The Power of Ethnicity?: the Geographic Limits to Modernist Theories of Intra-State Violence

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Abstract

This paper mounts a critique of the dominant modernist paradigm in the comparative ethnic conflict literature. The modernist argument claims that ethnic identity is constructed in the modern era, either by instrumentalist elites, or by political institutions whose bureaucratic constructions give birth to new identities. Group boundary symbols and myths are considered invented and flexible. Territorial identities in premodern times are viewed as either exclusively local, for the mass of the population, or ‘universal’, for elites. Primordialists and ethnosymbolists have contested these arguments using historical and case evidence, but have shied away from large-scale datasets. This paper utilizes a number of contemporary datasets to advance a three-stage argument. First, it finds a significant relationship between ethnic diversity and three premodern variables: rough topography, religious fractionalization and world region. Modernist explanations for these patterns are possible, but are less convincing than ethnosymbolist accounts. Second, we draw on our own and others’ work to show that ethnic fractionalization (ELF) significantly predicts the incidence of civil conflict, but not its onset. We argue that this is because indigenous ethnic diversity is relatively static over time, but varies over space. Conflict onsets, by contrast, are more dependent on short-run changes over time than incidents, which better reflect spatially-grounded conditioning factors. Finally, we note that violent ethnic rebellion is confined to indigenous, or primary, ethnic groups and violent secession to politically conscious national ethnic groups. These findings are more consistent with perennialist than modernist arguments. But this also exposes the limits of the perennialist paradigm: while it can help us identify contextual conditions for conflict in cross-sectional space, it cannot predict when violence will occur.
Why are some countries more ethnically diverse than others? What are the political consequences of ethnic fractionalization? These questions have been a subject of great theoretical controversy, pitting the dominant ‘modernist’ paradigm against its perennialist interlocutors.

Theories of Ethnicity and Nationalism

Any attempt to make sense of the ethnicity-nation link demands that we define our concepts with greater precision. This is a perilous but necessary task for a field of study which has been impaired by its arrival onto the academic scene during an era in which conceptual contestation has been more greatly esteemed than simplification. (Connor 1994) Even so, since 1980, great strides have been made toward differentiating the concepts of state, nation, and ethnic group, and sketching the linkages between such phenomena.\(^1\) The term ethnic group, or ethnie, should be reserved for communities which possess a belief in shared genealogical descent and meet a threshold requirement that distinguishes them from smaller-scale *gemeinde* like clans and tribes or larger ones like pan-ethnies.\(^2\) There are two major forms of ethnicity, according to the sadly forgotten schema of Francis (1976): *primary* ethnicity, in which members of the group occupy their ancestral ‘homeland’ territory; and *secondary* ethnicity, whereby groups acknowledge that they are not native, and thus their homeland lies elsewhere.\(^3\)

The power of ethnicity is explained in different ways by the three main families of nationalism and ethnicity theory, primordialism, ethnosymbolism and modernism. Primordialism and ethnosymbolism can be grouped under the rubric of perennialist
theories of ethnicity as they deem ethnicity to be a long-standing feature of humanity which pre-dates the modern, post-1789 period. Primordialism locates ethnicity in our genes or in universal aspects of human psychology. For primordialists like Pierre Van den Berghe, our evolutionary psychology represents the successful adaptation of our genes to conditions obtaining during prehistoric time. The evolutionary fitness of genes was maximized by groups that cooperated along nepotistic lines, i.e. in such a way as to favour those with the most similar genes. Primordialism argues that individual sacrifice in battle could often be a successful strategy in evolutionary terms if one’s genetic relatives gained a long-term advantage over competitors. Individuals that failed to cooperate in this way (by free-riding, for instance) had lower long-term genetic success. (Salter 2001; Van den Berghe 2002) Though genetic variation between humans is very slight, even a marginal difference is enough to drive selection. These inherited drives continue to shape individual behaviour today, argue primordialists. Thus ‘type I’ appeals to shared ethnicity tend to trump ‘type II’ appeals along the lines of interest or ideology, and are much more emotionally fervent. (Van den Berghe 1979) This also explains the high degree of relatedness – equivalent to that between grandparent and grandchild - between random members of the world’s major ethnic groups. (Salter 2003) Primordialism’s power is also manifested in human psychological universals, notably our attachments to territory and shared culture. (Geertz 1963; Shils 1995)

Critics of primordialism suggest that beyond the family, evolutionary psychological impulses may be ‘tricked’ and deflected toward other forms of community. Moreover, primordialists admit that their theory cannot account for the drawing of group boundaries. For these reasons, primordialist explanations remain less favoured than those
which invoke the social creations of mankind. A more popular alternative within perennialism is ethnosymbolism. For the ethnosymbolist school, ethnic groups predate the modern era, but arise only during the era of written civilization after 6000 B.C. They arose when writing, religion, recorded history and extra-local mobilization allowed for the formation of communities knit together by ‘imagined’ bonds of territory, memory and ancestry. Often ethnic consciousness remained the preserve of a small elite, as with the Anglo-Saxon Englishness of Bede and King Alfred. (Hastings 1997: 35-9) Some ethnic groups (i.e. Jews, Amhara, Armenians, Persians) have ancient origins, while many more emerged in the medieval and early modern periods through tribal confederation (i.e. Arabs, Kurds), conquest agglomeration (i.e. Germanic war bands) or dynastic competition (i.e. Scots, Catalans). In all cases, territorial identities extending beyond the locale came to be established. (Smith 1986; Armstrong 1982) Most of these premodern entities were primary ethnic groups, even if they sometimes spawned secondary offshoots like the Jewish, Parsee and Armenian diasporas. The appearance of translations of religious texts like the bible into vernacular languages, and the numerous premodern written references to nations and peoples is cited in favour of the theory. (Hastings 1997) This explains why historians of the medieval period tend to be ethnosymbolists. (Zimmer and Scales 2005) Ethnosymbolist theory predicts that ethnic identities, once formed, are highly path-dependent and durable. Ethnic sentiments are typically reproduced by popular institutions in civil society and are therefore capable of inspiring collective action and resisting ‘artificial’ political constructs which may be imposed by subsequent conquerors.
The *modernist* account goes beyond the ethnosymbolist version of events. It argues that premodern identities were strictly local – for the peasant masses - or imperial-religious – for military and religious elites. (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Giddens [1985] 1996) Modernity fractures the horizontal ties between cosmopolitan elites, as with Latin Christendom, which fragmented into nation-states with their own vernacular languages. Beneath them, locals were ‘invited into history’, and came to be connected to wider, self-conscious territorial communities. (Nairn 1977) Print capitalism, mass conscription, mass education, more intensive transport networks and secularization orient all identities toward a common, this-worldly community. Shared ethnic identities are only created in modern times as a product of state socialization (which integrates localities into a shared nationality), state internal boundary demarcation (which institutionalizes ethnic diversity, as with Soviet Republics or colonial administrative departments) or anti-state mobilization by political entrepreneurs. (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Brass 1991; Brubaker 1996) Such entrepreneurs may have experienced blocked upward mobility within central state structures (Gellner 1983), or merely see an opportunity to acquire more power or wealth than they can through established central political channels. (Breuilly 1993) Modernists therefore maintain that elites’ use of ethnicity is typically instrumental for their own private gain. The response of the populace to ethnic appeals is sometimes explained as the outcome of coercion (rendered easier by a shared language and sunk costs which tie individuals to groups) or attributed to the idea that people believe their interests to be bound up with the fate of their group. (Hechter 2000; Laitin 2007)
Theorizing Ethnic Fractionalization

