>49</sup> The nature of the political system in which the Order operates is also important. In Scotland, Newfoundland and Ontario (as in Canada at the federal level), there is a Westminster system with pragmatic 'catchall' parties like Liberal, Conservative or Labour/NDP based on class ideology. The system makes it tough for sectarian third parties to emerge and encourages parties to reach to the centre for votes beyond their ethnoreligious base. Lines of class and region cross-cut the ethnoreligious cleavage

thereby making it much harder to mobilize voters along ethnoreligious lines. Residential segregation is also much less pervasive (except in central Liverpool and to a lesser degree in Glasgow), which undercuts ethnic appeals at ward and constituency level.

In Northern Ireland, by contrast, the political system has been based on the ethnoreligious cleavage between Ulster-Protestants and Catholic-Nationalists since partition in 1922. Competition between parties occurs within ethnic blocs and is aimed at 'outbidding' mainstream parties by appealing to the sectarian extremes. This 'outbidding' dynamic has been noted in numerous other divided societies and arises because it is futile for parties to appeal across the communal divide since this strategy will gain few votes from the other ethnic group while losing many from a party's own group.<sup>50</sup> Unsurprisingly, the link between Orangeism and politics is strongest in Northern Ireland. During the Stormont period (1922-72) when the UUP ruled the province, all Prime Ministers of Northern Ireland and all but three cabinet ministers were Orangemen.<sup>51</sup> In a year 2000 study, roughly half the Ulster Unionist Party's 900-member governing body (the UUC) were shown to be Orangemen or women and most UUP MPs and MLAs are as well.<sup>52</sup>

At the elite level, Orangeism has also wielded influence in other jurisdictions, but has never dominated to the same extent as in Northern Ireland, except perhaps at the local level. Toronto has clearly been the epicentre of political Orangeism outside Ulster. For example, the 'Belfast of Canada' has had thirty Orange mayors in its history – and few non-Orangemen could win the job until the 1960s. The Ontario legislature was a third Orange in 1920 and no fewer than four Ontario premiers: George Ferguson (1923-1930), George Henry (1930-34), Thomas Kennedy (1948-49) and Leslie Frost (1949-61) have been Orangemen. At the national level, four Canadian Tory prime ministers were Orange: Sir John A. Macdonald (1867-1873, 1878-1891), John Abbott (1891-2), Mackenzie Bowell (1894-6) and John Diefenbaker (1957-1963).<sup>53</sup> In Newfoundland, the Order's representation in high politics has arguably been even stronger. For instance, the House of Assembly in 1885 was 2/3 Protestant and half the Protestant MLAs were Orangemen.<sup>54</sup> Four Orangemen have served as Prime Ministers of Newfoundland: William Whiteway (1889-94, 1895-7), James Winter (1897-1900), Robert Bond (1900-09) and Richard Squires (1917-23, 1928-32). In addition, the long-serving Joey Smallwood, premier of Newfoundland from confederation in 1949 until 1972, was an Orangeman.<sup>55</sup>

In Scotland, the smaller size of the Order is reflected in its more limited electoral clout. Nonetheless, the Scottish Order was very important in establishing a working-class Tory base in the 1880s through Working Men's Conservative Associations in the west of Scotland. In Glasgow, the Order played an important part in municipal politics until the 1930s, though it never dominated city politics to the same extent as in Toronto.<sup>56</sup> Nationally, in the 1880s and 90s, James Bain, Archibald Campbell and William Whitelaw were the first Scottish Orange MPs.<sup>57</sup> The surge in Orangeism and Protestant politics more generally in the 1920s and 30s following the 1918 Education Act brought at least six new Orange M.P.s to Parliament. These included Sir John Gilmour, who served as Secretary of State for Scotland (1924-29), Col. A.D. McInnes Shaw (also Grand Master), General Hunter Weston, Lt. Col. T.E.R. Moore, William Templeton and Sir John Baird.<sup>58</sup> Overall, however, it is clear that the Order in Scotland only furnished a fraction of the number of politicians it did in Canada and Northern Ireland. We may thus surmise that political influence seems to be linked to the numerical strength of Orange membership, with the caveat that cross-cutting cleavages tended to weaken Orange influence – as in Newfoundland.

