The Orange Order in Scotland since 1860: A Social Analysis

The Orange Order is a fraternity founded in the north of Ireland in 1795 whose constitution commits its members to the defence of Protestantism and the British Crown, and has served as a major associational nexus for Protestant dominant ethnic groups in Scotland, Northern Ireland, Northwestern England and Canada. Its convivial and religious role has been matched by its political engagement. In the above locations, the Order has supplied numerous local, provincial or national leaders and has attempted to influence the course of government policy in a Unionist and Protestant direction. (Senior 1972; Houston & Smyth 1980; Waller 1981; Neal 1987; Bryan 2000; Kaufmann 2007)

Two key questions run through the literature on Scottish Orangeism. First, whether the Order was an Irish import or a native Scots-Protestant response to Irish-Catholic immigration. Second, was the 'Orange vote' a coherent political force, and the rise to prominence of several Orangemen as Scottish politicians significant? These are symbolically charged issues. Those who cleave to a Scottish nationalist perspective tend to downplay the role of Scots-Protestant antipathy toward Irish, as well as the power of the Orange Order over Scottish politics. Scoto-Irish activists, will, by contrast, accentuate the power of native Scots' sectarianism and the role of Orangeism in Scottish politics. Where does the truth lie? On this, the academic authorities are divided. Elaine McFarland's stresses the Irish-Protestant, working-class, immigrant basis of Scottish Orangeism. This suggests that Orangeism was an import that failed to capture the imagination of native Scots, who were more inclined toward socialism or 'liberal commonsense'. (McFarland 1990) In considering the
interwar period, Graham Walker reiterates McFarland's claim that the Order was principally an Irish-Protestant ethnic association. Drawing on contemporary newspaper reports, he suggests that the Order was 'maintained in the early decades of the twentieth [century] by immigrants and their Scottish-born descendants.'

This did not, however, render the Order politically impotent. Walker maintains that the political turbulence of the interwar period led to a surge in Orange membership, a broader Scottish appeal and enhanced political activism. As evidence, he points to the sweeping success of Orange candidates in the 1919 Glasgow School Board elections and notes the presence of a considerable number of Orange MP's in the twenties and thirties. Among these were Sir John Gilmour, Secretary of State for Scotland (1924-29) and Col. A.D. McInnes Shaw. (Gallagher 1987a: 144-45). A study of election results in this period, writes Walker, indicates that 'the Orange vote was a meaningful political factor' despite its inchoate and unpredictable nature. (Walker 1992: 187-89) Steve Bruce adds that the Order helped deliver the Protestant working-class vote in west-central constituencies until the 1950s. (Bruce 1985: 167) Ian Maclean, however, disagrees: even in the turbulent 1918-22 period, he contends that Orangemen were less likely to vote as a bloc than Catholics, and failed to affect Labour in any major electoral contest. (Maclean 1983: 200-201) Others claim that the jury is still out as to the existence and efficacy of the Orange vote in the twentieth century. (Walker & Gallagher 1990: 91-92)

In terms of membership dynamics, Walker notes that Irish immigration slowed considerably between the wars, but he does not assert that this affected Orange membership. Rather, he suggests that events kept membership buoyant. This is an account that finds some resonance in the work of Bruce and McFarland, as well as other political historians of the Order who emphasise the role of events. (Marshall
1996: 105; Gallagher 1987a: 293-95; McCracken 1990: 35) Others point to the importance of class structure in reinforcing sectarian division, with the Orange Order in Northern Ireland viewed as a means for Protestant-dominated manufacturing interests to divide or control the working class. (Smith 1984; Bryan 2000: 20)

In terms of the more recent period, Steve Bruce suggests that slum clearance has been more of a factor than declining religiosity in the Order's decline. Though not specifically addressing Orangeism, he also writes that the relatively low proportion of Catholics in Scotland, as compared to Ulster, has always limited the appeal of militant Protestant movements. (Bruce 1985: 167, 246; 1998: 111) Some evidence for Bruce's contention is provided by the example of Liverpool, where Peter Day found that 60 percent of Orange members he surveyed chose slum clearance as a reason for post-1945 membership decline - by far the largest factor cited by Orange respondents. (Day 2006: 32)

This paper builds upon the existing historical newspaper-based literature, but attempts to chart major trends with greater precision and makes a more concerted attempt to evaluate the relative strength of competing explanations of fluctuations in Orange strength. This necessarily relies on high-quality statistical data which has only been made possible by unprecedented access to the records of the Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland (GOLS). These provide a virtually complete run of annual membership data, across lodge and county, for the period 1860-2001. ¹

Membership Trends

Let us begin by considering the long-term trend in Scottish male Orange membership, expressed as a ratio per thousand males. For confidentiality reasons,
actual membership figures cannot be displayed, but the general trend is clear.\textsuperscript{2} Membership increases occurred in the periods 1863-77, 1902-9, 1919-26, 1941-53 and 1961-79. Notable declines took place during 1878-1900, 1913-18, 1927-41, and 1987-present. Spikes of over twenty percent in membership took place during 1920, 1903, 1933, 1864 and 1865. Collapses of over 20 percent occurred during 1885 and 1934. (See figure 1)

[Figure 1 about here]

In explaining patterns such as these, it is tempting to jump immediately to event-driven explanations. However, while certain historical junctures appear to be relevant, we also need to be cognisant of the many events that seem to have had a surprisingly limited effect. (i.e. Great Depression, Home Rule Crises of 1884-6 and 1916-22, Northern Ireland 'Troubles' of 1969-72) Appearances can be deceiving, though, since events can counteract each other's influence and mask underlying social trends. We therefore need to contextualise these patterns against a background of both internal developments (i.e. dues increases) and broader social, demographic and economic changes in order to assess the true predictive power of these events. We will come to this later on.

Scottish Orangeism has been limited in strength, but has proven remarkably durable. The tale of Orangeism in the latter half of the twentieth century has been one of steady decline, but while Scottish Orange male membership peaked as late as 1982, Ontario membership peaked in 1920 (a smaller peak was attained in the late 50s) and membership in both Northern Ireland and Newfoundland peaked around 1960. These changes have been so profound that today there are slightly more Orangemen in
Scotland than in Canada! Though the nature of these differences is beyond the scope of this essay, it suggests that the Scottish context differs in important ways from those in other Orange jurisdictions.

A further dimension to this study is geographic. Figures 2 and 3 map Scottish Orange lodges in 2001, with points adjusted for size of lodge membership. This is framed by pre-1973 Scottish county boundaries. Notice the concentration of membership on the west coast of central Scotland around Glasgow and North Lanarkshire, with spillover into adjacent counties, notably West Lothian (the highest per capita concentration of current membership), Renfrewshire and Ayrshire. This is partially explicable by population distribution, given the primacy of Glasgow and the surrounding Clydeside conurbation as the largest Scottish metropolitan area. Yet the paucity of lodges in both the Highland and Borders regions and in populous Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen is striking.

Figure 2. Distribution of Scottish Orange Lodges, 2001

[Figure 2 about here]

Source: Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland 2001 Directory and return sheets.
Digital boundaries courtesy of EDINA/UK Borders.

Figure 3. Distribution of Scottish Orange Lodges, by County, Central Scotland, 2001

[Figure 3 about here]

Source: Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland 2001 Directory and return sheets.
Digital boundaries courtesy of EDINA/UK Borders.
Orange Membership Density

It is very often forgotten that Orangeism was, and is, a worldwide fraternity, and could at one time be found throughout the British Empire. English-speaking Canada, not Ireland, has been the leading Orange jurisdiction, with Scotland, England, Australasia and the United States occupying a much smaller position within the organisation. One way of examining the impact of Orangeism in a particular location is membership density. Orange male membership density is calculated as the number of Orange male members per target population (adult male British-Protestants). In these terms, the Scottish membership density has generally been little more than one percent, and averaged barely two percent in its Clydeside heartland during its membership peak. Even in its highest concentrations (Govan and Rutherglen in the greater Glasgow area), Scottish membership density rarely exceeded ten percent. Compare this with the Canadian province of Newfoundland or the Irish counties of Fermanagh, Monaghan and Tyrone (all had a density of roughly 1/3 in 1920) or, at the lower end, the Canadian province of Ontario and city of Belfast (membership density of both was around ten percent in 1920).³