Now consider the sources of ethnic diversity. A popular explanation in the immigrant-rich urban west is that immigrant societies are more diverse than emigrant societies. But only 2.7 percent of the world’s population are immigrants, and not all are ethnically different from their hosts and permanently settled in the hostland. (Demeny and McNicoll 2006) Moreover, diasporas are heavily concentrated in cities. Diasporic, or secondary ethnicity (Francis 1976) is therefore really only important in a small number of countries. To explain ethnic diversity and its relationship to conflict, we really need to explain variation in primary ethnic diversity, captured in the now-established measure of ethnic fractionalization (ELF). ELF measures the likelihood that any two random individuals in a state’s population are members of the same ethnic group. The greater the number of ethnic groups and the more even their relative size, the more fractionalized the population. This paper seeks to evaluate which theories best explain why certain countries are more ethnically fractionalized, and militarily fractious, than others.

Different theories of ethnicity make different predictions with regards to ELF. The primordialist perspective maintains that rougher terrain, by isolating populations, leads to cultural and genetic drift, hence greater numbers of languages, religions and ethnic identities. The ethnosymbolist contention is that rougher terrain makes it more difficult for premodern tribal confederations, conquest agglomerations and kingdoms (which operate at a larger scale than face-to-face interaction) to integrate peripheral populations into their community of shared ancestry. The spread of a common consciousness of myths, symbols, culture and memory is thereby impeded. Extreme
isolation produces mere localism, impeding ethnogenesis. However, above this threshold, more difficult terrain would be expected to increase the number of competing premodern polities. Rival ethnic identities can thereby take root so long as there is a literate clerisy that can spread myths, symbols and memories beyond the local. Given some level of extra-local mobilization, rougher terrain would be expected to lead to greater ethnic heterogeneity, but less so than in the primordialist case.

For modernists, rough terrain makes it more difficult for the state to homogenize populations and easier for secessionists to escape to peripheral redoubts from which they can invent their interest-reinforcing ethnic projects. Creating ethnic identity is functional for social communication between group members, and serves the practical purpose of enabling members to distinguish insiders from outsiders. A softer variant of this argument is to allow that group members are attached to their ethnic identities, but to claim that this attachment is manipulated by instrumental ethnic elites to attain wealth, power and prestige. Though rough terrain is associated with greater ethnic fractionalization (ELF) in all three theories, this relationship would be expected to be stronger under assumptions of primordialism than for competing theories. We can test for the importance of spatial variation by taking the simple relationship between the unevenness of a country’s topography, which does not vary over time and cannot be reduced to a prior social cause, and ethnic diversity. Thus our first hypothesis:

H1: Rougher terrain is associated with higher levels of ethnic fractionalization. The stronger the relationship, the greater the support for primordialist theories.
A strong relationship between these two variables can only be consistent with rough terrain shaping primary ethnic diversity unless we can explain how ethnically-diverse ecologies cause rougher terrain. Another possibility is that immigrants prefer mountainous lands, an unlikely prospect.

Religion and Ethnicity

According to the primordialist paradigm, individuals tend to cooperate with those who share a higher proportion of their genes, a strategy which maximizes each gene’s long-term evolutionary fitness. Phenotype is the best signal of genetic similarity. However, neighbouring ethnic groups – especially through much of mankind’s evolutionary time - are usually phenotypically similar. Thus cultural symbols are used as proxies of genetic relatedness, to obtain maximum differentiation. (Van den Berghe 1979) Religion is one such diacritical marker, and should therefore map closely onto ethnic and linguistic identity. Thus religious fractionalization should predict ELF. For ethnosymbolists, religion matters a great deal more than geography. Religious institutions serve as a premodern mass medium for the transmission of ‘imagined’ territorial identities, myths and collective memories. (Hastings 1997) Sectarian or regional divisions within religious groups are another source of ethnogenesis. (Kitromilides 1996) Ethnic groups frequently form along the division between major religious traditions (i.e. Islam and Christianity), fueled by what Armstrong terms the ‘crusade-jihad’ spiral. (Armstrong 1982)
By contrast, modernist accounts credit modern nationalist ideologies and modern states – which define the mass culture in linguistic, secular terms – as the key actors. Religious legitimation, based on the divine right of kings, gives way to secular legitimation based on shared political membership. Sometimes, nationalism is viewed as a secular religion. (Kedourie 1960) In any case, the new nation springs to life divorced from the existing religious landscape. A modernist account would therefore view ethnicity (extending to ELF) as independent of religion. This brings us our second hypothesis:

H2: If modernist theories are correct, there should be no association between religious and ethnic fractionalization. If primordialist and ethnosymbolist theories are accurate, religious and ethnic fractionalization should be significantly associated.

Global Region

The primordialist account conceives of the ‘ethny’ as a unit that can be as small as several hundred people. Genetic cooperation begins at local level and radiates outward, thus it is difficult to see how macro-level continental factors could make much difference to the degree of ELF obtaining in a country. This is especially true where we control for geography and religion. Hence if the predictions of primordialism are correct, we should not expect to see world regions associated with different levels of ELF. The modernist account makes a similar prediction, but arrives at it differently. For modernists, it is the political and economic environment, notably income per capita, democracy, colonialism,
instability or resource wealth which count most. Controlling for these properties, modernists would view world regions as relatively unimportant determinants of contemporary ELF.

