

On November 29, 2003, The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the only party to govern Northern Ireland since Partition in 1921, lost its primary position as the leading Unionist party to the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Reverend Ian Paisley. After its resounding defeat in the 2005 Westminster election, some began to speak of the UUP as a dying party. The key issue in both 2003 and 2005 was the Good Friday power-sharing agreement (GFA). Protestant opinion is divided on this issue, a cleavage which expresses itself both in the UUP-DUP split and in policy divisions within the UUP itself. This *intra*-party division is crucial. After 1998, *intra*-UUP division hampered the efforts of UUP leader David Trimble to build a pro-Agreement consensus and consolidate power-sharing in the province. This prevented the troubled province from embarking on an epochal historical trajectory towards a so-called 'New Northern Ireland'.

What caused these divisions within the UUP, and how were they able to frustrate the ambitions of the party leadership? More importantly, what does the case of the UUP tell us about why party activists behave as they do? A good deal has been written about party competition and leadership, but very little about the 'black box' of organisational dynamics within parties.<sup>1</sup> If party organisations matter – as they do in Northern Ireland – then *intra*-party processes strongly shape public policy. Thus we need to get beyond the high-profile leaders and election results and open up the 'black box' of party structure that can help us understand the activist behaviour which may bring down a leader like David Trimble. This paper speaks to this concern, demonstrating that individual-level characteristics like gender or socioeconomic position have little power to explain delegates' stance toward the Good Friday Agreement. Instead, a delegate's party section - whether in the form of their constituency or affiliated body - is the strongest predictor of their stance toward the Agreement.

Our research is based on new datasets and methods, particularly multi-level modeling, which allows us to prise apart the impact of individual-level characteristics (i.e. age or sex) and contextual-level ones (i.e. constituency of residence). We demonstrate that Orange and Unionist networks are more important than individual-level factors when it comes to explaining UUC

delegates' stance towards the Good Friday Agreement. In this manner, our research adds to the current understanding of Unionist (Protestant) politics in Northern Ireland.

### The Dynamics of Party Organisation

Our task draws together two re-emerging fields of research in Political Science, the study of party organisation and the contextual analysis of political behaviour. Parties are often loose-bounded entities in which the lines between leaders, members and voters are unclear. Nevertheless, recent research on party organisation sheds important light on the nature and role of political activists. This work documents the ways in which intra-party structures affect, and are affected by, legislative, electoral and social developments. (Samuels 2002; Janda and Colman 1998; Rohrschneider 1994) While a dominant current of thinking posits that declining political participation and the rise of national media have led to the marginalisation of party organisations in western democracies, a number of authors have recently contested this finding, claiming that party organisations remain a vital part of the political picture in many countries. (Katz and Mair 1994; Putnam 2000) Our work probes within party structures to explain variation between activists which often manifests itself in inter-constituency variation.

### The Importance of Context

Some have remarked that a focus on individual characteristics (and voting behaviour) in isolation from their contextual location in local or federal units greatly detracts from our understanding. (Young 2004; Huckfeldt 1986) Indeed, one American study found that half the variation in individual voting behaviour could be attributed to individuals' state of residence. (Erikson et al. 1987) Eagles contends that spatial and multi-level modelling is experiencing a growing currency within Political Science in the wake of the new territorial politics based on

resurgent separatist movements in Canada and Europe. In short, it is folly to explain the actions of a Canadian or Spanish voter without acknowledging the specificity of, say, the Quebec or Basque context. (Eagles 1995)

American research linking contextual concerns with questions of party organisation is rare due to the limited power of American constituency associations over leadership selection and party policy in the post-Progressive era. Yet in most other democracies, local party factors remain important. (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Scarrow 1996; Carty 2002) Even where a primary system is used, as in Israel, it is often restricted to paid-up party members who diverge greatly in their views from district to district. (Hazan 1999) Finally, it should be noted that constituencies can often be non-geographical. Religious and ethnic associations or trade unions often play a vital role in influencing candidate selection and may have bloc representation at party conferences.

### The Motivation of Party Activists

In order to understand intra-party dynamics, we need to understand the individual party activist. Party activists may agree on certain unifying party aims, but they often take different policy positions. Given the above, how might we explain constituency-level diversity among activists within parties? Individual-level explanations of constituency variation in activist voting behaviour centre on the differing costs/benefits, social locations or expressive motivations of individuals representing different constituencies within the party organisation. These explanations correspond to 'traditional' rational choice, structuralist/neo-Marxist and normative approaches. Constituency differences would thus be the result of a clustering of similarly-oriented individuals in particular geographic locales.

By contrast, network approaches highlight the importance of informal relationships within organisations which constrain individual behaviour. This is sometimes linked to New

Institutionalist theory. (March & Olsen 1984; Dowding 1994: 106-7; Pierson 1996; Peters 1999) Vivien Lowndes stresses a number of important perspectives of the new institutionalism which are relevant here, namely: a) an informal conception of institutions; b) institutions as disaggregated rather than holistic entities; and c) the historical and sociological embeddedness of institutions. (Lowndes 2002: 97-101) All three characteristics, as we shall see, strongly apply to the Ulster Unionist Party. These would point to the different contextual effects obtaining within the institutions of the UUP - notably in its informal and differentiated sub-structures - to explain constituency-level variation.

### The Ulster Unionist Party

The UUP party organisation shows how constituency-level diversity and independence from the electoral grassroots can be combined with strong local input into the party centre. Delegates to the UUP's ruling conference, the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) are selected by 18 geographic constituency-associations (controlling some 75 percent of delegates) and ten affiliate bodies, by far the largest of which is the 200 year-old Protestant loyalist fraternity, the Orange Order, which commands roughly 15 percent of the total.<sup>2</sup> The link between the Order and the UUC is somewhat analogous to that between the Trade Unions and the British Labour party, the former social movements playing a decisive role in the birth and evolution of the party. Together, the geographic constituency associations and affiliate bodies select the UUP's party leader and are empowered to review UUP policy. Should the party leader fail to gain the support of the UUC, s/he may suffer a vote of no-confidence and be forced to resign.