Figure 4 shows the density of Orangeism in the adult male Protestant population in 1991. Notice the strength of Orangeism in Glasgow and the Lothians (East Lothian's density is .0095) and its weakness in greater Edinburgh as well as the Borders, Highlands and northeast. In addition, the numbers are astoundingly small: even in West Lothian and Glasgow, the strongholds of Orangeism, there are only 1 to 1.4 Orangemen per hundred Protestant adult males. This pattern has held for a considerable period of time. Though there was a slightly more numerous Orange presence in Wigtownshire and Dundee in the mid-nineteenth century, the principal
Clydeside and west-central counties have dominated Orangeism from the outset. Despite some fluctuation - notably the rise and decline of Glasgow as population moved in, and then out, during the twentieth century - the geographical profile of the Order has not changed dramatically in a century and a half. (See Figure 5)

At its peak in 1951, under two percent of Glasgow's Protestant men were in a lodge, compared to Toronto's peak of seven percent (1921) or Belfast's sixteen percent (1951). On the other hand, if we look at ward-level patterns in Glasgow based on 1931 and 1961 census data and attribute membership data based on lodge locations, we find that the greatest area of strength is in Govan district, where Orange density may have been as high as 16-18 percent given the size of the district's Catholic population. This may be inflated due to commuting patterns, but in any case, density appears to be highest in the swath of south bank wards stretching from Govan in the west through present-day Ibrox (then Kinning Park and Fairfield) and Kingston. Orange density was also high in suburban Rutherglen (10-15%) to the southeast, and in Cowcaddens (10-12 %) north of the centre. These areas thus were as Orange as much of Belfast. 4 (Maclean & Gordon 1976) There is little to suggest that these areas of Orange strength shifted after 1961, though members in the city lodges may have increasingly been commuting in from suburban estates. Gordon McCracken suggests that roughly half of Kelvingrove district's membership resides in Drumchapel, an estate developed northwest of the city after 1959. A similar tale can be told for other city districts. (McCracken 2002a) Figure 6 shows Orange lodges in the city by size in
1981, at the peak of the Order's membership. The Clyde is the backbone of Orangeism in Glasgow. Notice the presence of the large Govan lodge in Kingston ward and the lodge in neighbouring Hutchesontown, despite significant Catholic presence in these areas. By contrast, the greater Bridgeton-Calton-Dennistoun area in the East End, though home to the Order's headquarters and known as a 'Rangers area', has fewer Catholics and thus a much lower Orange density than Govan. Figure 7 shows the city lodges in 2001. Little has changed, though there appears to be membership loss in the outskirts (especially Baillieston-Wellhouse in the east) and gains in greater Bridgeton as well as Maryhill-Possil-Cowlairs.

The Freemasons make for a useful contrast. Their ritual, symbolism, degree structure and organisation are virtually identical to that of Orangeism. Indeed, Orangeism explicitly drew upon Masonic models for inspiration. Given a native Scots tradition of Masonry that goes back to the late 15th century, it is unsurprising that this fraternity has done so well among Scottish Protestants. In fact, Scotland's total of some 150,000 Masons gives this nation the highest rate of Masonic membership in the world. (Bessel 2002) The Masons have also served as one of the institutional vessels of both Scottish and popular Protestant identity. (Finn 1990)

However, while Freemasonry has been associated with Protestantism in most English-speaking societies, its identity as an avowedly apolitical and non-religious organisation makes it a less convenient vehicle than Orangeism for Protestant or Loyalist identity. Here it is instructive to note the contrasting geography of Masonic
lodges vis à vis their Orange counterparts in Scotland and in Glasgow (see Figures 8 and 9). Notice Masonry's more even lodge distribution in the country - this maps much more neatly on to the broader Protestant population of Scotland as a whole: Clydeside is the major concentration, but lodges cover the Borders, Highlands and the Northeast, with secondary concentrations in Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen. Whereas nearly two-thirds of Orangemen live in Glasgow or Lanarkshire, less than a quarter of Scottish Masons do.

[Figure 8 about here]

Peering at trends in Glasgow in figure 9, we find both Orange and Masonic lodges absent from the largely Catholic south-western wards. Masonic lodge halls, which far outnumber their Orange counterparts, are relatively absent from the deprived inner city zone from Kingston-Kelvingrove to the city centre. On the other hand, they are plentiful in the better-heeled west, and on the city's outskirts. This reflects a class division between these two fraternities, which we shall return to later on.

[Figure 9 about here]

The Causes of Membership Change

Our next task is to explain membership dynamics in both their temporal and spatial dimensions. Orange membership has been computed from the annual reports of the Grand Lodge of Scotland 1860-1966, and annual returns for 1967-2001. Comparison data is drawn from decennial Scottish censuses, the annual reports of the Scottish
Registrar-General and electoral data. Geographic adjustments have been made in order to establish a continuous dataset for the 1961-91 period, but 2001 data are not available.

In order to figure out what is driving Orange membership, I compare against all available demographic, cultural and economic data from the 1861-1991 period. Variables are limited to those that span the entire 1861-1991 period as part of either the census or Registrar-General's series. The following variables were tested down for significance: a) demographic - population growth, population, sex ratio, population density, marriage rate, birth rate, infant mortality rate; b) cultural - religiosity (in terms of religious marriages as a percentage of total marriages), denomination (Church of Scotland, Roman Catholic, 'Nonconformist') and Irish born; and c) economic - proportions in agricultural sector, professions and manufacturing.

In addition, I try to isolate the impact of the Irish-Protestant ethnic factor to get at the question of whether Orangeism is brought by Irish Protestant immigrants, or is caused by the response of native Scots to Irish-Catholics. Since the Irish-born population includes both Protestants and Catholics, we need to compare this figure with the proportion of Catholics. If the proportion of Irish-born is not significant, but the Catholic proportion of the population is, this suggests that we are observing a Scottish Protestant response to the presence of Irish-Catholics. The use of fixed dates for the Irish-born variable (1851, 1901, 1921) is necessary due to the steady decline in the rate of Irish immigration after 1851.

Here I attempt to weigh the importance of the Irish-Protestant ethnic element by examining the ratio between the proportion Irish-born and the proportion Catholic at various dates (1901 was used for this model), a method used by Graham Walker (1991). If this ratio exceeds 1, for instance, there are likely to be more Irish-born who
are not Catholic than if the number is much less than 1. When multiplied by the Irish-born population of 1901, this provides a term which measures the impact of the Irish-Protestant population in the absence of direct data. This interaction term can be expressed as follows: Irish Protestant Ethnic Group = (Irish-born % / Roman Catholic %) * Irish-born %. This thereby arrays cases between, on the one hand, counties like Argyllshire or Aberdeenshire which possess larger native Scots Catholic populations but few Irish descendants, and, on the other hand, counties with a large proportion of Irish immigrants, but with relatively low Catholic populations. (i.e. Wigtownshire, Ayrshire). Given our focus on the central belt, the former effect is not likely to greatly influence our sample.

In statistical analyses which only include the main central belt counties, we find that the strongest predictor of Orange density in a county over the period 1861-1991 is the Irish-Protestant percentage (z-score of 17 in figure 10). Next in importance are political events like the Papal visit or Home Rule which are deemed to be political threats to Protestantism. The proportion of Catholics is weaker than various events at explaining membership, but is still significant. This indicates that Elaine McFarland and Graham Walker are correct in their appraisal that Irish-Protestant immigrants and their descendants are the key to explaining Orange strength. The mere presence of Irish Catholics, as in Dundee, is no guarantee of Orange strength, while smaller numbers of Irish Catholics - as in Ayrshire or West Lothian - may not directly correspond with lower Orange densities. Here we can see parallels with Ontario, where Orangeism is much stronger in areas of historic Irish-Protestant settlement, as well as Cumbria in northern England, where virtually all Orangemen had Irish immigrant heritage. Newfoundland, where Orange membership was the strongest of anywhere in the world despite the absence of Irish-Protestant
immigration, stands as a major exception to this pattern. (Kaufmann 2006; MacRaild 2005)

Another of the findings to emerge from this model is the importance of religio-ethnic variables as shown by the correlation between Orange membership density and the proportions of Irish-Protestant ethnicity and Catholic religion. The purely religious angle is not so vital: witness the insignificance of Protestant denomination (ie. Church of Scotland v. Nonconformist) and religiosity in the analysis, thereby broadly confirming Bradley's survey evidence which shows that 27 percent of Scots Orangemen belong to churches other than the Church of Scotland while many are not regular churchgoers. (Bradley 1995: 83, 95) In contrast, socio-demographic and economic factors such as population density, infant mortality, illiteracy and proportion in manufacturing are insignificant, casting some doubt upon theories which link the spread of Orangeism to a 'labour aristocracy' in growing industries like shipping or textiles. Factors (rotated principal components) designed to simplify the full range of structural variables were also tested, with similar results.