Ethnosymbolists, by contrast, would predict that the historical aspects of major world regions are important. For them, the collision between expansive world religions and empires in the premodern period helped to lay the groundwork for modern ethnic diversity. Two key factors in this process are the integrating power of premodern polities and the size of the empires which they commanded. When empires collapse, fracturing is rarely culturally perfect, so homogeneity is better achieved when culture and power expand in dialectical fashion. Ethnosymbolists also maintain that certain world regions were embedded in circuits of ‘archaic globalization’ and exchange (Eurasia) prior to the modern age, while others (sub-Saharan Africa, Oceania, the pre-Columbian Americas) were largely excluded for biogeographical reasons. (Abu-Lughod 1989; Diamond 1997; Bayly 2004) Islamic world regions involved a peripatetic elite governing nomadic populations. Muslim polities united temporal and cultural authority in the figure of the caliph. On the other hand, Christian regions were characterized by a greater disjuncture between religious and temporal realms, and hence a greater profusion of states. This ultimately reduced the incongruence between ethnicity and politics. (Armstrong 1982; Gellner 1981)

In addition, in Western Europe, the more rapid development of military technology began to favour medium-sized, integrationist states over loosely sovereign empires by the absolutist period, limiting the degree to which large states ruled over diverse populations, i.e. ELF. (McNeill 1991) In Eastern Europe, by contrast,
ethnosymbolists would aver that empires hung on longer, leading to more ELF. Finally, Northeast Asian premodern kingdoms (Chinese, Korean, Japanese), despite ‘yin-yang’ expansion and contraction, were more peaceful than their European counterparts and successfully aligned politics and ethnicity. They were thus highly successful in assimilating outsiders into the ethnic core, reducing ELF, something much less evident in South Asia. Overall, we would predict that:

H₃: If primordialist theories are correct, there should be no association between world region and ethnic fractionalization. The same should be true for modernist theories when economic and political factors are held constant. Finally, if ethnosymbolist theories are accurate, levels of ethnic fractionalization should vary significantly by world region.

Political and Economic Factors

In the foregoing, we briefly touched upon the importance of political and economic factors in modernist accounts of ethnicity. Specifically, higher levels of modernization in a country might be associated with higher levels of ethnic diversity. Income per capita serves as a proxy for modernization, and modernists would expect it to be linked to higher levels of ELF. Ethnosymbolists claim that modern processes only intensify processes of ethnic integration and fragmentation which have a much older provenance. The connection between premodern economic success and modern income per capita, and premodern ELF and modern ELF, within particular states would result in an association between income and ethnic homogeneity for ethnosymbolists. Yet
ethnosymbolists do not posit as sharp a link between income growth and ethnic change since they hold that many ethnic identities had already formed prior to modernity. Income per capita is less path-dependent than ethnic geography and hence would be expected to exhibit weaker covariation than for modernists. Primordialists view income as largely irrelevant since, for them, ethnic interests tend to resist amalgamation regardless of economic logic.

Politically, instability at the centre, resource wealth, the presence of a new state, or the advent of democracy should all predict more ELF if modernist theories are correct. This is because they increase the opportunities for potential ethnic entrepreneurs. From a modernist-institutionalist perspective, colonialists, with their penchant for employing divide-and-rule tactics within their colonies and enumerating and labeling populations (i.e. Hutu and Tutsi in Belgian Congo and French Ruanda-Urundi), would be expected to multiply and sharpen ethnic divisions. (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 25; Chrétien 1999) For primordialists and ethnosymbolists, such incentives should play no role in ethnogenesis. Ethnosymbolists do, however, recognize colonialism as a motive force in increasing ELF because they hold that colonial powers carved up territory according to economic and geostrategic, rather than ethnic, logic. The resulting misalignment of culture and politics results in vastly increased ELF. Finally, primordialists, with their focus on more local sources of diversity, would ascribe little weight to colonial processes. Thus:

H₄: If primordialist theories are correct, there should be no association between political and economic factors and ethnic fractionalization. The reverse is true if modernism holds:
colonialism and politico-economic factors should significantly predict fractionalization. Finally, if ethnosymbolist arguments are accurate, levels of ethnic fractionalization should be associated with colonialism, and to a lesser extent income per capita, but not with other politico-economic factors.

Methodology

In order to test this relationship, we use (Fearon and Laitin 2003)’s ethnic conflict dataset. It contains a wide range of relevant measures with which to assess these dynamics for all years and countries in the period 1945-99. The data furnishes a variable for territorial ruggedness (elevdiff), which measures the difference between the highest and lowest points in a country. The dataset also contains a variable for territorial noncontiguity. This describes an offshore island or other cut off territory holding at least 10,000 people and being cut off by land or lying at least 100 km offshore by sea from the mainland which contains the capital. 25 of 161 countries met this criterion in 1999. It provides an index of religious fractionalization based on the number of religions and the proportion of the population of each faith, to measure the likelihood of any two random individuals belonging to the same religion. The more religions and the more even their relative size, the more religiously fractionalized the population. Some may worry about endogeneity between ethnic and religious fractionalization. However, the religious measure has been compiled entirely independently from indices of ELF. Ethnic and religious fractionalization are both deployed alongside each other in analyses and displayed no multicollinearity in Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) model of civil war onset. In
addition, the dataset provides dummy variables for major world regions as well as for colonialism (derived by adding together variables for a country having ever been colonized by the British or the French).

Political variables include democracy (Polity 2 Score), political instability (whether the country had a shift of three or more units in its Polity IV index in the three years prior to the year in question), new state (whether formed in past two years) and oil exporter (fuel exports exceeding a third of total exports). We also include log of population since larger countries would be expected to contain more ethnic groups.

Finally, we use Fearon and Laitin’s EF as the dependent variable rather than the classic 1964 Soviet Atlas ELF measure because their measure takes account of both the morphology of minority groups and the share of the state’s population made up of the largest ethnic group.

We begin by testing ‘perennialist’ models (i.e. non-modernist ones) without political and economic factors. We then move to a ‘modernist’ model containing purely economic and political predictors and then run the full model. Two methods are used for each model, producing six models in total: ordinary least squares (OLS) and between-effects (BE) regressions. The latter are suited to panel data, and fit random-effects models using the between regression estimator. This is equivalent to running an OLS regression with dummy variables for each year. It reduces all variables to their temporal means, eliminating temporal variation.

We employ this method because ELF is basically invariant over time, as are most of our geographic and cultural variables. It would thus be misleading to try and predict changes over space with parameters that vary over time. Political and economic variables
display more cross-sectional than time-series change, but vary more over time than geographic and cultural variables. We know that differences on a variable between countries are often created by historical specificities and tend to be much larger than differences within the same country over time. Prior to 1964, for instance, southern U.S. states were generally weak on welfare spending but strongly supported the Democrats. The erroneous conclusion from a cross-sectional model - even with controls - would be that low welfare spending predicts high Democratic support. (Smith 1995) The same goes for the surprising finding that districts of the Punjab during 1961-1971 with higher literacy rates had higher fertility rates. On the other hand, within each district, as literacy increased each year over 1961-71, fertility (as expected) declined. The reason for the erroneous cross-sectional results is that districts with high literacy had high fertility for historical reasons.⁴ This unit effect persisted throughout the course of 1961-71. (Ali 1978) These patterns are critical to our methodology, and underscore the need to parse out cross-sectional and time-series dynamics.