Until the 1950s the weak and ineffectual nature of the nationalist opposition in Northern Ireland meant that Unionist leaders faced few major internal challenges. (Harbinson 1973) Thus when Lord Brookeborough resigned as Prime Minister and leader of the UUP in 1963 he was only the third leader of the party since the formation of the Northern Ireland state in 1921. In the

next decade, by contrast, the party would have as many leaders as in the previous forty years. Dissatisfaction on the part of the province's Catholic minority manifested in the street protests of the Civil Rights movement (1968-72) and pressure from the UK government led UUP leaders to initiate a programme of political, social and legal reforms which were intensely unpopular with broad swathes of party activists. Starting with Terence O'Neill (1963-69) and culminating with Brian Faulkner (1971-74) reformist leaders were harassed by critics who used the diffuse authority structure of the party to call frequent meetings of the UUC to discuss criticisms of the leaders' policies and put forth motions of no-confidence. (Patterson 2002:181- 212, 224-232)

It was these internal divisions that were in part responsible for the decision of the UK government to abolish the Stormont parliament in 1972 and introduce direct rule of the province from London. An attempt by the last Unionist prime minister of Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner, to resurrect devolution through a power-sharing arrangement with nationalists was rejected by the UUC in 1974 and Faulkner resigned as leader. (Faulkner 1978: 244-45)

Political upheavals since the upsurge of violence in the 1960s have democratised decision-making away from the party executive, but have not opened it up to the mass of party voters through a primary system. In this manner, the party organisation - and its sections in particular - exercise an unusually great degree of influence over both policy and personnel decisions. Differences based on constituency and affiliate body are thus critical. Individuals know that they can influence policy through local activism, hence, in keeping with a network explanation, candidates tend to reinforce their power base by bringing those in similar networks (fraternal, class, denominational, personal) into the local constituency party. The resulting diversity is then played out in the UUC over key policy issues, most notably those surrounding the Peace Process. We thereby expect to see a considerable party section effect on the pro/anti-Agreement issue.

As leader of the party, David Trimble was aware that the Peace Process would provide a major challenge to the UUP. His acceptance of the need for the UUP to work within the inclusive

framework promoted by the British and Irish governments as the inevitable price for the Republican movement's move away from armed struggle was opposed from the start by around a third of his party while it also disconcerted many who remained loyal to the leadership. (Trimble 2001: 41)

From the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 it was clear that the UUP was substantially more pro-Agreement than the Unionist electorate: the UUC ratified the Agreement by 71% while the Unionist electorate supported it by only 55% in the referendum. (Mitchell 2001) However, as in subsequent elections, the UUP vote fell as that of its rival the DUP increased, and hard core opposition to the Agreement within the UUP from sectors like the Young Unionists and the Orange Order was joined by those who had become disillusioned with a Peace Process which, to them, seemed too geared to the demands of nationalists and Republicans.<sup>3</sup> Critics of the leadership like the MP for Lagan Valley, Jeffrey Donaldson, who has since defected to the DUP, were able to exploit the provision in the party constitution that mandates a special meeting of the UUC at the request of just 60 party members. The result of this was a Peace Process regularly interrupted by 'crisis' meetings of the UUC called by David Trimble's opponents.

## Data and Methodology

This study builds on recent social survey-based research into the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). (Tonge & Evans 2001; 2002a) However, previous survey work cannot test for the impact of constituency associations or affiliate bodies since such information was not obtained. Even if such information was collected, the survey sample for some of these networks would be too small to be useful. Moreover, an OLS analysis using dummy terms for party sections may well fail to capture the random effects which a multilevel model can. Multi-level modeling refers to a statistical technique which uses random effects models to take into account the complex

hierarchies of context within which individuals are situated. In an education system, for instance, students are members of classes within schools within local education authorities. Each level may have an independent effect on pupil performance. (Goldstein 1995; Snijders and Bosker 1999) The multilevel technique thus allows us to accurately capture important geographic-constituency and party-section effects. This paper uses multi-level modeling to distinguish between the individual-level characteristics captured in previous survey work and the unique context represented by the constituency associations and affiliate bodies within the UUP.

Our work also employs ecological methods in order to achieve data on nearly 100 percent of Ulster Unionist Council members. An important methodological departure in this paper is that it represents, to the best of our knowledge, the first research in Political Science to use postcode-profiling technology, which allows us to derive *individual-level* data on UUC delegates. This technique relies on cluster analysis of data sources on the individual, household, postcode and enumeration district. Pioneered in Great Britain by Experian's GB MOSAIC system of lifestyle classifications, this regularly updated data allocates all Northern Ireland postcodes to 36 lifestyle classifications. In sum, nearly 350 variables are used, mostly from the census and vehicle, commercial and property records. (GB MOSAIC 2002; NI MOSAIC 2002) Though this information has been used by marketing firms, the little academic research that has been done to date has only utilised postcode-level, rather than individual-level data. Even so, studies show that knowing an individual's postcode is as good a predictor of their behaviour as knowing their age or class.<sup>4</sup> The MOSAIC classifications are also useful in that they are ordinally scaled - in socioeconomic status terms - from lifestyle categories 1 through 27. Categories 30 through 36 denote rural lifestyles, which allows us to develop a rural/urban dummy measure in addition to a socioeconomic status variable.

The main individual-level dataset has been compiled by UUP strategists in consultation with ourselves, party headquarters and local constituencies.<sup>5</sup> It combines party list data with the individual's imputed stance on the Agreement, defined in terms of support for the leadership's

pro-Agreement position during 2003.<sup>6</sup> Though this data has been attributed to individuals by strategists, it is in their interest to know how individuals vote. Unsurprisingly, the aggregate voting split (60% for, 40% against) conforms broadly to what we would expect given the results of previous UUC votes (including that of 27 March, 2004 where Trimble received 59.8% of the vote) and strategists have previously been successful at predicting UUC voting outcomes to within a few percentage points.<sup>7</sup> A further aim of this work is to bring new sources of data into the public domain. These include Orange Order and Ulster Unionist Party documents and committee minutes as well as Orange Order internal membership surveys.

### Testing Theories of Activist Behaviour

The motivation of party activists, as noted, is one of the key concerns of contemporary research. Classic rational choice models postulate that the number of party activists will always be a small fraction of the electorate. (Downs 1957; Verba et al. 1978) In Britain, though party branches tend to be more doctrinaire than party leaders, the most ambitious party activists are local councillors, who tend to be ideologically moderate. (Seyd and Whiteley 2002) In the UUC, we would therefore expect elected officials (mostly local councillors, plus some MPs and MLAs) to favour a centrist message so as to maximise their chance of re-election. Note that 'centrism' in the case of contemporary Unionism means taking what many in the mainstream British press consider the 'hardline' stance of being against the Agreement!

