

On 10 September 2005, the worst rioting in Northern Ireland in twenty years was sparked by a parade of mysterious bowler-hatted men wearing Orange sashes accompanied by hard-thumping marching bands and throngs of young spectators. Many outsiders know the Orange Order as the incomprehensible organisation at the centre of the conflict-ridden July marching season in Northern Ireland. This book presents the first modern history and social analysis of the Orange Order, and is based upon the Orange Order's treasure trove of internal documents - whose contents have never been exposed to a non-Orange audience.

The Orange Order, or Loyal Orange Institution (as it is officially known) in Northern Ireland is a fraternity dedicated to furthering the aims of Protestantism and maintaining the British connection.¹ Its loyalty to the Crown is an inheritance which is conditional upon the support of the British Crown for Protestantism and the continued political connection between the British government and Northern Ireland.² The Order is an extremely multifaceted organisation which must be considered in all its manifestations: cultural, religious, convivial and political. It also has economic functions as a benevolent association, property holder and charity. One the whole, it is an organisation located between the private sphere of individuals and the Protestant community as a whole. We can go further and specify that - at least in its main outlines - it is more of a cultural than an economic or political association.

Francis Fukuyama famously predicted that liberalism, democracy and capitalism would spell the 'End of History' as twenty-first century man came to appreciate that his cultural inheritance was merely one among many rather than a treasured tradition. Nationalism, in this view, was merely a growing pain which underdeveloped societies would pass through on their way to the cosmopolitan, individualist End of History.³ Anthony Giddens' sociology of high modernity sounds

a similar note: globalisation and fragmented identities are leading to de-traditionalisation.⁴ The twentieth century decline of sectarianism in North America, Australia and northern England reinforces the instinctive belief that conservative traditionalism naturally gives way to modern liberalism.

But what has occurred within Northern Ireland in the past thirty years turns conventional theories on their head. Society there has modernised and grown wealthy, but history continues to live in the hearts of men. The economy has developed and global pop culture flourishes, but underneath this surface, younger generations are more wedded to their ethnic past than their parents. Like youth everywhere in the West, young Unionists and Nationalists in Northern Ireland have rejected many of the traditions of their elders. But in common with the youth of the Muslim world, the rejection of established hierarchies has paved the way for militant communalism rather than cosmopolitan liberalism. Orangeism is an old tradition which is nonetheless geared toward communal solidarity. It thus finds its sails caught in the conflicting crosswinds of historical deference and youthful defiance.

The Order as an Ethnic Association

In its official statements, the Order stresses its religious basis. It takes great care to repudiate those who use the term 'Protestant' in a secular fashion and the recent (1997) LOI Commission avers that 'Ulster-Scot', 'unionist' or 'plantation' is better suited than 'Protestant' to describing the Order's *culture*.⁵ The Order's 'Constitution' - *The Qualifications of an Orangeman* - only make reference to ethical and religious obligations. Nevertheless, while its religious mission is central to its being, the Orange Order is not an evangelical religious organisation like the Christian Coalition

in the United States. Though it shares some features with the Coalition's anti-Catholic predecessors like the National Association of Evangelicals or nineteenth century Evangelical Alliance, it is an entirely different creature.⁶

Here we come to what is perhaps the crux of Orangeism's *raison d'être*: that of an *ethnic* association representing the Ulster-Protestant people. In addition, the Order has adopted a this-worldly, ethno-cultural orientation in virtually every part of the world where it has taken root, thereby alienating religious fundamentalists. For instance, in the strongest Canadian Orange province, Newfoundland, evangelicals like the early Methodists, Salvation Army and now Pentecostals have long discouraged their members from joining the Order.⁷ In Northern Ireland, a similar pattern can be discerned in the significant number of Orange apostates who leave the organisation due to their 'born-again' rediscovery of Christ. As Grand Master of the Orange Order Martin Smyth found out in 1995 when he participated in a Prayer Breakfast sponsored by American evangelicals, Ulster-Protestant ethnic boundaries do not take kindly to being stretched by religious proselytisers.⁸

In Canada and Australia, the Order was rooted in British-Protestant dominant-group ethnicity. Dominant ethnic groups are communities of shared ancestry which dominate particular nations or states.⁹ The composite British-Protestant group which holds sway in Canada and Australia is similar to that of the mixed Anglo-Scots 'British' group in Northern Ireland. These mixed ethnic groups were avid participants in what Douglas Cole refers to as Britannic nationalism: the feeling of shared 'British' (as opposed to English) descent, Protestant faith and imperial destiny.¹⁰ Outside these locales, things were slightly different. In Scotland, England and the United States, the Order identified with the broader Protestant ethnic majority, though it never became accepted as 'native'. As a result, Scottish, English

and American Orangeism relied mainly on immigrants and their descendants from Ulster (in Scotland and England) or Canada (in the USA). In other locations, Orangeism was aligned with a minority ethnic group. In West Africa, the Order is linked to the Ewe minority which straddles the Ghana-Togo boundary, and in Eire, it is part of the fabric of the small Irish-Protestant minority. In places where the religious division between Protestant and Catholic is non-ethnic (as in continental Europe or the western Isles of Scotland), Orangeism has never taken root.¹¹

