Melting Pot

Describes a model of ethnic relations in which a nation-state's constituent ethnic groups engage in a process of reciprocal fusion. This can take either of two forms: 1) all ethnic groups acculturate to a universalistic set of values and symbols with no ancestral connotations, or 2) there is two-way influence between ethnic groups in the society such that no ancestral group achieves symbolic dominance.

The melting pot process should not be confused with one-way assimilation to an ethnic core. In effect, its telos admits of no less than a fusion of all the groups known to mankind through 'democratic association', Talcott Parsons' highest evolutionary universal. (Parsons 1964:353-56) The agent of dissolution of ethnic bonds is typically liberal individualism, although the socialist melting pot of Soviet Man would qualify as would the melting process that occurred within religious sects like the Druze (during their dynamic phase) and the Mormons. (Rasiak 1980: 161; Smith 1986: 111-12) In addition, periods of ethnic fusion and fluidity - such as those which preceded the emergence of the Mestizos, Japanese, Central Asian Turks or English, may be classified as instances of the melting phenomenon. (Akiner 1997)

With regard to empires, the usual pattern is ethnic hierarchy, though some Imperial civilizations, like the Assyrian or late Roman, appear to have been more universalistic, and hence more similar to the ideal-type of the melting pot. Finally, religious civilizations like Christendom or the Dar-ul-Islam may also be considered melting-pots, albeit at the elite level. (Smith 1990: 4)

The term 'melting pot' was first introduced in 1908 by Israel Zangwill, a British Jew. Zangwill, a confirmed internationalist, worked with the International Territorial Association to resettle Russian Jews in the United States. His ideas were in turn shaped by the internationalist Jewish thinking of the late nineteenth century that pre-dated Zionism and found its most clear American exponent in Felix Adler. Adler, a lapsed rabbinical candidate who later taught at Columbia University, formed the Ethical Culture Society in 1876 which called for "a new religion where we may all grasp hands as brothers united in mankind's common cause." His work went on to influence the Liberal Progressive caucus of the Americanization movement, which included such figures as John Dewey, Jane Addams and W.I. Thomas. (Lissak 1989)

When Zangwill's play was first introduced to American audiences, the idea of the United States as a universal melting pot was virtually nonexistent, even though American liberals like Emerson or Jefferson had made rhetorical use of universalist statements in earlier eras. (Harper 1980) After Zangwill's popular play, the term melting pot began to gain currency but it was basically taken to refer to anglo-conformist assimilation, and several have commented that the term actually came to describe a "transmuting pot" rather than a melting pot. (Gordon 1964: 89; Herberg 1955: 34) With respect to the American case, therefore, the term has served as a receptacle for a wide variety of paradigms, from the dominant conformist to the pluralist. (Gleason 1992: 15)

In structural terms, the American melting pot certainly did not come to fruition until the decade of the 1960's, when the immigration quota system was removed, African-Americans achieved civil rights, electoral districts were reapportioned and anglo-conformity subsided. Since then, progress towards a melting pot in the United States has been rapid: inter-ethnic marriage has become a national norm (except with respect to
African-Americans and some Asian and Hispanic groups), and most ethnic groups have achieved socioeconomic parity with British Americans. (Battistella 1989: 134-140) The demographic data on inter-ethnic marriage has also breathed new life into melting-pot ideology since the 1960's, particularly among American neoconservatives, but also among liberals opposed to multiculturalism in education, government and the universities. (Salins 1997, Fukuyama 1995: 320, Schlesinger 1991, Sollors 1986, Hollinger 1995)

This is not to say that the melting pot is the dominant ideological or heuristic paradigm in the United States. Political opponents of the idea, whether of the neonativist right or communitarian left, are especially scathing in denouncing the abstract, cultureless society that the concept may bring forth. (Novak 1972; Bellah 1985; Brimelow 1995) Scholarly critiques, meanwhile, have tended to emphasize resistance to the melting pot from ethnic elites and social movements. They also point out that intermarriage does not necessarily eliminate ethnic boundaries and practices. (Gans 1979; Waters 1990)