Given the moderately anti-Agreement majority within the Unionist (i.e. Protestant) electorate, a rational choice approach would predict that, on balance, the UUP would adopt a moderately anti-Agreement line so as to outflank the DUP.<sup>8</sup> We also expect to see a link between electoral pressures in a constituency and the position of constituency activists, especially if they hold office. We would therefore predict that constituency associations will differ from each other and from the UUP party centre in their policy prescriptions, seeking to situate their policies



midway between the anti-Agreement right (i.e. DUP and some fringe Unionist parties) and pro-Agreement left (i.e. Alliance, Northern Ireland Women's Coalition) in their particular constituency. We thus expect to see a link between electoral pressures in a constituency and the position of constituency activists, especially if they hold office. However, to be anti-Agreement is to support suspending the Northern Ireland Assembly in favour of British direct rule. This course of action greatly reduces the salaries of MLAs, though it has little effect on those of MPs or councillors. Accordingly, we expect MLAs to support the Agreement, though this is not expected of other elected officials within the UUC.

An expressivist theory of activist behaviour, by contrast, places a greater role on the expression of ideological identity. (Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson 1994: 88, 109) This is perhaps clearest in the case of Orange delegates, since Orange publications and Jon Tonge & Jocelyn Evans' survey work (2001, 2002a, 2002b) supports the contention that most Orangemen disagree with the Agreement's stance on issues like RUC police reform, prisoner releases, North-South bodies and the role of the Parades Commission. Accordingly, an expressivist theory would predict that Orangemen would come out against an Agreement which they perceive to be an insufficient guarantor of Orange and Protestant interests. Rational choice theories, especially those that permit non-pecuniary motivation, would suggest that the Order, as an interest group, is less constrained than other members (particularly MLAs) in their pursuit of ideological goals. (Schlesinger 1984: 384) For other UUC delegates, the expressive bias would be pro-Agreement due to their tradition of deference to party leaders, the UUP's historic status as the establishment party and its Burkean philosophy of order and evolutionary change.

Structuralist theories, by contrast, would emphasise the social location of individuals in terms of socioeconomic status, gender, title, education or rural/urban residence as the most important determinant of their stance toward the GFA. Finally, a network model would make somewhat different predictions. Namely, that party section (constituency association or affiliate

body) rather than individual characteristics will be the most important predictor of voting behaviour.

#### The Orange Order and the Ulster Unionist Council

Though many assumptions have been made about the social composition of the Ulster Unionist Council and Orange Order, there have been few concrete studies of this phenomenon. (Harbinson 1973: 35-61; Hume 1996: 37-40; Bryan 2000: 111-12) Tonge and Evans' (2002b) recent survey research on the UUC, which received a healthy one-third response rate, suggests that about half the UUC delegates are in the Orange Order. Moreover, they found remarkably little difference in educational attainment or occupational profile between UUC delegates who are members of the Orange Order and those who are not. Our findings are broadly in line with those of Tonge and Evans: Orange delegates generally reflect the profile of the UUC as a whole.

Orange delegates to the UUC are, however, less reflective of the broad spectrum of the Orange fraternity. A 1996 Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland questionnaire which was returned by over 40 percent of the Orange membership shows that Orange UUC delegates are far more white collar and far less likely to be in trades or unskilled labour than the Orange membership as a whole.<sup>9</sup>

[Table 1 here]

Age categories used in the two surveys confound any precise comparison, but it is apparent that both the Orange membership and Orange office holders (defined as masters of lodges) are much younger than Orange UUC delegates. For instance, 40% of the Orange membership and 48% of office holders are under 40 while just a quarter of Orange UUC members are under age 45. Meanwhile, 42% of the Orange membership and 29% of office holders were over 50, while fully

66% of UUC Orange members were over 55. The above difference between the Orange UUC and the Orange leadership reflects the diversity of Orange organisational structures, which, as we shall see, helps to explain significant intra-Orange voting differentials. The above profile conveys a picture of a relatively aged, elite UUC which is reflected in both Orange and non-Orange delegates. This pattern reflects trends in other parts of the UK: the UUC has the same elderly age profile as the UK Tories, though, unlike the Tories (but in common with Labour), there is a vast gulf between the education/status profile of UUP activists and their support base. (Seyd, Whiteley and Richardson 1994: 43-51; Seyd and Whiteley [1992] 2002: 32-39) By contrast, Orange office holders are a relatively young group who reflect the grassroots of the Order (and the Protestant community) very well.

Let us now consider the results of our GB MOSAIC postcode profiling exercise across a number of comparative groups. Our sample represents 99 percent of the target categories' population.<sup>10</sup> In table 2, we consider five groups: 1) Orange and Freemason private lodge office holders (masters and secretaries of all lodges in 2001, numbering almost 1500 in the Orange case), Orange Grand Lodge officers (the top 150 or so delegates from county-level branches of the Order – thus the elite of the organisation), UUC delegates as a whole and UUC Orange bloc representatives.<sup>11</sup> We consider what proportion fall within the highest 12, lowest 7 and rural 8 (all mutually exclusive) of the 36 Northern Ireland MOSAIC lifestyle categories. Note that the top 12 MOSAIC categories encompass the three main urban/suburban white-collar, homeownership categories: 'Affluent Achievers', 'Satisfied Maturity' and 'White-Collar Owners.' (NI MOSAIC 2001)

Table 1. Orange UUC Delegates and Orange Members: A Social Comparison

	<b>White Collar*</b>	<b>Farmer</b>	<b>Manual</b>	<b>Retired</b>	<b>N</b>
<b>Orange male</b>	22%	20%	40%	5-10%**	41% of

<b>Membership</b>						members***
<b>Orange UUC</b>	44%	14%	6.3%	25.8%		128
<b>male delegates</b>						

\*Mostly professional, civil service and management. Includes the 6 percent of Orange survey respondents who ticked the ‘admin’ box and the 3 percent of Tonge & Evans’ UUC sample who stated ‘clerical’ as their occupation.

\*\*15% of respondents marked ‘other’, and the report claims that a ‘sizeable’ number of these were retired. (LOI Commission 1997)

\*\*\* Representing thousands of members. Actual figures remain classified due to our agreement with the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland.

