The Dynamics of Orangeism in Scotland: the social sources of political influence in a large fraternal organisation

Abstract:

Like other voluntary associations, fraternal organisations like the Orange Order can play a pivotal role in maintaining political cleavages. The membership dynamics behind such associations are less clear. Rival theories attribute membership fluctuations to changes in, alternatively, social capital, economic structure, culture or (de-)mobilising issues/events. This paper uses a pooled time-series cross-sectional model to evaluate competing hypotheses for the period since 1860. Results suggest that membership levels are strongly linked to longer-term changes in ethnic boundaries rather than structural or social capital variables, with events playing an intermediate role. Scottish-Protestant mobilisation against Catholics is a less important factor than Irish-Protestant ethnicity in explaining the Orange presence, but both are important. Finally, the Order has been numerically and electorally weaker than many believe, hence its inability - even during the apex of its influence - to shape Tory policy.

The literature on electoral cleavages recognises the cardinal role of voluntary associations like churches or unions in providing the institutional skeleton for the maintenance of political cleavages - rendering them resistant to the 'normal' cross-cutting pressures of pluralist politics. (Dahl 1965: 106; Lipset and Rokkan 1967) An influential recent text on this subject assesses cleavages along the axes of 'organisational density' (i.e. union membership levels) and cultural heterogeneity. These two axes are understandably dichotomised due to data limitations, but organisational density is in fact a distinct institutional variable that can equally be applied to the cultural or economic realms. (Bartolini & Mair 1990: 224-40) For example, regardless of how the census divides the population into cultural groups, vibrant and politically-engaged patriotic or religious associations will enhance the power of religious or ethnic cleavages just as powerful unions can catalyse socioeconomic differences.
Why cultural associations rise or fall is thus of great significance. Pressure groups are known for their short life-cycle, while established associations with deep communal roots like churches are far more enduring, though often less politically active. (Moran [1985] 1989) Though there is a growing literature on new social movement (NSM) and church membership dynamics, there has been little quantitative research on patriotic or ethno-nationalist organisations - many of which are politically influential. Putnam's recent (2000) work sketched some time-series patterns for certain American societies, but there has been no in-depth follow-up. Here we consider the dynamics of one such organisation, the Orange Order, across space and time. In the process, we will assess the theories of Putnam and others who have written about the post-industrial decline of cultural associations.

Whereas Lipset & Rokkan stressed the post-1920s 'freezing' of cleavages in Europe, more recent research in many western societies claims that established cleavages based on religion and class are eroding due to modernising (or post-modernising) pressures. One variant of this approach stresses the role of secularisation and post-industrialisation in undermining class and religion-based networks. (Bruce 2002; Barnes 1997; Heath et al. 1987) Another focuses on the post-1960s rise of a 'new politics' value cleavage, which is linked to membership in a 'post-materialist' social category somewhat analogous to notions of a post-industrial New Class. (Inglehart 1990; Bell 1980)

Ethnic or nationalist cleavages occupy a curious place in this literature. On the one hand, ethnic cleavages comprise part of Lispet and Rokkan's scheme (i.e. the linguistic cleavage) that we have supposedly surpassed. On the other hand, we often
find ethnicity and nationalism classed as forces that have contributed to a fracturing of established cleavages. The perception of a radical shift from religion to ethnicity/nationalism is understandable insofar as many separatist or far-right parties in the West - eschewing religious rhetoric - gained political ground as religious ones declined after the 1960s. Even so, the Orange Order, which is an ethno-religious organisation, shows how an organisation can reinforce both 'old' (i.e. religious) and 'new' (i.e. ethnic) cleavages.

Accordingly, this paper foregrounds the importance of the *continuities* that link, for example, the Catholic politics of pre-Quiet Revolution French Canadians with contemporary linguistic Quebec nationalism or the older Protestant politics of British dominant ethnic groups with the white racial politics of some of these groups today. Boundary symbols may have shifted from religion to language or race, but the underlying *ethnic* nature of political cleavages remains. Even if religion remains the major ethnic boundary, this theory - which distinguishes between ethnicity and the boundary markers which delineate it - allows us to explain why ethnic boundaries/cleavages based on religion (as in Israel, Yugoslavia or India) can harden in the face of secularisation. (Barth 1969; Connor 1994; Chhibber 1999; Shamir & Arian 1999)

Ethnic associations like the Hindu RSS, French-Canadian St. Jean-Baptiste Society or Afrikaner Broederbund have been intimately linked with nationalist movements of both dominant and subaltern character. A general diminution in ethnic associational activity may therefore have the effect of dampening ethnic/nationalist cleavages - a finding with profound consequences for the world's many deeply-divided societies.
Robert Putnam's recent (2000) work has drawn attention to the role of voluntary organisations in creating 'bonding' social capital of the kind that can integrate ethnic groups across lines of region or class.¹ His work used an array of time-series data from many American voluntary associations to sketch out longer-term patterns in national connectedness. The decline of many of these associations in the post-1960s period - largely due to generational turnover and the rise of television - has been paralleled by the decline of ethnic, religious and racial endogamy and the rise of hybridised patterns of identification. (Lieberson & Waters 1988; Gans 1994)

But what exactly is the nature of the causal link here? Has a decline in social capital led to identity change, or can we instead posit that identities declined for their own substantive cultural reasons, with the pattern of social interaction following, rather than leading, developments. Those who argue in this manner, against social capital-type explanations, tend to specify wide-ranging cultural changes (i.e. secularisation) or structural changes (i.e. de-industrialisation) as well as contingent factors like political events (i.e. strikes) as key determinants of change. (Bruce 2002) These modernising processes, it is claimed, tend to break up the overlapping associational networks which entrench political cleavages. Among the modernising factors which compose this 'black box' of modernity may be included: 'urbanisation, social and geographic mobility, growing heterogeneity, secularisation and embourgeoisement; diverse and multiple mass media; higher levels of education and cognitive mobilisation; [and] changing organisational structures and ties….' (Shamir & Arian: 1999: 265)
This paper tries to determine whether social capital, or one or more of the aforementioned modernising factors is of signal importance in explaining Orange Order decline in Scotland. The case of the Orange Order in Scotland provides an interesting test of current propositions in the literature on social capital and political cleavages. This longstanding mass association has both religious and ethnic overtones and a history of political activism and has recently experienced a membership decline whose trend exhibits both 'modernising' and Putnamesque characteristics.