References


Assimilation
The term 'assimilation' describes a process whereby members of an ethnic group take on the cultural and structural characteristics of another ethnic or national community. In the last instance, this results in the group exchanging its previous identity (in the eyes of self and other) for the new one. Hence assimilation is a broad term, covering many varieties of cultural change, and is thus applicable to individuals who 'convert' to the cultures and identities of ethnic groups, civic nations and universalist cosmopolitanisms. On the other hand, assimilation is not the correct term for describing the kind of two-way cultural fusion characteristic of the melting-pot phenomenon.

The assimilationist perspective of the Chicago School tradition, which grew from liberal-progressive roots, informed ethnic relations theory in the United States from the 1920's until the 1960's. (Park 1950; Laczko 1995: 32) However, prior to Milton Gordon's formulation of 1964, the term was rather loosely used by both professionals and the American lay public and covered a wide variety of processes, from acculturation to 'melting-pot' fusion. In response to this terminological confusion, Gordon put forth a systematic seven-variable model of the assimilation process as it applied to the United States: cultural assimilation, the first stage, was followed by structural, marital, identificational, attitude receptional, behaviour receptional and civic assimilation. (Gordon 1964: 71)

The assimilation process is, to a great degree, universal, unlike the melting pot, examples of which are much more limited. For example, Fredrik Barth's concept of the permeability of ethnic boundaries is implicitly grounded on the idea that migrants come to be assimilated into adjacent groups. (Barth 1969) In the classical world, for instance, Romans assimilated members of many groups, especially the Gauls, into their ranks while Greece assimilated a great many Slavic migrants and invaders in the early medieval period. (Deutsch 1966: 120; Smith 1986: 96) The Jews, Magyars, Zulus and English are other examples of ethnies that have participated strongly in this process. (Francis 1976: 28-31 and 93-94)

The direction of assimilation is also variable. For instance, Czechs tended to become Germans in nineteenth-century Bohemia, but the reverse occurred in the twentieth century. (Deutsch 1953: 133) Karl Deutsch theorizes that the direction of assimilation is governed by six factors, chief among which is prestige. Other factors include similarity of communication habits, frequency of contacts, material rewards and penalties, the similarity of values and desires between groups, and the centrifugal/centripetal balance of symbols and social barriers. (Deutsch 1953: 156-62)

In North America, the assimilation process dates to at least the mid-eighteenth century, when Benjamin Franklin and William Smith, alarmed at the growth and concentration of the German-speaking population of Pennsylvania, founded the Society for Propagating Christian Knowledge among Germans. The intent of the society, was, in their words, to 'anglicize' or 'anglify' the Germans. (Kerman 1983: 8) The Americanization movement, which gained strength after the First World War, represented a continuation of these assimilationist ideals. However, assimilation, normatively associated with dominant-group conformity and theoretically linked with functionalism, experienced an ideological setback in the 1960's. (Glazer-Moynihan 1963; Novak 1972; Birch 1989: 46) Notwithstanding these developments, the rapid rise in inter-ethnic marriage and the flattening of ethnically-based income disparities (between most European and some Asian groups) in the U.S. since that period has led to a revival

As in the United States, conflicts between the aims of multiculturalism and assimilationism (associated with monoculturalism) have erupted in western Europe (particularly France), Australia and Canada. The latter, for instance, has experienced patterns of cultural, structural and marital assimilation almost identical to those in the United States. (Halli, Trovato & Driedger 1990) This in turn has led to criticism of Canada's official multiculturalism policy. (Meghji 1991; Bissoondath 1994)

In summary, the debate between assimilation and ethnic persistence is as old as ethnicity itself. Theoretically speaking, functionalists and classical liberals tend to favour an assimilationist model while conflict theorists and communitarians cleave to a more pluralist approach.