First of all, the pattern we noted earlier regarding the difference between Orangemen who are UUC delegates and those who are not (i.e. just Orange officebearers) shows up again: the former are much better represented in the more elite categories though the rural proportions are similar. UUC delegates as a whole are similar in profile to Orange UUC delegates, though somewhat less rural in character – all of which corroborates our previous findings. We found little difference in social profile between Grand Orange Lodge and private Orange lodge officebearers. This indicates that the Orange Order’s democratic structure, in which decisions flow from private to district to county to grand lodge level - though often criticised as helping to insulate the Orange elite from the grassroots – has led to an Orange elite which is socially (if not politically) representative of the Orange masses. This is in contrast with UUC representatives – whether Orange or otherwise – who are far more bourgeois and much older than average.

Why the difference between the Orange leadership and its ostensible representatives on the UUC? The answer lies with a network explanation. When an official Orange bloc vacancy arises, the departing individual is generally not proposed on the floor of the County Grand Lodge which sends delegates. Instead, the matter is left to the UUC reps themselves. This is because

there is a history of division within the Orange Order over politics and because the UUC-Orange representatives have traditionally formed an elite network. In this manner, the current county (Orange) grand master of County Tyrone, whose social profile matches that of the UUC as opposed to other Orange leaders, was 'approached' privately by a current Orange representative from that county and asked to become an Orange UUC representative, thereby perpetuating this particular network.<sup>12</sup> Meanwhile, at about the same time, Joel Patton, leader of the anti-Agreement 'Spirit of Drumcree' splinter group within Orangeism in 1997, mobilised a counter-network also based among County Tyrone Orangemen.

[Table 2 here]

Table 2: The Social Profile of the UUC and Orange Order in Comparative Perspective, by MOSAIC Classification (99% sample)

	<b>% Top</b>	<b>% Rural</b>	<b>% Bottom</b>	<b>% Nonrural Top</b>	<b>% Nonrural Bottom</b>	<b>N</b>
	<b>12</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>	

<b>Freemason private lodge officebearers</b>	67.8%	15.5%	8.0%	80.2%	9.4%	766
<b>Orange bloc UUC delegates</b>	45.7%	36.2%	12.4%	71.6%	19.4%	105
<b>UUC delegates total</b>	44.3%	35.9%	8.4%	69.0%	13.1%	879
<b>Grand Orange Lodge officebearers</b>	34.7%	44.4%	9.7%	62.5%	17.5%	144
<b>Northern Ireland population average</b>	32.5%	18.1%	22.9%	39.6%	27.9%	1.6m
<b>Orange Order private lodge officebearers</b>	32.4%	43.9%	12.4%	57.7%	22.1%	1429

Arlene Foster, an anti-Agreement UUP representative from Tyrone who has since defected to the DUP, provides yet another example of a distinct network arising from the same geographical context. All three leaders know each other and interact, yet their varying networks help to perpetuate organisational diversity within both the Orange Order and Ulster Unionist Council. They also explain why constituency characteristics cannot explain diversity in constituency activist voting behaviour within the UUC any more than individual social characteristics can. A similar disjuncture exists in County Londonderry.<sup>13</sup>

#### Stance on the Good Friday Agreement

Table 3 lists the top and bottom five UUC party sections as well as the UUC average in terms of Good Friday Agreement stance across the entire dataset. It is apparent from this list and the wider

dataset that neither the rural-urban, social status or other individual-level structural indicators seem strongly correlated with individuals' stance toward the GFA. On the other hand, the strong endorsement of the Agreement by elected officials and overwhelming rejection of it by both the UUP's youth wing and Orange delegates suggests that the Orange, Youth and Elected Official categories may be important, though we will need to disaggregate these results by focusing on the more concrete networks within these categories. For example, county Orange bloc delegates to the UUC or MLAs form 'real' interpersonal networks. On the other hand, female, rural, wealthy or elderly UUC delegates or the over 400 UUC delegates who happen to be Orange Order members do not constitute 'real' interpersonal networks.

[Table 3 here]

The Orange influence, which Tonge and Evans flagged up as second only to age in its strength as a predictor of anti-Agreement attitudes, is evident here, however we must also be cognisant of the potential importance of Orange *activism*. For example, though Orange bloc delegates are 74% anti-Agreement (the highest of all sections), those in the Orange bloc who are Orange officebearers are fully 87% anti-Agreement. Outside the Orange bloc, UUC members are 34%

Table 3. Stance Toward Good Friday Agreement, by Party Section, 2002

<b>UUC Party Section</b>	<b>Pro-Agreement</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Sample</b>
<b>MLAs*</b>	93.3%	15	100%
<b>Councillors*</b>	90.0%	10	100%

<b>Newry &amp; Armagh</b>	87.5%	40	100%
<b>Strangford</b>	84.8%	46	98%
<b>N. Belfast</b>	80.0%	35	95%
<b>UUC Average</b>	57.9%	856	96%
<b>East Londonderry</b>	50.0%	42	98%
<b>S. Belfast</b>	48.6%	35	100%
<b>Young Unionist</b>	38.1%	21	68%
<b>Lagan Valley</b>	35.8%	53	100%
<b>Orange Order</b>	25.9%	112	95%

\*These delegates only comprise a subset of the total number of UUC delegates who are MLAs or District Councillors.

anti-Agreement while Orange office holders who are not in the Orange bloc are 47% anti-Agreement.<sup>14</sup> Bearing in mind the findings of Tonge and Evans, this suggests that mere Orange membership explains much less than the networks which link together Orange office holders and bloc delegates.

[Table 4 here]

Table 4. Orange Delegates' Stance Toward the GFA: the Role of Party Section and Orange Activism

<b>Characteristic</b>	<b>Pro-Agreement</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Sample</b>
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<b>Non-Orange Delegates</b>	66.3%	704	91%
<b>Orange officebearers outside Orange bloc</b>	52.6%	22	86%
<b>Non-officebearers in Orange bloc</b>	32.9%	73	94%
<b>Orange officebearers in Orange bloc</b>	12.8%	40	98%

### Modelling Delegate Support for the GFA

We have catalogued a wide diversity of sectional and geographic differences in UUC membership, socioeconomic status and stance toward the Agreement. This draws our attention to the clustered (heteroskedastic) nature of the data. This can render survey evidence problematic, especially when sample size makes it difficult to accurately control for geographic or sectional effects. The significance of being elected or an Orange member thus disappears when section controls are introduced in a multi-level iterative generalised least squares (IGLS) analysis using UUC delegate as the individual-level (level 1) identifier and party section as the contextual (level 2) identifier in which level 2 intercept variation is confirmed as significant.<sup>15</sup> The multi-level approach thereby allows us to determine the degree to which individual-level or contextual characteristics affect an individual UUC delegate’s voting behaviour.