A major question that arises from this discussion of high politics is whether the Orange representatives acted in the Protestant interest or were only ‘nominal’ Orangemen who toed their party line. Here the differences in the political environment between Northern Ireland and the other locales is reflected in the relative power of the Orange Order. In Northern Ireland, for example, the Order’s leaders generally conspired to maintain the system of inequality in the allocation of housing and employment in favour of Protestants during the Stormont period (1922-72).<sup>59</sup> However, Northern Ireland falls under British jurisdiction and the post-1945 British governments from Attlee on were determined to implement a universal welfare state in Northern Ireland. This led to growing pressure on Northern Ireland’s UUP leaders to keep their sectarian grassroots in check. In its first forty years, Northern Ireland had just three prime ministers, James Craig, John Andrews and Basil Brooke. All were all staunchly Orange, and Andrews served as Grand Master (1948-55) while Basil Brooke was active in Grand Lodge. After 1963, however, Prime Ministers Terence O’Neill (1963-69), James Chichester-Clark (1969-71) and Brian Faulkner (1972-74) tried to implement reforms. In all three cases, pressure from the Orange grassroots was immense, and these leaders were forced to back away from controversial measures like parade bans or power-sharing which they had promised to the British government. Thus the Order was able to compel their resignation. O’Neill, Chichester-Clark and Faulkner had all earned their spurs as hardline Orangemen prior to becoming elected as UUP leaders, but their Orange commitments had always been more nominal than real, and their appearance at Grand Lodge typically only began in the year or two before they made their UUP leadership bid. The same could be said for David Trimble (1995-2004) and his hardline performance at Drumcree 1995, whereas the other UUP leaders, Harry West (1975-78) and James Molyneaux (1979-94), had longer histories of genuine Orange activism and as a result did not accede to British-driven reforms.<sup>60</sup>

In Canada, some see party politics as following a ‘franchise’ model, whereby local constituency associations have a great deal of autonomy but little national policy input.<sup>61</sup> In addition, the liberal/conservative divide between reformers and the family compact elite cut across religious lines. This cross-cutting cleavage and the dynamics of the Canadian political system prevented the emergence of an ethnoreligious cleavage. We can see this in the way Tory and Liberal-Conservative party leaders assembled complex coalitions like the ‘Orange-Green-Bleu’ alliance post-1836 which united Irish and French Catholics with Ontario Orange Protestants.<sup>62</sup> In Ontario, the Tories were the preferred party of Catholics until 1890. In addition, there were strong differences between the reformist inclinations of Protestants of American and Scottish origin (notably in southwestern Ontario) and the conservative instincts of the more Orange eastern part of the province in the triangle between Toronto, Collingwood and Kingston. After 1890 (some view the 1876 Grand Orange Lodge of Canada sessions as the decisive turning point), Ontario politics began to change and became more polarized along sectarian lines.<sup>63</sup> We can see this statistically by examining Don Blake’s electoral-census county data for the period 1908-1968. Counties with higher Orange densities voted significantly more Tory than those where Protestants were less Orange.<sup>64</sup>

This does not mean the Order’s politicians always remained true to their principles, however. Prominent Orange policy successes driven by Orange politicians were few. They included a) John A. Macdonald’s leaving the Royal Tour in support of Kingston Orangemen despite his official duty to accompany the anti-Orange Duke of Newcastle (1860); b) Ontario Premier George Ferguson’s Regulation 17 restricting