Results

Results are presented in table 1.
Table 1. Predictors of Ethnic Fractionalization, Pooled Samples, 1945-99.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Perennial Model (OLS)</th>
<th>Perennial Model (BE)</th>
<th>Modernist Model (OLS)</th>
<th>Modernist Model (BE)</th>
<th>Full Model (OLS)</th>
<th>Full Model (BE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious fractionalization</td>
<td>0.07*** (.00)</td>
<td>0.08*** (.00)</td>
<td>0.06*** (.00)</td>
<td>0.06*** (.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Std.) Mountainous (highest v lowest points)</td>
<td>0.08*** (.00)</td>
<td>0.07*** (.02)</td>
<td>0.10*** (.00)</td>
<td>0.09*** (.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>0.03*** (.01)</td>
<td>0.06 (.05)</td>
<td>0.12*** (.01)</td>
<td>0.19** (.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.37*** (.01)</td>
<td>0.36*** (.04)</td>
<td>0.41*** (.01)</td>
<td>0.46*** (.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (not Japan)</td>
<td>0.05*** (.01)</td>
<td>0.08 (.05)</td>
<td>0.10*** (.01)</td>
<td>0.17** (.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>0.15*** (.01)</td>
<td>0.15** (.06)</td>
<td>0.15*** (.01)</td>
<td>0.19** (.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Std.) Islamic Country</td>
<td>0.08*** (.00)</td>
<td>0.07*** (.02)</td>
<td>0.06*** (.00)</td>
<td>0.07** (.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(log) Population</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.02*** (.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.02 (.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncontiguous State</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00 (.01)</td>
<td>0.00 (.00)</td>
<td>-0.03 (.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Std.) Polity 2 Score</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.03*** (.00)</td>
<td>-0.03 (.03)</td>
<td>0.01*** (.00)</td>
<td>0.04 (.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Std.) GDP per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.05*** (.00)</td>
<td>-0.07* (.03)</td>
<td>0.02*** (.00)</td>
<td>0.04 (.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Exporter</td>
<td>0.12*** (.01)</td>
<td>0.12 (.07)</td>
<td>0.10*** (.01)</td>
<td>0.13* (.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>0.05* (.02)</td>
<td>-0.10 (.19)</td>
<td>-0.01 (.01)</td>
<td>-0.24 (.17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Instability</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01 (.01)</td>
<td>-0.17 (.14)</td>
<td>-0.01 (.01)</td>
<td>-0.08 (.11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever Colonized (by French or British)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.19*** (.01)</td>
<td>0.17*** (.04)</td>
<td>0.07*** (.01)</td>
<td>0.06 (.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>.33*** (.00)</td>
<td>.33*** (.03)</td>
<td>.36*** (.00)</td>
<td>.41*** (.04)</td>
<td>.44*** (.02)</td>
<td>.41** (.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r^2$</td>
<td>.522</td>
<td>.517</td>
<td>.217</td>
<td>.168</td>
<td>.563</td>
<td>.525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>6518</td>
<td>6518</td>
<td>6247</td>
<td>6247</td>
<td>6118</td>
<td>6118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p <.01; ***p < .001. Note: Ethnic fractionalization as dependent variable. Source: Author’s analysis in Stata 10.0 using data from Fearon and Laitin (2003).
Examining the perennial models, the first point to notice is that cultural and historical regressors account for over half the variation in ELF ($r^2 = .522$). We introduce a time-static (BE) specification since ELF and the cultural-historical variables have little or no variation over time. This still results in the model accounting for .517 for the variance in ELF. Religious fractionalization and rough terrain are both significant at the .001 level, and of approximately equal predictive power, supporting $H_1$ in the direction of primordialism and $H_2$ in favour of ethnosymbolism. In terms of world regions, sub-Saharan Africa stands out as an especially strong predictor of ELF, but region as a whole is the most powerful element in the model, answering $H_3$ in favour of ethnosymbolism while casting doubt on the primordialist and modernist alternatives.

Turning to modernist models, we find that political and economic variables predict 21.7 percent of the variation in ELF. This confirms $H_4$ in favour of modernism, and to a lesser extent ethnosymbolism, while rejecting primordialist predictions. Yet this model’s power is considerably weaker than the perennialist alternatives. Model $r^2$ drops from .522 to .217, and down to .168 in the static (BE) formulation. More importantly, only two political and economic variables survive the BE model, GDP per capita, which is associated with greater ethnic homogeneity (i.e. lower ELF), and colonialism – the more powerful parameter – which predicts greater fractionalization. The full model only sharpens the discrepancy between competing modernist and perennialist frameworks. It demonstrates that the perennial model accounts for the lion’s share of variation in ELF. In fact the full model only predicts .41-points more of the variation in ELF than the perennial model, and a mere .08-point more under the BE specification. Moreover, oil exports as a proportion of total exports is the only strictly modernist parameter that
proves significant in the full model, and only modestly so. The colonialism finding, while powerful, dovetails with both modernist and ethnosymbolist premises, though not with those of primordialism.

Adjudicating between the leading theories, we find that ethnosymbolism – linked strongly to historical, world regional and cultural factors – outperforms rival explanations. We find modest support for primordialism and very weak support for modernist explanations of ELF. In some ways, our findings are not surprising – modernization has connotations of change through time while perennialist explanations stress path-dependency once initial patterns have been established. Ultimately a final theoretical verdict must await better time-series data on ethnicity which can shed light on whether modernization is associated with declining ELF over time. Historical atlases which allow us to pinpoint premodern political and culture patterns, and whether they predict those of today, would help to unmask some of the unobserved properties of countries and regions which have produced today’s ethnic geography.

Ethnicity and Violence

There is a further objection which a modernist theorist can raise. Namely, that ethnic fractionalization represents the world as seen from the viewpoint of the social scientist. This flags up the distinction made by anthropologists between etic (other-assigned) and emic (self-conscious) categories. (Eriksen 1993) Etic categorization by social scientists may present a portrait of today’s ethnic categories, but are these self-aware ethnic groups? (Connor 1994; Handelman 1977) If the latter, we should expect to
see ethnicity implicated in measurable ethnic conflict. This means that we should find a
relationship between ELF and intra-state violence. At a glance, this appears to be the case
(see figure 1), but do such appearances survive multivariate analysis?

Figure 1. Level of Intra-State Violence vs. the Largest Ethnic Group’s Proportion of
State Population

Source: personal calculations from MAR 2004-6.