The ethno-cultural dimension of Orangeism was confirmed in a straw poll taken at a conference on the future of the Order in 2003, attended by 250 selected delegates, the vast majority from the six counties of Northern Ireland. Of those voting, just 3 percent referred to the Order as a purely religious organisation and fewer still spoke of it as either a social, welfare or charitable organisation. On the other hand, 46 percent considered the Institution to be 'a cultural organisation with its basis in the reformed faith,' 36 percent saw it as a 'religious organisation with cultural characteristics' and 14 percent felt that no one aspect was paramount.¹²

Scholars of ethnicity and nationalism emphasise that ethnic groups are demarcated by cultural features like religion, language or race. Groups need not possess the full range of cultural markers - Ulster Protestants and Catholics have the same accent - but at least one significant difference is needed.¹³ In Ulster, religion serves as an ethnic boundary marker between Catholic-Irish and Protestant-British ethnic groups. This reinforces Brendan O' Leary and John McGarry's contention that the conflict is an ethno-national one, but does not invalidate Steve Bruce's hypothesis that religious narration helps to reinforce Ulster-Protestant ethnicity. Indeed, it seems to me that the two positions are mutually compatible.¹⁴ Religion, for instance, helps Protestants frame their communal story as one of divine election and religious

mission. The Old Testament, which Ulster-Protestants hold dear, is packed with references to Israel as a chosen people, and provides a template for Ulster-Protestants' religious nationalism.¹⁵ A similar process occurs elsewhere in the world. Around the Mediterranean or Balkans, for example, many groups, whether Christian or Muslim, define themselves as 'defenders of the faith' and their glorious past typically invokes battles against the infidel (i.e. Serbs against Turks at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389).¹⁶

The Social and Geographical Anatomy of the Order

In 1997, an Orange Order Commission which received responses from 41 percent of Orange lodges found that just 22 percent of the membership could be described as even broadly 'white collar'. Fully 40 percent were manual workers, 20 percent farmers and 5-10 percent retirees. The Order is also younger than some imagine: 20 percent of members are under thirty and just 25 percent are over 60.¹⁷ Orangeism has always drawn its principal strength from the working and rural masses, but encompassed all ranks of society in its lodges until the twentieth century. In 1900, as we shall see later in the book, those in the top several hundred positions (i.e. District, County and Grand Lodges) in the Order were disproportionately drawn from the middle and professional classes of Ulster-Protestant society. Those at the pinnacle of the Orange pyramid, Grand Lodge, had the same social origins as the province's landed and mercantile elite until the 1960s. Orangemen from the mass base of local lodges, by contrast, contained very few non-manual members. Fifty years on, things had changed completely: Orange leaders came from the same social background as their followers and were no longer drawn from the higher social strata of the population. This has been accompanied by a wider anti-elitist cultural shift


from 'deference to defiance' within the Orange rank-and-file, who are no longer prepared to tip their hat to their social betters.¹⁸

In 1950, roughly a fifth of adult Protestant men wore the Orange sash, though a much larger number, perhaps another 10 to 20 percent of Protestant males, had been initiated at some point in their lives but let their membership lapse. When we add junior and female Orangemen to the total and consider Orange families and sympathisers, we begin to see that Orangeism is a major cultural force whose power vastly exceeds the number of paid-up members at any given point in time. This influence is not uniform, but geographically variable. No two points in Northern Ireland are much more than two hours' drive apart, but the degree of local diversity is impressive. Arguably the most important engine of local Protestant variation is religion. Antrim, for instance, has a strong Scottish-Presbyterian strain in its population. Fermanagh Protestants, on the other hand, are largely Church of Ireland. The local Catholic population is not evenly spread either, but is more heavily concentrated in the western half of the province, in West Belfast and along the southern boundary with Eire. On the other hand, Antrim, North Down and Belfast county borough (until recently) have solid Protestant majorities.

The map below in figure 1.1 shows the proportion of Orangemen within the Protestant male adult population ('Orange density') of the six counties and two cities of Northern Ireland in 1971. The map also plots the more than 800 lodges, adjusted by membership size, in the province in 1991. With the exception of Lough Neagh in central Northern Ireland, areas without lodges represent sections of the province which are almost free of Protestants. Though Orange density has fallen sharply in the cities, the basic county-level differences remain much as they were. Notice that Orangeism is strongest among Protestants in the western counties of Northern Ireland

(darker shades) where there are more Catholics and a higher Church of Ireland population. What this level of geography cannot show is the disproportionate strength of Orangeism along the entire southern border, where the proportion of Catholics is very high. It will later become clear that Orangeism thrives best when local Protestants feel under siege, but not defeated. This explains its social power in the border counties and its relative weakness in both the Republic of Ireland and in Protestant-majority counties in the North.