French language instruction (1923) and Ontario MPP George Henry's successful motion to repeal Mitch Hepburn's 1936 Separate School Funding bill.<sup>65</sup> On the other hand, in most cases, elected Orangemen defied the grassroots in search of the electorally more lucrative centre ground. For instance, Orangeman Leslie Frost – in response to Catholic pressure – was the Ontario premier who brought in state funding for separate schools a quarter century after Hepburn.<sup>66</sup> Earlier in the century, Orange Prime Minister Mackenzie Bowell, courting Catholic support, had tried to force Manitoba to reintroduce funding for Catholic schools in 1896. Those Orange MPs who rebelled against him he later labeled a 'nest of traitors'. Likewise, many Orange MPs voted with their party in support of the pro-Catholic Jesuit Estates Act of 1890, though many paid an electoral price in the 1891 election.<sup>67</sup> As Toronto Orangeman and historian Alex Rough observes, the Order could get the vote out and get people elected, but once in power, 'we toed the [Tory] party line nearly every time.'<sup>68</sup>

Similar examples of this behaviour can be found in Newfoundland. For example, in 1885, memories of the deaths of several Orangemen in the 'Harbour Grace Affray' of 1883 at the hands of a Catholic mob were still fresh. These men had been acquitted and this prompted the unprecedented rise of a Protestants-only Reform Party in contravention of the longstanding power-sharing tradition represented by the existing administration of Orangeman William Whiteway whose deputy was the Catholic Ambrose Shea. Though the Reform party was elected on a promise of 'no amalgamation [coalition] with Catholics', it broke this promise within months of attaining office when it welcomed a section of Liberal-Catholic MLAs into its fold. The time-honoured pattern of trans-sectarian electoral alliances had re-established itself as the government sought support from Catholics to make up for divisions within its own ranks. Not only that, but Orange House Speaker Robert Bond spoke out against the Reform Party's Orange Incorporation Bill and Grand Master James Winter was rumoured to have conspired against its passing.<sup>69</sup> As Elinor Senior remarks, 'The amalgamation indicated that the sectarian animosity aroused by politicians for election purposes was easily dispensed with...even though it had a tendency to linger among the less sophisticated of the population.'<sup>70</sup>

Once again, much of this can be traced to cross-cutting cleavages such as the issue of confederation with Canada. This issue cut across the Protestant-Catholic divide, even though most Catholics were anti-confederate and a small majority of Protestants were pro-Confederate. Nonetheless, Confederates tried to mobilize the Protestant vote to their cause. Just prior to Confederation, in 1948, an 'Orange Letter' was sent by Grand Lodge to all lodges warning of a Catholic conspiracy to vote *en bloc* against Confederation. This may have swayed some Orangemen to vote for the Confederates, but it angered just as many. For example, after the vote, L.O.L.# 26 in Cupids (Conception Bay) fumed: 'We protest against use of Grand Lodge funds for printing unnecessary circulars'.<sup>71</sup> Statistical analysis of the 1948 confederation vote shows that while the proportion of Catholic voters in a district was a significant predictor of an anti-Confederation vote, the strength of Orangeism among Protestants had no significant impact at all.<sup>72</sup>

In Scotland, as in Canada and Newfoundland, Orange MPs had little influence over the course of Tory/Unionist policy due to the power of cross-cutting cleavages of class and the fact that sectarian issues had little resonance outside specific working-class locales in west-central Scotland. In the main, the Unionists welcomed the Orange element as a way of mobilizing a working-class vote, but kept the Order at arms length when it came to the party's policies and image.<sup>73</sup> The Scottish Orange MP Sir John Gilmour, for example, as Secretary of State for Scotland, rebuffed the

Church of Scotland's appeal to regulate Irish immigration to Scotland which the Kirk feared was a 'menace' to the Scottish 'race'. Meanwhile Orange Unionist councillor Sir Charles Cleland defended the 1918 Education Act against Protestant grassroots accusations of 'Rome on the Rates'.<sup>74</sup> In electoral terms, I could find no significant Orange effect on the Scottish national vote at either county level (1861-1961) or in Glasgow at ward level (1922-47).<sup>75</sup> In both cases, both class and the proportion of Catholics was highly significant, suggesting that both trade unions and Catholics were more highly mobilized (as Labour or Liberal supporters) than Orange men and women.