The Scottish Context

'Bad Old Habits: Ancient Hatreds Die Slow' announced a recent *Economist* headline discussing Scottish sectarianism in the wake of another episode of violence between supporters of two Glasgow football (soccer) clubs: Catholic-affiliated Celtic and Protestant-linked Rangers. Prosecutors in Scotland, the article noted, had now been instructed to take into account whether a crime had a sectarian motive. (*Economist* 2002) The issue, claimed noted Scottish-Catholic composer James MacMillan, went far deeper. In a high-profile address at the 1999 Edinburgh International Festival, MacMillan charged his Protestant compatriots with 'visceral anti-Catholicism' and claimed that bigotry was rife in Scottish society. At a time of devolution (post-1999) and growing Scottish self-confidence, sectarianism appears as an obstacle to intra-Scottish unity and a barrier to the legitimacy of the Scottish nationalist project. The limited Catholic support for the Scottish National Party - especially among the Irish-descended majority of Scots Catholics - is taken by some to reflect a lack of Catholic identification with the broader Scottish historical narrative. This is reflected in a
collection of articles examining the subject of Scottish sectarianism, which claimed that this taboo subject needed to be more openly discussed. (Devine 2000)

A further connection to current events is the linkage between Scotland and Northern Ireland politics. Protestants have tended to vote for Unionist parties in much greater numbers than Catholics for over a century in both locations. (Hutchinson 1998: 73-99; McCrone [1992] 1996: 157)³ Meanwhile, Ulster Protestant and Catholic paramilitary groups distribute promotional literature at Rangers and Celtic football matches and maintain Scottish cells, while in Northern Ireland, one frequently sees the Scottish flag flown in Protestant areas alongside more familiar ones like the Union Jack, Red Hand of Ulster and paramilitary emblems. (Bruce 1985; Marshall 1996: 99) These are especially pronounced in the lead-up to the mid-July Orange Order marching season which celebrates the victory of the Dutch Protestant King William of Orange over his Catholic rival James Stuart, at the Battle of the Boyne in Londonderry in 1690.

The Orange Order, a fraternity founded in Northern Ireland in 1795 whose constitution commits its members to the defense of Protestantism and the British Crown, has served as a major associational nexus for Protestant dominant ethnic groups in Scotland, Northern Ireland, North-western England and Canada. Its convivial and religious role has been matched by its political engagement. In the above locations, the Order has supplied numerous local, provincial or national leaders and has attempted to influence the course of government policy in a Unionist and Protestant direction. (Senior 1972; Houston & Smyth 1980; Waller 1981; Neal 1987; Bryan 2000)
This is clearly evident in present-day Northern Ireland. The 2003 suspension of the Northern Ireland assembly is largely attributable to divisions within the ranks of the dominant Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), which has ruled the province since partition in 1922. Most UUP politicians - David Trimble is no exception - have been members of the Orange Order, which is guaranteed 15 percent of the delegates to the UUP's governing Ulster Unionist Council. Many in mainland Britain are aware of the Order's public profile in Scotland as well, particularly in the period surrounding the July processions in the central belt. With some 1500 annual marches in the Strathclyde region and over ten thousand appearing to participate in and watch the Glasgow 'walk', this is a major cultural force in Scotland's west-central core. (Bradley 1995: 84)

The Order is at the centre of the debate on sectarian conflict in Scotland. This issue takes on salience primarily in industrial central Scotland, which attracted a considerable number of Irish immigrants, notably during the 1840-1920 period. It is less important in regions like the Northeast or Highlands where the Catholic population is largely of Scottish ethnic origin. (Brown 1997: 52-53) This suggests that where religion serves as an ethnic boundary marker, as with the Irish-Catholic/Scots-Protestant antinomy in central Scotland, it takes on greater political salience. Where the boundary is purely religious - as in the Scottish Western Isles, latter-day Holland, Germany or Switzerland - it may carry less potential for conflict.

Several important political and social histories produced in the 1980s helped shed light on Catholic-Protestant conflict in Scotland. (Gallagher 1987a; 1987b; Bruce 1985) Recently, the debate has taken more concrete shape. One school of thought...
holds that sectarianism is still a prominent influence in Scottish society, though it has been translated to new realms. It points to the persistence of a religious electoral cleavage and differences in economic performance between lowland Protestants and Catholics as evidence of this. Proponents of this view also cite the widespread Protestant desire for the abolition of Catholic separate schools and the large-scale public displays of antagonism that accompany both Rangers-Celtic matches and Orange marches. (Brown et al. 1999; Williams & Walls 2003; Reilly 2000)

The countervailing position contends that while sectarianism was an important feature of the Scottish landscape in the past, its influence a) has declined considerably since the Second World War and especially since the 1960s; and b) was never as considerable as is popularly believed, especially in comparison with other largely Protestant societies. The reduction of disparities in educational and economic performance, increasing intermarriage rates and converging responses to surveys of attitudes and voting intentions are cited in support of this position. (Rosie & McCrone 2000; Rosie 2001)

The literature on Scottish Orangeism conforms somewhat to the latter pattern. Elaine McFarland's comprehensive work on nineteenth century Orangeism, for example, stresses the Irish-Protestant immigrant origin of Scottish Orangeism. She reinforces this with newspaper and nominal census evidence which suggests that a majority of late nineteenth century Orangemen were working-class Irish Protestant migrants. She also asserts that the Order was never able to exercise a powerful hold over native Scots because it was popularly associated with Irishness and lower-class unruliness, and ran counter to bourgeois Scottish 'liberal commonsense'. Since the mid-twentieth
century, the Order, remarks McFarland, increasingly focuses on its convivial role and
downsplays political activities in recognition of its marginal place on the Scottish
political landscape. (McFarland 1990) In considering the interwar period, Graham
Walker reiterates McFarland's claim that the Order was principally an Irish-Protestant
ethnic association. Drawing on contemporary newspaper reports, he suggests that the
Order was 'maintained in the early decades of the twentieth [century] by immigrants
and their Scottish-born descendants.'

This did not, however, render the Order politically impotent. Walker suggests that the
political turbulence of the interwar period led to a surge in Orange membership, a
broader Scottish appeal and enhanced political activism. As evidence, he points to the
sweeping success of Orange candidates in the 1919 Glasgow School Board elections
and notes the presence of a considerable number of Orange MP's. 6 A study of election
results in this period, writes Walker, indicates that 'the Orange vote was a meaningful
political factor' despite its inchoate and unpredictable nature. (Walker 1992: 187-89)
Steve Bruce adds that the Order helped deliver the Protestant working-class vote in
west-central constituencies until the 1950s. (Bruce 1985: 167) Ian Maclean, however,
disagrees: even in the turbulent 1918-22 period, he contends that the Orange vote was
not only 'less coherent' than the Catholic vote, but failed to affect Labour in any major
electoral contest. (Maclean 1983: 200-201) Others claim that the jury is still out as to
the existence and efficacy of the Orange vote in the twentieth century. (Walker &
Gallagher 1990: 91-92)

In terms of membership dynamics, Walker notes that Irish immigration slowed
considerably between the wars, but he does not assert that this affected Orange
membership. Rather, he suggests that events kept membership buoyant. This is an account that finds some resonance in the work of Bruce and McFarland, as well as other political historians of the Order who emphasise shifts in the political climate and events like the Home Rule crises, the 1918 Education Act and the Northern Ireland 'Troubles'. (Marshall 1996: 105; Gallagher 1987a: 293-95; McCracken 1990: 35) Others point to the importance of class structure in reinforcing sectarian division, with the Orange Order viewed as a means for Protestant-dominated manufacturing interests to divide or control the working class. (Smith 1984; Bryan 2000: 20) In terms of the more recent period, Steve Bruce suggests that slum clearance has been more of a factor than declining religiosity in the Order's decline. Though not specifically addressing Orangeism, he also writes that the relatively low proportion of Catholics in Scotland, as compared to Ulster, has always limited the appeal of militant Protestant movements. (Bruce 1985: 167, 246; 1998: 111)

This paper builds upon the historical literature, with its rich lode of newspaper-based research, but attempts to chart major trends with greater precision and makes a more concerted attempt to evaluate the relative strength of competing explanations. This necessarily relies on high-quality statistical data which has only been made possible by unprecedented access to the records of the Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland. These provide a virtually complete run of annual membership data, across lodge and county, for the period 1860-2001.  