The only (modestly) significant structural variable is the agricultural proportion of a county's population. This was found to be negatively associated with Orange participation at a z-score of around 3. In other words, more urban counties like Lanark and Renfrew are more Orange than rural ones like Stirlingshire. This contrasts with findings in Ontario, Northern Ireland and Newfoundland where rural populations were/are more close-knit and more Orange. This discrepancy is probably explained by the fact that Irish-Protestant immigrants came to Scotland to work in the
industrial cities and towns while Orangeism remained a foreign import among the native Scots population, even in the agricultural areas of west-central Scotland.

What about the role of events? Many would leap to these in explaining membership trends over time. Generally speaking, major membership changes do not correspond very well to key historical events. Only in the case of the membership collapse of 1884-5 do we get some clue from printed sources. Elaine McFarland writes that some in the Govan area of South Glasgow complained of the impact of 'dull trade' on the membership during this period, though it must be asked why this recession could have such a decisive impact as compared with the Great Depression. (McFarland 1990) Another possible explanation is that the extension of voting rights to rural Scots (1884-5) obviated the need for participation in a political vehicle like the Order. However, any explanation focused on the extension of voting rights to rural Scots must explain why the membership falloff in a big city like Glasgow, where residents already could vote, was as severe as in rural areas and why the more significant 1918 franchise extension had no similar effect. Otherwise, there is no obvious reason for the Orange membership collapse of 1934 nor the spikes of 1903, 1920, 1933, 1864 and 1865.

Individual events had surprising little explanatory power. Among the few important individual events affecting membership were the two Church of Scotland-related crises (1868-9, 1962), the Boer War, World War I and the First Home Rule crisis (1884-6). I then tested for broad categories of events. This involved amalgamating events that could be categorised as: 1) Threats to Protestantism or the Union; 2) Protestant policy victories; 3) Protestant policy losses; 4) Social or political stimuli; 5) Wartime. Event variables were composed of the following events: 1) Threatening Events = Church of Ireland Disestablishment Controversy (1868-9),

I also tested for the impact of economic recessions, dues increases and leadership changes - none of which proved significant. Of the five main groups of events, all but policy victories were significant in at least some of the models. The exigencies of war (notably a high Orange enlistment rate) and policy losses tend to lower Orange membership whereas political threats and stimuli from socio-political actors (like firebrand preacher George Wise or the Protestant political parties of John Cormack and Alexander Ratcliffe) tend to increase membership. By and large, all of these variables display effects that are weaker than that of Irish-Protestant ethnicity
but stronger than that of the Catholic proportion of the population. One-year lags of
the five event variables listed above proved insignificant. On this evidence, we can
make the case that events occupy a middle causal ground between ethno-religious
factors and structural factors in explaining Orange membership dynamics. There is
one caveat to this: when we move from a county-level analysis to look at trends at
ward level in Glasgow, we find that the proportion of Catholics in a ward becomes
insignificant while structural forces seem more important. In particular, a high
number of casual workers and high population density in a ward (both associated with
poverty) seemed to be associated with low Orange participation by Protestants while
the proportion of skilled workers was linked to higher Orange participation. Saying
this, the limitations of the Mclean and Gordon data suggest that we should treat such
findings with some caution.

Social Makeup

Much of the analysis we have presented is based on county-level aggregate
data which compares census data and membership. But individual-level records
largely confirm our county-level findings (see table 1). For instance, an analysis of all
lodge masters and secretaries (256 in sample) from the Scottish Orange directory of
1881 against the nominal census of Scotland in that year paints a clearer picture: fully
72 percent were Irish-born. The average age was 39, almost all were working-class
(just 4.8% were nonmanual), with a slight majority in skilled as opposed to unskilled
trades. Given the occupational background of most inhabitants of central Scotland at
the time (which was not vastly dissimilar to this), the birthplace of Scottish
Orangemen stands out far more dramatically than their occupational profile, which
confirms our thesis regarding the relative importance of religio-ethnic over structural factors. It also confirms the ethnic Irishness of Scottish Orangeism which McFarland noticed in her Greenock data.

No ethnic data are freely available for years after 1881 (1891 and 1901 data are available for a fee), but we can still track occupational data through valuation rolls. Examining the valuation rolls of 1911 for Glasgow shows a much higher representation of *petit-bourgeois* occupations like shopkeeper and clerk than in Scotland as a whole in 1881. Fully 27 percent of our sample of 99 masters and secretaries from the city were in this category in 1911. This has less to do with changes between 1881 and 1911 than it does with the geographical fact that Glasgow had a higher proportion of nonmanual occupations than surrounding west-central belt towns. As with the 1881 Scottish lodge officers, the 1911 Glasgow Orangemen reflected the occupational structure of their city and this should dispel any notion that Orangeism was a unique product of class, as opposed to ethno-religious, relationships.

**Table 1. Occupational Class of Scottish Rank-and-File Orange Members**

[Table 1 here]

Sources: McFarland 1990; Bradley 1995; 1881 Census of Scotland; 1881 Grand Orange Lodge Reports of Proceedings; *Vigilant* subscriber list 1958-9; LOL #417 roll book 1881 and Primrose Ladies Lodge roll books 1921 and 1961

The class profile of Scottish Orangemen increasingly stood out after the 1950s because it was essentially the same as it was in 1881 while the country as a whole had
shifted in a far more post-industrial and professional direction. We can see this in the limited professional and bourgeois representation within the Orangemen and women sampled in the twentieth century in table 1 and figure 11. If anything, the proportion of professionals, bourgeoisie and skilled workers to the unskilled (labelled in the table as the 'class ratio') was higher in the late nineteenth than the late twentieth century. This reflects a 'class slippage' effect which was also noticeable in the Northern Irish organisation in the twentieth century. (Kaufmann 2007)

**Figure 11.**

[Figure 11 here]

Source: Bradley 1995; 1881 Census of Scotland; 1881 GOLS 1881 Directory

If we bring the tale forward to the present, class slippage becomes even more apparent - a pattern we also find in Northern Ireland. (Kaufmann 2007) Here we use postcode classification to get at a measure of status in figure 12. Notice, for example, that the 527 Orange officebearers of 2001 are vastly underrepresented in the top MOSAIC postcode classifications (A and B) and overrepresented in public housing categories (E through H). The contrast with the 1400-odd Freemason officebearers of the same year is particularly striking. The post-industrial restructuring of Scotland's economy seems to have passed the Order by entirely.

**Figure 12.**
The elite of Scottish Orangeism differ only slightly from the rank-and-file of the lodges. Looking purely at Glasgow-based members of the Grand Lodge of Scotland in table 2, we find a somewhat more elite social profile, albeit one which exhibits a static profile in the period 1881-1961. Unfortunately the postcodes of Grand Lodge members cease to be listed for the recent period apart from those holding the top few positions. Of these, two appear to be from well-off postcodes (A,J) and two from poorer ones (D), but the sample size is too small to draw firm conclusions. However, if trends in the Grand Lodge of Ireland (GOLI) are anything to go by, it is likely that the Scottish Orange elite social profile differs little from that of the Scottish Orange mass membership. (Kaufmann 2007)

**Table 2. Occupational Class of Scottish Orange Elite, 1881-1961**

[Table 2 here]

Source: GOLS Directories, 1881-1961

Women and Children

The role of women in passing on cultural traditions, and females' greater religiosity, is widely acknowledged. (Hayes 1996) Gordon McCracken relates how he
learned about the Protestant traditions of the Scottish Covenanters at his mother's knee. (McCracken 2002a) Women likewise played an important part in the junior movement which was critical to raising the next generation of Orangemen. In contrast to Northern Ireland, where the women's and junior branches remained small and marginal to the functioning of the Order, the Scottish Orangewomen and juniors were in the forefront of the organisation. We can see this in the way women's and junior lodges are incorporated into the lodge directories from the first decade of the twentieth century. They are also subsumed within the total membership numbers quoted by Grand Lodge, which is not the case in Northern Ireland.