## Conclusion

This macro-social overview of the Orange Order seeks to sketch the broad outlines of Orange social and political power. It shows that the Protestants of Newfoundland were the most Orange in the world in the early to mid twentieth century. A third of Newfoundland Protestant males in 1920 were Orangemen, which was considerably higher than the corresponding rate in Northern Ireland (20%), Ontario (10%) or west-central Scotland (2%). Membership in the Order appears to be strongest in close-knit rural areas like Newfoundland outports and Northern Ireland's border hamlets. It is generally strengthened by the presence of a large Catholic population (except in Newfoundland) and, in Scotland and Ontario, by Irish-Protestant immigrants and their descendants. What is clear, though, is that no single factor explains cross-county Orange membership variation across all jurisdictions – thereby underlining the importance of local, contextual factors which shape the more universal forces acting on membership. The Orange Order served as the associational nexus of the Protestant dominant ethnic group in each area, but this was less true in Scotland. To wit, while Protestants in Ontario, Newfoundland and Ulster were composite groups who identified their ethnicity as irreducibly 'British', the dominant group in Scotland was Scottish first, and their Britishness was a civic layer which sat on top of their Scottish ethnicity. This meant that Orangeism would always be more 'foreign' in Scotland than elsewhere and had greater difficulty achieving acceptance and mass penetration as the associational backbone of the dominant group. Overall, cultural variables best explain Orange membership differences between Protestants in different places, with economic factors - especially class and occupation - less important.

Over time, on the other hand, events attain more importance. We can spot certain similarities across all Orange jurisdictions. Membership rose everywhere between 1900 and 1914. The Depression caused membership decline in all cases, while global membership received a boost from the mobilization of World War II. Likewise, all jurisdictions of Orangeism were experiencing decline by the mid-1960s, though Scottish males bucked the trend until 1987. These patterns are similar to those observed by Robert Putnam for chapter-based associations in the United States, and are likely linked to declines in 'social capital' among the Baby Boom and subsequent generations. In terms of class, we find that the Order's class basis tended to match that of the wider Protestant population in 1900, but had 'slipped' considerably by the late twentieth century as Orange recruits remained largely rural or working-class in the face of the expansion of the professions and other tertiary occupations.

Moving on to politics, we find that the Order has played a political role in every location and has never been content to sit on the sidelines as a mere religious fraternity. It has tended to function as a lobby group and an organizational cog in the local Tory/Unionist machine. Its influence has varied depending on a) the nature of



the local political system; and b) the numerical strength of Orangeism. Its force has been felt most keenly in Northern Ireland because the political system is strictly governed by the sectarian cleavage and few vote outside their ethno-religious bloc. This has allowed the Order to develop official ties to the governing Ulster Unionist Party and discipline successive leaders who stray too far in the direction of pro-Catholic reform. In all other jurisdictions, by contrast, political cleavages are cross-cutting, so ethno-religious allegiances are bisected by class and ideology. Significant elements of the Protestant population in the non-Ulster cases are primarily loyal to other identities: in Scotland, class-voting was key; in Ontario, a blend of ideology, region and class; and in Newfoundland, the Confederate/anti-Confederate divide. In Northern Ireland, there are very few Catholics who would vote for a non-Catholic party and so few incentives for Protestant politicians to risk losing core support to chase them. But this is not true elsewhere. As a result, parties are organized as 'catchall' parties and tack to the centre, careful to steer a middle course between Catholic and Orange extremes. This limits Orange power. Orange success has been greatest when it comes to getting Orange candidates elected and helping Tories/Unionists to win elections. However, outside Ulster, elected Orange politicians rarely did their supporters' bidding and thus the Order's success in fielding politicians rarely translated into concrete policy success.