Membership Trends

Let us begin by considering the long-term trend in Scottish male Orange membership, expressed as a ratio per thousand males. For confidentiality reasons, actual membership figures cannot be displayed, but the general trend is clear. Membership increases occurred in the periods 1863-77, 1902-9, 1919-26, 1941-53 and 1961-79. Notable declines took place during 1878-1900, 1913-18, 1927-41, and 1987-present. Spikes of over twenty percent in membership took place during 1920, 1903, 1933, 1864 and 1865. Collapses of over 20 percent occurred during 1885 and 1934. (See figure 1)

Figure 1

![Orange membership, Scotland, per 1000 males](image)

Source: Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland reports and return sheets; Census of Scotland.

In explaining patterns such as these, it is tempting to jump immediately to event-driven explanations. However, while certain historical junctures appear to be relevant, we also need to be cognisant of the many events that seem to have had a surprisingly limited effect. (i.e. Great Depression, Northern Ireland Troubles) Appearances can be deceiving, though, since events can counteract each other's influence and mask
underlying social trends. We therefore need to contextualise these patterns against a background of both internal developments (i.e. dues increases) and broader social, demographic and economic changes in order to assess the true predictive power of these events.

A further dimension to this study is geographic. Figure 2 provides a digital map of Scottish Orange lodges in 2001, with points adjusted for size of lodge membership. This is framed by pre-1973 Scottish county boundaries. Notice the concentration of membership on the west coast of central Scotland around Glasgow and North Lanarkshire, with spillover into adjacent counties, notably West Lothian (the highest per capita concentration of current membership), Renfrewshire and Ayrshire. This is partially explicable by population distribution, given the primacy of Glasgow and the surrounding Clydeside conurbation as the largest Scottish metropolitan area. Yet the paucity of lodges in both the Highland and Borders regions and in populous Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen is striking.
This pattern has held for a considerable period of time. Though there was a slightly more numerous Orange presence in Wigtownshire and Dundee in the mid-nineteenth century, the principal Clydeside and west-central counties have dominated Orangeism from the outset. Despite some fluctuation - notably the rise and decline of Glasgow as population moved in, and then out, during the twentieth century - proportions have not changed dramatically in a century and a half. (See fig. 3)
The Masonic order makes for a useful contrast. Its ritual, symbolism, degree structure and organisation are virtually identical to Orangeism. Indeed, Orangeism explicitly drew upon Masonic models for inspiration. Given a native Scots tradition of Masonry that goes back to the late 15th century, it is unsurprising that this fraternity has done so well among Scottish Protestants. In fact, Scotland's total of some 150,000 Masons give this nation the highest rate of Masonic membership in the world. (Bessel 2002) The Masons have also served as one of the institutional vessels of both Scottish and popular Protestant identity. (Finn 1990) However, while Freemasonry has been associated with Protestantism in most English-speaking societies, its identity as an avowedly apolitical and non-religious organisation makes it a less convenient vehicle than Orangeism for Protestant or Loyalist identity. Here it is instructive to note the contrasting geography of Masonic lodges vis a vis their Orange counterparts (see fig 4). Notice the way in which Masonry maps much more neatly to the Protestant
population of Scotland as a whole: Clydeside is the major concentration, but lodges cover the Borders, Highlands and the Northeast, with secondary concentrations in Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen. Whereas nearly two-thirds of Orangemen live in Glasgow or Lanarkshire, less than a quarter of Scottish Masons do.

**Figure 4**

![Map of Scotland with Orangemen lodges](image)


International and Gender Dimensions

It is very often forgotten that Orangeism was, and is, a worldwide fraternity, and could at one time be found throughout the British Empire. The success of its
penetration outside its mid-Ulster place of origin depended on a whole range of factors. The degree of Protestant and British-Loyalist identity in a country is usually seized upon as the principal explanation, but we need to be cognisant of many other competing accounts. The proportion of Irish-Protestants and Roman Catholics in the population, the degree of religiosity, denominational mix, economic structure, geographic mobility and the range of alternatives for conviviality must be counted as important variables. Notice the similarity to the 'modernisation' list of variables scrutinised earlier with respect to social capital and cleavage decline. Such a list is instructive, but our true task is to test which of the above are significant factors.

Consider figure 5 below:

**Figure 5**

![International Orange Membership, 1912-1994](image)

Source: International Grand Orange Council Reports.

English-speaking Canada, not Ireland, has been the leading Orange jurisdiction, with Scotland, England, Australasia and the United States occupying a much smaller position within the organisation. One way of examining the impact of Orangeism in a particular location is membership density. Orange male membership density (OMD) is calculated as the number of Orange male members per target population. In this case,
adult male British-Protestants. In these terms, the Scottish OMD has generally been little more than one percent, and averaged barely two percent in its Clydeside heartland during its membership peak. Even in its highest concentrations (Govan and Rutherglen in the greater Glasgow area), Scottish OMD rarely exceeded ten percent. Compare this with the Canadian province of Newfoundland or Northern Ireland counties of Fermanagh, Londonderry City and Tyrone (all had an OMD of roughly 1/3 in 1920) or, at the lower end, the Canadian province of Ontario and city of Belfast (OMD of both was around ten percent in 1920). 

This goes some way to explaining why three Canadian prime ministers, many provincial premiers, federal MPs and numerous Toronto (and other) mayors were Orangemen while only a handful of Scottish Orangemen made the political grade. The political impact of the Order in both Canada and Liverpool has simply been far more profound than in Scotland. (Houston & Smyth 1980; Neal 1987; McFarland 1990) On the other hand, one needs to be careful in interpreting figure 5. Scottish Orangeism has been limited in strength, but has proven remarkably durable. The tale of Orangeism in the latter half of the twentieth century has been one of steady decline, but while Scottish Orange male membership peaked as late as 1982, Ontario membership peaked in 1920 (a smaller peak was attained in the late 50s) and membership in both Northern Ireland and Newfoundland peaked around 1960. These changes have been so profound that today there are slightly more Orangemen in Scotland than in Canada! Though the nature of these differences is beyond the scope of this essay, it suggests that the Scottish context differs in important ways from those in other Orange jurisdictions.
Data and Methods

This paper seeks to track membership dynamics in both their temporal and spatial dimensions. Orange membership has been computed from the annual reports of the Grand Lodge of Scotland. Independent variables are drawn from decennial Scottish censuses, the annual reports of the Scottish Registrar-General and electoral data.\textsuperscript{12} Geographic adjustments have been made in order to establish a continuous dataset for the 1961-91 period, but 2001 data are not available.\textsuperscript{13}