References


**Nation-Building**

The term nation-building has been used to describe the process whereby a nation integrates new populations into its official culture and national conscience collective. In the process, people come to identify with the nation's history, boundary symbols,
language and territory. According to Ernest Gellner, this 'garden culture' consists principally of the official language, which tends to crowd out or extinguish the folk-based languages and 'wild cultures' of ethnic and regional minorities. (Gellner 1983: 50-52)

Symbols of the nation-state, like a national anthem, flag or public monument, constitute another arm of the nation-building process, and are typically socialized into the young via the public school system and state-run media. (Birch 1989: 41) John Breuilly is especially emphatic about the role played by elites, whose mobilization of the population to achieve state power is seen as the engine behind nation-building. (Breuilly 1982: 20)

Of course, since the nation is constituted not merely by the state, but by the private sector and civil society, nation-building also occurs in the realm of private communicative action. For instance, in the decentralized United States of the early nineteenth century, national symbols like Greek Revival architecture, the national flag or Washington's portrait found their way onto (or into) private homes, consumer products and private buildings. (Zelinsky 1988) Another private force underlying nation-building, as Benedict Anderson persuasively argued, is modern print-capitalism, with its common stock of geographic and historical references. This process worked to codify vernacular languages (eliminating many others) and gave them, and by extension, their nations, a fixity previously unknown. (Anderson 1983) A more recent exposition of this theme as it pertains to the modern media may be found in Billig (1995).

It is also important that the process of nation-building be distinguished from related social phenomena. For instance, if we accept, as do most theorists of nationalism, that nations are modern constructs, it becomes imperative to differentiate nation-building from expansionist ethnicism. The latter phenomenon, for instance, describes the pattern to be found after 987 in Capetian France, among the Zulus of the nineteenth century and among lateral-aristocratic ethnies like the Greeks (Smith 1986: 141-2; idem. 1991: 57; Francis 1976: 28-31). The spread of ethnic consciousness within these pre-modern populations sprang from the efforts of clerics, monarchs, warrior bands or wandering performers, whose activities lacked the intensity, coordination or precision that is associated with nation-building. (Armstrong 1982) Here, however, it must be noted that this distinction presents a fine line that is a matter of debate between 'perennialists' and 'modernists'.

Similarly, assimilation, which describes a process applicable to both ethnic communities (pre-modern or otherwise) and modern nations does not exhaust all possible meanings for the term nation-building. Nevertheless, nation-building very definitely does have an assimilationist component which proceeds from the corpus of myths and symbols with which the national elite attempts to integrate its population. Thus we find a similarity between Birch's typology of social, economic and political integration and Gordon's typology of assimilation, which encompasses cultural and structural realms. (Gordon 1964: 71; Birch 1989: 51)

The difference between ethnicism/assimilation and nation-building/national integration does not preclude the possibility that both can occur simultaneously - a causal coincidence that has led to a clash between 'perennialist' and 'modernist' scholars. For perennialists, many of the 'official nationalisms' of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries may be considered modern forms of lateral-aristocratic ethnicization that used the machinery of state to achieve their aims. Habsburg Germanization, Hungarian Magyarization, Czarist Russification or Ottoman Turkification are thus
viewed as instances of the 'naturalization' of dynasties through an appeal to mass participation. (Smith 1986) The same coincidence of ethnic and national process may be discerned in democratic polities: Napoleonic Francification can be viewed as a continuation of an earlier trend traceable to Capet, and the process of Americanization, which reached its apogee after World War I, may be likened to the anglicization activities of Benjamin Franklin in colonial Pennsylvania. (Kerman 1983) This position is nevertheless a matter of dispute for scholars who claim that the state is of singular importance as an agent of nation-building. For instance, Eugen Weber has remarked that in late nineteenth century France, prior to major state-led efforts, roughly half the nation's schoolchildren could not speak the official language (Weber 1976:67).