Of course, not all party sections are concrete socio-political realities. The small sections for councillors and MLAs capture but a portion of the total number of councillors and MLAs in the UUC and have no real group identity, so we consolidate the number of sections from 27 to 21 in the main model, allocating ungrouped delegates to constituency sections based on residence. The question of how to treat the Orange bloc, which makes up 118 of our sample of 140 Orange members, is problematic. We have decided to retain a section control for the Orange bloc due to the great difference in stance between Orange bloc and non-bloc delegates. However, the fact that our sample of Orange members is restricted to identifiable officebearers and bloc delegates means that we must rely on differences between our study and survey research in order to assess the

impact of Orange membership (in aggregate) and to verify the differences between bloc and non-bloc Orange delegates.

In terms of geography, the census characteristics of particular constituencies (i.e. Protestant-Catholic balance, religiosity, education, wealth) and the level of Orange Order membership within the Unionist electorate in each constituency might be expected to have a contextual impact on the individual delegates who represent these areas, irrespective of their individual characteristics. Party lists allow us to assign all delegates to Northern Ireland's pre-1973 eight-county/borough geography.<sup>16</sup> Electoral dynamics at constituency level should also play a role if, as noted previously, we assume that delegates (especially if elected officials) rationally wish to maximise their party's electoral success. Once again, we assign those from affiliated bodies to electoral constituencies based on postcode of residence.

Results of our main model, a multi-level logistic regression of GFA stance on various parameters (omitting most insignificant variables) appear in table 5. Note that 'Methodist High Protestant' and 'Respectable Working Class' are principal components (see appendices for details) and two of the independent variables are interaction terms. 'Methodist High Protestant' refers to an individual's residence in strongly Protestant constituencies with a disproportionate share of Methodists. Delegates from 'Respectable Working Class' constituencies live in constituencies with a disproportionate percentage of skilled workers and those who have completed high-school (but no further education).<sup>17</sup>

[Table 5 here]

Table 5. Multi-Level Binomial Logistic Regression of Good Friday Agreement Delegate Stance†

<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Wald Statistic (Multi-Level)</b>	<b>Wald Statistic (Fixed Effects)</b> ††††
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<b>Orange Officebearer</b>	-2.409	.590	16.642***	12.515***
<b>Orange member from Methodist High-Protestant Constituency (interaction)</b>	-1.043	.280	13.870***	9.953**
<b>Respectable Working Class Constituency</b>	.868	.314	7.604**	6.559*
<b>Member of Northern Ireland Assembly (MLA)</b>	2.437	1.034	5.554*	5.092*
<b>Orange member from strongly Orange Constituency (interaction)</b>	4.687	2.063	5.161*	----
<b>County of Residence††</b>	.401	.400	1.006	15.544*
<b>Party Section</b>			91.598***	94.763***
<b>Orange Bloc</b>	-2.303	.622	13.714***	----
<b>North Antrim</b>	3.098	.928	11.110***	----
<b>Newry &amp; Armagh</b>	1.766	.621	8.083**	----
<b>Lagan Valley</b>	-1.559	.563	7.651**	----
<b>East Belfast</b>	1.338	.569	5.531*	----
<b>South Belfast</b>	1.798	.937	3.673	----
<b>Young Unionists</b>	-.967	.631	2.351	----
<b>Foyle</b>	1.004	.682	2.166	----
<b>South Antrim</b>	-.867	.617	1.974	----
<b>North Belfast</b>	.679	.498	1.860	----
<b>Upper Bann</b>	.552	.512	1.161	----
<b>Party Officers</b>	.950	1.176	.652	----
<b>Women Unionists</b>	.591	.839	.495	----
<b>East Londonderry</b>	-.347	.502	.478	----
<b>Fermanagh &amp; S. Tyrone</b>	.300	.525	.327	----
<b>Strangford</b>	.381	.677	.316	----
<b>East Antrim</b>	.244	.613	.158	----
<b>North Down</b>	.154	.677	.052	----
<b>Mid-Ulster</b>	-.070	.534	.017	----
<b>South Down</b>	.057	.635	.008	----
<b>Level 1 Constant:</b>	----	----	----	.539
<b>- 2 log likelihood</b>			872.464	920.469
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> (Nagelkerke) †††</b>			----	.295

\* p < .05; \*\* p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001.

† N = 887. Pro-Agreement stance is coded 1, Anti-Agreement as 0. Party section has 21 degrees of freedom, West Tyrone is the reference category, and did not turn up significant in regressions using other reference categories.

†† Pre-1973 counties/county boroughs. Belfast is the reference category for the fixed-effects model. For the multilevel model, this describes variation of a level 2 constant which was found to be zero, hence county of residence has no significant effect in the multilevel model.

††† No pseudo R<sup>2</sup> is provided by *MLwiN*.

†††† Coefficients for individual party sections in the fixed effects model are not provided as they bear no logical relationship to the data due to multicollinearity. (See discussion below)

The multi-level model in table 5 is superior to the pure fixed effects model because of its greater

efficiency and more meaningful party section coefficients, but, as we can see, the two models do

not differ greatly.<sup>18</sup> The above table foregrounds a number of key findings. First of all, contextual

characteristics are by far the most important influence on our model.<sup>19</sup> This strongly supports network rather than individualist explanations of GFA variation. Section has the greatest impact, followed by variables related to Orange delegates' constituency/county of residence. One may surmise that the Orange membership and age effects picked up in the Tonge-Evans survey are attributable to the influence of the strongly anti-Agreement Young Unionist (not significant here due to the large number of missing values) and Orange bloc affiliate bodies.<sup>20</sup> These sectional effects may also be illuminated by inserting a proportional variable for section vote.<sup>21</sup>

Second, it is apparent that we must re-evaluate our hypotheses regarding the importance of socioeconomic and electoral factors. Individual delegates' MOSAIC lifestyle group classification is not a significant influence on their stance except in the case of the nine delegates from the very poorest postcode-group, who manifest considerable antipathy to the Agreement. Tests on identifiable elite individuals by title (N =71) or self-identified university degree (N=21) confirm the pattern.<sup>22</sup> Gender, title, educational qualification and rural/urban postcode had no significance, and neither did a host of constituency census characteristics including most denominations, education, occupation and Troubles-related Protestant fatalities. This reinforces Seyd and Whiteley's observation that numerous studies have shown that 'no common factor, such as the social composition of the membership or the political opinions of the incumbent...appear[s] to have any significance in determining the political opinions of local party members.' (Seyd & Whiteley [1992] 2002: 24) It thereby calls into question the structuralist thesis relating socioeconomic status and delegate stance posited by recent UUC survey evidence. (Tonge and Evans 2001) Interestingly, Tonge and Evans' subsequent paper, which directly addresses individual delegates' current GFA voting intentions, found no significant effects from socioeconomic parameters. (Tonge & Evans 2001; 2002b: 21) Our findings corroborate the latter analysis.