Figure 1.1. Orange Lodges (1991) and County Orange Density (1971), Northern Ireland




Source: Northern Ireland Census 1971; GOLI Returns 1971, 1991; OSNI Digital Boundaries

These trends are confirmed through statistical analysis of membership at county level for the years 1891-1971. The strongest trend is that Orangeism is weakest in Protestant and Presbyterian counties in eastern Ulster. The inverse of this

is that a higher Catholic and Church of Ireland population boosts Orange participation in a county. Occupational distribution, migration and total buildings (a proxy for area wealth) had no effect on Orange membership density (Orangemen per Protestant population) in these years. On the other hand, the denominational mix in each county predicted almost three-quarters of the variation in Orange density over place and time.¹⁹ (See fig. 1.2)

Fig. 1.2



Source: Census of Ireland 1891-1911; Northern Ireland Census 1926-71; Orange County Reports, 1891-1971

In the glare of the headlines, people sometimes forget that Orangeism is a fraternity like any other, with an important convivial function. In many communities in the nineteenth century, there were few sources of entertainment beyond that provided in the lodge hall.²⁰ Halls are not only used for meetings, which allow friends to get together outside a church setting, but also host community social events. Even today, lodge halls are often among the most prominent recreational buildings in many

small communities. Rational choice theories of resource mobilisation argue that political organisations which provide their members with 'selective incentives' like sociability perform better in the long run than those which simply emphasise political ideology and action.²¹ Orangeism is a community tradition, and memories of Orange events are handed down across the generations. For many Orangemen, the political aspirations and theology of the Orange movement are less real than local memories, events and parades. Membership, especially in rural areas, is often inherited via family connections rather than chosen by those seeking a distinct Orange ideology.²²

The Political Activities of the Orange Order in Twentieth Century Northern Ireland

Political activity has always been a key ingredient in the Orange repertoire, and I would argue that the Order has served as both a cultural association - what Robert Putnam calls an agent of 'bonding' social capital - and a political interest group. In the evolving political context of the twentieth century, it has shifted from being a political insider ('protective' interest) in a corporatist system to an outsider, or 'promotional' lobby group, in a pluralistic polity.²³ In the process, it has lost the elitist, consensus-building quality which characterises groups at the very centre of state policy, and has instead become more independent of the state and party politics.²⁴ Cozy backroom meetings with friendly politicians have been replaced by adversarial meetings with hostile officials. The Order is also conditioned by its political environment in an ethnically divided society. In divided societies, parties try to outflank each other as the best defenders of their particular ethnic group's interests.²⁵

The Grand Orange Lodge was caught up in this struggle, and constantly had to watch out for challenges from Ian Paisley and other Independent Unionists on its right flank.

The variegated role of the Orange Order among Ulster Protestants finds expression in its Grand Lodge committee system, which has developed over the past century in response to changes in Northern Ireland's socio-political environment. Grand Lodge may be viewed as the Orange 'parliament' where delegates from the counties gather to discuss and vote on policy and Orange laws. Yet Grand Lodge is an unwieldy body of more than a hundred people which met only twice per year until 2000 and now meets just four times per year. This raises the issue of who exercises Orange power between the Grand Lodge sessions. Originally, policy was executed by Grand Lodge through *ad hoc* committees such as those charged with setting up a new Headquarters (1922) or erecting the Obelisk at the Battle of the Diamond (1927). Repeated functional requirements have since led to broad lines of organisation which reflect the stimuli to which the Order has responded.²⁶

Committees of the Order after the creation of Northern Ireland in 1922 were originally less numerous than they are today, but many of the basic functions have persisted. (See figure 1.3) For example, there existed a Historical Committee, re-constituted after 1922, to oversee the Order's ethno-historical role of maintaining an Ulster-Protestant collective memory. This broad 'historical' category encompassed archiving of documents, constructing memorials, re-enacting events, producing pamphlets and lecturing to the rank-and-file. The Historical Committee is the ancestor of today's Education Committee, though the latter incorporates legislative concerns arising from the 1947 Education Act (N.I.).²⁷

In 1922, two new committees were formed, the Press Committee, dedicated to rebutting 'slanderous' accusations in the radio and printed media of the day, and the

Parliamentary Committee - formed to oversee new legislation and to 'take whatever [political] action they consider necessary' in response.²⁸ The Press committee survived until the 1990s when technical advances allowed Grand Lodge and its public relations officer to reappropriate this function and communicate directly with the public.

Needless to say, there would be few in the Order today who wouldn't sympathise with the sentiments of the Press Committee's founders! The work of the Parliamentary Committee was largely devolved to the Central Committee in the years after partition as well as to specialist committees like that for Education, which could focus its fire on appropriate specialist agencies of government. In addition, the Grand Lodge's Finance Committee (which survives today) helped to oversee budgetary matters.

Most important of all is the Central Committee. The Central Committee acts as the nerve centre of the institution and may be considered the Orange 'cabinet'. Contrary to the assertions of the splinter 'Spirit of Drumcree' group in 1997, the Central Committee is not a recent invention, and proved a decisive actor soon after Partition in 1921, forming a kind of Orange 'cabinet' by 1926.²⁹ Here the Grand Master ('president'), Grand Secretary ('vice-president') and other top-ranking Orange officers - mostly County masters and secretaries as well as conveners of committees - discuss major policy initiatives and decide which items of business to forward to the periodic Grand Lodge sessions. They are also empowered to issue press releases and, since they meet more frequently than the Grand Lodge, have the important role of managing the intersessional affairs of the Institution.³⁰

Figure 1.3. Evolution of Major Policy Committees, Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland





Figure 1.4. The Orange Lodge Structure



Source: Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland policy document in response to the 'Spirit of Drumcree', 1997

The Central Committee, Elitism and Executive Power

The Central Committee of Grand Lodge gives the Orange elite considerable latitude in managing the flow of grassroots private, district and county lodge resolutions, executing policy and making public statements. It thus exercises a degree of elite control in an otherwise highly democratic institution, though there are good reasons for believing that the Central Committee is less of a socially elite body than in previous years. How is control achieved? On the surface, the structure of the Central Committee is relatively open: three members are sent by each County Grand Lodge in Northern Ireland and two apiece from the county lodges in the Republic. In principle, there is no reason why this should not ensure a strong grassroots democratic flow up to Grand Lodge. (See figure 1.4)

In practice, however, several 'intangible' forces allow for a stronger dose of executive power. First of all, as we move from the private level through intermediate tiers up to Grand lodge, each lodge level possesses emergent properties (i.e. not just a sum of lower-level actors) and places greater value upon the 'qualities' of the men it puts forward to higher levels. Thus men of means, influence, ambition and political talent find their way up the lodge structure. In the American CIO and IWW Labour movements of the early twentieth century, union leaders of White Anglo-Saxon Protestant ('WASP') descent led a predominantly southern/eastern European workforce because the latter 'pushed' WASPs to the top of the union hierarchy where it was felt they could better fit in with American political culture.³¹ Likewise, in the

Order, up until the 1960s, the strongly deferential loyalist culture - especially in southern and western parts of the province - resulted in a higher socioeconomic profile at Grand Lodge level than at private lodge level. For instance, Fintona district in Tyrone, in view of the vacancy caused by Sir George Clark's departure as Grand Master, recommended the Marquis of Hamilton, MP. It would be an 'honor for County Tyrone to have such a worthy brother in this high office...[he] would bring "grace and dignity" to this office [and] would mean much goodwill for the Orange Institution in Ireland'.³²

Add to this the cost of subscriptions and the time demands placed on individuals as they ascend the Orange ladder, and we can see how higher levels helped nominate (until recently) individuals of middle-class or aristocratic background to positions of leadership within Grand Lodge. Whereas class no longer divides Grand Lodge from the rank-and-file, two other factors allow for some concentration of power at Central Committee and Grand Lodge. The first is the low degree of participation at Grand Lodge meetings, where little more than half typically attend.³³ This facilitates the emergence of committed 'leaders' who dominate discussion at Central Committee and Grand Lodge and are the most active in Grand Lodge affairs. To some extent, this is necessitated by the fact that time for discussion is limited, the need for action is often urgent, and Grand Lodge rarely meets. In reading minutes of the Central Committee since 1945, it becomes apparent that the Grand Master is often, but not always the dominant figure with particular others wielding significant influence. For instance, Sir George Clark and James Molyneaux are two individuals whose experience and clout gave them a great deal of legitimacy within the Central Committee in the late 1960s and early 1970s during a period of relatively weak Grand Mastership. In most Central Committee meetings, policy is

decided by discussion among just a handful of key individuals. Though individuals frequently disagree, a consensus usually emerges quite quickly - often in support of respected 'leaders'.

The format of discussion at Central Committee typically involves a list of business items (including lodge resolutions) and reports from committee conveners. Debate then follows on various policy items, often beginning with the election of Officers and Grand Chaplains. There is a high degree of accord on many issues, and many votes have a consensual ring to them, with little dissent from the Grand Lodge 'backbenches'. Resolutions from lodge, district and county levels can be sent back to the counties or merely taken as read, thereby allowing the Central Committee to contain grassroots tendencies. To take but a few examples: in 1935, a resolution from Ballymoney district 'on a variety of subjects, several of which would require government legislation to be passed' was simply referred back to the County Antrim Grand Lodge.³⁴

In 1968, when a County Londonderry private lodge resolved to censure its County lodge for taking no action against Prime Minister James Chichester-Clark for attending a Roman Catholic service for Colonel McCausland, the Grand Secretary pointed out that proper procedure had not been followed so the resolution could only 'possibly' be considered at a subsequent meeting.³⁵ Even as late as 1971, at the height of the Troubles, Central Committee power was strongly reaffirmed by those present. As one member bluntly put it: 'all [district and county] secretaries must accept all instructions given by all leaders.'³⁶ However, the momentum of power had begun to swing away from Grand Lodge in line with general Unionist disenchantment with the traditional Unionist elite and UK government. This later manifested itself in catcalls

from the platform on the Twelfth of July, 1971.³⁷ After this date, rumblings of discontent from the Orange masses were voiced with increasing alacrity.