Due to the nature of the available data, this is an ecological, rather than individual-level analysis, based on Scottish pre-1973 counties. The validity of this kind of model has been established in the methodological literature and holds well in this case as the unspecified characteristics of counties, unlike those of neighbourhoods, are almost certainly too diffuse to decisively affect our dependent variable.\textsuperscript{14} Aggregation problems, by contrast, may be important, so we will be running some cross-checks against a substantial sample of individual-level data. The shape of our data also inclines us toward the use of time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) pooling using panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). This technique allows us to surmount a number of important problems encountered by researchers using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or Generalized Least Squares (GLS) techniques. (Beck & Katz 1995) Beyond its (much contested) utility for dealing with the small-N problem\textsuperscript{15}, it allows us to make a claim regarding the global relationship between our dependent and independent variables.
This is not to dismiss some of the serious pitfalls of pooled models, notably its more complex error structure and its assumption that a global relationship between two variables is possible. For instance, a number of authors have shown that the relationship that holds between variables in time does not obtain across place. These authors remark that pooled models tend to provide an 'average' of pooled cross-sections (i.e. 'between' variation) and pooled time series (i.e. 'within' variation). Thus the universal beta that is obtained may actually bear little relationship to either the 'real' pooled time-series or pooled cross-sectional relationships, thereby obscuring both. (Firebaugh 1980; Smith 1995)

Moreover, in political science, variation between units like congressional districts or nations is generally much greater than the variation over time within a unit. Relevant independent variables thus change more slowly than in economic analyses and often have a historical-institutional origin. (Smith 1995; Kittel 2001: 233) This pattern is certainly evident in our data: the variation across Scottish counties provides a much sharper contrast than the ebb and flow of membership over time within them. Hence we need to be cognisant that 1) many of our key variables involve slowly-changing cross-sectional processes and 2) cross-county trends will tend to dominate our model, and may owe their origin to unspecified historical developments that antedate our dataset.

All of which should serve to remind us that county and year intercepts in our data are not merely 'noise' to be corrected, but provide important information about the nature of the relationship between census variables, Orange membership and particular voting patterns. In order to be sensitive to these nuances, we will compare our pooled
results with a time-series model, as well as with distinct pooled cross-sectional and pooled time-series models. In addition, datasets are by nature bounded in space and time and so there is always a danger that our findings are conditional on the particular slice of space-time we are observing. (Kittel 2001: 239-42) In order to provide some safeguard against this, we will examine distinct time segments and sub-groups of counties to see whether key propositions obtain within sub-samples of the dataset.

Results

We begin with a pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) model using census and electoral data based on N x T cases, where N = 15 counties and T = 14 census years. In order to incorporate event data and utilise the full range of Orange membership data (where N = 15 counties x T = 142 years), we progress to a model based on estimated intercensual data.

Moving to the first (15 x 14) dataset, results of Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier and Wald tests (on generalised least squares models) were significant, demonstrating both heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation in the data. Arthur Stinchcombe famously commented that institutions tend to replicate themselves, thus generating numerous effects which feedback into a complex, self-replicating causal structure. For instance, the Orange Order's existing membership level will to a large extent condition its ability to attract new members through interpersonal contact as well as through financially-taxing events, the Orange Torch newsletter, social clubs and other activities. (Stinchcombe 1967) Results of Durbin's M-test confirm that this kind of serial autocorrelation is present. In order to correct for this error structure, we

Here we test down across all available demographic, cultural and economic variables from the 1861-1991 period. In addition, we test for the predictive power of the Irish-born population at various fixed dates (i.e. 1851, 1901, 1921) to gauge the degree to which Orangeism represents an Irish cultural imprint rather than a Scottish Protestant response to a Catholic presence. This is necessary due to the steady decline in the rate of Irish immigration after 1851. We also attempt to weigh the importance of the Irish-Protestant ethnic element by examining the ratio between the proportion Irish and the proportion Catholic at various dates (1901 was used for this model), a method used by Graham Walker (1991). If this ratio exceeds 1, for instance, there are likely to be more Irish who are not Catholic than if the number is less than 1. When multiplied by the Irish-born population of 1901, this provides an interaction term which measures the impact of the Irish-Protestant population in the absence of direct data.

The results obtained from this dataset are presented in figure 6 below, with variables ranked in order of significance (as measured by z-score). The first model includes only 'core' counties, excluding four counties in which membership is generally zero as well as records amongst the other counties in which there is no Orange membership. The second model includes the full dataset (15 x 14).
Figure 6 Cross-Sectional time-series regression for Male Orange Density by Census Variables, 1861-1991 (Census Years Only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 Transformed PCSE (core counties only, excludes zero cases)</th>
<th>Model 2 Transformed PCSE (all counties, includes zero cases)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRISHPROT01 (Irish Protestant population indicator (1901 basis))</td>
<td>30.03506***</td>
<td>30.92441***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC (% Roman Catholic)</td>
<td>4.761154***</td>
<td>5.419581***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGR (% in Agricultural Occupations)</td>
<td>-1.222394***</td>
<td>-1.477998***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model R-Squared</td>
<td>.4843</td>
<td>0.4365</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p > .01; **p > .05, *p > .1

These results suggest that those Scottish counties with higher male Orange Order membership rates tend to be those that have a high Irish-Protestant population and a high Roman Catholic population. On the one hand, repeated modelling indicates that the most durable variable of significance is the proportion Roman Catholic. It is, for example, the only variable that strongly predicts across both place and time. It is likewise the only variable that can significantly predict both short-run changes in Orange density (i.e. using a first differences PCSE model) and the mean Orange density across all models. Fixing a Roman Catholic cross-sectional variable for different base years provides a good predictor of the dependent variable. However,
even when fixed at early years like 1851 or 1901, RC is not as strong a predictor as variables which directly tap the Irish-born or Irish Protestant population.\textsuperscript{21}

Cross-sections of IRISHPROT from 1851 to 1921 are significant, but not thereafter. This reflects the fading influence of the first-generation Irish-Protestant population over the Order in Scotland as it assimilates into the Scots-Protestant mainstream. In contrast to the time-invariant Irish-Protestant variable, the proportion of Irish-born - which varies over time as well as place - is not significant in the above models, even when restricting the time period to the nineteenth century. These trends likely reflect an Irish-born population that is everywhere in rapid decline over time since our model works nearly as well when substituting (time-fixed) Irish-born proportions (i.e. IRISH01) for IRISHPROT01. More to the point, the high degree of multicollinearity between RC and variables tapping Irish-born and Irish-Protestant dimensions at fixed years - especially prior to 1931 - occludes any neat attempt to disentangle ethnic (Irish-Protestant), cultural (Irish) or sectarian (anti-Catholic) effects.\textsuperscript{22} The most we can say is that the Irish-Protestant effect seems more potent prior to 1931.

More agricultural counties are associated with lower Orange membership, though this effect is not as consistently strong as that obtained for RC in repeated testing. Moreover, the agricultural variable only attains significance if the dataset includes data prior to 1891, thus it likely reflects an effect that becomes less important in the twentieth century. Hence, one of the first findings that emerges from this preliminary model is the importance of religio-ethnic variables in our analysis. The purely religious angle is not so vital: witness the insignificance of Protestant denomination (ie. Church of Scotland v. Nonconformist) and religiosity in the analysis.
Meanwhile, socio-demographic and economic factors such as population density, infant mortality, illiteracy and proportion in manufacturing are insignificant, casting some doubt upon theories which link the spread of Orangeism to a 'labour aristocracy' in growing industries like shipping or textiles. Factors (rotated principal components) designed to simplify the full range of structural variables were also tested, with similar results. Tests of Putnam's hypothesis using 30-year cohorts (including the famous 1910-40 generation of 'joiners') proved insignificant as well, though the limited set of post-1970 cases and lack of data on television penetration makes it difficult to decisively reject his hypothesis for this association.