Another striking result of our model is that the popular vote for competing parties - expressed as a ratio between UUP support and that of both 'left' and 'right' wing parties at

constituency (Assembly) level - appears to have *no influence* on constituency delegates' voting intentions, even in interaction with elected-official status. This is clear in the case of the 25 MLAs: virtually all are pro-Agreement despite the diversity of opinion across their respective constituencies. (CAIN 2004; NILT 2001) This limits the applicability of the rational choice hypothesis to this case. On the other hand, the fact that all but one of the 25 MLAs in our dataset support the GFA (a significant effect in our overall model) while MPs and district council representatives (the majority of elected officials) do not vote in significantly different ways from other UUC delegates is important. Since district councillors and MPs suffer no pecuniary loss from the suspension of the GFA institutions while MLAs do, this lends some support to a traditional, individual-centred, rational choice interpretation.

Turning next to the 'Orange effect', our data reflects the survey evidence that Orange membership has a decisive negative impact on delegate stance. This is further confirmed by the strong relationship between Orange activism (i.e. serving as a lodge master or secretary) and a negative position on the GFA. However, this is not a blanket effect: intra-Orange differences are very great and networks within the Order seem to hold the key to these. The first difference is between official Orange delegates and delegates who just happen to be members of the Order. The former are involved in a network which meets on a regular basis while the latter meet only their local lodge brethren and may be among the 2/3 of Orangemen who either don't attend lodge meetings regularly or eschew them altogether. (LOI Commission 1997) This difference is evident in our small sample of non-bloc Orange delegates, who were far more supportive of the Agreement than bloc Orangemen. Further evidence for this comes from differences between our data and that of Jon Tonge and Jocelyn Evans: their sample undoubtedly consists of more (probably a majority) non-bloc than bloc Orange delegates. Accordingly, their survey found a mere 20-point difference between Orange and non-Orange stance, as compared with the 40-point differential we found between the Orange bloc and the rest of the UUC.<sup>23</sup>

The second intra-Orange difference with network implications is the strong relationship between Orange office holding and a negative position on the GFA. This result could be attributed to an expressive motive, namely the greater ideological commitment of Orange office bearers. On the other hand, a network perspective would suggest that lodge institutions which expose individuals to Orange political culture and subject them to scrutiny can shape individual preferences. Strong evidence for this position comes in the form of the *level* of office held by Orange officebearers. Those holding a district or higher lodge position account for just 1/3 of our wider Orange postcode sample of some 3000 individuals. However, fully 50 of 62 Orange officebearers in our UUC sample held higher Orange offices (40 of 42 in the Orange bloc). This means that few merely private lodge masters are on the UUC. This suggests that pure ideological commitment (amply available among local lodge masters) is of less importance than networks which link UUC delegates with the higher echelons of the Order.

A third intra-Orange difference with network implications is region. If the relationship between Orangeism and GFA stance was straightforward, we would expect to find the strongest opposition to the Agreement among delegates from border constituencies (mostly in the South and West) where per-capita Orangeism is strongest. Instead, what we find is a curious pattern of regional variation: Orange Order delegates living in heavily Protestant, disproportionately Methodist constituencies in the northeastern part of the province with are an important anti-Agreement force while those elsewhere are a pro-Agreement influence.<sup>24</sup> One reason for acute regional division within the Orange bloc is the fact that in high Orange-participation areas, Orange membership is more a matter of community, conviviality and tradition than in Protestant-majority constituencies around Belfast where the choice of Orange membership is a more overt statement of sectarian political identity.<sup>25</sup>

But we also need to take account of organizational networks. Official Orange delegates are selected by County Grand Lodges and meet regularly, forming a group which can enforce collective norms. This multi-network structure explains why every one of Belfast's 12 and County

Antrim's 25 Orange delegates are anti-Agreement while 10 of County Tyrone's 14 Orange delegates are pro-Agreement. Individuals' stance on the GFA is a matter of serious division among Northern Ireland Protestants, and few Orange bloc members are unaware of each other's position. As a pro-Agreement Tyrone Orange delegate explained, there is considerable pressure on Tyrone delegates at Orange bloc meetings, but the tenacity of the county network is able to withstand such pressures.<sup>26</sup> Unsurprisingly, a logistic regression of the stance of Orange UUC members on our predictors showed County Lodge and Orange officeholding to be the only significant independent variables (both at the .002 level).<sup>27</sup>

Networks are often attached to historical structures like the Orange Order's county lodges. Here new institutionalist theory may be of use, particularly historical institutionalism. For much of the past two centuries, most county lodges - especially in the South and West - have been content to follow the lead of the Order's patrician leadership. However, Belfast has long been home to an anti-establishment, working-class tradition with roots in the populist Orangeism of William Johnston of Ballykilbeg in the 1860s. (Bryan 2000) Later, protracted internal struggles took place over Grand Lodge hostility toward the Northern Ireland Labour Party in the early 1950s and Belfast lodges regularly crossed swords with the Orange elite in an attempt to change policy and democratise the Order. Likewise, in Antrim, a tenants-rights tradition traceable to the United Irishmen in the 1790s has bred a resolutely 'independentist' streak which not only informs the breakaway Independent Orange Order but also the County Antrim Grand Lodge, which has repeatedly (and, until very recently, unsuccessfully) tried to gain recognition for Ian Paisley's Free Presbyterian Church within the Order and has issued several resolutions demanding an end to the official link between the Order and the UUP. (GOLICC 1951-2004) These anti-establishment traditions are maintained in the norms of the Antrim and Belfast counties' UUC affiliates. This explains why Orangemen from heavily Protestant and Methodist constituencies – most of which are in Antrim and Belfast – are such a strong predictor of anti-Agreement

sentiment. It also highlights the way in which the concrete social networks of today (which strongly predict UUC voting behaviour) are shaped by historical forces.

The geographic division within Orangeism becomes even starker when we contrast Orange bloc voting behaviour with the votes of their co-constituents. Figure 6 below sorts constituencies according to the differential in voting intention between Orange bloc (N =106) and other (N = 781) delegates.