The numerical ascent of these 'auxiliary' organisations after 1909 is striking. Figure 13 shows the relative membership of the three branches of Scottish Orangeism in the twentieth century at successive census dates. Notice that the men's lodges are a near-minority within Orangeism by 1921. Between 1931 and 1951, the women's organisation actually *supersedes* that of the men and the juniors are not far behind. Only in the 1970s do adult men re-emerge as the majority within Scottish Orangeism. Even in Ontario, where the first women's lodges were formed in the late nineteenth century, women's lodges only enrolled about half the numbers that the men did. Thus Scotland appears to be distinct from other Orange jurisdictions in its twentieth century gender profile.

**Figure 13**

[Figure 13 here]
In Ontario, the decline of the youth organisation during the Second World War foreshadowed the decline of the men's organisation some fifteen years later. In Scotland, a similar pattern seems to prevail, with junior strength cresting in the early 1970s, followed by a decline in the men's organisation in the 1980s. (see figure 13) What is more difficult to explain is the slide in female membership from the late 1950s. Canadian evidence from Ontario and Newfoundland shows that Orangemen's and women's associations declined in tandem, beginning in the late 1950s or early 1960s. (Kaufmann 2006) The decline in women's interest may have to do with changing gender roles or with alienation at falling Orange church membership since women tend to be far more pious than men. (Hayes 1996) Sister Helyne MacLean certainly hints that gender issues were prominent in the Order in her bicentenary message to the membership:

Women have always been regarded as an important part of the Institution in Scotland...today they are being encouraged to take on a different role to that of the traditional 'tea makers' or 'fund raisers'...Society is changing dramatically and it is inevitable that we will see changes within our Institution, for some, (women as well as men), change may be unwelcome and happen too fast while for others it may not happen fast enough. I wonder how often during the almost ninety years of its existence that the Ladies Association of Scotland have raised the issue of the status of women...or indeed whether it has ever not been an issue....(MacLean 1998)

The Scottish men's organisation's buoyant membership into the mid-1980s may be related to the growth of licensed men's Orange social clubs (attached to lodges) after
the 1960s as well as the masculine appeal of Protestant football and paramilitary
culture from this period. (McCracken 2002a, McLean 2002; McFarland 1990: 215)

The rapid decline in general Scottish Protestant church membership from the
late 1950s came to be mirrored in Orangemen's slipping church attendance. At the
same time, the surging ecumenical movement within the Church of Scotland began to
close churches to Orange services and put pressure on the relationship between
Orange flocks and their pastors. In the 1970s, little more than a dozen clergymen
remained Orangemen, compared to several hundred in Northern Ireland. (McCracken
2002a; Morrow et al 1991) Ecumenical clergy criticised the Order from the left, while
on the right, evangelical clergy like Jack Glass or David Cassels looked askance at
Orange social clubs and their lack of piety. (McFarland 1990: 215) In 2002, one
Church of Scotland minister reflected the sentiment of many in the Kirk when he
remarked that membership in the church was incompatible with membership in the
Order. (GL 09/02: 30) Gordon McCracken adds that Orange membership can lead to
Church of Scotland ecumenical elites blocking upward mobility for candidates within
the Kirk. (McCracken 2002a)

Seven clergymen are listed as Grand Chaplains in 1969-70, and this number
remained steady until 1984. Importantly, just one of the seven Orange clerics in 1984
was present in 1970, suggesting that an important reservoir of new talent had risen to
the level of Grand Chaplain. However, between 1984 and the present, no new blood
has flowed into the Orange chaplaincy. Attrition culled the number of Grand
Chaplains to just four by 1989. The resignation of Rev. Gordon McCracken in 1997
over the violence at Drumcree deprived the Order of one of its leading intellectuals.
By 2001, Rev. Ian Meredith, an English-based minister active in Orangeism in Paisley
and Edinburgh, Rev. Ron Campbell, and possibly one or two other pastors from small
independent churches comprised the sole remnant of an unbroken Orange clerical tradition dating from the 1830s. (GOLS 1969-2002)

The consolidation of Glasgow Orange services within the walls of the Orange-friendly Glasgow Evangelical Church in Cathedral Square represents another facet of the contracting Orange connection to institutionalised religion. (McCracken 2002a, 2006) ’Grand Secretary advised Grand Lodge of the great difficulties we were experiencing in obtaining a suitable venue for the Annual Divine Service, having written to several prospective locations without success’ bemoaned Grand Lodge in March 2000. Remarking upon the fact that just one district lodge from outside Glasgow had attended the annual Orange service in 1999 despite the hire of two separate facilities, the author opined that Glasgow Evangelical Church would suffice for the 2000 service. (GOLS 04/03/00: 10) Poor attendance at Orange services was matched by slackening religious surveillance of new members. Whereas an Orange initiate required a letter from his or her clergyman in the 1950s to join, this had become watered down to mere 'vouching' from a churchgoing fellow Orangeman by the 1970s. (McCracken 2002a) Herein lies a possible explanation for the difference between Canada, where churchgoing remained strong into the 1960s and most Orangemen remain avid churchgoers, and Scotland, where the Kirk began to lose strength in the 1950s and secularisation within the ranks is high.\textsuperscript{10} This may have reduced the appeal of Orangeism among women, a relatively religiously-motivated group.

Orange Policy and Links with Northern Ireland in the Recent Period
Developments in Scotland in the late 1950s show that the Scottish Order was occasionally susceptible to a greater degree of militancy than its more cautious Ulster cousin. The Rev. Alan Hasson was integral to Scottish Orangeism's new radicalism. Hasson's genealogy was certainly unusual within Orangeism: his mother was Irish Catholic and his father Egyptian. Nonetheless, Hasson emerged as a charismatic minister who spearheaded opposition to ecumenism within the Church of Scotland in the 1950s and served as Grand Chaplain of the Scottish Orange Order. He visited Northern Ireland in 1959 and was instantly viewed as a troublemaker by the Grand Lodge of Ireland (GOLI). Likewise, Hasson's Orange-sponsored Scottish organ, *The Vigilant*, was the target of GOLI opprobrium.

This began when the Central Committee of the GOLI refuted the *Vigilant*'s outlandish claims that 'Senior Service' brand cigarettes subsidised the Pope and pointed out that 'County Grand Lodges should not invite Rev. Hasson to speak at any demonstrations'. Grand Lodge need not have worried: the *Vigilant*'s 1958-59 subscriber list shows that no more than about 10 percent of the 250-odd subscribers were from Northern Ireland. (CC 27/03/57; *Vigilant* Subscriber List 1958-59) It is noteworthy that Ulster condemnation provoked divisions within the clearly more militant Grand Lodge of Scotland. Though the Grand Lodge of Scotland agreed to apologise and pay compensation to the affected tobacco firm, Alan Hasson remained both editor of the *Vigilant* and an influential Orange chaplain and became Grand Master of Scotland the following year. (McFarland 1990: 215)

Hasson's activity and that of other ultras on the *Vigilant* led to a split between the *Vigilant* and the Scottish Orange Committee assigned to oversee it, but the militant forces gained the upper hand, and it is evident that the small size of the Scottish Order and its limited political responsibility allowed for a more radical
ideology than was the case in Northern Ireland. (McCracken 2002b; GOLS 06/57, 06/58, 12/58) We see this a year later in the midst of the second Dungiven parade dispute in Co. Londonderry in 1959, when Hasson openly criticised Northern Ireland (Official Unionist and Orangeman) Minister of Home Affairs W.W.B. Topping at the platform at Finaghy during the Belfast Twelfth of 1959. When pressed to apologise to both Belfast County organisers and Topping for his heckling, Hasson responded with an aggressive phone message to the Order's Belfast headquarters. Later, the Hasson-influenced Grand Lodge of Scotland's executive committee warned the Ulstermen to drop the charge against Hasson or face a serious inter-jurisdictional rift within Orange ranks. This was acceded to by the GOLI, and represented such a low point in relations between the two branches that one Ulsterman remarked that it would be unpleasant to go to Scotland in 1961 for the Triennial Council meetings. (CC 29/07/59, 16/10/59, 03/12/59, 30/12/60)