Rebels and Traditionalists: the Great Divide within Orangeism

One of the most salient divisions in the Unionist community is between what I term 'rebels' and 'traditionalists' (see table 1). Protestantism was originally a dissenting religious movement, and its populist, fissiparous spirit still animates Protestant Ulster.³⁸ However, there is a great difference between the Church of Ireland, with its establishment status and links to tradition, and low-church dissenting sects like the Presbyterians and Methodists. The latter have a history of conflict with the established Anglo-Irish elite over the right to worship freely and many supported radical movements like the United Irishmen and, later, the Ulster labour movement. This tension foregrounds the multifaceted divide within Unionism, which is represented in the form of 'rebel' and 'traditionalist' ideal types in table 1. These categories nest within the 'Ulster-Loyalist' vs. 'Ulster-British' dichotomy developed by Jennifer Todd, but may also be seen to complement Todd's work by dissecting the 'Ulster-Loyalist' category. The liberal, civic 'Ulster-British' tradition is a minor chord in Orange and popular Unionist life. Instead, I look at the majority 'Ulster-Loyalist' strand and the differing traditions therein. The 'rebel vs. traditional' schema attempts to root its competing idioms in distinct regional-historical locations and sketch out the difference in fundamental principle between the two. One could go even further and dissect 'rebel Unionism' into Steve Bruce's categories of evangelical (sectarian) and secular (ethno-nationalist). Some prefer to throw up their hands and speak of unionism as an irreducibly diverse babble held together only by a commitment to the

union.³⁹ What the study of Orangeism reveals, however, is that there is a definite clustering of positions within unionism. Unbundled, the individual strands of unionist diversity (i.e. class, region, denomination) remain relatively latent and unimportant. Meanwhile, many seem to think that rural traditionalism equates to militant Protestantism, but the Orange Order - a deeply conservative association which has spurned militancy and street politics in all locations - confounds this easy equation.⁴⁰

In the basement display of the Benjamin Franklin museum in Philadelphia, one exhibit relates how the Presbyterian Scotch-Irish of the Pennsylvania backcountry endorsed the frontier populism of the anti-Indian Paxton Boys prior to the Revolution. Later, these 'Scotch-Irishers' strongly supported the Revolution of 1776-83 against the one-third of Americans who remained loyal to the British. The children and grandchildren of the Scotch-Irish Patriots gave birth to Jacksonian populism in the 1830s and were prominent among the pioneers of Texas. They may be identified as the archetypal Ulster-Protestant 'rebels'. The Ulster-Protestant 'traditionalist' alter-ego could be found north of the American border where Irish Protestants (the largest ethnic group in English Canada by 1867) from more Anglican counties like Cavan, Monaghan and Leitrim established Orangeism as the backbone of the Canadian Tory party.⁴¹ Canadian Orangemen, few of whom were Presbyterian, fit in well with Canada's counter-revolutionary loyalism and served as the shock troops of popular toryism. They supported the established church and political elite, helping to suppress the liberal rebellions in 1837-8, 1870 and 1885 and were distinguished by their enthusiasm for Empire and the British connection into the 1970s.⁴²

Counties Antrim and Belfast have generally been the most rebellious in the province, with their high Methodist and Presbyterian populations and significant working-class/dissenting histories. The roots of this originated with the United

Irishmen, with their strong Antrim base, whose struggle for religious freedom for dissenters and land rights for tenants had a long pedigree. Meanwhile, in growing, rapidly industrialising Belfast, a class element was added to the mix. This begins no later than the 1860s, when William Johnston of Ballykilbeg became the spokesman for a new, Belfast-based popular Orangeism. In a period when Orange marches were officially banned, Johnston's movement challenged the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy who dominated the Order, with their penchant for loyalty and hierarchy. Less concerned with protecting the land rights of the aristocracy and the established status of the Church of Ireland, this new brand of Orangeism focused on attaining the right to parade and galvanising the Protestant working class. Though conservative forces managed to oust Johnston from the leadership, he gained the support of many proletarian Orangemen in Belfast. Dominic Bryan ascribes Johnston's rise to workingmen's more independent economic status (as compared with the traditional tenantry) which made them less dependent on traditional forms of landlord-tenant loyalty.⁴³

Antrim tenants-rights advocates, Belfast working-class agitators and militant Protestants coalesced to form the basis of the breakaway Independent Orange Order (IOO) in 1903. The movement's beginnings can be traced to heckling at the Orange platform during a Twelfth gathering at Castlereagh in 1901. Thomas Sloan, who became an IOO leader, challenged Belfast Grand Master Col. Thomas Saunderson over remarks he made that supposedly defended the government's position in banning the 1901 Rostrevor parade. Sloan's appearance on the platform, and his challenge to an individual of Saunderson's class, were unprecedented. Sloan's subsequent successful decision to run against a Conservative Association candidate in South Belfast sealed the rift between Sloan and established Unionism.⁴⁴

Sloan's suspension laid the groundwork for the rise of the Independent Orange Order, which blossomed during 1903-8 and maintains an active following today - particularly in North Antrim, where the Rev. Ian Paisley is a prominent supporter.⁴⁵ What is not appreciated is that mainstream Orangeism, especially in Antrim, shares an 'independentist' streak, manifested through support for the DUP and through a cherishing of the Presbyterian/United Irishmen tradition of rebellious, contingent Unionism. For instance, though Antrim Grand Officer Rev. John Brown occasionally warned of Paisleyite tendencies in particular lodges like LOL 159 Magheragall, he also tried to speak sympathetically to their concerns and bring about a rapprochement with the Independent Orange Order. In 1967, for instance, he accepted an invitation to preach at an Independent Orange service in Ballymoney, Co. Antrim in an attempt to build bridges.⁴⁶