<sup>1</sup> 'Forward Within the Community' conference, 18 Jan, 2003, Templepatrick, proceedings (Grand Lodge of Ireland 2003)

<sup>2</sup> Smith, A.D. *National Identity*, (London: Penguin, 1991)

<sup>3</sup> McGarry, John., and O'Leary, Brendan (eds).1995. *Explaining Northern Ireland* (Oxford: Blackwell), ch. 1

<sup>4</sup> O'Brien, Conor Cruise, *God:Land: reflections on religion and nationalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Smith, Anthony D. 2004. *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

<sup>5</sup> Armstrong, John. 1982. *Nations Before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press)

<sup>6</sup> Kymlicka, Will, *Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)

<sup>7</sup> Kaufmann, Eric. 2000. 'Liberal Ethnicity: Beyond Liberal Nationalism and Minority Rights,' *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 23, no. 6, pp. 1086-1119

<sup>8</sup> Kaufmann, E. P. 2004. 'Dominant ethnicity: from background to foreground,' in Eric Kaufmann (ed.), *Rethinking Ethnicity: Majority Groups and Dominant Minorities* (London: Routledge), pp. 1-14

<sup>9</sup> See Cole, Douglas, 'Canada's "Nationalistic" Imperialists', *Journal of Canadian Studies*, Vol.V, no. 3, (1970), pp. 45-46

<sup>10</sup> Handelman, Don, "The Organization of Ethnicity", *Ethnic Groups*, 1, (1977), pp. 187-200.

<sup>11</sup> Cole, Juan. 1993. *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), Chapter 5.

<sup>12</sup> Billington, Ray Allen. 1938. *The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860: A Study of the Origins of American Nativism* (New York, NY: Macmillan)

<sup>13</sup> Kaufmann, Eric. 2004. *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America: The Decline of Dominant Ethnicity in the United States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press)

<sup>14</sup> Giddens, Anthony. 1991. *Modernity and Self-Identity* (Cambridge: Polity Press)

<sup>15</sup> Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)

<sup>16</sup> March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen. 1984. 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,' *American Political Science Review*, vol. 78, no. 3.

<sup>17</sup> Putnam, Robert D. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster), see chapters 1-4 and appendix on associational trends

<sup>18</sup> Parsons, Talcott. 1951. *The Social System* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul)

<sup>19</sup> Bruce, Steve. 1998. *Comparative Protestant Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

<sup>20</sup> Smith, Anthony D. 1990. 'Towards A Global Culture?', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 7, 171-191

<sup>21</sup> Bell, Desmond. 1990. *Acts of Union: Youth Culture and Sectarianism in Modern Ireland* (London: MacMillan); Bairner, Alan. 1997. ' "Up To Their Knees?": Football, Sectarianism, Masculinity and

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Protestant Working-Class Identity,' in P. Shirlow and Mark McGovern (eds.) *Who Are the People?: Unionism, Protestantism and Loyalism in Northern Ireland* (London: Pluto Press)

<sup>22</sup> Imperial Grand Council of the World (IGCW) reports 1903, 1906.

<sup>23</sup> The Republic of Ireland contained just 2500 members by 1938, compared to almost 58000 in the North. Figures were much higher in 1901 and 1918, but are not available. Data for Scotland from Grand Lodge of Scotland (GLS) reports of proceedings (dues); Data for Ontario West from Grand Lodge of Ontario West (GLOW) reports of proceedings (dues); Data from Newfoundland from Grand Lodge of Newfoundland (GLNF) reports of proceedings (members); Canadian totals for 1918 and 1925 provided in Grand Lodge of Ontario West report for 1944, pp. 65-66, otherwise calculated on the basis that Ontario West and Newfoundland comprise 75 percent of the total membership.

<sup>24</sup> IGCW report, 1903. New Brunswick membership totals for 1918 and 1925 provided in GLOW report for 1944, pp. 65-66.

<sup>25</sup> Membership: GLOW return sheet from True Blue and Orange Home, Richmond Hill, Ont; GLS reports (dues); GLNF report, 1921; Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland (GOLI) return chart (adapted pro-rata from chart, courtesy of Grand Secretary Denis Watson); Census: Census of Canada, 1921; 1921 reports of the Registrar-General of Scotland; Census of Newfoundland, 1921; Census of Northern Ireland, 1926 in Database of Irish Historical Statistics: Census Material, 1901-1971, digital version compiled by M.W. Dowling et al. (UK Data Archive study SN 3542 <http://www.data-archive.ac.uk>). Note that Orange strength outside the west-central belt of Scotland was considerably lower.