Thus far, we need to be cognisant of the fact that results have been obtained across a relatively small set of data. We have yet to test for the relative importance of political events. In order to improve the effectiveness of a TSCS strategy and test for the role of events, we now move to a full, annualised dataset of Orange Order membership. As an annual record, this comprehensive set of data allows us to examine the impact of annual or multi-year events. However, such an exercise requires inter-censual estimates of variables from the census. In testing for the role of events, it became clear that much of what passed for a correlation could easily be a spurious result obtained by the coincidence between a particular event(s) and membership trends in a given year(s). Generally speaking, major membership changes do not correspond very well to key historical events. Only in the case of the membership collapse of 1884-5 do we get some clue from printed sources. Elaine McFarland writes that some in the Govan area complained of the impact of 'dull trade' on the membership during this period, though it must be asked why this recession could have such a decisive impact.
as compared with the Great Depression. (McFarland 1990) Otherwise, there is no obvious reason for the Orange membership collapse of 1934 nor the jumps of 1903, 1920, 1933, 1864 and 1865.

One way of surmounting the problem is to test for the role of broad categories of events. We tested for several types of amalgamated event using dummy variables for: 1) threats to Protestantism or the Union; 2) Protestant policy victories; 3) Protestant policy losses; 4) Social or political stimuli; 5) Wartime. All but variable 2 were significant in at least some of the models. We also tested for the impact of dues increases and leadership changes - neither of which proved significant. Results appear below, with variables arrayed first by type (socio-economic v. event) and then by importance. Results for insignificant variables are not displayed as these were removed from the analysis along lines suggested by David Hendry. (Gilbert 1990) In addition to the core county and all-inclusive models used with the smaller dataset, we are now able to employ (due to more extensive data) a model which includes all non-zero cases. (See fig. 7)
Table 7 Cross-Sectional time-series regression for Male Orange Density by Census Variables, 1861-1991 (Weighted intercensal estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Transformed PCSE (all counties, excludes zero cases)</th>
<th>Model 2 Transformed PCSE (core counties only, excludes zero cases)</th>
<th>Model 3 Transformed PCSE (all counties, includes zero cases)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRISHPROT01</td>
<td>36.98693***</td>
<td>48.77104***</td>
<td>32.298***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Protestant population indicator (1901 basis)</td>
<td>(2.453036)</td>
<td>(2.879023)</td>
<td>(7.421163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>4.197614***</td>
<td>2.542986***</td>
<td>4.56244***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% Roman Catholic)</td>
<td>(.7233012)</td>
<td>(.7389473)</td>
<td>(1.42298)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.9202024***</td>
<td>-1.173142**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% in Agricultural Occupations)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(.3501535)</td>
<td>(.4979386)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAR</td>
<td>-.1931871***</td>
<td>-.2038425***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Wartime)</td>
<td>(.020996)</td>
<td>(.0235167)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOSS</td>
<td>-.0797712***</td>
<td>-.0777954***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Policy Losses)</td>
<td>(.0107079)</td>
<td>(.0108503)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREAT</td>
<td>.0463054***</td>
<td>.0564817***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Threatening Events for Unionist Protestants)</td>
<td>(.0092961)</td>
<td>(.009055)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STIMULUS</td>
<td>.0660661***</td>
<td>.0792455***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Social &amp; Political Stimuli)</td>
<td>(.018295)</td>
<td>(.0170321)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTIMCONT</td>
<td>.0528311***</td>
<td>.0731619***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Census Estimation Control Monitor)</td>
<td>(.0091984)</td>
<td>(.0094914)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1348</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model R-Squared</td>
<td>.1185</td>
<td>.1169</td>
<td>.0951</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p > .01; **p > .05, *p > .1
In comparing the full dataset to the 'hard' dataset we visited earlier, the first pattern to notice is the great similarity between this and the earlier model. The Irish-Protestant and Roman Catholic percentages are still the most important underlying determinants of Orange density. Agricultural occupation emerges as significant in two of three models, and remains weaker than the religio-ethnic variables. Other structural variables were not significant. The differences between models contained here and in the first, 'hard' dataset are not great, despite the fact that estimated data did differ from hard data in significant ways in two of the models (though this is picked up by the dummy variable ESTIMCONT). On the whole, therefore, results reinforce our earlier conclusions regarding the primacy of religio-ethnic variables over structural or (purely) religious ones.

The role of events, however, needs to be considered. WAR is the most important event variable but LOSS, THREAT and STIMULUS are all quite significant (apart from the all-inclusive model where the high proportion of zero values dampens period effects). The exigencies of war (notably a high Orange enlistment rate) and policy losses tend to lower Orange membership whereas political threats and stimuli from socio-political actors (like firebrand preacher George Wise or the Protestant political parties of John Cormack and Alexander Ratcliffe) tend to increase membership. By and large, all of these variables display effects that are weaker than that of IRISHPROT01 but stronger than RC. Lags of the five event variables listed above proved insignificant. Among the more important individual events were the two Church of Scotland-related crises (1868-9, 1962), the Boer War, World War I and the First Home Rule crisis (1884-6).
On this evidence, we can make the case that events occupy a middle causal ground between ethno-religious factors and structural factors in explaining Orange membership dynamics. Events are important in predicting mean Orange membership, but tests using a first-differences PCSE model show that events cannot predict short-run changes in membership (i.e. shifts in rate of membership growth/decline). This accords with the unexplained nature of membership peaks and troughs we visited earlier. As a result, we can see that, contrary to widespread belief both inside and outside the organisation, events alone cannot predict the course of Orange membership - even over time.

Given our earlier comments regarding the difference between pooled cross-sectional and pooled time-series models, it is incumbent upon us to note how our conclusions apply differently when examining each dimension. To begin with, our Irish-Protestant variable is time-invariant and events are place-invariant. This adds an additional complicating factor to the usual problems with interpreting pooled models. (Kittel 2001) A clearer picture emerges when we contrast fixed (within) effects and between effects models.

Overall, the between component of our model's R-squared is some five times that of the within component, suggesting that cross-sectional effects are providing much of the power in our model. In the pure within-effects model, we discard the time-invariant IRISHPROT01, and both proportion Roman Catholic (which, in the absence of IRISHPROT01, reflects both Irish-Catholic and Irish-Protestant populations) and wartime become the most important predictors. Structural factors seem to take on greater weight: AGR is more important than in the pooled TSCS case and there is
some evidence that variables associated with youth and poverty are inversely correlated with Orange membership, though this may be a spurious result. But, the proportion in agriculture is still less important than proportion RC. Meanwhile, in contrast to the within-effects model, the pure between-effects model automatically excludes the role of events and privileges fixed differences in the Irish-Protestant (estimated) population and the Roman Catholic population across county. All other variables appear insignificant across county.