The exit of Hasson - who left in disgrace following an embezzling scandal - helped to heal the estrangement between the Irish and Scottish Grand Lodges. A period of quiescence followed, which was reawakened by the Northern Ireland Troubles of 1969-72. Gordon McCracken laments what he calls the 'Ulsterisation' of the Order from this period, accompanied by a growing tendency for Scottish lodges and bands to go across by ferry to march in Northern Ireland. This was mirrored by the fading of distinctively Scottish Orange traditions: the pipe bands which once led Orange services dwindled while the Scottish and Union flags which many districts once sported were replaced by the Red Hand of Ulster. (McCracken 2002a)

The Scottish identity of most Scots Orangemen (50% list it as their primary one) is nonetheless evident in surveys - albeit somewhat less prominent than among other Protestant Scots - and in the Scottish dancing which forms part of the Order's
youth programme. Yet it is the British identity of many Scots Orangemen that is most impressive: it comes across in the Union Jackery displayed in Orange commemorative videos of Orange gatherings like the 1998 Scottish Orange Bicentenary Video or 'Brig'ton Pride' (about the celebrations which opened the new Orange headquarters in Bridgeton Cross, Glasgow, in September 1999) as well as in survey evidence which shows that Orangemen are far more likely to identify as principally 'British' (14% of those surveyed) than other groups of Protestant Glaswegians. (Bradley 1995: 94; Bicentenary Video 1998)

This Britishness reinforces the concern for Northern Ireland issues, in marked contrast to Canada, where discussion about Ulster politics is virtually absent from reports of proceedings. Ulsterisation is clearly evident in the content of Grand Lodge of Scotland reports to the membership form the early 1970s onward. Since 1969, Ulster matters topped the list of concerns outlined in the annual reports, and in the regular Grand Master's Addresses. Throughout the 1970s, concerns over Ulster's security and constitutional status were paramount. The early 1980s, when fears regarding the official status of the Pope and the 1982 Papal Visit predominated, proved one of the few exceptions to the Ulsterisation rule. Even then, the Hunger Strike simmered just below the Papal Visit in the list of priorities. Thereafter, the Grand Lodge prioritised criticism of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in the late 1980s, agitated on behalf of the 'UDR Four' in the early and mid 1990s and backed the protests at Drumcree in Portadown in the late 1990s. These concerns featured as the first agenda item in reports, with local education, parading and political matters rarely intruding into top spot. Addresses by leading Ulster Orangemen like Martin Smyth and James Molyneaux were afforded wide coverage. (GOLS Reports)
In 1972, following the collapse of the Protestant-dominated Northern Ireland parliament at Stormont, relations with the GOLI had improved to the point where the Grand Lodge of Scotland could act as a facilitator for intra-Unionist talks between the 'established' wing of Unionism (the Order, Bill Craig's Vanguard and the Official Unionists) and the upstarts (Paisley's DUP and the paramilitaries) in pursuit of a united Unionist front. Two Scottish Orange representatives acted as observers at the first United Ulster Unionist meetings. These were initially torpedoed by clashes between the established Unionists (led by the Order), who counselled against violence, and Ian Paisley over the inclusion of paramilitary representatives at the table.11

At this juncture, the Grand Lodge of Scotland tried to salvage the talks. Ulster Orangemen had been impressed by the vitality of Orangeism among young Scots and appreciated the generous donations from Scotland toward Orange social causes in Northern Ireland. (CC 10/09/71; CC 08/12/71) Scottish Orangemen were looking to play a more high profile role in Ulster, and the unity talks offered them an opportunity. Accordingly, the Scots envisaged inviting all shades of loyalist opinion over to Scotland for a conference. Failing to understand the depth of Orange-DUP schism, Scottish Grand Secretary John Adam insisted that 'there ARE points of unity which MUST be common to all [including the UVF, UDA or UPV paramilitaries]...otherwise Ulster is fighting a losing battle'. (Letter from Scottish Grand Secretary John Adam to Irish Grand Secretary Williams, 11/09/72)

Adam received a courteous reply from Belfast and a promise to consider the matter at the Grand Lodge of Ireland. This was not enough for Adam, who pointed out that 'the meeting, having represented only three bodies - no matter how influential - did not produce the effect of solidarity'. Once again, Adam offered his lodge's
services to bring all parties together. After a month went by with no response from Northern Ireland, a follow-up letter was sent by the Scots. (Letters from John Adam to Walter Williams, 13/09/72 and 20/10/72) At the GOLI Central Committee, the Scottish proposal was rebuffed, with some concerned about the influence of Paisley. (CC 27/10/72) The eventual response to the Scots was cordial and thanked the Scottish Order for its rallies and its hundreds of pounds' donation to the Orange distress fund, but stressed that the Ulster Order 'unanimously agreed' that a unity conference 'would not be the answer to our many problems'. The letter concluded with an acknowledgment of Scottish-Ulster solidarity, which it was felt might extend to the military sphere: 'We know, that in certain ways, you will continue to prepare yourselves to support the Loyalists of Ulster should the present dangers increase'. (Letter from Walter Williams to John Adam, 10/11/72) This solidarity could draw upon a history of Protestant mobilisation in Scotland for the Ulster Unionist cause. During the uncertain days of 1913-14, when Irish Home Rule - enforced by British troops in the north - seemed imminent, the seven Glasgow chapters of the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force organised as many as 2,000 men to defend Protestant Ulster. (Marshall 1996: 99)

The Grand Lodge of Scotland (along with that of England) also became involved in Orange lobbying at Westminster for a return of Stormont and a hard line against terrorism. (CC 27/10/72) This effort failed, but the Ulster Workers Council strike of 1974 brought the Sunningdale power-sharing agreement to its knees and was perceived as a major victory for Ulster Unionism against the combined forces of Irish nationalism and British government complicity. At the GOLI, support from farmers and Scottish brethren for the strike was applauded. (CC 10/06/74) Yet such goodwill seems to have been sorely tested by the more radical approach of the Scottish Grand
Lodge. As in 1972, Scottish Orangemen seeking Unionist unity failed to respect salient intra-Unionist divisions between 'respectable' (Orange/UUP) and 'rebel' (DUP, paramilitary) Unionists. In 1975, Martin Smyth and the Ulster Orangemen scolded the Grand Lodge of Scotland for meeting representatives of loyalist paramilitaries and making press statements. Their request to hold a joint meeting of the central committees of the Irish and Scottish associations was then rebuffed by Scottish Grand Master Thomas Orr. (CC 5/12/75)

However, the Grand Lodge of Scotland under Orr's leadership remained highly tuned in to affairs in Ulster. In 1975, a 'Campaign to Assist Ulster' got underway, with plans for protest parades, petitions, lobbying, fundraising, visits to South Armagh and joint delegations with Ulster Orangemen to see the Prime Minister. (GOLS 06/09/75: 23-4) In a tersely worded telegram to Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Roy Mason, Orr castigated Mason's performance on security: 'The people of Scotland demand that you discard your smug and useless campaign of empty words. This latest outrage at Comber requires a policy of total extermination of the evil men and women of Ireland who glory in death and violence'. (GOLS Press Release 18/02/78) Grand Secretary David Bryce took a more cerebral approach, but was no less insistent on tighter security for Northern Ireland. (Letter from David Bryce to Harold Wilson, 02/12/75; Letter from A.R. Williams, NIO, to David Bryce, 22/12/75) In an interview following an announcement by the Scottish Grand Lodge that it had put its '80,000' (a heavily inflated figure) members on 'stand by alert', Bryce deflected questions of paramilitarism, claiming that he was referring only to humanitarian assistance to Northern Ireland victims of IRA violence. (BBC TV transcript, 06/01/78) Bryce was also keenly aware of Ulster Unionism's image in mainland Britain, hence his letter to the Ulster Unionist Party 'expressing the
abhorrence of the Members of the Order in Scotland at the racialist remarks of Mr.
Enoch Powell, the Ulster Unionist M.P. for South Down...[we] are deeply offended by
Mr. Powell's comments on repatriation...Mr. Powell is a luxury neither the Unionists,
nor Ulster, can afford'. (Letter from David Bryce to Norman Hutton, UUP Secretary,
06/10/76)

Throughout 1980-82, the Grand Lodge of Scotland coordinated its efforts
with the Irish and English Grand Lodges to thwart the proposed Papal visit and
prevent the upgrading of the Pope's diplomatic status. Lists of names of those to
contact were provided by the GOLI to the Scottish brethren and a 'mammoth' London
rally planned. The Scottish Grand Lodge helped to organise the printing of thousands
of leaflets and over 100,000 stickers. (GOLS 06/03/82: 5-7) A protest rally was
planned for Edinburgh, with the intention of halting the Pope's progress. After a
survey of the proposed Papal route with local Edinburgh Orangemen, it was
determined that:

With sufficient strength in numbers a strong protest could be effective at the
top of the Mound...Approximately 700-800 of our people were present in that
area and the whole of the Mound was there for the taking but unfortunately
approximately 30 minutes prior to the arrival of the Pope's transport the Rev.
Ian Paisley arrived and along with 20 of his supporters started singing which
attracted the police and caused police reinforcements to be brought to the area.
Prior to the police reinforcements arriving there was every possibility that we
would have been able to carry out the intention of blocking the Papal route by
sitting across the road. Brother [Magnus] Bain [soon to be Grand Master]
indicated that the protest had been effective but that more could have been achieved if a greater number of our members had been present.