<sup>26</sup> Bell, Daniel. 1973. *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (New York: Basic Books); Bell, Daniel. 1996. *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Harper Collins), pp. 46-84

<sup>27</sup> Putnam 2000

<sup>28</sup> Co. Down, Northern Ireland has been added due to our good run of membership there and because its membership is a pretty good barometer of provincial membership.

<sup>29</sup> Kaufmann, E., 'The Dynamics of Orangeism in Scotland: The Social Sources of Political Influence in a Large Fraternal Organization,' *Social Science History*, volume 30: 2 (Summer) 2006

<sup>30</sup> Northern Ireland county returns, 1966-2004; Northern Ireland county reports, 1945-1966

<sup>31</sup> Ontario East LOBA trends parallel those of Canada as a whole, and we may be fairly confident that Ontario trends match the Canadian ones as well. (Ontario E LOBA reports of proceedings)

<sup>32</sup> Census of Scotland 1881. UK Data Archive, History Data Service # 4178; GOLS report, 1881.

<sup>33</sup> Figures for Scotland from Census of Scotland 1881 and 1881 Report of the Registrar General for Scotland.

<sup>34</sup> Glasgow Valuation Rolls 1911; GLS report, 1911.

<sup>35</sup> Bradley, Joseph M. 1995. *Ethnic and Religious Identity in Modern Scotland: Culture, Politics and Football* (Aldershot: Avebury)

<sup>36</sup> 1901 Census of Ontario; 1901 Nominal Census of Ontario online: [http://www.collectionscanada.ca/02/02012202\\_e.html](http://www.collectionscanada.ca/02/02012202_e.html); 1901 GLOW report, 1901 Grand Lodge of Ontario East report.

<sup>37</sup> Census of Ireland 1901 in *Database of Irish Historical Statistics*.

<sup>38</sup> McFarland, Elaine, *Protestants First: Orangeism in Nineteenth Century Scotland* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990)

<sup>39</sup> Akenson, Donald Harman, *The Irish in Ontario: A Study in Rural History* (Kingston-Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984). In 1885-1886, surviving county reports show over 2000 Orangemen in County Monaghan, representing approximately a third of the Protestant adult male population. (County Monaghan reports of proceedings 1885, 1886) Cavan undoubtedly had more Orangemen than Monaghan. In 1938, even after partition, there were 1100 Orangemen in Cavan as compared with 800 in Monaghan. Ten years later the figures were 1300 and 900. (adapted pro-rata from Grand Lodge of Ireland chart, courtesy of Grand Secretary Denis Watson)

<sup>40</sup> Collins, Brenda. 1991. 'The Origins of Irish Immigration to Scotland in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Irish Immigrants and Scottish Society in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Edinburgh: Donald), pp. 1-18; Walker, Graham. 1991. "The Protestant Irish in Scotland," in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Irish Immigrants and Scottish Society in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Edinburgh: Donald), pp. 44-66

<sup>41</sup> 1901 Nominal Census of Ireland at PRONI; 1901 GOLI report.

<sup>42</sup> Belfast County application forms, 1961-1986.

<sup>43</sup> Putnam 2000.

<sup>44</sup> Moran, Michael. [1985] 1989. *Politics and Society in Britain: an introduction* (Basingstoke : Macmillan)