What is striking about the growing number of studies of the association of ethnic
fractionalization with civil war is that they disagree so sharply on the role of ELF as a
factor in conflict. Definitions of ethnic heterogeneity are important here – and the number
of indices of ethnic fractionalization has greatly expanded. (Campos and Kuzeyev 2007)
Some aver that conflict bears a nonlinear relationship to ethnic fractionalization, and is
muted at both high and low levels of diversity. Instead, they maintain that it is ethnic
polarization (a small number of significant-sized groups) that causes conflict rather than mere fractionalization. (Horowitz 1985; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Buhaug, Cederman and Rod 2008) A second concern revolves around identifying the politically relevant ethnic group (PREG), especially in Africa where ethnicity has an ‘onion’-like, nested quality, from the local-particular to the regional, ‘pan-ethnic’ level. (Posner 2005; Smith 1991) Yet a further methodological difference has to do with the threshold for violence. Thus De Soysa (2007), replicating Fearon and Laitin’s classic (2003) study, finds that ethnic fractionalization is insignificant at the 1000 battle-death threshold, but becomes significant when the bar is lowered to 25 deaths. Buhaug, Cederman and Rod (2008) unearth a similar finding. 5

Nevertheless, what is most striking is how different the results are when the dependent variable of interest is civil war onset as opposed to the incidence of civil war. When onset is the variable of interest, ethnic variables tend not to predict conflict. When incidence is the dependent variable, ethnicity emerges as significant. (See table 2)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Studies</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Onset or Incidence</th>
<th>Ethnicity Significant (Y/N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urdal</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Incidence</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montalvo and Reynal-Querol</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Incidence</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellingsen</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Incidence</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanhanen</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Incidence</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collier and Hoeffler</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Incidence</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lujala, Gleditsch et al.</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Onset and Incidence</td>
<td>N for onset, Y for incidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostby, Nordas and Rod</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Onset</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buhaug, Cederman and Rod</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Onset</td>
<td>Y (ethnic wars only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schneider and Wiesehomeier</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Onset</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collier and Hoeffler</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Onset</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fearon and Laitin</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Onset</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambanis</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Onset</td>
<td>N, Y for ethnic wars only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethnic diversity tends not to vary in most societies over time as much as it does over space. Moreover, existing data sources give us a much better measure of spatial ethnic diversity than changes in the ethnic composition of particular states over time.

Accordingly, we would expect ethnicity to do a much better job of predicting cross-sectional than temporal variation in levels of violence. Conflict onset involves a one-off change in time, which makes it highly sensitive to temporal factors. On the other hand, the incidence of conflict only involves temporal change at onset and finish, and is thus more reflective of cross-sectional variation. Therefore, we predict that:

**H₅**: Ethnic fractionalization is more associated with the incidence of civil war than the onset of civil war.
Measures of the number of wars (i.e. incidence x number) take this logic still further, since the presence of more groups in geographical space would offer more potential competitors and fronts for intra-state conflict. On the other hand, increases/decreases in the ethnic diversity of a country over time are minimal, and would be expected to have a less pronounced effect on increasing/decreasing numbers of civil wars over time. Thus:

H₆: Ethnic fractionalization is more significantly associated with the number of civil wars than with the mere incidence (presence or absence) of civil war.

H₇: Variation in ethnic fractionalization is significantly associated with variation in the number of civil wars across countries, but not over time.

Economic and political indicators, which vary more over time, should matter more when country fixed effects are controlled. This leads us to our next prediction:

H₈: Variation in economic and political variables is more significantly associated with variation in the number of civil wars across time than across countries.

Methods

As before, we turn to Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) rich dataset. It contains information on the presence or absence of civil wars in all countries for the years between 1945 and 1999. A civil war is defined by the authors as a conflict claiming more than 1,000 battle
deaths in total, with at least 100 killed per year, and at least 100 killed on both sides. The
conflicts are limited to those between state and non-state actors. (Fearon and Laitin 2003:
74) The data record 127 civil wars, of which 13 are anti-colonial conflicts.

We begin by replicating Fearon and Laitin’s model for civil war onset (see table 3). One of the most important findings of their model is that a country’s level of ethnic
fractionalization is not associated with the onset of civil wars. Rather, political and
economic factors emerge as significant. States that are new, weak, poor or situated on
rough terrain are most susceptible to civil war onset. This is in line with modernist
arguments about political and insurgent opportunity. Primordialist explanations that stress
instinctive, irrational ‘Type I’ mobilization, or ethnosymbolist accounts which emphasize
the importance of collective memories of hostility, do a poorer job of explaining conflict
onset.
Table 3. Regressions on Civil War, Pooled Samples, 1945-99.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior War</td>
<td>-0.93*** (.32)</td>
<td>6.358*** (.19)</td>
<td>0.999*** (.01)</td>
<td>-0.017** (.01)</td>
<td>-0.001*** (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Std.) GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.33*** (.07)</td>
<td>-0.163*** (.04)</td>
<td>-0.003*** (.00)</td>
<td>-0.017** (.01)</td>
<td>-0.001*** (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(log) Population</td>
<td>0.28*** (.07)</td>
<td>0.316*** (.07)</td>
<td>0.016*** (.00)</td>
<td>0.050** (.02)</td>
<td>0.239*** (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Std.) Mountainous</td>
<td>0.20* (.09)</td>
<td>0.127 (.07)</td>
<td>-0.002 (.00)</td>
<td>0.010 (.01)</td>
<td>(dropped)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncontiguous State</td>
<td>0.47 (.28)</td>
<td>0.517* (.25)</td>
<td>0.089*** (.01)</td>
<td>0.211** (.06)</td>
<td>-0.396*** (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Exporter</td>
<td>0.78** (.29)</td>
<td>0.131 (.28)</td>
<td>0.022* (.01)</td>
<td>0.105 (.07)</td>
<td>-0.134*** (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New State</td>
<td>1.77*** (.34)</td>
<td>1.797*** (.33)</td>
<td>0.069*** (.02)</td>
<td>-0.243 (.25)</td>
<td>0.052* (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Instability</td>
<td>0.63** (.24)</td>
<td>-0.055 (.22)</td>
<td>-0.018* (.01)</td>
<td>0.239 (.14)</td>
<td>0.090*** (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.02 (.02)</td>
<td>0.019 (.01)</td>
<td>-0.001*** (.00)</td>
<td>0.002 (.00)</td>
<td>-0.002* (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.41 (.44)</td>
<td>0.988* (.39)</td>
<td>0.068*** (.01)</td>
<td>0.260** (.09)</td>
<td>-0.955*** (.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.18 (.54)</td>
<td>0.078 (.45)</td>
<td>-0.036* (.01)</td>
<td>-0.038 (.10)</td>
<td>(dropped)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-7.03*** (.77)</td>
<td>-7.545*** (.70)</td>
<td>-0.145*** (.02)</td>
<td>-0.434** (.15)</td>
<td>-1.494*** (.16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo $r^2$ .110 .753
$r^2$ .734 .145 .008
N 6239 6239 6239 6239 6239

*p<.05; **p <.01; ***p < .001
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata 10.0 with data from Fearon and Laitin (2003).