In addition to castigating the apathy of the membership, Bain expressed 'amazement' that some members, including many from Central Committee, had opted to demonstrate in Glasgow on the same day, detracting from the Grand Lodge strategy to focus on Edinburgh. That said, a subsequent report on the Glasgow events found that just 38 souls had attended the Mosspark Boulevard protest despite police permission for 150. The sister demonstration at George Square was also a fiasco, with Orange protesters and Ian Paisley harassed by drunken 'loyalist' elements while police moved in. All told, the day underscored the apathy of the Orange membership and its lack of mobilising capacity. (GOLS 012/06/82: 16-17)

The air was filled with recriminations after this disaster. Three Glasgow Orange districts called for the Grand Master's resignation. The large Govan district complained that Grand Lodge had failed to coordinate their protests with local trade unions. Reflecting Bryan's 'rough' Orangeism with its emphasis on action, these grassroots complaints also alleged that the Grand Lodge officers were too dignified in their protest. In response, Thomas Orr's Grand Lodge officers stood up for 'respectable' Orangeism: 'If the membership disagree[s] with the principal lodge office bearers ignoring the call for militant action that ha[s] come from certain quarters, calling for "walking through blood to protest on the Pope's visit" which the Trustees believed was a contradiction of Orange Christian principles then the principal office bearers [are] due a vote of no confidence'. Grand Lodge officers also excoriated the apathy of many within the organisation who had not supported the campaign. (GOLS 04/09/82: 24-5) Some observers see the Papal Visit failure as marking a turning point

The Order's activity also encompassed other realms, much like its Ulster counterpart. An education committee oversaw developments pertaining to the equitable funding of Catholic and non-denominational schools, as well as seeking to bolster the religious content of the latter. Ecumenism and relations with the main churches (especially the Kirk) was another major sphere of activity and lobbying. Though few Orangemen were clerics, a wider number were active as church elders and could present their case this way as well as through letters which sought to bring forth motions in the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. Though less active on this front than its Irish counterpart, the Scottish Grand Lodge also sought to promote sabbatarianism. Hence, at the request of the Grand Lodge of Ireland, the Scottish Grand Lodge pressed the Glasgow Rangers to desist from playing on a Sunday. (GL 06/84: 16-17) This was not acceded to, though the Rangers regularly granted the Order permission to use Ibrox stadium for Orange services. (GOLS 03/03/90)

Notwithstanding its half-hearted efforts at sabbatarianism, the Grand Lodge was alive to the reality of its members' habits. A motion for lodges to be allowed to meet in licensed premises (though not in pubs) was, accordingly, passed. (GOLS 02/03/85: 7) Not only this, but the Grand Lodge tiptoed around the issue of Orange social clubs: in March 1974, it agreed to permit dancing between the first and second parts of a cabaret show at an Orange social club on a Sunday. Resistance was token, as with: 'it was emphasised by Grand Lodge, however, that there must be no organised dancing on Sunday, and it was emphatically decided furthermore that there
must be no strip-tease show(s), nor any production of a crude or obscene nature....'
(GOLS 03/74: 15) Commenting on the fact that a social club in Glasgow had been open on Sunday at the same time as a local junior Orange church parade was taking place, Grand Lodge made a recommendation that districts 'discuss' the possibility that Orange social clubs close on a Sunday 'if there is a church parade within a half mile radius of their premises'. Grand Lodge also urged that clubs move to a six-day opening, though no action appears to have been forthcoming on this issue. (GOLS 07/09/91:12)

In Northern Ireland, the GOLI failed to win the battle against drink in lodge halls in the 80s, but Sunday opening of social clubs in Scotland shows that Scottish Orangemen were far more 'secular' in their habits than their Irish brethren. Irish Grand Master Martin Smyth, who was embroiled in the conflict between 'wet' and 'dry' forces within Ulster Orangeism over hall licensing in the 70s, threatened in one meeting that if the wets gained the upper hand, Ulster Orangeism would have cabaret and drinks on a Sunday as in Scotland. (CC 13/12/78)

The issue of Scottish marching bands in Northern Ireland underscores the conflict between the 'rounder' brand of Orangeism in Scotland and the more traditional Orangeism of rural Ulster. In addition, the issue foregrounds the tension between Orangeism's desire to attract young members through spectacle and action, and its need to maintain respectability in the eyes of the church, media and society. (McFarland 1990: 215-19) The marching bands the Order hires for parades and the spectators who line the streets to watch parades rarely display the decorum demanded by Orange ritual and laws. Together, the youthful bands and spectators often relegate the Orange marchers and platform speakers to a sideshow. The Order's attitude to these supporters is ambivalent and reflects conflicting impulses, viewing the
spectators and bands as supporters but also as sources of trouble. In order to safeguard its image and pursue respectability, the Order focused on enforcing band discipline. This was not merely a PR device: real action was taken against unruly bands and this topic is discussed regularly by the Grand Lodge.

The backdrop to this is the growth of 'blood and thunder' flute bands, as in Northern Ireland, since the early 1970s. (Bryan 2000) Prior to this, suspensions of bands were more often linked to non-payment of fees, and many bands were accordion bands rather than the simpler flute bands favoured by the new 'blood and thunder' or 'kick the pope' bands. (GOLS 08/06/67) In the 1970s, individual bands were regularly suspended for poor behaviour. (GOLS 03/74: 13; 22/06/74) Band contracts dating from the 1980s banned paramilitary insignia and provocative behaviour in Ireland. In Scotland, action was taken against unruly bands, and attempts made to regulate both their symbolism (i.e. paramilitary flags) and hymn tunes (i.e. sectarian songs). (GOLS 04/09/82; 05/09/87) For example, 'the County Grand Lodge of Glasgow gave notice of its intention to ban the Monkstown Flute and Ballynahinch Blue Star Flute Bands. Grand Lodge decided that the ban should apply throughout Scotland'. (GOLS 11/06/88: 15) By 1989, the problem had become so acute that the Grand Secretary's report warned: 'it was necessary to spend more time than normal on the matter of discipline to ensure the maintenance of our reformed principles and standards. Not least in the area of bands where three...have been permanently banned. It was regrettable, but necessary to terminate the Scottish First Flute Band Association which was replaced by four band Liaison Committees...' (GOLS 21/01/89: 1)

The problem continued to flare during the 90s. (GOLS 1990: 8) Regular infringements led the topic to be seriously discussed at the 2002 meeting of Scottish, English and Ulster Orange leaders at Liverpool. (GL 06/02: 29) Discussions between
the Scots and Irish over the behaviour of bands also appears regularly in Irish reports in the early 1990s. Scottish bands are repeatedly singled out by the GOLI for their poor behaviour on parade, highlighting the often 'roughe' nature of Scottish Unionist culture as compared with that of Ulster - especially rural Ulster. (GL 06/92: 17-18; GL 12/92: 17; GL 12/93: 16; GL 06/98: 17) Violent behaviour by Scottish bands on Stena Line ferries across the Irish Sea is another pressing concern. A particularly nasty incident concerned members of four Scottish bands returning from Northern Ireland after parading in the Belfast Twelfth. Stena Line wrote to Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland executive officer George Patton as follows:

Members [of the band(s)] were involved in serious hooligan activity and loutish behaviour...violent and intimidating behaviour...included bottle throwing, fighting (with bottles), lewd and sectarian chants and even the manhandling of children travelling on board. (Letter from Stena Line to Grand Secretary of GOLI, George Patton, 03/09/01)

In these cases, the Scottish and Irish Grand Lodges cooperated quickly with Stena Line and banned the bands from taking part in future Orange parades. (GL 09/01: 4; GL 09/02: 3)