[Figure 6 about here]


Note the strong regional variations between the Antrim/Belfast and southern/western constituencies. In the Northeast Ulster and Greater Belfast area, Orange UUC delegates' viewpoints differ greatly from their fellow non-Orange delegates whereas in the border counties, Orange UUC men resemble their non-Orange UUC 'neighbours' more closely. The geographic pattern in Tonge & Evans' survey evidence is slightly at variance with our results: while in their work Fermanagh and Armagh show the expected (small) difference between Orange and non-Orange delegates in border areas, there also appears to be little variation between counties Down, Londonderry, Tyrone and Antrim in their Orange/non-Orange voting differential. This probably reflects a discrepancy between our Orangemen (all in Orange bloc) and their survey's capture of more 'incidental' Orange UUC delegates from outside the official Orange bloc. In other words, an Orangeman on the UUC who 'just happens' to be an Orangeman differs greatly from one who officially represents the Order on the UUC.

This is an extremely important finding because of the trajectory of UUC reform. Two-thirds of the Orange mass membership supported disaffiliation from the UUP by 1997 and, after a number of resolutions, the link between the UUP and the Orange Order was officially broken by the Order in 2005, after precisely one hundred years. (LOI Commission 1997; COLA 1999) Our



research indicates that while a substantial minority of the UUC will continue to be Orangemen, most will support the leadership against the wishes of the Orange Order.

Figure 6. Orange/Non-Orange Differentials in Stance by Constituency of Residence



Note: No Orange members in Foyle or West Belfast (these are shaded white and unlabeled).

Digital boundaries courtesy of Ordnance Survey of Northern Ireland (OSNI).

Network effects also dominate individual-level ones in the non-Orange part of the UUC. For instance, North Antrim and Newry & Armagh, two strongly DUP, anti-Agreement constituencies, show delegate support for the GFA at a whopping 72 and 88 percent respectively. As in the Orange case, constituency networks appear to insulate delegates from their wider political environment.

## Conclusion

This research brings important new evidence and methodological innovations to bear on the problematic of pro/anti-Good Friday Agreement support within the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). In so doing, it advances our understanding of activist motivation within party organisations. Most importantly, our research shows that in the case of the UUP, networks matter more than individual characteristics. This reinforces the idea that context is critical, and analysts who ignore contextual effects do so at their peril. Based on a wide array of internal Orange Order documents and a nearly complete 2002 party list of Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) delegates and their voting intentions, and utilising both multilevel modeling and MOSAIC postcode-profiling technology, we develop a social profile of the UUC and model its dynamics. Our findings confirm some of the results of extant survey research while questioning other aspects.

A number of key new insights have come to light as a result. First of all, the UUC (including the Orange bloc) stands out as a relatively affluent, educated and elderly body when compared to the younger, more socio-economically representative Orange Order leadership and the Unionist community as a whole. This is not uncommon for political parties - especially in the UK, though the Ulster Unionist Council appears to combine the UK Tories' social profile with a support base and elite-mass social gap which is more redolent of Labour.

Within the ranks of the UUC, the Young Unionists and especially the Orange bloc are distinguished by their opposition to the Good Friday Agreement while MLAs are striking in their near-unanimous support for it. The opposition of the former interest groups and the support of the latter group - whose individual members stand to gain most in economic terms from the survival of the Peace Process - lends some support to traditional rational choice approaches to political

motivation. Yet the overwhelming dominance of party section and intra-Orange links over both individual characteristics and other contextual factors in our model favours a network interpretation of intra-party dynamics in this case. The fact that a number of constituency associations, notably North Antrim and Newry and Armagh, diverge in statistically significant ways from their local voters' stance towards the GFA further reinforces this contention. Consequently, we need to revisit some of the conclusions in the party survey literature which generally overlook the role of contextual factors and particularly ignore intra-party institutions.

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[Appendix 1 here]

[Appendix 2 here]



**Appendix 1: Derivation of 'Methodist High-Protestant' Factor**

Rotated Component Matrix

	Component	
	'Established Church'	'Methodist High-Protestant'
<b>CATHOLIC</b>	.375	-.849
<b>PRESBYTERIAN</b>	-.945	-3.831E-02
<b>METHODIST</b>	.529	.708
<b>CHURCH OF IRELAND</b>	.908	-.156
<b>OTHER PROTESTANT</b>	-2.237E-03	.576
<b>% of Variance Explained</b>	42.85%	31.5%

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser

Normalization.

**Appendix 2: Derivation of 'Respectable Working Class' Factor**

Rotated Component Matrix

	Component
--	-----------

	'High Status'	'Respectable Working Class'
<b>AB. Higher and intermediate managerial / administrative / professional</b>	.974	6.004E-02
<b>C1. Supervisory, clerical, junior managerial / administrative / professional</b>	.853	.380
<b>C2. Skilled manual workers</b>	-.722	.374
<b>D. Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers</b>	-.777	-.465
<b>E. On state benefit, unemployed, lowest grade workers</b>	-.472	-.790
<b>EDUCATION LEVEL 0: No qualifications</b>	-.871	-.459
<b>EDUCATION LEVEL_1: Primary School</b>	-.321	.736
<b>EDUCATION LEVEL_2: High School GCSE</b>	5.558E-02	.946
<b>EDUCATION LEVEL_3: High School A-level</b>	.878	-.173
<b>EDUCATION LEVEL_4: First university degree</b>	.976	.125
<b>EDUCATION LEVEL_5: Higher university degree</b>	.972	-.184
<b>% of Variance Explained</b>	61.3%	25.4%

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Though the work of Seyd and Whiteley (2002) or Carty (2002) are exceptions.

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<sup>2</sup> West Belfast is not a functioning organisation, hence the number of constituencies in this dataset is seventeen rather than the eighteen which appear in the election.

<sup>3</sup> This reflected Protestant attitudes as tracked by the NILT survey which in 2001 found that 63% of Protestants believed the Agreement benefited nationalists more than Unionists. A QUB/Rowntree poll later showed that the proportion of Protestants saying they would vote 'yes' in a referendum on the Agreement dropped from 49% in October 1999 to 36% in February 2003. (Belfast *Telegraph*, 19 February 2003)

<sup>4</sup> Personal correspondence with MOSAIC founders Richard Webber and Marc Farr. In Webber's words, 'Although the classification in the strictest sense describes postcodes rather than individuals, the type of postcode in which a person lives is, in my view, just as much personal information as the house tenure (whether owner or renter) or the type of employment (in factories or offices). This assertion would be less easy to make if we were dealing with coarser geographic units. However when we are dealing with units averaging 15 households the salient characteristics of the neighbourhood are very efficient at describing all of the people living within the area. This can be seen by comparing the level of discrimination on behavioural data of a postcode classification compared with an occupational classification or an age classification. Tests show that across a large number of behaviours the different discriminators are about equally effective. However there is no doubt that the use of type of neighbourhood in combination with truly person data (such as age and class) will provide even better discrimination. In other words people of the same age or class do behave differently in different sorts of neighbourhood whilst people in the same neighbourhood do behave differently according to their age and class.' (Correspondence with authors, 2004) For an example of academic work with this data, see Farr and Webber 2001.