However, when we shift the focus from onset to incidence (model 2), ethnic fractionalization re-emerges as a significant predictor of violence. Predicting the
incidence of conflict is less dependent on timing since incidence builds in a path-dependent duration component. This allows variation in ethnic fractionalization, a cross-sectional variable, to re-enter the model. This also explains the divergent findings of the studies of onset and incidence that we visited in table 2. This therefore supports hypothesis 6. It gains even greater strength when we allow for multiple civil wars – up to a maximum of 4 - in a given country-year, as in model 3, supporting hypothesis 7. Overall, it appears that ethnic fractionalization is a significant predictor of violence, but not necessarily ethnic violence.

Another approach is to focus squarely on cross-sectional effects. The divergent impact of cross-sectional and time-series parameters is sharply evident in table 3. Here we compare our civil wars incidence model (3) with cross-sectional (4) and time-series (5) versions. Notice that when we decompose the civil wars incidence model into its spatial and time-series components we get very different stories. The between-effects (BE) model (4) performs far better than the time-series, or fixed-effects (FE) model 5 ($r^2$ of .145 vs .008). In other words, there is a lot more predicted variation in the incidence of civil wars between countries than within countries. This is hardly surprising given what we know from comparative research using panel data in political science in which cross-sectional factors tend to dominate pooled models. (i.e. Smith 1995) It reflects the fact that there is a great deal more recorded variation on most variables between countries than within them – something especially true of geographic and cultural parameters. Two such variables, religious fractionalization and rough terrain, do not vary at all over time in this data, and are thereby automatically dropped by Stata from the FE model. The opposite
holds for political and economic variables, all of which perform better over time (FE model) than across sections (BE model), confirming hypothesis 8.

Finally, ethnic fractionalization shows minimal temporal variation: mean ELF varies between .372 and .388 during 1945-59, jumping to between .452 and .482 after 1960. What is fascinating is that ELF takes on a negative coefficient in the civil wars (FE) model, suggesting that increasing diversity over time is associated with lower levels of conflict despite the fact that the opposite is true when we move from a homogeneous country to a fractionalized one. What better way to demonstrate the point that we may need different explanations for what is happening over time as opposed to space.

The previous analysis suggests that ethnic fractionalization acts as a conditioning factor, creating particular structural preconditions which may increase the odds of civil war, but do not themselves ignite it. Moreover, violence appears to be less sensitive to changes in ELF over time than it is to shorter-run shifts like regime stability, state weakness or even economic change. This accords with Horowitz’ distinction between preconditions, which are necessary but not sufficient to explain violence, and precipitants, which are its proximate causes. It also tells us a good deal about the major theories of ethnic conflict and nationalism. Perennialist, especially ethnosymbolist, paradigms are best suited to explaining the variation in ethnic fractionalization we find across countries today. They offer important insights into the broad cross-sectional preconditions of civil violence. Modernism, by contrast, offers a better account than perennialism of shifts over time, and can alert us to the more rapidly-changing economic and political factors which determine the timing and severity of violence. This makes
intuitive sense in that myths, symbols and genes change very little over time, and thus are hard-pressed to explain the rise and fall of violence.

‘Sons of the Soil’: the Role of Primary and National Ethnicity

We have focused a good deal on ELF, a precondition of conflict. But this does not mean that we have exhausted the full explanatory potential of ethnic preconditions in locating potential conflicts over space. A further narrowing of scope conditions for conflict remains a possibility, and can add to the utility of the ethnosymbolist paradigm. In particular, country-level datasets do not as yet distinguish between primary and secondary ethnicity, nor between primary ethnic groups which are *nations*, and those that are not.

*National Ethnicity*

With the advent of modern integration through print capitalism, roads, telecommunications, mass education, mass conscription, taxation and bureaucratization, many primary ethnic groups became nations. Languages and symbols were standardized, borders straightened, and insiders and outsiders sharply demarcated by identity records. (Wimmer 2002) The primary ethnic group came to know itself, through reflexive processes like census-taking and daily newspapers, as a living, breathing community of simultaneity relating to a world of other groups. In some cases, democracy and the welfare state added new layers of mass mobilization to these processes. Joseph Stalin, in
a remarkable essay (why couldn’t he have stuck to academia!), makes this point about his native Georgia in the 18th and 19th centuries. It had a loosely integrated, regionally variegated sense of ethnic consciousness and a fuzzy sense of territory, but lacked political aspiration. All of these aspects needed demarcation before Georgia could become a nation – not to mention achieving statehood. (Stalin 1936)

Of course, not all nations had their own states. Many had brief periods of statehood (Armenia, Estonia) before falling under the sway of others, or developed as provinces of larger entities (Tibet, Serbia). Still, they had political aspirations and a strong sense of territory, fanned by the ideology of national self-determination propounded first by Rousseau and the French Enlightenment, and later by German romantics like Herder and Fichte. Lost autonomy – real or imagined – came to be seen as a less acceptable state of affairs. So modernity transforms primary ethnies into nations.8 Or rather some ethnies are transformed, for even some of the larger primary ethnic groups were not catalyzed into nations in the modern era. Often this was because of their territorial dispersion, lack of political leadership or low level of integration. The Balinese and Aragonese are good examples of quiescent primary ethnies. One can even contrast the politically-minded ‘national’ French-Canadians of what is now Quebec, with the merely ethnic (but equally territorially-integrated) French-origin Acadians of New Brunswick and, later, Louisiana. Today, Quebecois are a nation, but the Acadians and Cajuns remain primary ethnies.