Examining sub-samples from the dataset, we arrive at a similar conclusion to that reached with the restricted data. In addition, the proportion Roman Catholic, even when fixed at particular base years, is less important in our explanation than the Irish-Protestant (or time-invariant Irish-born) proportions. Even though a high degree of multicollinearity between Irish and Catholic variables clouds any definite statement about the relative merits of sectarian or ethnic hypotheses, it appears that both are important, and the model r-squared definitely reflects this.

There is one further effect with merits mentioning, even though it may be an artefact generated by multicollinearity between RC and IRISHPROT01. Namely, that we see a pattern (evident also in the previous dataset), whereby the Irish-Protestant measure seems more important prior to the mid-1920s and after the mid-sixties, with RC taking the lead in significance during the interim period. A theoretical explanation (which takes account of multicollinearity to some degree) could be that the ethnic factor predominated prior to the large-scale assimilation of the Irish-Protestant immigrant population into Scottish life. Meanwhile, the familial links within 'Orange families' persisted, but were overshadowed by the sectarian cleavage which bulked
strongly after the 1918 Education Act. From this point until the mid-1960s (1971 in the 'hard' data), Protestant-Catholic conflict may have provided a more potent source of Orange dynamism than Irish-Protestant ethnicity.

The agricultural variable only provides an explanation if data includes pre-1890 cases and its effect weakens as the dataset extends beyond 1945. All of which suggests that Orangeism's association with non-agricultural counties is of importance only in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Given the lack of association between Orange activity and other indices of industrialisation (i.e. population density, manufacturing occupations), and given the agricultural variable's lack of significance in the main model (omitting zero cases) and lower predictive power in others, we are certainly justified in assigning this structural variable a lower - but not negligible - priority in our explanatory framework, particularly in the recent period. Once again, our generational variable proved insignificant, casting doubt on the applicability of Putnam's hypothesis to this data.²⁹

Comparison with individual-level data

One useful method of triangulating our analysis is to make a comparison with individual-level, nominal census data. Though these are not available for decades after 1901 for reasons of privacy, the earlier censuses do provide useful data. McFarland's work highlighted the Ulster-born nature of many prominent Orangemen. (McFarland 1990: 105) An analysis of 256 lodge masters and secretaries from the Orange directory of 1881 against the nominal census of Scotland in that year paints a clearer picture: fully 73 percent were Irish-born. (Census of Scotland 1881) Almost
all were working-class, with a slight majority in skilled trades. Given the occupational background of most inhabitants of central Scotland (less than 10% non-manual), the birthplace of Scottish Orangemen stands out far more dramatically than their occupational profile, which confirms our thesis regarding the importance of religio-ethnic over structural factors. We need to bear in mind, though, that this largely immigrant association was in a nascent phase, and would undergo rapid growth and assimilation in the century to come - a period of rapidly declining Irish immigration.

Clearly, then, a higher proportion of Irish-Protestants in a community will enlarge the pool of Orangemen. What is less obvious is what transpires as time passes, since Scottish Orangemen of Irish birth evince a high rate of assimilation into the Scots Protestant mainstream. As evidence: 54 percent of wives of Orange masters and secretaries in the counties for which we have data (all bar Lanark and Renfrew) were born in Scotland as against just 37 percent of the Orange husbands.\(^30\) Taken together with the declining proportion of Irish-born in Scotland after 1881, this points to a reduction in the strength of Irish-Protestant birth in explaining Orange strength. But what of Irish-Protestant *ethnicity*? Elaine McFarland and others have made the case that the organisation, despite a reduced proportion of Irish immigrants, continued to serve as a vessel for the Irish-Protestant descent community. (McFarland 1990; Walker 1992)

Yet we should not jump to the conclusion that Irish-Protestant descent is all-determining. For one thing, this bloodline diffused increasingly widely through intermarriage (native Scots erected few barriers to Irish-Protestants), and second, the counties with higher Irish-Protestant scores are not always the strongest Orange ones.
Were this the case then Wigtownshire would have had the highest Orange density in the immediate post-1860 decades. Generally speaking, more of the high density Orange counties are predicted by proportion Catholic than the Irish-Protestant measure. Sticking to the most important counties, however, the ratio is evenly split. Dumbartonshire, West Lothianshire and Stirlingshire are counties where the Catholic proportion appears more relevant; Renfrewshire, Ayrshire and Wigtownshire flag up the importance of the Irish-Protestant score, and Lanark seems influenced equally by both.

Given the overwhelming preponderance of Irish-Protestants in the Order in 1881, how might the above results be explained? The key is to isolate the ecological impact of the county environment from the more individual-level effect of Irish-Protestant immigration. Irish-Protestants may have formed the bulk of Orangemen in nineteenth century Scotland. But the fact that many Irish-Protestants settle in an area does not necessarily enhance the appeal of Orangeism for the Irish-Protestant immigrant. On the other hand, a hotly-charged sectarian context may have this effect on both immigrant and native Protestants.31

In Canada, the nature of the census makes it possible to isolate the Irish-Protestant ethnic component of the population. Preliminary research in the period 1911-41 suggests that Irish-Protestant ethnicity provides the most significant predictor of Orange density, but that the proportion Catholic is also important. Strongly Orange counties can thus be found among cases with a high Irish component to their Protestant populations (notably Grey, Bruce and Dufferin - which was half Irish-Protestant in ancestry in 1941 but only 8 percent Catholic) as well as among counties
with a high proportion of Catholics but fewer Irish-Protestants (especially Prescott, Russell and Algoma). We see this on a larger scale as well: Newfoundland Orangeism was purely related to sectarian competition and conviviality, with no Irish-Protestant membership, whereas Orangeism in Northeastern England was almost entirely an Irish immigrant activity. (Houston & Smyth 1980; MacRaild 2002)

The nominal Scottish census of 1881 provides a further clue to our puzzle: the only identifiable birthplaces of Irish Orangemen were two cases from Bangor, Co. Down, just across the water from Stranraer, in Wigtownshire. Ongoing research suggests that Bangor and the entire area east of the Bann River (Counties Down and Antrim, including Belfast city) have been historically weak Orange areas, with MODs around 10 percent as compared with around 30 percent west of the Bann, including pre-partition Counties Cavan and Monaghan. Tests on fairly complete census data for the 1891-1971 period have determined this to be principally related to the low Catholic population and strong Presbyterian influence in these areas.

On this reading, a move across the Irish Sea from strongly Protestant and relatively Presbyterian Bangor to more heavily Presbyterian Stranraer or Girvan would hardly lead to a surge in Orange activity despite the presence of many Ulster-Protestant immigrants. Brenda Collins proffers that between a quarter and a third of Irish immigrants to Scotland in the 1880-1910 period were from Antrim alone while Hutchison estimates that roughly 60 percent of Irish immigrants to Scotland in the 1876-81 period came from the four most Protestant counties (Antrim, Down, Armagh, Londonderry). (Collins 1991; Walker 1991) Thus - in contrast to the prevailing wisdom - it seems that Scotland's Irish-Protestant immigrants were generally drawn
from the least Orange sections of Protestant Ulster. In sum, it appears that Scottish Orangeism, though strongly related to the proportion of Irish-Protestants obtaining in a county, is also greatly assisted by the presence of a sectarian context.