Table 1. Rebel and Traditionalist Modes of Ulster Unionism

	Rebels	'Loyal' Traditionalists
Denomination	Presbyterian, Methodist	Church of Ireland
Plantation Origin	Scots-Irish	Anglo-Irish
Mass base	Industrial Labour, Small freeholders	Rural tenants
North American Exemplars	'Scotch-Irish' Patriots in USA, c. 1776	Orange Loyalists in Canada, c. 1837
Interpretation of Orangeism	Uphold militant Protestantism	Uphold traditional British-Protestant values
View of Grand Lodge and Unionist leaders	Skeptical	Respectful
Preferred Political Expression	Direct Public Protest	Informal elite channels
Preferred Orange Principle	Ulster-Protestant ethnic interest and reformed faith - as embodied in abstract principle and the sentiments of the mass membership	Orange tradition - as embodied in Orange laws, ordinances, customs and history
Leadership	Evangelical clergy, petit-bourgeoisie	Aristocracy, Large local businessmen
Political Philosophy	Lockean radical change, Populism	Burkean evolution, Deference to elite consensus
Attitudes to alcohol, band discipline and traditional social mores	Secularists more permissive, evangelicals more conservative than even traditionalists	Conservative
Stance toward paramilitaries and political violence	More permissive, especially secular rebels	Antagonistic
Attitude toward British crown	Conditionality	Loyalty
Interpretation of Protestantism	Protestantism as dissent	Protestantism as tradition
National identity	Ulstermen	British
Favoured N.I. party	DUP	UUP
Regional base	Antrim, N. Down, Belfast	South and West

Rebel Unionism has been a recessive trait through much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries due to mainland Britain's Unionism and the paternal mediating

role of the Ulster-Protestant elite. As the end of the millennium approached, things began to change. Brian Faulkner, the last Unionist Party leader to speak with a patrician pseudo-English accent, symbolised the demise of the old Ulster 'squirearchy'. In his wake came men like James Molyneaux, Billy Douglas and Martin Smyth: self-made populists chafing against the domination of the traditional elites. The new breed were in better tune with the Protestant masses who were losing their deferential traditionalism. Modernising impulses led to flattened status hierarchies and a search for a fundamental ethnic Unionism, freed from the cake of custom, ritual, restraint and compromise. In this way, modernisation, far from heralding a new spirit of liberalism and 'civic' Unionism, helped instead to recharge a recessive rebel Unionism, bringing it to prominence. In contrast to 1914, when a temporary emergency united the elites and masses of Ulster against Britain leaving the class structure intact, rebel Unionism in the 21st century represented a root-and-branch overhaul of the system, a return to a spirit unseen since 1798.

Structure of the Book

The first two chapters of this book consider Orangeism's political influence towards the end of the Stormont period (1922-72). During this phase of its existence, Orangeism saturated the Ulster Unionist Party which controlled the Northern Ireland parliament at Stormont on behalf of the Protestant majority. Though Michael Farrell's appellation, 'the Orange State', is often fitting, none have demonstrated how the Order managed to hold state officials to account. Prior to the mid-1960s, an elite of mostly patrician and mercantile grandees with Unionist Party connections captained the Order. Their stature combined loyalty to the Unionist Party with a defense of

Protestant interests, and in this period they successfully contained grassroots discontent against the government. Then things began to change.

Chapter two examines the turbulent years under the new Prime Minister, Terence O' Neill. Under O' Neill's leadership, Catholic civil rights campaigners and a British government sensitised to Protestant discrimination began to pressure the Unionist government to reform. O' Neill's Unionist government attempted to comply, but the Unionist grassroots were outraged. This put the old UUP-Orange corporatist system under intolerable strain. The ascent of James Chichester-Clark as Prime Minister of Northern Ireland in 1969 made little difference, as we see in chapter three. During 1969-72, the entry of the IRA onto the scene prompted the peak of the violent conflict between Catholics and Protestants known as the 'Troubles'. The Orange response to the chaos and violence, and its unwillingness to bend even in the face of danger, forms the centrepiece of this chapter.

In 1972, the British government abolished the Northern Ireland parliament at Stormont. British direct rule was soon accompanied by a reduction in the level of IRA violence. Chapter four probes the Orange response to the British-Irish search for a new constitutional arrangement for Northern Ireland based on power sharing and a role for the Irish government in the running of the province. During 1972-77, the Order resisted these measures, bringing it into open confrontation with Faulkner's Unionist Party and landing it outside the official circles of power. The Order's attempt to unite anti-Sunningdale forces under the umbrella of United Unionism held for some time, but also exposed the fissures between the Order's 'respectable' traditionalism and the rebel Unionism of Ian Paisley and the Protestant paramilitaries.

In chapter five, the story of Orange policy responses to British initiatives after 1978 continues as Orange Deputy Grand Master James Molyneaux assumed the

leadership of the Ulster Unionist Party. The close relationship between Molyneaux and Grand Master Martin Smyth ensured a stable axis of anti-power sharing rejectionism which encompasses the entire 1979-1994 period. With the help of survey and mass membership data, this chapter also turns our attention to some of the sociological and geographic currents moving within the wider Unionist electorate in this period. The Orange Order lost 500 men to the Troubles, and its reaction to this violence is interrogated in greater detail. We find that the Order was politically more conservative than the Unionist electorate, but steered its membership away from militancy and paramilitary violence.