A further point concerns the relationship between European and Third-World nation-building. Some, for example, argue that centralizing developments on the western and eastern edges of the old Roman Empire facilitated the later emergence of successful nation-states there. By contrast, they add, nation-building in the post-colonial world has often lacked a basis in pre-modern ethnic state-building, which in turn has contributed to instability. (Emerson 1963: 95-116; Rokkan 1975: 597) This problem is especially acute in Africa and on the Indian subcontinent, where borders were drawn up, often arbitrarily, by colonial powers. (Emerson 1963; Smith 1983: 27, 124)

References


**Dominant Ethnie**

The concept of a 'dominant ethnie' refers to either a nation's a) politically dominant ethnic group or b) its culturally/ontologically dominant ethnic group. The two are often, but not always, the same entity. This is easily discernible in cases where political dominance does not coincide with cultural dominance. Afrikaners, White Rhodesians, Alaouites, Americo-Liberians and Tutsis provide but a few instances of politically dominant groups which are not culturally dominant.
These cases were especially pronounced in the colonial era and appear frequently in the early histories of settler societies like pre-revolutionary Mexico. Minority nations' dominant ethnic groups (i.e. ethnic Basques, Catalans, Kurds or Scots) provide another complicating set of cases to the rule of political and cultural congruence. To complicate matters, there are also cases where dominance is economic, but not political or cultural (Anglos in pre-1960's Quebec). Hence the fact that economic, political and cultural factors are variable makes it imperative that the form of dominance be specified when using the term dominant ethnie. Perhaps the term 'national ethnie' is a more useful one in that it captures the concept which most users of 'dominant group' seek to elucidate: namely, the ethnic group whose mythomoteur furnished the symbols, myths and narratives for the nation.

The ethnocentricity of most ethnic relations material, especially in the United States, has meant that little attention has been paid to majority groups. For instance, Donald Young's 1932 work, described as the first comparative volume in the field, was aptly titled American Minority Peoples. Later volumes in the United States either reinforced the idea of ethnicity as innately 'foreign' or tended to ignore the 'majority' question entirely. (Warner & Srole 1945: 28; Bloom 1948; Rose 1953: v)

John Higham's Strangers in the Land (1955) did attempt to focus on majority attitudes, but failed to link American Anglo-Saxonism to any comparative model of dominant ethnicity. This was also a failing of Thomas Gossett, whose thesis (1953) and book (1963) on American Anglo-Saxonism reduced dominant ethnicity to 'race'. The publication of the late Digby Baltzell's Protestant Establishment (1963) proved another important landmark, but again, little attention was paid to the 'ethnic' quality of the 'WASP' dominant group. (Baltzell 1963: 321-3) Generally speaking, this situation has persisted, even though the existence of a majority group began to be discussed in the American literature by the 1970's. (Schermerhorn 1970; Burkey 1978: 170, Feagin 1978: 50-76)

Within this discussion, the dominant ethnic group was given little attention, as the principal focus of enquiry remained centred on the 'other'. Moreover, as Ashley Doane comments, there was too exclusive a focus on the 'superordinate' status or political dominance of the majority group, which, though important, is but one side of the dominant ethnicity coin. (Doane 1997: 375) The development of the 'ethnic' dimension of dominant ethnicity theory, on the other hand, has received scant attention in the ethnic relations literature of the past two decades. (Greeley 1970: 35; Isajiw 1974; Glazer & Moynihan 1975; Burgess 1978; Schaefer 1979; Postiglione 1983; Gleason 1992)