The Orange Impact on Politics in Central Scotland

If religio-ethnic variables do much of the work of predicting Orange membership, especially over place, what can our model tell us about the so-called 'Orange vote'?
Tests on our smaller dataset (the only relevant one given the timing of elections) reveal that the proportions agricultural, middle class, Church of Scotland and Irish-born are important in predicting the Tory vote in the period 1861-1961. This echoes established findings pertaining to the importance of the religious cleavage on the Tory vote in Britain during much of this period. (Wald 1983) Orange Order density, by contrast, is insignificant in predicting either the Tory, Liberal or Labour share of the vote in the central belt counties with which we are dealing.

A closer look at Glasgow is important as the city was, and is, very much the hub of Orangeism. Several Glasgow wards, especially those bordering the river Clyde, have male Orange densities that exceed those of any county. Springburn, Govan, and to a lesser degree Cowcaddens and Pollokshaws, for example, often had male membership densities in the 5-15 percent range during the 1920-65 period. In Glasgow, the Orange Order has had perhaps its greatest influence on municipal politics and attained an important degree of influence on the Tory party between the wars. (Gallagher 1987a: 144-45; Walker 1992) However, using ward-level data across a very limited range of census and electoral variables collected in a study of the Glasgow Labour
movement during 1922-47 (N = 680), we found no significant relationship between Orange density and the vote for either Labour (we might expect a negative relationship) or even the militant Scottish Protestant League. Given its limited impact on the vote at both county and city level, it seems that the overall impression of Orange impotence needs to be qualified: Orangeism seems to have punched considerably above, rather than below, its electoral weight in the political arena.

Conclusion

This article began by noting the importance of stable mass-member associations in maintaining cultural cleavages and the paucity of research into the membership dynamics of these - especially in the ethnic/nationalist realm. Examining one such association in time-series cross-sectional detail, the Scottish Orange Order, reveals that substantive cultural shifts are more powerful than structural or social-capital mechanisms in explaining membership change.

Orangeism in Scotland is a religio-ethnic fraternity principally confined to the central belt. It has generally been significantly weaker - even in its west-central heartland - than in comparable Orange settings like Northern Ireland or Canada. Nonetheless, the Scottish organisation was the last to peak, having weathered the storm of modernisation for longer than its counterparts in other locations. The most significant long-term predictors of male Orangeism's strength (as a proportion of the Protestant population) are religio-ethnic variables which demarcate Irish-Protestants and Irish Catholics. Religion is not in itself important: denomination and religiosity are insignificant. This implies that we need to re-think some commonplace notions about
the decline of religious cleavages and the rise of ethnic-nationalist ones. In this case, secularisation has virtually no impact on an ostensibly 'religious' association which helped maintain the Catholic-Protestant religious cleavage. Instead, religion serves as a boundary marker for an ethnic conflict which straddles the 1960s boundary between 'old' and 'new' politics periods.

Historical events are of intermediate significance between ethno-religious and structural factors. Dummy variables which aggregate threatening events or stimulating Protestant social movements were related to higher membership. Protestant policy losses and the exigencies of war predicted lower membership. Even so, events could not predict short-run changes in membership; moreover, much of the predictive power of the model comes from religio-ethnic differences across county rather than time-series effects.

The controversy over whether Orangeism is stimulated by Irish-Protestant descendants or by Scottish-Protestants' competition with local Roman Catholics is difficult to resolve due to multicollinearity. Yet available evidence marks both as important influences, and suggests that inter-ethnic competition between Protestants and Catholics was the primary motive force behind Orangeism during the period from the 1920s to the mid-1960s. This pattern displays similarities with those in Canada and Northern Ireland, where high local Catholic populations in certain counties have stimulated Orange membership. Indeed, it is suggested that the East of the Bann River (i.e. Presbyterian, majority Protestant) origin of many Irish-Protestant immigrants to Scotland led to a lower general level of Orange activity than was the case in Canada, where Presbyterians formed just a third of the Irish-Protestant inflow. (Richard 1991)
As to the debate over the enduring nature of the Protestant-Catholic division, this paper can provide no definitive answer: Orange membership in Scotland peaked much later than in all other locations, but our model suggests that post-1970 membership levels are more firmly tied to family tradition than sectarian competition.

Finally, we consider the electoral impact of the Orange Order on Scottish politics. Whether we take the county level (within central Scotland) or the ward level (within Glasgow) as our unit of analysis, we could find no connection between Orange density and the vote during 1861-1961. This holds not only for the main parties, but even for the Scottish Protestant League. Many have marvelled at the shadowy nature of the so-called 'Orange vote' and its limited impact on Scottish politics. This paper clearly demonstrates that such surprise is misplaced: the real question is how the Order managed to provide as many political figures as it did and acquire such an aura of influence despite possessing limited electoral clout.

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1 I am indebted to the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for funding the project upon which this paper is based. Thanks to <>

2 Hadassah, the Knights of Columbus and the Masons are three 'pan-ethnic' associations which Putnam tracked, and are linked with, respectively, Jewish, Catholic and Protestant whites in the United States.

3 Though this association has weakened in Scotland in the past few decades, it clearly remains. (Brown et al. 1999)

4 Every Northern Ireland first minister and all but three cabinet members were Orangemen during the Stormont period, 1922-72. Today, all Westminster MPs and most Unionist Assembly MLAs are members of the Order.
This generalisation should be restricted to the recent period since religious controversies and conflicts in these areas were rife in the period prior to the Congress of Westphalia (1648) and took on institutional forms which lasted, as Lipset and Rokkan observed, well into the twentieth century.

Leading Orange MPs in the twenties and thirties included Sir John Gilmour, Secretary of State for Scotland (1924-29) and Col. A.D. McInnes Shaw. (Gallagher 1987a: 144-45)

1908 is the only missing year and has been linearly interpolated from adjacent years. We would like to record our debt to Rev. Gordon McCracken, former Deputy Grand Master of the Order, who painstakingly collected and scanned in reports of proceedings from all over Scotland for the period 1860-1966, compiling these onto CD. His assistance and advice have been invaluable, as has that of former Grand Secretary Jack Ramsay and current Grand Secretary Donald Hatcliffe.

Those wishing to gain access to this data should contact the author. We will be pleased to release data pending the approval of the Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland and Reverend McCracken.

Memberships at lodge level are not available for the Masonic Order, hence the lack of size differentials on the map.

Lodges were formed in the South Pacific, South Africa and West Africa. Togolese and Ghanaian lodges formed just prior to the First World War in response to French-English colonial and missionary rivalry persist today.

Calculated from County (N. Ireland) and Provincial (Canada) Grand Orange Lodge reports of proceedings and return sheets and respective historical censuses.

I have drawn upon Michael Hechter's UK County dataset for the 1851-1966 period. (Hechter 1976) This comprehensive dataset encompasses variables from the census, registrar-general's reports and elections of 1885, 1892, 1900, 1910, 1924, 1931, 1951 and 1966. Election data has been matched to its closest census year. (Hechter 1975) A second source of electronic data is Iain Maclean's study of Labour Elites and Electorates in Glasgow which provides census and electoral data for Glasgow in the mid-twentieth century. (Maclean & Gordon 1978). This data has been augmented by text sources where necessary.