- <sup>45</sup> GOLI Central Committee (CC) minutes, 13 October 1953.
- <sup>46</sup> GOLI CC Minutes 4 December 1953.
- <sup>47</sup> GOLI CC Minutes 16 March 1954.
- <sup>48</sup> GOLI report, 20 March 2004, p. 11.
- <sup>49</sup> Senior, Hereward. 1972. *Orangeism, the Canadian Phase* (Toronto; New York: McGraw-Hill Ryerson), p. 96. These have included the Orange and Protestant party (Scotland), Scottish Protestant League (Glasgow), Protestant Action (Edinburgh), Protestant Party (Liverpool), Democratic Unionist/Independent Unionist parties (Northern Ireland), Protestant Protective Association (Canada) and Equal Rights Association (Canada).
- <sup>50</sup> Horowitz, Donald L. 1985 *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press), chapter 8.
- <sup>51</sup> Harbinson, J.F. 1973. *The Ulster Unionist Party 1882-1973* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press)
- <sup>52</sup> Tonge, Jonathan and Jocelyn A.J. Evans. 2002a. 'Party Members and the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland,' *Irish Political Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 59-73
- <sup>53</sup> Rough, Alex. Directory of prominent Orangemen, unpublished. Houston, Cecil and William J. Smyth. 1980. *The Sash Canada Wore: A Historical Geography of the Orange Order in Canada* (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press)
- <sup>54</sup> Senior, Elinor. 1959. 'The Origin and Political Activities of the Orange Order in Newfoundland, 1863-1890', (Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. Johns), p. 232
- <sup>55</sup> Rough, Directory of Prominent Orangemen.
- <sup>56</sup> McFarland, Protestants First; Walker, Graham. 1992. 'The Orange Order in Scotland Between the Wars,' *International Review of Social History*, vol. XXXVII, no. 2, pp. 177-206
- <sup>57</sup> McCracken, Gordon A. 1990. *Bygone Days of Yore: the Story of Orangeism in Glasgow* (Glasgow: County Grand Orange Lodge of Glasgow); Marshall, William S. 1996. *The Billy Boys: a concise history of Orangeism in Scotland* (Edinburgh: Mercat Press).
- <sup>58</sup> Gallagher, Tom. 1987. *Glasgow: the Uneasy Peace: Religious Tension in Modern Glasgow* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 144-5; McFarland 1990, pp. 192-3; McCracken 1990.
- <sup>59</sup> Patterson, Henry and Eric Kaufmann, *The Decline of the Loyal Family: Unionism and Orangeism in Northern Ireland* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), forthcoming.
- <sup>60</sup> Kaufmann, Eric, *From Deference to Defiance: The Orange Order in Northern Ireland since 1950* (unpublished manuscript under review with Oxford University Press)
- <sup>61</sup> Carty, R. Kenneth. 2002. 'The Politics of Tecumseh Corners: Canadian Political Parties as Franchise Organizations,' *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December), pp. 723-46
- <sup>62</sup> Senior 1972, pp. 29-54.
- <sup>63</sup> Evans, Margaret. *Sir Oliver Mowat* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), pp. 77, 124.
- <sup>64</sup> Blake, Don. *Canadian Census and Election Data 1908-1968* (ICPSR # 0039, 1999)
- <sup>65</sup> Rough, Alex. 1995. 'The Orange Order and the First Canadian Royal Tour,' <http://members.tripod.com/~Roughian/index-185.html>; Saywell, John T. *'Just Call Me Mitch': The Life and Times of Mitchell Hepburn* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), pp. 385-6
- <sup>66</sup> Graham, Roger. *Old Man Ontario: Leslie M. Frost* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 296
- <sup>67</sup> Rough, Alex. 'Sir Mackenzie Bowell', <http://members.tripod.com/~Roughian/index-185.html>, accessed 20 October 2005
- <sup>68</sup> Interview with Alex Rough, Toronto Orange Centre, Scarborough, 28 September 2004
- <sup>69</sup> Senior 1959, pp. 204-10
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid., pp. 204-5
- <sup>71</sup> Minute Book of L.O.L.# 26, Cupids, Newfoundland, 1949
- <sup>72</sup> 1945 Census of Newfoundland; 'The 1948 Referendums' at: <http://www.heritage.nf.ca/confederation/referendums.html>. Accessed 20 October 2005
- <sup>73</sup> Walker 1992, p. 187
- <sup>74</sup> Bruce, Steve, 'Comparing Scotland and Northern Ireland', pp. 135-42, in Devine, T.M. (ed.). *Scotland's Shame?: Bigotry and Sectarianism in Modern Scotland* (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2000), p. 139
- <sup>75</sup> Census and electoral data sources from Hechter, Michael. 1976. *UK County Data 1851-1966* (UKDA ref#430), and also McLean, Iain and J.C. Gordon. 1976. *Labour Elites and Electorates in Glasgow, 1922-1974* (UKDA ref#SN1007).