Despite the hiccups of the Hasson period and the spats over Scottish interference in Unionist unity initiatives in the early 1970s, the Scottish Grand Lodge has, like its Irish counterpart, served as a 'respectable' brake on the rougher attitudes of some members. In this, Dominic Bryan's 'rough vs. respectable' dichotomy between an often sectarian rank and file and a more image-conscious leadership is accurate. (Bryan 2000) However, the divide does not stem from the bourgeois composition of
the Grand Lodge leadership, as Bryan maintains, since Scottish Orange leaders have sprung from humble backgrounds for decades. Rather it comes from the leadership's perception that it must seek to safeguard the organisation's wider respectability to the greatest extent possible - especially in the face of falling membership. As a Scottish-Irish-English inter-jurisdictional meeting agreed, the Order must attempt to attract some businesspeople into its ranks. (GL 06/02: 29) Heightened cooperation is also evident on the parading issue, with Scots and Irish branches pooling their legal expertise on means of contesting parade bans. These bans became increasingly problematic for the Scottish Order in the 90s. (GOLS 06/95: 6) Indeed, the Scots refused to meet with Parades Commission representatives from Ulster in line with GOLI policy, despite the fact that the Order in Ulster is deeply divided on this issue. (GL 06/02: 29; Kaufmann 2007)

One further area where the Irish and Scottish branches think alike is over the problem of paramilitarism. As in Ulster, Grand Lodge has taken a stand against paramilitaries and most - but not all - members disapprove of them. Already in 1974, complaints had been received from Glasgow lodges about UVF paramilitary circulars, and Grand Lodge commented on the 'negative attitude' of the UVF. (GOLS 07/12/74: 30) In a subsequent report, Grand Lodge read a letter from the Ulster Defence Association complaining that the Scottish Grand Lodge had not contributed assistance to the dependants of prisoners. (GOLS 01/03/75: 16) This was a deliberate policy, since Grand Lodge claimed that monies for these funds were diverted to other UDA activities. (GOLS 02/09/89: 20) On 11 December 1976, the Grand Lodge passed a resolution ‘rejecting any support for the activities within Scotland of the UDA or any other paramilitary body’. Interestingly, this was a mere year after the Grand Lodge of Scotland received a reprimand from the GOLI for seeking to bring representatives of
loyalist paramilitaries together with mainstream Ulster Unionists to further Unionist
unity. (GOLS 21/01/89: 5; CC 5/12/75)

In 1988, the issue reared its head again when an Edinburgh member
complained that his district master, James MacLean, failed to take action when two
individuals dressed in UDA paramilitary uniforms made an appearance at an
Edinburgh Orange district dance seeking donations. Other members complained that
MacLean’s activities as a spokesman for the ‘Edinburgh Loyalist Coalition’ led to the
Order being branded as ‘sectarian’. MacLean had apparently voiced his opinion that
he ‘could not give any form of guarantee that there would be no violence should
Republican parades be permitted’ in his area. This led the Chief Constable to approve
parade restrictions against MacLean’s district, leading many members to express
annoyance at MacLean’s remarks. On a Grand Lodge ballot, MacLean was judged not
guilty – perhaps because his defenders included high-ranking Orangewoman Helyne
MacLean and several others. On the other hand, two lower-ranking members,
Crawford and Cameron, who admitted taking up a collection for the UDA, were
suspended from the Order and six others from several lodges in district 5 were later
expelled for UDA activities. (GOLS 25/02/89: 5-6, 03/03/90: 2)

Part of the explanation for Grand Lodge support for James MacLean may have
been Grand Lodge’s desire not to offend local sensibilities in district 5. Sometime in
the following months, members of the wayward lodge (L.O.L.#160) from which the
two suspended UDA men came shouted abuse at the Grand Master on an Orange
platform. (GOLS 01/09/90: 12) Ten members of L.O.L. 160, including its five office
bearers, were later charged with not properly conducting the business of their lodge. It
transpired that L.O.L. 160 had simply ignored the overwhelming evidence against the
two UDA brethren and failed to suspend them. (GOLS 08/12/90: 17) At the Grand
Lodge hearing in December, just one of the ten accused turned up to answer charges. James MacLean was at the hearing and he strenuously defended LOL 160, warning Grand Lodge that action against the lodge could lead to court action. This was rebuffed by a legal opinion received from a Donald Finlay QC. Despite this setback, MacLean maintained his resistance to action, but the ‘rough’ brand of Orangeism he represented clearly carried little weight among the gathered representatives of Scottish Orangeism: the vote to uplift the warrant of lodge 160 carried 116-5. (GOLS 08/12/90: 17)

This pattern of paramilitary ‘outlaw’ lodges has its Ulster counterpart in Belfast paramilitary lodges like L.O.L. 633 ‘Old Boyne Heroes’, known as the 'UVF lodge'. (Kennaway 2006) Yet, as in Northern Ireland, the ‘rough’ forces of sectarian Orangeism, with their pockets of strength in various locales, could not prevail at the higher levels of Orangeism. A similar dynamic holds for militant evangelical Protestantism, as when theological firebrands Ian Paisley and David Cassels were rejected by Grand Lodge as district speakers on Orange platforms in 1989-90. (GOLS 02/09/89: 20, 03/03/90: 3) Part of Grand Lodge’s motivation has to do with the split between Orangeism, as a ‘traditional’ Unionist organisation, and the street politics of ‘rebel’ Unionism with its emphasis on action and its lack of deference to hierarchy and tradition. (Kaufmann 2007) The Order is also aware of its plebeian makeup and the need to win public approval in order to have influence and retain the right to parade. Grand Lodge has had a running battle with the media in Scotland that has intensified in the 1990s. One of the major new advances within Grand Lodge at its new Olympia St. headquarters is an extensive press file and an organised system of responding to allegations made in the print or electronic media. (GOLS 1990: 13, 1991: 2, 1998: 28)
Politics

The nature of the political system in which the Order operates is important in determining its policy influence. In Scotland, and in both Newfoundland and Ontario (as in Canada at the federal level), there is a Westminster system with pragmatic ‘catchall’ parties like Liberal, Conservative or Labour/New Democratic Party based on class ideology. The system makes it difficult for ethnic or religious parties to emerge and encourages parties to reach to the centre for votes beyond their ethnoreligious base. Lines of class and region cross-cut the ethnoreligious cleavage thereby making it much harder to mobilize voters along ethnoreligious lines. Residential segregation is also much less pervasive, which undercuts ethnic appeals at ward and constituency level.

In Northern Ireland, by contrast, the political system has been based on the ethnoreligious cleavage between Ulster-Protestants and Catholic-Nationalists since partition. Competition between parties occurs within ethnic blocs and is aimed at ‘outbidding’ mainstream parties by appealing to the interests of one's own ethnic group only. This ‘outbidding’ dynamic has been noted in numerous other divided societies and arises because it is futile for parties to appeal across the communal divide since this strategy will gain few votes from the other ethnic group while losing many from a party’s own group. (Horowitz 1985, ch. 8) Unsurprisingly, the link between Orangeism and politics is strongest in Northern Ireland. During the Stormont period (1922-72) when the Unionist Party ruled the province, all Prime Ministers of Northern Ireland and all but three cabinet ministers were Orangemen. (Harbinson 1973) In a year 2000 study, roughly half the Ulster Unionist Party’s 900-member
governing body (the Ulster Unionist Council) were shown to be Orangemen or women, and most UUP MPs and MLAs were as well. (Tonge & Evans 2002)

At the elite level, Orangeism has also wielded influence in other jurisdictions, but has never dominated to the same extent as in Northern Ireland. Canadian Orange strength goes some way to explaining why four Canadian and four Newfoundland prime ministers, many provincial premiers, federal MPs and numerous mayors (including over thirty in Toronto) were Orangemen while only a handful of Scottish Orangemen made the political grade. In Scotland, lower Orange membership densities led to more limited electoral clout. Nonetheless, the Scottish Order was very important in establishing a working-class Tory base in the 1880s through Working Men’s Conservative Associations in the west of Scotland. In Glasgow, the Order played an important part in municipal politics until the 1930s. Its influence was similar to that of the Order in Liverpool, though it never dominated city politics to the same extent as in Toronto. (Houston & Smyth 1980; Neal 1987; Kaufmann 2006; Day 2006) Nationally, in the 1880s and 90s, James Bain, Archibald Campbell and William Whitelaw were the first Scottish Orange MPs. The surge in Orangeism and Protestant politics more generally in the 1920s and 30s following the 1918 Education Act brought at least six new Orange M.P.s to Parliament. These included Sir John Gilmour, who served as Secretary of State for Scotland (1924-29), Col. A.D. McInnes Shaw (also Grand Master), General Hunter Weston, Lt. Col. T.E.R. Moore, William Templeton and Sir John Baird. (Gallagher 1987a: 144-5; McFarland 1990:192-3; McCracken 1990)