Thanks to the important geographic areal interpolation work of Danny Dorling, David Martin and Richard Mitchell on the Linking Censuses Together project, we are able to establish a set of county-level data for the 1971-91 period which is continuous with Hechter's 1851-1961 county data. (Dorling et al. 2001) 2001 data, though now available using the post-1973 geography, has not been similarly covered by the LCT program and thus cannot be used in our county-level study.

Ever since Robinson's landmark 1950 essay highlighted the 'ecological fallacy', there has been an important debate regarding the validity of ecological analysis. Recently, a number of observers have pointed out that many of Robinson's (and subsequent) critiques rested on poorly-specified models. Though it may be stretching the point to assert, as some have, that the 'ecological fallacy is a fallacy itself', there is little doubt that a well-specified model and appropriate geographical units can allow for a causal analysis that compares favourably to, or in some cases surpasses, individual-level analyses. (Firebaugh 1978; King 1997; Jargowsky 2002)

This technique increases the number of observations rather than the number of cases, which raises a number of methodological problems. (Kittel 2001)

No census was taken in 1941 and there is no separate data for counties of cities, so Glasgow is included in the Lanarkshire total.

TSCS models gain appreciably in their power with the addition of a longer time series. Though this involves estimating a considerable number of data points for our independent variables, this is managed to some extent by comparing with the smaller 'hard data' model, weighting by annual Scottish figures for population and religion, and by inserting a tracking variable to test for any significant differences between census and estimated data.

Variables are limited to those that span the entire 1861-1991 period as part of either the census or Registrar-General's series. The following variables were tested down for significance: a) demographic - population growth, population, sex ratio, population density, marriage rate, birth rate, infant mortality rate; b) cultural - religiosity (in terms of religious marriages as a percentage of total marraiajes), Church of Scotland, Roman Catholic, Nonconformist (all who are not members of Church of Scotland or Roman Catholic church) and Irish born; c) economic - proportions in agricultural sector and in manufacturing.

This interaction term can be expressed as follows: IRISHPROT t = (IRISH t / RC t) * IRISH t; where t = 1901.
This variable thereby arrays cases between, on the one hand, counties like Argyllshire or Aberdeenshire which possess larger native Scots' Catholic populations but few Irish descendants, and, on the other hand, counties with a large proportion of Irish immigrants, but with relatively low Catholic populations. (i.e. Wigtownshire, Ayrshire). Given our focus on the central belt, the former effect is not likely to greatly influence our sample.

20 Excluded counties are Aberdeenshire, Argyllshire, Clackmannanshire and Perthshire.
21 For example, an interaction term which multiplies the Irish-born population of 1901 (or 1851) with the Protestant population in a given year was also highly significant.
22 Greene remarks that when independent variables are strongly correlated, unstable coefficients can result from even small changes in the dataset. (Greene 2003: 57)
23 This is achieved here by using linear interpolation of explanatory variables, which are adjusted by annual Scottish (national) time-series data on population. Most of the variables considered follow a broad trajectory (i.e. urbanisation, rise of the Catholic and non-religious population), hence our assumptions may be considered reasonable. In order to control for any difference between estimated and 'hard' data, we use an estimation control dummy coded 1 for estimated data and 0 for hard data. For more on this technique, see Greene 2003: 60.
24 Variables were composed of the following events: 1) THREAT = Church of Ireland Disestablishment Controversy (1868-9), Scottish Papal Hierarchy Restoration (1878), Church of Scotland Disestablishment debate (1881-4), Irish Home Rule Crises (1884-6; 1890-92; 1916-22), *Ne Temere* Decree (1907-8), 1918 Education Act, Roman Catholic Relief Act (1926), Visit to Pope by Church of Scotland Moderator (1962), N. Ireland Troubles (1969-72), Tullyvallen Massacre at a Northern Ireland Orange hall (1975), first Roman Catholic Chief Constable (1977), first Papal Visit (1982), Anglo-Irish Agreement (1986); 2) VICTORY: first Glasgow Orange parade (1872), first two Home Rule Crises' endpoints (1886, 1892), RC Bishop of Derry's visit halted at Edinburgh (1975); 3) LOSS: 1869 (COI disestablishment), 1879 (Restoration of Papal Hierarchy), 1922 (Irish independence), 1963 (Church of Scotland moderator visit - aftermath), 1977 (RC Chief Constable), 1983 (Papal Visit - aftermath), 1987 (Anglo-Irish agreement - aftermath); 4) STIMULUS - Union of competing Orange Order branches (1877), Boer War (1899-1901), Anti-Catholic mass activities of preacher George Wise (1903-6), Orange & Protestant political party (1923), height of John Cormack and Alexander Ratcliffe's Protestant parties in Edinburgh and Glasgow (1925-36), anti-Catholic riot in Edinburgh (1935); 5) WAR - Boer War (1899-1901), World War I (1914-18), World War II (1939-45).
25 The insignificance of AGR in model 1 is likely down to the bias towards more recent years introduced by including the (mostly recent) nonzero cases from marginal counties. Events are probably insignificant in the all-inclusive model due to the weakening of period effects that accompanies successive zero scores on the dependent variable. Predictive power of the model as a whole (R-sq.) is down due both to the increased size of the dataset and its greater time-series bias.
26 Though it is conceivable that the Irish-Protestant unit effect may impact differently in particular years while historical events may have different receptions in particular places. In a time-series exercise where we considered the total Scottish membership against an annual time-series of Registrar-General's statistics (no occupational data available, but some socio-economic demographic data like age structure, death and birth rates are provided), first-difference models showed both proportion Roman Catholic and the male death rate (inversely related) to be predictors of the annual rate of change in Orange density. So it may be the case that structural factors gain greater significance across time.
27 The insignificance of the significant multicollinear relationship between these two variables rises over time.
28 This is only a tentative conclusion which could be tested more intensively by a closer examination of the postwar period in which mobility and television-ownership data is included.
29 Sample size is ninety-seven. No comparable study of Renfrew and Lanark counties has yet been undertaken.
30 Tests do not, however, suggest that the interaction between the RC and Irish Protestant populations is a superior predictor.
31 Roughly 30-40 percent of eligible Protestant males were in membership in these counties during 1885-1965, similar to Tyrone and Fermanagh in Northern Ireland.
32 Unlike the Scottish case, denomination was a significant factor predicting Orange membership in Northern Ireland.
33 Excluding downtown lodges and based on location of lodges within wards and allocation of membership by visual inspection. Given a certain degree of inter-lodge mobility across wards as well
as the differing size of lodge catchment areas and the presence of large city-centre lodges, it is difficult
to specify the exact Orange membership of each ward. I have been aided in this task by former Deputy
Grand Master Gordon McCracken, whose encyclopaedic knowledge of Glasgow Orange membership
patterns proved extremely valuable.

35 Several commentators have pointed out that the Orange Order distrusted the street politics of
Ratcliffe. (Gallagher 1987a; McCracken 2002)