Chapters six through ten are concerned with the recent period of Orange history from 1995 to 2005. Changes in Republican strategy since the 1995 ceasefire brought about the rise of Nationalist 'Residents Associations' which began to contest the right of the Order to parade contentious routes. In chapters six and seven, the book concentrates on the battle between the Orange Order and Nationalist residents over the Drumcree parade route in Portadown. During 1995-97, the Order successfully paraded, but the ensuing violence proved a public relations disaster which split the Order's membership. Social changes since the 1960s, documented here, radically altered the class composition of the Order and led to falling membership, fuelling populism. Out of the violence at Drumcree rose the aggressive Spirit of Drumcree (SOD), a populist movement within the Order which supported the antics of the paramilitaries at Drumcree. This led to a reaction among traditionalist Orangemen, encompassing much of the leadership, clerical Orangemen, and the Education Committee. This battle for the soul of Orangeism is the main theme of these chapters.

In chapter eight, the book changes direction to examine the troubled links between the UUP and the Order in the Trimble era. David Trimble's willingness to

consider the unthinkable and sign up to executive power-sharing with Sinn Fein cost him the support of a majority of the Unionist community. The Orange response was predictably fiercer, and began with opposition to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. This chapter also uses survey and Ulster Unionist Council data to show the impact of Orangeism on successive UUC votes and the role of the Order in emasculating Trimble and the modernisers within the UUP. Finally, the chapter examines Orange opinion data to politically locate the Orange voter, and reveals the discussions which led to a fracturing of the century-old link to the UUP. After a fifty year Cold War, much of the Order's leadership and many members finally reconciled themselves to Ian Paisley and his Free Presbyterians, the outlaws of Unionism who came to power in late 2003.

The Whiterock Parade riot in 2005 shows that parading conflicts remain as fraught as ever. Chapter nine returns to the battle lines to continue the story of Drumcree. The Parades Commission (PC) was set up in 1998 and its determinations - which coincided with a period of increased parade restriction - are bitterly resented by the Orange Order. This chapter examines the Order's efforts to have the PC abolished, and the Grand Lodge's decision to employ a legal and public relations strategy based on secular civil rights to defeat its opponent. This saga continues to this day, but has split the Order between affected districts like Portadown, who wish to put their case to the PC, and the majority of the Order, which feels that legitimacy should be withheld from this body.

In chapter ten we take a hard look at two deep social problems which bedevil the Order at the dawn of the 21st century: falling membership and violence. An array of data sources are used to diagnose the cause of the Order's 40-50 year membership slide which has reached crisis levels, especially in the cities. The chapter uses

postcode profiling and statistical techniques to examine membership, resignation and suspension data. It asks whether there really has been a middle-class exodus in response to the violence of Drumcree and the Troubles. It scrutinises expulsion and suspension data to address the vexed issue of violence raised by Orange writer Brian Kennaway. The conclusion pulls it all together and poses normative questions about the validity of Orangeism and 'ethnic' Unionism as identity choices in contemporary Northern Ireland.

¹ GOLI. 2004. 'What Does Orangeism Stand For Today?'

<http://www.grandorange.org.uk/parades/orangeism_stand.html>, accessed 03/02/04

² The latter point was highlighted during partition when brethren from the three Ulster counties left behind in the Irish republic stated that their obligations 'forbade disloyalty' to their new state despite their affections for Britain. Similar sentiments later animated Donegal brethren in the mid 1960s (over use of 'God Save the Queen' on official county correspondence) and mid-1970s (singing of 'God Save the Queen'). (GL 1923; CC 03/12/65; 06/06/75) In Canada, the ambiguous and symbolic link between the Crown and the Canadian state allowed monarchist sentiments to remain well into the 1980s. Though the Grand Lodge acted in the 1980s to accept the new [1965] Canadian flag and 'Grand Lodge of Canada' designation, this new conception is very much contested and coexists uneasily with strong reservoirs of loyalist sentiment within the Canadian Institution. (Interview with Canadian Grand Secretary Norman Ritchie, Toronto, 14/12/99; Interview with Newfoundland Past Grand Master Ralph Roberts, Cupids, NF, 19/08/03)

³ Fukuyama, Francis 1992 *The End of History and the Last Man* (Hamish Hamilton, London)

⁴ Giddens, Anthony. 1991. *Modernity and Self-Identity* (Cambridge: Polity Press)

⁵ GL 12/97: 15

⁶ Kaufmann, Eric. 2004. *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America: The Decline of Dominant Ethnicity in the United States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press)

⁷ Interview with Newfoundland Grand Secretary Garland Baker and Andy Johnson, Conception Bay South, Newfoundland, January 2002

⁸ GOLI resignation forms 1998-2003; See chapter 8 for more on Prayer Breakfast

⁹ Kaufmann, E. P. 2004. "Dominant ethnicity: from background to foreground," in Eric Kaufmann (ed.), *Rethinking Ethnicity: Majority Groups and Dominant Minorities* (London: Routledge), pp. 1-14