Notice that nations need not aspire to independent statehood, but might content themselves with recognition or autonomy. New Mexico’s Hispanos remain a primary ethnie, but Puerto Rico qualifies as a nation even though a majority of its members do not
desire independence. Finally, it is important that we not reify nations. They are not monolithic entities, but are contested by divergent regional, class and ideological fragments which, as in Puerto Rico, may have very different visions for the nation. This in no way, however, detracts from the nation’s unity or corporeal reality, since conflicts over the nature of the nation employ the national idiom, thereby strengthening it. (Hutchinson 2005)

Do primary ethnic groups cease to be ethnic once they attain national self-consciousness? Though not actively discussed, this is the implication of Smith’s landmark (1986) work, but is difficult to sustain in light of the evidence. Indeed, this paper argues that primary ethnies remain ethnic even if they define ‘their’ nation in more inclusive terms to win minorities to their cause. In effect, they become national ethnic groups, communities of shared ancestry that have a proprietary relationship over ‘their’ historical-territorial-political nation. (Kaufmann 2004a: 12) Often they see the nation and their own ethnic identity as coterminous and lack a name for themselves (i.e. English in England, pur laine Quebecois in Quebec). In the United States, White Anglo-Protestants (WASPs) typically referred to themselves as ‘old Americans’, ‘native Americans’, ‘Yankees’ (in the north), or simply ‘Americans’. (Doane 1997; Kaufmann 2004b) Only minorities seemed to be ethnic. In other words, national ethnic groups are primary ethnic groups which have become nations (integrated communities of territory, political history, mass culture and mutual obligation) in their ethnic homeland during the modern period. Catalans in Catalonia, Melanesian Fijians in Fiji, the French in France, the Japanese in Japan - all are national ethnic groups. Such groups see the nation, or nation-state (if they possess one) as ‘theirs’.
Of course, nations, unlike ethnic groups, can employ ideological myths of descent which need not be genealogical. France, Iran and the United States are nations bound by such ‘civic’ myths. They contain national ethnic groups – (French in France, Persians in Iran, ‘whites’ or ‘Anglos’ in the USA), but the circle of national membership is wider than the national ethnie. This is increasingly true of minority nations like Quebec and Catalonia, which seek to define themselves inclusively. Nevertheless, the point here is that national ethnies continue to matter even if the nation is ideologically-defined and includes minorities. This is because national ethnies tend to have the heaviest psychic investment in the nation as it is also their ethnic homeland. They are consequently most prepared to defend it and least willing to accept foreign rule. In postcolonial settings, state-nations are controlled by dominant ethnic groups whose connection to the new nation-state may lack the ‘organic’ mytho-symbolic connections we find in much of Europe, East Asia and North America. Here national identities typically take on ‘missionary’ rather than ethnic form, and are defined by inclusive ideologies (i.e. nonaligned socialism, pan-Africanism, pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism). (Kaufmann and Haklai 2008) Behind the scenes, however, ethnic groups jockey for dominance of the state, and dominant ethnies are present in most postcolonial states. (Horowitz 1985, ch. 7 and 8) Sometimes, these are dominant national ethnies (i.e. Amhara, Tswana, Fijians, Malays) while in other cases they are dominant, but their national ethnicity remains regional in scope (i.e. Alawi, Maronites) or is lacking entirely (i.e. Americo-Liberians, white Rhodesians).

In this discussion, one can get the impression that national ethnicity refers only to ethnic groups which have come to possess their own nation-state or have gained control
of a regional/provincial governing apparatus. But most national ethnic groups are minorities within their states, and may have only limited power in their home region (i.e. Yoruba, Tibetans). They are not powerful enough to win independence, and may not even seek it. Even so, by definition, all national ethnic groups desire autonomy. For ethnosymbolists, modernity sharpens their political instincts, prompting a self-conscious desire for at least some level of autonomy.

*Modeling National Ethnicity*

National ethnicity barely exists as a concept, so we should not expect it to be included in large-N datasets. Fearon and Laitin (2009) go some way to addressing this deficiency through their upgrade of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data. They catalogue whether a group is a majority in its region, and, critically, whether it has been resident in the state prior to 1800. This is not a perfect measure of the primary/secondary distinction since many secondary groups (i.e. European Jews, Sino-Malays) arrived before 1800 while others have become somewhat dispersed, but it comes closer than any previous attempt. This formulation allows the authors to distinguish the 50 ‘immigrant’ groups in MAR from the 298 ‘sons of the soil’, and thereby to begin to operationalize what I have described as primary ethnicity. Unsurprisingly, they find that immigrant (secondary) ethnic groups universally do not rebel, and that the only group level factors which consistently predict the onset of civil wars are those related to the regional concentration and indigenousness, i.e. primary ethnicity, of the group. Indeed, with the special exception of the Jews of Israel (a dominant national settler group) and Mohajirs (a
founding ethnie of Pakistan), no immigrant groups were shown to have rebelled against the state. (Fearon and Laitin 2009)

Table 4, from Fearon and Laitin, shows that groups which arrived before 1800 and those with a regional base have a much higher propensity (roughly 3:1) to rebel. In other words, rebellion is basically the preserve of primary ethnic groups. Table 5, from the same source, extends the analysis by showing that while primary and secondary groups differ greatly in their degree of violent rebellion, both groups are equally implicated in less violent conflict with the state (rallies, riots) and political protest, much of which takes place in urban settings.

**Table 4. Residence and Rebellion: Mean Maximum Rebellion Scores by Category of Residence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has the Group Been in the Country Since 1800?</th>
<th>YES (n=248)</th>
<th>NO (n=50)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the Group have a Regional Base?</td>
<td>2.9 (n=276)</td>
<td>1.1 (n=123)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Laitin and Fearon 2009

**Table 5. Mean Scores on Protest, Communal Conflict, and Rebellion at Different Levels of Tradition (Maximum Values Since 1980)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>REBELLION COMMUNAL</th>
<th>CONFLICT</th>
<th>PROTEST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1800 Group is within state</td>
<td>2.3 (n=248)</td>
<td>2.5 (n=219)</td>
<td>2.9 (n=245)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group arrives after 1800</td>
<td>.66 (n=50)</td>
<td>1.7 (n=47)</td>
<td>2.6 (n=50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Laitin and Fearon 2009
Fearon and Laitin contend that these patterns are consistent with their modernist ‘insurgency’ model because immigrants lack a regional base from which to mount rebellions, tend to see problems as individual rather than communal, and have the option to exit. Yet this does not adequately explain why ethnic rebels can so easily hide among their co-ethnics. To assume that pure intimidation on the part of the rebels is sufficient to ensure that co-ethnics cooperate runs against a great deal of our case study evidence. For example, the IRA’s failed 1956-62 border campaign in Northern Ireland and its post-1969 success is difficult to explain on the basis of material incentives and coercion. Scholars tend to agree that a lack of local northern Catholic support was the crucial difference. (Dixon 2001)

The assumption that groups arriving after 1800 can easily exit their hostlands is also problematic, but contains an important insight. Namely, that groups which consider themselves indigenous to a territory are existentially, culturally and politically rooted to their lands – their entire security is bound up with their ‘homeland’. Therefore, a more plausible explanation of the above patterns is the contention that primary ethnic groups have far more at stake – not least in terms of existential security – and are therefore more willing to violently rebel if necessary. The idea that ethnic groups should dominate their historic territory may have a modern origin with Rousseau and Herder, but fits uneasily within an instrumentalist argument. The vast majority of ethnic rebellions and a slight majority of ethnic civil wars are secessionist, and only national ethnic groups in pursuit of the ideal of self-determination participate in this form of violence. This may strike some readers as a banal point to make, and there is no question that limiting our attention
to national ethnic groups will only take us some of the way toward predicting the likelihood of violence. Yet it is a point that is often occluded in large-N analyses. Caution must be exercised, however, since ethnic geography can help predict where violence will take place, but is of little use in telling us when it will burst into flame.