Overall, however, it is clear that the Order in Scotland only furnished a fraction of the number of politicians it did in Canada and Northern Ireland. We may thus surmise that political influence seems to be linked to the numerical strength of
Orange membership, with the caveat that cross-cutting cleavages tend to weaken Orange influence even if membership is very strong, as in the Canadian province of Newfoundland. In Scotland, as in Canada and Newfoundland, Orange MPs had little influence over the course of Tory/Unionist policy owing to the power of cross-cutting cleavages of class and the fact that sectarian issues had little resonance outside specific working-class locales in west-central Scotland. In the main, the Scottish Unionists welcomed the Orange element as a way of mobilizing a working-class vote, but kept the Order at arm’s length when it came to the party’s policies and image. (Walker 1992: 187) The Scottish Orange MP Sir John Gilmour, for example, as Secretary of State for Scotland, rebuffed the Church of Scotland’s appeal to regulate Irish immigration to Scotland which the Kirk feared was a ‘menace’ to the Scottish ‘race’. Meanwhile, the Orange Unionist councillor Sir Charles Cleland defended the 1918 Education Act against Protestant grassroots accusations of ‘Rome on the Rates’. (Bruce 2000: 139)

The turn of the Scottish Tory party away from Unionism alienated many Scottish Orangemen and west of Scotland working-class Protestants. This was symbolised by the dropping of the 'Unionist' label from the party's name in the 1960s and underscored by Thatcher's support for the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. (McCracken 2002a; Marshall 1996) Having lost its direct political connections, the Order concentrated on acting as a lobby for Protestant interests in education and on Northern Ireland issues. It first flirted with establishing a new Scottish Unionist Party in 1986, deciding later to focus on tactical voting against sitting Tory MPs. 100,000 leaflets on tactical voting were distributed and the Order made the Scottish Unionist position clear at a press conference prior to the election. The Grand Lodge of Scotland claimed that a large number of Tories lost their seats as a result of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement. 'Conservatives who had scoffed at the Orange vote had changed their
tune. They now know it exists,' glowed Grand Lodge. (GOLS 13/06/87) The GOLI
accepted this version of events, claiming that the Scottish branch had 'persuaded
electors to switch votes to punish Thatcher'. (GL 12/87: 20)

Despite such claims, in electoral terms, I could find no significant Orange
effect on the Scottish national vote at either the county level (1861-1961) or in
Glasgow at the ward level (1922-47) during eras of stronger Protestant politics. In
both cases, Orange density is insignificant while class and the proportion of Catholics
were highly significant electoral factors, suggesting that trade unions and Catholics
were more highly mobilized (as Labour or Liberal supporters) than were Orange men
and women. In Glasgow, the Orange Order has had perhaps its greatest impact on
municipal politics and attained an important degree of influence on the Tory party
between the wars. (Gallagher 1987a: 144-45; Walker 1992) However, using ward-
level data across a limited range of census and electoral variables collected by
Maclean and Gordon in a study of the Glasgow Labour movement during 1922-47, I
found no significant relationship between Orange membership density and the vote
for either Labour (we might expect a negative relationship) or even the militant
Scottish Protestant League (SPL)! (Maclean and Gordon 1976) Several commentators
have pointed to friction between Alexander Ratcliffe's SPL and the Orange Order,
noting that the Order distrusted the street politics of Ratcliffe while Ratcliffe criticised
the Orange Order for its insufficient religiosity. This analysis supports such a claim.
(Gallagher 1987a; Marshall 1996: 113; McCracken 2002a) Overall, given
Orangeism's limited impact on the vote at both county and city levels, it seems that
the puzzle of Orange political impotence needs to be qualified: Orangeism seems to
have provided far more political figures than its electoral weight warranted.
Conclusion

In summary, we have shown that the Order's strength within the Protestant majority in Scotland - even in the west-central belt - is and was much weaker than many believe. The Order's growth was fuelled by Irish-Protestant immigrants and their descendants and is currently strongest in areas of historic Irish-Protestant immigration. Broad categories of events like 'threats to the Union' explain some of the fluctuation in membership trends over time, but - apart from the wars - no single historical event seems to have dramatically altered membership levels. Economic trends seem to bear an ever weaker relationship to membership numbers. The decline in the religiosity of Scottish Protestants and the rise of Orange social clubs in the 1960s may account for the unusual pattern in which Ladies Orange membership began to fall some thirty years before the men's.

In ideological terms, the Scottish Order is divided along similar lines as Ireland, with a 'respectable' Grand Lodge trying to enforce decorum against the 'rougher' sentiments of sections of the rank-and-file who desire militancy and action. Though unsuccessful in curbing alcohol in lodge halls and on parade, the Grand Lodge of Scotland has kept a lid on paramilitarism and poor band behaviour. Having said this, comparisons with Ireland show that Scottish Orangeism has generally been rougher, more secular and occasionally more militant than its Ulster cousin. In political terms, the weakness of Orangeism within Protestant Scotland (as compared to Ulster) and the lower salience of ethno-religious as opposed to class issues there has resulted in a divided 'Orange vote' and little policy success. Given these realities,
the fact that the Order has provided so many political figures to Scottish politics is surprising - a testament to its efficacy in training men for elected office.

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1 1908 is the only missing year and has been linearly interpolated from adjacent years. We would like to record our debt to Rev. Gordon McCracken, an ex-Orangeman and former Deputy Grand Master of the Order, who painstakingly collected and scanned in reports of proceedings from all over Scotland for the period 1860-1966, compiling these onto CD. His assistance and advice have been invaluable, as has that of former Grand Secretary Jack Ramsay and current Grand Secretary Donald Hatcliffe.

2 Those wishing to gain access to this data should contact the author. Data will be released through the UK Data Archive subject to the approval of the Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland and Reverend McCracken.

3 Calculated from County (N. Ireland) and Provincial (Canada) Grand Orange Lodge reports of proceedings and return sheets and respective historical censuses.

4 Assumes target population at half electorate.

5 Memberships at lodge level are not available for the Masonic Order, hence the lack of size differentials on the map.

6 I have drawn upon Michael Hechter's UK County dataset for the 1851-1966 period. (Hechter 1976) This comprehensive dataset encompasses variables from the census, registrar-general's reports and elections of 1885, 1892, 1900, 1910, 1924, 1931, 1951 and 1966. Election data has been matched to its closest census year. (Hechter 1975) A second source of electronic data is Iain Maclean's study of Labour Elites and Electorates in Glasgow which provides census and electoral data for Glasgow in the mid-twentieth century. (Maclean & Gordon 1976). This data has been augmented by text sources where necessary.

7 Thanks to the important geographic areal interpolation work of Danny Dorling, David Martin and Richard Mitchell on the Linking Censuses Together project, we are able to establish a set of county-level data for the 1971-91 period which is continuous with Hechter's 1851-1961 county data. (Dorling et al. 2001; Hechter 1976) 2001 data, though now available using the post-1973 geography, has not been similarly covered by the LCT program and thus cannot be used in our county-level study.

8 Z-score is a measure of statistical significance (derived from comparing the coefficient of a variable with its standard error). TSCS refers to time-series cross sectional pooling, R sq (R-squared) is a measure of how well the independent variables predict the dependent variable (in this case Orange density).

9 There were roughly 5500 juniors in Northern Ireland in 1954, down to 3900 by 1970. (GOLI junior returns) In 1997, just one percent of Ulster Orangemen claimed to have pass through a junior programme. (LOI Commission 1997) The Loyal Orangewomen of Ireland are said to number seven or eight thousand members. (Interview with George Patton, former Grand Secretary of Ireland, 09/00)

10 For more on the decline of the Church of Scotland, see Brown 1997.
I am indebted to Alex Rough of the County Grand Lodge of Toronto for his personal directory of prominent Orangemen, compiled painstakingly over many decades.