¹⁰ On Britannic nationalism, see Cole, Douglas, 'Canada's "Nationalistic" Imperialists', *Journal of Canadian Studies*, Vol.V, no. 3, (1970), pp. 45-46; Darwin, John. 2005. "A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics," in Judith Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire*

Volume IV: The Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

¹¹ On West Africa, correspondence with James Gibbs re Ewe playwright and Orange founder Fiawoo, 17/03/03. See also Brown, David. 2000. *Contemporary Nationalism* (London: Routledge), pp. 116-18 on persecution of the Ewe by the Akan majority in Ghana. On Eire, see 'Protestants in Community Life: Findings from a Donegal Survey,' Derry and Raphoe Action, June 2001, pp. 3-7. On Scotland, see Kaufmann, Eric, 'The Dynamics of Orangeism in Scotland: Social Sources of Political Influence in a Mass-Member Organization', *Social Science History*, vol. 30, no. 2 (2006).

¹² *The Orange Order: Forward Within the Community* (Belfast: Grand Lodge of Ireland, 18/01/03)

¹³ Smith, Anthony D. 1991 *National Identity* (London: Penguin).

¹⁴ O'Leary, B. and J. McGarry, *Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995), pp. 212, 306; Bruce, S. *The Edge of the Union: the Ulster Loyalist Political Vision* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994)

¹⁵ Hastings, Adrian. 1997. *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press); O'Brien, Connor Cruise. 1988. *God-Land: Reflections on Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press); Akenson,

Donald Harman. 1992. *God's Peoples: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel, and Ulster* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)

¹⁶ Armstrong, John. 1982. *Nations Before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press)

¹⁷ LOI Commission 1997 (GOLI)

¹⁸ This shift in sensibility, used to describe recent shifts in Canadian political culture, also characterises the Ulster Unionist community. Newman, Peter C. 1995. *The Canadian Revolution: From Deference to Defiance* (Toronto: Viking)

¹⁹ Based on 45 cases compiled from surviving county reports, hence there is a good deal of missing data - especially for Derry City, Fermanagh and Armagh in the pre-1961 period. For detailed statistical output, see <<http://www.sneps.net/OO/book1.html>>

²⁰ Houston, Cecil and William J. Smyth. 1980. *The Sash Canada Wore: A Historical Geography of the Orange Order in Canada* (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press)

²¹ Olson, Mancur. 1982. *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press); McCarthy, John and Meyer Zald. 1977. 'Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,' *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 82, no. 6, pp. 1212-1241

²² Interview with Tyrone Orangeman and former Education Committee member Henry Reid, near Omagh, 14/03/00

²³ Hague, R. and M. Harrop. 2001 [1982]. *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*, 5th ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave), ch. 10

²⁴ Bryan, Dominic. 2000. *Orange Parades: The Politics of Ritual, Tradition and Control* (London: Pluto), pp. 77, 180

²⁵ Horowitz, D., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 347

²⁶ More discussion of the way in which organisations evolve structures in response to a particular environment can be found in Stinchcombe 1968.

²⁷ GL 06/49: 16-17

²⁸ GL 06/22: 14

²⁹ GL 1926; Spirit of Drumcree Press Release 1997

³⁰ Bryan, *Orange Parades*, p. 102

³¹ Higham, John. [1955] 1988. *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925* (2nd ed.) (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press)

³² Co. Tyrone Grand Lodge minutes 28/10/67

³³ Bryan, *Orange Parades*, p. 102

³⁴ GL 12/35: 24

³⁵ CC 5/12/68

³⁶ CC 8/12/71

³⁷ CC 7-8/04/72

³⁸ Bruce, Steve. 1998. *Comparative Protestant Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 6

³⁹ Cochrane, Fearghal, *Unionist Politics* (Cork: Cork University Press, 2001), p. 83

⁴⁰ Todd, J., 'Two Traditions in Unionist Political Culture', *Irish Political Studies*, vol. 2 (1987). The Order was, for example, suspicious of the militancy of John Cormack and Alexander Ratcliffe in Scotland in the interwar period. In Canada, it distanced itself from the Protestant Protective Association, and in Northern Ireland has kept Independent Unionism and the paramilitaries at arm's length.

⁴¹ Akenson, Donald Harman, *The Irish in Ontario: A Study in Rural History* (Kingston-Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984); Richard, Madeline A. 1991. *Ethnic Groups and Marital Choices: Ethnic History and Marital Assimilation in Canada, 1871 and 1971* (Vancouver: UBC Press)

⁴² Kaufmann, Eric. 2006. 'The Orange Order in Ontario, Newfoundland, Scotland and Northern Ireland: A Macro-Social Analysis,' in David A. Wilson (ed.), *The Orange Order in Canada* (Dublin: Four Courts, forthcoming); Senior, Hereward. 1972. *Orangeism, the Canadian Phase* (Toronto; New York: McGraw-Hill Ryerson); Houston and Smyth, *Sash Canada Wore*

⁴³ Bryan, *Orange Parades*, pp. 39, 45-7

⁴⁴ Bryan, *Orange Parades*, pp. 52-3

⁴⁵ Though he graces IOO Twelfth platforms, Paisley is not a member.

⁴⁶ Interview with John McGrath, 6/03/03; CC 27/09/63; CC 4/12/64; CC 04/65; GL 06/67: 14