<sup>5</sup> We are grateful to Dr. Steven King and Mr. David Campbell at Cunningham House and for the assistance of a number of constituency activists and MLAs who wish to remain anonymous.

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<sup>6</sup> Party list data includes address and postcode, gender, title and party section.

<sup>7</sup> This result does differ somewhat from that obtained in survey research, where Tonge and Evans found pro-Agreement support during the autumn of 2000 to be just 45%. In addition to variation between research methods, the discrepancy is probably attributable to a difference in the issue dimension tapped. Whereas we asked strategists to indicate delegates' support for the leadership's pro-Agreement stance (2003), Tonge and Evans asked respondents how they would vote today (2000). A delegate may support the leadership out of party loyalty despite having personal reservations about the Agreement. We would argue that our measure is a highly critical one for the Peace Process, hence our figures are in better accord with the successive results of recent UUC votes in which the leadership has managed to win over more than half the delegates.

<sup>8</sup> Only 28 percent of Unionist voters responding to the question, 'If the vote on the Good Friday Agreement was held again today, how would you vote?', claimed they would support the Agreement, as against 42 percent who would vote to oppose it. (NILT 2003)

<sup>9</sup> The presence of female Orange UUC delegates (25 percent of the total) does not greatly affect these findings as 'pink collar' occupations (clerical and housewife) do not alter the general pattern of a stark elite-mass disjuncture.

<sup>10</sup> Just nine postal codes failed to be assigned to a lifestyle category.

<sup>11</sup> These are the official Orange representatives who hold about 15% of UUC votes, and represent a subset of the roughly 50% of UUC delegates who happen also to be in the Orange Order.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with Perry Reid, Moy, Co. Tyrone, N. Ireland, 17 March 2004.

<sup>13</sup> As one anti-Agreement delegate from Co. Londonderry explained (in reference to one of his pro-Agreement counterparts), divisions between politically-active individuals in the County Orange membership were well-known and constituted an extremely salient social divide. (Interview with David Brewster, Limavady, Co. Londonderry, 7 July 2002 and 16 January 2003.)

<sup>14</sup> These statistics were computed by cross-referencing individual names.

<sup>15</sup> Using MLwiN 2.0. No significant random variation was detected. A similar result is obtained using constituency as the level 2 identifier. Use of pre-1973 county had no significant level 2 effect.

<sup>16</sup> Six counties and two county boroughs. We have avoided using constituency geography due to the possibility of multicollinearity with section constituencies.

<sup>17</sup> The multi-level model may be expressed as follows:

$$y_{ij} \sim \text{Binomial}(n_{ij}, \pi_{ij})$$

$$\text{logit}(\pi_{ij}) = \beta_{0j}x_{0j} + \beta_{1j}x_{1ij} + \beta_{2j}x_{2ij} + \beta_{3j}x_{3ij} + \beta_{4j}x_{4ij} + \beta_{5j}x_{5ij}$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \beta_0 + u_{0j}$$

$$[u_{0j}] \sim N(0, \Omega_u) : \Omega_u = [\sigma_u^2]$$

$$\text{var}(y_{ij} | \pi_{ij}) = \pi_{ij}(1 - \pi_{ij})/n_{ij}$$

Where y is delegate stance toward the GFA, subscript i refers to delegate and j to county (level 2 identifier).  $\Omega_u$  represents the variances and covariances of the level 2 random term, which in this case equals zero.  $\beta_0$  captures level 2 intercept variance (variance components), which is not significant in this case.  $B_1$  through  $B_5$  refer to the fixed (level 1) parameters.

<sup>18</sup> The large number of dummy variables in the fixed effects model is both inefficient and leads to multicollinearity between sectional and geographic effects which results in nonsensical section coefficients. On the other hand, the significance of the county variable in the pure fixed-effects model is due to multicollinearity with the Orange interaction terms. Excluding the Orange bloc from the dataset decisively removes the importance of county of residence from the model. Accordingly, we take the position that geography of residence is only significant for Orange delegates, a finding to be confirmed below.

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<sup>19</sup> Fixed effects are restricted to intercept and not random variation.

<sup>20</sup> Especially in view of the fact that the major anti-Agreement age group in the Tonge-Evans study were the 25 individuals in the 15-34 age category. This does not invalidate their conclusions, however: it may well be the case that these sections are anti-Agreement *because of* their youth or Orange membership stance, though our evidence strongly suggests that non-bloc Orange delegates are distinctly more positive about the Agreement.

<sup>21</sup> Replacing the categorical variable for party section with a proportional variable for section vote (proportion of section favouring GFA) yields similar results: the section vote variable (1 df) attains roughly the same predictive power.

<sup>22</sup> Notably JP, OBE/MBE, Dr, Reverend. The sample with higher degrees is of course but a small sub-sample of the total delegates with university degrees.

<sup>23</sup> Our differential would be higher still if we exclude Orange women from the bloc and omit non-bloc Orange members from the UUC remainder.

<sup>24</sup> Methodist population, as with other denominations, is computed as a proportion of the total Protestant population. Methodists are strongest in Belfast's Protestant population (10% of Protestants) though Belfast County Orange Lodge's opposition to the Agreement cannot be attributed to this denominational factor. That said, Belfast's anti-Agreement Unionism has working-class roots (as does Methodism) and therein may lie the connection.

<sup>25</sup> A parallel may be drawn with Canada, where the Order in the strongly Orange province of Newfoundland, with some three times the per capita membership strength of Ontario, stressed a far more moderate line on sectarian issues than the militant Ontario organisation. (GOLBNA minutes)

<sup>26</sup> Interview with Perry Reid, Moy, Co. Tyrone, Northern Ireland, 17 March 2004.

<sup>27</sup> Nagelkerke pseudo  $R^2$  was .435,  $N = 133$ .