Forms of Violence

We can take our argument - about the importance of ethnosymbolism in explaining cross-sectional variation in violence - further in two ways. First, by specifying the form of violence we expect from given ethnic configurations, and thereby narrowing the scope of our analysis. Codifying ethnic groups as dominant or subaltern (already possible using Buhaug et. al’s 2008 classification), as well as primary and secondary, will enable us to cross-classify group types along with the kind of violence we would expect them to commit. (See table 6)
### Table 6. Ethnic Group Types and Cognate Forms of Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dominant</th>
<th>Contested Dominance</th>
<th>Subaltern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary</strong></td>
<td>Dominant national ethnic groups: <em>Anti-separatist, anti-minority</em></td>
<td>Contending national ethnic groups: <em>Violence directed at the centre</em></td>
<td>Minority national ethnic groups: <em>Separatist, anti-minority (if locally dominant)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary</strong></td>
<td>Ruling, trading: <em>Anti-nationalist (colonial)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trading, immigrant, diaspora: <em>Long distance only</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not all are so easily classified. Settler groups like the Taiwanese, Afrikaners, American White Anglo-Saxon Protestants and Pakistani Mohajirs tend to indigenize, partly to legitimize territorial claims and partly for psychological reasons. (Francis 1976)

On the whole, they should be classified as primary ethnic groups unless they clearly view themselves as having a foreign homeland, as is true of colonial elites and trading minorities. Dominant ethnic violence against minorities can take statist or private form.

Subaltern rebellion could be targeted against the state or against non-state members of a dominant ethnic group (i.e. killing of settlers). Minority rebellion would therefore need to be classified as either anti-state or anti-dominant group. We should not forget that minority groups can be regionally dominant and persecute their local minorities with the same vigour as do state-dominant groups. Finally, there are situations of contested
dominance where a number of groups (i.e. Iraqi Sunni and Shia; Kenyan Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin; Rwandan Tutsi and Hutu) are vying for state power. Four of these groups, the Sunni and Shia of Iraq, Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Acholi of Uganda, were among the most violently rebellious groups in the MAR in 2004-6. They may thus be the most conflict-prone of all.

The Importance of National Awakening

A final means of narrowing cross-sectional uncertainty in models of conflict is to distinguish between primary ethnic groups which desire autonomy, i.e. national ethnic groups, and primary ethnic groups that lack politico-territorial ambitions. We know that 35 of the 110 civil wars of 1945-99 involved ethnic secessionist movements. It is hard to conceive of any actor other than a national ethnic group pursuing violent secession – indeed, all 37 rebellious separatist groups in the 2004-6 MAR fit this description. The 7 non-separatist rebels (i.e. Hutu, Acholi), by contrast, fall neatly into the ‘contested dominance’ type elucidated earlier. Yet we have no basis in the MAR for identifying national and non-national ethnic groups. We would predict that while all secessionist rebels are national ethnic groups, not all national ethnic groups will be secessionist rebels. The key to identifying national ethnic groups is to code for whether a group desires political autonomy. \(^{10}\) We are at an early stage in codifying the properties of the world’s ethnic groups. The MAR 2004-6, for example, has data for 284 ethnic groups out of a potential number which extends, on certain counts, to 6000. \(^{11}\) (Boran 2008: 191) Nonetheless, we are making progress, and future research could be more focused if data
identified national and primary ethnic groups and partitioned ethnic violence along the lines suggested in table 6.

Conclusion

This paper tries to make the case that perennialist, notably ethnosymbolist, accounts are more useful in explaining variation in ethnic heterogeneity between countries, and civil violence across countries and groups. Modernist theories are better suited to explaining temporal changes like the onset and timing of violence. This should come as little surprise since perennialist explanations emphasize path dependency, which has difficulty explaining sudden change. Modernist accounts, by contrast, stress the importance of cultural fluidity, modern breaks with the past and faster-moving politico-economic changes. These explanations tend to have difficulty accounting for durable differences in conflict between countries and groups.

This conclusion is sometimes clouded by the perceived implications of opposing theories, which carry a good deal of normative freight. The perennialist position aligns with a realist outlook, which may come across as pessimistic, appearing to consign fractionalized countries to a future of inevitable strife. If ethnically diverse countries are associated with war, this could divert attention away from addressing politico-economic sources of violence. Some fear it could reinforce the logic of ethno-nationalism. Yet the modernist position, though more optimistic, is implicated in other dangers. As Buhaug et al. (2008) point out, an insufficient sensitivity to the power of ethnic differences can lead to over-optimistic plans for political engineering which may exacerbate conflict. For
instance, a belief in the universal appeal of prosperity, liberty and democracy as a solvent of ethnic, nationalist or religious attachments was an article of faith within some sectors of the American foreign policy establishment. The neoconservative variant of this optimism emphasized regime change, a policy which led to considerable suffering in Iraq. Some suggest that similar qualms about dividing populations along ethnic lines – through either partition or consociationalism - prolonged the violence in the Balkans. (Lieven 1999; McGarry and O'Leary 2006) A middle path may be to accept that cross-sectional constraints exist, but that politico-economic change over time can lead to the progressive overcoming of such difficulties – a reading consistent with the analysis presented here.

References


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4 Perhaps since wealth used to be linked to both higher fertility and higher literacy.

5 We must also be mindful of methodological differences between the Correlates of War (COW) Intrastate War 1816-1997 and the Uppsala-PRIO Intrastate Conflict 1946-2005 Datasets.

6 For PRIO data, the authors found no significance for ethnic factors.

7 The relative wealth or poverty of a group vis a vis the centre – a structural condition - may incline a group to secede, but this is not a sufficient condition for secession. Violent secession also requires precipitants like discrimination in the allocation of government largesse, labour in-migration from other ethnic regions or violent repression by the state. (Horowitz 1985)

Though well beyond the scope of this paper, we might ask whether interstate wars sometimes involve a clash of dominant national ethnic groups, and their associated ethnic antipathies.

The desire for autonomy is not specified in the MAR, though there are questions on whether a group has lost autonomy, presently has autonomy or is actively separatist. Neither is fine-grained enough. National ethnic groups like the Kurds in Turkey have never had their autonomy to lose, many national ethnic groups desire autonomy but have not attained it, whilst other groups desire autonomy but are not separatist because their demands have been met.

Refers to the number of languages, though over 90 percent of the world’s population speaks a mere 100 languages. (Boran 2003: 191)