The first attempt to probe the question of dominant groups' ethnicity appeared with A.D. Smith's (1971) discussion of 'revivalist' nationalism as the alter-ego of reformist nationalism. Smith argued that the 'j anus-faced' character of nationalism could either lead the nation outward toward 'reformist' modernization in the pursuit of scientific legitimacy, or inward, toward its dominant ethnic (Smith didn't use this term) particularity, in search of spiritual legitimacy. (Smith 1971: 246-54) Smith's investigation into the 'revivalist' nature of dominant-group ethnicity has since been given a new interpretation by John Hutchinson, who postulates that dominant ethnic groups seek ethnic revival in response to what their intellectuals perceive as a weakening of the group's cultural self-awareness. Here again, however, no definition of dominant ethnicity was provided. (Hutchinson 1987)
Orlando Patterson's *Ethnic Chauvinism* (1977) also warrants comment. Patterson put forth a six-category typology of ethnic groups that included 'national' ethnic groups. France, Germany, Italy, Israel, Japan, Ireland and even Iran were given as examples. Patterson never, however, actually used the term 'national ethnic group', always preferring 'nation-state' as an expression of this idea. (Patterson 1977: 106-7) He also failed to specify the exact nature of the link between ethnie and nation, postulating instead that there existed an Anglo-Saxon model of nationhood, territorially based, which differed from the more ethnic model to be found on the European Continent. (Patterson 1977: 68) At this point, therefore, theoretical approaches to the 'ethnic' dimension of dominant ethnicity remained under-systematized.

Also around this time, there appeared one of the few empirical case studies of a dominant ethnie, namely *Ethnic Russia in the USSR* (1980), edited by Edward Allworth. Yet despite a promising line of enquiry, the book was short on theoretical generalization and failed to develop a conceptual framework relating ethnie to nation. In fact, it was not until 1991 that the term 'dominant ethnie' was first used - by Anthony Smith, who had refined the concept sufficiently to be able to provide its definition within the pages of his *National Identity* (1991). In this work, Smith emphasized that nations are built around 'ethnic cores' or 'dominant ethnies' which furnish the nation with its legitimating myths, symbols and conceptions of territory. In Smith's words: 'Though most latter-day nations are, in fact, polyethnic, many have been formed in the first place around a dominant ethnie, which attracted other ethnies or ethnic fragments into the state to which it gave a name and cultural charter…since ethnies are by definition associated with a given territory…the presumed boundaries of the nation are largely determined by the myths and memories of the dominant ethnie, which include the foundation charter, the myth of the golden age and the associated territorial claims, or ethnic title-deeds.' (Smith 1991: 39, emphasis added) Beyond this discussion, however, there has been little explicit attention paid to dominant ethnicity in the European nationalism literature.

In the American ethnic relations literature, the past few years have witnessed a growth in the study of whiteness. (Roediger 1994; Gallagher 1994; Del Gado 1997) Yet, here again, a promising line of enquiry has fallen prey to the ethnocentric tradition of the discipline in the United States. Of all the recent writing about dominant group identity, only that of Ashley Doane has delved into the question of dominant ethnicity. Doane first defined the term in a 1993 conference paper entitled 'Bringing the Majority Back In: Towards a Sociology of Dominant Group Ethnicity.' This was followed by a 1997 article on 'Dominant Group Ethnic Identity in the United States' which made explicit Doane's definition of the term 'dominant ethnicity' and his concerns about the ethnocentric neglect of its study. (Doane 1993, 1997)

Doane defined dominant ethnicity as follows: 'a dominant ethnic group [is] the ethnic group in a society that exercises power to create and maintain a pattern of economic, political and institutional advantage, which in turn results in the unequal…distribution of resources.' (Doane 1997: 376) Clearly, Doane's definition addresses the political dimension of dominant ethnicity while Smith's leans more heavily toward the cultural. In practice, the two facets often overlap, but, as mentioned earlier, the numerous exceptions to this relationship warrant a new terminological approach. As a preliminary suggestion, a distinction might be drawn between the dominant ethnie, which
could refer to the nation's politically dominant group, and the *national ethnie* - which would describe the culturally and ontologically dominant ethnic group.

References

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